Intuitions and Experiments - PhilPapers

April7,2011

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IntuitionsandExperiments

JenniferNagel,UniversityofToronto

Contemporaryepistemologistsemployvariousmethodsinthecourseofarticulatinganddefending

theirtheories.Amethodthathasattractedparticularscrutinyinrecentyearsinvolvesthe

productionofintuitiveresponsestoparticularcases:epistemologistsdescribeapersonmaking

somejudgmentandtheninvitetheiraudiencestocheckthisjudgment’sepistemicstatusfor

themselves.“DoesSknowthatP?”—Awell‐constructedcasecanelicitapowerfulintuitiveverdict.

Butthepowerofintuitiveresponsesissomewhatmysterious,forreasonstobediscussedinsome

detailinwhatfollows.Onecrucialcharacteristicofintuitionisthatitsworkingsarenotexposedto

usatthemomentofjudgment.Whenweareaskedwhetherasubjectinsomescenariohas

knowledge,ananswermaycometomindmoreorlessforcefully,withoutitsbeingimmediately

transparenttousexactlywhytheanswerhasthevalenceortheforcethatitdoes.

Thisfailureoftransparencydoubtlessmakesiteasierforus,asself‐conscious

epistemologists,towonderabouttheepistemiclegitimacyofthemethodofcases.Experimental

philosophershavesuggestedthatcloseattentiontothemechanicsofintuitivejudgmentshould

makeusuneasyaboutthemethod:intuitionsmayexhibitworrisomeinstabilityeitherwithinan

individual(Swain,Alexander,&Weinberg,2008,335),orbetweengroupsofindividuals,perhaps

alongsuchepistemicallyscaryfaultlinesasethnicity(Weinberg,Nichols,&Stich,2001)orgender

(Buckwalter&Stich,2011).IfacertainintuitiveresponsetosomeGettiercaseworksforthe

majorityofepistemologists,wehavenoguaranteethatitwillworkforothersoutsideour

professionalclub,andnogoodreason—theexperimentalistsargue—tosupposethatitsupplies

genuineevidenceaboutthenatureofknowledge.Ontheexperimentalistwayofthinking,

philosophershavetakenfalsecomfortinachievingconsensus(ornear‐consensus)amongst

themselvesonparticularcases,andneedtoberemindedofthedifferencebetweenagreeingwith

one’speersaboutsomethingandbeingrightaboutit.Accordingtoonegroupofexperimentalists,

‘‘experimentalevidenceseemstopointtotheunsuitabilityofintuitionstoserveasevidenceatall”

(Alexander&Weinberg,2007,63).Whateverexactlyisgoingonwhenphilosopherssolicit

intuitionsandusethemaspremisesintheirarguments,it’sthoughttobeepistemically

questionable,andratherdifferentinkindfromwhatgoesonwhenpeopleengageinalegitimate

cognitiveenterpriselikeempiricalscience.

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Iagreewiththeexperimentaliststhatthequestionoftheepistemicstatusofepistemic

intuitionsisanexcellentquestion,andthatwecantakesomestepstowardsansweringitbytaking

acloselookattheempiricalfactsaboutintuition.Ialsoagreethatphilosophersriskmistaking

consensusforcorrectnesswhenweighingtheevidentialvalueoftheirintuitions.Infact,according

tothebestavailablemodeloftherelationshipbetweensubjectiveconfidenceandaccuracyof

intuition,thestrengthofanintuitiongenerallycorrelateswithitsconsensualityratherthanits

correctness.However,thismodelappliesequallytodomainswhoseepistemiclegitimacythe

experimentalistswouldnotwanttodispute;inparticular,itappliestoperceptualjudgments.

Ratherthanunderminingthecasemethodinepistemology,closeattentiontothemechanicsof

intuitivejudgmentrevealssomedeepsimilaritiesbetweenepistemicintuitionandperception.1

Section1beginswithageneraldiscussionofintuitivejudgmentandthenisolatesthetype

ofintuitionthatservesasignificantdialecticalroleincontemporaryepistemology.Tobe

dialecticallyeffective,anintuitionaboutknowledgedoesnotneedtobecorrect:itjustneedstobe

sharedbyone’saudience.Itisaninterestingquestionhowskilledpractitionersofthemethodof

casescanknowinadvancewhichcaseswillresonatewiththeiraudiences:Section2showshow

thatquestionwouldbeansweredwithintheleadingmodelofconfidenceinintuitivejudgment,

Koriat’sSelf‐ConsistencyModel(SCM).Onthismodel,thestrongeranintuitionfeelstoan

individual,themorelikelyitistobesharedwithothers.IftheSCMappliestoepistemicintuitions,

variationsinthestrengthofepistemicintuitioncannotbereadatfacevalue:someintuitionsmay

bestrongandwidelysharedbutinaccurate.However,thefactthatwecandissociatethestrength

andaccuracyofepistemicintuitionsdoesnotentailthattheseintuitionsgenerallylackevidential

value.Similardissociationsarisewithinperception:wecallthemperceptualillusions.As

DescartesobservesintheFirstMeditation,thefactthatournaturalperceptualcapacitieshave

somevulnerabilitytoillusiondoesnotobligeustobegenerallyskepticalaboutthosecapacities.

Andifourepistemicintuitionsarisefromasimilarlyreliablenaturalcapacity,theycouldbe

similarlytrustworthy.

Section3arguesthatpre‐theoreticalepistemicintuitionsdoarisefromagenerallyreliable

naturalcapacity.Knowntopsychologistsas‘folkpsychology’or‘mindreading’,thisisourordinary

1Theobservationthatintuitionandperceptionhavesomeepistemicallyimportantfeaturesincommonhasbeenmadebyvariousdefendersofarmchairepistemology(e.g.Chudnoff,2010;Sosa,2007;Williamson,2007).ThesimilaritiesIexamineinthispaperhavenotpreviouslyattractedmuchattention,however.

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resourceforascribingstatesofknowledge,beliefanddesire.Experimentalistswhochallenge

epistemiccaseintuitionsdonotrejectallintuitivecapacities—andcannotdoso,onpainof

collapsingintoageneralskepticism.Atleastoneprominentexperimentalisthasexplicitly

identifiedmindreadingasthekindofintuitivecapacitythatcanbetrusted,andnotwithoutreason.

Itisentirelyplausiblethatthiscapacityislargelyreliableinitsdeliverances,notleastbecauseour

intuitivemindreadinggeneratespredictionsaboutwhatotherswilldoandsay,andthese

predictions—includingpredictionsaboutthedifferencesbetweenthinkingandknowing2—are

subjecttofeedbackandcorrectionovertime.Ourmindreadingcapacitiesareuniversal;thissection

alsopresentsevidencethatneitherethnicitynorgenderhasasignificantimpactonknowledge

ascriptioningeneral,noronepistemologicallyinterestingcasesinparticular.Inaddition,the

majorityofuntrainedsubjectsproducethestandardphilosophicalresponses,furtherevidencethat

wearedrawingonacommoncapacityinthecasemethod.

Althoughperceptionandmentalstateattributionarebothlargelyaccuratenatural

capacities,botharesubjecttocertainnaturalillusions.Wherestrengthandaccuracyofintuition

comeapartwehavevariousresourcesavailableforcorrectingourselves;Section3concludesby

notingsomesimilaritiesbetweentheresourcesavailableforself‐correctioninthedomainsof

epistemicintuitionandperceptualjudgment.ForthepurposesofthispaperIassumethatitis

epistemicallylegitimatetotakesensoryobservationsasyieldingevidenceaboutthephysicalworld;

theaimistoshowthatwehaveroughlysimilarreasonstotakeepistemicintuitionsasyielding

evidenceaboutknowledge.

1.Intuitivejudgmentingeneral,anddialecticallyusefulepistemicintuitionsinparticular

Therearemanycharacterizationsofthesplitbetweenintuitiveandnon‐intuitivejudgments,both

withinphilosophyandwithinpsychology(forreviews,seeEvans,2007;Nagel,2007;Sloman,1996;

Stanovich&West,2000).Fortunately,thereisveryconsiderablecommongroundbetweenthe

majortheoriesofintuition,andforpresentpurposesitmattersonlythatepistemicintuitionscount

asintuitiveinsomerelativelyuncontroversialsense.Itshouldbefairlyunsurprisingthatepistemic

intuitionsareintuitiveinsomemainstreampsychologicalsenseof‘intuitive’,butabriefreviewofa

2Theidentificationofknowledgeasamentalstateisuncontroversialwithinthepsychologyofmentalstateascription;thisissuewillbediscussedinmoredetailbelow.

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psychologicalaccountmayhelptomakethisevident,andhelptojustifytheapplicationof

psychologicaltheoriesofintuitiveconfidencetoepistemicintuitionsinparticular.

Bothinphilosophyandinpsychology,intuitivejudgmentsareseenincontrasttothe

judgmentsweproducethroughdeliberatereasoning.Becausethispointisemphasizedina

particularlyclearfashionbyHugoMercierandDanSperber,Ifollowtheoutlinesoftheirviewin

whatfollows,andusetheirterms‘intuitive’and‘reflective’forthetwocontrastingkindsof

judgment.MercierandSperberdescribeintuitivejudgmentsasgeneratedby‘processesthattake

placeinsideindividualswithoutbeingcontrolledbythem’(Mercier&Sperber,2009,153).The

spontaneousinferencesproducedbytheseprocessesmodifyorupdatewhatwebelieve‘without

theindividual’sattendingtowhatjustifiesthismodification’(ibid.).

Somecareisneededinhandlingtheclaimthatwedonotattendtothefactorsjustifyingour

intuitivelyproducedbeliefs.Failuretoattendisnotakindofblindnessorinsensitivity.Whenwe

readtheemotionsofothersintheirfacialexpressions—totakeanexampleofanuncontroversial

caseofintuitivejudgment—neurotypicaladultsareremarkablyaccurateatdetectinganddecoding

theminuteshiftsinbrowpositionandnostrilcontourthatdistinguishemotionssuchassurprise

andfear(Ekman&Friesen,1975).Butjudgmentsreflectthesecueswithoutourattendingtothe

cues:thecross‐culturallyrobustabilitytorecognizebasicemotionsdoesnotdependonany

personal‐levelattentiontothefacialconfigurationsandmovementsthatjustifytheseswiftintuitive

classifications(Ekman,1989;Ekman&Friesen,1975).Whatweareexplicitlyawareofatthe

personallevelistheemotionweseeexpressedinthefaceofanother;wearenottypicallyawareof

relevantsetofsubtlefacialcuesassuch,letalonethesubpersonalprocessingthatconnectsthem

withtheconceptualtemplateofthecorrespondingemotion.Sowedonotneedtohaveanexplicit

theoryofthefacialdifferencesbetweensurpriseandfearinordertodiscriminatetheseconditions

successfullyinthefacesofothers,andindeedwemayhaveconsiderabledifficultyinformulatingan

explicittheorythatreflectsouractualcompetence.Inintuitivejudgmentweare‘consciousonlyof

theresultofthecomputation,nottheprocess.’(Sloman,1996).

Inreflectivejudgment,bycontrast,weengageinexplicitreasoninganddevotepersonal‐

levelattentiontothegroundsoftheconclusionswereach.Becauseofthestrictcapacitylimitations

onconsciousattention,reflectivethinkingissequentialincharacter;whereintuitivejudgmentcan

integratelargeamountsofinformationveryrapidlyinassociativeparallelprocessing,reflective

judgmentisrestrictedbythebottleneckoflimitedworkingmemoryspace(fordetaileddiscussion,

seeEvans,2007).However,whatitlacksinspeed,reflectivejudgmentmakesupinflexibility(a

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pointparticularlyemphasizedinStanovich,2005).Intuitivejudgmentsuppliesroutineanswers,

say,automaticallyandeffortlesslyrecognizingthefaceofafriend,orproducingananswerwhen

oneisaskedtosum2+2;reflectivejudgmentcantacklenovelproblems,forexampleapplyinga

controlledsequenceofoperationstosumasetoflargenumberswehavenotpreviously

encountered.Thecontrolledsequentialcharacterofreflectiveprocesseslikecomplexarithmetical

calculationandconsciousdeductivereasoningkeepsthemopentoview:havingengagedinan

explicitprocesssuchassyllogisticreasoningorlongdivisionitisnotparticularlymysterious,from

thefirst‐personperspective,whywehavearrivedatagivenanswer.

Thecontrastbetweentheintuitiveandthereflectivedoesnotmeanthatthesetwotypesof

processingareisolatedfromoneanother.Theyareintimatelyconnectedinvariousways.Tobegin,

reflectiveprocessestaketheproductsofintuitiveprocessesasinput:inthereflectivecalculationof

anovellongdivisionproblem,forexample,theindividualstepsconsistintheapplicationof

intuitivesingle‐digitcalculation.Theintegrationbetweenthesekindsofprocessingcanalsogothe

otherway.Wecanalsohaveintuitiveresponsestotheresultsofreflectivecalculations;for

example,wemayhaveintuitivelygeneratedfeelingsofsurpriseorreliefwhenexplicitdeduction

producesanunanticipatedordesiredresult.

Complexrelationshipsbetweencontrolledandautomaticprocessingmayalsomakeitless

thanobviouswhichkindofprocessingisengagedinsometask.Becauseasenseofeffort

accompaniesthecontrolledallocationofattentioninreflectivejudgment,doingsomethinglikelong

divisionfeelshardwhilemerelyadding2+2feelseasy.Butenergycanbeapplieddifferentlyto

differentpartsofatask.AsMercierandSperberpointout,asenseofeffortcanalsoaccompanya

personal‐leveldecisiontokeepattending,overaperiodoftime,totheoutputofsomeparticular

intuitivemodule,liketheintuitivecapacityforfacerecognition(Mercier&Sperber,2009).Ittakes

efforttosustainthetaskofscanningfacesinacrowd,searchingforafriend,althoughineach

instancetheprocessingthatdecideswhetherornotagivenindividualisrecognizedisitself

subpersonalandeffortless.Itmayalsotakeefforttoscananepistemologicalscenarioforthe

presenceorabsenceofknowledge,eveniftheresultantrecognitionofknowledgeormerebeliefis

itselfprocessedintuitively.

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Thesenseinwhichepistemicintuitionsareintuitiveisadelicatematter.3Whenwereada

scenario,weareoftenawareofaseriesofconsiderationsthatcouldbearonwhetherthesubjectof

thecasehasknowledge.Wemaybeparticularlyconsciousofthiswhenreadingascenariothat

invitesustorepresentorretracethestepsofasubjectwhoisthinkingreflectivelyherself.Ihave

arguedelsewherethatourepistemicevaluationsaresensitivetowhetherthejudgmentsbeing

madebytheprotagonistofthecasewouldnaturallybemadeintuitivelyorreflectively(Nagel,

2011).Bydefault,andinroutinecircumstances,wethink(andexpectotherstothink)intuitively.

Theextraeffortofreflectivethinkingistriggered(andanticipatedtobetriggeredinothers)bysuch

factorsashighstakes,novelorunusualcasesandtheneedtonegatehypotheticalpossibilities.

Consequentlywetendtohavesomewhatdifferentexpectationsaboutaroutinejudgment,likethe

recognitionthatacertainzooanimalisazebra,ascontrastedwithamoreeffortfuljudgmentlike

thejudgmentthatthesamecreatureisnotacleverlydisguisedmule.Thereaderofascenarioneeds

toengageinreflectivecognitiontorepresentthesecondtypeofjudgment,ortograsphigh‐stakes

judgments,likethejudgmentsofapersonwhoisexceptionallyanxiousaboutwhetherthebankwill

beopentomorrow,andactivelycontemplatingpossibilitiesinvolvingchangesinthebank’shours.

However,thisisnottosaythatclassifyingtheresultsofsuchreflectivejudgmentsasknowledge(or

merebelief)woulditselfneedtobeareflectivematter.Thefactthattherearevariousdifferences

betweenintuitiveandreflectivejudgmentsdoesnotentailthatthereareanydifferencesinthe

qualitiesthatmaketheproductsofeithertypeofjudgmentcountasknowledge.

Asanexample,ifthereliabilityofanobservedsubject’s(reflectiveorintuitive)belief‐

formingprocessisaqualitythathelpstodeterminewhetherthesubjectknows,thenintuitive

knowledgeascriptioncouldbesensitivetodifferencesinperceivedreliabilitywithoutanyexplicit

personalattentiononourparttotheissueofreliabilityassuch.Evenifweneedsomemixtureof

intuitiveandreflectivecognitiontofollowthestory,itispossiblethatweuseintuitiveprocessing

acrosstheboardindeterminingwhetherthekeymentalstateinthestoryisaninstanceof

knowledgeormerebelief.3Thisquestionisfurthercomplicatedbythediversityofopiniononhowtocharacterizeintuition:therearecertainlyunderstandingsof‘intuitive’onwhichnotallepistemologicalcaseresponseswouldcountasintuitive.Forexample,thelinebetweenintuitiveandnon‐intuitivejudgmentissometimesdrawnstrictlyintermsofexecutivefunction,andthereisevidencethatmentalstateattributionmayundersomeconditionsdrawuponexecutiveresources(Apperly,Back,Samson,&France,2008;Apperly,Riggs,Simpson,Chiavarino,&Samson,2006).Theinterpretationoftheseresultsissomewhatcontroversial,however(Cohen&German,2009),asisthemoregeneralquestionofhowexactlytheintuitive/non‐intuitivedistinctioncouldbestbecharacterized(e.g.Evans,2007).Theproblemshereliebeyondthescopeofthepresentpaper;forpresentpurposes,itisenoughtoobservethatspontaneousverdictsonepistemicscenariosarenotgeneratedbythekindoffullytransparentprocessofreasoningweseeinlongdivisionortheapplicationofanexplicittheory.

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Wehaveavarietyofevidencethatouridentificationofknowledgewouldgenerallybe

intuitive.Mostnotably,wedonotneedtopossessorapplyanyexplicittheoryofknowledgein

ordertogainthesensethattheprotagonistofsomescenariohasorlacksknowledge.Wearenot

fullyconsciousofthegroundsofourjudgmentinthewaythatwewouldbeifweweremakinga

reflectivecategorizationonthebasisofanexplicittheory.Inmakingupourmindsaboutsome

particularcase,wearenottypicallyconsciousofmatchingfeaturesofthesubject’sjudgmentto

featuresofsometheoryofknowledge.Itisnotclearthatsuchatheoryisavailabletousinany

event.Eventhetheoristwhodoesadoptanexplicitworkingtheoryofknowledge—say,someone

attractedtoGoldman’searlycausaltheory(Goldman,1967)—canreadilyfindhimselfmovedto

classifynovelcasesinwaysthatdirectlyconflictwiththisworkingtheory(asinGoldman,1976).

TheresilienceoftheGettierproblemsuggeststhatitisdifficult(ifnotimpossible)todevelopany

explicitreductivetheoryofknowledgethatfullycapturesouractualpatternsofresponseto

particularexamples(Williamson,2000;Zagzebski,1994).

Furtherevidencefortheintuitivecharacterofknowledgerecognitioncouldbefoundinthe

speedandfrequencyofourreal‐timedecisionsbetweenverbsofthinkingandknowing—‘knows’

and‘thinks’arebothheavilyused,rankingat#8and#12oftheOxfordEnglishCorpuslistofour

mostcommonverbs.Judgmentsnaturallybecomeintuitivewhenmadeveryfrequently.While

criticsofphilosophicalmethodshavefocusedondeliberateassessmentsofhypotheticalscenarios,

wehavereasontobelievethattheabilitiesbroughttobearonthosecaseswouldbeequally

operativeinourveryfrequentandspontaneousassessmentsofreal‐lifesituations(Saxe,2006;

Williamson,2007).Forexample,similarbrainregionsareactivatedwhenexperimentalsubjects

readnarrativesabouttheknowledgeandbeliefsofothers(butnotabouttheirappearanceor

subjectivestatessuchashungerorthirst),andwhentheyareengagedinliveinteractionwith

others,playingagamethatrequiresthemtoattributeknowledgeorbelieftoapartner(Redcayet

al.,2010;Saxe&Wexler,2005).Justastheintuitivemechanismsenablingrecognitionofemotion

arestimulatedinsimilarwaysbylivefaces,videotapesofactualfacesoranimatedcartoons,our

resourcesforrapidlydetectingknowledgeandbeliefarethoughttobestimulatedinsimilarways

byliveinteractionsandappropriatenarrativerepresentations.4Whereattributionsofemotionare

4Presentationformatmayhoweveraffectthedegreetowhichthekeyresourcesareactivated.InarecentfMRIstudyofresponsestocloselymatchedanimatedandlive‐actionmoviesequences,RaymondMarandcollaboratorsfoundjustthesamementalstateattributionareasactivated,buttoagreaterdegreebythelive‐actionsequencesthanbytheircartooncounterparts(Mar,Kelley,Heatherton,&Macrae,2007).Activationoftheseregionswasspontaneous;participantswereinstructedtowatchthemovieclipscloselybutweregivennoinstructionstomakementalstateinferencesconcerningthecharacters(cf.Cohen&German,2009).

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triggeredbycertainpatternsoffacialfeatures,attributionsofmentalstatesaretriggeredbythe

recognitionofpatternsof‘input’toanother’sperceptualandinferentialcapacities—forexample,by

ourautomaticcalculationsofwhatanobservedagentcansee(Samson,Apperly,Braithwaite,

Andrews,&Scott,2010)—andbyrecognitionofanagent’s‘output’ofintentionalactionandspeech

(forreviews,seeApperly,2011;Goldman,2006).

Tosuggestthatourclassificationsofknowledgewouldordinarilybeintuitiveisnottosay

thatitisimpossibletodeviseasituationinwhichwewouldthinkreflectivelyinidentifyinga

judgmentasaninstanceofknowing.Forexample,reflectiveclassificationscanbemadewhenwe

areconsideringcasesatacertainlevelofabstraction.Supposewestipulatethatthereissomeset

ofsomepropertiesΓsuchthatanyjudgmentwillinstantiateknowledgeifandonlyifithasallthe

propertiesinΓ,andthenstipulatethatjudgmentJhasallthepropertiesinΓ;thesubsequent

conclusionthatjudgmentJisaninstanceofknowledgecanbemadereflectively,withfull

consciousnessofthegroundsofourcategorization.Suchformallyacceptablebutmaterially

uninformativeclassificationsarenotwhatfigureinthericherandmoreunpredictablecasemethod

thatexperimentalphilosophershavebeenattacking.

Itshouldalsobeacknowledgedthatnotallintuitiveidentificationsofknowledgeare

equallyrichandunpredictable.Itshouldbepossibletohavetheory‐drivenepistemicintuitions,for

example,afterbecomingverywell‐rehearsedinapplyingtheverdictsofsomeparticularanalysisof

knowledge.Suchclassificationsmayfailtoresonatewiththosewholackacommitmenttothat

analysis,andwouldsupplynoindependentevidenceforthetheorythatproducesthem.Asrote

exercisesintheapplicationofanexistinganalysis,theywouldlackintuition’sordinarypowerto

convinceothers,ortosurpriseusandreshapeourtheories.Someepistemicintuitionsmayindeed

betheory‐driven,butnotallintuitionsincurrentepistemologycouldhavethisstatus.TheGettier

resultthatjustifiedtruebeliefwasinsufficientforknowledgedidcomeasasurprise,andresonated

withanaudienceofphilosopherswhohadlargelybeencommittedtooneoranotherformofJTB

theory.Atleastsomedialecticallypowerfulepistemicintuitionsarepre‐theoretical.

Itisaninterestingquestionhowthepersonwhoexperiencesapre‐theoreticalintuition

couldseeitsvalue,especiallywhenitrunsagainstestablishedtheory.WhenEdmundGettierfound

himselfinclinedtojudgethatSmithdoesnotknowthatthemanwhowillgetthejobhastencoinsin

hispocket,hecouldhavedismissedthisinclinationasamistakeonhispart.Giventhebroad

acceptanceoftheJTBtheory,itmightseemGettiercouldreasonablyhaveconcludedthathewas

subjecttosomemomentaryfailureofinsightorhadsomeindividualpeculiaritydrivinghimto

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misclassifythecase.Heclaimedinsteadthathisverdictwasclearlyright,asifanticipatingthathe

himselfwouldmakethesamejudgmentaboutthiscaseonotheroccasions,andexpectinghis

audiencetodolikewise,notwithstandingtheirknownpriorinclinationstoaccepttheJTBtheory

(Gettier,1963).GettierdoesnotpresentanexplicitargumentshowingexactlywhySmith’s

judgmentdoesnotamounttoknowledge:hedoesnotofferanypositiveanalysisofknowledgeof

hisown,nordoeshespecifyanynecessaryconditionsonknowledgewhicharelackinginthiscase.

Butdespiteneitherexplainingnorperhapsevenknowingexactlywhyhefeelsthewayhedoes

aboutthiscase,Gettierseemsconvincedthathisintuitionaboutitwillbefeltbyothersandby

himselfonotheroccasions.Whatisitaboutthecharacterofintuitivejudgmentthatcouldhave

madehimfeelthatway?Thenextsectionexaminesthisquestion.

2.Confidenceandconsensualityinintuitivejudgment:Koriat’sSCM

Althoughwearenotconsciousoftheinnerworkingsofintuitionatthemomentofjudgment,weare

consciousofcertaindifferencesinitsdeliverances:someintuitionsfeelclearandstrong;othersare

weakerandmoreobscure.Thesedifferencesinconfidencehavemorethanmomentaryandprivate

significance.Whenanintuitionisstrong,itislikelytobestable,andlikelytobefeltbyothers.Toa

firstapproximation,thisisbecauseconfidenceinintuitivejudgmentisdeterminedbytheeasewith

whichonemakesthejudgment(Alter&Oppenheimer,2009;Kelley,1993;Reber&Schwarz,1999).

Ingeneral,whatisintuitivelyeasyononeoccasionislikelytobeeasyonsubsequentoccasions,and

similarlyeasyforotherpeople.Anelegantmodelexplainingthisphenomenonhasbeendeveloped

inrecentyearsbyAsherKoriat.Usingintuitiveresponsestotwo‐answerforced‐choicequestions

fromavarietyofdomains,Koriatestablishedthataperson’slevelofconfidenceinanintuitive

judgmentpredictsthedegreetowhichthatindividualwillmakethesamejudgmentagainwhen

presentedwiththesameproblemagain,and,furthermore,predictsthejudgment’sconsensuality—

theextenttowhichotherswillmakethesamejudgment(Koriat,2008;Koriat,2011).

Koriat’smodelofintuitiveconfidence,theSelf‐ConsistencyModel(SCM),tracesitsorigins

tosomecuriousfindingsofhisfromthemid‐1970s.Inthecourseofinvestigatingourabilityto

monitorourownmemoryperformance,hedecidedtoexamineanobscurememorydomain,where

subjectswouldpresumablynothavehadpreviousexperienceinmonitoringtheirtrackrecord.

Accordingtothe(nowderelict)theoryofuniversalphoneticsymbolism,therearecertainsounds

whichhaverobustcross‐culturalsignificance.Certainsound‐meaningrelationshipswere

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hypothesizedtobeencodedinthememoryofallhumanbeings.Someempiricalevidencehadbeen

offeredinsupportofthetheory:forexample,peopleperformatsignificantlybetterthanchance

whenaskedtomatchantonymsofvalue‐laden,magnitudeorsensationterms(beautiful,ugly;large,

small;hard,soft)fromtheirownlanguagewiththoseofanon‐cognatelanguagetowhichtheyhave

hadnopreviousexposure(Slobin,1968).

InKoriat’sfirststudyinthisarea(Koriat,1975),heaskedEnglish‐speakingparticipantsto

match56antonympairsinThai,KannadaandYorubatotheirEnglishtranslations,presentedin

randomorder.Aftertakingtheirbestguessasto,say,whichofthepair[tuun,luk]meant“deep”

andwhichmeant“shallow”,participantswereaskedtoratetheirconfidence—orwhatKoriat

describedinhisinstructionstothemas“theunexplainablefeelingthatyoumaybecorrect”—inthe

choicetheyhadmade.Ratingsweremadeona1‐4scale,where1wastobeusedfor“atotallywild

guess”,and4fortheanswersaboutwhichmostconfidencewasfelt.Onthematchingtask,Koriat

replicatedthepatternfoundbySlobin,with21wordpairsyieldingasignificantlybetterthan

chancematching,andonly7pairsyieldingasignificantlyworsethanchanceperformance.49out

ofhis55subjectsmatchedmorethanhalfthepairscorrectly,theremaining6closeto50‐50.The

resultsoftheconfidencetaskseemedtosuggestthatparticipantshadsomeaccesstothevalidityof

theiranswers:only53.35%ofthepairstowhichtheyhadassignedconfidencelevel1were

correctlymatched,versus66.10%ofthelevel‐4ratedpairs.Accuracyrosemonotonicallywith

confidenceratingacrosstheboard.

Inasubsequentstudy,Koriattookacloserlookattherelationshipbetweenconfidence,

accuracy,andconsensuality,ortheextenttowhichanintuitionwassharedacrossparticipants

(Koriat,1976).Drawingonearlierwork,Koriatcompiledalistof85antonympairsinsixnon‐

cognatelanguagestowhichhisparticipantsclaimednopreviousexposure;eachofthesepairswas

ultimatelyclassifiedaseitherconsensuallycorrect(CC),consensuallywrong(CW)ornonconsen‐

sual(NC).AnantonympaircountedasCCifastatisticallysignificantpercentageofsubjects(inthis

caseatleast60%)selectedthecorrecttranslation,asCWifasimilarpercentageagreedonthe

incorrectresponse,andasNCifneitherresponsewassignificantlypreferred.The1975studyhad

shownapositiveoverallcorrelationbetweenconfidenceandaccuracy,butinthatstudyCCpairs

outnumberedCWpairsthreetoone,leavingitunclearwhetherconfidencewasreallytracking

correctnessorconsensuality.Thenewstudyanalyzedtheconsensualityandreportedconfidence

foreachcategoryofitem.ConfidencestillcorrelatedpositivelywithaccuracyforCCpairs,suchas

theChinese[ching,chung],forwhich94%ofparticipantscorrectlychose[light,heavy]ratherthan

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[heavy,light].AcrossresponsestoitemsintheCCcategory,lowerconfidenceratings(1‐2)were

69.63%likelytobeaccurateandhigherconfidenceratings(3‐4)were79.55%likelytobeaccurate.

Fornonconsensualpairs,therewasnosignificantrelationshipbetweenconfidenceandaccuracy.

Meanwhile,forCWpairs,suchastheHindi[ranjida,khush],forwhichonly18%ofparticipants

correctlychose[sad,happy],confidenceandaccuracywerenegativelycorrelated:34.45%ofthe

lowconfidenceanswerswerecorrect,comparedwith24.22%ofthehighconfidenceanswers.

Strikingly,thosewhohadselectedaminorityresponse(eitherthewrongtranslationforaCCitem

orthecorrectoneforaCWitem)tendedtofeellessconfidentabouttheirchoicethanthosewho

hadchosenasthemajoritydid.Koriatconcludedthateachindividual’sconfidencewassomehow

“attunedtotheconsensualityoftheresponse,regardlessofitsaccuracy”(1976,247).

Onemightwonderhowisolatedparticipantscompletingthetaskindividuallywereableto

respondasiftrackinghowotherswereresponding;onemightalsowonderwhetherthesefindings

areparticulartotheintuitivedomainKoriatwasprobing,orwhethertheyariseasaresultofsome

generalorstructuralfeaturesofintuitivejudgment.Someprogressonthesequestionshasbeen

madeinrecentyears.Thereisevidencethatunderlyingstructuralfeaturesofintuitivejudgment

areatworkhere.Resultslikethosefoundinthephoneticsymbolismtaskhavebeenfoundfora

widevarietyofothertwo‐alternativeforced‐choicetasks,includinglong‐termmemoryfortrivia

(Koriat,1995),short‐termmemoryforsentenceswithandwithoutinterferencefromschema‐based

inference(Brewer&Sampaio,2006),socialattitudes(Koriat&Adiv,inpress),andperceptual

judgments(Koriat,2011).5Inthecourseofthiswork,twofurthercorrelationswereuncovered:a

participant’sreportedconfidencelevelinanygivenjudgmentpredictsnotonlytheextenttowhich

otherswillrespondsimilarly,butalsothelikelihoodthatthisparticularparticipantwillrepeatthat

responsewhenpresentedwiththesametwo‐alternative,forced‐choiceproblemagainlateron

(Koriat,2008;Koriat,2011).Furthermore,inastudywhichaskedsubjectstoanswerthesame50

intuitivequestionsseventimesoverthecourseofseveraldays,asubjectwhofluctuatedbetween

differentanswerstoanintuitiveprobewasmoreconfidentwhenhegavehismajorityanswer(the

answerthathegavemoreoften)thanwhenhegavehisminorityanswer(Koriat&Adiv,inpress).

TheselastcorrelationsprovidedtheguidingideaoftheSelf‐ConsistencyModel(Koriat,

2011;Koriat&Adiv,inpress).AccordingtotheSCM,subjectiveconfidenceisabyproductofthe5Suchresultsarenotrestrictedtoself‐reportofconfidence,buthavealsobeenfoundfornon‐verbalbehavior.Forexample,independentoftheiraccuracy,moreconsensualanswersattracthigherwagersinbettingtasks,evenforsubjectswhohavenotbeenaskedtogiveanyexplicitreportoftheirlevelofconfidence(Koriat,2011;Simmons&Nelson,2006).

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processofintuitivejudgment.Theparallelprocessingthatunderpinsintuitiveandperceptual

judgmentdrawsonavastrangeofinformationpotentiallyrelevanttotheproblemathand.Wedo

notconsulttheentirerangeonanygivenoccasion.Ingeneratingananswertoatwo‐alternative

forced‐choicequestion,asampleofrepresentationsisdrawnfromthepoolinorderproducea

response,whereeachrepresentationissomeconsiderationinfavorofoneortheotheranswer.

Samplingcontinuesuntileitheracriticalnumberofrepresentationsfavoringonesidehasbeen

amassed,oruntilapresetnumberofsampleshasbeendrawn.6One’sresponseisdeterminedby

thedirectionofthesample’smajority,andone’sconfidenceinthatresponseisdeterminedbythe

sizeofthesample’smajority,theinternalconsistencyofthesampleinonedirectionortheother.

Whereanalmostequalnumberofrepresentationsinthesamplespeakinfavorofeachside,one’s

confidencewillbemuchlowerthanitiswhenthesampleisunivocal.Onthismodel,neitherone’s

answernorone’sconfidencelevelwilldirectlymeasuretheextenttowhichtheunderlyingpoolof

informationsupportsananswertothequestion:itispossibletodrawanunrepresentativesample

fromapoolwhichoverallstronglyfavorsP,andrespondthatnot‐P.However,whenwehavedone

suchathing,theoddsareoverwhelmingthatoursamplewillspeakonlyweaklyinfavorofthe

unrepresentativechoice.7IfthepoolstronglyfavorsP,wearelikelytodrawaveryconsistent

samplefromit,andrespondwithhigherconfidenceforP.Ifconfidenceisdeterminedbythe

consistencyofone’ssample,thenconfidencewillpredictthelikelihoodofone’smakingthesame

choiceonsubsequentoccasions.Furthermore,ifothersaredrawingfromasimilarpoolof

representations,individualconfidencewillpredictconsensualityaswell:achoiceveryheavily

favoredbyone’sownsampleislikelytobefavoredbyothersalso.

TheSCMisageneralmodelofintuitivejudgmentfortwo‐alternativeforced‐choice

questions.Itisconceivablethatintuitivejudgmentsinepistemologyaremanagedinsomequite

differentway,althoughwehavenopositivereasontothinkso.Thequestionaskedattheendofthe

typicalcase—“DoesSknowthatp?”isatwo‐alternativeforced‐choicequestion.Theonlypublished

workbearingdirectlyontherelationshipbetweenintuitiveconfidenceandconsensualityin

6Whilethefocusofthepresentpaperisintuitivejudgment,itshouldbenotedthatsimilarsamplingmodelshavebeenproposedforreflectivejudgment.BenjaminNewellandMichaelLee,forexample,havearguedthatwealwayssampleevidencesequentiallyuntilwereachapresetthreshold(Newell&Lee,2010).Suchmodelscouldextendtheconclusionsofthissectiontothosewhoareinclinedtothinkthatepistemologicalcaseresponsesmaytosomeextentbegeneratedbysequentialorreflectivethinking.7Koriatsuppliesthefollowingexample(usingtheabbreviationpmajfortheproportionofrepresentationssupportingthemajorityanswer):‘withpmaj=.75,asampleofsevenrepresentationshasa.445likelihoodofyieldingsixorsevenrepresentationsthatfavorthemajoritychoice.Incontrast,thelikelihoodthatitwillyieldsixorsevenrepresentationsthatfavortheminoritychoiceisonly.001’(Koriat,2011,121).

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responsestoepistemicscenarioshasgeneratedresultsdirectlyinlinewiththepredictionsofthe

SCM(Wright,2010).

IftheSCMappliestointuitivejudgmentsinepistemologyasitappliestoothertypesof

intuitivejudgments,thestrengthofanepistemicintuitionisanindexofitsreproducibility.Justasa

goodexperimentisonewhichcanbereproducedbyothersorbyoneselfonotheroccasions,soalso

agoodintuition.Aslongastheunderlyingpoolofrepresentationsissimilarforoneselfandothers,

one’sconfidenceinanintuitiveresponseisamarkerofitsdialecticalvalue:astrongintuitionwill

typicallybestable,andotherswillfeelit,too.IfGettierfeltstronglythathisintuitionwouldbe

sharedbyhisaudience,hewasnotwrongaboutthat:whateverintuitivetechniquesheappliedin

categorizingthecase—orwhateversetofrepresentationshepulledupfromthepooltoidentifyhis

Smithasfailingtoknow—contemporaryepistemologistshavegenerallysharedhisexperience.

EvenepistemologistswhoexpressreluctancetorejecttheJTBtheoryonthebasisofGettier

intuitionsdonotdenytheforceofthoseintuitions(e.g.Weatherson,2003).Theapplicabilityofthe

SCMtoepistemicintuitionswouldhelptoexplainthedialecticalsuccessofappealtointuitions.If

theSCMapplies,however,thereisadistinctionbetweendialecticalvalueandaccuracy.Intuitive

confidenceisnotdirectlycorrelatedwiththetruthofone’sresponse:therearesomeintuitive

problemsforwhichone’sunderlyingpoolofrepresentationswillhavearobusttendencyto

generatethewronganswer.

Onthesideofperception,weclassifythese‘robustlyandconsensuallywrong’casesas

illusions.OurintuitiveresponsestoclassicillusionssuchastheMüller‐Lyercanbecloudedbyour

explicitknowledgeoftheirdeceptiveness.Itisusefultoconsidersomefreshcases,suchasthe

following,takenfrom(Koriat,2011):

Whichoftheselinesegmentsislonger?

Whichofthesefiguresislarger?

and the next trial began. The order of the 40 experimental pairswas determined randomly for each participant and for each block.There were short breaks between the blocks. The experiment lastedabout 45 min.

Results and Discussion

By and large, participants tended to give the same response toeach pair across the five blocks. Thus, the probability of makingthe Block-1 response again over the next four blocks averaged .76across participants.

The results were organized around four topics: (a) reproducibil-ity, (b) response consistency, (c) response consensus, and (d) theconsensuality principle. Within each topic, the results for confi-dence judgments are presented first, followed by those for choicelatency. In the final section, several analyses that connect some ofthe previously mentioned topics are presented.

Reproducibility. The assumption that confidence acts as amonitor of reliability implies that confidence in a choice predictsthe likelihood that an individual will make the same choice in asubsequent presentation of the item. To examine this possibility, Igrouped the confidence judgments in Block 1 into six categories,and calculated repetition proportion—the likelihood of making theBlock-1 response across the subsequent four blocks—across allparticipants and items. The results are presented in Figure 3A. Thefunction is monotonic; the Spearman rank-order correlation overthe six values was .94, p ! .005.2

Choice speed also predicted reproducibility. In all of the anal-yses of choice latency reported in this article, latencies that werebelow or above 2.5 SDs from each participant’s mean latency foreach block were eliminated (3.2% across all blocks). The choice

2 Other binning procedures led to similar results.

Figure 2. Examples of the stimuli used in Experiments 1 and 2, divided into those for which the consensualanswer was the correct answer (consensually correct) and those for which the consensual answer was the wronganswer (consensually wrong).

123CONFIDENCE IN PERCEPTUAL JUDGMENTS










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Inbothcases,thecorrectansweris:theoneontheright.However,theconsensualanswerforboth

casesis:theoneontheleft(endorsedby84.62%ofKoriat’sparticipantsinthefirstcaseand

82.93%inthesecond).Thesepairsofstimulicouldbecomparedwiththefollowing,alsofrom

(Koriat,2011):

Whichoftheselinesegmentsislonger?

Whichofthesefiguresislarger?

Theselasttwopairsfallintotheconsensuallycorrect(CC)category:astrongmajorityofsubjects

correctlyidentifytheright‐handfigureaslargerandlonger(83.59%and89.75%respectively).

Thesubjectiveexperienceofcomparingthemagnitudesissimilarfordeceptiveandnon‐deceptive

itemsofequalconsensuality:wescanthefiguresuntiloneanswerortheotherseemsright.Itisnot

transparenttousjustwhattechniquesweareapplyinginthecourseofmakingourevaluation.But

whateverourtechniquesmightbe,theyaresufficientlysimilaracrosspersonsthattheyshowclear

trendsofworkingmoreswiftlyandeasilyinsomecasesthaninothers.Whetherornottheywere

beingjudgedcorrectly,pairsonwhichtherewasmoreconsensuswerejudgedsignificantlymore

quicklyandwithsignificantlygreaterconfidencethannon‐consensualpairs(Koriat,2011).

Susceptibilitytoacommonsetofillusionsisstrongevidenceofsystematicsimilaritiesin

ourwaysofjudgingmagnitude.Ordinaryandillusorycasesarenotdistinguishedinourimmediate

subjectiveexperience,andcommonmechanismsaretakentounderpinboth;indeed,asHermann

vonHelmholtzobservedmorethanacenturyago,perceptualillusionsare“particularlyinstructive

fordiscoveringthelawsoftheprocessesbywhichnormalperceptionoriginates”(vonHelmholtz,

1893,75).Thefactthatwearepronetocertainillusionsofthetypeillustratedaboveisofcourse

notareasonforgeneralskepticismaboutourcapacitytodistinguishmagnitudesvisually;rather,

ourgeneraltrustinthiscapacitycontinuestobewarrantedaslongasthecapacityisgenerally



















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accurate.Illusionsarerareenoughthatthereisoverallastrongpositivecorrelationbetweenour

confidenceinourperceptualjudgmentsandtheaccuracyofthosejudgments.Evensettingaside

illusions,wearenotperfectlycalibrated—weseem8tobesomewhatunderconfidentaboutvery

easyjudgmentsandoverconfidentaboutdifficultones(e.g.Baranski&Petrusic,1994)—butin

general,theperceptualjudgmentsaboutwhichwefeelmostconfidentaresubstantiallymorelikely

toberightthanthejudgmentsaboutwhichwefeelleastconfident.Similarpatternsapplytoother

domains,suchaslong‐termmemory(Baranski&Petrusic,1995).Whereintuitivejudgmentiseasy

andswiftforsomeintuitivecapacity,wefeelmostconfident;theslowanddifficultjudgmentsthat

ariseatthebordersofanintuitivecapacitynaturallygeneratelessconfidence(Alter&

Oppenheimer,2009).Itisunsurprisingthatvariationsinsubjectiveconfidencewouldgenerallybe

adaptiveinthismanner:weakintuitiveresponsescansignalustobecautiousortosupplementour

intuitiveresponseswithreflectingthinkingintheinterestsofincreasingaccuracy(Alter,

Oppenheimer,Epley,&Eyre,2007).Naturalintuitivecapacitiesproducevariationsinsubjective

confidencethataremeaningfulandlargelyhelpful.

Incriticizingthecasemethod,JonathanWeinberghassuggestedthatintuitionis“basicallya

1‐bitsignal:isppossible,yesorno?Or:Doesthehypotheticalsituationfallundertheconceptor

not?”(Weinberg,2007,335)Heacknowledgesthatwesometimesexperiencevariationsinthe

apparentforceofintuition,butsaysthatitis“completelyunknowntowhatextentwehaveany

inter‐orevenintra‐subjectiveagreementaboutit.”(ibid.)Ihaveaimedtoshowthatifepistemic

intuitionsworklikeothertypesofintuitivejudgment,significantinter‐andintra‐subjective

agreementistobeexpected.Intuitionisasignalwhichcarriesinformationnotonlyabouttheyes‐

or‐noquestion,butalsoabouttheextenttowhichone’sownresponsewillbestableandotherswill

respondsimilarly.Thewayvariationsinsubjectiveconfidencearesharedhelpsexplainthe

dialecticalsuccessofthecasemethod.9Thefactthatphilosopherslargelyagreewitheachother

8Failuresofcalibrationarecontroversial;Gigerenzerandcollaboratorshavearguedthatanecologicallyrepresentativesamplingoftaskswouldproducesomethingclosertoperfectcalibration(Gigerenzer,Hoffrage,&Kleinbolting,1991).Cesariniandcollaboratorsarguethatthe‘hard‐easy’effectisatleastinpartastatisticalartifact,becauseerrornearthepolesoftheconfidencescalecanpushusonlytowardsthemiddle(Cesarini,Sandewall,&Johannesson,2006).9TheexperimentalistchallengetowhichIamrespondinghereadmitsthedialecticaleffectivenessofthemethodofcases.Anotherpossiblechallengetothecasemethodwoulddisputeeventhat,perhapssuggestingthatmostphilosophersdonotactuallyfeeltheGettierintuitionbutonlypretendto.Whileitistruethattherearesomecaseswhichprovokeadividedresponse—andmorewillbesaidaboutsuchcasesinSection3—thesuggestionthatcasesgenerallylackdialecticalvalueisextremelyhardtosquarewithempiricalfactsaboutthepracticeofcontemporaryepistemology.Inthedebatesbetweencontextualists,relativists,interest‐relativeandstrictinvariantists,forexample,thereisalmostuniformagreementontheintuitivepowerofthe

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aboutGettier’scasesisevidencethatwearedrawingfromsimilarpoolsofrepresentationsin

respondingtothem.However,theexperimentalistcanstillwonderwhetherepistemologists’

systematicallysharedintuitionsaregenerallyindicativeofthenatureofknowledge.Because

intuitiveconfidencecorrelateswithconsensusratherthanaccuracy,thecasemethodcouldbe

pursuedwithgreatdialecticaleffectivenesseveniftheintuitionsonwhichprofessionalsstrongly

tendedtoagreeweretypicallysharedillusionsratherthansharedinsights.Itisnaturaltowonder

whetherepistemiccaseresponsesarisefromthesortofnaturalcompetenceforwhichstronglyfelt

intuitionsaretypicallymorelikelytoberightandillusionsrelativelyrare,orwhetherthecommon

poolfromwhichepistemologistsaredrawingtheirsharedintuitivejudgmentsisanunfortunate

productoftrainingorselectioneffects.Thenextsectiontacklesthatissue.

3.Intuitivemindreading,amateurandprofessional

Howdoweattributeknowledgeormerebelieftotheprotagonistofanepistemologicalscenario?

Thedefaultanswertothisquestionis:thesamewaywegenerallyattributeknowledgeorbeliefto

anyoneelse.Unlessthereisaspecialreasontothinkthatknowledgeattributionsworkquite

differentlywhenwearereadingphilosophypapers—andI’llshortlysurveysomeevidenceagainst

thatsortofexceptionalism—weshouldexpecttofindthatepistemiccaseintuitionsaregenerated

bythenaturalcapacityresponsibleforoureverydayattributionsofstatesofknowledge,beliefand

desire.Thiscapacityhasbeengivenvariouslabels,including‘folkpsychology’,‘mindreading’,and

‘theoryofmind’.IwillfollowIanApperlyandothersincallingthiscapacity‘mindreading’,but

intendtoremainasneutralaspossibleaboutthecurrentdebateswithinpsychologyabouttheexact

natureofthiscapacity.

Althoughagreatdealofworkinmindreadinghasfocusedonnaturalillusionsofmental

stateattribution,particularlyinchildrenwhosecapacitiesarestillimmature,itisgenerallyagreed

thatadultcapacitiesformentalstateascriptionprovidefairlyreliabletrackingofwhatothersthink

andknow.Interestinglyenough,inhiscriticismofthecasemethod,Weinbergexplicitlyexempts

mindreadingfromthetroublezoneofsuspectintuitions:heiskeentoestablishthatsomeintuitions

areacceptable,inordertoshowthattheexperimentalistattackonphilosophicalintuitionsdoesnot

centralcases,evenwherethesecasesareawkwardordifficultforadvocatesofoneortheothertheoryanditmightbeverytemptingtoclaimonedidnotfeeltherelevantintuition(seee.g.DeRose,2009;Stanley,2005;Williamson,2005).

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havetocollapseintoageneralskepticism.Weinbergveryreasonablyobservesthatmindreading

intuitions“makeallsortsofpredictionsabouttheworld,”andfurthernotesthat“weseematleast

somewhatcapableoflearningfromtheoccasionalfailureofthosepredictions”(Weinberg,2007,

339).Manyresearchersinmindreadingwouldmakestrongerclaimsaboutthewaysinwhichour

capacitytoascribestatesofdesire,knowledgeandbeliefgetshapedbyfeedbackfromsuccessful

andunsuccessfulpredictions,butWeinberg’sminimalconcessionsareenoughforpresent

purposes.IfGettier’sintuitionsaboutwhatSmithdoesordoesn’tknowcomefromoureveryday

mindreadingcapacityforascribingstatesofknowledgeandbelief,andifthiscapacityisgenerally

reliable,thenourepistemiccaseintuitionshavesomepositiveclaimtoepistemiclegitimacy.

BecauseWeinberghimselfexplicitlylocatesGettierintuitionsinthetroublezoneofsuspect

intuitions(2007,335),hecan’tbeunderstandingthemasordinarymindreadingintuitions.Thisis

probablynotacapriciousmoveonhispart:hisownexperimentalresultscouldseemtomakeit

veryreasonabletotakeGettierintuitionstoarisefromsomecapacityotherthanmindreading.

Mindreadingcapacitiesaregenerallythoughttobecross‐culturallyuniversal,notleastbecauseof

developmentalsimilaritiesinmindreadinginradicallydifferentcultures(Wellman,Cross,&

Watson,2001).Naturalillusionswithinthemindreadingcapacityarealsocross‐culturally

shared.10Furthermore,mindreadingcapacitiesarethoughttoexhibitnogenderdifferencesin

typicaladults;extensiveresearchonmentalstateascriptionhasshownonlyamildadvantagefor

girlsbeforetheageoffour,perhapssimplyasafunctionofgirls’earlierlinguisticdevelopment,and

nodiscernablegenderdifferencesinthenon‐clinicalpopulationbeyondthatpoint(Charman,

Ruffman,&Clements,2002).Forthosewhosuspectthatthereiscross‐culturalvariationinGettier

caserecognition(followingWeinbergetal.,2001),andforthosewhosuspectthatGettierintuitions

maynotbefeltequallybymenandwomen(followingBuckwalter&Stich,2011),itmayseem

unlikelythatepistemologists’responsestoGettiercaseswouldbeproducedbyourcommon

mindreadingcapacity.

AnotherbarriertoallocatingGettiercaseresponsestoourcommonmindreadingcapacity

couldbethewidespreadphilosophicalopinionthatbeliefisamentalstatewhileknowledgeisnot.

10Inparticular,weshareabiasknownashindsightormorebroadlyepistemicegocentrism,abiaswhichdistortsourmindreadingofthosewhooccupyamorenaïveperspective,includingourownmorenaïvepastselves.Therehadbeensomesuggestionsthatthisbiasdiffersacrosscultures:forexample,onestudyfoundthatthebiasisworseundercertaininstructionsforWestern(Canadian)subjectsthanforEastern(Japanese)subjects(Heine&Lehman,1996),whileanotherfoundgreaterhindsightontheEastern(Korean)thanontheWestern(American)side(Choi&Nisbett,2000).Morecomprehensiveworkhasunderminedclaimsofcross‐culturaldifferencesineitherdirection(Pohl,Bender,&Lachmann,2002).

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Experimentalistswhoholdsuchaviewcouldthinkthatevenifphilosopherswouldsharewith

othersthenaturalandepistemicallyunproblematiccapacitytoattributebeliefs,perhapsthe

attributionofknowledgeisafurtheroperationdrawingonsomepoolofmentalresourcesof

dubiousvalue.Hereitisusefultoobservethatpsychologistsworkingonmentalstateascription

explicitlyclassifybothknowledgeandbeliefasmentalstates(e.g.Apperly,2011;O'Neill,Astington,

&Flavell,1992;Shatz,Wellman,&Silber,1983).Theattributionofknowledgeisnotseenasan

additionalsteptobetakenafterbeliefhasbeenascribed,andwiththehelpofauxiliaryfaculties;if

anythingitisbeliefthatisregardedasthemoredifficultandproblematicstatetoattribute(onthis

point,seeespeciallyApperly,2011).Somephilosopherssharetheviewthatknowledgeisamental

stateinitsownright,andnotacompositeofbeliefandotherfactors(e.g.McDowell,1995;

Williamson,2000).OnWilliamson’sview,forexample,theconceptofbeliefisderivativefromthe

conceptofknowledge:ratherthanourhavingtoaddextraingredientstoanascriptionofbeliefto

getanascriptionofknowledge,weinsomesensesubtractfromknowledgetoascribebelief—

indeed,‘merebeliefisakindofbotchedknowing’(Williamson,2000,47).Thepsychological

literatureonmindreadingalignsmorecloselywiththisviewthanwiththemorewidespread

philosophicalopinionaccordingtowhichknowledgeisnotconsideredamentalstate.Itmightbe

objectedthatWilliamsonhaswhatisfromthemainstreamphilosophicalperspectiveanon‐

standardunderstandingof‘mentalstate’,butevenifthatpointwereconceded,thelargerissue

wouldbeuntouched:itisuncontroversialinpsychologytoseeintuitiveattributionsofknowledge

asfallingunderthescopeofourmindreadingcapacity,soanyonewhogenerallytruststhatlatter

capacityhasreasontotrustintuitiveknowledgeascriptions.

Ifintuitiveknowledgeascriptionsforepistemologicalcasesdoarisefromourordinary

mindreadingcapacity,weneedtoexplainreportedpatternsofvariationinresponsestoGettier

casesandthelike.Areviewoftheevidenceisinorder.

Intheirinfluential2001paperonthecasemethod,Weinberg,NicholsandStichdiscussed

theresultsofpollingundergraduatesonthefollowingscenario:

Bobhasafriend,Jill,whohasdrivenaBuickformanyyears.BobthereforethinksthatJilldrives

anAmericancar.Heisnotaware,however,thatherBuickhasrecentlybeenstolen,andheis

alsonotawarethatJillhasreplaceditwithaPontiac,whichisadifferentkindofAmericancar.

DoesBobreallyknowthatJilldrivesanAmericancar,ordoesheonlybelieveit?

REALLYKNOWS ONLYBELIEVES

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Forthiscase(theonlyGettiercasetestedbyWeinberg,NicholsandStich),74%ofparticipantswho

self‐identifiedas“Western”hadthestandardknowledge‐denyingresponse;however,amongthe

EastAsiansubjectsonly43%hadthisresponse,andamongtheSouthAsiansubjectsonly39%did.

Ontwofurtherepistemologicalcases(both‘skepticalpressure’casesinwhichpossibilitiesoferror

werementionedbutstipulatedtobenon‐actual)theresponsesofWesternandEastAsiansubjects

werenotsignificantlydifferent,butSouthAsiansubjectswerestilloutofline,respondingatlevels

of70and50%whereWesternsubjectsregistered89and69%(Weinbergetal.,2001).Theseare

statisticallysignificantdifferencesinperformance.Butseveralfactorsraisequestionsabout

whethertheseresultsarebestinterpretedaspointingtounderlyingdifferencesinintuitive

competence.Onemightnoticethatifwetakethestandard“Western”responsesasnormative,the

non‐normativeresponseslieclosertothe50‐50splitthatoneseeswhensubjectsarenotinterested

inaproblemandarejustansweringrandomly.Infact,thecasesthatshownodifferencebetween

WesternandEastAsiansubjectsbothproducesimilardropstowardsrandomnessintheSouth

Asianparticipants.Itisnotclearwhy.Onepossibleexplanationherewouldinvolvedifferencesin

motivation:itispossiblethatthe24SouthAsianparticipantsinthestudywereonaveragesimply

lessengagedwiththeseparticularproblems.IfforexampleSouthAsianstudentsonthecampus

wherethisresearchwasconductedweresignificantlylesslikelytobehumanitiesmajors,11andif

participantswerethinkingoftheseriesofpuzzlesasanexerciseinapplyingphilosophicalmethods,

thentheprospectofponderingthesecasesmayhavebeenlessattractivetothem.Onemightalso

wonderwhetherthecontentoftheBobandJillscenarioresonatedmorewithmembersofsome

ethnicgroupsthanothers,orwhethersomegroupsfounditeasiertoread.12

ForamorereliablemeasureofvariationinresponsestoGettiercases,itisusefultoexamine

responsestomultiplecases.Inanewstudyinvolving222undergraduateparticipantsfroma

varietyofethnicbackgrounds(71participantsself‐indentifiedasWhite;58asSouthAsian,28as

EastAsian13,16LatinAmerican,15Black,6WestAsian,4Araband24other),eightdifferentGettier

11IdonothavedataforRutgersUniversityinparticular,butintheUnitedStates,therearestatisticallysignificantdifferencesinthecollegemajorsofdifferentethnicgroups(e.g.comparedtoWhitestudents,AsianstudentswereatthetimeofWeinberg,NicholsandStich’sstudymorethantwiceaslikelytomajorinbiologyorengineering).Source:NationalCenterforEducationStatistics,StatusandTrendsintheEducationofRacialandEthnicMinorities,table25.2,Percentageofdegreesconferredbydegree‐grantinginstitutionsinmostpopularfieldsofstudy,byrace/ethnicityandlevelofstudy:2003‐04.12Forexample,thestorywillbemoreeasilyunderstoodbyreadersforwhomitisanautomaticinferencethataBuickisanAmericancar.ThankstoMeredythDanemanforthisobservation.13ParticipantsinourEastAsiangroupactuallyidentifiedthemselvesasChinese,Japanese,Korean,FilipinoorSoutheastAsian(Cambodian,Vietnamese,etc.)followingthestandardCanadiancensuscategories.

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casesweretested,togetherwitheightordinaryknowledgecases,eightjustifiedfalsebelief(JFB)

cases,eightskepticalpressurecasesandeightfillerquestionsinvolvingvarioustypesofjustified

andunjustifiedbelief(Nagel,SanJuan,&Mar,inprep).The32experimentalitemswere‘matched’:

foreachGettiercase,therewasacorrespondingknowledgecase,skepticalpressurecaseandJFB

casewithanequalwordcount.Theseitemsweredistributedinabetween‐subjectsdesign,sothat

eachparticipantsawjustonememberofeachsetofmatcheditems(forexample,oneofA‐D

below);eachparticipantjudgedtwoexperimentalitemsofeachkind.

(A). [Ordinaryknowledge:]Wandaisoutforaweekendafternoonwalk.Shelivesinalargenewcondominiumtowerdowntown,andhersuiteisfairlysmallanddoesnothaveanywindowsthatopen,soshereallylikestogetoutforsomefreshair.Passingnearthetrainstation,Wandawonderswhattimeitis.Sheglancesupattheclockonthetrainstationwallandseesthatitsays4:15pm.Itisinfact4:15pmatthatmoment.

(B). [Skepticalpressurevariant:]Wandaisoutforaweekendafternoonwalknearthetrainstationandwonderswhattimeitis.Sheglancesupattheclockonthetrainstationwallandseesthatitsays4:15pm.Itisinfact4:15pmatthatmoment.Thestationclockisinfactworking,butithasnosecondhand,andWandaonlylooksatitforamoment,soshewouldnotbeabletotelliftheclockwerestopped.

(C). [Gettiercasevariant:]Wandaisoutforaweekendafternoonwalk.Asshepassesnearthetrainstation,shewonderswhattimeitis.Sheglancesupattheclockonthetrainstationwallandseesthatitsays4:15pm.Whatshedoesn’trealizeisthatthisclockisbrokenandhasbeenshowing4:15pmforthelasttwodays.Butbysheercoincidence,itisinfact4:15pmjustatthemomentwhensheglancesattheclock.

(D). [JFBvariant:]Wandaisoutforaweekendafternoonwalk.Shelivesinasmallcondodowntown,butenjoystheoutdoors.Asshepassesnearthetrainstation,shewonderswhattimeitis.Sheglancesupattheclockonthetrainstationwallandseesthatitsays4:15pm.Itisinfact4:53pmatthatmoment.Whatshedoesn’trealizeisthatthisclockisbrokenandhasbeenshowing4:15pmforthelasttwodays.

Aseachscenariowaspresentedonscreen,participantswereaskedtoverifythekeypropositionin

thestory(e.g.“Accordingtothestory,whattimeisitwhenWandalooksattheclock?”).

ParticipantswhoansweredthisquestioncorrectlywerethenaskedaboutWanda’sstateofmind

(thescenarioremainedonscreenthroughout).Unsurprisingly,participantsweremostlikelyto

ascribeknowledgeinthetype‐Abaselinestories(overall,72.0%agreedthatthesubjectknewthe

keypropositioninsuchcases),andleastlikelytoascribeknowledgeinthetype‐Dfalsebelief

stories(15.8%).Gettiercasesandskepticalpressurecaseswereseenbymostparticipantsas

involvingafailuretoknow,attractingknowledgeascriptionratesof32.9and39.8%respectively.

NoteveryoneproducedthestandardresponsetoeveryGettiercase,butdifferencesbetween

standardandnon‐standardresponseswerenotafunctionofethnicityorgender.Wedidnotfind

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statisticallysignificantcorrelationsbetweenethnicityorgenderandknowledgeascriptionforany

ofthefourkeytypesofscenario.14

Ifundergraduateswithlittleornophilosophicaltraining15generallyclassifyepistemology

casesthewayepistemologistswould,andifthereisnoappreciablegenderorethnicvariationin

caseresponses,thenthereisnogoodreasontodoubtthedefaulthypothesisthatwearerelyingon

acommonmindreadingcapacityinrespondingtothesecases.IfIamrightthatourknowledge‐

denyingintuitiveresponsestoskepticalpressurecasesarenaturalillusionsofthemindreading

capacity(Nagel,2010),thentheevidencethatwearerespondingtoepistemiccasesonasimilar

basisisstrongerstill:theuntrainedsharenotonlyourordinaryresponsesbutalsoshareatleast

oneimportantillusion.

Criticsofthecasemethodmayhoweverworrythatthesignalfromthelayresponsesisnot

asstrongasitshouldbe.IfepistemologistshaveclearintuitionsthatGettiercasesinvolveafailure

toknow,thenonemighthaveexpectedahigherlevelofconsensualityinamateurjudgmentsof

thosecases.Ouramateursgenerallyagreedwiththestandardprofessionallineontheeightcore

Gettiercaseswetested,butataperhapsdishearteningaveragerateof67.1%(tosaynothingofthe

15.8%ofparticipantswillingtoascribeknowledgeinJFBcases).

Therearesomemundanereasonswhyonemightfindaworsesignal‐to‐noiseratioinlay

judgmentsofepistemologicalscenarios.Whileintuitivejudgmentitselfiseffortless,effortis

requiredtoreadthestoriescloselyenoughtoregistertherelevantdetailsabouttheinputstothe

subject’sjudgment(cf.Williamson,2011).Participantswhoarenotinterestedinaparticularstory

maybemoreinclinedtorespondtoitrandomly.16Philosophersandothersmayhavethesame

14ForGettiercasesinparticular,thecorrelationbetweenethnicityandknowledgeascriptionwas0.018,p=.791(two‐tailed),n=222;thecorrelationbetweengenderandknowledgeascriptionwas0.019,p=.774(two‐tailed),n=222.Thep‐valueorsignificancelevelindicatestheprobabilityoftheobservedpatternsontheassumptionthatthenullhypothesisistrue(i.e.thatethnicity/genderdoesnotinfluenceknowledgeascription).Correlationsarenotregardedassignificantinpsychologyifthesignificancelevelisgreaterthan.05.Wrightalsofoundnogenderdifferences;shedoesnotreportonethnicity(Wright,2010).1558outofour222participants(26%)reportedhavingtakenatleastonephilosophycourse;ofthese39reportedhavingtakenonlyonesuchcourse.Knowledgeascriptionrateswerenotcorrelatedwiththenumberofphilosophycoursestaken,aresultconsistentwithJenniferColeWright’sstudiesofresponsestocaseslikeLehrer’sTruetempandtheFakeBarnGettiercase(Wright,2010).16Oneofthefillerquestionscompletedbyall222participantswasaverbatimcopyoftheJill/BobPontiacandBuickcasefrom(Weinbergetal.,2001).WedidnotreproducetheoriginalfindingthatSouthAsianstendedtogivethenon‐standardresponse:only40%ofourSouthAsianparticipantsascribedknowledgeinthiscase(vs.61%ofSouthAsiansinWeinberg,NicholsandStich’soriginalstudy).WedidhoweverseeaweakerresponsetothisparticularcaseamongSouthAsiansthanamongself‐identifiedWhites:only14%ofourWhiteparticipantsascribedknowledgeinthiscase(vs.26%of‘Western’participantsintheoriginal

April7,2011

22

basicintuitivecapacitytoregisterthepresenceorabsenceofknowledge,butphilosophersmaybe

moremotivatedtoreadepistemicvignetteswithaneyetoexercisingthiscapacity.Ifourcapacity

torecognizeknowledgeisintuitive,wedonotnecessarilyhavetodevotepersonal‐levelattention

tothefactorsjustifyingourjudgments:forexample,evenifreliabilityisanecessaryconditionof

knowing,wewouldnotneedtomakeexplicitpersonal‐leveljudgmentsofreliabilityinordertosee

someoneasknowing.However,someinterestintherelevantpartsofthestorymaybeneededin

ordertoactivatetherelevantspontaneousprocessing:participantswhoskimorreadinattentively

mayretainonlyaroughsenseofthegistofthestorywhentheyreachthequestionconcerning

mentalstate.Gettiercasescanbetaxingtofollow:amateurparticipantswhodonothavethe

motivationoftestinganepistemologicaltheorymaybelessinclinedtoreadclosely.17

Motivationmayalsoplaysomeroleintheothertypeofvariationthathasbeenconsidered

problematicforthecasemethod.Experimentalistshaveshownthatresponsestophilosophical

scenariosexhibitorderorcontrasteffects:forexample,naïvesubjectsaresignificantlymorelikely

toattributeknowledgetothesubjectofaversionofKeithLehrer’sTruetempcasewhenitis

presentedfollowingaveryclearcaseofignorancethanwhenitfollowsaveryclearcaseof

knowledge(Swainetal.,2008;Wright,2010).Intendedasacounterexampletoreliabilism,this

caseinvolvesapersonwhosebrainhasbeensurreptitiouslychangedtoproduceaccuratebeliefs

aboutthetemperaturewithouthisbeingawareofthechange;manyepistemologistshavethe

intuitionthatthesereliablytruebeliefsdonotconstituteknowledge.Observingthatthecasemay

ormaynotappeartobeacaseofknowledgedependingonitscontext,Swainandcollaborators

study).BecausewedidnotseeanysignificantcorrelationbetweenethnicityandknowledgeascriptionacrosstheeightotherGettiercasestested,itseemsmorereasonabletoattributethedifferenceinresponseratesheretosomethinglikedifferinglevelsofinterestorengagementwiththisparticularstoryasopposedtodifferencesinknowledgeascriptionforGettiercasesperse.Idonotknowenoughaboutthetestingconditionsoftheoriginalstudytospeculateaboutwhywemighthaveseenaclearersignalfrombothgroupsinourstudy.17Contingentdifferencesinmotivation,asopposedtounderlyingcognitivedifferences,havebeenpositedasexplainingmanyofthefindingsoncognitive‘cross‐culturaldifferences’thatservedasthetheoreticalbasisofWeinberg,NicholsandStich’sclaimofdiversityinepistemicintuitions.RichardNisbettandcollaboratorsmaintainthattherearefundamentalqualitativedifferencesinthereasoningofEasternandWesternpeoples,ascribingan“intuitive”,“holistic”and“experience‐based”wayofthinkingtothoseontheEasternside,andan“analytic”,“rule‐based”and“decontextualized”modeofthoughttotheWesterners(Nisbett,Peng,Choi,&Norenzayan,2001).HugoMercierobservesthatthesegeneralizationsdonotsquarewellwiththehistoricalrecordofChineseworkonlogic.HearguesthatNisbett’sEasternsubjectshavegivenlessanalytic—andmoreshallow—responsesbecausethesesubjectpoolshappenedtobelessinterestedinNisbett’stasks(Mercier,forthcoming).Thereisevidencethatdifferencesarenotfoundwhencareistakentoensurethatmotivationisuniform:forexample,evenjustimaginingthatonehasastakeinsomeissueundercontentioncansufficetoeraseculturaldifferencesinreasoningbetweenEastern(Japanese)andWestern(French)subjects(VanderHenst,Mercier,Yama,Kawasaki,&Adachi,2006).

April7,2011

23

contendthatvariationofthiskindunderminesthecasemethod:theyareconcernedthatsensitivity

towhatonehasrecentlybeenthinkingrendersintuitionsdisturbinglyopentomanipulationand

onlyquestionablyconnectedtothesubjectmatterofinterest.

Thepossibilityofcontextualinfluencesonsomecapacitydoesnotonitsownshowthatthis

capacitycannotbeasourceofevidence.Forexample,onefindscontrasteffectsinvisualjudgments

ofcolor:

Swainetal.explicitlyconsidertheobjectionthatthetypesofvariabilitytheyhaveidentifiedare

alsofoundinperception.Theycontendthereisarelevantdisanalogy:“Weareawareofthegreat

majorityofthecircumstancesunderwhichperceptualjudgmentsarelikelytobeunreliable.For

instance,weknowthatvisualperceptionrequiresacertainamountofillumination,andvisual

perceptionitselfprovidesuswithknowledgeofwhetherenoughilluminationispresent”(Swainet

al.,2008,148).Swainetal.observethatwenaturallyhavelowerconfidenceinperceptual

judgmentsinconditionsoflowillumination;thedefenderofthecasemethodmightobservethatwe

naturallyhavelowerconfidenceinborderlineintuitivejudgmentsaswell,includingtheversionof

theTruetempcasethatSwainetal.aretesting(Wright,2010).Swainetal.alsosuggestthat

correctingforunreliabilitywillbeeasierintheperceptualcase:whilewecancounterdim

illuminationinobviousways,“wedon’tknowwhatistheparallelforintuitionofmakingsurethat

thelightison;thatis,wedonotknowwhicharethecircumstancesthatrenderintuitionreliableor

unreliable”(ibid.).

Itisdoubtlesseasyenoughtokeepthelighton,butitisnotclearthatlowilluminationisa

goodparallelfortheordereffectsidentifiedfortheTruetempcase.Acloseranalogyfororder

effectsfromthedomainofvisualperceptionwouldbeordereffectsincolorjudgments:

argument that anticipated the psychophysics of Weber andFechner by more than a century, Bernoulli concluded thatthe utility function of wealth is logarithmic. Economistsdiscarded the logarithmic function long ago, but the ideathat decision makers evaluate outcomes by the utility ofwealth positions has been retained in economic analyses foralmost 300 years. This is rather remarkable because theidea is easily shown to be wrong; I call it Bernoulli’s error.

Bernoulli’s (1738/1954) model of utility is flawedbecause it is reference independent: It assumes that theutility that is assigned to a given state of wealth does notvary with the decision maker’s initial state of wealth. Thisassumption flies against a basic principle of perception,where the effective stimulus is not the new level of stim-ulation but the difference between it and the existing ad-aptation level. The analogy to perception suggests that thecarriers of utility are likely to be gains and losses ratherthan states of wealth, and this suggestion is amply sup-ported by the evidence of both experimental and observa-tional studies of choice (see Kahneman & Tversky, 2000).The present discussion relies on two thought experimentsof the kind that Tversky and I devised in the process ofdeveloping the model of risky choice that we called pros-pect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).

Problem 2

Would you accept this gamble?

50% chance to win $150

50% chance to lose $100

Would your choice change if your overall wealth were lower by$100?

There will be few takers of the gamble in Problem 2. Theexperimental evidence shows that most people reject agamble with even chances to win and lose unless thepossible win is at least twice the size of the possible loss

(see, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). The answer to thesecond question is, of course, negative.

Next, consider Problem 3.

Problem 3

Which would you choose?

Lose $100 with certainty

or

50% chance to win $50

50% chance to lose $200

Would your choice change if your overall wealth were higher by$100?

In Problem 3, the gamble appears much more attractivethan the sure loss. Experimental results indicate that risk-seeking preferences are held by a large majority of respon-dents in choices of this kind (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).Here again, the idea that a change of $100 in total wealthwould affect preferences cannot be taken seriously.

Problems 2 and 3 evoke sharply different preferences,but from a Bernoullian perspective, the difference is aframing effect: When stated in terms of final wealth, theproblems only differ in that all values are lower by $100 inProblem 3—surely, an inconsequential variation. Tverskyand I examined many choice pairs of this type early in ourexplorations of risky choice and concluded that the abrupttransition from risk aversion to risk seeking could notplausibly be explained by a utility function for wealth.Preferences appeared to be determined by attitudes to gainsand losses, defined relative to a reference point, but Ber-noulli’s (1738/1954) theory and its successors did not in-corporate a reference point. We therefore proposed analternative theory of risk in which the carriers of utility aregains and losses—changes of wealth rather than states ofwealth. Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) em-

Figure 5Simultaneous Contrast and Reference Dependence

704 September 2003 ! American Psychologist

April7,2011

24

identificationofcolorsissensitivetowhatothercolorswehavebeenseeing,sothatwewill

describethesamecolorpatchasgreenifweapproachitfromoneendofthespectrumandasblueif

weapproachitfromtheother(Kalmus,1979).18Thesekindsofcontextualeffectsdonotannounce

themselvesasobviouslyaslowilluminationdoes,anditisnotatrivialmattertofigureouthowwe

shouldassessthem,whethersucheffectsshouldbeseenasoccasioningerrorsinourapplicationof

colorconcepts,orasshowingthattheboundariesofourconceptsaremorevariablethanwemight

havesupposed(Raffman,2005).Naïveperceptiononitsowndoesnottelluswhattodohere.

Meanwhile,correctingforordereffectsinthecasemethodmightnotbeinsuperably

difficult.SimonCullenhasarguedthattheordereffectsfoundbySwainetal.arisefromadherence

toconversationalnormsinthesurveycontext:participantsnoticedtheobviouscontrastbetween

theTruetempandextremecasesofknowledgeandignorance,andunderstoodthequestionabout

Truetemp’sstateofmindasaninvitationtocomparehimwiththesalientcontrastingcase.Onthis

view,participantsgivenadifferentorderofcaseswouldhaveadifferentconceptionoftheirtask.

CullentestedthepairsofcasesthatgeneratedthestrongestordereffectsforSwainetal.,butthis

timewithinstructionsurgingparticipantsto“considereachindependently.”Clarifyingthe

pragmaticsinthismannerwasenoughtocanceltheordereffects:withthenewinstructionsno

significantvariationarosefrompresentingtheTruetempcaseafteraclearcaseofknowledgeas

opposedtoaclearcaseofignorance(Cullen,2010).Ifepistemologistsaregenerallymakingan

efforttoconsidertheircasesindependently,theSwainresultsshouldnotbecauseforalarm.

TheTruetempstudiesmayraiseworriesofanotherkind,however.AsSwainetal.observe,

mostepistemologiststendtohavetheintuitionthatTruetempdoesnotknowthetemperature:

evenreliabilistslikeAlvinGoldmanseethecaseasprimafacieintuitiveevidenceagainstreliabilism

(Goldman,1994).BothCullenandSwainfoundconsiderableambivalenceaboutthiscaseamong

amateurs,however,withmeanresponsesofabout2.5to3.3ona1‐5scalewhere3wasneutraland

4or5wouldindicateadenialorstrongdenialofknowledge;Wright’sresultsweremorenegative

butalsofailedtoshowstrongconsensusonthecase.Onemightworrythatdifferencesbetween

amateursandprofessionalsherepointtotheinvolvementofsomecapacityotherthantheuniversal

mindreadingcapacityindecidingwhetherTruetemphasknowledge.

Itispossiblethatgenericmotivationproblemsplayedarolehere:perhapsthecaseis

confusingenoughthatamateurparticipantsgiveuponfollowingwhatishappeningandrespond

nearthemidpointsimplytoexpressuncertaintyaboutthetask(cf.DeBruin,Fischhoff,Millstein,&

18ThankstoDianaRaffmanfortheexampleanddiscussionofthepoint.

April7,2011

25

Halpern‐Felsher,2000).Anotherpossibilityisthatthecaseissomewhatunder‐described,and

amateurparticipantsarenotallfleshingoutthedetailsthesameway(aseachother,oras

professionalswould).HereistheversionofthecaseusedbySwain,CullenandWright:

OnedayCharleswasknockedoutbyafallingrock;asaresulthisbrainwas‘‘rewired’’sothatheisalwaysrightwheneverheestimatesthetemperaturewhereheis.Charlesisunawarethathisbrainhasbeenalteredinthisway.Afewweekslater,thisbrainrewiringleadshimtobelievethatitis71degreesinhisroom.Apartfromhisestimation,hehasnootherreasonstothinkthatitis71degrees.Infact,itis71degrees.

Justgiventhistext,therearevariouswaystoconstrueCharles’spredicament.Onemightwonder,

inparticular,whetherheisinanywayself‐consciousaboutthepeculiarityofhisobviouslypeculiar

newtendencytoformprecisebeliefsaboutthetemperature.KeithLehrer’soriginalpresentation

oftheexample—involvinga‘tempucomp’implantedbyabrainsurgeon—providedmoredetailon

thisscore.InLehrer’sversion,Truetempis“slightlypuzzledaboutwhyhethinkssoobsessively

aboutthetemperature”.LehrergoesontostipulatethatTruetemp“neverchecksathermometerto

determinewhetherthesethoughtsaboutthetemperaturearecorrect.Heacceptsthem

unreflectively,anothereffectofthetempucomp”(Lehrer,1990,163).Oneoftheinteresting

featuresofLehrer’sversionisthatthetempucompisdescribedashavingtwodistincteffects:first,

theproductionofaccuratetemperaturethoughtsinTruetemp’smind,andsecond,theproduction

ofTruetemp’spersonal‐levelbutsomehowunreflectiveacceptanceofthesethoughts.19Whenwe

arereconstructingTruetemp’smentalstate,wegothroughatwo‐stepprocess,wherethesecond

step(inwhichthetemperaturethoughtsareacceptedwithoutreason)isproblematic,perhapseven

fromareliabilistperspective.Ifwenaturallyseethetempucompasmechanicallydisabling

Truetemp’sordinarycapacitytoweighevidenceashedecideswhattoaccept,andifweseethat

ordinarycapacityasgenerallyconducivetotheproductionoftruebelief,thenthetempucomp

interventioncouldwellcomeacrossasthetypeofthingthatwouldgenerallycompromise

reliability.20

19Onthethoughtthatacceptanceisapersonal‐levelphenomenon,see(Frankish,2009).Asimilartwo‐stagestructureisusedinanothermuch‐discussedinternalistcasedevelopedbyLaurenceBonJour:hisunwittingclairvoyantnotonlyformsvariousaccuratebeliefsthroughherpsychicfaculty,butalso,inadistinctstep,“acceptsthebeliefsinquestion”(BonJour&Sosa,2003,28).20Onthisreading,thecaseisnotintheendaneffectivecounterexampletoreliabilism.Forpresentpurposesitisenoughthatthecaseisambiguous,butmorenegativeinitsoriginalTruetempform;acleardecisionaboutwhattypeofprocessisintuitivelyseenasinstantiatedwouldrequiregrapplingwiththenotoriouslydifficultGeneralityProblem(Conee&Feldman,1998),notataskIwillundertakehere.

April7,2011

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ThesimplerCharlesexampledoesnotdwellontheseparationbetweenthegenerationand

theacceptanceofpropositionsabouttemperature:rather,Charles’sbrainre‐wiringleadsdirectly

toabelief.WheretheoriginalTruetempseemedtobemakingdubiousreflectivejudgments,

perhapsCharlescomesacrossasmakingbetterintuitivejudgments.Butthenewcasedoesnot

strictlyprecludeamorenegativereading:whenwereadthatCharleshas‘apartfromhis

estimation…nootherreasonstobelievethatitis71degrees’,itisopentoustorepresenthimas

activelythinkingtohimselfthathehasnoreasonsforhisbelief,andifweseehimasengagedin

thattypeofreflectiononthewaytomaintaininghisbelief,thenhisjudgmentonceagainappears

unreliable.ThismorereflectiveconstrualoftheCharlescasemaybemoreavailableto

professionalsfamiliarwiththesimilarlynegativeoriginalcase.

Wheretherearemultiplewaysofunderstandinganunder‐describedstory,better

consensusamongprofessionalsmaybearesultofournaturallyfavoringtheconstrualthatmakes

moredialecticalsenseinitsoriginalargumentativecontext.21Someonewhosewayoffleshingouta

caseisnon‐standardcouldhavestrongconfidenceinwhatseemstobeaminorityintuition;

divergentintuitionsonagivencaseinepistemologycouldinsomecircumstancesarisefrom

differentwaysofconstruingvarioussubtlefeaturesofthesubject’swayofthinking,ratherthan

differencesintheassessmentofknowledgeperse.22Itisdoubtlessariskofthecasemethodthat

wecanfillinunder‐describedcaseswithphilosophicallyimportantcontent.23Theproblemisnot

anintractableone,however:disagreementaboutcasescanhelpustoidentifythiscontent.The

problemisalsonotuniquetothecasemethod:perceptioncanalsopresentuswithstimulithatare

ambiguousbetweentwoormoreconstruals,stimulisuchastheNeckercube.

Sofar,theaimhasbeentoshowthatepistemicintuitionsdonotshowpeculiaror

particularlyproblematicformsofvariation.Thekindsofinstabilityfoundinepistemicintuitions

arealsofoundinperceptualjudgments.Amateurjudgmentsofordinaryknowledge,Gettier,

21Thispossibilityisparticularlyrelevanttoourunderstandingofthepairedcasesmotivatingcontextualismandinterest‐relativeinvariantism,whereitisclearthatthepointisthatthereissomewayofreadingthepairsothattheywilldelivercontraryverdicts.Cooperativereaderscanthenworktoconstruethecasesinsuchaway.TomotivatecontextualismorIRI,thesewaysofreadingthecasesdonotnecessarilyhavetobethewaysthatonewouldmostnaturallyreadthesecasesifencounteringtheminisolation.22ItispossiblethatthethinkingofthesubjectintheFakeBarncaseisalsoopentobeingunderstoodinvarioussignificantlydifferentwaysaswell,andthatthisunder‐descriptionalsoexplainslukewarmamateurresponsesandsomedivisioninprofessionalresponsestothecase.23TheimportanceoftacitcommitmentsinourunderstandingofcaseshasbeenexploredmostsystematicallybyTamarGendler:seetheessayscollectedin(Gendler,2011).

April7,2011

27

skepticalpressureandfalsebeliefcasesalignroughlywiththejudgmentsofprofessionals,anddo

notseemtovarywithethnicityorgender.Therearenoobviousbarrierstoseeingepistemiccase

intuitionsastheproductsofourordinarymindreadingcapacities.

Alastproblemconcernsourhandlingofillusions.Mindreading,likeperceptionandlike

otherintuitivecapacities,issusceptibletocertainnaturalillusions,mostnotablyepistemic

egocentrism,orthetendencytomisrepresentthecognitionofthosewhooccupyamorenaïve

positionthantheobserver(e.g.Birch&Bloom,2004;2007;Nickerson,1999).Thelegitimacyofthe

casemethoddoesnotrequirethatphilosophersbeimmunetotheseillusions,orabletodistinguish

illusoryfromnon‐illusorycasesimmediatelyastheyareexperienced.Evenadvancedreflection

andtrainingdoesnotinsulateonefromillusion:forexample,physicsgraduatestudentsand

postdoctoralresearchersstillexperiencethecharacteristiccognitive‐perceptualillusionsofnaïve

‘impetustheory’physics,illusionsthatareexplicitlyatoddswiththeirtheoreticalknowledgeand

easilydiscountedonreflection(Kozhevnikov&Hegarty,2001).

Fortunately,inepistemologyasinphysics,intuitionisnottheonlytoolatourdisposal:

considerationsoftheoreticalunificationcanalsosupplysomeguidance.24Wesuspectsensory

illusionwherethedeliverancesofthesensesappeartoconflictwithoneanother,asintheMüller‐

Lyerillusion;wemayhavesimilarsuspicionswherethereisapparentconflictamongourepistemic

intuitions,forexample,conflictofthesortfoundinthecasesmotivatingcontextualism.Itisnot

transparentthattheseapparentlyconflictingintuitionsareillusions;theoristsofvarious

inclinationshavedevelopedinnovativeandsometimesstrangetheoriesofknowledgeand

knowledgeascriptiononwhichtheapparentconflictisnomorethanapparent.Tojudgewhether

thesetheoriesaretrueorfalse,wecandrawonagreatarrayofconsiderationsfromlogic,

linguistics,psychologyandphilosophy;wecanalsodevisenewcasestoofferpositivesupportto

ourtheoriesortoserveascounterexamples.Inepistemology,asinempiricalscience,itisnot

alwaysatrivialmattertodeterminewhetherwearesubjecttoanillusion,orwhetherthe

phenomenonweareinvestigatingisstrangerthanwehadthought.Butthefactthataformof

inquiryisdifficultdoesnotentailthatthereisanythingfundamentallywrongwithitsmethods.25

24Foramoredetaileddiscussedofthispoint,see(Ichikawa,forthcoming).25ForcommentsonanearlierdraftIamgratefultoJaneFriedman,DianaRaffman,SergioTenenbaum,JonathanWeinbergandJonathanWeisberg.

April7,2011

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