Internet Governance

How much Input should governments have over global InternetGovernance?Words - 2716

Global internet governance appertains four producers of

control; technical infrastructure,1 market forces and

corporations, states, and supranational organisations

including non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Achieving a

consensus amongst the sectors seems unrealistic thus

generating an aspect of competition over control. Within these

criterion there are also factions competing over internet

governance, the pursuit of raison d’état superseding all other

priorities. Ultimately, internet governance is a complex nexus

of entities prescribed with various levels of power and a

common desire to control the internet. Nonetheless, it is

argued that governments are appropriately positioned to lead

global internet governance. Through the consideration of these

four competing sectors, the following essay will argue that

the state should have a highly limited role in governance.

The argument will unfold as follows; the first point will

emphasise the problematic inconsistency of state interest, and

how this issue has created a climate unsuitable for the task

of internet governance. Secondly, the role of ICANN (Internet

1 DeNardis, L. ‘Hidden Levers of Internet Control’, Information, Communication & Society 15, (2012) p. 721.

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How much Input should governments have over global InternetGovernance?

Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) as a good example

of internet governance will be explored; despite a few issues

with the structure of the organisation, it is more credible as

a governing body than states. An attempt to demystify the

often cited reason for state influence will follow; no

corporate censure and essentially a dangerous amount of

freedom online, enough to cause security issues for states.

This point will be countered with the final argument that

safeguards already exist to control corporate expansion and

security issues through the medium of technical infrastructure

and legislation from supranational organisations, that provide

a plausible consensus of state preferences.

State Inclusivity

Despite the mandated power of the state by the

electorate, excessive inclusion endangers cyberspace with the

potential of over politicisation; a minimal role is more

appropriate. The “political economy of telecommunications”2 is the

primary interest for states through internet governance

structures. Johan Eriksson and Giampiero Giacomello identify

2 Mueller, M, ‘World Summit on the Information Society: The State-centric View’, in Networks and States: The Global Politics of Internet Governance, (Cambridge, The MIT Press, 2010). p. 55.

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three political criteria of control over telecommunications;

access, functionality and activity.3 States have competing

“ambition” of governmental control using the various access

points which provides a model for both technical and political

influence over the internet.4 Additionally, Eriksson and

Giacomello argue that domestic actors of control “arbitrate

international developments, political culture and ideology.”5 Thus the

domestic agenda dominates state interests, on all three access

points. Drezner offers a technical model encapsulated within

the functionality access point aforementioned; technical

protocols, censorship, e-taxation, intellectual property

rights and privacy rights. Combining the two models is merely

an exercise in highlighting the complexity faced when states

are the primary actors in internet governance, making it

difficult to find consensus.

Myriam Dunn Cavelty emphasises the danger of asymmetric

power structures and distribution of resources mirroring

offline hierarchies, which can affect information

3 Eriksson, J. et al. ‘Who Controls the Internet? Beyond the Obstinacy or Obsolescence of the State’, International Studies Review 11 (2009) p. 206.4 Eriksson, J. et al. ‘Who Controls the Internet? Beyond the Obstinacy or Obsolescence of the State’, International Studies Review 11 (2009) p. 208.5 Eriksson, J. et al. ‘Who Controls the Internet? Beyond the Obstinacy or Obsolescence of the State’, International Studies Review 11 (2009) p. 209.

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infrastructures, essentially the “backbone” of critical

infrastructures.6 This permeates both software and hardware

capabilities; a monopoly on power in internet governance will

determine essential variables such as location of servers,

software hegemony and so forth. Inequalities in governance

online will therefore hinder the freedom of information and

the ability for the internet to benefit all citizens of the

world. States are therefore inadequate at governing the

internet. Not only do the power structures contradict the

morals underpinning the creation of the internet – freedom of

expression and access for all – but also enforce inequalities

in the global power structure offline, onto cyberspace.

States should have minimal input in internet governance

due to this “ambition”7 of hegemony; throughout the 21st century

the world has witnessed states using telecommunications as a

means of control. Egypt, during the protests in Tahrir Square

and other major cities, shut down the access to

telecommunications (both internet and phone service) for five

6 Dunn Cavelty, M. ‘Who Controls the Internet? Beyond the Obstinacy or Obsolescence of the State’, International Studies Review 11 (2009), p. 216.7 Eriksson, J. et al. ‘Who Controls the Internet? Beyond the Obstinacy or Obsolescence of the State’, International Studies Review 11 (2009) p. 206.

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days to stop the protests and spread of communication.8 This

abuse of power and the control of information is witnessed

across the globe on many occasions, such as China and Turkey.

Hamoud Salhi suggests that authoritarian states fear the

freedom of speech and expression online due to the potential

to delegitimise the regime in power and spread discontent.9 One

might argue that this fear is rational if the role of social

media is taken into account in the Arab Spring. However,

largely “advanced countries” make up a bloc who have vested

interest in seeking a “corporate based” internet to strengthen

their economies.10 Moreover, autocratic regimes wish to control

the access to the internet, whereas Western states wish to

control activity in order to neutralise the “virtual sanctuary”

utilised by terrorists and other threats to national security.

Dunn Cavelty argues that

The power to resist vulnerability moves outwards to internationalmarkets and international organisations while the power to causevulnerability moves inwards, through classes and groups to theindividual.11

8 DeNardis, L. ‘Hidden Levers of Internet Control’, Information, Communication & Society 15, (2012) p. 729.9 Salhi, H. ‘Who Controls the Internet? Beyond the Obstinacy or Obsolescence of the State’, International Studies Review 11 (2009) p. 212.10 Salhi, H. ‘Who Controls the Internet? Beyond the Obstinacy or Obsolescence of the State’, International Studies Review 11 (2009) p. 212.11 Dunn Cavelty, M. ‘Who Controls the Internet? Beyond the Obstinacy or Obsolescence of the State’, International Studies Review 11 (2009) p. 216.

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The shift in inclusivity and exclusivity elements12 through a

securitisation lens provides a map to the change in power

structures aside from the state, creating a cross-sector

responsibility for security in cyberspace. The democratic

state has a vested interest in controlling information flows

for the sake of national security, however one might ask whose

security this applies too; the state as a whole or the

individual.13 The state should have minimal input in internet

governance due to the risk of replicating power structures in

cyberspace and the subsequent ambiguity of acting in national

interest, despite separate agendas such as retention of power.

An assessment of ICANN and its function in internet governance

will be explored as a reasonable, evolutionary alternative to

increased state governance.

ICANN and Legitimacy

The previous section dealt with the issues surrounding a

large amount of state input in internet government, following

on, this section argues that ICANN and market forces are a

wiser alternative to internet governance than the state.

12 Granka, L. ‘The Politics of Search: A Decade Retrospective’, the Information Society 26 (2010), p. 365.13 Dunn Cavelty, M. ‘Who Controls the Internet? Beyond the Obstinacy or Obsolescence of the State’, International Studies Review 11 (2009) p. 218.

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Moreover, this is not a zero-sum enterprise; the state

deserves only minimal influence in internet governance, not

exclusion from it.

ICANN is a more legitimate source of internet governance

than states and approached as a Hobbesian solution to

governance.14 As a non-profit organisation who relies on “voice”

accountability mechanisms and classifies as a “public benefit

corporation,” it’s detachment from state governance is beneficial

for users and other corporations.15 The internet was formed

with liberal intentions, therefore it is appropriate to assign

vital parts of governance to a liberal organisation.

Furthermore ICANN is widely acknowledged as an “experiment”16 and

therefore requires time and scrutiny to improve before

designating it an illegitimate source of governance. Mueller

asserts that

ICANN responds to legitimacy and accountability concerns by creating newopportunities for public comment, public review and public participation.17

14 Mueller, M. ‘World Summit on the Information Society: The State-centric View’, in Networks and States: The Global Politics of Internet Governance, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2010) p. 62.15 Mueller, M. ‘ICANN, Inc.: Accountability and Participation in the Governance of Critical Internet Resources’, Internet Governance Project (2009), p. 2.16 Weinberg, Jonathan, ‘ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy’, Duke Law Journal50 (2000), p. 189.17 Mueller, M. ‘ICANN, Inc.: Accountability and Participation in the Governance of Critical Internet Resources’, Internet Governance Project (2009), p. 2.

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ICANN serves consumers, despite ties to the US government as a

result of their role in the evolution of the internet during

the Clinton administration. The board of committees is made up

of “constituencies” that represent international blocs far more

“responsive than the inter-governmental international institutions.”18 Thus

lending credibility to its status as a “public benefit corporation.”19

The state should have minimal input because ICANN provides a

significant amount of efficient governance with as much

inclusion of public participation as possible through it’s

various mechanisms. John Palfrey acknowledges the ambitious

“experiment”20 of ICANN’s method of legitimacy using openness and

representation, however he is sceptical of the oversight

functions and decision making elements of the organisation.21

ICANN is a by-product of the internets infancy, thus its

functionality requires frequent re-assessment in order to

continue evolving with the internet.

18 Mueller, M. ‘ICANN, Inc.: Accountability and Participation in the Governance of Critical Internet Resources’, Internet Governance Project (2009), p. 18.19 Mueller, M. ‘ICANN, Inc.: Accountability and Participation in the Governance of Critical Internet Resources’, Internet Governance Project (2009), p. 2.20 Weinberg, Jonathan, ‘ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy’, Duke Law Journal50 (2000), p. 189.21 Palfrey, J. ‘The End of the Experiment: How ICANN’S Foray into Global Internet Democracy Failed’, Harvard Journal of Law & Technology 17 (2004), p. 411.

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Regarding the role of the private sector involvement of

governance on the internet, Daniel Drezner argues that market

forces are “stripping governments of their agency” and applies a cyber

realist perspective to argue that states are the primary

actors in the cyber dimension, however this is largely

misguided.22 If one accepts that the basis for the internet is

the freedom of speech, knowledge dissemination and borderless

communication, all of which are liberal ideals, then the

application of realism on cyberspace is counter-productive to

the development of the internet. He also asserts that

increased market expansion online will lead to the

exploitation of consumers, however then suggests that privacy

is the biggest concern of internet users.23 If privacy lies at

the heart of internet users concerns then increased government

expansion is counter-intuitive given the recent Snowden

revelations on US mass surveillance. The state—irrespective of

the regime type—is far more dangerous with increased power

than corporations; the rule of law, public oversight and the

ability to control corporations through utilisation or

22 Drezner, D. ‘The Global Governance of the Internet: Bringing the State Back In’, Political Science Quarterly 119 (2004), p. 480.23 Drezner, D. ‘The Global Governance of the Internet: Bringing the State Back In’, Political Science Quarterly 119 (2004), p. 486.

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abstention of services as a consumer, is a far more bottom-up

approach to oversight than governmental. Despite this, there

are still legitimate reasons as to why the state would wish to

increase their input in internet governance, these will be

explored in the next part of the essay.

The Dangers of Freedom

The previous section promoted ICANN as a model for future

corporations providing services on the internet, and answered

why this model is a more legitimate source of governance than

the state. This part of the text is concerned with the

reasoning states use to increase their role of governance; the

security dilemmas that arise from freedom of speech and the

freedoms of a self-regulatory corporation, both of which are

credible concerns.

The state’s prevailing fear of cyberspace is the freedom

of political expression; home grown terrorism has attracted

media spotlight and facilitated the expansion of the threat

manifold. Complete borderless freedom online is not only

difficult for realism to conceptualise, but also problematic

for legislation construction. The current government solution,

due to the lack of governance online and threat of terrorism

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is surveillance.24 This breaches the right to privacy without

hindering the absolute right to freedom of speech; states wish

to avoid criminalising conversation in cyberspace. It is

therefore within state interest to govern the internet as much

as possible to further their preferences but also to defend

the state from cybercrime, cyber war, radicalisation and

‘hacktivists.’

Rod Bekstrom, the President and Chief Executive Officer

of ICANN, at a UN speech in New York suggests a “New Internet

Nation State” emergence, unequivocally advising that it be built

on “openness, transparency and trust with greater collaboration.”25 This

reflects the approach adopted by ICANN (liberal freedom) and

combines it with the necessity for adaptability throughout

governments in tackling the subsequent threats it will face

through the cyber realm. ICANN has a limited role in internet

governance as it covers the Domain Name System; there are far

more areas of technical infrastructure that are not governed

by an organisation or a state, thus a remaining threat to the

24 Roberts, D. Ackerman, S. ‘US intelligence outlines checks it says validate surveillance’ The Guardian (Online), 16 June 2013. Available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/16/nsa-the-nsa-files (Accessed on2 March 2015).25 Beckstrom, R. ‘A New Internet Nation State’, speech addressed to the United Nations in New York, December 14, 2010.

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http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/16/nsa-the-nsa-files


security of states and the potential for increased state

governance. A discrepancy is still encountered; Bekstrom is

highlighting those areas and calling for increased state

activity, which is counter-intuitive to the self-regulatory

role of ICANN.26

Moreover, corporate oversight is also cited as not strong

enough; there is not enough direct, exit or external

accountability applied to ICANN, therefore they may act

outside of government jurisdiction.27 Palfrey reiterates the

issue with “voice” accountability; ICANN has incorporated

multiple levels of public participation means throughout its

structure (At Large corporations and so forth), however it is

unclear whether or not they actually listened to the public,

or if they acted upon it.28 Jonathan Weinberg highlights the

creation of an Accountability and Transparency Review Team in

2010, as part of the self-regulatory mechanisms in place at

ICANN.29 The review’s main finding was the ambiguity in bylaws

26 Mueller, M. ‘ICANN, Inc.: Accountability and Participation in the Governance of Critical Internet Resources’, Internet Governance Project (2009), p. 2.27 Mueller, M. ‘ICANN, Inc.: Accountability and Participation in the Governance of Critical Internet Resources’, Internet Governance Project (2009), p. 4. 28 Palfrey, J. ‘The End of the Experiment: How ICANN’S Foray into Global Internet Democracy Failed’, Harvard Journal of Law & Technology 17 (2004), p. 413.29 Weinberg, J. ‘Governments, Privatization, and “Privatization”: ICANN andthe GAC’, Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review 18 (2011), p. 207.

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on advising directives30; the absence of a clear and

transparent code of conduct through which states and consumers

can understand, thus remains the threat of ICANN appearing

“incoherent and problematic.”31

There are credible reasons for states to wish to increase

their role in internet governance; the freedom of expression

and the lack of oversight on corporations acting on the

internet are legitimate causes to increase input. However

states fail to acknowledge alternative methods of governance

capable of defending freedoms of expression and market forces,

as well as reducing state inconsistency and the threat to

security. Technical infrastructure and international

organisations can provide oversight to market forces and

legislate with inclusion of the state, and the exclusion of

inconsistent state interests, which will be explored in the

next section.

Technicalities and International Consensus

The final section of the essay explores alternative areas

of governance that seek to resolve the issues states face in

30 Weinberg, J. ‘Governments, Privatization, and “Privatization”: ICANN andthe GAC’, Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review 18 (2011), p. 207.31 Weinberg, J. ‘Governments, Privatization, and “Privatization”: ICANN andthe GAC’, Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review 18 (2011), p. 190.

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trying to reach a consensus. They also provide sound reasoning

as to why the state is insufficient in internet governance

thus they should have minimal input. It will also seek to

address the claims made in the previous section on the dangers

of freedom of expression and freedom of corporations.

Laura DeNardis emphasises “the politics of technical infrastructure”32

in internet governance that include mechanisms such as CIRs

(Critical Internet Resources), IPs (Internet Protocols), ASPs

(Autonomous Systems Numbers) and DNS (Domain Name System).33

Within these encompass the aforementioned “political economy of

telecommunications”34 providing new platforms for the private

sector to capitalise on. The politicisation of the internet is

generated through the machinations of technical infrastructure

wherein protocols provide “sites of mediation over political and economic

values debates.”35 Technical infrastructure is thus imperative to

internet governance, however there are methods of law

enforcement built in that enable oversight and efficient

32 DeNardis, L. ‘Hidden Levers of Internet Control’, Information, Communication & Society 15 (2012), p. 721.33 DeNardis, L. ‘Hidden Levers of Internet Control’, Information, Communication & Society 15 (2012), p. 721.34 Mueller, M. ‘World Summit on the Information Society: The State-centric View’, in Networks and States: The Global Politics of Internet Governance, (Cambridge, The MIT Press, 2010), p. 55.35 DeNardis, L. ‘Hidden Levers of Internet Control’, Information, Communication & Society 15 (2012), p. 723.

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accountability to take place; restriction of internet access

(one of Eriksson and Giacomello’s access points of control36)

and seizing the DNS.37 These powers are largely in the hands of

the Internet Service Providers (ISPs), however they are

subject to fair usage policy outlined by the International

Standardisation Organisation (ISO).38 Furthermore DeNardis

emphasises the abuse of power when the internet is left to the

state; “some governments respond to technological dissent with technological

oppression.”39 Utilising the access points of control is the

danger of state involvement in internet governance, however

coalitions of states through supranational organisations are a

more reliable alternative to governance, as well as technical

infrastructure.

International governance is arguably a pragmatic

alternative; the International Telecommunications Union as an

extension of the UN and the EU provide sound platforms. The

Data Protection Directive of 1995 provides a clear guideline

and enforcement mechanisms for European firms constructed by36 Eriksson, J. et al. ‘Who Controls the Internet? Beyond the Obstinacy or Obsolescence of the State’, International Studies Review 11 (2009), p. 206.37 DeNardis, L. ‘Hidden Levers of Internet Control’, Information, Communication & Society 15 (2012), p. 727.38 Drezner, D. ‘The Global Governance of the Internet: Bringing the State Back In’, Political Science Quarterly 119 (2004), p. 492.39 DeNardis, L. ‘Hidden Levers of Internet Control’, Information, Communication & Society 15 (2012), p. 729

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the EU.40 This guideline was effective enough for US firms to

be persuaded to adhere to the regulations thus providing a

conflict of interest between the US conceptions of self-

regulation against the EUs state directed regulation.41

However, the US promote self-regulation because ICANN is

technically under their jurisdiction, therefore the US has an

interest in seeing the status quo retained. The EU on the

other hand, is not promoting a state directed regulation, as

Drezner suggests, but employs a supranational approach,

amalgamating the preferences of EU states, providing a complex

nexus of interests that is effective in internet governance

without the need for power structures to be replicated in

cyberspace.

Conclusion

Overall, state input into internet governance should be

kept to a minimum, arbitrary power given to the state with

little oversight is a dangerous proposition that already

evidently is abused. Not only are states liable to abuse the

power, but they also cannot agree on the path with which to

40 Drezner, D. ‘The Global Governance of the Internet: Bringing the State Back In’, Political Science Quarterly 119 (2004), p. 487.41 Drezner, D. ‘The Global Governance of the Internet: Bringing the State Back In’, Political Science Quarterly 119 (2004), p. 487.

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take on internet governance across the access points

aforementioned. This creates confused dialogue, diplomatic

issues and disastrously the replication of power structures in

cyberspace. Excessive state involvement will also prevent the

growth of the internet for market forces and the freedom of

information and speech; the basic tenets the internet was

built on. ICANN is a model of governance that raises questions

of legitimacy and oversight on private corporations, however

it is easier for states to agree on how to provide oversight

for market forces online, than it is to legislate on the

internet itself. ICANN provides a conceptually new method of

governance that incorporates the user and the corporation to

provide a successful and efficient governance mechanism. The

youth of the internet lends itself ability to adapt and re-

assess systems of governance, therefore ICANN is an organic

organisation that can change in time through government-led

assessments and directives. Checks and balances are essential

for the governance of the internet. No longer merely a talking

shop for states to express their interests, the EU has

provided legislation that unites state opinions and

effectively checks the power of corporations without impinging

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on the ability for freedom of speech and expression to thrive

online. However, the issue of security, addressed above, is a

sensitive governance issue that states will continue to

disagree on.

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Bibliography

1.Beckstrom, R. ‘A New Internet Nation State’, speechaddressed to the United Nations in New York, December 14,2010.

2.DeNardis, L. ‘Hidden Levers of Internet Control’, Information,Communication & Society 15 (2012) pp. 720-738.

3.Drezner, D. ‘The Global Governance of the Internet: Bringingthe State Back In’, Political Science Quarterly 119 (2004), pp. 477-498.

4.Eriksson, J. et al. ‘Who Controls the Internet? Beyond theObstinacy or Obsolescence of the State’, International StudiesReview 11 (2009) pp. 205-230.

5.Granka, L. ‘The Politics of Search: A Decade Retrospective’,the Information Society 26 (2010), pp. 364-374.

6.Mueller, M. ‘ICANN, Inc.: Accountability and Participationin the Governance of Critical Internet Resources’, InternetGovernance Project (2009), pp. 1-20.

7.Mueller, M. ‘World Summit on the Information Society: TheState-centric View’, in Networks and States: The GlobalPolitics of Internet Governance, (Cambridge, The MIT Press,2010) pp. 55-80.

8.Palfrey, J. ‘The End of the Experiment: How ICANN’S Forayinto Global Internet Democracy Failed’, Harvard Journal of Law &Technology 17 (2004) pp. 410-477.

9.Roberts, D. Ackerman, S. ‘US intelligence outlines checks itsays validate surveillance’ The Guardian (Online), 16 June 2013. Available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/16/nsa-the-nsa-files (Accessed on 2 March 2015).

10. Weinberg, J. ‘Governments, Privatization, and“Privatization”: ICANN and the GAC’, Michigan Telecommunicationsand Technology Law Review 18 (2011), pp. 189-220.

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