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Introduction to Game Theory Yale Braunstein Spring 2007
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Page 1: Introduction to Game Theory Yale Braunstein Spring 2007.

Introduction to Game Theory

Yale BraunsteinSpring 2007

Page 2: Introduction to Game Theory Yale Braunstein Spring 2007.

General approach

Brief History of Game Theory

Payoff Matrix

Types of Games

Basic Strategies

Evolutionary Concepts

Limitations and Problems

Page 3: Introduction to Game Theory Yale Braunstein Spring 2007.

Brief History of Game Theory

1913 - E. Zermelo provides the first theorem of game theory; asserts that chess is strictly determined

1928 - John von Neumann proves the minimax theorem

1944 - John von Neumann & Oskar Morgenstern write "Theory of Games and Economic Behavior”

1950-1953 - John Nash describes Nash equilibrium

Page 4: Introduction to Game Theory Yale Braunstein Spring 2007.

Rationality

Assumptions:

humans are rational beings

humans always seek the best alternative in a set of possible choices

Why assume rationality?

narrow down the range of possibilities

predictability

Page 5: Introduction to Game Theory Yale Braunstein Spring 2007.

Utility Theory

Utility Theory based on:

rationality

maximization of utility may not be a linear function of

income or wealth

It is a quantification of a person's preferences with respect to certain objects.

Page 6: Introduction to Game Theory Yale Braunstein Spring 2007.

What is Game Theory?

Game theory is a study of how to mathematically determine the best strategy for given conditions in order to optimize the outcome

Page 7: Introduction to Game Theory Yale Braunstein Spring 2007.

Game Theory

Finding acceptable, if not optimal, strategies in conflict situations.

Abstraction of real complex situation

Game theory is highly mathematical

Game theory assumes all human interactions can be understood and navigated by presumptions.

Page 8: Introduction to Game Theory Yale Braunstein Spring 2007.

Why is game theory important? All intelligent beings make decisions all the

time.

AI needs to perform these tasks as a result.

Helps us to analyze situations more rationally and formulate an acceptable alternative with respect to circumstance.

Useful in modeling strategic decision-making Games against opponents Games against "nature„

Provides structured insight into the value of information

Page 9: Introduction to Game Theory Yale Braunstein Spring 2007.

Types of Games

Sequential vs. Simultaneous moves

Single Play vs. Iterated

Zero vs. non-zero sum

Perfect vs. Imperfect information

Cooperative vs. conflict

Page 10: Introduction to Game Theory Yale Braunstein Spring 2007.

Zero-Sum Games

The sum of the payoffs remains constant during the course of the game.

Two sides in conflict

Being well informed always helps a player

Page 11: Introduction to Game Theory Yale Braunstein Spring 2007.

Non-zero Sum Game

The sum of payoffs is not constant during the course of game play.

Players may co-operate or compete

Being well informed may harm a player.

Page 12: Introduction to Game Theory Yale Braunstein Spring 2007.

Games of Perfect Information

The information concerning an opponent’s move is well known in advance.

All sequential move games are of this type.

Page 13: Introduction to Game Theory Yale Braunstein Spring 2007.

Imperfect Information

Partial or no information concerning the opponent is given in advance to the player’s decision.

Imperfect information may be diminished over time if the same game with the same opponent is to be repeated.

Page 14: Introduction to Game Theory Yale Braunstein Spring 2007.

Key Area of Interest

chance

strategy

Page 15: Introduction to Game Theory Yale Braunstein Spring 2007.

Matrix Notation

(Column) Player II

Strategy A Strategy B

(Row) Player I Strategy A (P1, P2) (P1, P2)

Strategy B (P1, P2) (P1, P2)

Notes: Player I's strategy A may be different from Player II's.

P2 can be omitted if zero-sum game

Page 16: Introduction to Game Theory Yale Braunstein Spring 2007.

Prisoner’s Dilemma & Other famous games

A sample of other games:

Marriage

Disarmament (my generals are more irrational than yours)

Page 17: Introduction to Game Theory Yale Braunstein Spring 2007.

Prisoner’s Dilemma

Notes: Higher payoffs (longer sentences) are bad.Non-cooperative equilibrium Joint maximumInstitutionalized “solutions” (a la criminal organizations, KSM)

NCE

Jt. max.

Page 18: Introduction to Game Theory Yale Braunstein Spring 2007.

Games of Conflict

Two sides competing against each other

Usually caused by complete lack of information about the opponent or the game

Characteristic of zero-sum games

Page 19: Introduction to Game Theory Yale Braunstein Spring 2007.

Games of Co-operation

Players may improve payoff through

communicating

forming binding coalitions & agreements

do not apply to zero-sum games

Prisoner’s Dilemma

with Cooperation

Page 20: Introduction to Game Theory Yale Braunstein Spring 2007.

Prisoner’s Dilemma with Iteration

Infinite number of iterations Fear of retaliation

Fixed number of iteration Domino effect

Page 21: Introduction to Game Theory Yale Braunstein Spring 2007.

Basic Strategies

1. Plan ahead and look back

2. Use a dominating strategy if possible

3. Eliminate any dominated strategies

4. Look for any equilibrium

5. Mix up the strategies

Page 22: Introduction to Game Theory Yale Braunstein Spring 2007.

Plan ahead and look back

Page 23: Introduction to Game Theory Yale Braunstein Spring 2007.

If you have a dominating strategy,

use it

Use strategy 1

Page 24: Introduction to Game Theory Yale Braunstein Spring 2007.

Eliminate any dominated strategy

Eliminate strategy 2 as it’s dominated by strategy 1

Page 25: Introduction to Game Theory Yale Braunstein Spring 2007.

Look for any equilibrium

Dominating Equilibrium

Minimax Equilibrium

Nash Equilibrium

Page 26: Introduction to Game Theory Yale Braunstein Spring 2007.

Maximin & Minimax Equilibrium

Minimax - to minimize the maximum loss (defensive)

Maximin - to maximize the minimum gain (offensive)

Minimax = Maximin

Page 27: Introduction to Game Theory Yale Braunstein Spring 2007.

Maximin & Minimax Equilibrium Strategies

Page 28: Introduction to Game Theory Yale Braunstein Spring 2007.

Definition: Nash Equilibrium

“If there is a set of strategies with the property that no player can benefit by changing her strategy while the other players keep their strategies unchanged, then that set of strategies and the corresponding payoffs constitute the Nash Equilibrium. “

Source: http://www.lebow.drexel.edu/economics/mccain/game/game.html

Page 29: Introduction to Game Theory Yale Braunstein Spring 2007.

Is this a Nash Equilibrium?

Page 30: Introduction to Game Theory Yale Braunstein Spring 2007.

Cost to press button = 2 units

When button is pressed, food given = 10 units

Boxed Pigs Example

Page 31: Introduction to Game Theory Yale Braunstein Spring 2007.

Decisions, decisions...

Page 32: Introduction to Game Theory Yale Braunstein Spring 2007.

Time for "real-life" decision making

Holmes & Moriarity in "The Final Problem"

What would you do… If you were Holmes? If you were Moriarity?

Possibly interesting digressions? Why was Moriarity so evil? What really happened?

–What do we mean by reality?–What changed the reality?

Page 33: Introduction to Game Theory Yale Braunstein Spring 2007.

Mixed Strategy

Page 34: Introduction to Game Theory Yale Braunstein Spring 2007.

Mixed Strategy Solution

Value in Safe

Probability of being Guarded

Expected Loss

Safe 1 10,000$ 1 / 11 9,091$ Safe 2 100,000$ 10 / 11 9,091$ Both 110,000$

Page 35: Introduction to Game Theory Yale Braunstein Spring 2007.

The Payoff Matrix for Holmes & Moriarity

Player #1

Player #2

Strategy #1 Strategy #2

Strategy #1

Strategy #2

Payoff (1,1) Payoff (1,2)

Payoff (2,1) Payoff (2,2)

Page 36: Introduction to Game Theory Yale Braunstein Spring 2007.

Where is game theory currently used?

–Ecology

–Networks–Economics

Page 37: Introduction to Game Theory Yale Braunstein Spring 2007.

Limitations & Problems

Assumes players always maximize their outcomes

Some outcomes are difficult to provide a utility for

Not all of the payoffs can be quantified

Not applicable to all problems

Page 38: Introduction to Game Theory Yale Braunstein Spring 2007.

Summary

What is game theory? Abstraction modeling multi-person

interactions

How is game theory applied? Payoff matrix contains each person’s

utilities for various strategies

Who uses game theory? Economists, Ecologists, Network people,...

How is this related to AI? Provides a method to simulate a thinking

agent

Page 39: Introduction to Game Theory Yale Braunstein Spring 2007.

Sources Much more available on the web. These slides (with changes and additions)

adapted from: http://pages.cpsc.ucalgary.ca/~jacob/Courses/Winter2000/CPSC533/Pages/index.html

Three interesting classics: John von Neumann & Oskar Morgenstern, Theory

of Games & Economic Behavior (Princeton, 1944). John McDonald, Strategy in Poker, Business & War

(Norton, 1950) Oskar Morgenstern, "The Theory of Games,"

Scientific American, May 1949; translated as "Theorie des Spiels," Die Amerikanische Rundschau, August 1949.