Invasion by media: Propaganda as a weapon of war

Invasion by media: Propaganda as a weapon ofwar

Philip Jones MA

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Contents

Abstract 4

Introduction 5

(i) Propaganda(ii) Propaganda and Mass (iii) Information Dominance(iv) United States, Propaganda and Media Manipulation

(v) United States and Broadcasting Propaganda

Chapter 1 15

Iraqi Media Pre-Invasion

15

Iraqi Media Post-Invasion

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Chapter 2 24

Reconstructing Iraq’s media -US perspective

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Chapter 3

Al Hurra 29

Conclusion 33

Bibliography 35

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Abstract

The Iraqi media has been going through a state of flux for

generations. Prior to the Ba’thist coup of 1968, Iraq had a

growing and well respected media sector, publishing

newspapers, magazines and books as well as broadcast media.

The media was independent and burgeoning.

Post the Ba’thist coup of 1968, the media came under the

direct control of the state. Rather than continuing its

growth as an independent and objective aspect of the public

sphere, the Iraqi media became an organ of the Ba’thist

regime. During that time journalism in Iraq was stifled,

subjective and a conduit of state propaganda.

By the time of the United States invaded Iraq, the media

sector was under the direct control of Uday Hussein, the son

of Saddam Hussein. Uday used the media to further the causes

of Ba’thism; he further used it as a tool of self

aggrandizement for both him and his father. With summary

executions of journalists, and a dearth of objective news, the

media sector was as dangerous for a journalist as the front

line is to a soldier.

After the United States led invasion in 2003, the Iraqi

media sector exploded with a massive increase of newspapers,

radio and television stations and soap box orators. This is

something that the United States had promised in a new

democratic Iraq; however they did not acknowledge the problems

that would arise from such a rapid opening up of the media.

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The relatively rapid transformation of the Iraqi public

sphere uncovered a wealth of problems that were not envisaged

prior to invasion. Furthermore the United States military did

not fully articulate their intentions vis-à-vis the media,

with many incidents of propaganda dissemination and other

questionable activities.

Has the Iraqi media sector benefitted from the ousting of

Saddam Hussein? Or has it simply slipped back into the same

dominant and controlling mindset of Ba’thism?

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INTRODUCTION

Media manipulation is not a new concept nor is it exclusively

controlled by governments or corporations. Media manipulation

has been used by corporations to raise awareness of products

and services, it has been used by governments to sell

unpalatable actions such as war and it has been used by

interest groups and opposition parties to further their cause.

In the case of war, governments will often engage a public

relations company to frame the rationale in a way that is not

egregious to the population. Where the motivations behind war

are questionable as in Iraq, the PR companies inevitably bear

indirect responsibility for casualties.

The techniques used to manipulate the media are varied,

however the most common approaches that have been used by PR

companies and governments include:

Disinformation dissemination - PR companies releasing storiesto the press without revealing sources or intentions. Thedesired effect is to evoke change in public opinion in supportof war.

Buying editorial space or paying a journalist to supplant anewsroom by publishing stories that support war.

Essentially PR companies attempt to manage media, direct news

content and in particular visual news content. Take the

raising of the US flag in Iwo Jima in 1945; it is an icon and

a memorial to an American victory. Fundamentally it is

forever immortalised in the American psyche as a triumph over

evil.

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During the First Gulf War, the Bush administration

employed the services of PR company, The Rendon Group. John

Rendon, the company’s founder was synonymous with many of the

images broadcast to the world when the US military marched

into Kuwait city. In a speech he delivered at the US Air

Force Academy in 1996 he elaborated to cadets on the power of

PR and how it was used effectively.

“I am not a national security strategist or a militarytactician,” Rendon said. “I am a politician, and a person whouses communication to meet public policy or corporate policyobjectives. In fact, I am an information warrior and aperception manager.” He reminded the Air Force cadets thatwhen victorious troops rolled into Kuwait City at the end ofthe first war in the Persian Gulf, they were greeted byhundreds of Kuwaitis waving small American flags. The scene,flashed around the world on television screens, sent themessage that U.S. Marines were being welcomed in Kuwait asliberating heroes.

“Did you ever stop to wonder,” Rendon asked, “how the peopleof Kuwait City, after being held hostage for seven long andpainful months, were able to get hand-held American, and forthat matter, the flags of other coalition countries?” Hepaused for effect. “Well, you now know the answer. That wasone of my jobs then.”

... Public relations firms often do their work behind thescenes....But his description of himself as a “perceptionmanager” echoes the language of Pentagon planners, who define“perception management” as “actions to convey and (or) denyselected information and indicators to foreign audiences toinfluence their emotions, motives, and objectivereasoning. ... In various ways, perception management combinestruth projection, operations security, cover, and deception,and psyops [psychological operations]” (Miller, Stauber, andRampton 2002).

Propaganda, perception management and psyops all play a

strategically important role in the successful performance of

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a war. To this end the media is an indelible and

indispensible conduit of information that when used correctly

is the most powerful weapon in any armies arsenal. Within

this dissertation I intend to articulate the use of media

manipulation not only as a weapon of war but as an essential

political aide. I will examine the use of media as a conduit

of propaganda, particularly American efforts at broadcasting

in the Middle East, predominantly in Iraq.

The dissertation will give a clear and concise

description of the state of Iraqi media pre 2003 and post

2003. It will pay particular attention to United States

efforts at rebuilding and directing the new fledgling Iraqi

media and the difficulties experienced by journalists during

this process. It will also examine the United States owned

Middle East Broadcasting Network, its satellite channel Al-Hurra

and its historic efforts at evoking change via the mass media.

(i) Propaganda

The origins of propaganda do not lie within state

institutions, armies, political parties or business interests.

Propaganda in fact was the brainchild of the Roman Catholic

Church and was instituted under the auspices of Pope Gregory

XIII. The Congregatio di Propaganda Fide, was “charged with

spreading Catholicism and regulating ecclesiastical affairs in

heretic, schismatic or heathen lands” (Lambert, 1938:07). In

its purest sense, propaganda simply means to promote and

disseminate ideas.

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Soon the meaning of propaganda would spread beyond the

exclusivity of ecclesiastical use and began to be “applied to

any organisation set up for the purposes of spreading a

doctrine” (Lambert, 1938:08). Although its beginnings can be

attributed to religion, propaganda soon became a tool of

armies and states. From Cromwell to Napoleon the spreading of

propaganda was as important to the war effort as artillery and

gun powder.  As early as 1928, Edward Bernays recognized

propaganda as a modern instrument to be utilized to produce

productive ends and “help bring order out of chaos” (Bernays

1928)

Over the course of these wars and the periods of quiet in

between, “propaganda became associated with stress and

turmoil, in which violent controversy over doctrine

accompanied the use of force” (Lambert, 1938:09). Therefore

it is very prevalent during wars and revolutions and may take

many forms and functions. Propaganda has been described as

lies, manipulation, psychological warfare and mind control to

name a few examples.

As an intensely interesting and studied form of

persuasion, propaganda has attracted many scholars to define

exactly what it means. Sproule defines propaganda thus;Propaganda represents the work of large organisations orgroups to win over the public for special interests through amassive orchestration of attractive conclusions packaged toconceal both their persuasive purpose and lack of soundsupporting reasons (1994:08).

Whether it is governments, corporations or interest

groups, propaganda is used to persuade and convince the public

of the merits of a particular action. This may be media

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manipulation by government to elicit public support for

particularly unpalatable actions such as war; the highlighting

of human rights abuses in the case of interest groups; or a

corporation espousing a positive public image in order to

maintain profits and client base.

(ii) Propaganda and the Mass Media

The most successful distributor of propaganda is the mass

media, with newspapers, television, cinema, social networking

and the power of the internet; it has become an omnipotent

presence in contemporary society. As early as 1928, Edward

Bernays recognized propaganda as a modern instrument to be

utilized to produce productive ends and “help bring order out

of chaos” (Bernays 1928).

The mass media serve as a system for communicating messagesand symbols to the general populace. It is their function toamuse, entertain and inform, and to inculcate individuals withthe values, beliefs and codes of behaviour that will integratethem into the institutional structures of the larger society.In a world of concentrated wealth and major conflicts of classinterest, to fulfil this role requires systematic propaganda(Herman and Chomsky, 1994:1)

As Herman and Chomsky have said, the mass media is a tool

of inculcation. In the past individuals developed moral

values from the teachings and doctrines of institutions such

as churches, synagogues and mosques. With greater access to

various forms of information, individuals are more susceptible

to a host of differing opinions, beliefs and attitudes. As

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such the mass media has the ability to mould and influence an

individual’s beliefs and core values. This is strategically

important to the dominant elite who, with the use of

television, radio and print media, maintain their hegemonic

position in society by ensuring the continuation of a class

system.

Herman and Chomsky point out that this is achieved

through monopolistic control of the media in the hands of a

bureaucracy, supplemented by state censorship. They suggest

that this ‘makes it clear that the media serve the ends of a

dominant elite’ (1994:1). This has been seen in places such

as Rhodesia and Apartheid South Africa, North Korea and in

many Latin American countries. In almost each case the media

was/is almost entirely controlled by the government, subject

to censorship and generally devoid of any balance or

rationality.

In systems where the media is privately owned, Chomsky

and Herman suggest that the likelihood that propaganda will be

disseminated is slim. This is due to the competitive nature

of the media in aggressively seeking its own market dominance.

They are more interested in exposing ‘corporate and

governmental malfeasance’ (1994:1). Essentially, the

propaganda model focuses on wealth and power and the role it

plays in establishing a media organisation in a position of

hegemony. Wealth improves program quality, thus increasing

market share vis-a-vis audience size, which is then converted

into revenue via advertising.

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The news generated by these media organisations is

essential to their modus operandi. As such it must be

gathered and compiled with great precision in order to

influence public opinion. The content of the news, its

language and visual narratives are generally determined by the

type of audience the media organisation is pitching to.The raw material of the news must pass through successivefilters, leaving only the cleansed residue fit to print. Theyfix the premises of discourse and interpretation, and thedefinition of what is newsworthy in the first place, and theyexplain the basis and operations of what amount to propagandacampaigns (Herman & Chomsky 1994:2).

Newsworthiness is something each media organisation

interprets itself. For example, broadsheet newspapers

generally rely on quality journalism, sophisticated writing

and factual information, whereas tabloid newspapers rely on

sensationalism and simple less factual writing. Objectivity

within broadsheet or tabloid media is not dissimilar; the raw

material used to create the story must be scrutinized to

determine is value. Though the journalist may feel she is

being objective, “the constraints are so powerful and built

into the system in such a fundamental way, that alternative

basis of news choices are hardly imaginable” (Herman and

Chomsky 1994:2).

A prime example of this is described by Herman and

Chomsky when they speak of the US claims that Nicaragua was

about to receive a shipment of Soviet MIG jet fighters

(1994:56). The media were so indoctrinated by the White House

spun propaganda that they did not stop to question the bias of

the story or whether the government was manipulating the news

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to suit its own agenda. They did not stop to ask if the

government was spinning a yarn in order to divert attention

from another story.

Using the mass media to supplant factual information in

place of propaganda has been successful for the United States

but has not always run according to plan. In instances where

it has been disastrous the USA has been forced into a

humiliating retreat, with its opponents vindicated by the

uncovering of American interference in the affairs of other

nations. Nonetheless it has not deterred the Whitehouse from

pursuing methods of media manipulation designed to topple

hostile governments such as international broadcasting.

(iii) Information Dominance

Information Dominance plays a key role in the United

States military strategy and Foreign Policy. According to the

Pentagons Joint Vision 2020, Full Spectrum Dominance “implies that

US forces are able to conduct prompt, sustained and

synchronised operations with combinations of forces tailored

to specific situations and with access to and freedom to

operate in all domains – space, sea, land, air and information

(US Gov 2000). Recognised by the US Military as an element of

combat power, it has been recognised as a resilient and

indispensable weapon of war.The US army defines information operations as “the employmentof the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computernetwork operations, psychological operations, militarydeception, and operations security, in concert with specifiedsupporting and related capabilities, to affect or defendinformation and information systems, and to influence decisionmaking (Kamalipour and Snow 2004:8)

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This broadens the remit and traditional meaning of

propaganda to the extent that it guarantees the US right to

Information Dominance. The United States has sufficient

resources and knowledge to stop anything it does not want to

occur. Strategic to US efforts of information dominance

include the amalgamation of propaganda and psychological

operations and the application of information war to military

strategy.Traditional concepts of propaganda involve crafting themessage and distributing it via government media orindependent news media. Current conceptions of informationwar go much further and incorporate the gathering, processingand deployment of information – by way of computers,intelligence and military information systems (command andcontrol) (Kamalipour and Snow 2004:8).

What this means is that the United States military has

the capacity to co-ordinate the creation and dissemination of

information through a series of integrated, intelligent

systems that work efficiently and in unison with each other.

To all intents and purposes, greater integration of

information increases its power as a weapon of war.The key preoccupation for the military is interoperability,where information systems talk to and work with each other.Interoperability is a result of the computer revolution, whichhas led to a so called revolution in military affairs. Nowpropaganda and psychological operations are simply part of alarger information armoury ((Kamalipour and Snow 2004:8).

(iv) United States, Propaganda and Media Manipulation

In contemporary times propaganda became more synonymous

with government ministries and other institutions as a means

of damage limitation. The term used to describe this is

‘spin’. “Spin is often used with reference to the

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manipulation of political information; therefore press

secretaries and public relations officers are referred to as

‘spin doctors’ when they attempt to launder the news” (Kurtz,

1998:75).

The media now plays an intrinsically important and

pivotal role in the governance of nations. Through the

facilitation of dialogue, the media has taken on the role of a

liaison between those who govern and those who are governed.

As such, it is of utmost importance that messages it publishes

are framed and delineated by government press officers/spin

doctors. In a sense the government has turned the media into

a political institution akin to an interest group or a

political party.The contemporary emphasis on political public relations andspin control reflects the intertwining of journalism withpolitics particularly well: statecraft and stagecraft go handin hand. It is important to point out, however, that themedia are no weak-willed tool of the media. They sometimesuse their publications and broadcasts in an active and unifiedfashion to shape political discourse to their own purposes andto pursue policy objectives on their own (Page 1996 in Esser,Carsten and Fan 2001:21).

Viewing this relationship as master and dilettante, the

media and the government often alternated their roles.

Fundamentally, in countries such as the United States, the

media and the government have a symbiotic relationship. The

greatest example of this was in the aftermath of the 9/11

terrorist attacks on the United States. The frenzy and

hysteria that followed was in no small part intensified and

fuelled by the media and government. Patriotic images,

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American flags and speeches by Bush and others provided the

impetus and support to launch a Global War on Terror.The principle reason is the post-September 11 view that mostAmericans believed this new war to involve nearly existentialstakes. Americans polled after 9/11 who were asked whichevent was the more historically significant – the attacks onthe World Trade Centre and Pentagon or the attack on PearlHarbour – chose 9/11 by nearly a three-to-one margin. The9/11 attacks also resonated with long standing fears about thethreat of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, each ofwhich had been identified by eight in ten or more Americansfor a number of years as critically important threats thatneeded to be addressed. 9Larsen 2005:xxii)

As a tool of inculcation the media was harnessed and

surreptitiously directed in terms of its news direction. On

the morning after the attacks, President George W Bush opened

a press conference by saying “The deliberate and deadly

attacks which were carried out yesterday against our country

were more than acts of terror, they were acts of war,” (Entman

2003:415-432). Terms such as evil, war and unite were invoked

repeatedly until the American psyche was framed by emotion,

irrationality and nationalism. Overwhelming support from the

Global War on Terror ensued resulting in the 2001 invasion of

Afghanistan and the co-ordination and planning of the invasion

of Iraq.

Since the 9/11 attacks on the United States, there has

been a gear shift in terms of national security, protection of

borders and the dissemination of propaganda. The United

States championed this by seeking to strengthen its national

security arrangements and legitimize its aggressive ‘War on

Terror’. The attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon

placed American society at the epicentre of terrorism. This

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was highlighted by the media with alacrity, who published

editorials and scathing attacks of Taliban and Saddam Hussein

which served to incite hatred and calls for retribution from

ordinary Americans.

Prior to the United States led invasion of Iraq, the

American Psychological-Operations machine had been attempting

to disseminate information designed to coerce and to inculcate

Iraqi civilians and military personnel. One such incident of

this was reported by Newsweek’s Malinda Liu in 2003. Dr. Muthafar Adhami, a prominent Iraqi academic, was watchingTV at home not long ago when his 14-year-old son Faradsuddenly stopped surfing the Internet and said, "Daddy, comesee this." Adhami had received an unusual e-mail titled"Important Information," transmitted by U.S. psy-opsspecialists. It warned Iraqis to "protect their families" byreporting any information about weapons of mass destruction toU.N. inspectors--or face "grave personal consequences." The e-mail also urged Iraqis to sabotage any WMD they know about--orat least to ignore any orders to use them. (Liu 2003)

This is what Ellul described as the propaganda of

agitation, that seeks to provoke people to rebel or destroy

the established order or government. By subverting beliefs and

customs, the aggressor, in this case the USA, attempts to

reduce the resistance of the Iraqi population prior to

invasion. Realistically very little resistance existed in

Iraq or the United States to a fully fledged ground invasion.

Keeping this resistance at bay would involve the use of media

manipulation and covert propaganda, including international

broadcasting, something the United States had mixed success

and failure in.

(v) United States and Broadcasting Propaganda

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The United States, like many other nations, has

maintained a network of international broadcasting facilities

including satellite television and radio stations, which it

uses to transmit messages via program content to particular

parts of the world. Though these networks are not all owned

by the US Government, their mission is to bring an American

brand of news and entertainment to the rest of the world. The

most famous of United States international broadcasting

efforts are the privately owned CNN and the state owned Al-

Hurra.

Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty were American

operated stations and in terms of international broadcasting

they were unique. Unlike other forms of international

broadcasting, they did not seek to promote American culture or

the American way of life, instead they targeted the very

foundations of communism.The two ‘freedom radios’ however had a much different purpose.They were, to begin with pure Cold War institutions. Theirgoal was not simply to inform their listeners but also tobring about the peaceful demise of the Communist system andthe liberation of what were known as satellite nations(Puddington 2003:ix).

This was to be achieved by supplanting the domestic

Communist radio network with a surrogate that was not under

the control or dictation of the socialist state. Most

importantly the radio stations brought news from the outside

world. America’s position as a superpower in a bi-polar world

gave it the confidence to conceive of such a conceited plan.

The plan was to bring down the entire Communist system through

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a network of radio stations. It was arrogant and provocative,

but for the Americans it was genius.

Men such as General Lucius Clay, Allen Dulles and George

F Keenan were some of America’s most innovative cold war

strategists. Their ingenuity, alacrity and confident

arrogance allowed them to conceive some of the most brilliant

ideas the US has ever seen. They were convinced that the Communist System was susceptibleto an aggressive form of psychological warfare and undeterredby the uniqueness of the project, or by the fact that many maymight regard RFE’s broadcasts as a blatant form ofinterference in the internal affairs of foreign countries(Puddington 2003:x).

Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe were not adverse to

disseminating propaganda if it hastened the demise of the

Communist System. The lengths to which the United States were

prepared to go would unfold during the disastrous Hungarian

Revolution of 1956. In that year the RFE’s Radio Free

Hungary was one of the most popular stations in the country

with over 50 percent of the audience, mostly workers and

peasants (Puddington 2003:95), the most easily influenced.

According to a US embassy note in 1956:“RFE’s popularity among Hungarians is substantial”…..“itscredibility tends to increase as one descends the educationalladder” (Puddington 2003:96).

The failure of the revolution and blatant American

manipulation of public opinion eroded all RFE’s credibility

among its Hungarian listeners. As Moscow re-asserted its

dominant control over Eastern Europe the Americans retreated

in disgrace. In a newspaper interview in 1957, Khrushchev

commented, "support by United States... is rather in the

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nature of the support that the rope gives to a hanged man”

(Simpson 1997:672).

The disastrous outcome of the Hungarian revolution did

not deter the United States from its international

broadcasting efforts. In addition, the supplanting the media,

distorting news and spreading disinformation would all become

intrinsically important weapons in the US military arsenal.

From Hungary to Korea to Vietnam, Cuba, Latin America, Russia

and occupied Europe, international broadcasting, media

diplomacy and manipulation in tandem with covert propaganda

would define America’s tactical assault style and its foreign

policy.

It is during the build up to, during and after the Iraq

war that evidence of the lengths the US was prepared to go to

were revealed. The tightly controlled Iraqi media, used as a

conduit of propaganda and aggrandisement of the Saddam regime,

was set firmly in the crosshairs of the American war effort.

How to capture it and use it to the advantage of the coalition

forces was a challenge that would unfold throughout the course

of the war.

Further reading of this dissertation will reveal the

state of the media in Iraq prior to and post 2003. Of great

interest are the problems, dangers and directives issued by

the Saddam regime and equally those issued by the United

States and interim Iraqi government to the Iraqi media. The

nature in which the Iraqi media developed and the lack of

regulation all contribute to the current flooded nature of the

market. Supplanting the news with western viewpoints becomes

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increasingly difficult as the burgeoning media sector follows

a path of its own volition.

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CHAPTER 1

Iraqi media pre invasion.

To understand the organisation of the Iraqi media during

Ba’thism, it is important to follow the political life of

Saddam Hussein. As a senior figure in Iraqi Ba’thism, Saddam

Hussein was given responsibility for the organisation of Jihaz al

Khas (Special Appuratus) sometime between 1964-66. The

organisation concentrated on security and intelligence

gathering and would prove intrinsically strategic to the

overthrow of President Abdul Rahman Arif.

After the Ba’th Party had seized power in the bloodless

coup of 1968, Saddam Hussein took control of the states

Directorate of General Security expanding the remit of Jihaz al

Khas. He appointed Nadhim Kzar, a prominent Shia Muslim as

head of the organisation. His appointment proved to be ill-

advised, not only was Kzar a sadist who killed and tortured

thousands of Iraqi Communists and Kurds, he also attempted a

coup against President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, taking both the

Minister of the Interior Sa’adiun Gheidan and the Army Chief

of Staff and Minister of Defence General Hamid Shehab hostage.

The plan was to assassinate Bakr as soon as his plane

landed in Baghdad but was abandoned after his flight was

delayed. This forced Kzar and his men to flee with their

hostages to Iran. Their convoy was intercepted en-route and

attacked by Iraqi helicopter gunships leading to his capture,

the death of Sa’adiun Gheidan and injuries sustained to

General Shehab. Kzar was found guilty on July 7 by the Iraqi

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Revolutionary Command Council under Izzat Ibrahim ad-Douri and

executed that same month for his actions (Abrish 2000:103-05).

The internal uprising saw a significant development in

Iraqi-Soviet relations which would involve direct co-operation

between the Iraqi and Russian intelligence apparatus; Saddam Hussein sought a secret agreement with KGB head YuriAndropov late that same year, which led to a closerelationship that included intelligence exchange, Iraqitraining in KGB and GRU schools, a thorough DGS reorganizationunder the advice of the KGB, equipment for surveillance andinterrogation, and Iraqi embassy support of Soviet agents incountries without Soviet relations (al-Khalil 1989:6).

The reorganised Jihaz became known as Da'irat al Mukhabarat al

Amah, General Intelligence Department (GID) in English, also

known as General Intelligence. Its organisation comprised of

31 plus directorates including Secret Service, electronic

surveillance, propaganda and special operations among a

labyrinth of others. These intelligence agencies along with

Ba’th Party organisations and select units of the military

formed Saddam’s security network, permeated every aspect of

Iraqi life ensuring his total control over the state (Al-

Marashi 2002:1).Propaganda employs encirclement on the individual by trying tosurround man by all possible routes, in the realm of feelingsas well as ideas, by playing on his will or his needs throughhis conscious and his unconscious, and by assailing him inboth his private and his public life (Ellul 1973:11).

Iraqi intelligence directorates maintained a pervasive

presence under Saddam Hussein, maintaining personal files on

citizens including birth, marriage and death certificates.

In addition they carried out monitoring of the Ba’th Party as

well as other political parties, youth groups, women’s groups

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and unions. They suppressed opposition from the Kurds and

targeted threatening individuals within Iraq. Essential to

all of this was the maintenance of a large group of informers

who for the most part were made up of ordinary citizens, many

either intimidated into doing so, or for reward.

Outside Iraq the intelligence services played a very

important role in ensuring the survival of the Ba’th Party

regime and in particular Saddam Hussein. Agents were engaged

in espionage, monitoring of Iraqi Embassies and Iraqi citizens

deemed to be opposition members, often resulting in murders.

In addition subversion, terrorist attacks and Black Ops were

carried out against hostile neighbouring regimes such as

Syrian and Iran. Through a network of moles, they sought to

exploit Arab media and other media by spreading

disinformation.

Within Iraq, propaganda and disinformation was easily

spread using all of the state controlled newspapers and

broadcasters. All media sources were under strict direct

supervision from the government with media outside the purview

of the state banned. Throughout its history, there have been

at least 7 newspapers in Ba’thist Iraq, these were, Title Circulation 1999 First

Published

Babil NA 1991Al-Thawra (The Revolution) 250,000

1968Al-Jumhuriya (The Republic) 150,000

1958Al-Iraq 30,000

1976

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The Baghdad Observer (English) 22,0001967

Al-Qadissiya (Sanctity) 20,0001983

Al-Bath NA NA(Rugh 2004:30)

The Ba’th, not least Saddam Hussein, understood the power

the media could wield; as such measures were taken to ensure

that this power was harnessed in favour of the ruling party.

These measures would ensure the continuous flow of propaganda

through recognised conduits allowing the Ba’th to manipulate

public opinion and elicit support. In an act which demonstrated its understanding of press power,the Ba‘th, following its 1968 coup by sequestering Iraq’s twomajor newspapers, Al-Thawra [The Revolution] and Al-Jumhuriyya [TheRepublic]. They also forcibly closed one of the country’s mostrespected professional newspapers, Al-Manar [The Beacon,or TheLighthouse], and executed the head of the Iraqi JournalistsUnion, Aziz Abdel Barakat (Bengio 2004: 110; Daragahi 2003:46, 50).

In respect of all publications, there was very little

diversity on important political issues. Since all reports,

editorials and opinion pieces were required to praise the

leadership, it was impossible to access news that offered

differing or even neutral perspectives. When Saddam Hussein

assumed the office of the presidency in 1979, he transformed

Iraq’s media into an ‘an omnipotent propaganda machine [which]

played the role of the Ba‘th regime’s watchdog, thus

contributing significantly to its survival and longevity’

(Bengio 2004: 109–110). The entire exercise was designed to

weaken the socio-political system thus removing any threat to

the leadership.

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Not only was the media used to channel political

propaganda, it was also used as a tool for the aggrandisement

of Saddam and his heir apparent, his eldest son Uday. To

encourage and ensure this narcissism, he appointed Uday as

head of the Journalists Union, making him responsible for

managing and censoring most of the nation’s media (Bengio

2004: 111; Daragahi 2003: 47; Bengio 1998: 8). Not

surprising, on assuming office, Uday sacked in excess of 1000

journalists for not praising the president with the requisite

enthusiasm (Bengio 2004: 111).

Uday Hussein was a tyrant in his own right, bellicosely

dealing with journalists who did not live up to his impossible

standards. For journalists under his control life became

almost intolerable, living in constant fear that what they

wrote could amount to a self imposed death sentence.

According to the French based International Alliance for

Justice, over 500 journalists and intellectuals were either

disappeared or executed during the reign of the Ba’th (as

cited in: Daragahi 2003: 46).

In terms of television there was very little variety with

only a handful of channels of which, “Iraqi TV” was the main

terrestrial broadcaster. Its programming was emblematic of

Ba’thism with images of Saddam Hussein and Iraq’s military

accompanied by patriotic music. It was also a conduit for

government spun news and propaganda. In 1994 an effort was

made to accommodate the youth of Iraq by launching “Qanaat Al-

Shabaab” or Youth Channell. Its programming including western

films and popular music, though censored of mature content.

26

The content of news in both the print and broadcast media

was blatantly not objective. This type of press behaviour has

been described by William A Rugh in "Arab mass media: Newspapers,

radio, and television in Arab politics" as mobilization press. According

to Rugh the mobilization press has a policy of non-criticism

against the government. It is more common for the newspapers

to highlight issues in relation to more localised, trivial,

bureaucratic issues such as sanitation or the quality of

public services. In these cases however the lower level bureaucrat rather thanthe national leadership is held responsible and the criticismserves a pedagogical purpose for the leadership as well asproviding an outlet for very limited debate. (Rugh 2004:30).

This petty airing of citizen views in a controlled and

organised public sphere was the only form of political

discourse allowed in the press. The content of discussion in

the Iraqi public sphere was severely limited and retarded by

the ban on satellite dishes, putting ordinary Iraqis into

state imposed information solitary confinement. Some members

of the elite were either allowed satellite dishes or flouted

the ban giving them access to world news, though this

information was seldom shared within the Iraqi zeitgeist.Saddam's background in the security apparatus and in thepropaganda business, coupled with his slow rise to thepresidency, taught him how to thrive in such a weak socio-political system - how to cope with enemies, whether real orimagined, and develop various mechanisms of control (Bengio2000:95).

In spite of all this, there was growing momentum among

the Kurdish minority in Iraq in terms of information

dissemination and critical discourse. Following the Gulf War

27

in 1991, Kurdish Iraq gained autonomous status from Baghdad.

They used this autonomy to establish an array of political

organisations, which became conduits of information through

newly established partisan print and broadcast media. (Al-Bab

2003, BBC News 2002, RadioNetherland 2003). Apart from the

Kurdish enclave in the north, the organized opposition has no

significant bases in Iraq and lacks unity, credibility,

support, and any positive sense of purpose (Bengio 2000:94).

In Iran, exiled Shi’ite Muslims from the Supreme Council

for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) had established

radio stations to broadcast into Iraq in an attempt to

manipulate the Iraqi mediascape. The broadcasts called for an

Islamic revolution and the overthrow of the secular Ba’thist

regime in favour of an Islamic state similar to Iran.

(RadioNetherland 2003). Efforts were also made at

infiltrating the Iraqi media by other regional and western

powers, not least the United States, the United Kingdom and

the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Foreign infiltration used significant amounts of Psy Ops

in an attempt to destabilise and usurp the legitimacy of the

Ba’th party whereby an intervention could be justified.

Methods used included the funding and establishment of

opposition movements and political parties as well as a

handful of media outlets (Myers 1999; Sussman 2005). Parties

such as The Iraqi National Accord were facilitated by the KSA

and UK, in setting up a series of popular radio stations that

broadcasted messages across Iraq calling for the overthrow of

Saddam Hussein.

28

The US CIA sponsored efforts included the funding of The

Iraqi National Congress to the tune of US$6 million to create

a media empire which included a television station Hurriya

(BBC News 2002). According to Bengio, the reliance on

opposition groups and media to affect regime change in Iraq

was a mistake in that they could hold a monopoly on

manipulation. …………..the Americans made the mistake of relying on the Iraqiopposition to destabilize Saddam's regime. If they did sobecause they truly believed that the opposition could get ridof Saddam, they grossly miscalculated. Saddam's bickeringfoes’ a mélange of squabbling Iraqi Kurds, Shiite groups bothsecular and fundamentalist, communists, and hacks’ are badlyfragmented and deeply vulnerable to manipulation (2000:94).

During the Invasion of Iraq in 2003, these US, British and

regionally sponsored opposition groups and media outlets were

used in an attempt to win over Iraqi ‘hearts and minds.’ The

fragmented nature of Iraqi opposition would remain a burden to

its success.

Iraqi media post invasion

The impossibly restrictive organisation of the Iraqi

media had turned it into little more than a propaganda

apparatus for the Saddam Hussein regime. The US led invasion

of Iraq transformed the mediascape into an unrecognisable

mutation of Hussein era propagandists and post-invasion

journalists. It quickly mushroomed into one of the most

diverse, unrestricted, and complex media environments on earth

(Zanger 2005: 106) with over 7000 former journalists of the

Iraqi Ministry of Information staffing most of the new

29

publications. In addition a number of expatriates and foreign

experts had come to Iraq to build the fledgling media sector.

The opening of the unrestricted nature of the newly

establish Iraqi media sector encouraged anybody with access to

capital to publish an opinion. By the end of may 2003 100

news publications and a handful of new broadcast outlets had

become available, while more were launched concurrently in

Basra, Kirkuk and Mosul (Daragahi 2003: 46). This increased

rapidly with the Iraqi city of Najaf publishing 30 newspapers

in a city of 300,000 people. In addition a plethora of Iraqi

owned television and radio stations continued to grow at a

rapid rate in the nascent democracy.

The Iraqi public consumed the newly undoctored news with

fervour even spending upwards of US$200 on newly imported

satellite dishes, enthusiastically tuning into more than 300

regional satellite channels and a growing number of indigenous

satellite stations (Cochrane 2006; Oppel Jr. 2003; Price 2003;

Baltic Media Center 2003). It would seem that the Iraqi

media-scape had risen from the ashes like a Phoenix ready to

serve the people with gusto. The reality of this new found

press liberalisation would unfold during the interregnum

between invasion and democracy.

Print and broadcast media would play an intrinsically

important role in the 2003 invasion, as a mechanism for

winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the Iraqi populous. The

United States were very much experienced in this regard from

its cold war efforts at international broadcasting. The day

after the successful US led capture of Baghdad, the United

30

States began broadcasting to the Iraqi public via a command

solo plane. The television station Nawah A Hurrieh broadcast

personalized messages from US President Bush and British Prime

Minister Tony Blair (Feuilherade 2003).

The establishment of the Coalition Provisional Authority

(CPA), which was tasked with running the country during its

period of transition, quickly set about establishing as many

media outlets as it could with the single objective of

encouraging support and acceptance for US Foreign Policy. A

series of Government studies stressed the importance of

creating a ‘Rapid Reaction Media Team’ (The National Security

Archive 2007) and of using media to encourage public support

for the war (Carpentier 2006; Patrick and Thrall 2007).

Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC),

was contracted to establish major media outlets in Iraq. With

little media experience, SAIC established the Iraqi Media

Network;The Iraqi Media Network focused primarily on rebuilding Iraq’stelevision and radio broadcasting systems, which haddeteriorated significantly during Saddam Hussein’s reign orhad been destroyed in some instances during the invasion orhad even been vandalized or looted in the aftermath (Rousu2010:2).

Its first effort was to fund a new Iraqi newspaper called Al-

Sabah, launching on May 17 2003. In a period of 2-3 months the

paper was put under the control of the Coalition Provisional

Authority who promptly exercised its authority over the Iraqi

media. The paper was a not a success in that it failed to

become anything more than a competitor to two dozen

31

publications. It was also widely recognised as a mouthpiece

for the coalition forces.

In an attempt to change this, SAIC was dropped in favour

of the Harris Corporation who sought to bolster the IMN. In

collusion with the CPA, the Harris Corporation set about

achieving hegemony through a series of orders. Key to this

was Order 14 which was enacted at the first signs of criticism

of the ruling elite.‘Order Number 14: Prohibited Media Activity’, issued in June2003 by Lewis Paul Bremer III, head of the CPA. Instead ofproviding a framework for renewing a lively public sphere,this document rendered illegal any organ which ‘incitesviolence . . . incites civil disorder . . . incites violenceagainst Coalition Forces or CPA personnel. . . advocatesalterations to Iraq’s borders’, or ‘advocates the return ofthe Iraqi Ba‘th Party’ (Bremer 2003: 1–2).

In addition Order Number 66 declared that IMN was to become

the public service broadcaster for Iraq further strengthening

its aspirations of hegemony. Both orders aggressively pursued

these aspirations with intimidation and censorship.The penalties for breaking these prohibitions were severe andincluded arrest, detention and prosecution with a possibleprison sentence of up to one year, while in the case of‘emergencies’, Coalition Forces were permitted to ‘take directaction to prevent or defeat the threat’ (Bremer 2003: 2)

Although the United States was promoting the principle of

freedom of speech and press, in principle only pro-American

news was acceptable. Journalists and editors faced almost the

same levels of control and intimidation under the CPA as they

had under the Saddam regime. The importance of disseminating

pro-American news was paramount in terms of the war effort.

32

Strategic to this was a process of news sanitisation through

media management.

Media management deemed that the principle of objectivity

had to be suppressed in favour of a pro-US bias. “The American

Broadcasters are pursuing a classic propagandistic programming

concept in the Middle East, and making no attempt to achieve

critical balance” (Hafez 2007: 120). To be successful in

achieving its objectives the United States had to maintain

hegemony over the Iraqi media or risk being sidelined by Saudi

Arabia and Iran who had already established a foothold in the

new Iraqi press.Although the extent to which Iran and Saudi Arabia may beinvolved in direct editorial manipulation of these outletsremains undetermined, their concerted interference in thepost-2003 Iraqi mediascape indicates the important role theyascribe to media as an international propaganda tool. (Isakahn2009:13-14)

During the initial few days of the invasion the American

military took control of two independent Iraqi media outlets

including Mosul TV and Najaf TV. Major General David H. Petraeus

considered placing an army officer and a translator inside the

station in order to censor content that he perceived would

potentially inflame ethno-sectarian passions (Pincus 2003).

The establishment of Al-Iraqiya aimed to divert attention from

ethno-sectarian passions and attempted to present itself as a

respectable news network such as the BBC or PBS. Iraqis

scornfully rejected the network claiming it to be a propaganda

tool of the United States (Badrakhan 2006:472).

In the months following the enacting of order number 14,

a number of independent Iraqi newspapers and publications were

33

forcibly closed. These included the independent Shi’a

newspaper, Al-Mustaqilla and the arrest of its editor Dhari Al-

Duleimi. Outraged by the closure of Al-Mustaqilla, and his arrest

Al-Duleimi said ‘If this is American or world democracy we

reject it. Democracy means dialogue and exchange of views. Not

attacking it

in this way’ (Al-Duleimi as cited in: Brahimi 2003).

Additionally Ashtar Ali Yasseri of the satirical Habezbooz

stated ‘How can they say we have a democracy? That’s not

democracy. It sounds like the same old thing’ (Yasseri as

cited in: Hama-Saeed 2007).

The American CPA and IMN were engaged in Orwellian

doublespeak. On one hand they were encouraging the growth of

an independent media that would help in building a new Iraqi

state, with political discourse and pluralism. On the other

hand they were closing television stations, newspapers and

radio stations that dared to hold a critical approach to the

United States.

In reality the US attempted to defeat factionalism by

ignoring the presence and importance of ethno-religious

groups, cultural values and beliefs. In true US fashion, they

were attempting to westernise the Iraqi people as the Shah had

tried to do in Iran prior to the Islamic revolution. The CPA

continued to close publications such as Al-Hawza, a newspaper

published by Moqtada Al-Sadr, for bearing headlines such as,

‘America Hates Islam and Muslims’; its closure prompted

thousands of protestors to gather at the paper’s offices in

central Baghdad (Rosen 2004; Gettleman 2004;Al-Sheikh 2004).

34

Even after the election of a new Iraqi government the

United States continued to use clandestine means to insert

stories in the Iraqi press. Methods used by the United

States including paying US$50-200+ to newspapers to publish

stories that would portray the coalition forces in a more

positive light (Mazzetti & Daragahi 2005). In 2005 the Los

Angeles Times published a story detailing the lengths the US has

gone to, to disseminate propaganda.The militaries efforts to disseminate propaganda in the Iraqimedia is taking place even as US officials are pledging topromote democratic principles, political transparency andfreedom of speech in a country emerging from decades ofdictatorship and corruption. (Mazzetti & Daragahi 2005)

The report sparked a backlash among the senior ranks at the

Pentagon who believed that US subversion of the media could

destroy any ground the US gained in winning Iraqi ‘hearts and

minds’. In reaction a senior Pentagon official stated.“Here we are trying to create the principles of democracy inIraq. Every speech we give in that country is about democracyand we’re breaking all the first principles of democracy whenwe are doing it” (Mazzetti & Daragahi 2005).

In doing so the United States had once again shown its

complete contempt for truly independent news free of

interference and propaganda. This attempt to foster a more

positive image of US Foreign Policy simply served to increase

apathy towards the occupation forces.

35

CHAPTER 2

Reconstructing Iraq’s media – US perspective

Ross Howard, Director of the Institute for Media Policy and

Civil Society (IMPACS), argues that the media are an

imperative component for ‘peace-building’ because: At its best, [the media] is the safeguard of democraticgovernance. At its best means accurate and balanced reportingwhich fairly represents a diversity of views sufficient forthe public to make well-informed choices. Reliable and diversemedia that can express themselves freely provide early warningof potential outbreaks of conflict. They serve as watchdogsover leaders and officials and hold them accountable. Theymonitor human rights. Their presence is essential to thefunctioning of other civil society actors. In less optimalenvironments, the media can still foster stability byproviding essential information about humanitarian initiatives(Howard 2002).

The contrast between the opinions of Ross Howard and the

US in Iraq is astounding. Here Howard explains the importance

of accurate and balanced reporting which acts as a watchdog

and holds officials to account. The new Iraqi Fourth Estate

was being embraced with gusto from experienced and new

emerging inexperienced journalists determined to make their

name stand proud among the masses. The United States, the

CPA, the UK and the incoming Iraqi government had decided on

the direction the fledgling media would travel and who it

would serve.

While the burgeoning new media sector was enjoying a

brief period of unrestricted freedom, the United States and

coalition forces moved to replace the older propagandist Iraqi

Ministry of Information with a respectable media network. The

initial US/Coalition investment was handled by SAIC and later

36

the Harris Corporation, who were contracted to build a media

network. Iraqi Media Networks was established as an umbrella

group for its newspaper al-Sabah and its television station al-

Iraqiya. This initial investment in Iraqi media would allow the

coalition forces to disseminate propaganda and information

vital to the war effort, while creating a new national

broadcaster.

The British and the Americans had differing opinions of

what the role of a public broadcaster should be, leading to

disagreements. Simon Haselock explains the problem.In the US the notion of public broadcasting is synonymous withstate and state broadcasting is synonymous with the sorts ofthings which used to happen in these centralist regimes. It isextremely difficult to get people to understand that whatpublic broadcasting gives you is the ability to require abroadcaster not to be controlled but to deliver certainservices and have the funding necessary to be able to do it(Allen and Stremlau 2005:05).

Essentially the new network would become a conduit for

American spun propaganda, repugnant to the ideals and

principles of respected public broadcasting, objectivity and

fairness.

Though al-Iraqiya and al-Sabah are now successful, they did not

always have the support of the population. In particular al-

Sabah was treated with the same contempt as Saddam era

newspapers. In his study of Iraqi media Rousu describes why:Al-Sabah is currently one of the most widely read and successfulnewspapers in Iraq, but it has had to overcome a series ofhurdles to improve its reputation, which suffered fromallegations that it was a propaganda tool. From its birth, agreat number of Iraqis considered Al-Sabah to be the mouthpieceof the United States and the Coalition forces (2010).

37

For ordinary Iraqis readers, al-Sabah represented an occupation

force, who had invaded their country to topple their leader,

leading to widespread insurgency, banditry and sectarian

killings. Additionally the newspaper refused to print stories

relating to the Coalition forces that would have painted them

in a negative light. Unlike the BBC during WWII, allied

casualties were not reported by al-Sabah, leading to mistrust.

When the interim Iraqi government took control of the

paper in 2004, it experienced a surge in popularity and

respect; this was however marred by the fact that some still

regarded it as a US mouthpiece. In particular insurgents

targeted the newspaper for these reasons. Within a three-month

period in 2006 alone, two suicide bombers attacked Al-

Sabah’s headquarters, killing and wounding several employees

(Von Zeibauer, NY Times 2006).

In broadcast media, al-Sabah was joined by its sister

outlet al-Iraqiya. Under the auspices of the IMN the station

launched three channels Iraqiya TV, Iraqiya TV2 and Iraqiya Sports. The

venture which was launched under the guidance of SAIC, was

supposed to mirror more mainstream broadcasters but was

received with hostility from Iraqis:From the beginning Al-Iraqiya struggled to maintain credibilitywith Iraqis because it too was seen as a propaganda tool and amouthpiece for Coalition forces. In fact, many Iraqis havescornfully referred to it as ‘America Television’ (Badrakhan,2006:472)

Even after an initial improvement in ratings after its

handover to the Iraqi government, the station was still

receiving visceral critiques from Iraqis. Widespread

38

accusations of the US buying editorial space to run positive

stories caused significant damage. Most strikingly,

journalists from al-Iraqiya have suffered more fatalities than any

other television station in Iraq, including foreign channels

such as Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya (Cochrane, 2006).

In spite of all its negative press and apathy from the

Iraqi public, Al-Iraqiya continued to attract new viewers. This

was attributable to ease of access, as Iraqi viewers did not

need to purchase an expensive satellite dish in order to tune

in. One study found that 93% of Iraqis have access to al-

Iraqiya, which is significantly more than for any other news

channel (Cochrane, 2006). This trend is simply over-turned by

purchasing a satellite dish, invariably leading to a decline

in viewership for al-Iraqiya in favour of Arabic news sources

such as Al-Jazeera, Al-Aribiya and other religious networks such as Al-

Manar.

Given the flooded nature of the Iraqi media-scape the

United States needed to be a pervasive, albeit camouflaged

force in as many Iraqi media outlets as possible. This could

not be achieved without using crude yet clandestine means such

as bribes, infiltrating key newspapers, the dissemination of

false facts and rumours spinning, otherwise known as ‘covert

propaganda’. According to Zanger, ‘‘nearly all Iraqi

newspapers trade in street rumour, conspiracy theories, and

endless editorial comments, often based not on fact but

biases, misconceptions and wild innuendo’’ (2005:107).

Press Manipulation & Public Diplomacy

39

United States efforts at manipulating the Iraqi media

were strategic and designed to serve the interests of the

invading force. In any conflict the United States have

engaged in there is an important emphasis on encouraging

support from the country’s population. In this regard Public

Diplomacy plays an important role in improving the local

perceptions of the US through projects, charity, house

building and not least the media to channel this information.

Though many examples of US Public Diplomacy constitute

material or information propaganda, it is important to be

cognisant of the role the media plays in distributing the

information to the population. In Iraq it became increasingly

important for the US to supplant the negative media without

arousing suspicion. The use of this form of

information/propaganda dissemination became synonymous with

the Bush administration in an attempt to advance the

objectives of the campaign in Iraq, at home and abroad:The Bush administration has come under criticism fordistributing video and news stories….without identifying thefederal government as their source and for paying Americanjournalists to promote administration policies (Mazzetti andDaragahi. 2005).

The US Military hierarchy were cognisant that civilians

were best suited at communicating messages to a foreign

audience. Aaron Snipe, deputy spokesman for the US Embassy in

Baghdad explains why this is so important in fostering

relationships with Iraqis."the [military] uniform is a barrier, it communicates amessage that is a barrier to genuine dialogue. The militaryhas a rank structure that can be very intimidating. A civilian

40

face is important because it can communicate things that amilitary face can't." (Duggan 2012:53-78).

The belief is that the image of the US Military is tainted in

terms of what credibility its announcements would have amongst

the Iraqi people. With this in mind a more accepted non-

military conduit was needed to disseminate information

essential to the US objectives.

Ambassador Schmierer's more philosophical views on why public

diplomacy should be conducted by civilian professionals are

worth quoting at length: Public diplomacy efforts ultimately are intended to promotegreater understanding of the US and the American people on thepart of those in the foreign country where the efforts areundertaken. The underlying assumption — which has provencorrect in my experience over the past 30 years — is thatbetter understanding of our country and its people improvesthe views and attitudes of foreigners towards the US andAmericans. This goal, and the efforts that need to beundertaken to pursue this goal, do not have a militarydimension, and thus should be in the hands of civilians(Duggan 2012:53-78).

Major Christopher Ophardt (Army Public Affairs Officer)

spoke of the short term mindset of the military’s public

diplomacy and how this affected its initial success. In a

recent interview he noted that, "the military's mind-set was

'what do we need to do to successfully get out of here?'"

(Duggan 2012:65).

This mindset let to some disastrous broadcasts about

anti-terrorism which were blatantly obvious to have come from

the coalition forces and were counterproductive. Returning to

the issue of buying editorial space in newspapers, the US

military contracted the Lincoln Group to carry out the secret

41

transactions. Adopting the guise of a freelance reporter or

an advertising executive, the Lincoln Group were supplanting

the negative Iraqi press with stories and reports favourable

to the US. According to Mark Mazzetti and Borzou Daragahi of

the Times. "…many of the articles [were] presented in the Iraqi press asunbiased news accounts written and reported by independentjournalists. The stories trumpet[ed] the work of U.S. andIraqi troops, denounce[d] insurgents and tout[ed] U.S.-ledefforts to rebuild the country." (2005)

The revelations in the Los Angeles Times highlighted the

extent to which the US military were infiltrating the Iraqi

media. It also vindicated the calls from many Iraqis that the

US/Coalition forces were manipulating the media in a bid to

influence public opinion. US attempts at ‘Agenda Setting’

needed to be buttressed by an open source rather than through

clandestine means. As such the US set about developing a

media outlet at home.

42

CHAPTER 3

Al-Hurra

As realised from the creation of IMN, the most effective

way of reaching the Iraqi people was through the medium of

television. Television was a media outlet that almost every

Iraqi household had and through sometimes grainy images,

opinions were formed. This was something that was realised

early on by many political and religious groups in Iraq who

sought to exploit the power of the medium of television in

pursuit of their own objectives.

Norman Pattiz, an American media mogul and member of the

Broadcasting Board of Governors, felt that the United States

was suffering from bad press. Coverage of the war in Iraq,

Afghanistan and the ongoing Israel/Palestinian conflict by Al

Jazeera and Al Arabiya, was creating a corrosive image of the United

States in the Middle East, rather than promoting it as a

liberator. Pattiz knew that the United States had to have its

own news network broadcasting in Iraq just as it had done in

Eastern Europe during the Cold War.

The plan to launch a news network under the auspices of

the Americas Middle East Broadcasting Network (MBN) was put to

the United States Congress. Funding was approved to the tune

of US$62 million to establish a network and broadcast into

Iraq. From a formerly derelict television station in

Springfield VA, Al Hurra was launched on February 14th 2004,

broadcasting commercial free 24 hours a day. Its programming

43

is indicative of American norms and values including women’s

rights, something unparalleled in the Middle East. It is an American mass media project through which the United States is telling the region that Alhurra is the ideal exampleof what media should be […] it is reiterating that the Arab media are not professional and impartial; starting from the name chosen for the channel, The Free Channel (Alhurra). It isa symbol of twisting the truth and Americanizing the Arab minds and souls (Aldawood 2004:82 in Alhammouri 2013:35).

Of its programming a number of shows are broadcast live

from its bureaus in Beirut, Cairo, Baghdad, Dubai, Jerusalem

and Washington. One of these programmes is “Al Youm” which is

180 minutes in duration and broadcast from five different

countries simultaneously. It focuses on Middle Eastern issues

as well as, social, cultural and sports related issues. Other

programmes include, “Hunna” which is hosted by influential

Arab women as well as magazine shows, financial and sports

related.According to the official Website Alhurra.com, the channel’sobjective is to “provide accurate and relevant news to peopleof the Middle East, the United States of America and theworld; enhancing values of democracy and debate throughhosting a number of discussion programmes that examinespolitical and social issues appealing to the audience in theMiddle East” (Alhammouri 2013:35)

In the beginning Al-Hurra found it difficult to establish a

foothold in the already saturated market. The Middle East

market was dominated by the more established Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya

and a myriad of stations in excess of 550. As the station

established itself its viewership began to slowly increase.

In surveys viewership had grown by 28% between 2004-2008

increasing its audience to 25 million approximately (Whitlock

44

2008) with viewership stagnating at 29 million by 2011.

Eventually Al-Hurra became more popular than other western

stations such as CNN Arabic, BBC Arabic and France 24.

Al-Hurra’s increased popularity suggested that the United

States had made a good decision rather than relying on press

manipulation and ‘covert propaganda’. This growing respect

was felt in Egypt during the Arab Spring, when over 25 percent

of Egyptians turned into Al-hurra, 3 percent more than Al-

Jazeera's 22 percent at the same period (BBG 2011).

Disappointingly overall viewership amongst citizens of

Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE remained

low at 2 percent (Maryland/Zogby 2009).

Criticisms

In spite of its success as trumpeted by the BBG, Al Hurra

has come under considerable criticism from commentators in the

US and internationally. The station has been accused of being

an overt form of propaganda designed to delegitimize

insurgency and sanitize US actions in Iraq. In an op-ed in

the Los Angeles Times, Chambers and Anatol wrote that “the station

is rightly regarded by most Arabs as a mouthpiece for the Bush

administration” (2006). Mamoun Fandy suggests that Al-Hurra is

viewed by many people as “government spin from a government

they do not fully trust to begin with” (2007:111).

The fact that Al-Hurra has failed to carve out a

substantial position in the overall Arab media market outside

of Iraq is due to the content of its programming and lack of

appreciation for the savvy nature of the Arab media consumer.

45

The gap between Arab audiences’ high expectation of Alhurra asan American style channel with the standards of NBC and CNN,and what they received, low-quality reporting with aconservative Lebanese slant, undermined the station’scredibility as a serious news outfit (Fandy 2007:108).

This is attributed to what can be described as arrogant

ignorance of management understanding of the Arab media market

on behalf of the United States.Understanding audiences, its sensitivities andvulnerabilities, is a crucial step in building an effectivepublic diplomacy channel between east and west; it could bevery powerful tool. That step was left out in the case ofAlhurra […] in a complex, fragile environment like the MiddleEast, public diplomacy voices should be chosen with greatcaution. As they stand now, Alhurra and Radio Sawa areembarrassments to the United States (Fandy 2007:116- 117).

According to Chambers and Anatol, the station is modelled

on a Cold War concept of the US facing a hostile totalitarian

domination and media rigidity. With over 550 satellite

stations for Arabs to choose from, the circumstances are

incongruous with the concept;The situation in the Arab world is utterly different. Arabsmay be oppressed by their own governments, but with theexception of the Palestinians and some Iraqis, they are notseeking liberation from alien domination. And their media arenow genuinely diverse. There are more than 200 competingsatellite television stations. The ones with serious newsservices do show deference to their government sponsors -- butthen, these Arab governments themselves have very differentcultures, attitudes and policies (2006).

Among critics, claims that Al-Hurra was merely a mouthpiece

of the Bush administration and an extension of US Foreign

Policy resonated loudly. These claims were substantiated in

2006 when the station’s news director, Mouafac Harb resigned,

stating that there was more of an interest in appeasing

46

Washington than the Arab audiences by promoting U.S. Foreign

Policy (Whitlock 2008). His statement gave credibility to the

assertion that al-hurra was a mouthpiece for the Bush

administration.

This claim would lead one to believe that the station was

overtly pro-American and would be viewed as such by

commentators in the United States. Joel Mowbry, a prominent

American right wing journalist vociferously expressed his

disdain for al-hurra accusing it of harbouring an anti-American

bias and being a “platform for terrorists”. The latter claims

were in response to Al-Hurra interviews with Hezbollah leader

Hassan Nasrallah and Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh. He also

criticised Al-Hurra facilitation of a discussion accusing Israel

of planning to destroy the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.

Mowbry’s accusations played on the energies of a

hysterical America, whom he convinced that al hurra was indulging

Arab audiences rather than encouraging pro-US perspectives.

The furore placed Larry Register, the station’s news director

under intense pressure. Mowbry believed that the station was

too much like Al Jazeera. Ironically Registers appointment as news

director was to compete with Al-Jazeera and increase its

ratings. Mowbry’s attacks eventually forced Register to

resign.

Al-Hurra, conduit of propaganda or Legitimate News Outlet

The launching of Al-Hurra was a calculated strategy with

key objectives. From a public diplomacy point of view, Al-Hurra

is used to portray the United States in a positive light.

47

This is done through news reports that praise the good work of

the US Military or US policy in terms of Iraq.According to Aldawood (2004) the channel is not aiming atbeautifying the acts and plans of America towards the Arabregion; it is aiming clearly at “brainwashing” some basicprinciples in the minds of Arabs and Muslims. (Abdul AzizAldawood (2004) in Alhammouri 2013:36)

The station also uses language neutrality in its news

reports which has served to antagonise many Arabs. When

talking about certain military actions, terms such as

“martyr”, “occupation forces”, or “resistance forces” are

replaced with terms like armed group, “US”, “UK” or coalition

forces (Inskeep 2004). The cleverly written news reports are

design to increase America’s popularity among Arabs, in

particular younger more impressionable ones.

The station has been accused of being an extension of US

Foreign Policy. Its news is framed in accordance with current

foreign policy as an editorial principle and it is done with

an obvious bias.….. the news on Alhurra refers to Palestine as the PalestinianTerritory and to Israel as the Jewish Country; and the acts ofresistance are referred to as acts of violence or terroristattacks at some points. These terms used heavily in a mediaoutlet such as Alhurra is tuning the Arab minds intoforgetting about their rights and treating the enemy andoccupier as a friend and cohabitant (Aldawood 2004:82).

It must be remembered that Al-Hurra is a form of

international broadcasting. From its studios in Springfield,

VA it broadcasts into the Middle East, news from an American

perspective designed to influence and shape the opinions of

its viewers. This is of course propaganda or ‘soft power’ and

the purpose of US international broadcasting. Without the

48

dissemination of propaganda there is no point to the news

network, it has to be subjective in order to change public

perceptions of the USA.

49

CONCLUSION

Herman and Chomsky (1994) established that the mass media

is a tool of inculcation; Iraq is an excellent example of this

in practice. This is only achieved through what they describe

as monopolistic control of the media in the hands of the

bureaucracy. As I have already discussed, post-Saddam era

media restrictions serve as a serious impediment to the the

fledgling Iraqi zeitgeist. Censorship, banning, judicial

closure, restrictions of press and inexperience journalists

continue to retard the growth of an indigenous Iraqi media

sector indicative of cultural norms and values that serves the

people as a whole.

In Iraq, the purpose of state controlled media is to

serve the interests of government and its supporters. Just as

in any capitalist society, the media can be funded by and

supportive of business interests and financiers. This ‘makes

it clear that the media serve the ends of the dominant elite’

(Herman and Chomsky 1994:1). In contrast to what they

suggest about privately owned media rarely disseminating

propaganda, in Iraq where many religious, political and

interest groups use the media to further their own cause,

propaganda has become endemic. In addition extra-state

broadcasts from Iran, Saudi Arabia, Hezbollah and the United

States serve to inculcate the populous and often incite

sectarian violence.

Propaganda in Iraq is pervasive and ever present. It

comes from government, the United States, political groups,

religious groups and extra-state actors to the extent where

50

man is virtually surrounded. Ellul explained the effect this

level of propaganda has on man.Propaganda employs encirclement on the individual by trying tosurround man by all possible routes, in the realm of feelingsas well as ideas, by playing on his will or his needs throughhis conscious and his unconscious, and by assailing him inboth his private and his public life (Ellul 1973:11).

Post-Saddam Iraq has been transformed, attributable in no

small part to the United States and extra-state actors. From

a small, dilapidated but potent government controlled

propaganda machine, the media sector has metamorphosed into a

mutation of government controlled spin, political rhetoric,

religious dogma and external agitation.

The question is whether or not the Iraqi people are

benefiting from this new found freedom of speech. The ongoing

violence from insurgency, suicide attacks and external

agitation from Iran and Saudi Arabia, certainly suggests that

the new Iraqi media has remained a conduit of propaganda,

albeit no longer under the exclusive control of the

government. It is a corrosive, manipulative and dangerous

medium, though there are some genuinely objective newspapers

aggressively protecting their own space from attack.

Like other Arab countries in turmoil such as Syria, Iraq

has become a staging ground for Islamic extremism by both

Sunni and Shia groups such as the Islamic State or IS. These

groups use the media to broadcast their own interpretation of

the Koran, their political beliefs and their Fatwa’s. A lack

of regulation and ease of access to broadcast media has

allowed this to become a norm. Misuse of broadcast media is

something that is regulated in almost all western nations and51

at no point can they be used by non state actors to

disseminate propaganda; Iraq has proved to be the exact

opposite.

We must remain cognisant that Iraq is essentially a new

democracy, merely 10 years old. In that time the nation has

gone from dictatorship to occupation and US imposed western

democracy. The media plays a pivotal role in informing,

educating, and even inculcating people during the

reconstruction process. The burgeoning public sphere has been

hijacked by those who seek to control Iraq, while the genuine

polemicists who seek a peaceful and unified Iraq are being

squeezed out and in some cases killed.Although objectively greater demands are placed on [publicopinion], it operates less as a public opinion giving arational foundation to the exercise of political and socialauthority, the more it is generated for the purpose of anabstract vote that amounts to no more than an act ofacclamation within a public sphere temporarily manufacturedfor show or manipulation (Habermas 1989:222).

Habermas believes that modern politics are a sham and

though the public opinion is often evoked to legitimate the

state power within a democracy, it does not exist continually.

He believes that “the public sphere” is merely manufactured

during election times to lend legitimacy to the de-jure

government. The public are so manipulated that they simply

agree. Iraq is a prime example of Habermas opinions, fake,

manufactured and manipulated.

Though the Iraqi public can differentiate between

American news (Al-Hurra), how it chooses to consume the news is

entirely personal. Beliefs based on cultural values, politics

52

and religion all contribute to how Iraqis digest the news and

how they form opinions. The United States simply did not

expect the new Iraqi media to transform into what it has

become, nor did they have effective tools that they could use

to prevent it from happening.

53

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