InTown Suites v. Carrollton Lawsuit

PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND DAMAGES, APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI, AND REQUEST FOR DISCLOSURES 1427271 PAGE 1

CAUSE NO. DC-11-07850

INTOWN SUITES CARROLLTON, L.P. AND §

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

INTOWN SUITES TRINITY MILLS, L.P., §

Plaintiffs, §

v. §

THE CITY OF CARROLLTON, TEXAS; THE PROPERTY STANDARDS BOARD OF

§§

THE CITY OF CARROLLTON, TEXAS; §

192nd JUDICIAL DISTRICT

LEONARD MARTIN, CITY MANAGER OF

§

THE CITY OF CARROLLTON, TEXAS; §

AND BRIAN PASSWATERS, COMMUNITY

§

SERVICES MANAGER, ENVIRONMENTAL §

SERVICES DEPARTMENT OF THE CITY §

OF CARROLLTON, TEXAS; §

Defendants. §

DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND DAMAGES, APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF

CERTIORARI, AND REQUEST FOR DISCLOSURES

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF THIS COURT:

COME NOW, Plaintiffs, InTown Suites Carrollton, L.P. and InTown Suites Trinity

Mills, L.P. (together, “Plaintiffs”), and file this their Second Amended Petition complaining of

Defendants The City of Carrollton, Texas (“City”); the Property Standards Board of the City of

Carrollton, Texas (“Board”); Leonard Martin, City Manager of the City of Carrollton (“Martin”),

and Brian Passwaters, Community Services Manager, Environmental Services Department of the

City of Carrollton, Texas (“Passwaters”). Plaintiffs respectfully show the following:

I. DISCOVERY CONTROL PLAN

1. Pursuant to RULE 190.3 of the TEXAS RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Plaintiffs

hereby request discovery in this case be conducted under Level 2.

II. PARTIES, JURISDICTION, & VENUE

2. Each of the Plaintiffs is a Delaware Limited Partnership, and each has its principal

place of business in Dallas County, Texas.


3. All Defendants herein may be served at the offices of the City of Carrollton,

Texas, located at 1945 E. Jackson Rd., Carrollton, TX, where:

a. The City may be served by serving the Mayor, Matthew Marchant; b. The Board may be served though its Chairman, Bob McCranie; c. City Manager Leonard Martin may be served; and d. Environmental Services Department Community Services Manager Brian

Passwaters may be served.

4. Jurisdiction is proper in this Court as the amount in controversy is within this

Court’s jurisdictional limits. Venue is proper in Dallas County because all, or a substantial part

of, the events giving rise to this litigation occurred in Dallas County, Texas.

III. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

5. Plaintiff InTown Suites Carrollton, L.P. is the owner of the InTown Suites located

at 2661 Westgrove Drive in Carrollton, Texas (the “InTown Westgrove”). Plaintiff InTown

Suites Trinity Mills, L.P. is the owner of the InTown Suites located at 1240 West Trinity Mills

Road in Carrollton, Texas (the “InTown Trinity Mills”). These two InTown Suites properties are

substantial businesses that have been operating in Carrollton for 10 and 13 years, respectively,

and together generate annual revenues of approximately $2,000,000.00 within the City, thereby

contributing substantially to the City’s economic base. Together, they remit to the City of

Carrollton an average of almost $60,000.00 each year in property taxes, sales taxes, and annual

fees; plus, they provide other significant economic benefits to the City, including directly

employing 12 individuals comprising an annual local payroll of over $308,000.00. In addition,

as hotels within and serving residents of, families in, and visitors to the City, Plaintiffs provide

accommodations for people whose own activities contribute substantial economic benefits to

businesses in and the economy generally of the City. Notwithstanding all of the significant

positive economic benefits Plaintiffs provide to it, the City has decided that these (as well as the


City’s other four or five hotels) are undesirable and has implemented an illegal and

unconstitutional licensing scheme – called a Hotel Licensing Code – that is obviously crafted and

designed not to work with hotel operations to improve hotel properties within the City, but to

inevitably bar hotels from being able to operate as businesses within the City. While it seems

Plaintiffs are the first victims of the City’s anti-hotel scheme, the vagueness, overbreadth,

unpredictability, lack of reasonable standards, and sheer unworkability of this licensing scheme

assure that, without the court’s intervention to compel the City to abandon this anti-hotel scheme

and replace it with a reasonable and rational regulatory program, these Plaintiffs will not be the

last victims of the City’s attack on hotel businesses within the City’s boundaries.

IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. The Re-Development Subcommittee’s “Idea”

6. In 2008, the Re-Development Subcommittee of the Carrollton City Council, under

the stated guise of reducing crime, came up with the idea of holding hotels responsible for the

criminal activities of others on their premises by the “innovation” of linking the granting of a

lodging license to a review of both alleged criminal activity on a hotel’s premises, as well as to

that hotel’s supposed history of compliance with whatever various codes the City might choose

to make applicable to hotels. See Item from the September 16, 2008 Carrollton City Council

Agenda, copied from the Carrollton City website, a true and correct copy of which is attached as

Exhibit “A” and is incorporated herein by reference for all purposes. This instrument was the

first public unveiling of the scheme to eradicate hotels in the City and, on that same date, that

proposed ordinance was placed on the City Council’s “consent” agenda, thereby assuring that

such that no public discussion about any of the details of the alleged basis for the proposed

ordinance or the proposed ordinance itself was permitted before the City Council enacted the


ordinance. It clearly was carefully orchestrated to avoid the possibility of any public discussion

or even to permit any suggestions for changes or improvements to the proposed ordinance before

it was enacted. At no

time prior to enactment of that ordinance did any member of the City

Council, the City Council’s Re-Development Subcommittee, or any City staff member seek any

input from Plaintiffs – or, on information and belief, from any

representatives of the hotel

industry –about the proposed ordinance to license hotels, much less to try to ascertain whether

any of its provisions were unreasonable or unworkable. Instead, that Hotel-Eradication License

Scheme was ramrodded through as City Ordinance 3254, despite the concerns expressly voiced

by a citizen (Thomas Keen) during that City Council meeting about the process used and the lack

of opportunity afforded for any genuine public comment or involvement of the affected industry,

all as reported in the minutes of the City Council’s September 16, 2008 meeting as posted on the

Carrollton City website, a true and correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit “A-1” and is

incorporated herein by reference for all purposes. This, of course, was as it had to be for

proponents of that Hotel-Eradication License Scheme. If the hotel industry had been permitted

to have input about it, the goal of putting the City’s hotels out of business might have been

thwarted, as the proponents knew or reasonably should have known that the provisions enacted

were vague, unworkable, duplicative of other City authority, and downright punitive in their

intended effect. So – just as planned – that oppressive Hotel-Eradication License Scheme was

enacted. Although it has since been amended several times – each time without first seeking

input from the hotel industry – that enactment remains a Hotel-Eradication License Scheme, and

now is codified as Chapter 97 of the Carrollton, Texas Code of Ordinances. Attached hereto as

Exhibit “D” is a true and correct copy of the current text of said Chapter 97 (“the Ordinance”).


7. And the Ordinance truly is a Hotel-Eradication License Scheme. In short, it

requires that every hotel be licensed by the City as a condition of operating, but requires denial

or revocation of a lodging license if the hotel does not comply with the City’s “building, zoning,

housing, fire safety, and health regulations and codes;” notwithstanding that the Texas

Legislature has specified that the City’s power to regulate buildings in these areas is limited to

the methods described in Chapters 54 and 124 of the Texas Local Government Code. And, as if

trying to regulate these matters in the present tense in a manner differently than prescribed by the

Legislature was not enough, the Ordinance goes on to also require denial or revocation of a

lodging license if the number of previous violations of any of the City’s various code provisions

at a hotel exceeds 10% of the number of rooms in the hotel during a twelve month period. This

code violations limit is referred to in the Ordinance as the “Code Conviction Limit” (“CCL”).

An example of the unreasonableness of this concept: If a hotel has 100 rooms and if during the

course of a year any combination of those rooms is found to contain just 11 items that an

inspector considers to be code violations, the Ordinance says that the “lodging license shall be

denied

. . . .” See Exhibit “D”, Section 97.05(A) and Section 97.05(A)(4). All of those 11

“violations” that could cause automatic denial or revocation of a hotel’s license could be as life-

threatening as: a missing sign; a wall or chair the inspector thinks looks “dirty”; a missing

handle on a dresser; a torn curtain; a television not working; a door that rubs the floor; a chipped

nightstand; or a door the inspector feels needs to be painted. All of the foregoing are examples

of “violations” actually charged against Plaintiffs. Even if all of these “violations” are resolved

promptly such that these issues no longer exist at the time of consideration of the license, this

provision requires “resurrection” of those violations for use as the basis for denying a license to

the hotel for the next year. Clearly, this “Business Death Penalty” bears absolutely no rational


relationship to the severity of the infractions permitted to comprise the basis for denial of a

lodging license.

8. Any careful reading of Exhibit “A” confirms that the true goal of the City’s Hotel

Code was to put hotels out of business, not

to encourage hotels to improve their facilities to meet

any reasonable expectations of the City. Exhibit “A” tries to paint the City’s hotels as crime-

ridden cesspools, but contains no specifics as to any individual hotel nor any comparisons to

other types of businesses in the City where crime also occurs. More importantly, Exhibit “A”

attempts to imply that the City otherwise is powerless to enforce City codes. This, of course, is

not true at all. But – apparently to give that appearance – Exhibit “A” makes absolutely no

mention of the fact that the Texas Legislature has already provided the City with two specific

statutory methods by which a municipality is expressly empowered to regulate substandard

buildings. Those powers are specifically delegated to municipalities by the State in Chapters 54

and 214 of the TEXAS LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE, each of which provides very specific and

detailed mechanisms by which substandard buildings can be closed and demolished. Yet,

Exhibit “A” makes no references to these powers at all and – instead – implies that, without the

ability to completely deny a hotel the right to conduct its business at all, the City is somehow

powerless to regulate hotel structures that do not comply with city code provisions. This

omission forms the core of the purported basis for this Hotel-Eradication License Scheme.

9. After the Hotel-Eradication License Scheme went into effect, the efforts of City

inspectors to “find” violations increases exponentially over previous years. Things that were

never mentioned in the past began being noted and new requirements were imposed that had

never existed in the past. For the first time, the City’s inspectors refused to allow Plaintiffs’

personnel to enter rooms with the inspectors during the inspections; also – again for the first time


– the City inspectors conducted not just inspections, but unlawful searches of occupied rooms, in

the course of which they left these occupied rooms in a disheveled state (including removing and

tossing to the floor bedcovers and rifling the drawers and personal belongings of guests, all

without the consent of the affected occupants). Once these new “procedures” began, it became

clear that the City intended to put hotels out of business by setting them up to not be able to meet

these new license requirements. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs worked tirelessly and spent over

$ 200,000.00 in 2009, 2010, and 2011 fixing, replacing, and remodeling everything that the City

called to Plaintiffs’ attention. In this regard, all of the material items identified in the 2010

inspections (the citations for which were the basis for the City’s denial of lodging licenses to

Plaintiffs) had been remedied in accordance with the City’s specified processes and to the City’s

satisfaction at both Plaintiffs’ locations long before the time that the licensees were denied in

2011. Not only had Plaintiffs spent those substantial sums of money in doing that remedial

work, at the insistence of the City, Plaintiffs also agreed to plead nolo contendre to over 130

alleged violations and to pay approximately $21,000.00 in fines to the City for those 2010

alleged violations, all of which Plaintiffs did. Nevertheless, in the 2011 denial of Plaintiffs’

lodging licenses, the City asserted those same remediated 2010 alleged infractions as the

principal basis for denying Plaintiffs’ 2011 lodging licenses by calling them “convictions” for

purposes of the Code Conviction Limit scheme. Is there even a hint of fairness or

reasonableness in the City’s treatment of Plaintiffs? There is not.

10. Whether called “Double Jeopardy” or merely a “Sucker Punch,” by insisting that

Plaintiffs first spend substantial sums to remediate their hotel facilities and then – based on the

same items already remediated to the City’s expressed satisfaction – denying Plaintiffs the

lodging licenses the City alone deemed necessary for Plaintiffs to be able to continue to conduct


those same businesses is nothing short of impermissibly punitive and constitutes, in effect, an

unlawful taking or damaging of the Plaintiffs’ property, including specifically their businesses.

B. The Improper Denial of Licenses to Plaintiffs

11. On or about December 4, 2010 – well after the 2010 alleged code violations had

been remediated – Defendant Passwaters sent to each of Plaintiffs a letter regarding the necessity

to apply for a new Lodging license for 2011. In each letter, Defendant Passwaters represented

that:

Upon review of the application the hotel will be designated as a Tier 1 or Tier 2 hotel. This designation establishes the city codes the hotel must operate under for the coming year.

Attached hereto as Exhibits B-1 and B-2 are true and correct copies of Defendant

Passwaters’ December 4, 2010 letters. Thereafter, each of Plaintiffs complied and duly applied

for their 2011 lodging licenses.

12. As of December 4, 2010, the City and Defendant Passwaters had long been fully

aware not only of the number of alleged 2010 violations, but also that Plaintiffs had fully

remedied all of those alleged violations according to the City’s processes and to the City’s

satisfaction. No one with the City ever even suggested that anything about the remedied 2010

violations could affect Plaintiffs’ entitlement to the 2011 lodging licenses and, to the contrary,

Exhibits B-1 and B-2 instead notified Plaintiffs that each of them would be designated either as a

Tier 1 or a Tier 2 hotel. So being designated as a Tier 2 hotel was the worst either of Plaintiffs

expected. However, to Plaintiffs’ surprise, on or about March 30, 2011, each of Plaintiffs

received another letter from Defendant Passwaters, This letter did not designate Plaintiffs

facilities as a Tier 1 or Tier 2 hotels, as expected, but instead totally denied both of their

applications for a lodging license, stating that each had exceed their “Code Conviction Limit” in


reliance on the fully remediated and settled 2010 alleged violations. Attached hereto as Exhibits

C-1 and C-2 are true and correct copies of Defendant Passwaters’ March 30, 2011 letters.

13. In connection with Defendant Passwaters’ original determination to deny the

requested licenses, there was no hearing, no opportunity for Plaintiffs to be heard, and no

discussion with Plaintiffs was allowed before Defendant Passwaters unilaterally denied Plaintiffs

2011 lodging licenses. This, alone, was a complete denial of due process to Plaintiffs.

C. The Unlawful Hearing Before the Property Standards Board.

14. Following those March 30, 2011 letters, Plaintiffs duly appealed under the

Ordinance and a hearing was scheduled for June 16, 2011 before the City’s Property Standards

Board (“Board”) as Case No. 2011-15. At that hearing, counsel for Plaintiffs presented evidence

and argument about a number of issues regarding the background facts, including that: all of the

2010 and 2011 alleged violations had been remediated, such that there remained no work to be

done; that many alleged violations were either not violations of actual code provisions or were

inconsequential; and that – in any event – most of the alleged violations were hardly the sorts of

matters that should be considered as grounds for denying a lodging license. And the City’s own

witness admitted that, as of the date of that hearing, all such matters had been resolved and there

were no outstanding violations at either Plaintiff’s property, thereby confirming that no work or

time was then required from or by Plaintiffs to conform to the City’s ordinances (which is the

only specific burden imposed on Plaintiffs by the process described in the Ordinance). It was

clear, however, that the Board members did not feel constrained by the review standards and

burdens set out in the Ordinance and, instead, had pre-judged the situation and knew from the

beginning of the hearing what decision they would render. Perhaps there was advance

discussion and agreement outside the presence of Plaintiffs or perhaps it was because the


Ordinance itself provided no real standards for the Board’s actions. Whatever the reason, the

Board’s decision to uphold the denial of Plaintiffs’ lodging licenses was arbitrary and capricious

and not based on the substantial evidence showing that, as of the time of the Board’s hearing,

there were no outstanding violations nor convictions of any sort for code compliance work not

done, that the violations being counted for the supposed Code Conviction Limit all were for

matters resolved by agreement with the City long before that hearing, and were all specifically

the result of inadmissible nolo contendere pleas.

D. The Harm to Plaintiffs Goes Beyond Just Not Being Able to Do Business as a Hotel

15. Because the Ordinance provides that, in the absence of a lodging license, a hotel’s

certificate of occupancy can be revoked, and because a certificate of occupancy is required to

operate as a business in the City, the City’s action under the Ordinance effectively threatens to

prohibit Plaintiffs from operating their lawful businesses on their properties. The City’s

threatened actions, therefore, would deny Plaintiffs all economically viable use of their

properties, or, in the alternative, would cause a significant diminution in value thereof, and

therefore constitute a taking of Plaintiffs’ properties and their privilege to operate their legitimate

businesses.

16. Not being able to do business as a hotel is harm enough. But preventing Plaintiffs

from being able to continue to operate as hotels has much greater impact and ramifications than

just shutting down these two hotels. It will cause up to 70 hotels across the country to also have

to shut down and close. Each of the properties at issue here is subject to a loan instrument that

also includes loans for other similar properties in locations across the country. Specifically, there

is an approximately $112,000,000.00 loan covering the InTown Suites Westgrove, as well as 39

other InTown Suites in Texas and other states; and there is an approximately $88,000,000.00


loan covering the InTown Suites Trinity Mills, as well as 29 other InTown Suites in Texas and

other states. Each of these loan instruments contains cross-default provisions, meaning that a

loan default applicable to one property constitutes a loan default on all of the other properties

covered by that same loan instrument. Inability to operate as a hotel constitutes a default under

each of these loan agreements. So, if both of Plaintiffs are not able to operate their properties as

a hotel, defaults will occur under both loans, and that will cause cross-defaults on the loans for

68 OTHER InTown Suites across the country.

E. Conflicts and Errors in the Ordinance Itself

17. For all of the reasons described elsewhere in this pleading, the Ordinance

obviously was very poorly drafted. But there are some glaring errors and apparent internal

conflicts that make it even more vague and ambiguous than probably was originally intended.

First, in Section 97.07(H) of the Ordinance, the required appeal standards from the result of the

Property Standards Board hearing are cited as to be found in Section 214.012 of the TEXAS

LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE. That statutory provision, however, contain no appeal standards at

all; instead, it deals with municipal regulation of sewers and plumbing.1 So, the ordinary reader

of the Ordinance would not find the necessary appellate standards for Section 97.07 of the

Ordinance in the location specified in the Ordinance, thereby making the Ordinance

unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous. Additionally, while Section 97.07(H) of the Ordinance

refers to Chapter 214 for those appellate standards and specifies that a lawsuit must be filed

within twenty (20) days, Section 97.11(H) allows enforcement procedures, which also include

appellate standards, under Chapter 54 of the TEXAS LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE, which itself

1 Plaintiffs presume that the drafter intended to refer to Section 214.0012 of the TEXAS LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE, but no published version of the Ordinance that could be located does so, including the copy obtained from the City upon which are copies of signatures and the City Seal. Interestingly, that copy itself contains no date and month when it was enacted, though it does state it occurred sometime in 2008.


provides for an appeal suit to be filed within thirty (30) days, as well as permits seeking a Writ of

Certiorari within ten (10) days. See TEX. LOC. GOV’T. CODE §§ 54.039(a) and (b). These

conflicting appellate references also make the Ordinance difficult to comprehend and effectively

set traps that could easily cause an aggrieved party to not be able to pursue whichever appellate

course the City may deem applicable at the time, thereby rendering the Ordinance

unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous. Finally, Section 97.07(E) of the Ordinance expressly

provides that “[e]nforcement of the denial for a lodging license shall be stayed during the

pendency of an appeal . . . .” And thereafter, at Section 97.07(H) – a provision of the same level

as 97,07(E) – the Ordinance identifies that “[t]he action of the Board may be appealed to a

District Court . . . ,” which is precisely what is done by this lawsuit, but the City has refused to

honor the stay of enforcement provided in its own Ordinance.

F. Thwarted Efforts to Obtain Record from Property Standards Board Hearing

18. On June 23, 2011, Jason Mathis, an attorney for Plaintiffs, contacted the Property

Standards Board to attempt to obtain a copy of the recorded proceedings from the June 16, 2011

hearing. Kathleen Engleheart, the City’s Building Inspections Secretary, told Mr. Mathis that he

would have to speak with Clayton Hutchins, the City Attorney. When Mr. Mathis called Mr.

Hutchins and requested a copy of the recording from the June 16, 2011 public hearing, Mr

Hutchins refused, saying that he wanted to read it first and told Mr. Mathis that “These cases . . .

are subject to appeal with a writ or application of certiorari . . . if you filed a writ of certiorari,

then you would get a copy of the transcript anyway.” Following filing of this lawsuit, counsel

for Defendants has provided Plaintiffs with a written transcription of the proceedings at the

hearing, as well as exhibits therefrom. However, Plaintiffs still have not received a copy of the

actual audio recording of the hearing to be able to verify the accuracy of the transcription


provided by Defendants, and therefore have not yet had an opportunity to confirm the accuracy

of the record of the June 16, 2011 hearing as provided by Defendants and, therefore, expressly

reserve their right to amend and plead further after receiving the record.

G. Current Status of Enforcement of the Ordinance Against Plaintiffs

19. Pursuant to Section 97.07(E) of the Ordinance, “[e]nforcement of the denial for a

lodging license is stayed during the pendency of an appeal there from that is properly and timely

filed.” Section 97.07(H) of the Ordinance states that this lawsuit constitutes Plaintiffs’ appeal of

the Board’s action in upholding the denials of Plaintiffs’ Lodging licenses, as this lawsuit was

filed in “a District Court of the County in which the property . . . is located . . . within twenty

(20) days of the Board’s action.”

H. Recent Citations Issued to Plaintiffs

20. Recently (after the original filing of this lawsuit), the City has issued new

citations to Plaintiffs for alleged code violations based on inspections in 2011. Those citations

are currently pending in municipal court.

V. CAUSES OF ACTION.

Count 1: Declaratory Judgment

21. Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment pursuant to Chapter 37 of the TEXAS CIVIL

PRACTICE AND REMEDIES CODE to construe and declare their rights under the Ordinance. A

current dispute exists between Plaintiffs and the City with respect to the construction,

application, and enforcement of the Ordinance. Specifically, Plaintiffs seek a declaratory

judgment that:

A. Convictions counted for purpose of the code conviction limit as defined in the

Ordinance must relate to public health, safety, and welfare.


B. The City is required to prove, and Plaintiffs may present evidence to rebut, that

convictions relied upon by the City for purposes of the code conviction limit as

defined in the Ordinance are related to public health, safety, and welfare.

C. The relevant dates for purposes of the code conviction limit in the Ordinance are

the dates of the violations as opposed to the dates of the convictions.

D. Convictions for code violations based on no contest pleas or plea deals with the

City may not be used for purposes of the code conviction limit under the

Ordinance.

E. The Ordinance does not allow the City to deny a lodging license to a hotel that is

in compliance with laws and codes.

F. Enforcement of the Board’s decision denying a lodging license is stayed during

the pendency of a proper and timely filed appeal to this Court.

G. In the absence of a valid search warrant, the City may not search occupied units in

hotels without reasonable notice to and obtaining the express consent of the

occupant of each such unit.

Count 2: Void for Vagueness

22. Article I, Section 19 of the TEXAS CONSTITUTION guarantees each citizen due

course of law. This guarantee requires that a law or ordinance gives persons of ordinary

sensibilities notice of prohibited conduct and provide the enforcement authority with objective

standards for enforcement. The Ordinance fails to give adequate notice to persons whether

convictions based on no contest pleas or plea deals with the City can be used against them to

deny a lodging license under the Ordinance or whether the date of conviction or offense should

be used for purposes of the code conviction limit under the Ordinance. Thus, the Ordinance fails


to sufficiently define the prohibited conduct that results in denial or revocation of a lodging

license.

23. Further, the Ordinance fails to provide objective standards for enforcement by

requiring the official to deny a lodging license for reasons an official “may discovery or deem

advisable or necessary.” Said standard vests unguided discretion with the official while the

Ordinance is ambiguous as to whether the Board may grant a license to an applicant despite the

evidence presented regarding the code conviction limit.

24. Section 97.07(H) of the Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague and confusing with

respect to its failure to correctly reference and specify the appellate standards and procedures

intended to apply for appeals from actions of the Property Standards Board.

25. Accordingly, the Court should declare these provisions invalid and temporarily

and permanently enjoin their enforcement.

Count 3: Violations of Due Course of Law (Procedural)

26. Again, Article I, Section 19 of the TEXAS CONSTITUTION guarantees each citizen

due course of law. The CONSTITUTION’s guarantees that every citizen will be provided the

opportunity to present evidence in defense of allegedly prohibited conduct. The Ordinance

provides for the process by which Plaintiffs may be charged with violations of the underlying

code requirements and allows the City to rely on code convictions to deny or revoke a lodging

license, but does not allow Plaintiffs to challenge the code convictions or present evidence

regarding such convictions, including whether the convictions are properly related to public

health, safety, or welfare. Thus, operation of the Ordinance violates Plaintiffs’ procedural due

process rights by allowing the City to deny or revoke a lodging license and effectively shut down

Plaintiffs’ lawful business enterprise without allowing Plaintiffs’ to present evidence and be


heard regarding the code convictions and the relationship to, or effect on, public health, safety,

and welfare, if any.

27. Accordingly, the Court should declare these provisions invalid and preliminary

and permanently enjoin their enforcement.

Count 4: Violation of Due Course of Law (Substantive)

28. Article I, Section 19 of the TEXAS CONSTITUTION guarantees each citizen that the

laws enacted by governmental entities for the public health, safety and welfare of its citizens will

be so related, reasonable, and not irrationally or arbitrarily related to such purposes. The

Ordinance states that its purpose is for the “public health, safety and welfare” of the citizens of

Carrollton. The Ordinance, however, is not limited to those purposes in the application of the

use of code convictions to the deprivation of the Plaintiffs’ Lodging licenses. Defendants instead

utilize any

code conviction, regardless of its correlation to the stated purpose of the Ordinance, in

the determination of the number of convictions for purposes of the determination to grant or

deny Plaintiffs’ Lodging licenses in violation of the protections of the TEXAS CONSTITUTION.

29. Requiring the denial of a lodging license for past violations that no longer exist

constitutes an irrational and arbitrary punishment resulting in the closing down of Plaintiffs’

businesses notwithstanding Defendants’ admissions that Plaintiffs’ businesses are in full

compliance with all applicable laws and codes. The City’s Hotel-Eradication Scheme makes it

impossible to comply, on the one hand, with the City’s requirements to repair City code

violations in the exercise of the powers granted to the City by the Legislature, and then, on the

other hand, to later comply with the hotel licensing standards. It also interferes with the intended

operation of the regulatory program prescribed by the Legislature, in that it encourages hotel

business owners to contest alleged violations, rather than working to resolve them amicably with

the City, out of fear of having those violations later counted as “convictions” against the hotel for


licensing purposes. Under the Ordinance, Plaintiffs could not both agree to and remediate

alleged violations and later expect to be licensed, making the Ordinance inherently

unconstitutional and unlawful. Further, the Ordinance allows (arguably requires) the City to

deny the lodging license and destroy Plaintiffs’ ability to use its property even after the alleged

violations are corrected and the property is in full compliance. For these reasons, the Ordinance

is unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious, contrary to its stated purpose of ensuring the

availability of safe and clean hotels in the City, and – by unreasonably penalizing Plaintiffs for

fully remediated alleged past violations by taking away their right to operate their businesses –

not rationally related to any legitimate purpose.

30. Accordingly, the Court should declare the provisions requiring the denial of a

lodging license resulting in a de facto closing down of Plaintiffs’ businesses to be unreasonable

and not rationally related to the stated purpose, or any other legitimate purpose, and, therefore

preliminary and permanently enjoin enforcement of same.

Count 5: Violation of Equal Protection Clause

31. Article I, Section 3 of the TEXAS CONSTITUTION mandates that all persons

similarly situated must be treated equal under the law. The Ordinance distinguishes between

relevant groups doing business in the City and specifically targets and disadvantages hotels

vis-à-vis other types of similarly situated businesses, such as multi-family dwellings, apartment

complexes, duplexes, restaurants, theaters, shopping centers, and other businesses. There exists

no legitimate or rational basis for the City to make such a distinction between relevant groups of

businesses.

32. Accordingly, the Court should declare the Ordinance invalid under state law and

temporarily and permanently enjoin its enforcement.


Count 6: Unlawful Searches

33. Article I, Section 9 of the TEXAS CONSTITUTION protects citizens from all

unreasonable searches and precludes issuance of warrants for such searches without probable

cause supported by oath or affirmation. The Ordinance as enacted violates this constitutional

principle by purporting to allow City personnel to conduct searches of occupied units under the

guise of alleged “inspections” without notice to or consent by the occupants thereof and without

first obtaining a warrant based on probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, as is required

by the TEXAS CONSTITUTION.



Count 7: Preemption by State Law

35. State law governs what a local government may regulate. Local government only

has authority granted to it by the TEXAS CONSTITUTION and state law. The Ordinance as enacted

by the City is an improper exercise of its powers under applicable state law. The City derives its

authority to enact ordinances from the State of Texas. Specifically, Chapters 54 and 214 of the

TEXAS LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE address the authority of the City to enforce municipal

ordinances and to regulate housing and other structures. The City has not only exceeded its

authority as granted by the State but has gone so far in its regulation as to negatively counteract

the express intentions of the legislature and to discourage economic investment by businesses in

their properties.

36. In addition, to the extent the Ordinance is construed to allow counting of

convictions based on “no contest” (or nolo contendere) pleas for purposes of the code


conviction limit, said provision is preempted by section 27.02 of the TEXAS CODE OF CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE.



Count 8: Inverse Condemnation

38. In the alternative, assuming due process allows the City to prohibit Plaintiffs from

conducting their lawful businesses on their properties, such action by the City constitutes a

taking under Texas law. Article I, Section 17 of the TEXAS CONSTITUTION guarantees each

citizen that their property and privileges shall not be taken or damaged for the public use without

adequate compensation. Denying the lodging licenses pursuant to the Ordinance does not

substantially advance a legitimate state interest. Further, the City’s denial of the lodging licenses

denies Plaintiffs all economically beneficial or productive use of their properties. Finally, the

City’s conduct under the Ordinance, including denial of the lodging license, unreasonably

interferes with Plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment of their properties and deprives them of their right

to operate their legitimate businesses, privileges to which they are lawfully entitled, without any

opportunity to cure or apply for issuance of a new license for a period of three (3) years, which is

unconstitutionally punitive and not calculated to assure compliance with reasonable regulations,

but instead is intended specifically to put Plaintiffs and other hotel operators out of business

within the City, an unreasonable and unconstitutional goal.

39. Accordingly, in the event the Court determines the Ordinance is valid, the Court

should declare that the denial of the lodging licenses under the Ordinance constituted a taking of

Plaintiffs’ properties and privileges for public use for which Plaintiffs are entitled to adequate

compensation, including, but not limited to, the fair market value of their property or diminution


in its value caused by City’s actions, as well as the substantial consequential damages that will

result by reason of the cross-defaulted loans hereinabove discussed.

VI. CONDITIONS PRECEDENT

40. All conditions precedent to Plaintiffs’ claims for relief have been performed or

have occurred.

VII. REMEDIES

Declaratory Judgment

41. Pursuant to TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 37.001, et seq., Plaintiffs seeks a

Declaratory Judgment construing the Ordinance to avoid any constitutional infirmities as

requested herein, including a stay of enforcement of the Property Standards Board’s denial of the

lodging licenses while this case is pending in this Court. In the alternative, Plaintiffs request the

Court declare that the challenged provisions of Ordinance are void and/or unenforceable, and

Lodging Licenses should be ordered issued to Plaintiffs, because the Ordinance:

A. Violates the DUE COURSE OF LAW CLAUSE of the TEXAS CONSTITUTION;

B. Violates the EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE of the TEXAS CONSTITUTION; and/or,

C. Is preempted by Chapters 54 and 214 of the TEXAS LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE

and/or by section 27.02 of the TEXAS CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.

42. Finally, in the further alternative, Plaintiffs request the Court declare that the

enforcement of the Ordinance against Plaintiffs constitutes a taking of property and/or privileges

for which adequate compensation is due, including without limitation damages in the form of fair

market value of Plaintiffs’ property, diminution in value of Plaintiffs’ property, and

consequential damages as hereinabove referenced.


Attorney’s Fees

43. Plaintiffs have been forced to hire the undersigned attorneys to prosecute their

claims and to declare and enforce their rights and, therefore, Plaintiffs seek recovery against

Defendants for their costs and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in this matter, both through

trial and any appeals, pursuant to the TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE & REMEDIES CODE Section 37.009,

as is permitted under Texas law.

VIII. WRIT OF CERTIORARI

44. In accordance with Section 211.011(c) of the TEXAS LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE,

Plaintiffs petition this Court for a Writ of Certiorari directing Defendants to submit a verified

return to Plaintiffs’ counsel within ten (10) days containing a complete record of the Property

Standards Board’s actions with regard to the above matter.

45. The decision of the Property Standards Board in Case 2011-15 is illegal in whole

or in part, is unreasonable and contrary to fairness and justice, was illegally predetermined

before any evidence was presented, and was not based on substantial evidence. In addition, the

Property Standards Board failed to consider the fact that all alleged code violations and

problems at the Plaintiffs’ hotels had been remediated and fixed and that (as admitted at the

hearing by Defendants’ own witness) Plaintiffs had zero

outstanding code violations at the time

of the hearing before the Property Standards Board, thus establishing Plaintiffs’ sole burden

under Section 97.07(C)(2) of the Ordinance, which was to “ . . demonstrate the scope of any

work that may be required to comply with city ordinances and the time it will reasonable take to

perform the work.” The Property Standards Board exercised no discretion with its decision to

revoke the lodging license of Plaintiffs, which – if enforced – will caused Plaintiffs considerable

irreparable harm for which Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law. The Property Standards


Board’s actions as to Plaintiffs were arbitrary and capricious and the City failed to present

substantial evidence upon which the Board’s decision to deny the lodging licenses to Plaintiffs

can be based. The Property Standards Board’s ruling should be reversed and Lodging Licenses

should be issued to Plaintiffs.

IX. JURY DEMAND AND REQUEST FOR DISCLOSURE.

46. Pursuant to the TEXAS RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Plaintiffs hereby request a

jury trial, and will tender the fee at a later date. In addition, Plaintiffs here restate their request

originally made in Plaintiff’s June 24, 2011 “Original Petition for Declaratory Judgment,

Application for Writ of Certiorari, and Request for Disclosure” that Defendants disclose the

information and material described in subsections (a) through (l) of TEX. R. CIV. P. 194.2. in

accordance with the requirements of TEX. R. CIV. P. 194.3 and 194.4.

X. PRAYER.

47. WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiffs prays that the Court

enforce Section stay enforcement of the Board’s decision pending resolution of this case, enter a

temporary injunction prohibiting enforcement of the Board’s decision pending trial of this case,

reverse the decision of the Board and order the City to grant Plaintiffs’ lodging licenses, enter a

declaratory judgment as requested herein, award Plaintiffs damages within the jurisdictional

limits of this Court, award Plaintiffs attorney’s fees and costs of court, issue a Writ of Certiorari

as requested herein, and award Plaintiffs all other relief to which they are justly entitled.


Respectfully submitted,

COWLES & THOMPSON, P.C. 901 Main Street, Suite 3900 Dallas, TX 75202

By: ____________________________________ D. PAUL DALTON Texas Bar No. 05333800 [email protected] (214) 672-2112 (214) 672-2312 (Fax) RICHARD BARRETT-CUETARA Texas Bar No. 01812700 [email protected] (214) 672-2165 (214) 672-2383 (Fax)

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS


CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a copy of this document was delivered pursuant to TEX. R. CIV. P.

21a to all counsel of record as indicated below on August 9, 2011.

VIA FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

AND ELECTRONIC MAIL

George A. Staples TAYLOR, OLSON, ADKINS, SRALLA AND ELAM 6000 Western Place, Suite 200, Fort Worth, Texas 76107 817-332-2580 (fax) [email protected]

(e-mail) Attorney for Defendants

____________________________________ D. PAUL DALTON

CARROLLTON CITY COUNCILWORKSESSION AND REGULAR MEETING

SEPTEMBER 16, 2008

The City Council of the City of Carrollton, Texas convened in a Regular Meeting andWorksession on Tuesday, September 16, 2008, at 5:45 p.m. with the following members present:Mayor Ron Branson, Mayor Pro Tem Pat Malone, Deputy Mayor Pro Tem John Mahalik,Councilmembers Tim Hayden, Larry Williams and Herb Weidinger. Also present were CityManager Leonard Martin, Assistant City Managers Marc Guy and Bob Scott, Director ofManaged Competition Tom Guilfoy, Workforce Services Director Erin Rinehart, City AttorneyClayton Hutchins and City Secretary Ashley D. Mitchell.

* * * * PRE-MEETING * * * *5:45 P.M. – COUNCIL BRIEFING ROOM

1. Dinner

2. Mayor and Council reports and information sharing.

3. Receive supplemental staff information and responses to questions.

* * * * EXECUTIVE SESSION * * * *

4. Council convened in Executive Session at 6:10 p.m. pursuant to Texas GovernmentCode:

Section 551.071 for private consultation with the City Attorney to seek legal advicewith respect to pending and contemplated litigation and including all matters on thisagenda to which the City Attorney has a duty under the Texas Rules of Discipline andProfessional conduct regarding confidential communication with the City Council.Section 551.072 to discuss certain matters regarding real property.Section 551.074 to discuss personnel matters.Section 551.087 to discuss Economic Development.

5. Council reconvened in open session at 7:10 p.m. to consider action, if any, on mattersdiscussed in the Executive Session.

INVOCATION was led by John Jobb, Community Bent Tree Church.

PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE was led by Councilmember Williams.

PRESENTATIONS

12. Recognition of AICPA Outstanding CPA in Government Award For Bob Scott.

Mr. Martin stated that on August 18, 2008, at the American Institute of Certified PublicAccountants (AICPA) 25th Annual National Governmental Accounting and AuditingUpdate Conference our own Bob Scott was awarded the AICPA’s 2008 Outstanding CPAin Government Award. The award recognizes CPAs working in the state and localgovernment who have made significant contributions to increased efficiency and

Exhibit A-1

REGULARMEETING&WORKSESSIONMINUTES – SEPTEMBER 16, 2008 PAGE 2effectiveness of governmental organizations and to the growth and enhancement of theprofession.

While Bob has made many contributions over the years to the government financeprofession, his nomination specifically recognized his recent work with the TexasMunicipal Retirement System (TMRS) and the coordination of a shared actuarial servicecontract that assisted Texas governments in implementing the Governmental AccountingStandards Board’s new standard on Other Post Employment Benefits.

13. Present a Proclamation Declaring October 2008 as Disability Employment AwarenessMonth.

Cathy Coangelo of the Alliance for Agency Executives Serving People with Disabilitieswas presented a proclamation declaring October as Disability Employment AwarenessMonth.

PUBLIC FORUM

14. Hearing of any citizen/visitor on items not listed on the regular meeting agenda.Citizens/visitors should complete an appearance card located on the table at the entrance to theCity Council Chambers. Speakers must address their comments to the presiding officer rather thanto individual Council members or staff; Stand at the podium, speak clearly into the microphone andstate your name and address prior to beginning your remarks; Speakers will be allowed a maximumof 5 minutes for testimony; Speakers making personal, impertinent, profane or slanderous remarksmay be removed from the room; Unauthorized remarks from the audience, stamping of feet,whistles, yells and similar demonstrations will not be permitted; No placards, banners or signs willbe permitted in the Chambers or in any other room in which the council is meeting. In accordancewith the State Open Meetings Act, the City Council is restricted from discussing or taking action onitems not listed on the agenda. Action can only be taken at a future meeting.

Thomas Keen, 2001 Bryan Street, #1250, Dallas stated that Had a comment about thecity’s policy and procedures with regard to staff or council initiated proposals? It is goodfor the city to identify a problem within the city, and it is good for the city to want to dosomething about that problem, but would suggest at the outset that the thing to do wouldbe to contact the area or business that you are having a problem with to see if there couldbe something worked out on a reasonable basis. If staff is imitating a proposal and comeup with all kids of good rules that appear good on paper and present those to the Councilin the form of an ordinance and it is on the Consent Agenda and the first notice that thoseeffected by the ordinance get is of the council meeting when the ordinance is consideredand then they are not allowed to speak because it is on the Consent Agenda, that is aproblem. When people are not told that they are about to be clubbed over the head, theycan’t take precautions and try to work out the problem. This is a problem with the CityCouncil rules and not the Texas Open Meetings Act. Mr. Keene said that there are severaloptions you can take in a situation like this. You can forbid the industry completely fromyour city if you think that industry is a problem, you can regulate that industry, or youcan try to communicate with the people you believe are causing the problem to see ifthere are some options other than regulations. The appropriate thing to do is meet withthat business and try to find a middle ground. It is a much more appropriate way thanadopting an ordinance that nobody knows about and can’t speak about on a consentagenda item and are likely to get a measured response but a predictable response oflitigation over something that could have been completely avoided by somecommunication.

Exhibit A-1

REGULARMEETING&WORKSESSIONMINUTES – SEPTEMBER 16, 2008 PAGE 3

CONSENT AGENDA (*All items marked with a single asterisk are part of a Consent Agenda and requireno deliberation by the Council. Each Council member has the prerogative of removing an item from this agendaso that it may be considered separately. Contracts and agreements are available in the City Secretary’s Office.)

Councilmember Hayden moved to approve Agenda Items No. 15-24 and 26-29. Second byCouncilmember Marchant. The vote was cast 7-0 in favor of the motion.

BIDS AND PURCHASES

*15. Consider Approval Of Bid #08-042 For The Purchase Of Seven Police PursuitMotorcycles From American Eagle Harley Davidson In An Amount Not To Exceed$115,493.00.

*16. Consider Approval Of Bid #08-041 For The Purchase Of Water Meters FromVarious Vendors In An Amount Not To Exceed $132,000.00.

*17. Consider Approval Of An Agreement To Repair Or Replace Roofs On Various CityFacilities With Benco Roofing Through An Interlocal Agreement With Buyboard InAn Amount To Not Exceed $126,878.00.

CONTRACTS AND AGREEMENTS

*18. Consider Authorizing The City Manager To Enter Into A Contract With The Cities OfAddison and Farmers Branch, Senior Adult Services And Project LifesaverInternational.

*19. Consider Authorizing The City Manager To Approve An Extension To The InterlocalAgreement With Dallas County To Continue Carrollton’s Participation In TheDallas Area Household Hazardous Waste Network.

*20. Consider Authorizing The City Manager To Approve A Construction ContractAgreement With Texas WaterWorks (Robax Corporation) For The Construction OfThe Rosemeade Aquatic Facility Phase II Project In An Amount Not To Exceed$1,432,251.00.

ORDINANCES*21. Consider An Ordinance Approving A Negotiated Resolution Between The Atmos

Cities Steering Committee And Atmos Energy Corporation.

*22. Consider Ordinances Amending Chapter 31, The Comprehensive Fee Schedule, ToInclude Various Fee Adjustments As Included In The Fiscal Year 2008-09 Budget.

*23. Consider An Ordinance Regulating Hotel Operations.

*24. Consider An Ordinance Authorizing Updated Service Credits, Increase InRetirement Annuities, Discontinuance OF Supplemental Death Benefits, AndFuture Service Contributions.

Exhibit A-1

REGULARMEETING&WORKSESSIONMINUTES – SEPTEMBER 16, 2008 PAGE 4RESOLUTIONS

*26. Consider A Resolution Authorizing The City Manager To Enter Into An AgreementWith Senior Adult Services For Services Provided To Carrollton Citizens For The2008-09 Fiscal Year In An Amount Not Exceed $147,500.00.

*27. Consider A Resolution Authorizing The City Manager To Establish A RetireeHealth Savings Plan, Sevelop An Administrative Policy For The Plan, Establish AgeBased Premiums For The participants Who Wish To Remain On The City’s HealthPlan Upon Retirement, Enter Into A Contract With ICMA Retirement CorporationFor The Administration Of The Plan And Investment Of Plan Assets.

*28. Consider A Resolution To Change The Individuals Authorized To Invest Funds AndMake Withdrawals From The Public Funds Investment Pool Known As “Texpool”.

*29. Consider A Resolution Requesting A Longer Amortization Period And EstablishingA Policy For Voluntary Contributions To Texas Municipal Retirement System ThatWill Improve Funded Status And Reduce The Length Of The Amortization PeriodBelow Forty Years Without Increasing Mandatory Contributions.

Council considered the following item separately:

*25. Consider A Resolution Authorizing The City Manager To Enter Into An AgreementWith Metrocrest Social Service Center For Services Provided To CarrolltonCitizens For The 2008-09 Fiscal Year In An Amount Not To Exceed $88,500.00.

Councilmember Mahalik moved to approve Agenda Item No. 25. Second byCouncilmember Weidinger. The vote was cast 6-1 in favor of the motion, Mayor ProTem Malone voted no.

PUBLIC HEARING -INDIVIDUAL CONSIDERATION

30. Conduct an Additional Public Hearing On The Proposed Operating And CapitalBudget For The Fiscal Year October 1, 2008 Through September 30, 2009.

No action was required for this item

OTHER BUSINESS

31. Consider An Ordinance Adopting And Approving An Operating And CapitalBudget For The City of Carrollton, Making Appropriations Therefore For TheFiscal Year October 1, 2008 Through September 30, 2009.

Councilmember Simons moved to approve an Ordinance Adopting And ApprovingAn Operating And Capital Budget For The City of Carrollton, MakingAppropriations Therefore For The Fiscal Year October 1, 2008 Through September30, 2009. Second by Councilmember Marchant. The vote was cast 6-1 in favor of themotion, Mayor Pro Tem Malone voted no.

Exhibit A-1

REGULARMEETING&WORKSESSIONMINUTES – SEPTEMBER 16, 2008 PAGE 532. Consider A Resolution Ratifying The Property Tax Increase Reflected In The Fiscal

Year 2008-2009 Operating Budget.

Mayor Pro Tem Malone moved to approve a Resolution Ratifying The Property TaxIncrease Reflected In The Fiscal Year 2008-2009 Operating Budget. Second byCouncilmember Weidinger. The vote was cast 7-0 in favor of the motion.

33. Consider An Ordinance Establishing The Tax Rate And The Tax Levy For The Cityof Carrollton For The Tax Year 2008 Upon The Taxable Property In The City ofCarrollton In Conformity With The Laws Of The State Of Texas And The City.

Councilmember Weidinger moved to approve an Ordinance Establishing The TaxRate And The Tax Levy For The City of Carrollton For The Tax Year 2008 UponThe Taxable Property In The City of Carrollton In Conformity With The Laws OfThe State Of Texas And The City. Second by Councilmember Mahalik. The votewas cast 7-0 in favor of the motion.

Mayor Branson adjourned the meeting and reconvened the Worksession at 7:34 p.m.

* * * *WORKSESSION * * * *COUNCILBRIEFINGROOM

6. Discuss the Proposed Construction Contract For The Rosemeade and Thomas PoolImprovements.No Discussion.

7. Discuss Fiscal Year 2009 Proposed Budget.

No Discussion.

8. Discuss Proposed Rezoning of PD-169 (Belt Line Road Corridor).

Christopher Barton, Senior Planner stated that PD-169 includes both sides of Belt LineRoad from Josey Lane to Erie Street (on the north side) and Myers Street (on the southside). The current ordinance for PD-169 was enacted in 2003, and was one of theoutcomes of the Carrollton Renaissance Initiative. In June 2008, staff began analyzing theeffect and administration of PD-169, in order to determine its continued appropriatenessand efficacy.

On August 5, 2008, staff made a presentation to the Redevelopment Sub-committeeregarding findings and recommendations. The Sub-committee recommended that thepresentation be made to the full City Council for direction.

As part of that approval, staff will ask City Council to schedule a joint public hearingwith the Planning and Zoning Commission, in order to complete the proposed zoningchange in a prompt manner. A joint public hearing will also allow formal notice of theproposed zoning change to be made by placing a paid advertisement in the legal noticessection of a local newspaper instead of mailing formal notices to the approximately 250property owners in the subject area and adjacent to it.

Exhibit A-1

REGULARMEETING&WORKSESSIONMINUTES – SEPTEMBER 16, 2008 PAGE 6There are no financial implications on current or future operating budgets regarding thezoning request itself. However, staff may recommend future programs to “partner” withlandowners to improve the appearance of the area.

This project is a City Council strategic goal aimed at improving the visual character ofthe Belt Line Road corridor west of Josey Lane, which serves as an important entrywayinto Carrollton and the future Downtown Carrollton Station TOD area.

9. Discuss Amendments to the City Council Governance Policy.

Ms. Mitchell stated that at the City Council Strategic Planning Session in July, Councildirected staff to make changes to the Governance Policy. Staff made the followingchanges:

5.7 Members of the Council shall conduct an orientation for new council members

Is amended to read:

4.7 Staff shall conduct an orientation for new council members.

10.2 In order that Boards, Commissions and Committees may accomplish their tasks freeof political influence, it is preferable that City Council members not attend the meetingsof Boards, Commissions and Committees. If a City Council member should attend ameeting of a Board, Commission or Committee, the member shall not take part in themeeting nor address the board in any manner whether by questions or statements. A CityCouncil member shall not attempt to influence the decisions of Boards, Commissions andCommittees either directly or indirectly nor express an opinion to a Board, Commissionor Committee about its actions unless at a City Council meeting.Is amended to read:

9.3 In order that Boards, Commissions and Committees should accomplish their tasksfree of political influence. If a City Council member should attend a meeting of a Board,Commission or Committee, the member shall not take part in the meeting. A CityCouncil member shall not attempt to influence the decisions of Boards, Commissions andCommittees either directly or indirectly nor express an opinion to a Board, Commissionor Committee about its actions unless at a City Council meeting.

Staff also did some renumbering of the sections and included the Council Travel Policyand a Code of Ethics.

10. Discuss the 2009 Council Meeting Calendar.

Ms. Mitchell stated that every year in September, Council sets the meeting for the nextyear. Most months fall in accordance to the first and third Tuesday meeting schedule. Themonths where the dates need to be moved for council travel conflicts or holiday conflictswill need to be discussed.

Council made the following changes.

Second meeting in March will be March 24.Exhibit A-1

REGULARMEETING&WORKSESSIONMINUTES – SEPTEMBER 16, 2008 PAGE 7Second meeting in October will be October 20.

11. Discuss Future Agenda Items.

ATTEST:

______________________________ ___________________________________Ashley D. Mitchell, City Secretary Pat Malone, Mayor Pro Tem

Exhibit A-1

InTown Suites v. Carrollton Lawsuit

Documents

senior adult

code conviction

eradication

regular meeting

intown suites

texas constitution

proposed zoning

joint public