INTR310/710 - International-Relations.com · Web viewIn Islam there was a recognition of a zone of peace, the Dar al Islam surrounded by a potentially hostile Dar al-Harb, the zone

INTR13/71/72-310 R. James Ferguson © 2006

Lecture 4:

The Contested Role of Culture in International Relations

Topics: -1. Types of Cultures: Political, Economic and Strategic Cultures2. The Pervasive Influence of World-View in Constructing Political Realities3. Culture and Foreign Policy4. Culture Diversity and Assertion of Culture5. Cultures: Sources of Conflict, Sources of Cooperation6. The Resources of Cultural Internationalism7. Bibliography, Resources and Further Reading

1. Types of Cultures: Political, Strategic and Organisational Cultures

'Culture' is difficult to define narrowly but remains an important concept in international affairs. At the basic level culture is 'the human made part of the environment' which can be communicated, and which provides the patterns, meanings and knowledge of human activity socially and in relation to the world (see Hudson 1997b, pp2-4 for some further definitions).

Part of the problem with culture is that it is so inclusive that it is hard to know what to exclude (Hudson 197b, p2), and therefore it is very hard to 'operationalise' the concept, hard to test its effects and make exact behavioural predictions. It tends to be a fuzzy concept, but one central to much current international relations thinking. The new emphasis on culture in international relations derives from a number of trends: -

The past decade has also witnessed an explosion of interest in the concept of culture, a development that overlaps with the constructivist emphasis on the importance of ideas and norms. Thus, Thomas Berger and Peter Katzenstein have used cultural variables to explain why Germany and Japan have thus far eschewed more self-reliant military policies; Elizabeth Kier has offered a cultural interpretation of British and French military doctrines in the interwar period; and lain Johnston has traced continuities in Chinese foreign policy to a deeply rooted form of "cultural realism." Samuel Huntington's dire warnings about an imminent "clash of civilizations" are symptomatic of this trend as well, insofar as his argument rests on the claim that broad cultural affinities are now supplanting national loyalties. Though these and other works define culture in widely varying ways and have yet to provide a full explanation of how it works or how enduring its effects might be, cultural perspectives have been very much in vogue during the past five years. This trend is partly a reflection of the broader interest in cultural issues in the academic world (and within the public debate as well) and partly a response to the upsurge in ethnic, nationalist, and cultural conflicts since the demise of the Soviet Union. (Walt 1998)

Rather than try to cover all the meanings of 'culture', we can start this discussion by briefly outlining three areas where culture is often found useful in understanding international affairs. They are the related areas of political, strategic and

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organisational cultures, suggesting that different societies may structure these three overlapping areas of human activity in different ways.

A technical definition of political culture can be given: 'Political culture is all of the discourses, values, and implicit rules that express and shape political action and intentions, determine the claims groups may and may not make upon one another, and ultimately provide a logic of political action' (Hudson 1977b, p10). 'Politics' is deeply concerned about power and human relationships. It also tends to overlap with the five dimensions of national culture as developed by Geert Hofstede including "power distance (attitude toward hierarchy and communication), uncertainty avoidance (attitude toward rules and risks), individualism (attitude toward oneself and others), masculinity (attitude toward rivalry and consensus), and long-term orientation (attitude toward status and social order)" (Young 2002; see further Hofstede 2001). Indeed, these dimensions of political culture can also be mobilised in any self-recognised community or organisation that wields power through the use of rules or established patterns of human relations.

Leaders can often be empowered when they seem to embody or symbolise deeply help cultural beliefs of a nation (Hudson 1997b, p13). Numerous individuals or groups have staked a place on the world stage through linking cultural aspirations with political action. For example, a number of important policies have been based on political and cultural aspirations. The desire for a 'proper place under heaven' in modern China was part of the driving force of PRC policy, seeking to both modernise China and gain a stronger role in Asian affairs internationally (see Johnston 1995 for one view). The current aspirations of India to be recognised as an advanced technological power are in part based on a sense of India having a deep and refined culture worthy of a stronger role in international affairs (see Garver 2001). France's claim to be both a cultural and military power (under several Presidents including President Chirac) is in part based on a strong sense of the Republican tradition in France. The aspirations for German unification became a major feature of former Chancellor Kohl's leadership from 1989, based on a sense of Germany that could take up a strong and positive role in European and international affairs, having overcome many of the legacies of World War II (for Germany's political culture, see Duffield 1999).

Strategic culture overlaps with many of the features of political culture. Strategic culture essentially concerns the methods nations and other organised groups choose to achieve their goals, and the cultural factors which affect the way they seek cooperation or competition in the international scene. For example, several thinkers have argued that China tends to have a very strong strategic tradition which influences political activity, foreign affairs and defence activities, taking it beyond a narrow political realism based on Western models, though power politics is often used (see Fairbanks & Kierman 1974; Zhang & Yao 1996; Dellios 1994; Dellios 1997; Ferguson 1998a; for an alternate view, see Johnston 1995). Likewise, patterns of arms acquisition in some developing countries might be influenced by issues of prestige, affluence and status-hierarchy as much as direct defence issues (see Cha 2001). In this perspective, in times of warfare or intense conflict, certain cultural trends may be intensified, and become even more important than otherwise.

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Organisation culture refers to typical ways societies structure power relations in institutions, organise groups to achieve goals, and promote economic activities. Patterns of leadership, manager-worker relations, styles of cooperation and conflict, patterns of openness and secrecy, can be affected by broader cultural conceptions. Unique patterns of organisation culture, and the relationship between political and economic systems, can be detected in Carthaginian, Roman, Islamic, Arabic, Jordanian, Chinese, Malay and Japanese cultures (in general see Moussetis 2006; Nathan 1993a; Nathan 1993b Chen 1992; Watson 1992; Ferguson 1998b), though all these cultures have also been able to adapt to chanced circumstances. The ability to build viable and strong institutions which can carry out their tasks and even adapt their roles has been a major feature of the American and European traditions, while others would see distinctive advantages in American, Japanese and Chinese business organisations. From this viewpoint institutions such as NATO, ASEAN, and APEC are not just rational constructs, they also carry varying cultural elements from the cultures that constructed them, e.g. rule-compliance verses dialogue-based institutions.

Moreover, the overlapping of these three areas suggests that 'culture' often has a very broad, background affect on behaviours and institutions, but does not determine all aspects. Instead of looking at these three concepts separately, we will look at how culture is used in international affairs, using a range of examples.

2. The Pervasive Influence of World-View in Constructing Political Realities

Culture is important in influencing values, world-views, and the structure of human relationships. In general, 'culture tells us what to want, to prefer, to desire, and thus to value.' (Hudson 1997b, p8). The way culture can affect attitudes and social relations has already been verified in a wide range of areas, including varying patterns of individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, power distance and cultural complexity. (Hudson 1997b, p8). In summary, cultural variables can be shown to affect a wide range of social, political and business behaviours. However, it is less clear whether a particular culture in general can ever be used to predict an individual response, the way a government may act in a particular case, or the outcome of a specific negotiation or reaction to a crisis. Furthermore, individuals may utilise chunks of culturally acknowledged behaviour to meet their own ends, often in an individual or creative way (Hudson 1997b, p9). Culture and knowledge systems can also be competitive and contested; they can empower some and exclude others. There is thus ‘a darker side to knowledge: the fear of failing to master it, of being excluded from it, of becoming its object’ (Hobart 1995, p49).

We can, of course, look at the way that culture influences the decisions of leaders and restricts government action through popular pressure (e.g. via the linkage of domestic politics and foreign agenda). Culture is certainly an important element which effects foreign policy in specific cases (see below). However, at a deeper level, we can also argue that international relations in its broadest sense is itself the product of the interaction of different cultures. In this sense, international affairs are also an intellectual and cultural phenomena, 'of which changing ideas of war and peace are important aspects' (Iriye 1997, pix). Just as to some extent national communities must be 'imagined' and created (Iriye 1997, p16, following Anderson 1983), so too international relations can be imagined and re-invented within

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certain parameters. Akira Iriye argues that 'the internationalist imagination has exerted a significant influence in modern world history' (Iriye 1997, p16), e.g. the vision needed to create the League of Nations and the United Nations, as well as to create hundreds of diverse international organisations (IGOs, International Government Organisations and IGNOs, International Non-Government Organisations, which perform diverse international roles). Likewise, the intellectual tools admitted and perspectives used in international relations means that different nations are sometimes influenced by rather different ‘schools’ of thought , e.g. the somewhat more behaviourist orientation of much US research, the more historical trend of some English theoreticians, and new, emerging patterns of international relations analysis in the PRC (see Geeraerts & Men 2001; Thomas 2001; discussed further in week 5).

There is another crucial way in which culture shapes international affairs. Most developed, large-scale communities over the last 5,000 years have developed a vision of inter-state relations, 'world-system' or world society, to support the idea of reaching out into this broader world (Buzan & Little 2000). Different societies took very different views on how models of this world should be constructed. China, in the imperial past, developed a system of Asian international relations based on the tribute system, with a core, civilised area, surrounded by frontier states linked by tribute, then a more distant 'wild' region, with Chinese culture viewed as a key influence across these zones (see Mackerras 1992; Perelomov & Martynov 1983). In traditional Western Christendom, a community of Christian nations sharing religious and moral outlooks was envisaged as the basis real community and international law before the advent of the modern state system.1 Even when nation-state came to be viewed as the main source of political authority, only in the second half of the twentieth century would non-Europe nations be recognized as fit to join this club or be accepted as part of this 'civilised' community (Iriye 1997, p20). In Islam there was a recognition of a zone of peace, the Dar al Islam surrounded by a potentially hostile Dar al-Harb, the zone of non-believers where there were high levels of conflict (for one view, see Sivan 1998).

Both Christianity and Islam had certain universalising tendencies, trying to reach out to all of mankind. In the modern period, with the end of most European Empires, the state system first developed in 17th century Europe was extended to virtually all of the planet, as the world was carved up by borders based on over two hundred nation states. There has been a rapid expansion of independent states as some Federal states, e.g. Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, fragmented into a number of smaller entities, many of which demonstrate serious problems in the viability of the state system (see Huntington 1996, p33-36). As we have seen in earlier lectures (see lecture 2), there are debates as whether this pattern of self-determination will continue, or whether this will result in smaller, less viable units that will still need to negotiate their relations with their neighbours.

However, this has led to a dangerous tendency to simply equate the international system with the inter-state system (Buzan & Little 2000, pp5-6), a fallacy which 1 Hence the limited but real powers of the Pope and the Holy Roman Emperor in European affairs, with the dominance of the state system as a source of authority and legitimacy signalled by the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), though in fact it would take almost another two hundred years for these trends to be deeply established as patterns of European nationalism (see Cruz 2005).

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tends to make us ignore other elements that shape relations among communities, systems of political authority, economic cultures, and civilisations. In this context cultural perspectives may indeed be 'structural' elements in the changing international system: -

Socio-cultural structures are more difficult to specify in any international system. But drawing on the work of the English school [of historians] and constructivists, who have focused on the idea of an international society, it seems clear that international units within an empire or an anarchic arena can be constrained by a common ideology or set of beliefs about appropriate norms and rules of behaviour (Buzan & Little 2000, p12).

This state system has become normative over the last five hundred years and dominant in the last three hundred years, but is also challenged by the needs of states, cultures, economies and civilisations to interact. What is paradoxical is that at the same time as the state system has strengthened, so too has the need to interact internationally, thereby supporting trends towards global economic networks (16th-19th centuries), waves of internationalism (late 19th through early 20th century) and new phases of globalisation (see lectures 1 & 2). We can sample this by a glimpse at some international organisations and patterns of internationalisation that would set the stage for later development.

Examples of Cooperative Internationalisation Trends 1851-1945 (Compiled from Iriye 1997 & Nolan 1995).

Creation of Red Cross in 1859 (and later on Red Crescent) 1885 International Institute of Statistics (standardising

national statistical data) 1888 International Council of Women 1889 International Workingman's Association (= The

Second International) The Hague Conference in 1899, met to strengthen

international law Creation of 400 international institutions before World

War I Universal Postal Union, created 1874 (standard weights

and measure to aid international mail) Creation of Parliament of Religions (Chicago, 1893) Holding of 42 international Exhibitions and Expositions

1851-1914 (similar to World fairs, Iriye 1997, p30) Proposal to develop Esperanto as an international

language (first textbook in 1887) 1910, Brussels, creation of Union des Associations

Internationales, serving as headquarters for 132 'cross-national organizations' (Iriye 1997, p32)

1928 Pact of Paris, legal agreement trying to renounce use of force to end international disputes

1928 creation of World Association of Cooks' Societies (now has 1.5 million members in 52 countries, Iriye 1997, p173)

The creation of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO constitution completed in 1945)

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Today, there are thousands of key Inter-Governmental and international Non-Government Organisations (IGOs and INGOs) performing hundreds of necessary tasks (see for example National Standards Association, 1993; Henderson 1998). At first these organisations were largely focused on Western nations (the West and its empires controlled 84% of the earth's territory in 1914), which gradually invited other modernising communities to become involved, e.g. Japan, Persia, and Turkey.

Internationalism itself is therefore an attitude and has cultural features, which find expression in new and vigorous institutions. What was emerged over the last century were two impulses, one pragmatic, the other ideal: -

a pragmatic need to coordinate international activity as global interactions expanded. This ranged from issues as simple as developing a system of passports and postage, through to means to reduce conflict in Europe, through to international networks of ports, railways and roads that allowed trade to flourish.

the creation of 'a vision of international community interests and ideals, an imagined world order in which these interests and ideals would overcome differences and antagonisms among nations' (Iriye 1997, p32). Here a vision of community, founded in part upon tradition that goes back to notions of civilisational hierarchy (Roman Law, Christendom, the Chinese tribute system), but was reinvented by European thinkers such as Grotius and Kant in order to establish norms for interstate relations and to establish 'universal' peace (see lecture 2).

After the horrors of World War II and the tensions of the nuclear gamesmanship of the Cold War, it was recognised that some kind of system was needed to moderate international conflict as well as set the stage for international reconstruction, improved trade, and heightened levels of prosperity. The key element which was revolutionary was the idea of a mindset which used a vision of international order in transnational debates. The United Nations and its related institutions, as well as key International Financial Institutions such as the World Bank and IMF were created in this context (see Henderson 1998; Stevenson 2000). However, we can debate how far these institutions really went beyond particular national cultures of the dominant states of the period (Iriye 1997, p60).

The currently used notion of a truly universal, integrated global culture, i.e. a universal civilisation, is very much the product of Western civilisation (Hobart 1995, p50), and tended to develop as Western nations expanded and reached out to control much of the globe. In the second half of the 20 th century, 'the concept of a universal civilization helps justify Western cultural dominance of other societies and

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the need for those societies to ape Western practices and institutions. Universalism is the ideology of the West for confrontations with non-Western cultures' (Huntington 1996, p66). Furthermore, current theories of international relations, which focus on the political-military relations of the last three hundred years, also tend to be highly Eurocentric (Buzan & Little 2000, p5). It is not surprising, therefore, that the interpretation of the role of culture in international affairs is a controversial and highly contested area. Furthermore, such a claim to global dominion has a down side, since such self-confidence is ‘likely to ignore what people are actually doing somewhere in the world’ outside the preconceived mind-set (Hobart 1995, p68). In other words, if our conception framework excludes a large number of interactions and processes that are occurring, then our understanding will always be incomplete and our conclusions insecure (see further Hopf 1998).

New theories such as constructivism suggest that neo-realism and power-balance theories have made several dangerous assumptions about how global and state relations work. These include: -

1) The 'fallacy of the unitary actor state', when in fact a range of different groups within government, state and society interact in modern diplomacy and global flows, e.g. leaders, ministries, interest groups, business groups, civil society etc. Thus: -

Constructivist approaches, on the other hand, emphasize the role of social norms and institutions, stressing ways in which actors and their preferences derive from social structure. That is, social structures not only regulate behavior but also define the social identities and interests of actors. On this view, the state is modeled as the product of social processes, and state action reflects a socially constructed "logic of appropriateness." Although some of this work analyzes the embeddedness of states in a wider social structure, an important line of thinking emphasizes the ways in which states are the product of national cultural and interpretative systems. In addition, constructivist theories of social action typically suggest that institutions influence state behavior through socialization and habitualization. Through processes of social learning and persuasion, actors "internalize" new norms and rules of appropriate behavior and redefine their interests and identities accordingly. Normative authority can persuade public and private actors to change their interests. (Goodman & Jinks 2003)

2) If state focus on 'self interest', this does not tell us much about the 'self' referred to, nor the contents of such interests. The 'self' is shaped by identity politics, history, and reflections of actors, e.g. great power roles taken up by states in relation to current crises, past greatness, or future 'destinies' (Hopf 1998). Specific interests are often shaped by identity (Hopf 1998) as well as by specific physical needs.

3) States as actors in the IR system and as social groupings help construct partial international orders, but remain 'rigorously constrained by the webs of understanding of the practices, identities, and interests of other actors that prevail in particular historical contexts' (Hopf 1998). Thus, for example, the growth in power of a nearby non-allied state

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need not be viewed as dangerous unless it is sustained by assumptions or assessments that lead to threat perceptions, leading in turn to a range of security dilemmas, in turn driven by uncertainty, lack of cooperation, or reputations based on past experience (Hopft 1998).

4) States and institutions, beyond accruing various forms of power, also seek to reproduce themselves as viable in the future, and to police regimes that sustain, present their identities in the international system (Hopf 1998). Thus, even powerful states will invest or disinvest in different organisation as they meet these diverse needs, e.g. varying degrees of US and European support for NATO as it changed its role from 1991, different views by the US and Russia of the UNSC, etc.

5) In order to sustain this complex of identities and interests, power states will often seek to maintain 'a well-articulated ideological hegemony' against a changing landscape of alternative ideas (Hopf 1998). This is most notable for past empires (British, French), for 'reluctant empire builders', a term used of US global power networks (see Ferguson 2203 & 2004), but also for new grouping that wish to assert influence in specific areas, e.g. EU's export of governance concepts (democracy, human rights, accountability, transparency etc) in its external relations, in spite of some concerns about some 'democratic deficit' within the EU supranational organisations itself.

3. Culture and Foreign Policy

One area where there has been some effort to understand the detailed impact of diverse cultures has been to study the way actors (leaders or institutions) reach decisions in foreign affairs (Hudson 1997b, pp4-7), especially during times of crisis. Aside from individual characteristics and psychology, governmental politics and structure, it is often assumed that individuals must be affected to some degree by the differences in their societies, their historical experiences, value systems and language structures. Here micro-cultures might be important (Hudson 1997b, p16), e.g. those in particular professions, areas of research, different groups in government, the graduates of a particular university. The 'epistemic' communities form their own theories, jargon and preferred modes of explanation. In so far as one group is chosen to help shape foreign policy, they also flow into the impact of knowledge-cultures on political decision making, e.g. certain 'clubs' of economists, advisers or diplomats who argue for a particular orientation to world affairs. Thus ideals of neo-realism (see lecture 2) or neo-liberal economic policies (arguing for open markets as the driver of international growth) are often carried forward by sets of economists, advisers and diplomats trained in these schools of thought. Epistemic communities have been found to have an important role in the gradual emergence of a shared European political identities (ESDI, EDI, EU convergence among elites see Howorth 2004) and in reduction of regional tensions within ASEAN via ASEAN security think-tanks.

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Key issues include: -

* Do cultural differences lead nations to predictable patterns of interaction?* 'Under what conditions would we expect culture to play a more important role in international interactions?' (Hudson 1997b, p18)* Do 'cultural syndromes' lead to predictable 'propensities of thought, reaction, and action'? (Hudson 1997b, p18)* Is the protection of national culture and identity itself a core 'national interest'?* What are the dynamics of cultural change and how can this be measured, along with its impact on foreign policy? (Hudson 1997b, p18)

Moreover, since the 1920s, governments have often tried explicitly to use culture in foreign affairs, promoting their own languages, music, media and views overseas. In the past was usually a promotion of 'high culture', or the view of one culture as being a 'leading civilisation' which had a duty to tutor lesser nations, e.g. in 19th century British policy and in late 19th and early 20th century US attitude to parts of Latin America including Cuba and Haiti. Today countries such as France, Germany, Japan and China still seek to promote themselves as the source of great cultural resources. It was thus recognized that there were cultural borderlands where different cultures interact, and of the usefulness of cultural diplomacy (see for example Finn 2003). Britain and France have been willing to promote their own language and culture as part of nation-to-nation diplomacy, e.g. the operation of the British Council throughout the world, e.g. in Malaysia. France has actively sought the 'rayonnement (spread) of the most notable aspects of French culture, including the French language and intellectual traditions' (Schraeder 2000), a trend also aiding French business relations in parts of Africa. Through 2000-2003, France has been extending its trade and contact with many African nations, as noted in Franco-African Summits, with a cultural core leading to wider political interactions: -

The latest Franco-African summit in Paris was further confirmation of a fresh trend reflecting new geopolitical realities. The bi-annual summit can no longer be viewed simply as a French-speaking club meeting. Two Anglophone countries, South Africa and Nigeria are now France's largest sub-Saharan markets and Nigeria's exports to France outstrip those of Cote d'Ivoire - formerly France's top trading partner in Africa. The language divide is becoming less relevant by the week.

As the international geopolitical power structure is in flux, it was not surprising that all African nations, with the exception of Somalia, were present in Paris. (Misser 2003)

Likewise, Turkey tried for a time to gain some benefits from its position as a culture borderland between Europe and the Central Asia, capitalising on its access to European trade and technology, as well as a tradition cultural connection with the Turkic people of most of central Asia (the cultural area known as Turkestan). Likewise, India and China present themselves to the international community not just as powerful, modernising states but as the sources of great civilisational-complexes. The possession of such cultural resources, expressed in religious and historical terms, has sometimes been used to bolster political legitimacy in Asia, and has had

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a complex impact on the political life of countries in Eastern Europe, America, and the Middle East (for examples, see Alagappa 1995 Hudson 1997a; Chay 1990).

The Cold War itself saw an extremely active phase of the use of culture in international relations: -

The ideal of cross-national cultural communication and understanding, of course, was compromised by the geopolitical realities of the cold war, as the United States and the Soviet Union waged what has been called World War III on all fronts. Cultural activities, ranging from intelligence gathering and propaganda in the media to student exchanges and subsidies to foreign intellectuals, became instruments of official policy. International power relations, defined, to that extent, international cultural relations. (Iriye 1997, p151).

Culture, then, could be put to use in propaganda and ideological battles. We can glimpse this in two major works published and promoted during the World War II and Cold War period. Hans Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace was written in this period precisely to justify the culture of political realism in a world of conflict (see lecture 2). Likewise, Karl Popper wrote a famous work of political philosophy, The Open Society and Its Enemies, during the early part of this period to attack (indirectly, via and analysis of Plato and Marx) both fascism and communism, arguing that both undermined democratic societies. These works supported specific political and cultural views of how societies, political power and the international system should operate. Today, many proponents of Western-led globalisation can also be accused of Western 'globalism', i.e. supporting the dominance of a particular 'rationalistic' culture from which they benefit (for one telling critique, see Saul 1993). In other words, current descriptions of globalisation are often ideological projects expressing preferences as much as realities.

Likewise, Japan from the 1980s also relied on cultural exchange as one of its three pillars of foreign policy, the other two being security and economic activities, a trend which first developed under Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru (Iriye 1997, p167). One of the key elements of this has been the promotion of Japanese cultural events overseas, and an extensive programme of student exchange which has allowed foreign students to enter Japan in large numbers (while restricting any permanent settlement). Today, Japan continues to project its image as a non-violent, democratic (though with some variations from Western experience), and high tech society that is an active partner in world affairs, even as it moves towards a somewhat more active military and defence role internationally, i.e. a slow creep towards mormalisation (see Hughes 2004). Likewise, the use of politico-cultural theories such as the idea of the of the 'developmental state' or the 'bureaucratic state' have been used to both explain and further Japan's national economic policies, and form part of a complex dialogue with the US and Europe over the international economic order and its regulation (see Young 2002).

International organisations have also tried to benefit from cultural diplomacy and by developing cultural internationalism. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM, now with 113 members), even from the earlier Bandung Conference held in Indonesia in 1955, argued for active cultural exchange, but this was never followed up, thereby not building active bridges of understanding between Africa, Asia, the

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Middle East and Latin America which would have strengthened other forms of cooperation (Iriye 1997, pp161-162). This has changed to some extend with the speeches made at NAM and G-77 meetings over the last decade, where at least a critical view of certain aspects of the modern global system are often expressed. Thus the NAM conferences have tried to bring together converging political and cultural views that allow for greater cooperation among developing nations. Its current main agenda is the eradication of poverty and the move towards sustainable development in its member countries, thereby giving the organisation relevance after the end of the Cold War (Xinhua News 2000), based on strong South-South cooperation (see further Morphet 2004).

Other organisations have made a positive use of culture. The ASEAN organisation (the Association of South East Asian Nations) has been quite successful in promoting a consensus-based system of inter-state relations based on the principle of non-interference. This has led to a certain sharing of styles of diplomacy and business practice, at least among elites in Southeast Asia. ASEAN itself provides a nuanced example of how trade, cultural patterns, and dialogue can mix to create a successful international organisation (for further detail, see Katsuma 2003; Dellios & Ferguson 1997; Ferguson 2001). ASEAN itself has largely been able to impress the wider international environment with these values through its central role in the extended dialogue groups of the ASEAN Regional Forum, and through the Asia-Europe meetings that have proceeded since 1996. In spite of numerous criticisms, some system of shared values in Southeast Asia does seem to be influencing foreign affairs, and to some extent resisting certain Western claims (see Acharya 2003; Dupont 1996; Hitchcok 1994 for critical accounts). Likewise, relations between Southeast Asia and China are strongly shaped by the experiences of history and the interaction of cultural systems: -

This preference of the countries of Southeast Asia to deal with China in their own way can be labelled accommodation, and denounced as weakness, but as a response it needs to be understood. Though the ASEAN states may prefer to deal with China as a group, it is upon their bilateral relations regimes that they will ultimately have to rely--and these are deeply influenced by history and culture. Southeast Asian leaders are thus likely to give China what they believe the Chinese want--due deference, status as a great power, recognition of China's interests even while pursuing their own--in return for non-interference in their internal affairs and fair trading relations. These are what China traditionally provided. This would be to trade on the moral dimension of Chinese foreign relations culture, which realists would consider something of a weak reed. But Southeast Asian states taking this course would do so on a stronger basis than realists might realize. For to accept de facto Chinese hegemony would not imply neglecting military preparedness. As in the past, any Chinese invasion would be vigorously resisted--after which due acceptance of Chinese hegemony would again need to be symbolically re-established. (Stuart-Fox 2004)

In other examples both the OAS and the World Bank (through various conditionalities) have recently made limited moves to recognise and support indigenous rights and cultural systems (on the basis of improving human rights, local development, and aiding cultural diversity), though this has often been problematic for individual nations, e.g. even for Mexico and Chile (Devalpo 2006; Sarfaty 2005; Lam 2004; Conaway 2003; Conaway 2001b; Conaway 2001a).

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There has thus been a conscious use of cultural and value systems in support of specific foreign policy agenda, in some regional groupings, in selected IGOs, and in diffuse support for an internationalist agenda.

4. Culture Diversity and Assertions of Culture

Beyond this, specific cultural systems has sometimes been viewed as in need of protection under current patterns of globalisation, and is sometimes linked to patterns of nationalism or assertive claims within the international system. Several key issues emerge from the enormous cultural diversity of civilisations, societies, and sub-communities around the world. Cultural extinctions have been occurring at a rapid rate over the last three thousand years, especially as small societies are destroyed, transformed or incorporated by more powerful groups. In the past, the formation of extended territorial kingdoms and empires were the main driving force for this. Today, the main driving forces seem to be the formation and incorporative processes of modern nation-states, transnational economic flows, and the modernising forces of globalisation. We can glimpse of these problems by the way that languages carried by cultures are in some cases undergoing extinction, e.g. some 200 languages in Africa are in serious decline and may soon now longer be living languages, while 17 languages in the region of former Soviet zone are in danger (Brenzinger et al. 1991; Kibrik 1991). One estimate suggests that of 'the 5,000-6,700 extant languages, more than half will probably be extinct by the end of the 21 st century' (Kellman 2001), though it is possible that local revivals and open, globalised information sources may save some of these languages (see Whaley 2003).

Moreover, diversity can be a crucial human resource. There is a parallel from biology which suggested that a minimum number of viable species is required to maintain a stable ecosystem. Likewise, unique plants and animals once lost are almost impossible to resurrect, and their unique natural function, as well as chemical, medical and industrial uses can also be lost. The bio-diversity argument is paralleled by an argument concerning cultural diversity. For example, the European Union has argued that its diversity of languages is both a problem and a resource, and that economic efficiency can be developed while protecting a range of different subcultures and unique heritages in Europe (Attali 1997). The cultural and linguistic diversity of Europe, alongside its competitive state-system, may have helped drive forward the Renaissance and the Industrial revolution, in contrast to the more unifying and ultimately more stagnating state of knowledge in late Imperial China, especially in the late 19th century (Ridley 1998). From this point of view, linguistic diversity is also a resource (Muhlhausler 1994).

Biological, philosophical, linguistic and cultural diversity are all important aspects (Sangalli 1996) of living in a wider, and more adaptive society. Already, business groups and corporations have tried to turn around this ‘problem’ of diversity into a resource, though sometimes dealing with cultural diversity in a rather functionalist way. Terms such as 'human resources' and 'social capital' recognise the vast array of human skills needed to create functioning large-scale modern societies. Likewise, governments, including those of Australia, Canada and the US have tried to use the skills and knowledge of minority and ethnic groups to improve their foreign relations and trade competitiveness. The social capital argument suggests that a wide range of diversity may be needed to face future unknown challenges.

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Diversity and the creation of qualitatively differentiated patterns of social capital are also one path towards tolerance and a strong underpinning for democratic societies (see Sullivan 1999).

Another problem is that cultural theory can sometimes be interpreted to suggest that certain cultures are so unique that they cannot readily take part in international dialogue or cosmopolitan projects. Taken to extreme, cultural essentialism can feed conceptions of an exclusive nationalism, xenophobic conceptions of superiority, or fears of culture pollution and identity-loss (Iriye 1997, p8). New or fragile nations often appeal to specific ethnic, national, religious, or cultural considerations to reinforce their sense of identity, and to develop loyalty to a new or threatened state structure, e.g. at various times in Serbia, Bosnia, Chechnya, Latvia, and Turkmenistan. Indeed, political polarisation and the creation of ethnic myths are often needed to create this kind of nationalism, and generate conflict or exclusion of ethnic groups with whom they have often lived in relative peace in the past (this is particularly the case in the Balkans and the Middle East). Fears of cultural pollution have also been used politically to exclude and control ideas that threaten particular governments or their cultural agenda, e.g. in PRC, Vietnam, and even in defence of the French language. The new cosmopolitanism, however, argues that dialogue among diverse cultural groups will support greater tolerance and justice in the international system (see for example Shapcott 2002), as well as provide a creative range of options for international society (discussed further in lecture 11).

Even at a more moderate level, the contrast between national culture verses internationalism can complicate foreign relations. In Japan, for example, the word bunka became popular in the 1920s in contrast to 'civilisation and enlightenment'. Rather than simply following the path of Westernising and modernising (as in the early Meiji Westernisers), this was a claim of unique Japanese 'essence' which should not be ignored in national policy (Gaenslen 1997, p266). In the broader history of Japanese foreign policy, there has been this tendency to veer between conceptions of Japan as fitting into a basically Western world order, and Japan as a unique civilisation able to make a particular contribution in the Asian world (Johnson 1994; Morris-Suzuki 1995). Japan can thus swing towards or away from various poles of cooperation, e.g. between China and the US, between seeking deeper integration in Asian verses a more general role in world affairs (Johnson 1994). This, of course, may be part of a deeper identity debate in Japanese culture, turning to the West for enrichment, then back in search of a unique Japanese 'soul' (Johnson 1994). Here, some of the negative cultural assertiveness of 1930s and 1940s has left a complicating legacy, with Japan for a time claiming cultural leadership of a proposed Asian co-prosperity sphere (Iriye 1977, pp134-136; Kim 1980). Today, any such indirect leadership would be based on increased trade with Asia, and on Japan's technonationalism, combined with a comprehensive view of her security (Ferguson 1995). At the same time, diffuse elements of national culture such as Shinto, the role of the Yasukuni Shrine, views of the war dead, and the Japanese education system still remain controversial for both China and South Korea, and have heightened tensions between China and Japan through 2005-2006 (see Pye 2003). These trends can weaken national influence: -

Five times in four years, Koizumi has visited the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo, a memorial where the names of the fallen of Japan's wars are enshrined -- including 14 convicted

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Class A war criminals from World War II. Only two other sitting prime ministers in the past twenty years visited the shrine at all, and each only went once. In Japan, opinion over Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni is almost evenly split, with six former prime ministers and five of Japan's six largest newspapers opposing them. But the dominant Mori faction of the LDP, to which both Koizumi and the influential chief cabinet secretary, Shinzo Abe, belong, has strong connections to Japan's political leadership of the 1930s and 1940s. (Abe, for instance, is the grandson of Nobusuke Kishi, a member of Prime Minister Hideki Tojo's wartime cabinet; Kishi's legacy remains controversial even though later, as prime minister, Kishi began Japan's policy of providing large-scale reparations to Southeast Asia.) Such ties make the Koizumi government prone to holding conservative conceptions of national interests and render it more suspect than its predecessors in the eyes of many Asians, including the Chinese (Calder 2006).

It can also undermine specific cooperative foreign policy goals: -

Koizumi has consistently stressed the personal and unofficial nature of his visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. Beijing has nevertheless criticized them sharply. Seasoned U.S. diplomats suggest privately that the Yasukuni issue is more damaging to Japanese regional influence now than it was even two or three years ago, because China is emerging as a skilled diplomatic player that can use the history card more effectively to marginalize Japan than previously due to its growing political and economic clout. Two months after the February 2005 U.S.- Japan Security Consultative Committee meetings, at which Washington and Tokyo decided to make a priority of peacefully resolving Taiwan Strait issues, major demonstrations broke out in Beijing and Shanghai against Koizumi's Yasukuni visits and the standard depiction of the war in Japanese textbooks (which the Chinese see as downplaying Japan's culpability for the conflict). Many observers note that Beijing has particularly strong incentives to prevent any strengthening of the U.S.-Japanese alliance on Taiwan-related matters. And China, claiming that Japan has not sincerely atoned for its wartime aggression, has also used the issue to hinder Japan's bid for the permanent UN Security Council seat that many feel it richly deserves (Tokyo, after all, funds 20 percent of the UN budget, compared to China's 3 percent). (Calder 2006)

Culture, in this sense, can also be 'an assertion of both national unity and national independence', or an assertion in relation to the demands of other states (Gaenslen 1997, p266). Culture, cultural diplomacy and particular institutional cultures can therefore form important parts of national strategy.

The main trend recently has been to recognise that the world consists of hundreds of different subcultures and cultural groups, operating at the level of the village, tribe, local region, city, nation, state, and civilisational groupings. Diversity of cultures has been actively recognized as the counterbalance to the quest for a core set of human values (Iriye 197, p141), and the push towards some sort of integrating global geo-culture. Agencies such as UNESCO have actively taken on this diversity of cultures as one its key resources, and even transnational corporations, though pushing for a specific material and economic culture, are now trying to utilise cultural understandings and local cultural symbols for their own benefit. Though a genuine multiculturalism may be relatively rare within nations (here we might contrast Canadian, Australian and Malaysian experiences), this cultural diversity is a reality for most regions in the world. Likewise, there can be problematic cultural diversities between producers and buyers within commodity chains, and between creators and audiences in global information markets.

How well do governments and systems of international governance to cope with widely diverse cultural systems? This has led to tensions in globalisation, disputes

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over the pursuit of human rights, the maintenance of concepts of a truly just and international law, and even within countries serious debates about pluralism, multiculturalism, national culture and interpretations of history (this can be so intense that it has been labelled in the US as culture wars, Iriye 1997, p171). Alternative models of cultural accommodation, options such as multiculturalism, political pluralism, the promotion of cosmopolitanism, verses the protection of a core national culture, remain hotly debated in countries such as Australia, France, PRC, the US and Russia.

Chinese Calligraphers in Qufu (Confucius' Family Forest and Cemetery:A Tradition Art in a Traditional Setting - But Who Forms the Market?

Photo Copyright © : R. James Ferguson 1998

5. Cultures: Sources of Conflict, Sources of Cooperation

There are numerous ways that cultural system reduce or aid conflict and cooperation. One of the simplest problems has been that of cultural imperialism whereby a dominant political or economic power can impose its power on others, or create conditions whereby its culture has preference. This was the case with most European empires (including the Spanish, French, English and Dutch). In the contemporary period, the US is often seen as directly and indirectly aiding Americanisation, largely through companies spreading cultural commodities as well as having strong educational, research, media and publishing industries. Partial Americanisation has been experienced in part in places as diverse as Greece, Japan, Saipan and Australia.

However, it must also be remembered that American culture itself has been greatly broadened by cosmopolitan influences, most from Europe since World War I, and increasingly through more prominence of Latin American, African and Asian cultural streams. Some would argue that in large measure American culture has now become rather de-centred (Iriye 1997, p84) and what is being spread around the world is much more than a WASP (White-Anglo-Saxon-Protestant) American culture. This means there can be more bridges between commodities and local or foreign cultures, but does not guarantee a genuinely cosmopolitan media or multi-valued production system.

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Even though certain aspects of 'Western/American" culture may have been adopted (media, economic models, technological imperatives, etc.) this does not guarantee a complete adoption of social and political values, even today (see Emmerson 1998 for limitations to this Westernism even in East Asia. For French 'resistance', see Moïsi 1998). Resistance remains a viable strategy for many communities even in the face of global forces. There are ‘many African, Asian, and Oceanic small-scale societies’ which are alive and quite able to utilise elements of both local and Western culture (Howell 1995, p171). Diffusion of cultural patterns ranging from religions, arts, dance, music and views on nature is occurring between a wide range of cultural groupings (Howell 1995, pp172-176). Likewise, since the 1990s a distinct resistance to the more superficial elements of global culture, sometimes viewed as ‘anti-culture’ or de-civilising and overly commercialised, has emerged in many countries, including Italy, France, Hungary, and India, alongside and efforts by civil society organisations to reclaim public political and media space, sometimes dubbed ‘culture jamming’ (Worth & Kuhling 2004; New Straits Times 1995). A wide range of patterns of resistance can be utilised even by weaker groups ranging from passive resistance, inertia, non-violent protest, legal obstruction, creative re-adaptation of the product, popular violence, or selective sabotage through to outright terrorism (see Pettman 1991 for further examples; discussed further in week 11).

However, Western culture cannot be just equated with 'Coca-Cola' and blue jeans. The cultural, legal, philosophical and scientific legacy of the West is deep and diverse. As suggested by Samuel Huntington the 'essence of Western civilization is the Magna Carta not the Magna Mac' (Huntington 1997, p58). The problem is, however, that social and humanitarian elements are not so easily transported by economic forces. Secondly, even the deeper of themes of the human tradition, ranging from religious tolerance to human rights and democracy, have sometimes been used as ‘political footballs’ to claim cultural superiority over other societies. This has resulted in very entrenched arguments about human rights and the role of the UNSC or ad-hoc coalitions in various forms of intervention (see lecture 2; Stein 2004). It is this political usage of human rights, unfortunately, which has partly undermined the humanitarian missions of both the UN and a wide range of humanitarian agencies, ranging from Amnesty International to the former United Nations Human Rights Commission, now reformed as the new Human Rights Council in March 2006, see Debono 2006 for one critical view). This shift towards humanitarian and/or political intervention, especially if 'unauthorised' by clear UNSC resolutions, can head towards a direct pre-emption of policy by powerful international players, e.g. accusations of this in relation to NATO war campaign in relation to Kosovo, and the US in relation to Iraq.

A related problem is the issue of cultural appropriation, where cultural elements are taken from the context of their society and reused in a new context, often as part of an academic or commodified ‘product'. This can be harmless, but in other cases leads to a complete misinterpretation of the source culture (Howell 1995, pp164-166), can infringe religious customs and in other cases is blatant theft of intellectual property. Yet other cultures, too, have sophisticated views of knowledge, e.g. in Bali knowledge is ‘knowing and remembering as the act of agents’, i.e. is involves action and work, the ability to do, rather than just an abstract collection of information (Hobart 1995, p51, p59) and is often incorporated in sophisticated art, music, dance

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and religious rituals. This is a dynamic culture which has been able to take on, integrate and use diverse influences (Hindu, Buddhist, Islamic, European), and turn back and enter into a humorous debate with the world, often using three languages in one performance (e.g. Javanese, Indonesia and English, see Hobart 1995, pp63-64). Certain elements of the dance-music culture are readily adapted to tourist needs, but fortunately the broader culture which sustains these artistic products remains vital and only partly reliant on the tourist dollar. Likewise, tourist money and UNESCO funds have helped restore and maintain major monuments around the world, e.g. Buddhist sites in Sri Lanka, which has balanced the needs of locals and visitors to some degree (Otchet 1998, pp20-21) Not all other cultures, especially indigenous ones, have retained such a relative balance, and in many cases indigenous communities have to struggle to reclaim a heritage and culture from extinction or destructive exploitation (see for example Gibbs 1991). In many cases, the culture and its ‘relics’ are plundered, with specialists hoping to ‘master the other culture’ (Hobart 1995, p54. This phrasing of the process does not seem to be accidental). This cultural knowledge is still often viewed as a type of power that can be appropriated and used by a dominant group. More recently, efforts have been made to mobilise indigenous and local understandings in a range of cooperative ways, ranging from poverty reduction, health care provision, through to management of ecosystems (see Ross & Pickering 2002 for one example).

At the highest level of cultural organisation, civilisation groupings, one scholar in particular has argued that civilisational differences can also lead to conflict (Huntington 1996, p43). Samuel Huntington wrote a famous article in the influential Foreign Affairs journal (1993) that major conflicts in the future would be between civilisations, and along geographical fracture lines between civilisations. In the 19th century wars had been between nations, and in the 20th century were often fought between ideologies. Huntington argued that, with the end of the Cold War, different cultural and religious formations would tend to intensify conflicts. He explained this: -

The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principle conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future (Huntington 1993, p22)

Huntington argues that a civilisation is a cultural identity, and the highest, most general level of identity. It includes elements of language, history, religion, customs, institutions, as well as self-identification (Huntington 1993, p24). For Huntington, the major civilisations existing today are the ‘Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African’ civilisations (Huntington 1993, p25). Huntington feels that there are a number of reasons why conflict between civilisations will tend to grow, and why they are often the most intense (Huntington 1993, pp25-27): -

1) Civilisation differences, e.g. in history, language, culture, religion, are basic and real.2) The world is ‘becoming smaller’, with more interaction among different cultural groups.

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3) Modernisation has led to a loss of tradition and identity, which is often filled by fundamentalist religious and national feeling.4) The dominant role of the West has led to a response by other civilisation to strengthen themselves, e.g. the rise of Islamic radicalism.5) Cultural ‘characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved’,6) Economic regionalism is increasing, thereby increasing areas of competition.

Huntington describes several areas where these civilisation and cultural differences could intensify conflicts (Huntington 1993, pp29-34). He argued that the war in Bosnia was on the borderline between Western Catholic Europe and Slavic and Islamic East Europe. Likewise, he saw growing tensions between Europe and Islamic states, e.g. over religious values, migrations, and differences in wealth. Lastly, he noted growing tensions between a growth in East Asian power and American views of how the world should be run. Thus he argued that the ‘next world war, if there is one, will be a war between civilizations’ (Huntington 1993, p39). Even if war does not occur, cultural differences will tend to lead to more misunderstandings and intensify competition.

Huntington argues that these trends have serious implications for the future: -

It will also, however, require the West to develop a more profound understanding of the basic religious and philosophical assumptions underlying other civilizations and the ways in which people in those civilizations see their interests. It will require an effort to identify elements of commonality between Western and other civilizations. For the relevant future, there will be no universal civilization, but instead a world of different civilizations, each of which will have to learn to coexist with others. (Huntington 1993, p49)

If Huntington is right, then no simple set of universal values to provide norms for global governance will be agreed upon. He sees this mix of cultures as inherently conflict-promoting and needing careful management.

There are numerous criticisms that can be made of Huntington. In brief, we could debate his break down of civilisational groups, e.g. he happily includes the Arab, Turkic, and Malay worlds within an overarching Islamic civilisation, yet these three cultures are very different to each other, and he seems to have totally ignored the long-term impact of Persian culture. Likewise, he had argued that there is a Confucian-Islamic connection between East Asian and Middle East states to challenge Western power (Huntington 1993, pp45-47), but this is simply based on some arms sales that China has made to Pakistan and the Middle East and little more. The cultural systems of Confucianism and Islam are very different indeed, and aside from some China-Pakistan cooperation, there is only limited coordination of Middle Eastern and Chinese interests, in spite of some links on energy policy and growing trade contacts overs the last decade, including with Israel and Turkey (for other criticisms see Muzaffar 1994; Ahluwalia & Mayer 1994). Likewise, we could note that internal conflicts, civil wars, and intra-civilisation conflicts remain extremely important in the 21st century, rather than being dominated by

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civilisational conflicts. Further, Charles Kupchan has suggested 'that "the ongoing struggle between the United States and Islamic radicals does not represent a clash of civilizations," but rather is the result of extremist groups preying upon discontent within Islamic states. "The underlying source of alienation," writes Kupchan, "is homegrown - political and economic stagnation and the social cleavages it produces."' (Kupchan in Seib 2004). Likewise, Thomas Friedman argues that Huntington "vastly underestimated how the power of states, the lure of global markets, the diffusion of technology, the rise of networks, and the spread of global norms could trump [his] black-and-white (mostly black) projections" (in Seib 2004).

In response to massive and detailed criticism, Huntington slightly adapted his thesis in his 1996 publication, The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order (reprinted in 2002). In this book, for example, he changes the term 'Confucian' civilisation to Sinic civilisation, recognising that much more than Confucian thought has formed a unique Chinese culture (Huntington 1996). However, he strongly defends his conception of conflict now being exacerbated by differences in culture, even while recognising that intra-civilisational conflict and civil wars also occur. The last version of the Huntington thesis can be summarised in the following sections: -

Part I: For the first time in history global politics is both multipolar and multicivilizational; modernization is distinct from Westernization and is producing neither a universal civilization in any meaningful sense nor the Westernization of non-Western societies.Part II: The balance of power among civilizations is shifting: the West is declining in relative influence: Asian civilizations are expanding their economic military, and poltical strength; Islam is exploding demographically with destabilizing consequences for Muslim countries and their neighbours; and non-Western civilizations generally are reaffirming the value of their own cultures.Part III: A civilization-based world order is emerging: societies sharing cultural affinities cooperate with each other; efforts to shift societies from one civilization to another are unsuccessful; and countries group themselves around the lead or core states of their civilization.Part IV: The West's universalist pretensions increasingly bring it into conflict with other civilizations, most seriously with Islam and China; at the local level fault line wars, largely between Muslims and non-Muslims, generate "kin-country rallying," the threat of broader escalation, and hence efforts by core states to halt these wars.Part V: The survival of the West depends on Americans reaffirming their Western identity and Westerners accepting their civilization as unique not universal and uniting to renew and preserve it against challenges from non-Western societies. Avoidance of a global war of civilizations depends on world leaders accepting and cooperating to maintain the multicivilization character of global politics. (Huntington 1996, pp20-21)

Each and every one of these propositions could be challenged, and might need modification. However, for our purposes, his most important point is that no single dominant global culture has completely filled the global system, and we do indeed live in a multi-civilisational world. You might also like to test Huntington's idea in the post-2001 period: in spite of the 'worst' of efforts of some to bring about a wider clash between Islam and the West, this has mainly occurred at the level of perceived security threats (see Seib 2004). This clash has forced changes in foreign policy of some states (especially the US, UK and Australia), and changed policies towards Afghanistan and Iraq. Indeed, some scholars have suggested that the real issue is reform within the Islamic world, with the clash with the West largely a secondary

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strategy used by groups such as Al-Qaeda to gain prestige and credibility as leading a specific kind of militant Islamic revival (for related analysis, see Fradkin 2005; discussed further in week 9). Whether this will result in a sustained clash of civilisations remains to be seen. Moreover, Huntington has focused on the way that communication between civilisations can lead to conflict. But it can also lead to dialogue, adaptation, and mutual learning.

Hans Küng likewise feels that there is a real danger of continued war, conflict and environment destruction so long as the world is full of ‘differing, contradictory and even antagonistic ethics’ (1991, pxvi). His idea is that although there will be different political and religious systems, that some sort of basic shared ethic needs to emerge at the global level. World society needs ‘some norms, values, ideals and goals to bring it together and to be binding on it (Küng, 1991, pxvi). He feels that in spite of relative economic success, the West ‘is faced with a vacuum of meaning, values, and norms which is not only a problem for individuals, but also a political issue of the first order’ (Küng 1991, pp9-10).

Put another way, Küng thinks there is a crisis in the meaning of progress. Though there has been progress in science, technology, industry, and even in democracy, each of these has been attended by other problems, e.g. scarcity of resources, environmental damage, unemployment, nuclear and other advanced weapons, information overload, and a more competitive social environment. Here Küng argues that there is no point being smart after the fact. Instead of trying to fix these problems after we’ve created them, he suggests we should work on a preventive ethics, which can work out the basis of how to manage these problems and conflicts before they occur. To create the stable, wealthy and environmentally-sound world in which such self-development can be continued, we also need a sense of social and global responsibility. Put another way, the search for self-fulfilment can only be continued if there is also a sense of responsibility ‘for society and nature’ (Küng 1991, p31).

Küng goes on to suggest that religious dialogue can provide an important starting place for developing a shared global view (1991, pp56-58). In part, this is because religion is now becoming more important in the late 20 th century and 21st century, and in many ways is taking over some of the functions of identity formation that states used to try and control through nationalism. Huntington likewise argues that religion is becoming more important in international affairs, a trend moving away from the old statist separation between 'church and state' (Huntington 1996, p54, pp64-66). Küng argues that moderate world religions can provide some input for a humanised 21st century. Most religions: -

* focus on human well-being in the broadest sense.* focus in core human values, e.g. not killing, which apply generally unless there are powerful reasons why not, e.g. self-defence.* provide a sense of a balanced ‘middle way’.* Many have a version of the gold rule, i.e. ‘Do not do to others what you would not want them to do to you’ (Rabbi Hillel, the Jewish thinker, 60-10 B.C.E.). This rule in different forms is found in Confucianism and Christianity, and is implied in the Buddhist notion of compassion.

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* gives strong motivation to be moral by providing a great role model in charismatic figures, e.g. Buddha, Confucius, Jesus, Lao-tze, Muhammad. * provide a sense of global meaning for the world, life and death.

This means that the post-modern world needs global religious understanding and knowledge and respect for major value systems - without it no political understanding between civilisation can be possible (Küng 1991, p135). Furthermore, many countries are now multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and therefore practically multi-cultural, regardless of specific government policies. The US, Australia, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Russia, India, Malaysia, and Indonesia all live with this reality. This means that a proper and serious dialogue between these different value systems is needed, both for social and global stability (Küng 1991, p138). Kung developed these ideas further in his 1997 work A Global Ethic for Global Politics and Economics. Without the emergence of this genuine dialogue, the kind of conflicts Huntington has outlined might intensify. Moreover, the dialogue of cultures is already quite active globally, and has begun to influence the way trade, economic and security issues are perceived (see Healey 2001). If in the future, a single global culture does begin to truly emerge (see Kessler 2000), then it is crucial that this new global culture is resource-rich, inclusive, and flexible enough to meet new needs and dangerous challenges.

6. The Resources of Cultural Internationalism

Cultural internationalism has been an important trend in the 19 th and 20th century, especially after the end of World War I and again in recent years. Cultural internationalism is 'the idea that world order can and should be defined through interactions at the cultural level across national boundaries' (Iriye 1997, px). From this point of view, an alternative view of world order has often been created by artists, writers, thinkers, popular movements and civil society organisations which is often in contrast the view of a world system dominated by great powers (Iriye 1997, p2) and the realist demands of geopolitics (see lecture 2 for these 'realist' and ‘neo-realist’ ideas). In the last several decades, an emerging international civil society has begun to shape cooperative movements working outside state-to-state interactions (see further Iriye 2002; Warkentin 2001). Though not totally coherent, this international civil society has begun to shape the agenda of INGOs, place pressure on the policies of governments and IGOs, and is strongly reflected through global media (see Scholte 2002).

Some of the main trends of the new internationalism have been summarised by Akira Iriye in his Cultural Internationalism and World Order, who argues that international cooperation goes well beyond relations between nation states. This internationalism 'aspires to a more peaceful and stable world order through transnational efforts' on several fronts: -

'legal internationalism, with a stress on international law and arbitration'

'economic internationalism, envisaging a global network of economic exchanges; and socialist internationalism,

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promoted by those who believed that world peace must be built upon the solidarity of workers everywhere'

'cultural internationalism, the fostering of international cooperation through activities across national boundaries' (Iriye 1997, p3).

Since the end of the Cold War, a new, dynamic form of internationalism has emerged which goes well beyond merely creating some kind of humane, global culture (in the past usually rather Western in tone). If some sort of global civilisation has begun to emerge, it still remains a thin and fragile veneer covering the great diversity of cultures, religions and historical experiences (Huntington 1996, p57, following the ideas Vaclav Havel). Instead, major research and institutional efforts have begun to: -

Debate a core of acceptable values which could function as the basis of cross-cultural dialogue, play a role in international disputes, and even result in a more widely accepted formulation of universal human rights (see Küng 1997). Since the Vienna Human Rights Conference (1993), though there has been an attempt to extend economic and social rights, there has also been strong tensions between the effort to emphasise universal and indivisible rights (e.g. by the US), and trends towards considering other cultural formulations of rights (Huntington 1996, p38)

Develop stronger understanding around the world of different cultures and societies, avoiding unnecessary mistakes in diplomacy, or errors leading to heightened conflict. Cultural studies in this sense are a standard part of International Relations, strategic studies, and diplomatic studies.

The recognition that cultural diversity can complicate both international relations and intensify conflicts of interest. Issues of national identity, diverse ethnic groups, nationalism, multiculturalism and pluralism are real and often problematic issues for many major states (the US, China, Russia, France, Malaysia etc.), and for regional groups that cross culture zone (NAFTA, the EU, APEC, OAS).

The recognition of cultural diversity as a global resource, and efforts to preserve and further this diversity as an important global asset.

Efforts at 'cross-cultural cooperation to deal with global issues such as environmental degradation, human rights, and demographic explosion' (Iriye 1997, p8). This means that this cultural is not merely 'an add on' to economic and diplomatic efforts, but very much at the heart of major international agendas. As we shall see in later lectures, different cultural and religious values can be readily mobilised in environmental policies, in the fight against poverty, and in creating cooperative organisations. Cultural cooperation can be used as a force promoting environmental values and

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directing attentions towards problems such as poverty, disease, lack of education, and structurally induced crime (Iriye 1998, p176; Ross & Pickering 2002).

New movements towards recognising cultural diversity have broadened the intellectual space in which people and societies operate. It has also tended to 'enlarge the spheres in which peoples and nations' can cooperate' (Iriye 1997, pp96-97). However, the leading question remains whether cultural diversity and cultural internationalism can work together to help define 'a stable world order' (Iriye 1997, p175), or whether more explicit patterns of 'governance', based on norms and rules, need to be developed. Culture is a real force in international relations and helps construct institutions and actors in their use of power, but is no single source for, or magic cure to, conflict. Put another way, cultural factors may be much too dispersed an influence to provide specific solutions major economic, environmental and social crises. However, power and interests are partly defined through culture. We will look in more detail at international institutions and their related cultural systems later weeks.

7. Bibliography, Resources and Further Reading

Resources

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Webpage at http://www.unesco.org/ This page provides a range of data about the organization, access to indexes of The UNESCO Courier, and downloads of UNESCO Sources, which includes concise briefing materials on a wide range of topics (You will need access to Adobe Acrobat PDF software to download these).

InterAction, a coalition of 150 non-profit organisations working in areas of humanitarian relief, refugees, the environment, development and social issues, has a searchable Webpage on the net at http://www.interaction.org/A number of short articles on wide range of topics, including the activities of NGOs, can be located.

OneWorld.net covers a range of international and NGO campaigns and their slant on world events. Located at http://www.oneworld.net/article/frontpage/10/3

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace covers a wide range of international issues, with commentary from scholars and participants. Located at http://www.ceip.org/

Further Reading

You might to look at one of the following: -

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GEERAERTS, Gustaaf & MEN, Jing “International Relations Theory in China”, Global Society, 15 no. 3, 2001, pp251-276 [Access via Ebsco Database]

GOODMAN, Ryan & JINKS, Derek "Toward an institutional theory of sovereignty. (Symposium on Treaties, Enforcement, and U.S. Sovereignty)", Stanford Law Review, 55 no.5, May 2003, pp1749-1788 [Access via Infotrac database]

HELD, David et al. Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture, Oxford, Polity, 1999

HOFSTEDE, Geert Culture's Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions, and Organizations Across Nations, Thousand Oaks, Sage, 2001

HOPF, Ted "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory", International Security, 23 no. 1, Summer 1998, pp171-200 [Access via Infotrac Database]

HUDSON, Valerie M. (ed.) Culture and Foreign Policy, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1997HUNTINGTON, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, N.Y., Simon & Schuster, 1997 & 2002IRIYE, Akira Cultural Internationalism and World Order, N.Y., John

Hopkins University Press, 1997IRIYE, Akira Global Community: The Role of International

Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2002

SEIB, Philip "The news media and the 'clash of civilizations'", Parameters, 34 no. 4, Winter 2004, pp71-85 [Access via Infotrac Database]

STUART-FOX, Martin " Southeast Asia and China: the role of history and culture in shaping future relations", Contemporary Southeast Asia, 26 no. 1, April 2004, pp116-139 [Access via Infotrac Database]

References and Bibliography

ACHARYA, Amitav Acharya, “Democratisation and the Prospects for Participatory Regionalism in Southeast Asia”, Third World Quarterl,y 24, no. 2, 2003, pp375-390

AGUNG, Ide Anak Agung Gde Bali in the 19th Century, Jakarta, Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 1991AHLUWALIA, Pal & MAYER, Peter "Clash of Civilisations - or Balderdash of Scholars?", Asian

Studies Review, 18 no. 1, 1994, pp21-30ALAGAPPA, Muthiah (ed.) Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia, Stanford, Stanford University

Press, 1995ATTALI, Jacques “The Crash of Western Civilization: The Limits of the Market and Democracy”,

Foreign Policy, 6-1-1997 [Internet Access to Electric Library]ANDERSON, Benedict Imagined Communities, London, Verso, 1983ANDERSON, Benedict The Spectre of Comparison: Politics, Culture and the Nation, London, Verso,

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