7/29/2019 Interpretation, Vol_4-2 http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/interpretation-vol4-2 1/56 a journal of political philosophy volume 4/2 winter 1974 page 65 thomas s. engeman homeric honor and thucydidean necessity 79 w. b. alien theory and practice in the founding of the republic 98 robert r. or r intellectual biography as a form of the history of ideas 107 harry neumann atheistic freedom and the international society for the suppression of savage customs: an interpretation of conrad's heart of darkness martinus nijhoff, the hague edited at queens college of the city university of ne w york
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H O M E R I C H O N O R A N D T H U C Y D I D E A N N E C E S S I T Y
T h o m a s S. E n g e m a n
Commenta to r s on Thucyd ides generally agree on at least on e point: h e
is exceedingly reluctant to reveal h is ow n t h o u g h t s concerning the m e a n i n g
of th e events which he n a r r a t e s . 1Thucydides'
reticence has natura l ly le d to
confusion in unders tanding his t rue intention. F or e x a m p l e , was T h u c y d i d e s
a supporter of Athen ian imperialism, as is often a rg u e d , or did he bel ieve
that imper ia l ambition was inevitably prone to a lack of moderation in
success an d t h e r e f o r e to ultimate disaster? Looking at the Mel ian dialogue-
Sicil ian expedition s e q u e n c e , it is frequently noted that the skillful
juxtaposi t ion of the hubristic speeches of the Athen ians at Meios and
t h e i r defeat in Sicily is designed to teach sensible me n that ambition and
success breed hope, daring, and defeat . A s H . D . F . Kitto judged theAthenians'
fate in Sicily, " their success h ad betrayed them."2
However, th i s conclusion seems to be only an inference based upon
the dramat ic association of the tw o events. Thucydides himself ascribes the
Athen ian d efe at in Sicily to the absence of an ou t s t and ing s ta te sm a n w ho
could command the steady adherence of a major i ty of th e citizens to a
consistent fore ign pohcy (11.65.10-11). ( W h a t is more important, th i s
j u d g m e n t is borne ou t by a s tudy of th e events which caused the A t h e n i a n
defeat.) If Pericles h ad lived, the expedition would no t have been
u n d e r t a k e n ; or if Alcibiades h ad been trusted by th e A t h e n i o n demos,
Sicily could have been conquered. Thucyd ides t h u s indicates that politics
depends upon individuals an d condi t ions , no t upon the designs of gods
or uponfate.3
1 Cf., fo r instance, A . W . Gomme, T h e G r e e k A t t i t ude to Poetry an d History(Berkeley: University of Cali fornia Press, 1954), pp. 307-8; A . W . Gomme, M o r e
Essays in G r e e k History an d Li t e r a tu re (O x fo rd : B asil Blackwell, 1962), pp. 123,
159ff.; Jacque l ine DeRomilly, T h u c y d i d e s an d Athen ian Impe r i a l i s m ( N ew York;
Barnes an d Noble, 1963), pp. 58, 103; H . D . F . Kitto, Poies is : S t ruc tu r e an d T h o u g h t
(London: C a m b r i d g e University Press, 1966), pp. 307-8; L eo Strauss, T h e City an d
M an (New Yo r k : Rand-McNally, 1964), pp. 1 4 4 - 4 5 .
2 Kitto, Poiesis, p. 336; Strauss, City an d Man, p. 153 .
3 Th i s is no t to deny that there is a c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n th e M el i an dia logue and
the Sic i l ian de fe a t . T h a t c on ne ctio n c an b een in th e inability of th e Athen ians at
M e i o s to unde r s t and th e essential p i e t y of politics. Af te rPericles '
death the Athenian
leaders wi t h the best na tu r e s , i.e., those capable of rule (Alcibiades), d e p r e c i a t e d th e
pious understanding of right in favor of the na tu ra l u n d e r s t a n d i n g of right. There fo re
they los t the trust of the demos, w h o , when s o r e l y troubled by th e magnitude an d
d a n g e r of the Sicilian expedi t ion , naturally turned to the pious Nicias, wh o was
f rom their point of view p e r f e c t l y trustworthy. Nicias, of c o u r s e , was unable to
e x e c u t e the plan conceived by th e daring Alcibiades . See Strauss , City an d Man,
T h e elusiveness of Thucyd ides can b e traced to his singular manner of
writing. Kit to has characterized Thucyd ides as someone who "could sa y
t h i n g s without sayingthem."4 Thucyd ides (o r any on e of his cha rac t e r s )
can make judgments or speeches w hich are contradicted by the course of
events. A careful reader m ust com pare the events which Thucydides
r el at es w ith th e speeches which he (o r an y cha rac t e r ) makes about t h o s e
events in order to reveal th e deepest reflections of the writer. A s T h o m a s
H o b b e s says in th e "Address to th eReaders"
of his t r an s l a t i on of
Thucydides, " B u t t h e s e conjectures [ abou t the meaning of a history]cannot often be ce r t a in , unles s witha l so evident , that th e narration itself
m ay be sufficient to suggest th e same also to th er e ade r. "5
T h e Archeology
T h e Corinthians at th e first Congress at L a c e d a e m o n contrast th e
Athen ian manner and th e Spartan manner. W h e r e the Athenians are
innovative, swift to desire and a t t empt , publ ic-sp i r i ted , bold, hopeful, an d
lovers of m o t i o n , th e Spartans are traditional, s l o w, s e l f - conce rned , cau
tious, doubtful, and lovers of rest (1.70; cf. VII I .96 .5 ) . T h e C o r in th ia ns are
describing th e characters of th e dramat ic protagonists Sparta and Athens,whose struggle forms the axis of
Thucydides' his tory.6 The i r struggle,
according to Thucydides, is of the greatest importance because these tw ocities stand at the end of a long period o f p ro gre ss w hich has made them
truly significant. T h e Greeks, le d by Athens an d Sparta, now possess a
vast quantity of w ealth and power that has been stored u p during th e
prior age of p rogres s. T h e age of progress is a lso , in one sense , an age
of r e s t ; it provides the material needed to wage a"total"
wa r lasting fo r
decades and involving everyone (1.1.1-2, 23.1-4, II.82.1-2, 83.1, 85-87,11.38. 2, 6 2.1). T he g re at es t r es t and progress issue in th e grea tes t , no t to
say th e universa l , motion of th e Peloponnesian War. T h e wa r between
Athens an d h er allies and Sparta an d h er allies is a civil w a r, a stasis in
4 Kitto, Poiesis, p. 302.
5 T he Engl ish Works of T h o m a s Hobbes, ed. Sir W ill i am M o l e s w o r t h (London :
J o h n Bohn, 1843), Vo l . 8, p. viii. Is H ob be s correct in a s s u m i n g that Thucyd id e s was
perfect ly free to c h o o s e , a r r ange , or perhaps invent e v e n t s , i.e., to s a y any t h ing he
wished through h is narrative? Is t he r e no t a"historiographic"
n e c e s s i t y, th e
accidental occurrence of e v e n t s , which l imitsThucydides' "logographic"
potential?
Or, to pu t th e question in a more r e v e a l i ng w a y, to what extent was Thucyd ides a
scientific historian w ho w an ted o n l y to describe acc u r a t e l y the events that o c c u r r e d ,
or to w ha t e xt en t wa s h e c on ce rn ed w it h discovering th e causes of the events? If, as
indeed seems to be th e case , he wa s concerned wi th th e latter, wouldn't that task
force him, when n e c e s s a r y, to compromise th e s imply scientific re cita tio n o f the
l i teral and un re ve a l i ng facts?6 A . W . Gomme, A His to r i ca l Commentary on Thucyd ides (Oxford: O x f o r d
University Press, 1950), Vol . 1, p. 23 3 (1.71.5); DeRomilly, Thucydides, pp. 77-82,311-13; Strauss, City an d Man, pp . 148-49 .
s tr at ag em w as successful. T h e Ampraciots, having seen the P e l o p o n n e s i a n s
e s c a p i n g , attempted to follow them, were cu t off by the Acarnanians, an d
dr iven into a ne ighbor ing coun t ry ( 111 . 1 0 5 - 1 3 ) .
Afte r the defeat of the Ampraciots, the A c a r n a n i a n s refused to i nvade
A m p r a c i a as the Athenians an d D e m o s t h e n e s desi red them to do, fo r they
feared that if the Athen ians h ad A m p r a c i a they would b e worse
neighbors than their present ones. Instead, after D e m o s t h e n e s and the
Athen ians left, they concluded a peace treaty with the A m p r a c i a n s on
very liberal t e r m s (III . 114.2-4; cf.TV.92 .5 ) .17
In the summer of the seventh year of the war the Athen ians helped
capture Anac to r ium (a city in imica l to the Acarnan ians [III. 114.3]) and
turned it over to the Acarnanians, who settled it with their ow n people
( IV.49) . T h a t winter the Acarnan ians took part with D e m o s t h e n e s inan unsuccessful attack on the Boeo t i an t o w n of Siphae . O n the re turn
voyage they tried another unsuccessful attack on part of Sicyonia (IV.77,
101). T h e Acarnan ians come to sight fo r the last time inT h u c y d i d e s '
history in Sicily, having been persuaded by D e m o s t h e n e s to a c c o m p a n y
h im there on his relief expedition (VI I . 31).
W h a t ca n be learn ed f rom these narrative events and T h u c y d i d e a n
remarks (III. 113.6, V I I . 5 7 . 10-11) which deepen the unde r s t and ing of the
"progress ivet h e s i s "
and hence the deprecat ion of"ancient"
h fe an d
wisdom? T o answer t h i s question we must fur ther distill the sense of
th e narrative. First, it appears that the Acarnan ians are as unorganized as
T h u c y d i d e s h a d suggested that the"ancients"
were (1.3.1) . They lack
s t rong pol i t i ca l , mi l i t a ry, or rehgious conventions or laws. Politically, theyare no t even united under the leadership of a single polis. T h e majo r i t y of
the Acarnan ians live in unwalled vi l l ages ; they are like an e t h n o s ; the
inhabi tants of each locality are ruled by t y r a n t s who a p p e a r to be the
obvious ly su pe rio r m en (1.5.1). T h e Acarnan ians are therefore analogous
to the people of Att ica before Theseus gathered them together (II . 15. 1-2).A s on e might e x p e c t , the Acarnan ians are also weak militarily. The i r
weakness is caused by their general inability, and apparent unwillingness,
to learn th e regimented t e ch n ique s needed fo r efficient military organi
zation. They are relu ctan t to assemble fo r purposes of warfare; once
a s s e m b l e d , they are difficult to order fo r b attle. However, weakness in
their case cannot b e asso ciated w ith a lack of individual intelligence, ski l l ,
or daring. T he Acarnan ian generals are resourceful and devious. Theyplan tw o e ff ec tiv e a mb us he s and share in the
" p e a c e "
agreement with
the Peloponnesians which gives them the oppor tun i ty to destroy their
ne ighbo r s , the Amprac io t s . Individually the Acarnan ian soldiers ar e profi
cient in th e use of s l ings , an open kind of warfare requir ing personal skill
1 7 Gomme, Commentary, Vo l . 2, p. 4 2 9 : " A m p r a k i a gets of f very lightly after
h er defeat, and Athens go t little by the v i c t o r y ofDemosthenes."
H o m eric H o n o r an d Thucyd idean Necessity 73
and daring, as opposed to th e discipline of the galley an d p h a l a n x ,which necessitates strict obedience to convent ion .18
FinaUy, T h u cy d id e s i nd ic at es that the Acarnanians are no t excessively
pious. In fact, he never shows a single instance of their religious festivalsor auspices before c a m p a i g n s , no r does he mention any Acarnanian
temples, nor report oaths sworn to th e gods (one certainly would anticipate
such o aths to legitimate the treaty with Ampracia; oaths were sworn in
each of the three t rea t ies between Spar ta and Athens [IV. 119, V .I 8-19,24]).
In addition to th e apparent laxity of th e Acarnanian convent ions ,one is struck by the overall prudence and moderation of their policies.
The i r prudence is evident in t he i r alliance with Athens and use of
Athenian power to maintain and improve t h e i r ow n position while
never allowing th e Athenians to become to o powerful in the area. B u t
th e Acarnanians d id no t ignore considerations of equity (dike) an d loyaltyin their deliberations. Originally they allied t h e m s e l v e s to Athens onlyafter they h ad come to respect Phormio. This attachment apparent lymotivated t h e i r request that a kinsman of P ho rm io be sent to replace h im
(a request which probably also reveals th e nature of t h e i r o wn r eg im e) .
Finally, their affection fo r Demosthenes and loyalty to A th en s led them
into th e middle of the Athen ian disaster in Sicily.
T h e source of the Acarnanians'moderation ca n be t r a ced to t h e i r
t e m p o r a t e ange r, or desire fo r revenge. Thucydides explicitly d raws
attention to the fac t that the stronghold at Olpae was used as a place
where the Acarnanians would meet t oge the r for "m atters ofjustice."
While t h i s m ay seem to indicate that in peaceful t i m e s they acted justlyt o w a r d one ano the r, we can see that during the course of the wa r they are
hesitant to infl ict injury on their own people. Even t h o u g h they jo ined in
tw o expeditions with th e Athenians against Oeniadae (an Acarnanian
city) , bo th cam paigns w ere marked by inactivity a nd n on en ga ge me nt
(11.102, III.7).19 O n another occasion when anger or revenge might
have been expec t e d , th e Acarnanians acted in a generous manner bygiving l iberal peace t e r m s to the quarrelsome Ampraciots, wh o had
i nvaded them no f ewer than three t i m e s during th e course of the war.
Could the Acarnanians have pitied the A m p ra cio ts b ecau se of t h e i r
stupendous defea t (the greatest defeat suffered by an y city, in a short
18 Occasionally some question is raised as to whether the A c a rn a ni an s h a d a fleet.
Since there is no substantial evidence to support the f lee tthesis,
most commentators
agree that they did n o t ; cf. Gomme, Commentary, Vo l . 2, p. 4 11 . I t is c lear, how
e v e r , that they did ha ve a hopl i te force (Commentary, p. 4 20 [1 07 .4 ]. These are
p r o b a b l y t r o o p s f rom the larger cities an d fo rm exceptions to th e almost universal
slingers (11.81. 8, 82, VH.31.5, 67.2).
is Gomme, Commentary, Vol. 2, p. 11 (9.4), is w r o n g when he claims that
O e n i a d a e wa s always at variance with th e rest of Acarnan ia . T h e Acarnanians settled
t h e i r ow n d i s a g r ee m en t an d made O e n i a d e become a member of th e alliance
relationship of h u m a n nature and convention. Diodotus argues that
c o n v en t i on , or th e legislative ar t , is"progressive"
like th e other arts. B u t
th e progress of convention is th e same as the s t rengthening of convention:
progress equals power. In th e a r cheo logy, Thucyd ides showed that
convention has th e power to change th e relation of m otio n a nd rest amongme n (1.18.1, 6-7). I t creates r e s t , generates wea l th , and makes possible
"Greekness"
and the tw o premier Greek cit ies , Spar ta and Athens .
Putting t o g e t h e rDiodotus'
speech and the a r c h e o l o g y, we observe what
price men pay fo r the progress of convention: it leads to an ever greater
r eli an ce o n convention an d consequently a heightened fear of it s contra
vention and removal. Thi s accounts fo r the increased punitiveness of l aws
an d men which Diodo tus mentions and fo r the overpower ing anger
generated by th e stasis atCorcyra .22
Diodotus, the Athenian, appears as
th e spokesman fo r th e an c i en t , Acarnan ian nuldness. B u t his mUdness is
a result of re f lec t ion , th e reflection (and res t ) possible in p o s t - c o n v e n t i o n a l ,
innovat ive Athens; theAcarnanians'
results f rom the pre-progressive
laxness of their conventions. H u m a n nature is c o r r u p t e d , bu t necessari ly
corrupted by c o n v e n t i o n ; the innocence of both the Athenians an d
Acarnan ians is easUy and necessarUy los t on th e level of political affairs
Spar ta and h er aUies defeat Athens and h er aUies.
H o w e v e r this m ay be, th e importance of the Acarnanians does not end
with t e s ti m o n i a l s to t h e i r gentleness and moderation. A s an"ancient"
people they are undoub ted ly associated with"ancient"
wisdom. T h u c y d i d e s
emphasizes t h i s association when h e digresses to describe th e place where
Hesiod died and th e purification of Delos, in the section recount ingDemosthenes'
expeditions around the Ionian gulf. T h e digression on the
purfication of Delos includes verses f rom H o m e r ' s H y m n to Apollo, which
describe a color fu l , idyUic fest ival held long ago on th e is land of Delos.
This romantic scene is th e only passage in th e whole of th e T h u c y d i d e a n
narritive which looks at h u m a n affairs peaceful ly and privately:
A t o t h e r t i m e s , Phoebus, D e l o s is deares t to y o u r heart, where the Ionians in
trailing robes are gathered t o g e t h e r with t h e i r wives an d children in your w a y ;
t h e r e they del ight t h e e with boxing an d dancing an d s o n g , m a k i n g mention of your
n a m e , whenever they ordain th e contest.23
2 2 C o n v e n t i o n n urtures an d rules anger. W h e n convention is removed, as at
Corcyra, anger an d the desire fo r revenge are insanely emancipated.
23 O n e cannot help o b s e r v i n g that T huc yd ide s ends h is quo ta t ion of the second
passage of the H y m n to Apol lo in mid-sentence. T h e complete
q u o t a t i o n ,with the
omission u n d e r s c o r e d , is as fo l lows: " C o m e n o w, le t Apol l o be gracious an d Ar temis
also an d farewell, all y o u m ai de ns . Y et r e m e m b e r me even in after t imes, whenever
some other toil-enduring m a n , a dwel ler u p o n the earth, s ha ll v is it th i s island an d
ask: 'O m a i d e n s , what man is the sweetest of minstrels to yo u of all who w a n d e r
hither, an d in whom do yo u t a k e m o s tdelight?'
D o yo u make a n s w e r , p i o u s l y an d
a l toge the r 'The bl ind ma n who dwel ls in ruggedChios'
w ho se s on gs ar e evermore
sup reme ( thebest"
(165-73) . Homer, in the contest of p o e t s , proclaims his e t e rna l
superiority to all other contenders. Entering the lists somewhat late, Thucyd ides
TemporarUy a b a n d o n i n g his political and nnl i ta i ry or"war"
n a r r a t i v e ,
T h u c y d i d e s in t roduces th e ancient H o m e r to speak of p r iva t e , s exua l , an d
honor-seeking relations(e ros) .2 i T h e fact that th e only view of peace
which is presented in the whole of T h u c y d i d e s takes place in the past
indicates again that th e"progress"
which produced th e greatest m o t i o n ,
the Pe loponnes i an War, m ay after aU b e a regress. D o e s that progress
compensate fo r th e absence of aH o m e r ? 2 5
B u t beyond this, th e narrative presence of th e Acarnan ians fur ther
correctsT h u c y d i d e s '
i nd i c tmen t of th e past. Thucydides, as we have s e e n ,
says that poets ar e unreliable because they exaggerate an d beautify the
events they describe ( I .10 .3 ) .26 T h e poe t s , to take the most i m p o r t a n t
ca se , claimed that the heroes who served A g a m e m n o n did so to fulfill the
oath to Tyndareus . Thucyd ides corrects that mistaken beautification
through his historical research an d sober reflection: men are motivated
" n o t so much by favor (o r honor) as byfear"
(1.9.3) . In th i s light, when
T h u c y d i d e s gives h is catalogue of the co mb atan ts on th e great SicUian
e x p e d i t i o n , h e naturaUy reaffirms h is unb l ink ing j u d g m e n t of h u m a n
things: "they (the aUies) chose sides no t so much on the ground of right
(dike) or even kinship to one another b u t either ou t of regard fo r their
o wn a dv an ta ge or from necess i ty (ananke), acco rd ing to th e circumstances
in which they happened to beplaced"
(VII.57.1; fo r th e entire a s s e m b l y,
see 57-58; compare the I li ad I I. 48 5 -e n d ). A n d ye t when we look d o w nth e list of Athen ian aUies we find near the end the Acarnanians, who came
on th i s long an d doubtful v e n t u r e , as T h u c y d i d e s himself aff i rms , no t fo r
reasons of advantage or necess i ty, b u t ou t of friendship, good wiU, and
concern. "Some of th e Acarnan ians served fo r g a i n , b u t th e la rger portion
[were m o v e d ] by friendship fo r Demos thenes and good wUl toward the
Athenians being allies an d coming to theiraid"
(VII . 57. 10). 2T
does no t appear to break th e code of good s p o r t s m a n s h i p by s t r i k i n g H o m e r ' s b o a s tf rom the r eco rd ( com pa re 11.62. 1-3, 1.21, 22.4, 23).
2 4 Thucydides m en tio ns w om en o n l y in their connection wi th political life. F o r
e x a m p l e , they f ight at Pla t aea and C o r c y r a (II.4.2, 111.74). Per ic les t e l l s them to b e
silent in their grief (11.45.2). Further, eros is on l y used once by T h u c y d i d e s in the
nominative, in the u n u s u a l love of th e Athen ians fo r Sicily (VI.24.3) while Per ic les
asks the Athenians to b ec om e lo ve rs of their city (11.43. 1) . (For the excep t i o n that
proves the ru le , consider 1.136.3.) M o s t important,Thucydides'
view of the conflict
between erotic des i re (the p r i v a t e ) an d a good regime (the p u b l i c ) ca n be seen in
hi s discussion of th e so-called t y r a n n i c i d e s H a r m o d i u s an d Aris togei ton ( V I . 5 3 . 3 - 5 9 ) .
T h u c yd id e s d e pr e ci at es eros /o r the same reason Pla to d oe s fo r the sake of the
public an d the c o m m o n , th e city (Republic, 420b-421c, 440b, 452c-459e) .
2 5 Strauss, City an d Man, p. 2 3 6 .
2 6 Thucydides, of course, does t a k e th e l i teral bas is of H o m e r ' s account s e r i o u s l y,
bo th in the a r c h e o l o g y (1.10.3-4) a n d , more important, in book III, where Thucyd i de s
presents H o m e r to show that there wa s an anc ien t fes t iva l on Delos ( compare 1.9.3
an d I I I .104.6) .
2 7 T h e A c arn an ia ns symbolize the anc ien t peoples at t h e i r bes t . T h e Aetol ians
H o m eric H o n o r an d Thucydidean Necessity 77
Thucyidides t h u s foregoes h is cus tomary sever i ty, and permits th e
Acarnanians, his ancient or Homer ic peop le , to voyage on his epic
exped i t i on , no t prosaically, fo r reasons of gain or necess i ty, b u t
HomericaUy, fo r friendship and honor. In th i s marvelously"silent"
and
indirect fashion, Thucydides apologizes to H o m e r fo r th e injustice he h ad
shown to h im in th e archeology. Homeric w i s d o m , which adorns and
exaggera tes , is res tored , and th e entire "progressivet h e s i s "
of th e
archeology is corrected. T h e ancient Acarnanians (the barbarians) are
shown to be in fundamental respects the precursors of Athenian and
Thucyd idean gent leness , inteUigence, daring, and moderation (dike).
Thucydides t hus qualifies his own account (1.1.1-2, 23.1-4, III.82.1-2,83.1, II.38.2, 62.1); no wa r is t o t a l w a r , no motion is total motion. W ar
and th e motion which w ar brings can never become universal. There are
always restful places an d restful t i m e s in the midst of the greatest
possible mot ion , as there are me n (the Acarnanians, Demosthenes, an d
Thucydides) who can live amidst th e greatest mot ion , still guided bypassions and opinions which are supposed only to be fo un d in peace
mUdness , honor, and patriotism (III.82.2).28 T he wisdom of Thucydides,which looks to an absolute necessity (ananke) caused by absolute m o t i o n ,is as deficient as th e wisdom of Homer, which disguises necessity (war
an d m o t i o n ) in a halo of gods and heroes (1.9.3). There is always a
combination of m otion and rest in both the theoretical and th e practical
world.
Homer ic wisdom is as t r ue as Thucyd idean wisdom. T h e H om eric
barbarians are , in m a n y r e s pec t s , bet ter me n than th e Greeks: Thucydides
allows us to see th i s . So in the e n d , ancients an d m o d e r n s , barbarians
and Greeks, H o m e r an d Thucydides, an d honor and necessity are all
judged by Thucyd ides in a new and juster perspective.
In s u m m a r y, on e might characterizeThucydides'
con te st w ith H o m e r as
follows: H o m e r proceeds with poetic e loquence and t h e nsUently
qualifies
his great t h e m e s through th e dramat ic denouement. A s Benardete has
observed about H o m e r ' s manner of writing: "the Il iad moves from th e
apparent ly higher to the apparent ly lower; AchiUes, the Achaean hero,finaUy yields to his o p p o s i t e s . " 2 9 O ne might sa y that th e honor-lovingAchUles yields to th e wily
Odysseus .30
Thucydides, on the other hand, claiming to proceed prosaicaUy and
severely (i n opposition to Homer), in fact fashions a poetic drama, and
t h e n sUently qualifies both his prosaic and his poetic accounts. H e proceeds
serve fo r gain (VII.57.9), th e Ozol ian Locrians are no longer m e n t i o n e d , an d none
of the other peoples of th e Ionian gulf are distinguished by name.
2 8 T h e Spartans an d th e pious Nicias, while a p p e a r i n g f rom th e point of view
of outsiders to be at rest an d to desire res t , are a c t u a l l y always in motion. The i r
private an d hidden motion results f rom th e potential or actual depredat ions of helots
an d gods (1.101-2, IV.41.3, 80, VIII.40.2, VII.50.4).2 9 "Ach i l l e s an d th e
IN T H E F O U N D I N G O F T H E R E P U B L I C
W . B . Allen
Those s e r i o u s , t h o u g h natural e n m i t i e s , which occur between the popular classes
an d the n o b i l i t y, a r i s ing f rom th e desire of th e la t ter to c o m m a n d , an d the
dis inc l ina t ion of the fo rmer to o b e y, are the causes of most of th e troubles which take
place in c i t i es ; an d f rom th i s diversity of p u r p o s e , all the other evils which disturb
republics derive t h e i r origin.
Niccolo Machiavelli, History of Florence, Bk. Ill
A recent interpretation of Montesquieu 's contribution to th e foundingof Amer ica argues that the disagreement b e tw e e n F e d er ali st s and Anti-
federalists is of negligible importance . Traditionally, Montesqu ieu has
been held to have contributed to the founding principaUy through the
doctrine o f s ep ar atio n of powers. In rejecting that v i e w, t h i s argument
does no t maintain that separation of powers has been misunderstood in
Montesqu ieu though that argument is possible. Rather, it is urged that
separation of p ow er s w as an administrative necess i ty, and t hus historicallyd ete rm in ed . T h us is Montesqu ieu r e j e c t ed , without question as to what
h e meant to say or as to how he was understood by Federalists and
Antifederalists .
T he problem in part arises from the difficulty of Montesqu ieu ' s
principal w o r k , D e I 'Espr i t des lois. I t offers the critic an extremely
difficult t a s k : to derive the schematic form of a government f rom a work
that, in th e final ana lys i s , offers only a picture of it s character. T h e hones t
critic wUl only reconstruct the characterization. If, however, on e is
confronted with an immed ia t e pohtical task as well as the in terpre t ive task,
honesty is insufficient . Federalists and Antifederalists as critics co n
f ronted t h i s difficulty. A possible approach is to l imit one's appraisal to the
firts tw o sections of L'Espr i t des lois, where some dicta as to form an d
mechanisms can be found. Y et t hose sections form an i ncomple t e
s t a t emen t , particularly as they are foUowed by a middle s ec tio n w hich
develops a definitive characterization of th e republic. StUl, the founders
were forced to focus their a tte ntio n o n th e first tw o sections Anti feder
alists stiU more so t h a n Federalists. Montesquieu, therefore, w ou ld seem
to have left them behind and perhaps even to have misled t h em as he
moves to a conside ra ti on o f th e republic. B u t whether that could justifyth e argument that Montesquieu 's unders tanding is no t that of the regime
can only b e determined by judging that unders tanding in the hgh t of the
f o u n d i n g . 1
i S u c h inves t iga t ion suggests that th e determinist view is not an ent i re ly accurate
portrayal. T h e Federalists, in p a r t i cu l a r, demonstra te a n a tt ac h me nt to m o de rn v ir tu e
In the course of t h i s attempt to avoid an aU too rigid i n t e rp re t a t i on of
Montesqu ieu and s ep ar at io n o f p o w e r s , the ne w in terpre ta t ion succeeds in
eliminating M o n te sq u ie u (m o r e prec ise ly, denying the i m p o r t a n c e of theory
in the founding of r e g i m e s ) from any serious discuss ion of pohtics in the
Amer ican regime. It s success , moreover, is qualified: it depends on the
notion that the response to circumstance or history impeUed by the
circumstance itself is the only justification of such response. Even t s or
history alone can explain pohtical action. Poh t i ca l speech is anciUary. N o w
t h i s m ay be true, b u t it could only be shown to be true by c o n s u l t i n g ,
in this case , the s pe ec he s o f th e Framers and the writings of Montesqu ieu .
Were it poss ib le , i n d ete rm i ni st terms, to say that history qu a history has a
s ing le , dominating principle, that principle would be the pr imacy of
practice as a p re co nd it io n fo r theunder s t and ing
of h u m a n action. N o n e
theless, there is a legit imate question as to the abUity of history to
describe events o r actions without the existence of prior unde r s t and ing of
th e characteristics or moral qualities of such events or actions. Thi s would
seem to suggest that, in fact, history must be preceded by phUosophy or
t h e o r y : history must be Herodo tean inquiry.
B u t that alone w ou ld s ug ge st that history consists only in th e sounding
( w h i c h will be d eve loped b e low with respect to Monte sq u i e u ) . Ine s s a y
35 P ub l iu s
demonstra tes th; essential fo rm of the problem by p re sen t i n g th e interests of
commerce an d agriculture, with the learned professions interposed, as the essential
form of the discussion about representation and. hence, the modern republic. T h e
Ant i federa l i s ts well understood the republic as the best fo rm of g o v e r n m e n t ; theyd id no t understand that it o n l y became possible in a confede ra l republic. Theynever moved m uch beyond co ns id e r i n g the usefulness of a confederal republic as
a defensive m a t t e r ; th e s a l u t a r y effects of government would all come f rom th e
v ar io us s ma ll states. T h e federat ion w ould no t b e a ne w structure h u m a n conven
t ion d r a w n f rom first conventions b u t a superstructure. This, of course, meant
that that structure w as r em ov ed b u t one s tep f rom the state of n atu re and all too
close to th e awful t r u th s of that state. Among other questions, Ant i f ede ra l i s t s
questioned whether moderate government could be installed in such a large territory
unde r s t and ing t h a t it is moderate government that secures liberty. T h e general
welfare was to be secured t h r o u g h a virtuous ci t izenry a virtue based on c o m m e ' c e ,
indeed, b u t a commerce based on agriculture still more than on manufacture. W i th
such principles, Antifederalists concluded that the o n ly poss ib i l i ty fo r liberty (and
a virtuous c i t izenry) would come through the confederal arrangement they also
called a complex consolidation. Federalists, too, p res en te d a n argument in t e r m s of
p r i n c i p l e s , including the basic principle that the phenomenon of representation isan i ndependen t g o o d , t h o u g h it is true that it m a y initially result f rom an extensive
territory. It is th e contention of th i s e s s a y that such principles did, indeed, inform
th e political decisions made by the founders . Both Federa l is ts an d Antifederal is ts
referred their principles to Montesqu ieu . If n o th i n g more, this must mean that their
principles can. to a great e x t e n t , be understood in terms of their under s t and ing of
Montesquieu. Conceding that, it should then be possible to determine whether
Montesquieu, as he understood himself, was r ight ly understood by on e or th e other,or bo th .
Theory an d Pract ice in th e Founding o f the Repub l i c 8 1
of general or t h eo r e t i c a l principles. History exists not qu a history, b u t
qu a moral possibUity. This says more than that theory m ust precede
prac t i ce ; th i s says that practice is impossible without t h e o r y. Unless,
therefore, phUosophy must be held to be commonly p rac t i c ed , there must
be another possible conclusion. Revela t ion provides one such poss ibUi ty,
yielding definitive descriptions of th e characteristics or moral qualities
of events or a ctio ns a nd thereby permit t ing the j udgmen t of such events or
actions in th e absence of inquiry. Th i s arrangement works w e U , permit t ing
history qu a history to exist fo r just so long as t h e r e occur no events or
actions that m ay be adjudged beyond th e j udgmen t of revelation or divine
legislation.
T h e problem is prefigured in Montesquieu 's L'Espr i t d es lois, a complete
unde r s t and ing of which t u r n s on an unders tanding of the last eight b o o k s
the practical books. T h e opening of book X X I V (the first of the practical
books) announces that th e author will unfold the proper manner in
which to s tudy h u m a n th ings and that he wiU demonstra te that the
possibUity of prov id ing me n "the bes t pohtical laws and the best c i v Ulaws"
is dependen t upon such study. Thi s strikes one's attention sharplybecause b o o k X X I V is entitled " T h e laws, in the relationship that theyhave with the religion in each c o u n t r y, considered in it s prac t ices , an d initself."
In th i s book, however, there wUl b e t h i n g s that are t r ue only in
"a h u m a n sense." T h e author pleads that he is no t a t h e o l o g i a n and that
he wiU s p e a k , therefore, no t of the best re l ig ion , b u t of th e best laws.
I t m ay be possible to explain the historical books, and hence the
practical books, through rigorous analysis an d close comparison of the
History o fF l o r e n c e 2
with those books . I am no t present ly capable of
making that a n a l y s i s , b u t some t h i n g s do appear at first glance that m ay
be of more than pass ing significance. E a c h author seeks to present th e
history of his regime fo r MachiaveUi, the city of Florence, an d fo r
Montesquieu, the country of France. B u t their histories are very different,ev en w here the same facts are material. T h e history of Florence moves
t h r o u g h me n ( though sometimes re luctant ly "with t h e s e idle princes and
contemptible a r m s , m y history must therefore befilled"
[I, 3, end]) ; the
history of F r a n c e moves through laws ( t hough the impac t of greatness
must be admitted under Charlemagne "l 'empire se maintint pa r la
grandeur d u chef: le prince etoit grand , I ' homme l 'etoitdavantage"
[XXXI, 18, beginning]).
Again, considering the fate of the e mp ire a fte r the death of Charle
m a g n e , M a c h ia v elli la ys the b lam e for its disintegration to the discords
a m o n g the grandsons: "th e E m p ero r C h arle s d ie d an d was succeeded byLoui s (the Pious), after whose death so m a n y disputes arose a m o n g his
sons that at th e t i m e of his grandchUdren France lost theempire"
(I, 3, end). Fortune, then, paved th e w ay for the empire's destruction as
she bred, at differing o c c a s i o n s , the forces of stren gth or of weakness.
2 N i c c o l o Machiavelli, History o f Florence ( N e w Yo r k : Colon ia l Press, 1901) .
B u t M o n te sq uie u saw the "cause principale de l ' a f f o i b h s s e m e n t de la
seconderace"
to be less th e absence of a Char lemagne to settle the d i sco rds
of Lothar, Louis, an d Charles than the changes made in the const i tu t ion
left by Char l emagne an d Pepin . H ad Charlemagne made such changes
ru in would also have foUowed. T he changes o c c u r r e d , it is true, as an
outgrowth of the Battle of F on te nay . B u t it was that port ion of th e treatywhich permitted free men to choose their seignors that b r o u g h t ruin
(XXXI, 25 , middle).
Thus it appears that the laws made by regimes maintain their force at
the expense of other possibilities and in disregard of for tune.
T h e history of Florence a history of re tu rn s and reverses t a k e s one
f rom her origins to h er current" i m b e c i l i t y ."
I t is a history into which
Machiavelli"descends"
(I, 3, end). T he history of Flo rence is of periods
specific even t s , a l l iances , and intrigues.
T h e history of France, on the other hand, t a k e s on e f rom France ' s first
constitutions to h er developed constitution. I t is a history of practices and
ordinances ("cold, dry, insipid an d hard writings [which] must be read
an d devoured as th e fable says S atu rn d ev ou re dstones"
[XXX, 10-12]).
I t is a history of laws, presented by Montesqu ieu " r a t h e r as [h e has]envisaged t h e m than as [h e has] treated
t h e m "
(XX, 1).
History, Montesqu ieu a rgues , is a particular force particular to a
civilization and t h u s to it s insti tutions(XXVIII, 23-XXX,
14). M en have
positive o r n eg ativ e effects on their laws or institutions, and change m ay
resu l t , b u t that change wou ld invariably result f rom such effec t s , howeve r
arrived ( X X X I , 18, 25, 32). F o r Montesquieu, history ca n exist only to
estabhsh continuity (XXX, 10-12) . A n d th e first step in es tabhsbing that
cont inui ty is to know perfectly o ne 's a nc ie nt laws and morals. I t is onlythrough these that events an d actions have meaning (XXX, 15). H e does
no t address th e question or place of self-interest in specific acts or events
related in h is h isto ry. Machiavel l i relates his interest entirely in t e r m s of
self-interest. If history must show cont inui ty, it would appear that in teres tmust no t be its basis. Where self-interest is absent or cont roUed, one
a s cends ; where it is present an d uncon t roUed , one descends.
I t would be unfa i r, however, to speak of Machiavelli as interested onlyin the unfolding of selfish conflicts. A discussion of th e history of conflicts
of interest necessarily points beyond itself to a discussion of the di s
interested t h i s is t r ue even if the discussion beyond only concludes that
disinterested behavior is impossible o r, at best, unreasonable. Nowhere is
t h i s better attested than in a history of in teres ted conflicts that occur in a
religious context. A s revelation is presumed to supply th e basis forquestions subject to the j udgmen t of r e l i g i o n , to discuss such questions in
t e r m s of interests is to undermine revela t ion an d thus to point beyond.
S u c h d is cu s si on is h u m a n and prepares the h u m a n judgment of th e divine.
Montesqu ieu urges that religion be judged, poli t icaUy speaking, in t e r m s
of it s conformity to la w that is, logos (XXTV, 1). Such an inquiry,therefore, argues a basis fo r history other than revelation and s u p e r i o r
Theory an d Practice in th e Founding o f th e Republ ic 83
to it . Machiavelli joins o r, indeed, has le d Montesquieu in establishingthe principle of a reasonable j udgmen t of th e church.
In the first book of th e History o f Florence, Machiavelli portrays the
Church 's influence (he says th e pope ' s , fo r he speaks of m e n , no t of lawsor institutions) in th e decline of Italy. H e demonstra tes th e absurdity of
it s policy of hiring arms to fight in its behalf and of it s attempt to extend
it s temporal d om in an ce. T h e pontiffs he holds responsible fo r nearly aU
the barbar ian inundations, each occasion of which was an instance of
pontific aggrandizement (I, 3, beginning).
A s religion in th e city must yield to la w in Montesquieu, religious
principal it ies must undergo th e s truggles of interest in Machiavell i . Further,to speak of th e ascendance of th e religious principali ty is, ipso facto, to
speak of the decline of th e city. A history which describes such an
o c c u r r e n c e , therefore, describes to th e extent that it is h u m a n a decline.
T h e actions o f men are determinants of laws and institutions, and what
separates th e history of F l or en c e f ro m th e history of France is th e fac t that
only certain men with certain interests ca n effect certain changes: "If we
only consider the evils which arise to a republic or kingdom by a change
of prince or of g o v e r n m e n t ; no t by fore ign interference, b u t by civil discord
(i n which we m ay see how even slight variations suffice to ruin the most
powerful kingdoms or States), we m ay then easily imagine how much
Italy and th e other R o m a n provinces suffered , when they no t only
changed their forms of government and pr inces , b u t also t h e i r laws,c u s t o m s , m odes of living, re l ig ion , language, and
name"
(I, 2, beginning) .
"Frequen tchanges"
of th i s nature (IV, beginning) render a history of
men necessary and in t roduce For tuna as th e Clio of that history. " I m p e r
fectlyorganized"
repubhcs require "for t h e i r welfare th e virtue and the
good fortune of some individual who m ay be removed by death or become
unserviceable bymisfortune,"
and "a g o o d , w i s e , and powerful citizenappears"
b u t seldom. A good re pu blic would have "good l aws fo r it s
basis an d good regulations" fo r enforcing t h e m . It would no t , therefore,require the wise man to balance it s contending forces. Most, if no t aU ,
histories wiU b e h is to ri es of me n and contending forces. A history of l aws
m ay be written only fo r that government which proper ly "may be caUedfree."
It would a p p e a r, therefore, that th e History o f Flo rence and the
history of France differ only in that th e one is written fo r an "imperfectlyorganized"
r epub li c and th e other fo r a perfec t ly organized republic. A n d
th e latter must be understood only in t e r m s of the claim presented fo r it :
in th e history of laws, th e laws have been presented as they were
envisaged rather than as they were t r e a t ed .
Practice, it would s e e m , m ay be i n fo rmed by theory, b u t only insofar
as it is "goodpractice"
or th e practice of th e "goodregime,"
which
decidedly is no t the divine regime. T o the extent that the practical
books of L'Espr i t des lois are informed by theory, it is likely t h a t it is th e
theory of the republic as finaUy developed in books X IX and X X . B ut if
th i s be co r r ec t , Montesquieu, in proposing that th e construction of th e
Theory and Practice in th e Founding o f th e Republ ic 85
T h e problem in th e discussion a m o n g th e founders and in L'Espri tdes lois is set in t e r m s of a discussion of th e circumstances of th eregime. Among t h e s e th e most important, troublesome, and frequentlyrecurrent is the question of combining a republican government with an
extensive t e r r i tory. With th i s question every other issue is immediatelyconnected in a manner that makes it appear architectonic in scope
andeffect.3
This result is in agreement with the principal problem to be resolved:
th e nature of repubhcan government in th e modern world. A n extensive
territory serves to distinguish the ancients f rom the m o d e r n s , b u t it does
no t answer finaUy th e question as to the form of repubhcan government.
Montesquieu seeks to provide that answer. Federalists and Antifederalists
presented rival answers.
Though it has been differentlya rg u e d , 4 it is clear that th e founders drew
their arguments from opposing conceptions of the n at ur e a nd possibihty of
republican government. Professor Kenyon holds that th e Federalist-Anti-
federalist dispute is really a dispute about th e possible kinds of federalism.
B ut most Antifederalists agreed with "A n O ldWhig"
that the lessons of
history and phUosophy t e ach " tha t a r ep ub hc an government can exist onlyin a narrow t e r r i t o r y . " 5 Al though it is admittedly possible that on e m ayspeak of size an d circumstance in explaining federalism, problems arise
not f rom a federal correlation with extent , bu t f rom a repubhcan corre
lation with exten t.
O ne can n ei th er r ej ec t consideration of the possibUity of repubhcan
government nor t a k e it as given. T o show th e possibUity of the republic
in th e new wor ld , it is necessary to demonstra te w hy it could no t exist
in the ancient world. O ne must show th e differences between ancient and
modern histories. A s R o m e's greatness depended on curiou s circum
s tances ,6
so d id the chance fo r th e existence of the republic. In the modern
world , a U hinges on the capacity to domina te such c i r cums tance , and
giving a circumstance an architectonic role serves to detach the new
world f rom a world of architectonic principles.
Though one would seem to be deahng with polarities among the
Founders, they seem clearly to form a single p ole with respect to one
other: th e polis. I t is apparent that bo th Federalists and Antifederalists
discussed the means of establishing a r ep ub lic weU in excess of 10,000
no t to mention 5,040 c i t izens ; and they intended to do so without
exterminat ing or exUing e ve ry on e ab ov e ten years of age. The i r dispute
over size was no t that of bigger vs. s m a U e r ; it was rather that of
3 W i l li a m Allen, "Mon te squ ieu . T h e Federa l is t -Ant i federa l i s tDispute"
(Ph .D .
diss., C l a r e m o n t G r a d u a t e School, 1972) .
* Cecel ia Kenyon, T h e Antifederal is ts (N ew York : Bobbs-Merrill, 1966).
5 M o r t o n Borden, e d . , Antifederal is ts P ap e rs (E ast Lansing, Mich.: Michigan
State University Press, 1965-67), nos. 18-20.6 Montesquieu, Cons ide ra t i ons su r le s causes de la grandeur des Romains et de
calculation. When, therefore, Professors K e n y o n and B o r d e n suggest that
Antifederalists were animated by ancienti dea l s ,7
on e could be confused.
In both c a se s , their attempt to realize the republic is as with M o n t e s
quieu an attempt to exceed ancient l imi ta t ions .
T h e first eight books of L'Espr i t des lois develop the co ncep t of th e
ancient r e p u b l i c , and it is this that must initiaUy be set against th eFounders'
a du mb ra ti on s o f the general p rin cip le s o f the republic. With
such principles th e Founders permit a discussion of mechanisms. They are
no t so given to historical analysis as Montesquieu; he reaches a discussion
of modern possibi li ties t h r o u g h a discussion of ancient mechanisms. This
difference n ee d n ot be accounted fo r mere ly by the fact that Montesquieu 's
pohtical objective is no t so immedia t e as their own. F o r h im th e birth of
pohtical phi losophy must b e re-created. T h e r e a re , therefore, tw o republics.
T he first is found a m o n g the ancients in a c on si de ra ti on o f first t h i n g s .
T h e second is to be found in the modern world (IX, 1).
T h a t with which P u b li us b eg in s is that with which Montesqu ieu ends:
modern virtue and it s basis.Publius'
position wUl b e in dica ted below.
Initially, Montesquieu 's prescr ipt ion must be presented in order to reveal
th e hideout of private interest .
A s suggested a b o v e , th e design of L'Espr i t des lois is of impor t ance .
This design, however, would appear to point beyond the immed ia t e
purpose of th i s essay. I am capable of
developingit
onlyinsofar as
exposition of Montesquieu 's political prescription is constrained to foUow
it . I f one does not count the pre face , there appear to b e tw o main
sections of eight books each , on e m ain section of nine books, and tw o
transition sections of three books each. T h e section of nine books iscentral and is introduced by th e transition section that ends with th e
famous book containing th e chapter on the Engl ish constitution. I t is byvirtue of this relationship that that o ft -q uo te d c ha pt er is here read as
introductory rather than conclusive. Montesquieu suggests th i s as weU
through hisinterpretation
ofSocrates'
efforts in th e Republ ic .8
Montesquieu reminds the reader of th e purpose of the first eleven books
(principaUy to demonstrate ancient limitations) in the central number of
th e last eleven books: in chapter 23 he advises that " a large state (a),having become accessory to ano the r, weakens itself and even weakens th e
principals ta te . "
In footnoting th i s passage (i n par t icular, the expression
"larges ta te , "
which does no t say precisely the same thing as does th e
passage taken as a whole ) , he indicates several earlier passages that deal t
with the extent of a regime's te r r i tory. O f these citations (twelve), exactly
half are contained in the first section an d half in the second sec t ion ,
Theory an d Pract ice in th e Founding o f th e Republ ic 87
which begins to detaU t h o s e means which th e ancient regimes could employto r emedy the i r defects an d to indicate th e first d istin ctio ns b etw een
ancients and moderns: representation and largeness. B u t th e citations
encircle t h o s e passages (IX, 1, fo r example ) which hold that a smaU
republic w iU perish unless it joins a federation.
T he passages would seem to be admonitions to the king of F r a n c e to
restrain his appetite fo r conquest were it no t for the fac t that some do
refer to the problems of r e pub l i c s , and specif icaUy (VIII, 16) indicate that
they must b e smaU. It is possible that a dual purpose is involved: th e
king of France should no t seek to establish a "universal m o n a r c h y " ; and a
discussion of th e size of states is a c on ve ni en t m ea ns of consideringancient repubhcs.
Again, th e passage to which th e footnote is attached does no t speak of
th e problem of particularstates'
exceeding th e limits of form. I t speaks
rather ofstates'
(any s ta tes ) attaching t h e m s e l v e s to other states. A n d
the c i ta t ion , to r e p e a t , is placed not at th e end of this passage where it
should be if meant to app ly only to France b u t after "largestate,"
suggesting a m ore general application. T o return th e reader to t h e s e
p a s s a g e s , therefore, is to return him to th e distinctions of ancients an d
moderns.
In the first se ctio n o f L'Espr i t des lois, it is established that t h e r eare
only t h r ee separate principles that m ay inform regimes. These are simple
pr inc ip les ; in fact, one discovers them by consult ing the "least ins t ruc tedmen"
(II, 1; III, 1). They a re , in fact, passions. Fear motivates despotism;honor a false honor motivates m o n a r c h y ; a n d , cur ious ly, th e passion
o f v ir tu e m otiv ate s th e republic. This virtue is also caUed a renunciation
of self.
Thi s formulation would suggest th e absence of reason in the establish
ment of g o v e r n m e n t s , b u t M o n tes qu ieu h as opened b is t rea t i se with the
explanation that it is indeed reason which makes ma n i ncapab le of
perfectly obeying the laws of nature and propels h im into error (I, 1;
V, 14 and preface). In other w o r d s , because h u m a n nature is more than
beastly one can expect more than the beastly. Y et if it is m o r e , it is only
so with regard to th e rational fac tor which , because of e r ro r, is seldom
prudently pursued and w h i c h , because of the need fo r intentionality, is
seldom favored by chance (V, 14).
T h e presence of intentionality in th e format ion of governments would
necessitate th e p re se nc e o f a legislator f rom the earliest moment. Montes
quieu avoids the difficulties inherent in that position by arguing the
existence of a natural desire fo r association (I, 2). This natural desire
makes accident the presiding officer over first societies. T h e point is
emphasized in th e refutation of Aristotle's history of kingship. T he
r e f u t a t i o n consists of tw o parts: paternal rule is no t th e h is to ri ca l b as is of
ru l ing (I, 3), an d paternal rule is no t th e pattern for monarchical
power (V, 8).
P a t e r n a l rule is httle more than historical a c c i d e n t an accident that is
ir re levant since pa te rna l rul e is most useful in that government (a r epub l i c )
where i t is least likely to appear accidentaUy ( the laws a t t e m p t to add it
there) (V, 7). Poht ica l societies begin no t a m o n g relatives l inked by their
re la t ionship but, a r c h e t y p i c a U y, a m o n gth e unrelated. P o h t i c a l p o w e r ,
under such c o n d i t i o n s , is a question of pohtical association that is, of
several families. T h e defective natural a s s o c i a t i o n , as suming that an effec
t ive s uc h a ss oc ia ti on ever e x i s t e d , would b e transformed by the addition
of pohtics. A legislator must have been pre sen t , in h o w e v e r l imited a
form, at the init ial transition. It is the fact that m o n a r c h y is in tent ional
which distinguishes it f rom despot ism.
T h e repubhc is the in tent ional form of government pa r excellence, fo r
it is based upon want ing to be a citizen. It s motive force is self-renuncia
tion a decision to be some th ing other than what on e is (III, 2, 5). T owant to b e a citizen is to want to have a c i t y, an d to want to have a city is
to want to be virtuous to love th e city. This virtue is a sent iment within
th e reach of every man. I t is no t knowledge; it is o p i n i o n , a n d , u l t im a t e l y,
a passion. A nd it is a passion which , a m o n g ancient r e p u b h c s , required
fo r it s indulgence the forgoing of other passions.
Thi s p a s s i o n , acco rd ing to Montesquieu, is a substitute fo r more
p artic ula r or indiv idual passions: it is genera l , it is pubhc. A s fewer
particular passions ca n b e sa t i s f ied , t h i s general passion is all the more
accessible. It is, in a s e n s e , created by h u m a n s as a result of the imposi t ion
of s o c i a l , re l ig ious , or political order (V, 2 ). I t s e r v e s , therefore , as a
higher or u lt ima te pass ion which undermines the effect of the ord ina ry
passions. F o r t h i s r e a s o n , Montesqu ieu ca n say that pol it ical virtue is self-
renunciation. I t is renunciation of what H o b b e s designated as our real
selves.
O f th e tw o forms of ancient republics, a ris to cr atic a nd democratic,
only the latter was perfect. I t alone could boas t that equality necessitated
by virtue (II, 2-3; V, 8). It is alone that form in which repubhcan virtue
hence, equal i ty can be perfected. In a regime that requiresself-
renunciation as fe w temptations to ordinary passions as possible should
be presented. T h a t means that the differences a m o n g m en must be
negligible. In fact, aU "inequalit ies [are to be derived] f rom the nature of
the democracy an d the principle of equalityitself"
(V, 5). Such a state
must l imit com merce an d the possibUity of gain (V, 6), since g a i n , bydefinition, cannot be contained within the f r amework of equal dis t r ibut ion .
A nd w here com merce does enter a democracy, it must be held to a
" c o m m e r c e ofeconomy"
in order to avoid the real
enemyof equality:
luxury (V, 6) . Individual happiness an d " g o o d sense" is dependen t on a
mediocrity of t a l en t s and fortunes in a republic (V, 3).
A t t h i s point Montesqu ieu speaks of th e perfection of ancient repubhcs,
taking them as they could be. T h e im p h ca tio n is that such governments
are always possible because their principles are alw ays v iable. W h a t
distinguishes the ancients f rom the moderns are different intentions or
choices , no t different possibilities. Thi s is amply demonstra ted when
Theory and Practice in th e Founding o f th e Republ ic 89
Montesquieu states t h a t most ancient peoples hved under governments
which"have"
virtue fo r their principle. T he peoples are past ; the principles
are perpetual.
These ancient repubhcs were the recipients of "s ingularinstitutions"
(IV, 5) . T h e unusual was necessary because their governments were
fo rmed to alter th e usual. ' T h e t a sk of the legislator has been that of
deahng with man's most basic and in t rans igent desires (IV, 5), an d
"singulari n s t i t u t i o n s "
are th e means to that end. "These kinds of insti tut i ons "
can b e instituted in the r epub l i c , where virtue is the pr inc ip le , bu t
only in a smaU state like th e t o w n s of Greece (IV, 6) . They require a
general education an d th e raising of all citizens as though they were aU
brothers an d sisters and mothers and fathers (IV, 6) .
But, fo r a U that, aU ancient regimes a re cor rupt ib le monarchy an d
despotism by t he i r inherent defects.9 T h e corruption is entirely a matter
of bad founding an d refounding (VIII, 12). T h a t which is defective in the
principle of the regime leads to it s decline. A s noted a b o v e , that which
corrupts the principle of the republic is luxury (VIII, 2-5). T o avoid that
danger a republic must be small (VIII, 16, 20).
Montesqu ieu closes the first section with th e apparent notion that onlyth e small republic is capable of escaping corruption. This establishes tw o
principles: that the repubhc offers th e possibUity fo r a lasting r e g i m e , b u tthat th e an cie nt r ep ub lic n ev er achieved that goal. T he second principle
is d ev elo ped in the next sec t ion , which begins with the announcement:
"If a repubhc is s m a U , it is destroyed by a foreign force; if it is large,it d e st ro y s i ts el f by an interior
vice"(IX, 1).
Montesqu ieu opens th e second s ec ti on w it h th e notion that no republic
can exist except in a federa ted form. Thi s means that a republic could
never have been considered truly viable in the fo rms heretofore examined.
In that sense , th i s is a clear break with the past , b u t in the sense that it is
an attempt to discover a "usefulmean"
fo r mak ing past virtues a part of
a viable and endur ing r eg im e , it is a modern undertaking. This contra
diction is fu r the r emphasized by th e fact that th e r e m e d y th e federated
repubhc is itself a h u m a n cons t ruc t i on , i.e., it is pu t t o g e t h e r from t h i n g s
which humans h ad made.
T he fe de ra te d repubhc is t h e n twice removed from na tu re , as nature
was understood by th e " s t a t e ofnature"
theor i s t s . T h e break with the past
is also a break with th e present: Montesqu ieu holds that th e stateonce-
removed f rom nature is inherently a state of w a r ; the republic is de s t royed
either f rom without or within. H e t h u s presents an alternative: th e conven
t ions a l r eady c re ate d o ut of an imaginary state of nature m ay be perfected.
T h e r e is in th i s a superficial resemblance to the ancient v i e w, an d it
9 I t s h o u l d also be noted that no modern counterpart is offe red fo r e i t h e r,
suggesting that the distinction between ancients an d m odern offers t h e m no
suggests that th e confederated republic is in t roduced more as in t roduct ion
t h a n c o n c l u s i o n , an in t roduct ion to consideration of the bes t regime.
Thi s in terpre ta t ion is suppor t ed , first, by a picture of th e federation
which
sharplydiverges from the accepted description (IX, 3). T he
"beautiful confederated repubhc" chosen as exempla r, Lycia, s e e m s , in the
description, almost h k e a single regime or administration rather than a
gather ing of independent cities. Further, t h i s section opens by extoll ing th e
virtues of th e confederal republic an d closes by extoUing th e virtues of
England . T he suggestion is that it is th e republicanism in a new setting
that warrants examination. And, were that no t e n o u g h , Montesqu ieu
focuses th e reader's attention on th e contrast between th e benef i t
accidentally der ived from confederations by th e ancients (IX, 1) and th e
necessity f o r i nte n tio n a l confederation a m o n g th e moderns.
T h e confederation described by Montesqu ieu is on e that must be
created , unlike o the r s , fo r th e specific purpose of perpetuat ing repub
licanism. I t suffe rs , therefore , certain cons t r a in t s , a m o n g them, that a U
confederates must be republics (IX, 2). T h e need fo r intentionality imposes
a need fo r control of circumstances (IX, 13). T h a t the ancients were
unintentional in this respect Montesquieu decrees, when he describes th e
"best form of government ever imagined byman."
T h a t government wa s
n eit he r a nc ie nt Spar ta nor ancient R o m e . It wa s a fo rm of monarchy
a m o n g th e barbar ian Germanic t r ibes . There, says Montesquieu, is where
th e history of intentional good government begins (XI, 8) .T he Germans began as free and democrat ic . They became several smaU
monarchies after conquest and separation. These monarchs then assembled
to deliberate on common affairs an d were t h u s representatives. Theyt e m p e r e d their rule and offered a sim ulacrum of political hber ty. In
"Aristotle 's M a n n e r ofThinking,"
one distinguishes regimes by t h i n g s of
accident: vir tue and vice. T h a t which distinguishes is th e constitution and
no t th e quahty of rule (XI, 9) . T h e weU-run government is the weU-formed
government. T h en he adds that the English system is based on the
barbarian government. F r o m the Germans it is possible to trace the origins
of th e modern English republic. A s Sparta drew her laws f rom Crete onlyto have t h e m perfected by Plato, the Enghsh laws are drawn f rom the
German t r ibes only to be perfected it is argued by Montesqu ieu (XI, 6) .
In considering ancient laws, Montesquieu begins with their establishment
and ends with t h e i r corruption. H e begins with that w hich w ou ld cor rup t
th e laws of the modern republic. T he modern sys t em, too, is pe r i shab l e ,b u t t h r o u g h mechanical defects (abrogation of separation of
p o w e r s )(XI, 6). Unlike th e ideal repubhc of Plato, whose corruption is almost
insensible, th e cause of th e decline of the English r ep ub li c c an be preciselyknown. M o r e exac t ly, it s essential character is t ic , liberty, can b e studied to
see how it might be lost, and also how it might be established. Unlike
Harrington, Montesquieu has recognized true liberty and constructs a true
state (XI, 6) . T h a t liberty consists of th e power to be vir tuous , an d that
Theory an d Practice in th e Founding o f th e Republic 91
Montesquieu concludes th e second section by discussing England, no t as
a model b u t as th e source of that hberty, or vir tue , which animates the
modern republic. In his teaching, an unders tanding of hberty in it s several
variations foreshadows th e e merg en ce o f th e requisites of the republican
f or m . D i sc u ss io n of England serves to introduce discussion of th i s liberty,with a focus on pohtical liberty, strictly defined. W h a t fo Uo ws is a portrait
of th e repubhc. Pohtical liberty is th e necessary condition of th e civU
hberty which th e citizen exercises. I t exists , therefore, in th e constitution
(XI, 6). Its creation is as dependen t upon limiting abuses of power as it is
in granting power to do the hmited. This is accomplished by using power
to check p o w e r, that is, in the arrangement. It depends on th e legislator.
T h e citizen exercises civU hberty, and Montesqu ieu ' s central section
commences with a discussion of it . I t is defined as safe ty, or as the
opinion th e citizen holds of his safety (XII, 1-2). T h e most basic form of
safety is physical safe ty, and it is with th e body that th e bu lk of th i s section
is concerned. CivU hberty is based on private interests, and th i s fact is
best seen in it s oppos i t e , slavery th e ignoring or destruction of the
private the slave has no wUl (XV, 1, 7). Mon tesqu ieu argues that no on e
has an interest that requires slavery.
Only after a lengthy discussion of civU liberty (o r the demands of th e
body, includingthe effects of various climates an d the means employed in
providing sus t enance ) m ay consideration of th e best laws b e undertaken.
Thi s consideration begins with distinctions between laws, m o r a l s , manners,
etc. T h e principal distinction, however, is that between in ter ior an d
hence nongovernable and exterior and hence governable conduct
(XIX, 16-17, 19, 20) . Those t h i n g s attaching to th e body and it s passions
provide a surer basis fo r the formulat ion of laws. In fact, citizens w U l
more readUy be induced to do great things by t h e i r passions than byreason (XIX, 27) .
This ca n be exp l a ined , to a large ex t en t , by the fact that citizens w iU beindividualists, which ca n only mean caring fo r t h e i r private in teres ts
rather than public interests, and that their nation wiU be c o m m e r c i a l ,
"free of dest ruct iveprejudices."
Weal th an d heavy t a x e s w iU be introduced,and men of l imited for tunes wUl be indust r ious . I n d iv id u a l i nt er es ts wUl
multiply grea t ly, an d conflicts between them wiU multiply. Posit ions of
power wiU b e greatly distinguished; men wiU be less dist inguished. M en
w iU be esteemed by " rea lqualities,"
an d t hose are only t w o : wealth and
personal merit. A n d t h e r e wUl be luxury, t h o u g h based on " rea lneeds"
rather than vani ty (XIX, 27) . T h e me n in t h i s regime w iU be occupied
whoUy by their interests.
This regime wUl fur ther dist inguish itself by including all men and
basing itself on a predisposition in f avo r of reason. M en wiU reason in
e r r o r they wiU, in fact, calculate bu t it is the r e a s o n i n g , no t it s end ,
that is impor t an t . Reasoning brings hberty to a free nation (XIX, 27). I t is
the forming of opinions or calculations about one's safety that is
pa r t i cu l a r ly pro tect ive o f th e favored position of re as on and thereby of th e
regime. A s the opinions must undergo as f r equen t and extensive changes
as private interests, th e process could be perpetual if the principle of the
regime is maintained. T o unders tand the principle of this regime one must
consider it s basis, c o m m e r c e , in terms of it s re la t ionship to the t h r ee
possible principles.
I t is of note that th e b o o k which develops the "freenation"
is foUowed
by the b o o k which develops commerce in a "freenation,"
he f ina l b o o k
of the central section. B u t no mention of principle is made in the former.
In the f ina l chapter of the b o o k on a f ree n a t i o n , th e word" r e p u b h c "
does no t occur. Since it is advertised as fur ther treatment of the regime
treated in b o o k XI, where" repubhc"
is used twenty-eight t i m e s (seven in
chapter 6), t h i s omission is aU the more striking: th e word" repubhc"
is
absent inthe on e chapter
inwhich
itappears that the character of the
republic is to be most fuUy developed. It is stUl more surprising because
Montesqu ieu suggests a correlation be tween his" r e p u b h c "
and that of
Plato.10Having substituted bis fo r that of Plato, he then drops the r e p u b h c
and it s pr inciple altogether.
This paradox is solved in tw o ways. First, the free nation of b o o k XIX,
chapter 27, is indeed a repubhc. This is clear f rom the foUowing book,which demons t r a t e s that the commerce descr ibed in this chapter is only
possible in a repubhc a n d , u l t im a t e l y, in a m od er n r ep u bh c (XX, 3-4, 9,
12, 23). Why, then, was it necessary to avoid mention of th e republic inth e chapter that most openly speaks of the pursuit of priva te pas sion and
it s place in the regime? T h e re sp on se p ro vi de s th e s econd solut ion.
A re turn to th e ancient republic o r , more s p e c i f i c a l l y, to what remains
of it, once it has been cor rec ted ,11
suggests th e solution. W h a t remains is
the attachment to the regime, Vamour de pa t r i e , without the actual
necessity fo r self-renunciation. T h a t singular pas s ion , v i r t ue , is no longer
exclusive of ah the other passions. Indeed, exceUence is now based on
1 0 Bk. V . This correlation helped to explain the posit ion of a r i s t o c r ac y in his
scheme: a r i s t o c r ac y is pe r fec t o n l y as it approaches democracy, the true republic,
since the tw o ar e clear ly different regimes. T h e difference be tween th e tw o strongly
resembles th e difference be tween the Repub l i c an d it s r e su l t an t a r i s t o c r a c y after
it has been corrupted. Thi s is Aris tot le ' s criticism ofSocra tes '
presentation: the
reason fo r th e corruption is u n c l e a r ; we d o no t see th e one state becoming the
other, as in all the other examples. T o the ex ten t that th e corrupted version of the
ideal state is just that, there must be a principle of movement be tween t h e m w hi ch
demonstra tes th i s c o m i n g into b ein g. M o n te sq uie u accounts fo r t h e s e factors by
denominating the tw o regimes as examples of the republic, an d demonstrating h o w
th e more corrupted version can b e perfected. I f it ca n be perfected, th i s process
ca n o n l y move in th e direc t ion of being more republican. T h a t which it approaches,
t h en , must be m os t r ep ub lic an . Mo nt e sq u i e u removes the o bscu r i t y of Socrates;t h e n he allows th e republic to disappear altogether.
11 If , in the modern world, th e republic loses it s size (smallness), it fo l lows that it
loses the corollaries of that size i.e., singular institutions such as th e communi ty
of g o o d s , c o n st an t a tt e nt io n of each citizen toward e v e r y other citizen, etc.
Theory an d Pract ice in the Founding o f the Republ ic 93
t h e m . B u t t hose very passions upon which the regim e m us t be based are
most effective no t when consciously reflected upon (men wiU reason in
e r ro r ) b u t when subhmated to the exe rc is e o f sovereignty (a s indeed theywere s u b h m a t e d , fo r differing r e a sons , among th e ancients).
A pohtics of th e beastly must no t be beastly politics: th i s would seem the
true gloss on th e statement that a free people can be led by t he i r
passions to great things even against their t r ue in te re sts. T h is assertion
can be t r ue only if the fact that me n are acting on the basis of interest is
no t disclosed to t h e m . The i r interests must be operative b u t unmentionable.
L ' a m o u r de patrie m ay only b e I 'amour propre b u t it m ust sound l ike
Vamour de patrie.
W h e n the discussion tu rn s to interestp r o p e r ,
th e"republic"
cannot be
men t ione d , although th i s is the t r ue unders tanding of it s pr inc ip le , virtue
and hence equality. I t is only h is equali ty w hich p erm its ancient an d
modern republics to bea r the sam e n am e. Equality is, however, imper fec t
in the on e and perfect in the o t he r ; that which unites th e tw o also divides
t h e m . T h e ancient republic grants equali ty to aU c i t i z e n s ; the modern
r ep ub li c g ra nt s citizenship to ah. This necessitates differing standards of
j u d g m e n t in t h e s e contrasting r e g i m e s , as indicated by the fact t h a t the
ancient cit izenship is constructive while the modern is receptive. M o d e r n
cit izenship thereby conveys t h o s e unmentionable rights the coroUaries of
interest whUe ancient cit izenship provides the occasion fo r greatness to
t h o s e who can or would be great. There in lies the mean ing of Aris to t le ' s
defense of the natural s l a v e ; therein hes the mean ing of Montesqu ieu ' s
assertion that Aristotle p roves no th ing.
FinaUy, the effort Montesqu ieu makes to heighten the differences
betw een bo ok s X IX and X X (the final b oo ks of the central sec t ion)
suggests that they must b e read together if on e is to appreciate t h o s e
differences. T h e in tr od u ctio n to the fo rmer explained that it s subject was
of great ex t en t ; the latter is deemed to b e l imited. In the metaphors of each
i n t roduc t ion contrasts also appear: in book XIX, Montesqu ieu moves he
moves to th e r i g h t , s l ides, pierces , an d makes light; in book XX, he is
moved " I want to flow on a t ranquU r iver, carried along by th et o r r e n t . "
In the one he is c r ea t i ve ; in the other he is a h isto ria n. W h a t b o o k X IX
brings into open discussion is hidden again in b o o k X X .
B o o k X X once again speaks of v i r t u e , of modern v i r t u e ,"humanite,"
and
of th e fac t that it s place is in the modern repubhc . I t speaks less of in teres t
or pa s s ion , except to show it s connection with "exac tjustice"
in the
c om m e rc ia l r ep ub li c. In sho r t , Montesqu ieu retakes the high g r o u n d ,
dissociating his regime f rom br igandage on the one hand an d " those
m o r a l
virtues"hat induce men to renounce self-interest on the other.
Commerce, h e s a y s , cor rupt s pure morals b u t it perfects barbar ian morals.
I t is a civUizing influence, curing the dest ruct ive p re ju di ce s o f pure morals
an d bringing gent le morals. It is t h i s cou r se , a course of prudent m o d e r n i t y,
which h e extols. T h e modern r e p u b h c , in sho r t , must encou rage acqui si
t iveness, b u t what i t must praise is th e p e a c e f u l n e s s , civi l i ty, gentility
Thi s conclusion was reached through consideration of the fundamen ta l
q ue stio n o f g o v e r n i n g , no t of it s ex t en t , b u t of it s nature. W h e n Montes
quieu states as a general rule that small states must be r e p u b h c a n ,
mediocre s ta tes , m o n a r c h i c , e tc . , he seems only to be saying that one can
discover it s essential nature in it s classical locus. W h e n he says that a
smaU repubhc is dest royed f rom w i t h o u t , e tc . , h e is sugges t ing that the
durability of th e repubhc cannot depend on recrea t ing the classical locus.
In other w o r d s , a change in th e nature of repubhcan government to remove
it s handicaps removes the s trictu res o f size as weU as it s fundamen ta l
incapacity. T h e F ed eralists concluded with Montesqu ieu that under a
system in which the people held all powers "all would belost."
This
constitutes their parting glance at ancient democracies . Tiny agricultural
repubhcsuni t ing
the citizens in single b od ie s fo r the management of affairs
were rejected as t y r a n n i c a l . In fact, so long as the people hold th e
g re ate r p ow er of legislating, they are the holders of aU the powers of
government. This is w hy th e legislative power is seen as greatest.
Although it is true that a people m ay commit t h e m s e l v e s to th e hands of
governors because of an extensive territory, th e Federal is ts held such
action to be an independent good. I t remains only to ad duce th e basis of
a regim e so constituted.
Montesquieu 's view of th e negociant and the poht ical officer as
natural allies and th eFederalists'
view of the manner in which compro
mises an d coalitions of interests form the stuff of republican pohtics
combine in a concept of pohtical knowledge as reflected in interested
behavio r. T h e attempt to buUd homogeneity through a proliferation of
interests, t he r e fo re , unites the theories of Montesquieu and Publius.
Pubhus argues that the Amer ican states w iU become more hke each
o the r, no t because aU wUl be reduced to a common denomina to r b u t
because a U w U l be raised to an equal level of interested behavior.
M o n tes qu ieu h olds that a general
mediocr i tywUl exist wherein the
poorest must work to surv ive , the richest to conserve. T h e multiplication
of interests w U l serve to attach a U to the general interest . I t is, at bottom,t h i s t r a d e and finance that must be instituted if the representat ion is to
be effective.
T he Antifederalists appear to have fully appreciated th e modern
predisposition to provide fo r the body, b u t they approach that task more
directly than either Montesqu ieu or Pu bhus. T he ir caU for a wider
representation specif icaUy, fo r representation of the middle c lass , though
it is o ften aim ed at aU or most"interests"
is based on the assumption
that th e protection of equality and individual rights must be an open
affair. This m ay require the acknowledgment that men have private
interests, b u t that is part of the bargain. Reminding me n of their rights
is no t viewed as reminding t h em of their passions. In that s e n s e , the
regime is no t to be protected by noble hes or wise m e n ; it is to be
protected by it s motive force, equah ty as der ived from natural law.
Theory an d Practice in the Founding o f the Republ ic 97
Indeed, government exists specificaUy to enforce whatever limits t h e r e
are to th e pursuit of happiness.
T h e F ed era lis ts reasoned in t e r m s of satisfying private interests, an d
they were no t ashamed of discussing the place that interests occupy inh u m a n affairs. Y et they were re lu ctan t to discuss the fact that the
establishment o f g ove rnm en t on the basis of interest vests a right in
citizens to pursue their passions. They posited th e fact of such behav io r
as the occasion fo r instituting government b ut discreetly treated govern
ment as exist ing independent of such behavior. T he confounding of
classes that was created t r e a t ed equahty as the elimination of distinctions
between rich and poor wlhle creating the distinction of interests. A s no t
all interests can be equa l , th e multiplici ty of interests represents an
inequali ty. Y et that inequality exists only between specific interests and is
d raw n fro m th e regime's equahty itself. I t is t h i s inequality created byequah ty that renders necessary a sUence as to rights: th i s is so because
it is impossible fo r government to enforce , equal ly, every l imit on the
pursuit of happiness .
T h a t Federal is ts and Antifederalists must jointly b e considered the
Founder s of Amer ica t h u s uni t ing t h e i r contrary positions is appro
priate. To g e t h e r they present a complete in terpre ta t ion of the regime.
With respect to that about which one should b e mute in founding an d
mainta in ing r e g i m e s , they either foUow an d are proper ly silent or re jec t ,
on th e basis of an older p r u d e n c e , the prudent modern i ty of Montesqu ieu .
W h e t h e r o ne accepts the one or the other is dependen t upon th e extent
to which th e problem of pohtical theory is seen to be embodied in the
Amer ican founding.
If virtue is the answer to th e problem of the possibUity of modern
repubhcan g o v e r n m e n t , if t h i s virtue consists of that exceUence particular
to th e p urs uit of private interests, understood as love of one's coun t ry or
whatever makes such exceUence poss ib le , if an extensive commerce is the
basis of such a cons t i t u t i on , then Montesqu ieu ' s dictum that small
repubhcs suffer an incurable defect and large republics a curable defect
is readUy understood. A constitution can prudent ly control the form and
nature of that to which it alone applies. T h e virtue of a republic's citizens
can no t b e a g ua ra nte e of the virtue of t h o s e of it s neighboring regimes.
Smal l repubhcs are prey to conques t , and this, says Montesquieu, is
incurable . Large republics can , of c o u r s e , provide fo r t h e i r defense if theyare sufficiently virtuous to avoid th e in te rn al d efe ct of dissension. Theycan only b e t h u s virtuous in a commercial r epub l i c , identifying their
virtue with their immedia t e interests. T h e publ ic- interest s ta te speaks no t
to the i n t e r e s t the citizens hold in th e city, b u t to th e interest the pubhc
Intellectual Biography as a F o r m o f the History o f Ideas 101
th e circumstances which gave the argument it s beginning an d it s e n d ,
which made it intelligible, b u t were no t t h e m s e l v e s a part of it .
T h u s intellectual practice is argumentative in t h e s e tw o ways. A n d the
credo of inteUectualism is a belief that th e boundar ies of argument should
b e extended as fa r as poss ib le , that it be le t loose into th e whole tide of
life. T h e besetting sin of the inteUectual, the e x c e s s , the folie d e g r a n d e u r
of which he is always on the brink, is the refusal to recognize any l imits
at aU , to see the whole of hfe as ideaUy to be translated into the compass
of discourse. H e is occupat ionaUy vulnerable to th e belief that, with
sufficient industry and a c u m e n , you ca n press every h u m a n w i s h , every
impulse, onto the discursive field of battle, a field on which f inal victories
ar e to be w o n , where vic tory consists in pre-empt ing aU possible
responses. Yo u r vanquished opponents are given a grace-and-favor lease
hold o n c on dit io n that they end aU verbal res is tance . T h e refusal to keepthis kind of dicourse in it s place betrays, pe rhaps , an inabuity to
distinguish between fo rma l a rgumen t s , which have a total an d self- just ifying
qual i ty, a nd s ub sta ntial o n e s , whose ultimate justif ication lies outside
themselves. T h e ideal society of the complete intel lectual is one w here the
talk of t h i s kind never stops and where nothing else ever s ta r t s , o r, if it
s ta r t s , it owes its life entirely to the permission of argument.
N o w the man we ca n caU an inteUectual has th i s skiU, b u t we need to
know m o r e , because it can b e turned in different directions. I t can set
itself onto problems in formal logic or arguments fo r and against
c o e d u c a t i o n , or it can engage in the weird casuistry w hic h s ur ro un ds p ea ce
t a l k s . If a ma n writes exclusively about one of t h e s e matters we usual ly
caU h im s imply a logician, an educational theorist, or an author i ty in
strategic studies. A n d biographies and autob iographies will reflect such
speciahsm. W e shah find books an d theses entitled T he Philosophy o f
B e r t r a n d Russell, T he E d u c at io n a l I d ea s o f Cyri l Burt, and T he Pol i t ica l
T h o u g h to f Henry
Kissinger.If, however,
he does no t specialize b u t
writes in aU three, and perhaps in addition finds writ ing a novel no t
beyond him, together with some books o n m arria ge an d m o r a l s , we m ay
r est c on te nt to caU h im an inteUectual, mean ing , s i m p l y, that his capaci tyfo r organized thought is generous ly employed. H e is a general practitioner
of the discursive art. T he id eal intellectual is a citizen of th e whole
systematic world. A t the end of his biography it seems that he has left
no territory unvisited. Such a ma n m a y, of cou r se , have one love, one
corner of the world which he caUs his home, where he is recognized to
b e resident expert. F o r RusseU this was mathematics. O r he m ay benomadic, p a s s i n g , as Arthur Koest ler has done, from sex manuals to
c a p i t a l p u n i s h m e n t , to the history of s c i e n c e , to Eas te rn m y s t i c i s m ,
to the Thirty Years War, with no permanent roots in one or th e other.
M o s t in te l lec tua ls restrict t h e i r t rave ls somewhat. T h e history of that
d ive r se body of letters caUed political t h o u g h t displays a line of such
t ravelers , wh o h av e divided then t rudgings between the flat plains of
pol i t ica l an d mora l r ecommenda tion and th e high peaks of theology and
Peter QuenneU, writing on Ruskin, hkewi se shapes the story into
themes, denoted by chapters headed "Opin ions of an A rtCritic,"
" In f lu
ence of a SocialReformer, "
and "LiteraryD e v e l o p m e n t . "
A s with Miss
Himmei fa rb ' s Acton, t h e r e is no attempt to locate a master in teres t or
central concern in the subject's work. QuenneU claims only to have
attempted " a balanced portrait."h e b o o k stays close to the sources, bu t
gives shape to th e m .
This w ay of writing is no t easy. I t is beset, h k e aU historical wri t ing ,
with the bugbea r of preserving chronological movement while analyzingthe t h e m e s . A s soon as a theme is explored to any depth, the t i m e
sequence suffers disruption. B i og ra p he rs h a ve employed various t e c h n i q u e s
to keep the tw o in some kind of balance. Michae l Holroyd, in his Lyt ton
Strachey,employs flashbacks and f la sh -f or w ar ds . I v o ne Kirkpatr ick keeps
h is M u ss olin i mov ing steadUy forward save fo r one static chapter which
analyzes th e character of h is subject. Elie Halevy on Bentham (in T he
Growth o f Phi losophic Radicalism) an d Maur ice Cowling on J . S. MU1
present critical studies of inteUectual p os itio ns a ss um ed to be more or
less fixed.
T h e third contribution is to record and account fo r a change of mind
or behef in on e of the interests usually identified as the central one
of th e chosen inteUectual. H e m a y, of c o u r s e , have given an account of
th i s himself, b u t th i s wUl rank as only one piece of evidence, and initiaUysuspect evidence at that, to be t e s t ed against o th er evidence. Char les
Darwin, in his later yea r s , said that the idea of the mutation of species
by natural selection wa s germinating in his mind whUe aboard the"Beagle,"
yet Miss Himmelfarb, going through the" B e a g l e "
diaries and
Darwin, in his la ter yea r s , said that the idea of th e mutation of species
which apparent ly remained in tac t t h r o u g h o u t the v o y a g e , foUowed shortlyafterwards by a blinding inspirational period. F or the historian of ideas the
mature relections of a writer on h is own work are never to be taken
at face value.
O v e r t changes of m ind like those of Darwin give th e biographer some
thing fairly definite to fix upon. M u c h more elusive to t r a ce are shifts of
interests or failing e n g a g e m e n t , since your subject m ay be inarticulate,re t icent , or even ignorant of t h e s e . Pe te r Munz, writing on Hooker, was
faced with the question of how Hooker, having marshaled aU the T h o m i s t
a rgumen ts about the mutual complementarity of the orders of nature an d
g race , of the regnum and the sace rdo tum, c a m e , in th e last three booksof h is great w o r k , to fall into a MarsUian strain of argument which
stressed the priority of civU peace and therefore of the civil order over
th e ecclesiastical. M u n z accounts fo r the change f rom within Hooker,referring to th e political commission to defend th e Settlement f rom which
the great apologist started. H e h a d begun with th e firm conviction that the
Acts of Supremacy and Uniformity could be represented in Thomist terms,w ith grace supplementing, no t supplant ing , na tu re , an d church and civil
government harmoniously cooperat ing under a monarch and Supreme
Intellectual Biography as a F o r m o f th e History o f Ideas 10 5
Governor united in one person. By the t i m e he had reached b o o k VI,however, his growing an d painful awareness of the realities of T u d o r
practice had undermined his abUity to use Thomis t categories with con
f idence. H e t h e n t u r n e d to MarsUius fo r general ized arguments more
appropriate to the situation he saw before him.
Here, then, is an account of a change in a writer's d ir ec tio n d ra w n no t
from extraneous sources b u t f rom th e record itself. T h e evidence is ent i re ly
internal, and relates the collapse of the fo rma l argument to the subject's
changed view of the substantial circumstances which first set his pen to
paper. M u n z points to later passages of H o o k e r which betoken disUlusion-
ment and in fact adduces Hooker ' s growing uneasiness about th e coherence
of his work as a hypothesis to explain his faUure to finish writ ing it .
This t h e m e of dis iUusionment is a f r equen t motif of intellectual biogr a p h y and points sharply to a major difficulty of keeping to the"life-of-the-mind"
brief. In wri t ing of intellectuals you are examin ing the
doings of super-civUized people w ho se w ho le life represents an e n g a g e m e n t
to self-knowledge. B u t their passion fo r cons is tency often makes them
reticent or even determinedly unaware of then changes of m i n d , an d in
exploring t h e s e the biographer is treading the outer reaches of the mind
itself, where th e inteUectual and the affective life meet and merge. I f one
foUowsany
account of a writer's change of
front,abandonment of an
a rg u m e n t , or switch in style of a p o l o g y, on e encounters words l ike"disappointment"
an d"disiUusionment"
and phrases about realizing the
incompatibUity of something with something else or references to a growing
sense of ineffectiveness. T h e language of sensibUity invades the story of
an argum ent. C. R . Leslie, sett ing ou t to draw th e mind of Constable,observes that in C o ns ta ble 's case the invasion is near- to ta l , since " the
affections of the hear t were inseparably b lended with all that related
topainting."
Mrs. Letwin, in T h e Pursu i t o f Certainty, acknowledges an emotive
component in the thinking of H u m e an d of J . S. Mill . In a chap ter ent it led
"The PhUosophica l Enthus i a smRenounced"
she shows that H u m e ' s
increasing feeling fo r th e complexi ty of every th ing undermined his energy
fo r ph i lo s o p hy, that his"sentiments"
turned him t o w a r d s history an d
e ss ay w r it in g as more suitable media fo r thinking on p ap er ab ou t politics.
O n MiU, she notes that the friendship with Harr i e t Tay lo r was fo l lowed
by a new in teres t in " the souls ofmen"
as weU as in the m a c h i n e r y
of government. Accounting fo r a change of m i n d , front, or commitment
to a central interest, therefore, is a third w ay of shap ing an in te l lec tua l
b iog raphy. In complex i ty it outdistances th e phas ing of a story or it s
classification into more or less self-contained themes.
T h e four th an d most intricate contribution the b iographe r can make is
to connect the diverse in teres ts of his subject to find, if he c a n , a uni fy ing
principle which wiU bind the whole corpus t o g e t h e r. H e is challenged by,an d must respond to , a many-sided mind. If wri t ing of a p h U o s o p h e r ,
h e wiU search fo r an even more comprehensive master idea than h is
AT H E I S T I C F R E E D O M A N D T H E I N T E R N AT I O N A L S O C I E T Y
F O R T H E S U P P R E S S I O N O F S AVA G E C U S T O M S :
A N IN TE R P R E T A TIO N O F C O N R A D ' S
H E A R T O FD A R K N E S S *
Harry N e u m a n n
In Plato's R e pu b lic S ocra tes denounces poets who unearth hidden
passions which his utopia wishes to s u p p r e s s . 1
By publicizing in terd ic ted
crav ings , t h e s e inteUectuals undermine publicspiritedness. Unlike ordinary
cit izens, t h e i r attachment to the prevail ing mora l i t y is no t jeopardized
once they discern the skeletons in it s closet. Instead, they champion it s
forbidden or illicit side. T h u s their fight with u n s o p h i s t i c a t e d , old-fashioned
morah ty is a famUy quarrel be tween the same morality's noble and it s
repulsive forms. Indeed th e inteUectuals seem more loya l than others to
that m o r a l i t y, since they, unlike pious c i t i z e n s , embrace it s u g l y, repeUent
fo rms .2
PhUosophers, however, take t h e i r insight into th e questionable founda
t ions of the regnant mora l i t y as grounds fo r doubting it s worth. Unlike
old-fashioned c i t i z e n s , they do no t shun those questions b u t believe that
inteUectuals should question the value of th e shocking side of the
predominant or thodoxy instead of defending it against suppression bytraditional faith and morals. From a phUosophical s t andpo in t , both
inteUectuals an d t rad i t iona l i s t s are defenders of th e prevail ing or thodoxies .
T h e plulosopher's belief in his ignorance of the true value of th e orthodox
m o r a h t y is responsible fo r h is neutrali ty in th e wa r be tween it s
t r ad i t i ona l i s t and it s sophisticated defenders. Depending on c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,
he supports on e or another of t h e s e war r ingcamps.3
In H e a r t o f Darkness, Conrad or his Mar low are no t phUosophers b u t
intellectuals in the sense just defined. O n their horizon, the affirmation
of Western morality's illicit unde rg round present s itself as a triumph of
wisdom an d ethics, fa r more noble than it s puritanical repression or
* This article wa s assisted by a research fellowship f rom th e E a r h a r t F o u n d e . t i o n .
1 Al lan Bloom, T h e Repub l i c o f Pl a to (New York, 1968), pp. 433-34.
2 M ax Weber, "Science as aVocation,"
in F r o m M ax Weber, trans. H . H . G a r t h
an d C . Wr i g h t Mil ls (Ne w York, 1958), pp. 147-48: "W e realize today that something
can be sacred no t only in spite of it s no t being beautiful, b u t rather because an d in
so fa r as it is no t beaut i fu l . Y o u will f ind th i s d o c u m e n t e d in the f i f ty- th i rd c h a p t e r
of the book of Isa iah an d in th e twenty-first psalm. And, since Nietzsche, we realize
that something can be beautiful, no t o n l y in spite of th e aspect in which it is no t
g o o d , b u t rather in that v e ry aspect. Y o u will f ind th i s expressed earlier in the
Fleu r s du Mai, as B aud e l a i r e n a m e d his volume of poems. I t is today commonplace
to observe that s o m e t h i n g m a y b e t r u e although it is no t beaut i fu l an d no t holyan d no t good. Indeed it m a y be true in prec ise ly those
I mean the authoritative ethics in governments which derive their right to
govern f rom the consent of th e governed. Thi s def in i t ion inc ludes a U
i m p o r t a n t modern r e g i m e s , Naz i as weU as C o m m u n i s t an d l iberal
democratic. N o less than Jefferson or Lenin, Hit ler insisted that his rule
was legit imized by the consent or wUl of th e people (Vo lk ) . Consequentlyh e (like his C o m m u n i s t and democra t i c opponents) ridiculed the Japanese
theocracy as unenlightened sup e r s t i t i on , fo r there the people existed fo r
th e sake of their divine e m p e r o r , whose legitimacy was no t d e p e n d e n t
upon their cons en t ; in fact, his wiU or consent wa s responsible fo r
their legit imacy.
Weste rn contempt fo r Japanese theocracy arose f rom the behef that
individuals should not be subject to moral authorities which they do no t
freely choose to accept. Legi t imate acceptance depends solely upon
indiv idual c h o i c e , no t u p o n some natural or divine compulsion which
precludes free consent. In th i s p a p e r , moralities d e p e n d e n t fo r their
acceptance upon that f reedom are called atheistic. Athe i sm t h u s under
stood need no t deny the existence of gods or moral standards. T h e
crucial point is the atheist's ins is tence that h is reason or wUl is not
governed by standards whose au tho r i ty he is not at liberty to reject.
I suggest that a th ei sm s pr in gs f rom the opinion that the indiv idual ' s
reason should emancipate itself from them o r a h t y
authoritative in his
regime. O n c e e m a n c i p a t e d , h e can strive fo r an impar t i a l e va lu at io n p er
mit t ing him to accept or re ject that moral i ty on it s ow n merits. However,the belief that m en should attempt th i s emancipation is itself q u e s t i o n a b l e . 5
Cons ide r Genes is (2 :16-17) . I f it s value is no t demonstrable, the fa ith in
it s worth arises from an atheistic assertion of wiU and no t from impar t ia l
insight. T h a t self-assertion is th e hal lmark of what t h i s paper calls atheism.
F o r a the is t s , belief in the existence of divine or natural standards is
subordinate to an unwillingness to recognize an y author i ty which denies
the right of self-determination. Atheists m ay believe in g o d s , b u t no t ingods which preclude this
r i g h t . 0
Atheism, the crime fo r which Socrates was e x e c u t e d , emerged with
Greek phi losophy or science. O f cou r se , it appears as atheism only to men
skeptical of that philosophy's claims to demons t r a t e th e justice of rational
emancipation from th e gods of one's city. This paper assumes never
forgetting that it is an assumption that atheistic self-assertion and no t
impar t ia l reason have i n fo rmed European or Western civilization since it s
birth in Socra tes or some other G reek. M r. Kurtz, the hero (o r an t i - he ro )
4 Joseph Conrad. H e a r t of Darkness, ed. R . Kimbrough . rev. N o r t o n crit. ed.
(New York , 1971). A ll references are to th i s edition.
5 Neumann, "Is Philosophy StillPossible?"
8 L eo Strauss, T h e Pol i t ica l Philosophy of H o b b e s (Chicago, 1952), pp. 99-100;L eo St-auss, N a t u r a l R igh t an d History (Chicago, 19521. p. 92; Harry V . Jaffa, " T h e
Case against Pol i t ica lTheory,"
Equality an d Liberty ( N e w York, 1965), pp. 220-29.
of H e a r t o f Darkness, is that civUization's moral t r i u m p h : "A U E u r o p e
contributed to th e making ofKurtz"
(p . 50).
Marlow, the narrator of H e a r t o f Darkness, begins his description of
Kurtz with a discussion of a pre-atheistic r e g i m e , th e R o m e which
conquered Britain (p. 6). H e contrasts R o m a n exploitation of Bri t i sh
savages with European im p eria hsm in A fric a. T h e fundamen ta l difference
is the regnant moral i ty of the tw o civUizations. Since th e R o m a n ' s ultimate
moral author i t ies , h is g o d s , were concerned solely with Rome ' s happiness,R o m a n consciences experienced no qualm s about ruthless e xp lo it at io n o f
foreigners: indeed, R o m a n civic piety encouraged it . O n such an horizon,
loving one's enemies appears atheistic. However, modern or atheistic
moral i ty is concerned with th e right to s el f-det ermina ti on o f individuals
which are believed to b e moraUy i ndependen t of any communal bonds .
Indeed, t h e s e bonds are in terpre ted as th e free creations of mora l ly
autonomous individuals. T h u s atheists justify support fo r democratic,Communist, or Fascis t regimes by appealing to m ora l co ncerns com mon
to a U l iberated individuals. Consequently, their moral exhortations ar e
universa l ; they tend to stress common h u m a n goods an d no t the self-
aggrandizement to which in fac t atheistic moral i ty does subordinate all
commongoods .7
M a rlo w k now s that any atheistic r e g i m e , whether imperial ist ic or anti-
imperialistic, needs th e siren song of lofty ideas to enlist support fo r it s
crusades: "A n idea at the back of it . . . and a n u ns el fi sh belief in the
idea something you ca n set u p , an d bow down before, and offer a
sacrificeto "
(p . 7). In a variant r e a d i n g , he envies R o m a n s the narrow
civic piety responsible fo r their lack of concern with such p r o p a g a n d a ,
t hose "prettyfictions"
designed by atheists to seduce others into their hea r t
of darkness (p . 7). H is revulsion at the "phi lanthropic pretense of the
wholeconcern"
(p . 25) causes h is respect fo r Kurtz's abandonment of
that pretense.
T h e relation between atheism's pretty fictions an d Kurtz's f inal night
mare resembles that be tween the loftiness of his original report to the
ISSSC (the In t e rna t iona l Society fo r the Suppress ion of Savage Customs)an d his later subscriptum to it:
H e began with the argument that we w h i t e s , f rom the point of development we h a d
arrived a t, " m u s t n e c e s s a r i l y appear to them [savages] in the nature of supe rna tu ra l
beings we approach them with the might as of adeity,''
and so o n , an d so on.
"By th e simple exercise of ou r will we can exert a power fo r good p r a c t i c a l l yunbounded,"e tc . , etc. F r o m that
pointhe
soared an d took me with h i m . T h e
peroration wa s magnificent, though difficult to remember, yo u k n o w. I t gave me
th e notion of an exotic Immensity ruled by an august Benevolence . It made me
t ing le with enthusiasm. . . . T h e r e were no practical hints to in ter rupt the magic
current of phrases, unless a kind of note at th e foo t of the last p a g e , scrawled
e v i d e n t l y much la te r in an u n s t e a d y hand, m a y be regarded as the exposition of a
t M a r t in Heidegger, Ni e t z s che (Pfullingen, 1961), II , p. 198 .
are possible in atheistic regimes would subscribe to th e ISSSC's revulsion
at th e "horr idways"
of tribal and civic piety.
Freedom, and specificaUy inteUectual freedom, is atheism's core. W h a t
one does with one's freedom whether one supports democratic, a n a r c h i s t ,Communist, or Fascis t regimes is less important th a n its adamant
determination to undermine th e behef in moral authorities which preclude
atheistic hberty. Western propaganda glorifies this freedom, encouragingone to overlook it s bestial forms. M en acquainted with C o m m u n i s t an d
Fascist terror hardly need Kurtz's Africa to discover atheistic f r eedom' s
hear t of darkness . Y et w hy condemn any us e of freedom, includingHitler 's and Stalin's, if that f r eedom itself, and no t it s products or it s
justifications, is th e ultimate court of appeals? Should no t atheists despise
such condemnations as relapses into a now-discredited past governed byt r i ba l and civic superstition?
Does no t fear of punishment or disgrace preclude fuU atheistic use of
one's freedom, preventing th e unleashing of th e lusts forbidden by unen
l ightened t as tes?
T h e joy of killing . . . an d w h y not? T he mind of man is capable of a n y t h i n g
because e v e r y t h i n g is in it, all th e past as well as all th e future . W h a t is t h e r e after
all? Joy, fear, s o r r o w, devotion, a p a t h y, v a l o r, rage . . . you c a n ' t understand. H ow
could you? with solid pavement u nde r you r feet, surrounded by kind neighbors
r e a d y to cheer yo u or to fall on y o u , s t e p p i n g delicately between the bu tche r an d
th e p o l i c e m a n , in holy terror of scandal and gallows an d lunatic asylums ....T h e s e little things make all the difference [pp. 36-37, 50].
F o r Conrad, the more the respect fo r non-atheistic morah ty declines,th e more a thei st ic hcence comes in to its own. Kur tz in Africa, fa r from
accustomed res t ra in ts , found that " there was nothing on earth to prevent
h im f rom killing whom he joUy wellpleased"
(p . 57). T h e sohtude of the
wUderness uncovered the abyss of f reedom within his atheism. H ad he
never come to Africa, he might have been fooled by the altruistic
propaganda glorifying martyrdom fo r the sake of h u m a n self-determina
tion, th e rights of man. In comment ing upon the heads which Kur tz h ad
impaled on stakes around h is house, Mar low notes that
they o n l y showed that M r. K u r t z lacked res t ra in t in th e gratification of his various
lusts. . . . whether he k n ew of this deficiency h ims e l f I can't say. . . . B u t the
wilderness h ad fou nd h im ou t early. ... I think it h ad whispered to h im t h i n g s
about himself which h e d id no t know, t h i n g s of which he h a d no conception t i l l he
took counsel with th i s great solitude an d th e whisper h ad proved irresistiblyfasc inat ing. I t echoed loudly within h im because h e was hol low at the core
[pp. 58-59] .
M r. Kurtz came to regard the whole unive rs e as his proper ty to be dealt
with at his pleasure:
Y o u should have hea rd h im s a y, "M y ivory, m y intended, m y s t a t i o n , m y r iver,
m y everything b e l ong ed to h im . . . b u t that was a t r i f l e . T he thing was to know
what he be lon ge d to , ho w m a n y powers of darkness claimed h im fo r t h e i r own.
T h a t wa s th e reflection that m ad e y ou c r e e p y all over [p. 49].
Mar low considers M r. Kurtz ' s atheism i n h u m a n unless moderated byin ternal checks (pp. 22, 26-27, 32-34, 42 , 49-50, 58-59, 67-69). H ow
eve r, no rational basis fo r checks exists if morality's true ground is hbertyunfettered
byprior restraints. Consequently, Mar low believes it for tunate
that most advocat es of f reedom as the ground of virtue faU to comprehend
their commitment's abyss. " T h e i nne r truth is hidden luckily,luckily"
(p . 34). Aw a r e of th i s p r o b l e m , a Platonic clerk who glorifies the ISSSC's
messianic zeal never theless refuses to practice what he preaches: " I am no t
such a fool as I look, quoth Plato to hisdisciples"
(p . I I ) .10 Mar low ' s
aversion to lies (p . 27) is moderated by h is refusal to deprive Kurtz ' s
fiancee of th e Ulusion which ennobles h er life: "bowing m y head before
the faith that was in her, before that g re at a nd saving Ulusion which shone
withan unea r th ly
glowin
thetriumphant darkness
f rom which I could
no t have defen ded her. . . from which I could no t even defendmyself"
(p . 77) .
Mar low ' s " t r iumphan tdarkness"
is no t s e l f - s u b s i s t e n t ; it arises f rom the
a th eis tic r ef us al to acknowledge an y moral authorities which would
preclude unbridled self-indulgence. If t h o s e authorities are na tu ra l , then
atheism is an unnatural effort to conquer n a t u r e , a rebeUion against
nature. In that c a s e , atheism degrades what is naturaUy experienced as
good to the level of edifying lies. Y et the charge that it is contrary to
nature rests upon th e assumption that unchecked self-determination isunnatural. T h u s bo th atheism and the c as e a ga in st it seem to spring from
unproved opinions w h i c h , if accepted as true, b e c o m e n ob le o r ignoble lies.
Fai th in the truth of what atheism despises as pretty fictions is the
remnant of pre-atheistic tribal or civic piety in regimes dedicated to the
destruction of that piety. S uch fa ith almost invariably faUs to discern it s
conflict with the liberty which it claims to justify. F o r atheistic f r eedom
justifies anything from inteUectual emancipation to cann iba l i sm , f rom
Socrates an d Jesus to Lenin and H itler. M r. Kur t z finaUy comprehends
what readers of H e a r t o f Darkness usual ly faU to grasp. F a r f rom beingin co nflict w ith th e ISSSC's lofty endorsement of h u m a n freedom, his
cannibalism is it s moral t r i u m p h . In his"extremist"
pursuit of liberty(p . 74), Kur t z p ra ct ic es w ha t the ISSSC preaches.
Dostoyevsky's G r a n d Inquis i tor rightly notes that m ost people abhor
the c on se qu en ce s o f a th ei st ic f r eedom and censures Jesus fo r founding a
religion dependent fo r it s acceptance on man's freed om . T o the Inquis i tor
an d the dying Kur tz religions of t h i s sort seem i n h u m a n . Probably fo r
simUar r e a s o n s , Taci tus characterizes Christians as haters of mankind
(Anna l s 15:44). Kur tz bo th embraces his f reedom an d revues it . Since
some of his passions especially t h o s e which formed h im prior to his
African o d yssey were not fully a the is t ic , they opposed the boundless
f reedom of atheism. T h u s Mar low "saw the inconceivable mys te ry of a
soul that knew no res t ra in t , no faith, and no fear, ye t struggling blindly
10 C f. L eo Strauss, Though t s on M a c h i a v e l li (Glencoe, 111., 1958), p. 327, n. 287.
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