Interpretation of Statues - Kamkus College of LAWkamkus.org/coursematerial/Unit - I - Interpretation of Statues.pdfAIDS OF INTERPRETATION – INTERNAL & EXTERNAL Internal Aids: The

1

KAMKU

S

Strictly for Internal Circulation - KCL

UNIT - I

MEANING OF STATUTE AND INTERPRETATION

1. What is A Statute: The legislative, as the representative of the people of a nation or the people of a

state expresses its will and such expression of the will in accordance with constitutional provisions is a

statute.

·Statute popularly known as Act of parliament.

·Halsbury's Laws of England - "A Statute is a declaration of the law as it exists or it shall be from the

time at which such statute is to take effect."

·It expresses the collective will of legislature.

·Allen - "A Statute is the highest constitutional formulation of law, the means by which "Law in the

making" the supreme legislative, after the fullest deliberation, expresses its final will."

·According to Wilberforce: "Statute law may be properly defined as the will of the nation,

expressed by the legislature, expounded by courts of justice. The Legislature, as the representative

of the nation, expresses the national will by means of statute. Those statutes are expounded by the

courts so as to form the body of statute law."

2. In a democracy, there is a legislature which makes laws, an Executive which implements the law

and the judiciary which interprets and determines the scope of the laws in the event of a dispute about

such scope between one citizen and another, or between a citizen and the government.

In a federal polity like India, there are legislatures both at the centre and for each state, and the matters on

which each can legislate, i.e. make laws, are set out in a constitution accepted by the people. Generally, the

government (Central or State) in order to combat some evil or make some benefits available to the people,

directs the law secretary of the state or at the centre to prepare a set of rules for that purpose. He does so

with the aid of the law minister, the chief law officer (either the Attorney General or the Advocate-General in

a State) the department concerned and the law commission.

In the case of Seaford Court Estates Ltd. vs. Asher (1949)2KB481-Denning LJ remarked "Whenever a

statute comes up for consideration, it must be remembered that it is not within human powers to foresee the

manifold sets of facts which may arise, and that, even if it were it is not possible to provide for them in terms

free from all ambiguity."

The rules prepared by the law secretary are suitably modified according to those recommendations of the

committee which the Government accepts, and the rules are put in a form called a Bill. The Bill is then

KAMKU

S

2


placed before the legislature. It is there discussed rule by rule, clause by clause and scrutinized carefully by

members of the legislative body supporting the Government, and those who are in the position. It is then

voted upon with or without modifications. The final result is sent to the President if e legislative is the Central

Legislative, i.e., parliament, to the Governor if it is a state Legislative. When e President or Governor signs

the Bill, it becomes an enactment or the Law and it is binding on everyone in India. The law is said to have

been passed. Ordinarily the date of passing of the law and the date of enforcement may be postponed for

the entire enactment or some sections of it, to a data to be notified in the official Gazette.

Statute is today the principal source of law. According to Austin, in regard to any law (whether it proceeds

from a subordinate, or from a sovereign source) which is made directly, or in the way of proper legislation,

the direct and proper purpose of legislation is the establishment of the rule. It is not the instrument or means

of deciding a specific case but is intended solely to serve as a rule of conduct, and therefore to guide the

courts in their decisions upon classes of cases1

Advantages of Statute Law :

1. Abrogative Power: Statute is not only a source of law, but is equally effective in increasing,

amending or annulling the existing law.

2. Efficiency: Legislation allows an advantageous division of Labour by dividing the two functions of

making the law and administering it. This results in increased efficiency.

3. Declaration: Justice demands that laws should be known before they are applied and enforced by

the Law Court. Law must be known before the case is decided. Legislation satisfies the requirement of

natural justice in this respect.

4. Provision for Future Cases: Legislation can make rules in anticipation of cases that have not yet

arisen, whereas precedent must wait for the occurrence of some dispute before the court can create

any definite rule of law. Legislation can fill up a vacancy or settle a doubt in leg31 system as soon as the

defect is brought to the notice of the legislative. This is not possible in the case of precedent.

5. Form: Legislation is superior in form - brief, clear, easily accessible and understandable. According

to Salmond, case law is gold in mine - a few grains of precious metal to the ton of useless matter- while

statute law is coin of the realm, ready for immediate use.

According to Dicey, the morality of the Courts is higher than the morality of politicians. Legislation is the

product of the will of politicians, who are affected by the popular feelings and passions. That is why the

Judiciary often denounces statutes as wrong, tyrannical, unjust or contrary to fundamental principles laid

down in the written constitution.

Statutes may be classified as general, local or public and private. A general statute applies to the whole

community, a local is limited in respect of area and personal, limited in respect of individuals. A public

statute is one of which judicial notice is taken, while a private statute is required to be pleaded and proved by

the party seeking to take the advantage of it.

Interpretation is the process by which the court seeks to ascertain the meaning of a particular legislation,

what the legislature has actually said and what the legislature intended to have said.

In ancient Hindu Law, provision has been made for solving conflicts between sruti and smriti. Jaimini's

KAMKU

S

3


2'MIMANSA' is the most important collection of rules of interpretation. Certain rules of interpretation from

'Mimansa' are amazingly reminiscent of morden rules of interpretation, for example: Mimansa Modern rule

i) Sarthakya: Every word should have a purposeful meaning.

ii) Arthaikatwa: Same words should have the same meaning.

iii) Gunapradhana: Reconciliation of all ideas with the principal one.

iv) Samanjasya: Contradiction should not be presumed and on the contrary reconciliation should be

attempted.

v) Vikalpa: Choice between two meanings is permitted.

vi) Anarthakeya: An interpretation which makes a word or phrase meaningless should be avoided.

The principles of interpretation have been enunciated in various shlokas. One such sloka is:

"upkarmop sanhard abhyaso uppwwatta fa/am,

arlhwadoppatti ch Ungam tatparya nirnaye"

"This means that when one has to draw the conclusion from a writing he has to read it from beginning till

end, as without doing it, it is difficult to understand the purpose. If there is any repetition or emphasis, its

meaning must be understood. If there is any curiosity or a curious problem tackled, it should be noticed and

the result thereof must be understood. If there is any innovation or something new, it should be taken note

of. Then one must notice the result of such innovation. Then it is necessary to find out what the author 3

intends to convey and in what context."

4 Keeton has observed

"The function of the judges in interpreting statutes is two fold. In the first place, they must decide upon the

exact meaning of what the legislature has actually said, and, in the second place, they must consider what

the legislature intended to have said, or ought to have said, but did not, either because it never visualized

such a set of circumstances arising as that before the court, or because of some other reason.

5Interpretation Distinguished from. Construction: According to Cooley "Interpretation differs from

construction. Interpretation is the art of finding out the true sense of any form of words; construction, on the

other hand, is the drawing of conclusions respecting subjects that are beyond the direct expression of the

text; conclusions which are in the spirit, though not within the letter of the law."

Interpretation is the act of making intelligible what was before, not understood, ambiguous, or not obvious.

It is the method by which the meaning of the language is ascertained. Construction means to determine

from its known elements its true meaning or the interest of its framers and the people who have adopted it;

construction of a statute is an effort to draw conclusions.

When the court goes beyond the language of the statute and seeks the assistance of extrinsic aids in order 6

to determine whether a given case falls within the statute, it resorts to construction.

7Construction is the means of interpretation and interpretation is the end.

The distinction, however, between the two processes is of no great consequence, as the dominant purpose

in each case is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature. In all cases, the object is to see what is the intention

KAMKU

S

4


expressed by the words used.8

According to Eugene Wambaugh9, "Some authors have attempted to introduce a distinction between

interpretation' and 'construction'. The distinction, however, has not been accepted by the profession, and

the two expressions are in practice, synonymous. The more common term is 'construction'."

According to Sutherland, the distinction is erroneous. By passage of time and in view of the case law

evolved, the distinction has been largely relegated to the realm of academic discussion.

The words 'interpretation' and 'construction' are used interchangeably.

Interpretation according to Legislative Practice: The conventional way of interpreting a statute is to 10seek the intention of its makers and apply it to the facts of the case at hand.

An interpretation of the statutory provision which defeats the intent and purpose for which the statute was 11

enacted should be avoided.

12In the case of Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti V. Pillibhit Pantnagar Beej Ltd., Sinha J. observed that

construction of statute will depend upon the purport and object of the statute, and different provisions will

have to be interpreted differently. For example, a provision to levy a market to benefit products will have to

be interpreted differently from one that mandates obtaining a license in order to regulate trade.

It is often contended that if the courts have made a mistake in construing the legislative intention, the

legislative can always amend the law to clarify matters.

In our country law is not so advanced as in UK and USA, and the legislative is not yet keeping a vigilant

standing committee to watch all judicial decisions and bring about amendments of the law at once where

the decisions given are contrary to the intention of the legislature.

In the end, we can say that the. Interpretation may be defined as process of reducing the statute applicable

to a single sensible meaning - "the making of a choice from several possible meanings".

AIDS OF INTERPRETATION – INTERNAL & EXTERNAL

Internal Aids: The intrinsic or internal aids in the construction of statutes are derived from context,

preamble, headings, title, marginal notes etc.

1. Context

2. Preamble

3. Title

4. Headings

5. Marginal notes

6. Punctuation marks

7. Illustrations

8. Definitions

KAMKU

S

5


9. Interpretation clause

10. Proviso

11. Exception & Saving Clauses

12. Explanation

13. Schedule

14. Fictions

15. Conjunctive and Disjunctive words,

16. Include

17. Enabling and Disabling Statutes

18. Non-obstante clause

19. Subsection

20. Modification of the language to meet the Intention.

1. Context: It is one of the cardinalt5nnciples of the interpretation of statute that, where the language

is plain and unambiguous, and admits of but one meaning, the courts must give effect to it according to

its plain meaning.

It is well-settled that the meaning of the words used in any portion of the statute must depend upon the

context in which they are placed. In interpreting an enactment, all its parts must be construed together

as forming one whole and it is not in accordance with sound principles of construction to consider one

section, or group of sections, divorced from the rest of the statute.

The words may be given a wider or more restricted meaning than they ordinarily bear, if the context 13requires it, widest possible interpretation unless context otherwise directs; (occupant includes a

muafidar).

In construing a particular section of an Act, one must look at the whole Act, and it is necessary to

consider the context in which such section occurs, as far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of 14the whole statute.

General words of a particular provision of a statute may be given a restrictive meaning if the context

requires it. By 'Context' is meant not only the textual context arising out of the other provisions of statute, 15

but also factual context including the mischief to be remedied, and the circumstances under which the

statute was passed.

Context refers to the statute as a whole, the previous state of law, other statutes in pari materia, the

general scope of the statute and the mischief that it was intended to remedy . But for such restriction, a

compelling reason must be found. It is no sound principle of construction to interpret expressions used

in one Act with reference to their use in another Act. The meaning of words and expressions used in an 16

Act must take their colour from the context in which they appear.

The ordinary rule of grammar cannot be treated as an invariable rule which must be accepted in every

case without regard to the context. If the context definitely suggests that the relevant rule of grammar is

inapplicable, then the requirement of the context must prevail over the rule of grammar.

KAMKU

S

6


It is well settled that the language of a statute constitutes the depository or reservoir of the legislative

intent, and in order to grasp its true meaning it is necessary to consider a sentence in its entirety.

17The general rule of construction is not to look at the words but to look at the context.

Every clause of a statute should be constructed with reference to the context, and the a her clauses of

the Act, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute. The ultimate result must be determined.

Every statute must be construed "ex visceribus actus" within four comers of e Act. When construing the

terms of any provision found in a statute, the court is bound to consider other parts of the statute which

throw light on the intention of the legislature. No part of a statute should be construed in isolation, for the

intention of the law - maker is to be found not in one part of the statute or another, but in the entire

enactment and that intention can best be gathered by viewing a particular part of the statute not

detached from its context in the statute but in connection with its whole context.

The ordinary rule of construction is to assign the word a meaning which it ordinarily carries. The subject

of legislation and the context in which a word or expression is employed may require a departure from 18

the rule or literal construction.

Words do not always retain their abstract or primary definitions and their meaning varies in accordance

with the contextual use. It is often the secondary meaning which acquires more extensive recognition

and receives ready comprehension.

Normally, the words used in a statute have to be construed in their ordinary meaning, but in many cases,

Judicial approach finds that the simple device of adopting the ordinary meaning of words does not meet

the ends of a fair and reasonable construction. Exclusive reliance on the bare dictionary meaning of

words may not necessarily assist a proper construction of the statutory provision. In interpreting

statutory provisions, it becomes necessary to have regard to the subject - matter of the statute and the

object which it is intend to achieve. That is why in deciding the true scope and effect of the relevant

words in any statutory provisions, the context in which the words occur, the object of the statute in which

the provision is included, and the policy underlying the statute assumes relevance and becomes

material.

Halsbury has observed, the words "should be construed in the light of their context rather than what

may be either their strict etymological sense or their popular meaning apart from the context."

2. Preamble: The preamble of a statute is a prefactory statement at its beginning, following the title

and preceding the enacting clause, explaining or declaring the policy and purpose, the reasons and

motives for, and the objects sought to be accomplished by the enactment of the statute.

Although the enacting words of a statute are not necessarily to be limited or controlled by the words of

the preamble but in many instances go beyond it, yet, on a sound construction of every Act of

parliament, the words in the enacting part must be confined to that which was the plain object and

general intention of the legislature in passing the Act, and the preamble affords a good clue for

discovering what that object was.

The object and purpose of a preamble to a statute is well settled. A preamble is a key to open the mind of

the legislature but it cannot be used to control or qualify precise and unambiguous language of the

KAMKU

S

7


enactment. It is only when there is a doubt as to the meaning of a provision that recourse may be had to

the preamble to ascertain the reasons for the enactment and hence, the intention of Parliament. If the

language of the enactment is capable of more than one meaning then that one is to be preferred which

comes nearest to the purpose and scope of the preamble. Preamble may assist in ascertaining the

meaning but it does not affect clear words in a statute.

A preamble though a key to open the mind of the legislature, cannot be used to control or qualify the

precise and unambiguous language of the enactment. It is only in case of doubt or ambiguity that

recourse may be had to the preamble to ascertain the reason for the enactment in order to discover the 19true legislative intendment .

The significance of the preamble in gathering the legislative intent was stated in Arnit Das V. State of .20Bihar "The preamble suggests what the Act was intendent to deal with. If the language used by

parliament is ambiguous the court is permitted to look into the preamble for construing the provisions of

an Act. The Preamble is a key to unlock the legislative intent. If the words employed in an enactment

may spell a doubt as to their meaning it would be useful to so interpret the enactment as to harmonise it

with the object which the legislature had in its view."

21In the case of West Bengal vs. Anwar Ali Sankar , it was contendent that Sec.5 of the West Bengal

Special Courts Act, 1950, was unconstitutional and void as it contravened Art. 14 of the constitution.

That section provided that a special court shall try such offences or class of offences, or cases or

classes of cases, as the state Government may direct. It was contended on behalf of the state that the

preamble should be read as part of the section, (The Preamble read, 'whereas it is expedient to provide

for the speedier trial of certain offences') and that the proper interpretation to be put upon the section

was that only those cases and offences which in the opinion of the State Government required speedier

trial could be assigned to the special court and hence there was no scope for any discrimination. It was

held:

"The express provision of an enactment, if it is clear and unambiguous, cannot be curtailed or extended

with the aid of the preamble to the Act. It is only when the object or meaning of the enactment is not clear

that recourse can be had to the preamble to explain it. In this case, the language of Sec. 5(1) is perfectly

clear and free from any ambiguity. It vests an unrestricted discretion in the state Government to direct

any cases to be tried by the special court.

3. Title: Strictly speaking, a title is not a part of an enactment. It cannot legitimately be used to restrict

the plain terms of an enactment. All the same, titles have often afforded additional evidence in support

of a theory of interpretation. In some cases title may supply key to the meaning with the exception of

private and local laws. Title does not play any significant part in the interpretative process and may not

be looked at to modify the interpretation of plain language.

The title does not even receive the same attention of the legislators as does the main body of the Act,

and therefore it may not disclose the legislative intent with exactitude. In private and local laws,

however, the title is of greater value as an aid in construction, as a result of the constitutional

requirement that the subject of such laws must find expression in the titles.

It is permissible to use the long or full title of an Act to throw light on a doubtful meaning, no weight

should be attached to the short title. It is only a 'Statutory nickname' to obviate the necessity of always

referring to the Act under its full and descriptive title, and nowadays in every statute, there is a section

KAMKU

S

8


22containing the short title by which the statute may be cited.

4. Headings: Where the language of the section of an Act is plain, it is not necessary to have recourse

to the general heading under which the section comes. The head notes and sections cannot cut down

the express meanings of the words occurring in the section. The headings of different portions of a

statute can be referred to determine the sense of any doubtful expression in a section ranged under any

particular heading. To control the plain meaning of the words of the enactment though they may, in

some cases, be looked at in the light of preambles if there is any ambiguity in the meaning of the

sections on which they can throw light.

The headings prefixed to a section or sets of sections in some modern statutes are regarded as

preamble to those sections. They cannot control the plain words of statutes, but they may explain

ambiguous words. If there is any doubt in the interpretation of the words of section, the headings 23certainly help the court to resolve that doubt.

It is permissible to assign the heading or title of a section a limited role to play in the construction of

statutes. They may be taken as very broad and general indicators of the nature of the subject - matter

dealt with thereunder. The heading or title may also be taken as a condensed name assigned to indicate

collectively the characteristics of the subject - matter dealt with by the' enactment underneath, though

the name would always be brief having its own limitations. In case of conflict between the plain

language of the provision and the meaning of the Heading or Title, the Heading or Title would not control 24

the meaning which is clearly and plainly discernible from the language of the provision thereunder.

25In the case of Union of India V. Raman Iron Foundary, it was held that a heading cannot control the

interpretation of a clause if its meaning is otherwise plain and unambiguous, but it can certainly be

referred to as indicating the general drift of the clause and affording a key to a better understanding of its

meaning.

5. Marginal Notes: Marginal notes of the sections are not to be referred to for the purpose of

construction; unless they have been inserted with the assent of the legislature.

The marginal heading to the section cannot control the interpretation of the words of the section

particularly, where the meaning of the section is clear and unambiguous. But where the section is

unambiguous the marginal note may not be used as aid to its interpretation.

If there is any ambiguity in the meaning of the provisions in the body of the statute, the marginal note 26

may be looked into as an aid to construction.

In the case of Indian constitution, the marginal notes were enacted by the Constituent Assembly and

hence they may be referred to for interpreting Articles of the constitution.

27In State of Bombay V. Bombay Education Society, it was contended that Art-29(2) did not confer any

fundamental right on all citizens generally but guaranteed the rights of citizens of minority groups by

referring to the marginal note to Art.19 which states : "Protection of interests of minorities". This

contention was rejected by the Supreme Court and it was held that Article 29(2) applies to all citizens.

28In I.C. Golaknath V. State of Punjab Justice Subba Rao relied on the marginal note to Art. 368 and held

that it only prescribes the procedure to amend the constitution.

KAMKU

S

9


In one case privy council has ruled that the marginal notes to the sections of an enactment cannot be

referred to for the purpose of construing the Act. There is no justification for restricting the contents of a

section by its marginal notes. They are not part of the Act. A marginal note is merely an abstract of the

clause intended to catch the eye. Although a marginal not cannot control the clear language of the

section, or overside the provisions of the enactment, the court can consider it for the purpose of arriving

at a conclusion as to what according to the legislature was the purpose of enacting the section. The

marginal note cannot, however, affect, the construction of the language used in the body of the section if

it is otherwise clear and unambiguous.

6. Punctuation Marks: Punctuation marks cannot control, vary or modify the plain and simple

meaning of the language of the statute. At the most they can aid in the construction of ambiguous

statutes. Such assistance is also subject to the condition that the punctuation marks have been inserted

with accuracy and they were present at their places at the time of enactment.

Punctuation of law, generally speaking, does not control or affect the intention of the legislature in its

enactment. The intention is generally gathered from the context to which the words relate. Even where

punctuations sometimes lend assistance in the construction of sentences, they are always subordinate

to the requirement of the context.

When a statute is carefully punctuated and there is doubt about its meaning, weight should undoubtedly 29

be given to the punctuation.

The punctuation may have its uses in some cases, but it cannot certainly be regarded as a controlling

element and cannot be allowed to control the plain meaning of the text. .

30In Maharaja of Burdwan V. Murtunjoy Singh , it was observed by privy council that it was an error to rely

on punctuation in construing the Act of the legislature.

In Ashwini Kumar V. Arbinda Bose31 their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that punctuation is

after all a minor element in the construction of statute and very little attention is paid to it by English

courts. When a statute is carefully punctuated and there is doubt about its meaning, weight should

undoubtedly be given to the punctuation. Punctuation may have its uses in some cases but it cannot

certainly be regarded as a controlling element and cannot be allowed to control the plain meaning of

text.

In conclusion, we can say that

a. Punctuation is not a part of the statute, but where it is clear that the punctuation is correctly placed,

there is no reason why the punctuation should not be considered as a proper guide for

understanding the sense of the section.

b. In construing a statute the court should first read it without the punctuation.

c. If the section as punctuated leads to a conflict the punctuation must be ignored.

32In Gopalan V. State of Madras, the provisions of the Preventive Detention Act were challenged on the

ground that they contravened Art.22 of the constitution. Sec. 12 of the impugned Act was challenged on the

KAMKU

S

10


ground that it did not conform to the provisions of Art. 22(7). It was argued that the Art. permits preventive

detention beyond three months, when parliament prescribes the circumstances under which, and the class

or classes of cases in which, a person may be detained for a period longer than 3 months and that both

these conditions had to be fulfilled.

It was held that the use of the word 'which' twice in the first part of the sub-clause, read with the comma put

after each, shows that the legislative wanted them to be read as disjunctive and not conjunctive. The

legislature intended that the power of preventive detention beyond 3 months may be exercised either if the

circumstances in which or the class or classes in which, a person is suspected to be doing the objectionable

things mentioned in the section.

7. Illustrations: Illustrations in enactments provided by the legislature are valuable aid~ in

understanding the real scope of the text thereof. They are part of the statute. The illustrations, however,

make nothing law, which would not be law without them. They only exhibit the law in full action.

An illustration does not exhaust the full content of the section which it illustrates and equally it can

neither curtail nor expand its ambit.

If the text is clear and an illustration is beyond it, the illustration cannot be taken as extending or limiting

the scope of the text. But in all other cases the illustration shall be taken as explanatory of the section.

The illustrations merely exemplify the application of the rule contained in the section and do not control

the meaning of the section itself, they are not to be regarded as exhaustive, but are only intended as a

guide to the working and application of the section. It is always open to a court to go back to the main

section and consider whether the section as it stands, is applicable to any given set of facts as to enable

the court to draw inference from these facts; they do not restrict presumptions regarding the existence

of facts into the acts covered by the illustrations.

Illustrations are deliberately introduced in certain enactments by the legislature to guide the courts in

interpreting the words of the statute and they are almost on the same level as the words of the statute. It

is impossible to imagine that a statute can be interpreted in conflict with the illustration given in the

statute itself.

An illustration does not limit the generality of the section to which it is appended. It dose not exhaust the

full content of the section. It only examplifies the section and cannot be taken to enlarge, restrict or

modify the section.

33Shambhu Nath V. State of Ajmer, in this case the appellant was convicted of the offence of cheating

and under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, clause 7 -A in that he did not either make a particular

Journey or pay the claim for fare. On appeal to the Supreme Court it was contended by the respondent

that under Sec.106 of the Evidence Act and illustration (b) to the section, the facts were especially within

the knowledge of the accused and that the burden lay on him to prove that he had made the journey and

paid the fare. Rejecting the contention and allowing the appeal, the court held:

"We recognise that the illustration does not exhaust the full content of the section which it illustrates but

equally it can neither curtail nor expand its ambit.

The great usefulness of the illustrations, which have, although not part of the sections, been expressly

KAMKU

S

11


furnished by the legislature as helpful in the working and application of the statute, should not be thus

impaired.

8. Definitions: The definition must ordinarily determine the application of the word or phrase defined,

but the definition must itself be interpreted first before it is applied.

When the definition of a word gives it an extended meaning, the word is not to be interpreted by its

extended meaning every time it is used for the meaning ultimately depends on the context, and a

definition clause does not ordinarily enlarge the scope of an Act.

A court should not lay down a rigid definition and crystallize the law, when the legislature in its wisdom

has not done so.

It is ordinarily unsafe to seek the meaning of words used in an Act, in the definition clause of other

statutes even when enacted by the same legislature.

Definitions in an Act are to be applied only when there is nothing repugnant in the subject or context, and

this is so even if such a qualifying provision is not expressly stated by the legislature.

Where the definition of a word has been given it must be construed in its popular sense if it is a word of

every day use. Popular sense means that sense which people conversant with the subject matter with

which the statute is dealing, would attribute to it.

It is a principle of interpretation of statutes that even a definition clause is always subject to the context

in which the word is used. If the context so requires, a word or expression may be given a meaning not

covered by the definition clause.

Where in a definition section of a statute a word is defined to mean a certain thing, whenever that word is

used in that statute, it shall mean what is stated in the definition unless the context otherwise requires.

But where the definition is an inclusive definition, the word not only bear its ordinary, popular and natural

sense whenever that would be applicable but it also bears its extended statutory meaning.

If the statute is with reference to a particular trade, business or transaction, then the words used there

which every body conversant with that trade, business or transaction knows and understands to have a

particular meaning of it, then those words should be construed as having that particular meaning of it,

then those words should be construed as having that particular meaning which may differ from the

ordinary or popular meaning.

The same expression may be used in different places in a statute. Generally, they bear the same

meaning depending on the context. Particular expression has to be interpreted in the light of the section

itself and the Act as a whole.

If a special definition of a word or phrase is set out in an Act, the meaning of this word or phrase as given

in such definition should normally be adopted in the interpretation of the statute. In the absence of such

a definition, General Clauses Act of the particular legislature which enacted the statute should be

referred to. If the word is not defined there also, the rules of interpretation would come into play.

34In Indira Nehru Gandhi V. Raj Narain, Khanna J., observed: "A definition clause in a statute is a

legislative device with a view to avoid making different provisions of the statute cumbersome. Where a

KAMKU

S

12


word is defined in the statute and that word is used in a provision to which that definition is applicable,

the effect is that whereever the word defined is used in a provision to which that definition is applicable,

the definition of the word gets substituted. Where, however, the definition is preceded by the words

"unless the context otherwise requires", the connotation is that normally it is the definition given in the

section which should be applied and given effect to. This normal rule may, however, be departed from, if

there be something in the context to show that the definition should not be applied. 35In State of Bombay V. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, the question was whether the JJ group of Hospitals

was an 'industry' within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947. The Supreme Court held that it

was an industry and in doing so observed : "Section 2(i) does not define "industry" in the usual manner

by prescribing what it means; the first clause of e definition gives the statutory meaning of 'industry' and

the second clause deliberately ra ers to several other items of industry and brings in the definition in an

inclusive way. It is obvious that the words used in an inclusive definition denote extension and cannot be

treated as restricted in any sense. Where we are dealing with an inclusive definition it would be

inappropriate to put a restrictive interpretation upon terms of wider denotation."

9. Proviso: The main function of a proviso is to take out of a section a part of the category to which the

section applies. It must be construed harmoniously with the main enactment.

A proviso to a section in a statute is not an independent section calling for a construction entirely

removed and detached from the construction to be placed on the main section. A proviso is subsidiary to

the main section and has to be construed in the light of the section itself.

A proviso merely carves out something from the section itself, a proviso never destroys the section as a

whole. The proper function of a proviso is that it qualifies the generality of the main enactment by

providing an exception and taking out, as it were, from the main enactment a portion which, but for the

proviso, would fall within the mF.lin enactment.

In construing a section full and natural meaning should be given to a proviso, if any. The proper function

of a proviso is to except and deal with a case which would otherwise fall within the general language, the

main enactment and its effect is confined to that case. The section must be construed as a whole, each

portion throwing light on the rest.

A proviso should never be construed in a manner which would nullify the effect of the main section to

which it is merely a proviso. In construing a proviso one has to harmoniously construe the proviso with

the main section and to see that the proviso does not cut down the obligations cast by the section itself.

In Mohan Kumar Singhania V. UOI (1992 SPP (1) see 594), the expression "provided further" spells out

that the first proviso cannot be read in isolation or independent for the second proviso but it must be

read in conjunction with the second proviso.

In S. Sundaram Pillai Vs. v.R. Pallabiraman ((1985) 1 see 591), it was held:

"A proviso may serve four different purposes :

a) it may qualify or except certain .provisions from the main enactment,

b) it may entirely change the very concept of the intendment of the enactment by insisting on certain

mandatory conditions to be fulfilled in order to make the enactment workable.

KAMKU

S

13


c) it may be so embedded in the Act itself as to become an integral part of the enactment and thus

acquire the tenor and colour of the substantive enactment itself, and

d) it may be used merely to act as an optional addenda to the enactment with the sole object of

explaining the real intendment of the statutory provision"

10. Exception and Saving Clauses :

A saving clause or exception being a later passage in an enactment prevails over the substantive

portion it follows.

Exception exempts something which would otherwise fall within the purview of the general words of a

statute. The substantial distinction between a proviso and an exception is that the former follows an

enacting clause, and qualifies it in certain specified cases, while the latter is part of the enacting clause, 36and is of general application.

Exception exempts something which would otherwise fall within the general words of the statute. A

proviso, on the other hand is a clause added to an enactment for the purpose of acting as restraint upon, 37or as a qualification of the generality of the language which it follows . The practical effect of the

distinction is that plaintiff or prosecutor must prove that the particular case was not within the exception,

whereas a proviso is a matter for the defence.

Exceptions must be construed strictly and strongly against the party trying to take the benefit. The 38

mention of certain exceptions to the general rule implies that no other exceptions were cqntemplated.

Saving clauses are generally inserted where a statute is repealed and re-enacted. The effect is that the

repealed statute remains in force as regards the rights the party previously had; but it does not create

new rights in its favour.

A saving clause is generally introduced into the repealing Act, in order to safeguard rights which, but for

such saving, would be lost.

A saving clause which is repugnant to the body of the Act is void.

A saving clause would not give any further right that a party already had.

11. Explanation: The object of an explanation is to understand the Act in the light of the explanation. It

does not ordinarily enlarge the scope of the original section which it explains, but only makes the

meaning clear beyond dispute.

In S. Sundaram Pillai Vs. V. R. Pattaliraman39, The Supreme Court explained the objects of an

Explanation Provision as follows :

a. to explain the meaning and intendment of the Act itself;

b. where there is any obscurity or vagueness in the main enactment, to clarify the same so as to make

it consistent with the dominant object which it seems to subserve;

c. to provide an additional support to the dominant object of the Act in order to make it meaningful and

purposeful;

d. an Explanation cannot in any way interfere with or change the enactment or any part thereof but

KAMKU

S

14


where some gap is left which is relevant for the purpose of the Explanation, in order to suppress the

mischief and advance the object of the Act it can help or assist the court in interpreting the true

purport and intendment of the enactment; and it cannot, however, take away a statutory right with

which any person under a statute has been clothed or set at naught the working of an Act by

becoming a hindrance in the interpretation of the same.

Explanation to a section is not a substantives provision by itself. It is entitled to explain the meaning of the 40words contained in the section to clarify certain ambiguities or clear them Up. It becomes a part and parcel

of the enactment. Its meaning must depend upon its terms. Sometimes it would be added to include

something within it or to exclude from the ambit of the main provision or some condition or words occurring

in it. Therefore, the explanation normally should be so read as to harmonise with and to clean up any

ambiguity in the same section.

An 'Explanation', generally speaking, is intended to explain the meaning of certain phrases and

expressions contained in a statutory provision. There is no general theory as to the effect and intendment of

an explanation except that the purpose and intendment of the 'Explanation' are determined by its own

words. An explanation, depending on its language, might supply or take away something from the contents

of a provision.

Merely because a particular provision in a Statute is labeled as an Explanation it does not mean that it is

inserted merely with a- view to explain the meaning of words contained in the section of which it forms a

part. The true scope and effect of an explanation can only be Judged by its express language and not

merely by the lable given to it. The language of an explanation may show that it intends to create a legal 41fiction.

An explanation should be read with a view to harmonise and clear up the ambiguity in the main provisions of

the section. The explanation should be interpreted according to its own terms having regard to its' context

and not so as to widen the ambit of the section. Where two interpretations are sought to be put upon a

provision that which fits the description which the legislature has chosen to apply to it, according to sound

canons of constructions, to be adopted provided it is consistent with the language employed in preference

to the one which attributes to the provision a different effect from what it should have according to its 42description by the legislature.

Explanation is merely meant to explain or clarify certain ambiguities which may have crept in a statutory

provision. In DG. Mahajan V. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1977 SC 915) it was stated that it is well settled that

an explanation added to a statutory provision is not a substantive provision but has the plain meaning of the

word and itself shows that it is merely meant to explain or clarify certain ambiguities which may have crept in

a statutory provision. But it is the intention of the legislature which is paramount and the court can look into

the purpose for which the Explanation was added to the section.

12. Schedule: Schedules form part of the statute. They are catalogued towards the end and contain

minute details for working out the provisions of the Act. The expressions in the schedule cannot override

the provisions of the express enactment. Where the enacting part and the schedule cannot be made to

correspond, the latter must yield to the former.

The code of civil procedure (V of 1908) consists of two parts, the first containing section called the body

of the code and the second containing orders in the schedule, called the rules. The body of the code

contains provisions of a substantive nature and lays down the general principles and creates

KAMKU

S

15


jurisdiction, while the Orders contained in the schedule relate to procedure and indicate the mode in

which jurisdiction created by the body of the code has to be exercised. The body of the code is

fundamental and being expressed in general terms has to be read in conjunction with the rules

prescribing the details. To ascertain the jurisdiction of the court in a particular manner not only the code

but also the rules which may have set limits to the exercise of it have to be looked. The sections lay down

the general principles, while the rules provide the means by which they can be applied. If, however, the

rules are inconsistent with the body are inconsistent with the body of the code, the latter would prevail.

The schedule may be used in construing provisions in the body of the Act. It is as much an act of

legislature as the Act itself and it must be read together with the Act for all purposes of construction.

Expressions in the schedule cannot control or prevail against the express enactment and in case of any

inconsistency between the schedule and the enactment, the enactment is to prevail and if any part of

the schedule cannot be made to correspond it must yield to the Act.

The basic principle is that in case of a conflict between the body of the Act and the schedule, the former

prevails.

The forms in the schedule being intended to suit the generality of cases rather than all cases should not

be regarded as a guide to the meaning of a statute. They should yield to the clear provision of an

enactment. Where however, the enactment is ambiguous, a schedule form may be of assistance in

interpreting its meaning.

43In Aphali Pharmaceuticals Ltd. V. State of Maharashtra, it was helds:

"A Schedule in an Act of Parliament is a mere question of drafting. The schedule may be used in

construing provisions in the body of the Act. It is as much an act of legislature as the Act itself and it must

be read together with the Act for all purposes of construction. Expressions in the schedule cannot

control or prevail against the express enactment and in care of any inconsistency between the schedule

and the enactment the enactment is to prevail and if any part of the schedule cannot be made to

correspond must yield to the Act. It is the legislative intent that is material"

13. Fictions: A fiction is a legal assumption that the thing is true which is either not true or which is

probably as false as true.

The effect of a deeming clause is that when legislature introduces a statutory fiction and courts have to

proceed on the assumption that such state of affairs exists on the relevant date.

When a person is 'deemed to be' something the only meaning possible is that whereas he is not in

reality that something the Act of parliament requires him to be treated as if he were.

44In Avtar Singh V. State of Punjab , it was held: "If a provision says that something which is not an

offence within the meaning of another statute is to be deemed to be such, the offence is created by the

statute which raises the fiction and not by the statute within which it is to be deemed by that fiction to be

included.

It was held in so many cases by supreme court that legal fictions are created only for a definite purpose

and should not be extended beyond the legitimate field. It is well settled that a deeming provision is an

admission of the non-existence of the fact deemed. The legislature is competent to enact a deeming

provision for the purpose of assuming the existence of a fact which does not even exist. It means that

KAMKU

S

16


the courts must assume that such a state of affairs exists as real, and should imagine as real and

consequences and incidents which inevitably flow therefrom, and give effect to the same.

The deeming provision may be intended to enlarge the meaning of a particular word or to include

matters which otherwise mayor may not fall within the main provision.

The legal fiction created under para 6(2) of the X (Tenth) Schedule to the constitution was interpreted by 45the Supreme Court in Kihoto Hollohon V. Zachillhu . Sub-para (2) of para 6 of the Tenth Schedule

deems the proceedings that must be followed so as to arrive at decision 0 disqualification under para

6(1) as proceedings in Parliament within the meaning of Art 122 or, as the case may be, proceedings in

the legislature of a state within the meaning of Art. 122. The deeming provision implies that the

proceedings of disqualification are, in fact, not before the House, but only before the speaker as a

specially designated authority, the decision under the House, nor is it subject to the approval by the

House. The decision operates independently of the House. A deeming provision cannot by its creation

transcend its own power. There is therefore, no immunity under Articles 122 and 212 from judicial

scrutiny of the decision of the speaker or chairman exercising power under paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth

Schedule.

14. Interpretation Clause: The interpretation clause and definitions do not take away the ordinary and

natural meaning of words, but are used: (1) to extend the meaning of a word to include or cover-

something, which would not normally be covered or included, and (ii) to interpret ambiguous words

which are not plain or clear.

The legislature can lay down legal definitions of its own language. If such definition is embodied in the

statute itself, it becomes binding on the courts. When the Act itself provides a dictionary for the words

used, the court must look Into that dictionary first for an interpretation of the words used in the statute.

Where a term is defined in the enactment, the court has to look into' the definition and not to its ordinary

meaning..

An interpretation clause may use the verb 'includes' or 'means' or 'means and includes', or denotes or

'deemed to be'.

The-word 'means' or 'means and includes' are used it affords an exhaustive explanation of the meaning

which, for the purposes of the Act, must inevitably be attached to those words or expressions.

15. Conjunctive and Disjunctive words: The word 'and' used in a statute may be read 'or' and vice

versa, if such alteration is necessary to give effect to the intention of the legislature. In criminal or

penallegislation, however, conjunctive words should never be construed as disjunctive and vice versa,

if the effect would aggravate the offence or increase the punishment. It has to be assumed that the

le3islature has chosen the correct words to express its purposes. Hence, the literal meaning of the

expressions should be accepted unless the context points to some other interpretation.

It is legitimate to read the conjunctive and disjunctive words 'and' and 'or' one for the other literal

interpretation would defeat the intention of the legislature or the object of the Act.

The word "or" and the word "and" are often used interchangeably. As a result of this common and

careless case of the two words in legislation, there are occasions when the court, through construction,

may change one to the other. This cannot be done if the statute meaning is clear or if the alteration

KAMKU

S

17


operates to change the meaning of the law.

A departure from the natural and plain meaning of the word "or" can be made whenever the context

justifies it or makes it necessary so to do; but the departure ought not to be made, except for good and

sufficient reasons.

The word "or" can be read as "and" the word "and" can be read as "or" where it is necessary to do so to

give effect to the intention of the legislature.

16. Include: The word "include" is generally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the

meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute and when it is used, those words or

phrases must be construed as comprehending, not only such things as they signify according to their

natural import, but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include.

17. Enabling and Disabling Statutes: Enabling statutes amplify the scope of the common law where it is

too much restricted or limited. Disabling statutes do just the opposite, they confine or delimit the

common law. A statute which legalises some act which under the common law would be illegal to

perform is called an enabling Act.

Wherever the legislative enacts a statute it should also give the details of the method for carrying out the

purpose of the statute. Where the legislature fails to do so the courts may assume that the statute

impliedly authorises the carrying out of the details.

An enabling provision in a particular statute should be construed so as to subserve the purpose for

which it was enacted. It implies power to do everything indispensable for carrying out the purpose.

18. Non-Obstante Clause: The expression "non obstante" means "notwithstanding". Sometimes, a

section commences with the clauses stating that "notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or any

la for the time being in force". And, in case of conflict, the idea is to give the enacting or operative part of

the section an overriding effect over provisions of the Act found in the non obstante clause. The

enacting part of a statute must, where it is clear, be taken to control the non obstante clause where both

cannot be read harmoniously.

46In the case of Dominion of India V. Shrinbai A. Irani, it was observed by their loardships of the Supreme

Court, "Although ordinarily there should be a close approximation between the non- obstante clause

and the operative part of the section, the non obstante clause need not necessarily and always be co-

extensive with the operative part, so as to have the effect of cutting down the clear terms of the

enactment. If the words of the enactment are clear and are capable of only one interpretation on a plain

and grammatical construction of the words thereof, a non-obstante clause cannot cut down the

construction and restrict the scope of its operation. In such cases the non-obstante clause has to be

read as clarifying the whole position and must be understood to have been in corporated in the

enactment by the legislature by way of abundant caution and not by way of limiting the ambit and scope

of the operative part of the enactment."

The very purpose of non-obstante clause is that the provision shall prevail over any other provision and

that other provisions shall not be of any consequence. In case there is any inconsistency or a departure

between a non-obstante clause and other provisions, one of the objects of such a clause is to indicate

that it is the non-obstante clause that would prevail over the other clauses. Even by the dictionary

KAMKU

S

18


sense, the expression 'notwith standing' implies that other provisions shall not prevail over the main

provisions. The ambit of the word 'notwith standing' or in other words, of the non-obstante clause must

remain confined to the provisions specified thereunder and should not be enlarged.

Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. One may well say if the text is the texture,

context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. The interpretation is best

which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know

why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and then section by

section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at in the context of

its enactment, with the glasses of the statute-maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the

sections, clauses, phrases are looked at without the glasses provided by the context. With these

glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each clause, each phrase

and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a

statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that

every word has a place and everything is in its place.

There is a distinction between proviso, exception, provision, saving clause, non-obstante clause,

explanation, etc. The better rule appears to be not to give undue weight to the aforesaid distinctions,

which are somewhat obscure and to direct one's attention to the substance rather than to the form

adopted by the legislature. The proper course is to apply the broad general rule of construction, which is

that the provision must be construed as a whole, each portion throwing light, if need be, on the rest.

There is no other rule even in the case of a proviso or non-obstanta clause in the strict and narrowest

sense. When language is quite clear and no alternative view is possible, it is futile to go into the question

whether it operates as a substantive provision or only by way of an exception. The non-obstante clause

need not necessarily and always be co-extensive with the operative part so as to have the effect of

cutting down the clear terms of the enactment. If the words of the enactment are clear and are capable

of only one interpretation on a plain and grammatical construction of the words thereof, a non-obstante

clause cannot cut down the construction and restrict the scope of its operation. The enacting part of the

statute must, where it is clear, be taken to control the non-obstante clause where both cannot be read

harmoniously.

19. Sub Section: The words used in a section must be given their plain grammatical meaning.

Where the court is dealing with two sub-sections of a section, it is necessary that the two sub section

must be construed as a whole, "each portion throwing light, if need be, on the rest. The two sub-sections

must be read as parts of an integral whole and as being inter-dependent; an attempt should be made in

construing them to reconcile them, if it is reasonably possible to do so, to avoid repugnancy. ~f

repugnancy cannot possibly be avoided, then a question may arise as to which of the two should

prevail. But that question can arise only if repugnancy cannot be avoided.

20. Modification of the language to meet the intention: Where the language of the statute, in its

ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to manifest contradiction of the apparent

purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity which can hardly have been

intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words and even the

structure of the sentence. This may be done by departing from the rules of grammar, by giving an

unusual meaning to particular words, or by rejecting them altogether, on the ground that the legislature

could not possibly have intended what its words signify, and that the modifications made are mere

corrections of careless language and really give the true meaning. Where the main object and intention

of a statute are clear, it must not be reduced to a nullity by the drafts man's unskilful or ignorance of the

law, except in the cases of necessity.

KAMKU

S

19


External Aids of Interpretation : External aids or Extrinsic aids may be employed in the construction of

statutes if the words and language employed are not free from ambiguity and which cannot be cleared even

by resort to internal aids. External aids in the construction of statutes are permitted to explain the state of the

law at the time it was passed, but not to interpret the Act.

There is one principle on which complete unanimity of all the courts in the world is that where the words or

the language used in a statute are clear and cloudless, plain, simple and explicit. unclouded and

unobscured, intelligible and pointed so as to admit of no ambiguity, vagueness, uncertainty or equivocation,

there is absolutely no room for deriving support from external aids.

It is equally well settled that it is not the duty of the court to import words which have been omitted

deliberately or intentionally in order to fill up a gap or supply omissions to fit in with the ideology or concept of

the Judge concerned. The words and the language used must be given their natural meaning and

interpreted in their ordinary and popular series.

1. Parliamentary History of the Enactment: History of the Act, Parliamentary debates, are materials

forming part of preliminary discussions of legislation which can support any interpretation.

Legislative records may provide a clue to the circumstances leading to the enactment of the statute.

Reports of relevant legislative committees may also be consulted. The history of the legislation,

even though employed in interpreting the meaning of a statute, is, however not conclusive. But it is

unquestionably a rule of interpretation that the Parliamentary history of an enactment is not

admissible to explain its meaning.

To find out the meaning of a law, recourse may legitimately be had to the prior state of law, the evil

sought to be removed and the process by which the law was evolved. In interpreting a statute,

although if is useful to keep in mind the historical background, it does not necessarily help to

determine the true meaning to be attached to the language employed in the statute.

The legislative history of another Act does not afford any aid to the construction of a statute.

Legislative history plus within circumspect limits may be consulted by courts to resolve ambiguities.

According to Sutherland the history of events transpiring during the process of enacting an Act has

generally been the first extrinsic aid to which Courts have turned in attempting to construe an

ambiguous act.

A statute may be enlarged or restricted in order to harmonize it with the legislative intent of the entire

statute. It is the spirit of the statute which should govern over the literal meaning.

The object of all interpretation is to discover the intention of parliament and it must be deduced from

the language used. It is well accepted that the beliefs and assumption of those who frame Acts of 47

Parliament cannot make the law .

48According to Lord Halsbury in Powell V. Kemplon Park Racecourse Co. , such topics as the history

of the legislation and the facts which give rise to the enactment may usefully be employed to

interpret the meaning of the statute, though they do not afford conclusive argument.

49In Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri V. UOI, the question was whether a law relating to a single individual

could be treated as a law relating to a class or if it was discriminatory. It was held:

KAMKU

S

20


"It is the accepted doctrine of the American Courts, which I consider to be well-founded on principle,

that the presumption is always in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is

upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional

Principles. The petitioner has made no attempt to discharge the burden of proof and we are merely

asked to presume that there must necessarily be other companies also which would be open to the

charge of mismanagement and negligence. The question cannot, in my opinion, be treated so

lightly. On the other hand, how important the doctrine of burden of proof is and how much harm can

be caused by ignoring it or tampering with it, will be fully illustrated, by refering to the proceedings in

Parliament in connection with the enactment of the Act, where the circumstances which

necessitated it are clearly set out. I am aware that legislative proceedings cannot be referred to for

the purpose of construing Act or any of its provisions, but I believe that they are relevant for the

proper understanding of the circumstances under which it was passed and the reasons which

necessitated it."

50In S.C. Parashar, ITO V. Vasantsen Dwarkadas, S.K. Das, J. observed. "The statement of objects

and reasons for introducing a particular piece of legislation cannot be used for interpreting the

legislation if the words used therein are clear enough. But the statement can be referred to for the

purposes of ascertaining the circumstances which led to the legislation in order to find out what was

the mischief which the legislation aimed at."

51In special reference NO.1 of 2002 in re, (Gujrat Assembly Election matter) The debates in the

constituent Assembly on Art. 85 and 174 were looked into. Justice Khare referred to Keshvanand

Bharti case in support of the proposition that the Constituent Assembly Debates are permissible

aids in construction to ascertain the intention of the constitution. The learned Judge observed that

"One of the known methods to discern the intention behind enacting a provision of the constitution

and also to interpret the same is to look into the historical legislative developments, Constitutent

Assembly Debates or any enactment preceding the enactment of the constitutional provision."

52In Keshvananda Bharti V. State of Kerala it was held that constituent Assembly Debates although

not conclusive, yet show the intention of the framers of the constitution enacting provisions of the

constitution and the Constituent Assembly Debates can throw light in ascertaining the intention

behind such provision.

2. Legislative Debates: Statement of legislators at the time of discussion of an Act are admissible as

an aid to interpretation.

53In Golaknath V. State of Punjab the Supreme Court referred to the speeches of two legislators

made in the Constituent Assembly not with a view to interpret the provisions of the Article in

question, which the court did on its own terms, but only to notice the transcen-dental character given

to the fundamental rights by two of the important architects of the constitution.

A statute, as passed by Parliament, is the expression of the collective intention of the legislature as

a whole and any statement made by an individual, or a Minister, of the intention and objects of the 54Act cannot be used to cut down the generality of the words used in the statute .

55In the case of p.v. Narsinmha Rao V. State (C.B.1. (S.P.E.), Supreme court said that the statement

of the Minister who had moved the Bill in Parliament can be looked at to ascertain mischief sought to

KAMKU

S

21


be remedied by the legislation and the object and purpose for which the legislation is enacted. The

statement of the minister is not taken into account for the purpose of interpreting the provisions of

the enactment.

Interpretation of a statutory provision is always a question of law on which the reasons stated by the

mover of the amendment can only be used as an aid in interpretation if it helps considerably in

understanding the meaning of the amendment law.

.

3. Proceedings of Legislative Council : Reference to proceedings of the Legislative Council is not

permissible. The proceedings of the Legislature cannot be called in aid for construing a section. The

intention of the Legislature must be taken for what it has enacted and not from what the legislaters

said while discussing the bill.

It is true that the speeches made by the members of the legislature on the floor of the House when a

bill for enacting a statutory provision is being debated are inadmissible for the purpose of

interpreting the statutory provision but the speech made by the mover of the bill explaining the

reason for the introduction of the bill can certainly be referred to for the purpose of ascertaining the

mischief sought to be remedied by the legislation and the object and purpose for which the

legislation is enacted. This is in accord with the recent trend in juristic thought not only in western

countries but also in India that interpretation of a statute being an exercise in the ascertainment of

meaning, everything which is logically relevant should be admissible.

56In the case of Sub-Committee of Judicial Accountability V. UOI & others it was said that where

internal aids are not forthcoming, we can always have recourse to external aids to discover the

object of the legislation. External aids are not ruled out. This is now a well settled principle of modern

statutory construction.

4. Statement of Objects and Reasons not admissible in construing statute: The statement of

objects and reasons is not admissible in evidence for construing a statute.

The history of a legislation would be admissible for ascertaining the legislative intent when the

question is one of severability. But the statement of objects and reasons is not a part of the history of

legislation. It is merely an expression of what according to the mover of the bill are the scope and

purpose of the legislation. But the question of severability has to be judged on the intention of the

legislature as expressed in the bill as passed and to ascertain if the statement of the mover of the bill

is no more admissible than a speech made on the floor of the House.

The statement of objects and reasons might be admissible not for construing the Act but for 57

ascertaining the conditions which prevailed when the legislation was enacted.

58It has been said in the case of Aswini Kumar Ghose V. Arabinda Bose that although the statement

of objects and reasons appended to a bill is not admissible as an aid to the construction of the Act as

passed, yet it may be referred to only for the limited purpose of ascertaining the conditions

prevailing at the time which necessitated the making of the law. It can also be referred to for the

limited purpose of ascertaining the precise extent and urgency of the evil or the mischief which was

sought to be remedied by introducing the amendment, as it often called the Surrounding

circumstances' of a statute.

KAMKU

S

22


Courts always lean towards a construction which would help in giving effect to the object underlying

a statute. But if the language used by the statute is clear, a court cannot construe the ct differently

because of what it thinks was the object of Parliament.

It is well settled that the statement of objects and reasons accompanying a bill when introduced.

Parliament can be used to determine the true meaning and effect of substantive provisions of e

statute. They cannot be used except for the limited purpose of understanding the background and

the antecedent state of affairs leading up to the legislation. A statute, as passed by parliament, is the

expression of the collective intention of the legislature as a whole, and statement made by an

individual, a Minister of the intention and objects of the Act, cannot be used to cut down the

generality of the words used in the statute.

A reference to statement of objects and reasons may be permissible in the case of ambiguity of a

statutory provision. But it cannot be allowed to overside the plain provisions of law which are clear

and free of ambiguity.

The statement of objects and Reasons can be referred to ascertain the mischief sought to be

remedied by the statute.

5. Motive and object of Legislation: Although the Court is not at liberty to construe an Act of

Parliament by the motives which influenced the Legislate, yet when the history of law and legislation

tells the courts, and prior judgments tell this present court, what the object of the legislative was, the

court is to see whether the terms of the section are such as fairly to carry out that object and no other,

and to read the section with a view to finding out what it means, and not with a view to extending it to

something that was not intended.

The words of a statute, when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense

in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the Legislature

has in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strictly grammatical or etymological propriety of

language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used,

and the object to be attained. (Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edition)

6. Contemporaneous Events and Historical Setting: Contemporaneous events form an important

extraneous aid to the construction of a statute. A consideration of history of the period of enactment

including the history of the law itself, the nature of the preceding law and the mischief that was

sought to be removed by the law is called for.

In the case of ambiguity of different articles of the constitution, the reports of the Drafting Committee

of the Constituent Assembly may be consulted but not with a view to controlling the meaning of the

article in question. In order to find out the precise evil that the legislators tried to remedy, it is useful

to scan the opinions and statements of the legislators expressed at the time of the discussion of the

law and ascertain the relevant condition at the time of the enactment.

Historical works and public official documents may be referred to in order to ascertain ancient facts

of a public nature.

7. Public Policy: Legislation is intended to accord with and give shape to the established principles of

public policy, and not to transgress them. If the statute lends itself to double interpretation, the

interpretation that achieves this object should be preferred. The effect and consequences of the

KAMKU

S

23


proposed constructions of the enactment have also to be examined, and if the examination reveals

that one of the proposed constructions goes against the spirit of public policy, and the other does

not, the reasonable and beneficial interpretation is to be accepted.

In one case Supreme Court of the United States observed that "if a policy exists, we may grant that it

may be used to resolve the uncertainty of a law, but it cannot be a substitute for a law.

The Supreme Court of Massuchusets held that "The natural import of the words of any legislative

act, according to the common use of them, when applied to the subject-matter of the act, is to be

considered as expressing the intention of the legislature unless the intention so resulting from the

ordinary import of the word, be repugnant to sound acknowledged principles of national policy."

For although it is not to be presumed that the legislature will violate principles of public policy, yet an

intention of the legislature repugnant to those principles, clearly, manifestly and constitutionally

expressed, must have the force of law.

Judicial observations on this point do not show that the Courts are in favour of enlarging or

restraining the literal sense of the legislation, but rather their anxiety that the interpretation

consistent with the public policy should be selected.

In an English case of Egerton V. Brownlow, in 1953 Park B., observed that "Public Policy" is a

vague and unsatisfactory term and calculated to lead to uncertainty and error when applied to the

decision of legal rights. It is capable of being understood in different sense. There may be variety of

opinion according to the education, habit, talents and disposition of each person who is to decide

whether an Act is against public policy or not. To allow this to be a ground of judicial decision would

lead to the greatest uncertainty and confusion. It is the province of the statesman and not the lawyer

to discuss, and of the legislature to determine, what is the best for the public good and to provide for

it by proper enactments. It is the province of the Judge to expound the law and not to speculate upon

what is the best, in his opinion, for the advantage of the community.

The above view, however, does not take into consideration the fact that in many cases

determination of public policy would be helpful in assigning the proper meaning to a particular

statute. Where the public policy is clearly defined, there is no case of dismissing it as an aid in the

construction of statutes.

In the case of Bayonne Textile Corp. V. American ,Federation of Silk Workers, the New Jersey Court

held: "It is well established rule that, for the purpose of determining the meaning, but not the validity

of a statute, recourse may be had to consideration of public policy."

In one case of Jamunadas Devaibhai Bhati V. The Commissioner, Nagpur Division, Nagpur

Bombay High Court observed that the scope of the expression 'public purpose is obviously not

static and must change with varying concept, time, state of society and its needs. A rigid or fixed

meaning if given to the words 'public purpose' might defeat the very object with which the legislature

made it only an illustrative definition.

The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislative must be found in the

words used by the Legislature itself. If the words used are capable of one construction only, then it

would not be open to the court to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such

hypothetical construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the

KAMKU

S

24


Act. The words used in the material provisions of the statute must be interpreted in their

grammatical meaning and it is only when such words are capable of two constructions that the

question of giving effect to the policy or object of the Act can legitimately arise. When the material

words are capable of two constructions, one of which is likely to defeat or impair the policy of the Act

whilst the other construction is likely to assist the achievement of the said policy, then the courts

would prefer to adopt the latter construction. It is only in such cases that it becomes relevant to

consider the mischief and defeat which the Act purports to remedy and correct.

8. Previous Legislation: Where a code consolidates the statute's law on a particular subject or

reduces the whole law, the rules of construction lay down that the express statutory enactment

alone should be looked at and should govern the rights of the parties. The language employed in the

statute, uninfluenced by any considerations derived from previous law, should regulate the

relations of the parties.

But there is a slight departure in the case of a consolidation Act where the courts are inclined to

presume that it is not intended to alter the law, and in case of doubt, it is reasonable to infer that the

legislature intended the law to stand. In such cases the history of the previous Act may be looked at

to determine the construction to be put on the same word in different section.

In construing a statute the general rule is that the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words used

is to be adhered to. This is essential in the case of statutes codifying the law. But where a statute is

only modifying the form of any previous law and to determine whether it is retrospective in

operation, it may be necessary to refer to the prior state of law.

9. Dictionaries: In the absence of any judicial guidance or authority, dictionaries can be consulted to

find out the meaning of a particular word or a phrase. In the absence of there being anything

contrary to the context the language of a statute should be interpreted according to the plain

dictionary meaning of the terms used therein.

It is true that "dictionaries are not to be taken as authoritative exponents of the meaning of words

used in Acts of Parliament, but it is a well-known rule of courts of law that words should be taken to

be used in their ordinary sense." 59

In the case of R.S. Nayak Vs. A.R. Antualay, held that while it may be permissible to refer to

dictionaries to find out the meaning in which a word is capable of being used or understood in

common parlance, the unrestricted reference to the dictionaries should be avoided and the well

known canon of construction that the meaning of the words and expressions used in a statute

ordinarily take their colour from the context in which they appear, should be kept in mind.

Reference to dictionaries is hardly of any avail, particularly in the case of words of ordinary parlance

with a variety of well-known meanings, such as the word 'import'. Such words take colour from the

context.

Dictionary meaning of a word cannot be looked into in case that word has been statutorily or

judicially defined. But in case there is no definition, the court takes aid of dictionaries to ascertain the

meaning of the particular word. Dictionaries are for consultation in the absence of any judicial

guidance or authority.

KAMKU

S

25


10. Rules of Grammar: If the context definitely suggests that the relevant rule of grammar is

inapplicable, then the requirement of the context must prevail over the rule of grammar.

11. Value of English Decisions Resembling Indian Statute: When Legislature in this country enact

statutes which closely resemble statutes in England and have the settle purpose and object in view,

then unless the expressions used in the Indian statutes are defined, Courts of law cannot go wrong

in interpreting them in the way English Judges have done.

60The decisions on the English Statutes, when held to be pari-materia with the Indian statutes can be

referred to for the purpose of construction of the Indian Act. They are not compelling decisions, but

they are certainly persuasive decisions.

It is dangerous to apply the decision of an English court construing an English Act of parliament not

in pari materia with the Indian statutes and over Indian decisions, interpreting very similar

enactments.

In the case of Commissioner of Income-tax and Excess Profits Tax, Madras V. South Indian Pictures 61

Ltd. Karaikud, it is held by Hon'ble Supreme Court that the provisions of the Indian Income Tax Act

are not in pari materia with those of the English income tax statutes so that the decisions of the

English Acts are in general of no assistance in construing the Indian Act.

In interpreting a statute, the Court is not so much concerned with the meaning which any expression

has acquired in another country. It is rather concerned with the intention of the legislature that

enacted it. To ascertain the intention in the absence of any indication to the contrary in the statute

itself, it is but proper to consider the notions which the legislature had, when it employed the

particular words in the statute. The language in any Indian Act, like the Indian Income-Tax Act, has

to be construed in accordance with the concept prevalent in India and not by following the

construction of the English statutes. The legislative enactments have not to be construed in a

manner similar to deeds, in the sense that both of them have got to be understood in the light of the

surrounding circumstances attending the enactment or the document, as the case may be. The

rule, does not, however, prevent the court from resorting to English decisions for interpretation of

statutes in appropriate cases.

The English common law does not apply to India when there is statutory law covering the point, but

when there is no rule of statute, the common law of England is applied suo motu having regard to the

condition of the society and the customs and manners of the people of India. When, however, the

principles of common law in England are themselves in a state of uncertainty, there is nothing to

preclude a judge in adopting that rule of English common law which is in accordance with justice

and equity.

In India, there are definite statutes and the courts have to follow the same. The rules of the common

law of England or the legal maxims embodying certain judicial principles, however wholesome they

may be, cannot be engrafted upon the Indian Acts.

12. Special Meaning of words in a statute: Special meaning may be given to a word because of the

collection of words in which it figures. Maxwell in "Interpretation of statutes" gives numerous

examples of the application of this principle. The words 'places of public resort' assume a very

different meaning when coupled with roads and streets from that which the same words would have

KAMKU

S

26


if they were coupled with 'houses'. In the same way the word 'posting' cannot be understood in the

sense of 'transfer' when the idea of appointment and promotion is involved in the combination.

13. Use of Technical Words: Common words have to be accorded their plain and normal meaning.

Technical terms should be construed according to their customary significance.

The first and most elementary rule of construction is that it is to be assumed that the words and

phrases of technical legislation are used in their technical meaning, if they have acquired one, and

otherwise in their ordinary meaning.

14. Use of legal terms: It is well settled that where the Legislative uses a legal term which has received

Judicial interpretation, the courts must assume that the term has been used in the sense in which it

has been judicially interpreted.

6215. Legal Rule: In the case of National Textile Workers Union Vs. P.R. Ramkrishnan Justice Bhagwati

said that the courts in India will have to build their own jurisprudence and though they may receive

light from whatever source it comes, they cannot surrender their judgment and accept as valid in

India whatever has been decided in England.

Justice Chinnappa Reddy also said in the above mentioned case that there is no sanctity attached

to the age of a judgment or to the circumstances that the decision is that of an English court from

where most of our company law has been borrowed. A line of distinction is drawn between the

British and the Indian Jurisprudence as our needs, our social, political and economic bases,

aspirations, our systems, our development, all are different.

As per Venkataramiah J. in the above said case the practice of relying on foreign decisions what

ever may be their age only when they are in conformity with what the courts in India wish to hold and

of condemning them only on the ground that they are ancient foreign decisions when they do not

accord with our views is not correct. A foreign decision (ever though it may not be binding) is

depending upon the reasons contained in it and not on its origin or age. There is no reason why a

well reasoned foreign decision should not be followed unless it is opposed to our ethics, tradition

and jurisprudence or otherwise unsuited to Indian conditions.

16. Terms of Trade and Commerce: Terms of trade and commerce, when they occur in a legislation

concerning those subjects, should be deemed to have been used in their trade or commercial

meaning, unless of course a contrary legislative intent is evident.

17. Use of Specific Words: General expressions in a statute may be restricted by the use of specific

words associated with them. Specific words, on the other hand, may be enlarged in their scope on

the ground that the intention of the legislation is general.

Where there are two provisions in an Act, one of which is specific or of a special character and the

other of a general character, the specific or special provision qualifies the general one and ought to

be applied in preference to and unaffected by the general one.

63 64In Venkateshwar Rao V. Government of Andhra Pradesh and C.I.T. Patiala V. Shahzada & Sons

the supreme court has held that if a special provision is made on a certain matter, that matter is

excluded from the general provision.

The settled rule of interpretation of statutes is that if there is a specific provision dealing with a

KAMKU

S

27


particular matter, the same will override the general. The provision is said to be specific when it is

precise or exact in respect of fulfillment of a particular object.

18. Use of Adjective: Explanatory expressions, qualifying words etc. cannot be allowed to cloud the

meaning of the actual words or expressions used in the statute. Courts must caution against

adjectives getting the better of the nouns. Adjectives are attractive aids but in matters of 65interpretation they are diverting intruders (Sanjeev Coke Mfg. Co. V. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd.

19. Text Books: The exposition of statute by a text-writer of repute, the work of a jurist or commentator

may help elucidate the meaning of an enactment which is either ambiguous or obscure.

A commetary in a text-book is not binding on the court, but when it is to be found in a learned treatise

on a relevant law, it can and does have persuasive value in so much as it demonstrates that the view

of the jurist and that of the court coincide.

20. Statutes in Pari Materia: These are statutes dealing with the same subject-matter, relating to the

same person or thing or the same class of persons or things, or forming part of the same system.

Each word, phrase and sentence is to be construed in the light of general purpose of the Act itself.

The text of the statute taken as a whole is, no doubt, the most important material for ascertaining the

intention of the legislature, but the external aids by having recourse to statutes in pari materia are

also admissible. These external aids widen the concept of 'context' as including not only other

enacting provisions of the same statute, but its preamble, the existing state of the law, other statutes

in pari materia, and the mischief which the statute as intended to remedy.

21. Verbal or Clerical Error: A verbal or clerical error may be corrected by the court if it thinks that such

correction is necessary to give effect to the intention of the legislature. It is within the province of the

courts to correct a merely clerical error, even in an act assembly, when as it is written it involves a

manifest absurdity, and the error is plain and obvious. The power is undoubted but it can only be

exercised when the error is so manifest, upon an inspection of the Act, as to perclude all manner of

doubt, and when the correction will relieve the sense of the statute from an actual absurdity and

carry out the clear purpose of the legislature.

22. Provisions of General Clauses Act :

a) Gender and Number: Sec. 13 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, lays down that in all

central Acts and Regulation unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context:

i) words importing the masculine gender shall be taken to include females;

ii) words in the singular shall include the plural, and vice versa.

The word 'person' includes members both of the male and female sex.

b) Meaning of Expressions: Words or expressions are defined in statutes by employing the

words "means", "includes", "denotes" and "deemed to be". When the word "means" is employed

it shows that the definition is a hard and fast definition and that no other meaning can be

assigned to the word or expression defined than is put down in the definition.

The use of the word "denotes" shows that the legislature did not intend to put down a cast-iron

definition of the word but only sought to describe which word might mean.

KAMKU

S

28


When a thing "is deemed to be" something, the only meaning possible is that whereas it is not in

reality that something, the Act directs that it should be treated as if it were that thing.

The expression "include" or "shall be deemed to include" is very generally used in the

interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases occurring in

the body of the statute. When these words are used, then the term defined must be considered

as comprehending not only such things as they signify according to their natural import, but also

those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include.

The expression "including" is very generally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge

the meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute, and when it is so used

these words or phrases must be construed as comprehending not only such things as they

signify according to their natural import but also those things which the interpretation clause

declares that they shall include. The word "including",. therefore, is a term of extension. It

imports addition. It adds to the subject-matter already comprised in the definition.

c) Power to Appoint: Sec. 16 of the General clauses Act also lays down that where, by any

central Act or Regulation, a power to make any appointment is conferred, then, unless a

different intention appears the authority having for the time being power to make the

appointment shall also have power to suspend or dismiss any person appointed whether by it

self or any other authority in exercise of that power.

d) Implied Ancillary Power: It is a well recognised principle of interpretation of statutes that

where a statute confers a power on an authority, such ancillary or incidental power must be

implied as is necessary for the effective and complete exercise of that power.

The Kerala High Court acted upon this principle in the case of M.K. Mohammad Kunhi V. Income

Tax officer66 and held that the Income - Tax Tribunal has the power to stay recovery of tax

pending the disposal of an appeal before it, and, although such power is not expressly provided

under the Act, it is ancillary and incidental to the appellate powers of the Tribunal. The decision

of the Kerala High Court was affirmed by the Supreme Court in appeal.

23. Welfare Legislation: In the case of a legislation which has labour welfare for its object the

legislative purpose should not be unduly cut down or curtailed by the court, but, at the same time, it

must not be forgotten that when the legislative draws a line between various industries for the

purpose of determining the field of operation of such welfare legislation, then legislative intent, as

discrenible from the language employed by the law-giver which is the dominant or controlling factor

must be upheld and it is not open to the courts to strain the language for either extending or

restricting its scope.

Welfare statutes must, of necessity, receive a broad interpretation. Where legislation is designed to

give relief against certain kinds of mischief, the court is not to make inroads by making etymological

excursions.

The provisions of the Act which is a welfare legislation are meant to ensure the employees the

continuance of the benefits of the provident fund. They should be interpreted in such a way so that

the purpose of the legislation is allowed to be achieved.

KAMKU

S

29


24. Beneficial Legislation: Beneficial Legislation should have liberal construction with a view to

implementing the legislative intent. The Employees Provident Funds Act is a beneficent piece of

social welfare legislation aimed at promoting and securing the wellbeing of the employees and the

court will not adopt a narrow interpretation which will have the effect of defeating the very object and

purpose of the Act.

In Industrial Jurisprudence a dispute should be determined liberally in the context of social Justice.

The maxim "Salus populi supremea lex" that is "the welfare of the people is the supreme law"

adequately enunciates the idea of law. This can be achieved only when justice is administered

lawfully, judicially, without fear or favour and without being hampered and thwarted, and this cannot

be effective unless respect for it is fostered and maintained.

25. Fiscal Statute: It is not the nomenclature but the pith and substance of a tax which has got to be

seen.

Either the Statute applies "proprio vigore" or it does not. There is no question of applying a fiscal

statute by intendment, if the expressed words do not apply.

IMPORTANT QUESTIONS

Q.1. What is a Statute? How does it differ from Precedent? "Interpretation is the process of which the

courts seek to ascertain the true meaning of a particular legislation". Discuss.

Q.2. Discuss the importance of "Legislative Debates",

Q.3. Explain the term "Internal Aids".

Q.4. Distinguish between 'Judicial Review' and Interpretation of statutes. Is the power of court same in

both the process?

Q.6. Can an explanation clause enlarge the scope of original section?

Q.7. What are the different internal aids to construction? Of all the internal aids Preamble is s aid to

be the most important aid. Is the preamble a part of the Act?

Q.8. discuss the importance of “Text Book” in the interpretation of statutes.

Q.9. What does a “provision” do in an enactment clause?

Q.10. Is punctuation in the construction of statutes relevant or irrelevant?

Q.11. What is statutory law and what is the interpretation? Discuss the importance and utility of the work of

interpretation undertaken by judiciary?

Q.12. What are the internal aids to construction? Write a short note on each of the following as an aid to

the interpretation of statutes :

KAMKU

S

30


i) Title

ii) Interpretation Clauses

iii) Preamble

iv) Headings

v) Marginal Notes, and

vi) Schedules

Q.13 Discuss the importance of “Interpretation Clauses” of an Act?

Q. 14. The Statute must be read as a whole”. Explain.

References:

1. Jus dicere - to interpret law; Jus dare - to make law

2. K.L. Sarkar : Mimansa Rules of Interpretation.

3. UP Bhoodan Ygna Samiti V. Braj Kishore (1988) 4SCC 274

4. Jurisprudence (1949 p. 89)

5. Constitutional Limitation, P70

6. Re Sea customs Act AI R 1963 SC 1760

7. Kocourek, An Introduction to the Science of Law, art 41, p.1919

8. Lord Blackburn referred to by Earl of Halsbury in Eastman Cov. comptroller 1899

9. How to use Decision and Statutes

10. Bhatia International vs Bulk Trading SA & Another (2002) 4SC905

11. State of Kerala & ors vs. Dr. SG Sarvothama (2001) ISCC 673

12. (2004) ISCC 391) SB

13. Kushilal V Board of Revenue AIR 1967 MP 201

14. Punjab Beverages Pvt. Ltd., Chandigarh V. Suresh Chand (1978) 2SCC144

15 This word is often used as signifying the object or purpose of statute (Wharton, Law Lexicon)

16. Ram Narain V State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1957 SC13

17. Jagir V. State of Bihar AIR 1976 SC 997 (The above sentence said by supreme court while

interpreting the word owner' in a transport legislation in Bihar)

18. Jogender Pal V. Nava! Kishor Behal (2002) 5 SCC1

19. (YA Mamarde V. Authority under the minimum v,'age5 Act, (1972) 2SEC 108.)

20. (2000) 5SCC 488

21. (AIR 1952 SC 75)

22. Sec. 28 of the General Clauses Act.

23. Bhinka V. Charan Singh, AIR 1959 SC 960

24. Raichur matham Prabhakar V. Rawatmal Dugar AIR 2004 SC 3625

KAMKU

S

31


25. (1974) 2 SCC 231

26. S.P. Gupta & ors V. The Union of India & ors, (!AIR 1982 SC 139. 610

27. AIR 1958 SC 561

28. AIR 1967 SC 1643

29. Crawfords on statutory construction.

30. 1887 14 Ind APP. 30

31. AIR 1952 SC 369

32. AIR 1950 SC 27

33. AIR 1956 SC 404

34. 1975 SCC1

35. AIR 1960 SC 610;

36. Wilberfore : 'Statute Law' , 1881 Edn. p.304

37. Crawford : 'Statutory Construction Art.91.

38. Kehar Singh V. State (Delhi Admn.) (1988) 3SCC 609

39. (1985) 1SCC 591

40. Sulochana Amma V. Narayan Nair, (1994) 2 SCC 14

41. V raj Lal Manilal & Co. V State of M.P. 1986 54 PP SCC 201

42. State of Bombay V The United Motors, AIR. 1953 SC 252

43. (1989) 4 SCC 378

44. AIR 1965 -SC 666

45. 1992 SUPP (2) SCC 651

46. 1955 SCR 296

47. Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes

48. (1899)AC 143

49. AIR 1951 SC 41

50. Air 1963 SC 1356

51. (2002) 8 sce 237

52. (1973) 4 SCC 225

53. 1967 AU 813

54. State of West Bengal V. UOI (1964) 1 SCR 371

55. AIR 1998 SC 2120

56. (AIR 1992 SC 320

57. Jai Lal V. Delhi Admn. AIR 1962 SC 1781

58. AIR 1954 SC 92

59. [(1984) 2SCC 183] SC

60. 'In Pari materia - upon the some matter subject. Statutes "in pari materia" are those relating to the

same person or this or having a common purpose. This rule of statutory construction, that statutes

KAMKU

S

32


which relate to the same subject should be read, construed and applied together so that the

legislature's intent, on can be gathered from the whole of enactments, applied only when the

particular statute is ambiguous. Statutes are in pari materia which relate to the same person or

thing, or to the same class of persons or thing.

61. AIR. 1956 SC. 49

62. (1983) ISCC 228

63. AIR 1966 SC 828

64. AIR 1966 SC 1342

65. (1983) ISCC 147

66. (1965) LTR 171

Interpretation of Statues - Kamkus College of LAWkamkus.org/coursematerial/Unit - I - Interpretation of Statues.pdfAIDS OF INTERPRETATION – INTERNAL & EXTERNAL Internal Aids: The

Documents