Graduation Dissertation Politecnico Di Milano 2 nd School of Engineering Management, Economics and Industrial Engineering Internationalization of Chinese MNEs and Italy Market Analysis: A Case study of Huawei Technologies Corporation’s Internationalization Strategy Author: Wanxing Zhan Student No.: 749656 Supervisor: Professor Lucia Tajoli Master Thesis July 2011
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Graduation Dissertation
Politecnico Di Milano
2nd School of Engineering
Management, Economics and Industrial Engineering
Internationalization of Chinese MNEs and Italy Market Analysis:
A Case study of Huawei Technologies Corporation’s
Internationalization Strategy
Author: Wanxing Zhan
Student No.: 749656
Supervisor: Professor Lucia Tajoli
Master Thesis
July 2011
Politecnico Di Milano
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Acknowledgements
I would like to express my gratitude to all those who gave me the possibility to
complete this thesis.
I am deeply indebted to my supervisor Professor Lucia Tajoli from the Department of
Economics, School of Industry Engineering and Management, Politecnico di Milano,
whose help, stimulating suggestions and continuous encouragement helped me
throughout my graduate career and during completion of this thesis.
My former colleagues from Global Technology Service Department supported me
during my working in Huawei. I want to thank them for all their help, support, interest
and valuable hints. Especially I am obliged to thank Mr. Sun Tao, Project Management
Officer, Network Roll-Out Department of Huawei Technologies Corporation for giving
me permission to commence this thesis in the first instance, to do the necessary
investigating work and to use the official data.
Especially, I would like to give my special thanks to my parents whose patient love
enabled me to complete this work.
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Abstract
In recent years, Chinese Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) have not been paid adequate
attention in terms of internationalization studies even have increasingly been involved
in the internationalization activities. This thesis applied SWOT and PEST analysis
model to analyze the Chinese high-technology MNE and the international market
respectively, and deployed the method of case study to analyze the internationalization
strategy of the Chinese high-technology MNE by studying internationalization process
of Huawei Technology Corporation in Italy market. First the development of Huawei
was introduced to show the key components of Huawei’s internationalization strategy.
Then political, economic, social, and technological analyses of Italian market and
analysis of Italian Telecom Market were conducted to show why Huawei choose this
Italian market for their internationalization. The factors that influence the
internationalization development of Huawei were also studied by the strength, weakness,
opportunity and threat analyses using SWOT model. The case study showed that: 1)
MNEs from developing countries adopt catch-up strategy in their internationalization
process by investing in developed countries and forming alliance or cooperation to
acquires technology and brand resources, and gradually enhance their competition
advantages. 2) Markets in large developed countries are more attractive for MNEs from
developing countries for having leading technologies and top-ranking Research and
Development resources, wide network of infrastructure, friendly business environment
and big market opportunity. 3) During the internalization process, except the advantages
in low cost, differentiation, technology and reputation, the MNEs from developing
countries should also enhance the management system, e.g. enterprise management,
finance management, human resource management, cost control etc.
Keywords: Case study, Chinese MNE, Huawei, Internationalization, Italy.
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Abbreviations
ADSL: Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Loop
ARPU: Average Revenue Per User
ATM: Asynchronous Transfer Mode
B2B: Business to Business
BT: British Telecom
CDB: China Development Bank
CDMA: Code division multiple access
CEO: Chief Executive Officer
CMM: Capability Maturity Model
China Ex-Im Bank: The Export-Import Bank of China
DSL: Digital Subscriber Line
DTT: Digital Terrestrial Television
FDI: Foreign Direct Investment
FT: France Telecom
FTTH: Fiber to the Home
FhG: Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft
GPRS: General Packet Radio Service
GSM: Global System for Mobile Communications
H3C: Huawei-3COM
H3G: Hutchison Whampoa
HRM: Human Resource Management
IAS: International Accounting Standards
ICT: Information Communication Technology
IDC: International Data Corporation
IFS: Integrate Finance System
IPD: Integrated Product Development
ISC: Integrated Supply Chain
ISDN: Integrated Services Digital Network
ISP: Internet service provider
LAN: Local area network
LLU: Local-loop unbundling
LTE: Long Term Evolution
M&A: Mergers and Acquisitions
MDA: Mutual Distribution Agreement
MNE: Multinational Enterprise
MOFCOM: Ministry of Commerce
MPLS: Multi-Protocol Label Switching
NGN: Next Generation Network
OECD: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OEM: Original Equipment Manufacturer
OLI: Ownership, Location and Internalization
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PCT: Patent Cooperation Treaty
PSTN: Public switched telephone network
PwC: PricewaterhouseCoopers
PVR: Personal Video Recorder
R&D: Research and Development
SDH: Synchronous Digital Hierarchy
SME: Small and Medium Enterprises
TAC: Technical Assistance Centre
TD-SCDMA: Time Division-Synchronous Code Division Multiple Access
TI: Telecom Italia
UNCTAD: United Nation Conference on Trade and Development
UMTS: Universal Mobile Telecommunications System
VAT: Value Added Tax
VPN: Virtual Private Network
WiMax: Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access
WCDMA: Wideband Code Division Multiple Access
WIPO: World Intellectual Property Organization
3G: The 3rd Generation
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Index Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................ I
Abstract ......................................................................................................................................... II
Abbreviations ............................................................................................................................... III
Index .................................................................................................................................................... V
1 Introduction of the Internationalization Road of Chinese Company ............................................ - 1 -
1.1 An Internationalization Course of Chinese Enterprises ..................................................... - 1 -
1.1.1 Market Seeking - Opening International Market for Meeting Demand .................. - 2 -
With years’ extensive growth of Chinese economy, energy companies are often difficult to
meet for the resources required through trade. Then, they only have to get resources
through international M&A. Sinopec, CNPC, CNOOC and so on, every year, there are
some overseas acquisitions occurred in the oil and gas assets. In recent years, the big three
iron ore resources, which control nearly 80% resource all around the world, through
Price-Fixing Cartel wild speculations for iron ore, this triggered iron and steel enterprises
in China to international merger for controlling the upstream industry.
Capital is also a resource. To seek funding at the international level is a broader
international pattern. In 90s of last century, a group of state-owned enterprises issued H
shares in Hong Kong Exchange for international capital. Today, including the four large
state-owned commercial banks, as well as Sina, Baidu and other emerging industries, they
accessed resources to list overseas through the global configuration, from the initial listing
locations in New York Stock Exchange and Hong Kong Stock Exchange, extending to the
Hong Kong GEM, NASDAQ, and Singapore Exchange, and so on. The significance of
enterprises listed overseas is far beyond international capital, but also management and
cultural integration. Chinese companies listed overseas have to meet local demand for
corporate governance and securities regulatory requirements, which is turned into
preparing for the international business. However, the cost of this process is often very
large. It is estimated that the cost of direct inputs reach to 10 billion Yuan for Chinese 46
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companies which listed on the U.S. Exchange against to the implementation of new SEC
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. These costs have to be considering before deciding the
internationalization of capital.
In overall, we still have low degree of internationalization. Currently, there are only about
6,000 enterprises in China having business in oversea market, only accounting for 0.4% of
the total global multinational corporations, investment only accounted for 0.55% of the
world. Oversea FDI is still focusing on small and medium enterprises projects and the
average investment about 100 million U.S. dollars, much lower than developed countries
which average are about 600 million U.S. dollars. Regional distribution is not balanced,
Hong Kong and Macao is still a major international process for mainland enterprises. In
addition, the overall performance for the international is not ideal, only 55% of them can
be profitable.
1.2 Four New Trends
Based on past average annual growth rate around 25% for predicting, in the next five years,
China's oversea foreign investment will reach 60 billion U.S. dollars, the rate of foreign
investment accounted will continue to increase in private enterprises. In this period, the
internationalization of Chinese enterprises faces more complex background, and show a lot
of new trends.
1.2.1 Government Deregulation
Chinese enterprises internationalization, the main obstacles come from the policy,
especially foreign exchange controls and investment license, which is more complicated
and time-consuming. In 2000, the central government has promoted internationalization to
national strategic level. Since then, the policy gradually becomes loose. In October 2002,
foreign exchange started management reform; to the end of 2004, policies had been
introduced which provided credit support to key projects for oversea investment. In July of
same year, purchase quota restrictions have been removed for overseas investment foreign
exchange. With deregulation and policy support, the pace of internationalization of
Chinese enterprises will be presented to the trend of accelerating.
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1.2.2 Invisible Barriers
Over the years, the anti-dumping from overseas markets, the high technical standards and
health standards, as well as intellectual property litigation, and so on, the obstruction which
increases the process of Chinese enterprises internationalization has become unavoidable
barriers. McKinsey's data shows that 67% of China's overseas acquisitions are
unsuccessful. Almost every Chinese enterprise overseas M&A will be encountered
political censure in the host country.
International means that the interests’ conflict, with the face of barriers, Chinese
enterprises should learn to fight in the international business because complaining are
unhelpful. To face increasingly severe international trade patterns, domestic enterprises
gradually shift from passive bearing to actively respond. Facing obstacles in the path of
internationalization, Chinese companies are gradually formed a team to fight more than
cope alone.
1.2.3 Background of RMB Appreciation
Although the Government's remarks has always been cautious on RMB appreciation,
during the past year, the rate of RMB against the dollar has continuously rising which
become an indisputable fact. RMB appreciation will have a negative impact on exporters,
but there is another round of significance for Chinese Overseas M&A. Taking Japan as an
example, their companies had set off a wave of overseas M&A after the currency
appreciation. In 1985, Japan signed the Plaza Agreement3, then Yen began to appreciate,
which induce to buy foreign assets become much cheaper with Yen. From 1985 to 1990,
there are more than 21 overseas acquisitions which total amount are over 50 billion Yen.
The peak appeared in 1990, there are 45 international mergers and acquisitions during that
year.
Currently, RMB appreciation is still very small and not sufficient to form a direct drive for
cross-border mergers and acquisitions of Chinese enterprises. In the long run, the trend of
3 Plaza Agreement was an agreement between the governments of France, West Germany, Japan, the United States, and
the United Kingdom, to depreciate the U.S. dollar in relation to the Japanese yen and German Deutsche Mark by
intervening in currency markets.
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continues appreciation of RMB will be difficult to change, which predicted that overseas
investment of Chinese companies and M&A would be activity ascendant.
1.2.4 Firstly, Bringing In, and then, Going Out
More and more overseas capitals enter into China, hunting Chinese enterprises as
acquisition targets. This seemingly reversed the process of internationalization; in another
aspect, this provides a new path of internationalization for Chinese enterprises.
Chinese enterprises want to succeed in the world, not only need to consider these factors,
but also enhance the ability level of management, as well as win the respect of the host
country. Just only like this, the road to internationalization will appear a prosperous future.
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2 Economic History of People’s Republic of China
2.1 1949-1978 Prior to Reforming and Opening up
When P.R. China was found in 1949, the fundamental long-term goal of leaders was
transforming China into a modern, powerful, socialist country4. In the economic terms,
these objectives meant industrialization, improvement of living standards, narrowing of
income differences, and production of modern military equipment. As the years passed, the
leaders continued to subscribe to these goals. But the economic policies formulated to
achieve them were dramatically altered on several occasions in response to major changes
in the economy, internal politics, and international political and economic developments.
Prior to 1979, China maintained a command economy. A large share of the country’s
economic output was directly controlled by the state, which set production goals,
controlled prices, and allocated resources throughout most of the economy. During the
1950s, all of China’s individual household farms were collectivized into large communes.
To support rapid industrialization, the central government undertook large-scale
investments in physical and human capital during the 1960s and 1970s. As a result, by
1978, nearly three fourths of industrial production was produced by state owned
enterprises according to centrally planned output targets. Private enterprises and foreign
invested firms were nearly non-existent. A central goal of the Chinese government was to
make Chinese economy relatively self-sufficient. Foreign trade was generally limited to
obtaining only those goods that could not be made or obtained in China.
Government policies kept the Chinese economy relatively stagnant and inefficient, mainly
because there were few profit incentives for firms and farmers; competition was virtually
nonexistent, and price and production controls caused widespread distortions in the
economy. Chinese living standards were substantially lower than those of many other
developing countries. The Chinese government hoped that gradual reform would
significantly increase economic growth and raise living standards.
4 Economic history of modern China: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_history_of_Modern_China
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2.2 1978 - 2005 Post Reforming and Opening up
Economic reforms began after Deng Xiaoping and his reformist allies ousted the Gang of
Four Maoist faction. By the time, Deng took power; there was widespread support among
the elite for economic reforms5. As a leader, Deng's policies faced opposition from party
conservatives but were extremely successful in increasing the country's wealth.
Beginning in 1979, China launched several economic reforms. The central government
initiated price and ownership incentives for farmers, which enabled them to sell a portion
of their crops on the free market. In addition, the government established four special
economic zones along the coast for the purpose of attracting foreign investment, boosting
exports, and importing high technology products into China. Additional reforms, which
followed in stages, sought to decentralize economic policy making in several sectors,
especially in trade. Economic control of various enterprises was given to provincial and
local governments, which were generally allowed to operate and compete on free market
principles, rather than under the direction and guidance of state planning. Additional,
coastal regions and cities were designated as open cities and development zones, which
allowed them to experiment with free market reforms and to offer tax and trade incentives
to attract foreign investment. In addition, state price controls on a wide range of products
were gradually eliminated.
Since the introduction of economic reforms, Chinese economy has grown substantially
faster than during the pre-reform period (see Table 2.1)6. In January 2006, China made
major revisions to its GDP data for 1993-2004. The revisions indicated that, based on new
estimates of growth in the service sector, the size of China’s economy and its GDP growth
were significantly higher than previously estimated. For example, real GDP growth in
2004 had been originally measured at 9.5%, but the revised figure puts this rate at 10.1%.
Overall, the size of the economy in 2004 was estimated to be nearly 17% higher than
previously thought. Based on these revisions, Chinese average annual real GDP is
estimated to have grown by 9.6% between 1979 and 2005; it grew at 9.8% in 2005.
5 China's Great Transformation 6 Source: Official Chinese government data.
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Table 2.1 Average Annual Real GDP Growth Rate
China’s Average Annual Real GDP Growth Rates, 1949-2005
Time Period Average Annual Growth (%)
1949-1978 (Pre-reform) 5.3
1979-2005 (Post-reform) 9.6
1990 3.8
1991 9.3
1992 14.2
1993 14.0
1994 13.1
1995 10.9
1996 10.0
1997 9.3
1998 7.8
1999 7.6
2000 8.4
2001 8.3
2002 9.1
2003 10.0
2004 10.1
2005 9.8
Source: Development Research of State Council, PRC 2006-12-16
2.3 2005 – Present New Economy Police
The conservative administration began to reverse many of Deng Xiaoping's reforms in
2005. Observers note that the government adopted more egalitarian and populist policies. It
increased subsidies and control over the health care sector, halted privatization, and
adopted a loose monetary policy, which lead to the formation of a U.S. style property
bubble in which property prices tripled. The privileged state sector was the primary
recipient of government investment, which under the new administration, promoted the
rise of large "national champions" which could compete with large foreign corporations.
2.4 Economic Performance since Reform
Chinese economic growth since the reform has exceeded the East Asian Tigers.
Economists estimate China's GDP growth from 1979 to 2005 at 9.6% a year which has
risen ten-fold comparing the period before reforms For the period 1978-2005, Chinese
GDP per capital increased from 2.7% to 15.7% of US GDP per capital, and from 53.7% to
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188.5% of Indian GDP per capital. Per-capital incomes grew at 6.6% a year. Some scholars
believed that Chinese economic growth has been understated, due to large sectors of the
economy not being counted7.
Figure 2.1 People's Republic of China's GDP between Years 1952 to 20058
Source: Official Chinese Government Data.
2.4.1 Impact on World Growth
Twenty-five years of reform have transformed China from a centrally planned and closed
system to a predominantly market-driven and open economy. As a consequence, China is
widely seen as an engine of world and regional growth. Surges in Chinese demand account
for 50%, 44% and 66% of export growth of Hong Kong, Japan and Taiwan respectively,
and Chinese trade deficit with the rest of East Asia helped to revive the economies of Japan
and Southeast Asia. Asian leaders view China's economic growth as an engine of growth
for all Asia.
2.4.2 Reforms in Specific Sectors
1) Agriculture
Chinese agricultural performance was extremely poor and food shortages were common
during the pre-reform period,. After Deng Xiaoping implemented the household
responsibility system, agricultural output increased by 8.2% a year, compared with 2.7% in
7 China has socialist market economy in place (People's Daily Online, 2005) 8 Source: Official Chinese government data.
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the pre-reform period. Food prices fell nearly 50%, while agricultural incomes rose9.
2) Industry
Industry was largely stagnant and the socialist system presented few incentives for
improvements in quality and productivity in the pre-reform period. In the early 1980s,
productivity increased greatly with the introduction of the dual price system and greater
autonomy for enterprise managers. By the 1990s, large-scale privatizations reduced the
market share of both the Township and Village Enterprises and state-owned enterprises
and increased the private sector's market share. The state sector's share of industrial output
dropped from 81% in 1980 to 15% in 2005. Foreign capital controls much of Chinese
industry and plays an important role.
China is now the world's biggest producer of concrete, steel, ships and textiles, and has the
world's largest automobile market. The increase in production is largely the result of the
removal of barriers to entry and increased competition; the number of industrial firms rose
from 377,300 in 1980 to nearly 8 million in 1990 and 1996; there are almost 1.33 million
manufacturing firms with annual sales above RMB 5 million in 2004. Compared to other
East Asian industrial growth spurts, China's industrial performance exceeded Japan's but
remained behind South Korea and Taiwan's economies.
3) Trading and Foreign Investment
Throughout the reform period, the government reduced tariffs and other trade barriers, with
the overall tariff rate falling from 56% to 15%. By 2001, less than 40% of imports were
subject to tariffs and only 9% of import was subject to licensing and import quotas. When
China joined the WTO, it agreed to considerably harsher conditions than other developing
countries. Trade has increased from under 10% of GDP to 64% of GDP over the same
period. China is considered the most open large country; by 2005, China’s average
statutory tariff on industrial products was 8.9%. For Argentina, Brazil, India, and Indonesia,
the respective percentage figures are 30.9%, 27.0%, 32.4%, and 36.9%10
.
Foreign investment was also liberalized upon Deng's ascension. In the early 1980s, China
9 http://faostat.fao.org/faostat/help-copyright/copyright-e.htm (last updated 4th April 2005) 10 30th September 2007 from http://www.imfstatistics.org/DOT
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created Special Economic Zones (SEZs) to attract foreign capital by exempting them from
taxes and regulations. This experiment was successful and SEZs were expanded to cover
the whole Chinese coast.
4) Services
After China joined WTO, the service sector was considerably liberalized and foreign
investment was allowed. Restrictions on retail, whole sale and distribution were ended.
Banking, financial services, insurance and telecommunications were also opened up to
foreign investment.
5) Government Finances
Government was funded by profits from state-owned enterprises in the pre-reform era. As
the state sector fell in importance and profitability, the government relied on a confused
system of inventory taxes. The tax system was reformed in 1994 with the Value Added
Tax (VAT) becoming the main income source, accounting for half of government revenue.
The 1994 reform also increased the central government's share of revenues, increasing it to
9% of GDP11
.
Figure 2.2 Country Foreign Exchange Reserves minus External
Source: 2010 data, CIA Fact book
2.5 Reasons for Success
Scholars have proposed a number of theories to explain the success of China's economic
11 Data from CIA Fact book
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reforms in the transition from a planned economy to a socialist market economy12
. One
notable theory is that decentralization of state authority allowed local leaders to experiment
with various ways to privatize the state sector and energize the economy. Another theory is
that officials presiding over areas of high economic growth were more likely to be
promoted for local and provincial governments in China were hungry for investment and
competed to reduce regulations and barriers to investment to boost economic growth. A
third explanation believes that the successes of the reformists are attributable to Deng's
cultivation of his own followers in the government. Successfully used export-led growth
strategy was another reason for China’s success13
. China also learned to avoid the planned
economic fate in Russia which resulted in the rise of powerful oligarchs, corruption and
loss of state revenue which exacerbated economic disparity 14
.
With China’s rapid development, many Chinese firms have already been the leading
players in the international market. Chinese multinationals could no longer be regarded as
apprentices on the international stage; they have already been investing in the developed
countries to obtain intellectual property and to learn from joint venture partners.
Therefore in this thesis, we seek to identify analyze how Chinese firms go to global. By
taking Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd as a case study, we try to find out the strategies that
Chinese firms used for internationalization.
12 Calhoun, Craig: Wasserstrom, Jeffrey N. (2003). "The Cultural Revolution and the Democracy Movement of 1989:
Complexity in Historical Connections". In Law. Kam-yee. The Chinese cultural revolution reconsidered: beyond purge
and holocaust. Palgrave Macmillan. P.247 ISBN 9780333738351 13 Sharma China's Economic Transformation, Global Dialogue 2007 Jan 1:9(1/2): 29-38. In: ABI/INFORM Global.
http://www.proquest.com/; Document ID: 1929024531 14 Remnick, David. 1997. Can Russia change? Foreign Affairs 76, no. 1, (January 1): 35-49. http://www.proquest.com/
(accessed October 28, 2010).
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3 The Development of Huawei
3.1 The Global Telecom Equipment Industry
The global telecom equipment industry had gone through a series changes in the past few
decades. In the 1960s and 1970s, network equipment suppliers were few and were
categorized by the types of products, primarily through in-house development.
Manufacturing was largely decentralized as suppliers operated independent subsidiaries to
serve different countries and regional markets around the world. With the introduction of
digital technology in the 1980s, product lines proliferated and country-specific operations
were integrated into single, global organizations. Manufacturing tended to become more
centralized to increase production volumes and decrease unit costs. By the 1990s, the pace
of technological advances, commercialization of the internet, and privatization of telecom
services providers worldwide had created an unprecedented level of competition in the
industry. Telecom equipment suppliers took on the role of broad-based system integrators,
building extensive product lines through third-party contracts, OEM and other partnership
arrangements15
. Service providers used acquisition-based strategies to keep pace with
consumer demand and drove the market for global networking products to US$50 billion
by the end of 2000, up from US$15 billion in 199516
.
Telecommunications Industry underwent a down turn from 2001 and has lasted for almost
3 to 4 continuous years. Most Technologies have high sunk costs. The result of the downturn
was mega-mergers in Telcos, and they dramatically changed the telecom industry landscape.
The ripple effects were passed on to Telecom Equipment Providers. However, technological
advances in the internet boom had persisted up to 2006, and the technology choices and
service requirements of service providers such as AT&T, AOL and PCCW were more
diverse than ever.
15 Nissen, K. (2005) “New World Telecom: A Survival Guide for Global Equipment Suppliers”, Business
Communications Review, September. 16 McFarlan, F.W., Chen, G. and Kiron, D. (2001) “Cisco China”. Harvard Business School Case, Harvard Business
School
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Figure 3.1 Total Revenue of Huawei in 2009
Source: Huawei Revenue Report of 2009
Telecom equipment suppliers could be broadly divided into five sub-sectors and global
players tended to align themselves with two or more of these sub-sectors: optical
transmission systems, switch systems, access systems, data communications and mobile
communications.
Table 3.1 Leading Firms in the Global Telecom Equipment Industry, 2009
Sub-Sectors Leading Firms
Optical Transmission Systems Alcatel-Lucent
Switch Systems Huawei-3Com, Cisco
Access Systems DSL: Alcatel-Lucent, Nokia-Siemens
Cable Modem: Motorola
Data Communications Routers: Cisco, Huawei
Ethernet Switches: Cisco, Ericsson
Mobile Communications Ericsson, Motorola, Nokia-Siemens
Source: Department of Urban Studies and Planning, MIT, November 11th 2009.
3.1.1 China’s Telecom Equipment Industry
In the 1980s, China’s telecom industry achieved substantial double-digit growth, and by
the end of 2002, China surpassed the US to become the largest telecom market in the world.
Overall, China’s telecom industry recorded US$112 billion in business transactions in
2004, with an annual growth rate of 34.9%, 3.7 times China’s GDP growth rate of 9.5%17
.
Phone subscriptions had increased to 390 million mobile phone users and 348 million
17 “Annual Report, China’s Post and Telecommunications Industry 2005”, Ministry of Information Industry, China
Internet Access
Temination
3% Voice Circuit
Switches
5%
Teledatacom
Servers
6%
Data Switches &
outers
7%Transport
Equipment
8%
Wireless
Infrastructure
29%
Others
42%
Total Revenue 2009 = US$ 18.1 Billion
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fixed-line users by October 200518
. As of June 2010, there were a total of 1.1 billion
phone users in China, of which 306 million were fixed-line telephone users, and 796
million were mobile phone users.
Prior to its World Trade Organization (WTO) accession, China’s policy protected the
national emerging telecom industry and only foreign equipment vendors were allowed to
invest in China. At that time, most foreign firms entered the market by setting up joint
ventures with local Chinese companies, usually involving equity investments. The
leveraged their Chinese partners’ local market knowledge and distribution networks in
order to reduce investment risk19
. American companies accounted for 75% of the telecom
equipment market in China in 2001, within which Cisco accounted for 62% and 26% of the
routers and switching markets respectively20
. As a result of China’s entry to the WTO in
2001, a new regulatory regime is now being established and foreign operators are gradually
being allowed to access the market.
While the entry of these multinational telecom enterprises had facilitated the building of
China’s telecom infrastructure, they had also contributed to the growth of domestic
manufacturers in China. Domestic Chinese vendors started to emerge, most notably the
four companies, Huawei, ZTE, Digital Terrestrial Television (DTT) and Great Dragon
Telecommunication (GDT), collectively known as “Great China”21
. According to the
CRC-Pinnacle market research firm, domestic Chinese equipment manufactures occupied a
combined 32% of the Chinese market by 2005, of which Huawei Technologies became the
market leader with 13.5% market share.
3.2 Overview of Huawei
Huawei Technologies Corporation (Huawei) was established by Ren zhenfei in 1988 in
Shenzhen. It is a private enterprise which specializes in research and development (R&D),
production and marketing of communications equipment, and providing customized
18 China Today (2005) “China to Have over 440 Million Mobile Phone Users by End of Next Year”
http://www.chinatoday.com/ 19 “China’s Telecommunications Industry in 2004”, Asia Case Research Center Case, University of Hong Kong 20 Ibid. 21 When the first characters of the four companies were arranged in reverse order, the phrase “Great China” was created.
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network services for telecom carrier. Today, Huawei is the largest networking and
telecommunications equipment supplier in China and developed into a high-tech
Multinational Enterprise (MNE) which provides telecommunications networks products,
services and solutions for 45 of the world’s top 50 operators.22
By the end of 2007, Huawei has set up 8 regional headquarters worldwide, including Asia
Pacific Headquarters in Malaysia, East Pacific Headquarters in China, Commonwealth of
Independent States Headquarters in Russia, Latin America Headquarters in Brazil, Middle
East & North Africa Headquarters in Egypt, South Africa Headquarters in South Africa,
Europe Headquarters in United Kingdom, and North America Headquarters in the U.S.
There are more than 100 branch offices, 12 R&D centers and 28 training centers23
around
the world (as shown in Figure 3.2).
Figure 3.2 Training Centers around the World
Source: http://www.huawei.com/trainingcenter
According to Huawei 2007 official released report, Huawei achieved US$12.6 billion
revenue, and US$16 billion as total contract sales, respectively increasing by 47.7% and
45.5% over 2006. The overseas contract sales increased significantly by 60.4% in 2007
compare to 2006. It reached US$11.5 billion, accounting for 72% of the total contract
sales.24
22 Source: Huawei Win-Win Interview (2009-08-28) and www.huawei.com 23 Ibid 24 Gan, Ross (April, 2008):”2008 Corporate Update”, Huawei Global Industry Analyst Summit, Huawei Technologies.
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Figure 3.3: Total Contract Sales and Overseas Contract Sales25
Source: Huawei Annual Report 2004 and 2008 Corporate Update, Huawei Global Industry Analyst Submit.
3.3 Internationalization of Huawei
Huawei began to consider international expansion in 1996 in developing countries like
Russia and Africa, and it further entered European, America and Asian Pacific market after
2000. The internationalization strategy applied is to orient to technology R&D and to
compete internationally with price competitiveness and technologically value-added
products.
The internationalization process of Huawei can be divided into four stages:
Stage 1 (1996-1999) – Tentative Stage;
Stage 2 (1999-2001) – Take off Stage;
Stage 3 (2001-2008) – Mature Stage;
Stage 4 (2008 till now) – Future development.
3.3.1 1996-1999 Tentative Stage
At the initial stage of internationalization, Huawei’s market selection strategy is targeting
the markets that have weak telecommunication infrastructure but have great developing
25 Source: Huawei Annual Report 2004 and “2008 Corporate Update”, Huawei Global Industry Analyst Summit,
Huawei Technologies.
26703830
55828200
11000
16000
600 1100 23004800
7200
1150022.5%
28.7%
41.2%
58.5%
65.5%71.9%
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
70.0%
80.0%
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
18000
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total Contract Sales Overseas Contract Sales
Total Contract Sales and Overseas Contract Sales (US$ in Million)
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potentiality26
. Compared with developed countries, the developing countries have
relatively backward telecom technologies. Huawei is capable of adapting to the
development of the telecom industries in these countries and it can rely on low-cost
advantage to compete with its competitors in these markets. This is the reason why MNEs
from developing countries usually choose another developing country as their investment
host countries27
.
As a breakthrough, Huawei began its international business at Russia in 1996. In 1997,
Huawei formed joint venture (Beto-Huawei) with Umberto Konzern Russia, which is a
Russian telecommunications company. As a new player in international market, the
development of Huawei in Russian market is very hard at the first stage. After spending
four years on waiting and studying, in 2000, when Russian economy recovered, the sales in
Russian market became one of the main sources for Huawei’s overseas sales.
Furthermore, in 1998, Huawei went into Asian market for the first time through
international bidding. At the beginning, the overseas potential customers did not know
much about China telecom industry, thus, they had no confidence in Chinese high
technology products. Recognizing that company reputation is as important as technology,
Huawei started to focus on brand building in international marketing. On the other hand,
Huawei increased R&D investment on new technologies and improved R&D cooperation
with world top telecom enterprises.28
3.3.2 1999-2001 Taking-off Stage
Taking-off Stage was the fastest international expansion period for Huawei. In the late of
90’s, most oversea customer kept the impression that products made in China are low cost
and low quality. In order to change people’s attitude, Huawei launched a marketing
initiative called “New Silk Road” and participate in all kinds of international expositions.
Meanwhile, Huawei also invited overseas customers to its campus in Shenzhen. By doing
26 Wu D. and Zhao F. (2007): “Entry Modes For International Markets: Case Study Of Huawei, A Chinese Technology
Enterprise”, International Review of Business Research Papers, Vol.3 No.1.183 – 196 pp. 27 Wells, Louis T. (1983): “Third World Multinationals: The Rise of Foreign Investment from Developing Countries”,
Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 206 pp. 28 Source: Huawei Interview (2008-04-16) and “Milestones of Huawei”,
for Huawei to capture. In order to enter North America market, Huawei took the advantage
of R&D ability and the 3COM’s international market resource to set up joint venture:
Huawei-3COM with 3COM (U.S.), the main player in data communication market. In
2006, Huawei transferred total share of Huawei-3COM (H3C) to 3COM, so that H3C
became 3COM’s wholly-owned enterprises33
. At the end of 2007, Huawei jointly with
Bain Capital (U.S.) put forward acquisition proposal of 3COM (U.S.). However, the
proposal was rejected due to national security concerns34
.
In this stage, Huawei has successfully shifted international market target from developing
countries to developed countries. China-based cost-effective R&D is one of Huawei’s
competitive advantages of expanding abroad. Up to June 2005, Huawei Technologies has
established a total of 10 joint R&D labs with Texas Instruments, Motorola, IBM, Intel,
Agere Systems, Sun Microsystems, Altera, Qualcomm, Infineon and Microsoft.35
3.3.4 2008-Now Future development
After 20 years of growth, Huawei has grown into a leader in the telecommunications
industry. In May 2008, Huawei joined Optus to develop a mobile innovation center in
Sydney of Australia. The objective is to accelerate the adoption of high-speed mobile and
wireless broadband. The year after, Thomas Lee, the Vice Director of the Industry
Standards Department of Huawei, became one of the new members in the Worldwide
Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMax) Forum. At the same year, Huawei won
the Green Mobile Award at the GSMA Mobile Awards. On July 9, 2010, according to U.S.
magazine Global Fortune 500, Huawei was present for the first time with the annual sales
of 21.8 billion U.S. dollars and net profit of 2.67 billion U.S. dollars.
How to maintain and continue developing becomes a new challenge for Huawei?
Continuous innovation based on customer demand
R&D Resources and Bold Investment
33 Source: “Milestones of Huawei”, http://www.huawei.com/corporate_information/milestones.do. 34 Weisman, Steven R. (2008-2-28): “U.S. Security Concerns Block China’s 3Com Deal”, New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/21/business/worldbusiness/21invest.html?pagewanted=print. 35 Source: Huawei Interview (2008-04-16) and “Milestones of Huawei”,
Source: Italy Telecommunication and Information Cooperation Federcomin
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7 SWOT Analyses for Huawei
Huawei did not succeed, but in the growth.
Figure 7.1 Factors in SWOT Analysis
Since it’s found, Huawei started the company from agent communications switch products
in Hong Kong. After twenty years of development to overcome the various difficulties,
from the cracks to survive, relying on a strong marketing behavior and endless stream of
technological progress, it defeated many powerful opponents, and step into the world's
leading telecommunications solutions provider, become a national brand which was proud.
At the same time, it became a benchmark in the same industry and even many Chinese
companies to learn. SWOT Analysis of Huawei as follows:
7.1 Strength analysis
Core competitive ability is a key factor to sustainable development. Huawei, which takes
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strong campaign for many years in the multitude telecommunications industry, has a
profound understanding of this. So, from the beginning, Huawei is setting up their own
advantage of brand from many areas, such as R&D, channel, service, and so on. Huawei is
a distinctive company, through years’ accumulation, many advantages and benefits have
become dominant in the industry.
7.1.1 Business Ranking
January 27, 2009, WIPO announced the quantity of Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT)
applications on its website in 2008 global. Data show that, in 2008, Huawei Technologies
Co., Ltd ranks top of PCT applications which takes 1,737 pieces of PCT applications from
last year's No.4 (1,365 cases)46
straight stepping to No.1 for the first time.
7.1.2 Strong Marketing Capability
Huawei was said the wolves fighting strategy in the industry. Huawei people, especially
president Ren Zhengfei, have advocated this in the marketing: unity, fierce, fast and
efficient to win the trust of customers, grabs a large number of orders, even at high cost
and high pay. Such tactics gathered strong momentum, input and output were huge, so as
to convince customers, but also give a great deterrent to the opponent. These have become
a famous label and greatly enhance the brand and influence of Huawei.
For personal qualities of marketing, Huawei will also take the time and cost for strict
training, at the same time, provide a powerful impetus and protection in the remuneration.
In the strategy of Marketing, Huawei has right direction and specific goal for development.
At the beginning of the Enterprises established, it is difficult to compete with large
communication equipment manufacturers as the limited strength. So company starting
from the rural areas and the low end, gradually nibbles market share of large
telecommunications equipment suppliers, and develops skills with the wolf pack tactics,
finally, beat the competitor to win the major market share.
46 Huawei Win-Win 2009-02-05
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7.1.3 Products and Technologies
The most proud for Huawei people is the competitiveness which comes from strong R&D
and technological innovation. In similar companies in China, Huawei's strength in this area
is recognized as first position. Since the company just enters the stage of profitability, in
the absence of uncertain future, Huawei dare to put a large proportion of the capital, began
to focus on developing its own high-end communications equipment. Huawei can compete
in the high-end market depending on its independently developed the world's leading-edge
core technology.
In the initial accumulation of technology, it has formed tradition of high R&D investment
and innovation. In the high-end technology, from scratch, from weak to strong and to lead
the industry, it has formed a virtuous cycle, became a world-class technology innovative
company and the industry leaders. It is one of a few companies which have ability to
provide next-generation switching systems manufacturers all around the world. The
quantity of patent application ranks the first position in China, and it possesses of a number
of 3G innovation in industry. Most of its communications products based on their
independent developed property rights products, which fully respond to customer needs.
Huawei takes advantage of their own in the management of IPD, Capability Maturity
Model (CMM) and in product of development, to meet the broadband metropolitan area
network and enterprise network requirements through the product design and scalability, as
well as operational characteristics, in order to provide solution to customers with more
efficient, safe, easily expandable. Taken the method based on shared devices & software
system development and design, all data communications products choose VRP unified
common operating platform and iManager N2000/Quidview network management systems
to maintain continuous investment in the development of ASIC chips, at the same time,
introduce a cost-effective solution and products.
7.1.4 Sensible Decisions
The company was established in the telecommunications market penetration, Present Ren,
in the leader's leadership, courage to invest for marketing operations, and occupy high
ground for technology R&D of the industry. To get in return capital through selling
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business prior the industry winter, and then, go abroad for an overseas distribution at
appropriate time, every step of the walk is very wise.
Also some errors in the development of decision-making, but this did not threaten the
company's fundamental, and influence the company forward. Most of the time, Huawei
walked in front of trends and time, enabling the company to seize the opportunity to
rapidly grow and develop.
7.1.5 Localization
Based on the Chinese user and localization services, nowadays, China is not only the
world's most rapidly growing demand for network equipment, but also become network
equipment supply base only after North America in the world. Obviously, Huawei have a
clear understanding to this point: if domestic manufacturers want to surpass the
competition of foreign companies, it has to take more efforts on localization. However, this
difference must establish on the major technical standards. Take product as an example,
firstly, it has to ensure equipment performance and stability, and on this basis, focus on the
domestic user specific business needs for development, only this to reflect the
competitiveness of localization. In this respect, Huawei has achieved very good results.
7.1.6 Cultivate Culture and Standardization
• Attention to staff training. Do not pay attention to the surface of the diploma; all
employees must start from the grass roots. Huawei University was established and convey
not only in job skills training, technology, but also for cultural transmission, so as to
increase the sense of identity and belonging Sense. Senior managers are growing up step
by step.
• Cultivate a good corporate culture. Company attaches importance to training of
ideological and cultural, usually organizes staff learning; the company's leaders are good at
boot, and gradually formed a wolf culture: active, united, focused, ferocious has become a
common label in the industry.
• Standardization. Formulated Basic Law of Huawei, Huawei will be written down in
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the form of regulation during their development in marketing, development and
management, human resources, culture and tradition accumulation. The company's location
and type, and direction of development identified, is long-term development for the
company under the foundation.
7.2 Weakness Analysis
7.2.1 The Individual’s Leadership Affected is Serious
As a private enterprise, all private enterprises will inevitably exist a common problem in
general, the leader's personality. President Ren, the company's top leaders, has ingenious,
as the company forward step by step, but the company’s operation are more controlled by
the president. The risk largely depends on president’s action, so that is not conducive to the
sustainable development for the company. Under the dominant power, mistake decision
will appear easy. At the same time, it takes less attention to public opinion and does its
own way, so this usually induce instability; Huawei respected wolf and stiff competition,
most people, especially for young graduate, could not bear this pressure, this is one of the
reasons for employees jump and sudden death.
7.2.2 Capital Equity Issues are Complex
Company invests in human wave tactics to sell out for public relations in the long-term,
with substantial funds for research and development. The effect is significant, but this
make the company's financial struggled when resurgence. - the company is facing the risk
of cash flow fracture many times, and have no choice to encourage staff investment
holding to ease the financial pressure. As the company's development and growth, funding
issues have been eased, but the equity problem has become complicated. Complex of the
shares influence the company's profit distribution and decision-making, even the company
missed the opportunities to list. As Huawei is not listed company, and its financial are
much weaker comparing with Alcatel and Cisco. To some extent, this will hinder the
process of internationalization, but also limits R & D expenditures.
7.2.3 Without Suitable Successor
As president has always been strong, when the rapid progress in the company, there is no
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successor with the same charge of the future for the company, which increases the
uncertainty of the company. The company will have a great shock after current present
retired; there is a certain gap comparing with foreign famous companies after their coacher
coaching.
7.2.4 Low-Key Style
Lack of public relations propaganda does not help to improve corporate image. In front of
the media deliberately maintain low-key image, this gradually increasing mismatch
between the company's reputation and the strength. Many Chinese people are not familiar
with Huawei, which is not conducive to establish the company's brand value and difficult
to access to the mobile terminal market and win the trust of consumers in mass popularity.
7.2.5 Mattress Culture and Wolf Culture
Mattress culture and wolf culture in Huawei are against human nature management
requirements, which are not conducive to physical and mental development for the staff
and will certainly affect the work efficiency.
7.3 Opportunity Analysis
7.3.1 Terminal Market
With the rapid development of the telecommunications industry, this gives great
opportunities to Huawei. Actually, in Chinese market of 3G including a serious of business
opportunities, lack of 3G terminal product has been the biggest stumbling block for the
development. As the pace of development is very inconsistent for the global 3G market,
compared with 2G mobile phones, the number of 3G mobile phones is still negligible.
Therefore, in early stages of development, the domestic 3G market is still a coexistence
market including network card, Internet and mobile multi-terminal form. Huawei has the
advantage of WCDMA. As early as 1998, Huawei began research and development testing
for WCDMA terminal product, and gradually established research and development office
in Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen, and around the world in Europe, the United States,
South Korea and other regional offices. Since 2000, WCDMA test UE of 3G network
equipment has become an important network testing tool vendors. At that time, the world
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is still at the eve of large-scale commercial for 3G network, and the market situation of
monopolize has not yet formed around the foreign telecom giants. So, developing 3G
terminals are very favorable in time for Huawei. Based on the experience of foreign
countries, in 3G markets depending on data-based value added services, mobile terminal as
carriers for voice and data service, and differentiation competitive embodiment, will be
more and more to customize. This will increase the threshold of mobile terminal industry,
and domestic communications equipment manufacturers with the core technology
advantage and competitive will seize the opportunity.
7.3.2 International Market Environments
With Chinese rapid development and international distribution, Chinese companies have
been significantly improved in overseas development environment; more and more
Chinese companies are starting to show their talents in the international market. In the
mobile wireless communications and the Internet integration changes constantly, plus
rapidly changing trends, the Chinese company and the world are basically at the same
starting line, with many years business in the foreign operations and international brand
building, Huawei is expected to be just top international technology companies like
Panasonic, Casio, and Siemens.
7.3.3 Domestic Market Environments
China's real economy has been starting transformation from the low value product to
high-tech products with higher value-added, while Huawei has already walked in the front,
and become one of the best technological innovation of Chinese companies. Now, Huawei
is expected to become national brand of proud for people like Panasonic, Sony as long as
operating careful.
7.4 Threat Analysis
1. Through years of rapid development, company has gradually gone through the stages
of development, and entered the maturity stage. It is difficult to obtain huge profits through
aggressive expansion in the future. However, it is a proper transformation to operation in
the capital, technology R&D investment. At the same time, comparing with Cisco, Alcatel
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and other companies, network design and network deployment as well as human resources,
Huawei take a distinct disadvantage in these areas. With more telecom operators consider
network functions and performance, the low price strategy would be losing their appeal for
Huawei. Global telecommunications provider is to shift more operations to China, to take
advantage of low-cost engineering and manufacturing capabilities. Alcatel and Shanghai
Bell plus TCL set up joint ventures. Nortel Networks has been alliance with the Electronic
Products Group, China Putian, to manufacture 3G mobile devices. This will enable
low-cost advantage of Huawei is no longer significant, and facing great competitive
pressures.
2. After years of development, business activity gradually decreased in the company, it
would cost more and greater difficulty to maintain high activity of the original wolves’
tactics. And now, a large number of second generation have been introduced to the
company, so that it is a new challenge to heritage of Huawei spiritual, continue to dynamic,
fierce flame.
3. After financial crisis, every government wants to promote their economic development
which will take a variety of strict protection measures. Take European Union as an
example, in January 2009, the products without registration or pre-registered in EU
REACH regulations will be ban into the EU Market, which means many products
including communications product will face ROSH directive, WEEE directive and
REACH regulation test. These new trade protection measures could lead to a greater effect
to export of communication products Effects represented by environmental standards,
intellectual property.
4. Huawei will face overall challenge of strong international company, as the domestic
telecommunications market is becoming increasingly open and decreasing import tariffs.
With the brand becoming more prominent, Huawei will be increasingly becoming a strong
competitor of many international companies, and will also become a challenge object and
competitor to many new companies. Addition to considering the expansion, we should also
start considering holding the current market.
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Summary:
After years of development, now is the time to take off, but due to the development of
leadership and the many remaining issues, making the company's future involving
potential problems. Looking for a same illustrious successor, the appropriate expansion
and business transformation to further promote their brands should be more important
thing.
7.5 Advises
7.5.1 Enterprise Management
It is a general issue to concern: the emerging enterprises in China growing up in the past 20
years, are generally rely on the iron-fisted leader of individuals or the wisdom of small
groups developed. This development model comprises much human culture of Chinese
characteristics, whether enterprises can adapt to the institutionalization and standardization
Management philosophy for practice? Whether the traditional mode of authoritarian led
enterprise to business success, and top management team is able to discard?
As a technology enterprise paying attention to corporate culture and standardize the
management, Huawei can consider the introduction of institutional knowledge
management, to establish an organized, systematic learning culture and mode, in order to
enhance the core competitiveness of employee and the entire organization (the ability to
continuous acquire knowledge and organized institutional knowledge resources), directly
supporting enterprise management. Meanwhile, the model of institutional knowledge
management can help build learning, collaborative work culture-based enterprises which
can help Huawei to become modern learning organizations.
7.5.2 Generation Mechanism for Leaders
The leader, does not mean the highest decision-makers, but as a decision-making group for
corporate strategy. The individual role of leaders was one legend (start, transition) in the
Chinese and foreign enterprises which have been confirmed. The companies, which realize
continually overcoming difficulties and achieving sustainable development, even more
depend on the specific organizational structure of a systematic and synergies of the entire
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decision-making and implementation team. The generation mechanism for leaders and
promotion mechanisms for staff are complementary, while the former is the highest
demonstration for the latter. Promotion mechanism is not only the base and verification
system for the leaders of the generation mechanism, but also provide a steady stream of
excellent talent pool and quality personnel files.
In the long-term development for Huawei, the collective wisdom cohesion based on the
system is more important success factor. Therefore, the promotion of system and
transparent generation mechanism for leader cannot be ignored and avoided.
7.5.3 Human Resource Management
Talent inflow and outflow has always been larger in Huawei, and even it has been blamed
for a large waste of human resources. In the high-speed stage, enterprise would be
inevitable using some human resources of unconventional strategy, and this also does have
a very effective and operating incentive results.
Establishing an open, free business environment, emphasizing on individuality and
autonomy of employees, Huawei should focus on people-oriented. Employees are the most
important resource, and companies should focus on staff training and motivation.
However, as the market and enterprises gradually go to matures, exciting needs would be
replaced by the orderly need. Scientific and systematic evaluation positions, promotion
mechanism and long-term career planning for employees and employers, have become
increasingly important. Huawei's success in enhancing the share of international market, to
achieve international development, needs a sound human resources management system as
a support and protection. It can also take the opportunity to solve some other management
issues, such as high staff mobility, high costs of human resources, and higher training
costs.
7.5.4 Operation and Management Tools
In the operational level with the specific management tools, the main challenges faced by
Huawei are able to effectively implement the management system through the
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demonstration, and whether achieve self-improvement by use of their own learning and
knowledge resources. During the company stepping to maturity, the enterprise gradually
eliminate unconventional operation after high-speed development, such as R&D
management, marketing management, human resource management, cost control, financial
management, etc.
Financial and fund management is the key and vital for modern enterprise. Huawei has to
need to upgrade financial management to the same height with R & D and marketing,
because financial accounting management directly impact on enterprise management for
decision-making based on the accuracy of financial data. Financial and capital operations
are the important means to compete with the international competitor.
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8 Case study of Internationalization Strategy of Huawei in Italy
As for Huawei case, why Huawei choose FDI in oversea market rather than choose
sub-contract as agency to sell their product? As we know, FDI is expensive because a firm
must bear the costs of establishing production facilities in a foreign country of acquiring a
foreign enterprise. FDI is risky because of the problems associated with doing business in a
different culture where the “rules of the game” may be very different. Relative to
indigenous firms, there is a greater probability that a foreign firm undertaking FDI in a
country for the first time will make costly mistakes due to its ignorance. When a firm
exports, it need not bear the costs associated with FDI, and it can reduce the risks
associated with selling abroad by using a native sales agent. Similarly, when a firm allows
another enterprise to produce its products under license, the license bears the cost or risks.
The following three reasons maybe explain why Huawei choose FDI over licensing to
sub-contractor.
Licensing may result in a firm’s giving away valuable technological know-how to a
potential foreign competitor.
Licensing does not give a firm the tight control over manufacturing, marketing, and
strategy in a foreign country that may be required to maximize its profitability.
Another problem with licensing arises when the firm’s competitive advantage is based
not as much on its products as on the management, marketing, and manufacturing
capabilities that produce those products. It is that such capabilities are often not
amenable to licensing47
.
As we know, Huawei is a telecom enterprise belonging to technology intensive industry.
The key competency or comparative advantages of high technology products mainly stem
from technology and brand. Huawei has certain gap with the MNEs from the developed
countries in these two aspects. Huawei’s comparative advantages over MNEs from the
developed countries arise from low R&D cost. Huawei utilized low cost advantage as a
competitive weapon to penetrate the markets in developed of the countries rather than as a
47 International Economics 7th Edition Ch 7
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purpose or motive to invest in the developed countries. Huawei intends to acquire the
technology advantages rather than “exploit” its low cost advantages in developed countries.
Technology and R&D resource seeking are Huawei’s strategic goals of investing in
developed counties. In this chapter, we studied the development of Huawei in Italy as an
example case to analyze the internationalization process of Huawei. Huawei first
established in Italy in July 2004, and set up its Milan and Rome offices in the same year
and in April 2006 it opened the Turin office.
8.1 Advantages of Huawei
The advantages of Huawei can be considered in two aspects: 1) Inborn advantages
including low cost, high efficiency and differentiation; 2) Acquired advantages refer to the
advantages gradually formed after offsetting the weakness in technology, reputation.
Inborn advantages were mainly used in the initial stage of internationalization to open
foreign markets and develop acquired advantages through international competition and
cooperation. In the mature stage, Huawei focused on exploiting the acquired advantages to
consolidate its strategic position in the international competition while protecting its
existing advantages. Another advantage that influences the development of Huawei is the
government support.
1) Cost and Efficient
Cost is a very powerful “offensive” weapon in business competition48
. Some scholars
suggested that MNEs from the developing countries might utilize their comparative low
cost advantages as their primary offensive strategy to penetrate international market49
.
High performance-price ratio products and highly efficient services become the primary
competitive weapons in Huawei’s international strategy. Huawei’s low-cost advantage is
generated from low-cost China-based R&D and engineering resources. Huawei’s report
shows that the average cost of Huawei’s R&D employee is US$25,000 per year, while that
of the European enterprises is around US $120,000-150,000 per year, six times of
Huawei’s. Meanwhile, Huawei’s R&D staff work on average about 2750 hours annually.
48 Porter, Michael E. (1980): “Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors”, New York:
Free Press. 49 Rugman, A.M. (2006): “Multinational Enterprise Strategy for Developing Countries”, in Multinational Corporations
and Global Poverty Reduction, edited by Subhash C. Jain and Sushil Vachani, Edward Elgar Publishing, pp142-163.
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While European R&D people work only 1300-1400 hours every year. The man-hour
investment is about 2:150
. As a result, Huawei does not only have low cost R&D, but also
has fast response to innovation and customer request.
Cost advantage is a relatively important competitive factor for MNEs from developing
countries to penetrate international market, but in order to compete in other higher
value-adding markets; differentiation, innovation and brand advantages are also required51
.
2) Differentiation
Differentiation advantages refer to Huawei’s customized solutions of next generation
telecommunications networks. Huawei is willing to customize products and solutions for
the specific or special requirement of each and every customer. This is the most prominent
characteristic that differentiates Huawei from those western telecom enterprises mainly
offering relatively fixed solutions. In Italy, Huawei using this advantage to provide
end-users products with a seamless convergent telecommunications experience anytime,
anywhere, and via any terminal. As such, it offers a range of Next Generation end-to-end
Telecom and IT network solutions to main Mobile and Fixed Line Italian Operators such
as Telecom Italia, Vodafone, Wind, H3G and Enterprise Networks. The full product
portfolio includes wireless products, network products, application and software products
and terminals. In July 2010, Huawei launched to the Italian open market its branded new
smart phones based on Android, U8110 e U8230 technologies. It has also been presented 2
GSM mobile phones, G6600 e G7002, and the new Wi-Fi modem E5830S.
In terms of technology, brand and management, there still had been some gaps between
Huawei and enterprises from the developed regions at that time. But Huawei today has
managed to make up for the weaknesses and have already formed some acquired
advantages in international competition through consistent efforts.
3) Technology
Maintaining the technology advantage of the core product is the key for high-technology
50 Source: Huawei Interview (2008-04-23). 51 Child, John and Rodrigues, Suzana B. (2005): “The Internationalization of Chinese Firms: A Case for Theoretical
Extension”, Management and Organization Review, Vol.1, No.3, pp. 381–410.
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enterprises to engage in cross-boundary investment. Huawei provides state-of-the-art
technology that meets the needs of the most demanding customers. Huawei believes in the
importance of research and development. It stresses the development of high-end and
mid-range technologies through participating in international R&D cooperation and setting
up independent R&D system. Huawei invests an average of 10% of its revenues in R&D
on an annual basis, at the similar level as the leading telecom enterprises like Motorola,
Alcatel-Lucent52
. The R&D expenditure in 2005 was US$588 million, more than triple that
in 2000 (US$180 million) (Figure 8.1)53
. 46% of its employees are dedicated to research.
Huawei holds the second place worldwide for the number of registered patents, with 1.847
registrations in 2009.
Figure 8.1 Revenue, R&D Expenditure and R&D Intensity
Source: Huawei Annual Report 2004 and Huawei Annual Report 2006
4) Reputation
As most of MNEs from developing countries, Huawei also suffers from lack of
internationally acknowledged brands or trade names54
. Good reputation is one of the main
criterias to evaluate an enterprise’s success in internationalization. These could also be
advantages for MNEs in overseas investment. In 2004 when Huawei started its presence in
52 Brian, Low (2007): “Huawei Technologies Corporation: from local dominance to global challenge”, The Journal of
Business & Industrial Marketing, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp.138. 53 Source: Huawei Annual Report 2004 and Huawei Annual Report 2006, www.huawei.com 54 Wells, Louis T. (1983): “Third World Multinationals: The Rise of Foreign Investment from Developing Countries”,
Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 206 pp.
19932290 2128
2694
3827
5982
180 342 355 389 487 588
9.3%
14.9%
16.7%
14.4%
12.7%
9.8%
0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
16.0%
18.0%
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Revenue R&D Expenditure
Revenue, R&D Expenditure and R&D Intensity (US$ in Million)
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the Italy, China was not perceived as point of excellence for the high-tech market. Now the
perception is different and Huawei gives a strong contribution, thanks to the high-level of
solutions and services offered to the telecommunications operators. Huawei solutions
passed the strong testing phases and demonstrated to be best in class solutions. Huawei are
very fast in transforming key innovations into market realities. Currently, customer can be
confident that Huawei can satisfy their innovation requirements in a very short period of
time.
5) Government Support
During the transitioning period, Chinese government authorities are more interested in
guiding future development of larger firms55
. They are willing to provide financial support
to these domestic larger firms or “national champions” for their internationalization and
protection from domestic market56
. In internationalization process, Huawei also benefits
from government support and protection. For example, to improve the R&D capability of
Chinese telecom enterprises, the governments helped to bring about technology
cooperation and strategic alliance between Huawei and foreign telecom giants like
Motorola, Siemens, Nokia and etc. Governments also provide soft loan for Huawei’s
international operation, for example, The Export-Import Bank of China (China Ex-Im
Bank) and China Development Bank (CDB) provided Huawei US$600 million57
and
US$10 billion58
credit respectively in 2004.
Under governments’ meticulous care and support, Huawei quickly grew from a weak
domestic private enterprise into a multinational telecom enterprise with international
competency.
55 Nee, Victor and Opper, Sonja (2007): “On Politicized Capitalism”, in Victor Nee and Richard Swedberg (eds.) On
Capitalism, Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 93-127.
56 Child, John and Rodrigues, Suzana B. (2005): “The Internationalization of Chinese Firms: A Case for Theoretical
Extension”, Management and Organization Review, Vol.1, No.3, pp. 381–410. 57 Huawei News (2004-04-08): “A US$600 Million Export Buyer's Credit Framework Agreement Signed between China
EXIM Bank and Huawei”, http://learning.huawei.com/english/EnglishVersion/new.php?NEWS_ID=617. 58 MOFCOM News (2005-03-15): “China Mobile Bids to Take First Global Step”,
In order to protect their investments and minimize risk and uncertainty, MNEs usually
prefer to invest in politically and economically stable countries. However, Huawei has the
unique logic of strategic location choice. Huawei set its eyes on the potential market
behind uncertainty and risk. In the initial stage of participating in international competition,
Huawei does not possess the strength for directly crossing swords with telecom enterprises
from the developed countries. Therefore, Huawei set its eyes on the potential markets
behind uncertainty and risk in developing countries. Huawei accumulated strength and
achieved international influence by grasping the opportunity of development in these
countries. These also laid a good foundation for Huawei to further improve its strategic
layout in global market and participate in higher level of international competition.
Even developing countries provided a lot of opportunities for the internationalization of
Huawei, attractions of markets in large developed countries could more than offset any
problems of psychic distance. At present, most of Huawei’s investment concentrates in
developed countries and majority of overseas sales also come from developed countries.
Some studies on Chinese MNEs showed similar evidences to explain why they prefer to
invest in developed countries with possible huge culture shock, because they are pursing
long-term globally-oriented strategies and the source of crucial technology and brand
assets59
.
Huawei decided to expand its presence in Italy for the important competences found at
local level. Italy needs to create its Global Microwave R&D center serving both the Italian
and the Global market. The Italian operators are very strong both on fixed and mobile
communication and they are making high investments in the development of new
technologies. Huawei was involved in very innovative local projects such as the technical
development of the first trial of LTE/4G network with Telecom Italia in 2009. Italy is also
a very active market in terms of consumer mobile applications.
59 Li, Ping P. (2003): “Toward a Geocentric Theory of Multinational Evolution: the Implications from the Asian MNEs”,
Asian Pacific Journal of Management, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 217–242.
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8.2.2 Why Choose Italy
The attractiveness of specific factor endowments in host country for investment by MNEs
is the location advantage60
. Location advantages is the main reason for location choice,
which contain natural resources, economic environment, cultural and social factors,
political power, legal environment and etc. These aspects in Italian market were analyzed
using PEST algorithm Chapter 5. As one of the developed countries, the location
advantages of Italy are summarized as:
1) Leading technologies and top-ranking R&D resources.
According to the case studies on three Chinese high technology MNEs by Li Ping61
, the
primary motive of MNEs from China engaging in cross boarder investment in the
developed countries is technology seeking. Italy is the 4th European largest investor in
R&D by volume, with spending totalling over €15 billion. Italy contains an extensive
network of high-quality universities and public and private institutions and a modern
network of science and technological parks, which ensure that research is widely integrated
into industrial processes. These technology clusters have significant positive impact to
technology innovation. Companies investing in Italy can rely on an average of 300,000
graduates per year62
. A survey conducted by Ipsos Explorer in February 2008 of 60
multinational companies operating in Italy, highlighted that top foreign multinationals
located in Italy benefit from sector-specific technical and managerial skills and
patents/know-how (55%) as well as the capacity to set trends in different industries, such
as fashion and design (53%)63
.
2) Wide network of infrastructure and business environment.
Italy has a wide network of infrastructures which is conducive to increase operation
efficiency. Italy has a strategic position in Europe and is in the heart of the Mediterranean
Sea. Italy is the main thoroughfare linking southern Europe to northern and central Europe
60 Dunning, John H. (1988): “The Eclectic Paradigm of International Production: A Restatement and Some Possible
Extensions”, Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 1-31. 61 Li, ping p. (2007): “Toward an Integrated Theory of Multinational Evolution: the Evidence of Chinese Multinational
Enterprises as Latecomers”, Journal of International Management, Vol. 13 No. 3 p.p. 296-318. 62 Source: Minister of University and Research 63 Why Italy: http://www.invitalia.it/site/eng/home/why-italy.html
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by land, sea and air. The majority of Europe's capitals are within 3 hours flying time from
Rome. It provides a gateway affording easy access to 436 million consumers across the
European Union, and a further 240 million in Northern Africa and the Middle East. Italian
roads cover approximately 1 million km, making them the second longest network in the
EU 25, after France. With an evolved system of international ports, logistics platforms and
interports, Italy ranks as the second most important country in Europe for maritime freight,
and the second also for passenger transport: 263 ports scattered along 7,400 km of
coastline, 80 million passengers per year, port traffic of 550 thousand ships64
.
A friendly business environment could offer efficient platforms and abundant capitals for
commercial operation of high-technology products. Following a thorough reform of Italian
corporate law in 2003, the legal framework for companies can now be considered one of
the most modern and dynamic in Europe. During the past years, Italy has been
implementing a broad reform of the Italian corporate tax system and the corporate income
tax rate is now reduced to 27.5%. The good ecosystem combined with the positive
collaboration with some Italian universities make Huawei very positive for the current and
future business in Italy.
3) Market and opportunities.
Italy boasts a long tradition of Information Communication Technology (ICT) innovation
dating back to the beginning of last century. Today Italy remains a source of vigorous and
dynamic innovation, a major developer of pioneering technologies. It contains a potential
market of almost 60 million potential consumers (more than 25 million internet users)
which making Italy one of the most outstanding pilot markets worldwide for development
and launch of ICT products and services. Italy is Europe’s fourth largest ICT market, with
market value exceeding € 60 billion in 2010. TLC market share is worth € 41.8 billion and
the IT one is equal to € 18.4 billion65
.
64 Ibid 65 Foreign Direct Investment in ICT sector in Italy: