International Think Tank Resources Issue 28

8/7/2019 International Think Tank Resources Issue 28

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International Think Tanks Resources

Issue 28

Table of Content

Libya

Fighting in Libya: The Military Balance.2

Steven Heydemann on Libya...5

Do No-Fly Zones Work?........................................................................................................6

Bahrain:

Bahrains Shia Question..8Syria:

Is Syria the Next Domino?..................................................................................................11

Iraq:

Rage Comes to Baghdad..13

Up in Arms.16

Egypt:

Saving the Egyptian Revolution..18

Egypts Draft Constitutional Amendments Answer Some Questions and Raise Others20

Women and Egypt's Revolution..24

Saudi Arabia:

Saudi Arabia's Musk Revolution.26

Yes, It Could Happen Here..28

Jordan:

Roil, Jordan?......................................................................................................................32

Oman:

Oman's Days of Rage ..35

Revolutions in the Arab world

Of Revolutions, Regime Change, and State Collapse in the Arab World.37

A legacy of violence.40

Iran:

Iran's reformists under fire...42

New Evidence of Iran's Nuclear Ambitions.45

Turkey:

Turkey's New a la Carte Nerve.47

China:

China Reacts to Middle East Unrest.49


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Fighting in Libya: The Military BalanceBy: Jeffrey White .Source: The Washington InstituteDate: Mar 2, 2011

Jeffrey White is a defense fellow at The Washington Institute, specializing in military and security affairs.

The uprising in Libya has evolved into a significant military struggle. The Qadhafi regime and, to a lesserextent, its opponents are employing substantial levels of violence, including the use of heavy weapons.Thousands have been killed and wounded.

At the moment, the military balance lies somewhat in favor of the opposition. Regime forces have

suffered significant losses in weapons systems and personnel, and have had difficulty retaking areas.Nevertheless, the government is fighting hard to hold onto Tripoli and drive the opposition out of cities ithas seized. The regime is not yet out of the fight, and a prolonged, violent struggle is shaping up.

Course and Geography of the Conflict

The conflict erupted over a wide area of Libya beginning on February 15, with civil disturbances in Tripoliand Benghazi spreading rapidly to other cities and intensifying. At least twenty-two cities have beencaught up in the turmoil, most prominently the key coastal communities where most of the populationand oil export terminals are concentrated. Urban areas in the interior, including the far south, have alsobeen involved.

By February 23, the regime had effectively lost the east, with Benghazi, al-Bayda, Ajdabiya, Darnah,Tobruk, and other cities under opposition control. The opposition has been less successful in the west,although it has taken several major communities, such as the hotly disputed Misratah, which fell onFebruary 27, and Zawiyah. Even in these cases, however, regime forces are reportedly still operatingnearby and attempting counterattacks to retake the cities. Meanwhile, Tripoli remains under regimecontrol, and the opposition appears to have been largely suppressed there.

Major Military Developments

Several factors have influenced the course of the fighting. First was the regime's collapse in the east

within only a few days, a development attributed to surprise at the scale and scope of thedemonstrations, the defection of regular army personnel, and the opposition's determination even inthe face of serious violence.

Second was the relative effectiveness of opposition forces. With primitive or light weapons (at leastinitially), little apparent organization, and little or no military training, the demonstrators succeeded inovercoming government security forces. The opposition has since become better armed and organizedthanks to the participation of former regime military personnel.


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Third was the collapse of cohesion within the regular military. As early as February 17, some regimesecurity personnel were refusing to fight or were even defecting. This unraveling has continued,weakening the regime's ability to respond and boosting the opposition's capabilities.

Fourth was the regime's willingness to deploy heavy weapons against the opposition. Tanks, artillery,antiaircraft guns, and fixed- and rotary-wing combat aircraft have all been used in the fighting.

Most of these developments have favored the opposition. To be sure, the regime continues to controlkey areas in the west, carry out coordinated operations, and conduct long-range reinforcement activitiesand local tactical and operational movement. Yet its limited ability to retake other areas suggestsdifficulties in massing and coordinating large forces and a lack of willingness among certain personnel toengage in serious fighting.

Types of Forces

The regime has used at least five different kinds of forces against the opposition: regular army, air force,and navy units; regime security forces, including the well-equipped Khamis Brigade, a praetorian unitnamed after and led by one of Qadhafi's sons; organized, government-sponsored militia elements;foreign and domestic mercenaries; and pro-regime civilians who have been provided with light arms.Although the performance of these elements has been mixed, the government has been able to hold onwherever it has achieved a substantial concentration of forces.

Opposition forces appear to consist of two types: large numbers of essentially unarmed or lightly armeddemonstrators, and military personnel who have defected from the regime, including perhaps somesmall units. Some opposition elements have been observed using military weapons (e.g., tanks, armoredinfantry fighting vehicles, heavy antiaircraft machine guns, antitank weapons), but with little apparentorganization. This is in addition to the large numbers of military-type small arms now in their possession.

Regime Tactics

The government's approach has centered on holding or retaking cities and airfields. The fight for thecities is the primary struggle, but airfields have emerged as important places from which the regime canassert residual control, such as supporting air strikes and troop movements. Qadhafi apparently seeks toestablish and secure an area of control from Marsa al-Burayqah in the east to the Tunisian border.

Regime tactics against the opposition have included the use of snipers, heavy automatic weapons, teargas, and rubber bullets. In addition, roving patrols of mercenaries and militia have employed live fire toclear and control the streets and prevent demonstrations from forming. In areas where the regime haslost control, it is using a combination of heavy and light forces to conduct counterattacks. The regime hasemployed fighter jets and helicopters to attack arms depots and communications facilities seized by theopposition and is using transport aircraft and helicopters to move forces. Indeed, the threat of air attackhas been a significant concern for opposition forces. The regime is also employing informationoperations to control the flow of information and the narrative of the struggle. These actions haveincluded disrupting communications, limiting the information available to both the Libyan public and theexternal world, and engaging in extensive pro-regime propaganda activity.

Outlook


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Initial expectations that the opposition's progress was unstoppable have been somewhat blunted -- theregime has proven more resilient than it appeared to be in the early days of the uprising. No matter howbizarre Qadhafi's public appearances have been, loyalists are mounting an organized and determined

fight to preserve his rule. For its part, the opposition has been hampered by lack of military organization,limited firepower, and emergent political rivalries. It has already shown some difficulty in mounting aneffort to seize Tripoli by force or to reinforce other disputed areas. All of these factors suggest that thefight may be protracted and costly.

Still, the opposition seems to have the upper hand. It has great determination, the support of asignificant part of the population (although not all of it), and control over many key cities. Meanwhile,the regime has lost much of its military capacity and has no way to rebuild it, at least in the short term.With no real foreign allies to call upon, it is essentially fighting to retain control of an enclave within thecountry.

The conflict will likely evolve in one of three broad directions:

1.

The regime could collapse quickly under the pressure of continuing opposition advances, its ownisolation, and disintegration within the security forces.

2.

A prolonged struggle could develop because neither side has the capability to quickly defeat theother. This could result in a period of continuing clashes, perhaps some form of negotiations, andregime attempts to break its isolation through promises of reform.

3.

By taking advantage of opposition infighting and logistical problems, the regime could begin toreassert itself and retake lost areas.

Of the three scenarios, the second seems most likely, as both sides lack the offensive capability to bringthe conflict to a rapid conclusion.

Implications

A prolonged struggle would have several important consequences. First, as the fighting became moreserious, casualties would increase, as would damage to the economy and infrastructure. This wouldheighten humanitarian concerns and produce more internal and external refugees. Second, increasingcasualties or a protracted conflict would increase pressure for external military intervention. Most of theattention so far has been on establishing no-fly zones, but these may be inadequate to deal withQadhafi's remaining forces. The regime's key instruments are ground units, so no-drive zones orairstrikes would likely be needed to truly curtail its ability to move against the opposition.

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Steven Heydemann on LibyaBy: Steven Heydemann.Source: United States Institute Of PeaceDate: Feb 25, 2011

Steven Heydemann serves as vice president of the Grants and Fellowships program and as special adviser to the MuslimWorld Initiative.

What do you make of the current situation in Libya? How do you think it might impact the regionconsidering the events that took place in Egypt? The current situation in Libya is deeply distressing. The violence being directed against the Libyan peopleby the regime of Col. Muammar al-Qaddafi is an outrage that is appropriately being condemned aroundthe world, including by the United States.

The rapid and largely peaceful collapse of authoritarian regimes in Egypt and Tunisia might havecontributed to a sense among Libyan citizens that they too could push a long-serving authoritarian rulerout of power through peaceful protests. Qaddafi, however, seems to have drawn different conclusionsfrom mass uprisings across the region. One lesson is that if the Egyptian and Tunisian regimes had usedmore force, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Tunisian President Zein al-Abdin Bin Ali might still bein power. A second is that local armed forces are not to be trusted. Qaddafi has, instead, relied on armedunits that were recruited on the basis of their political loyalty and, according to reliable reports in themedia, mercenary forces recruited from Sub-Saharan Africa. The result has been carnage and adeepening conflict in which unarmed citizens confront much better equipped forces loyal to the regime.The international community has responded through international institutions like the U.N. and theAfrican Union by imposing sanctions against the Libyan government, and by mobilizing humanitarianassistance. Additional measures, such as imposing a no-fly zone over Libya to further isolate pro-Qaddafiforces, are under active consideration, and seem likely to have support from the U.S. government.Despite having a military advantage, it seems likely that the Qaddafi regime will eventually fall, leavingterrible destruction in its wake. Both the intensity of the Libyan conflict, and the extent to which theQaddafi regime had for decades weakened formal political institutions and undermined frameworks forsocial organization, mean that the struggle to construct a democratic political order in Libya will beenormously challenging, and could fail. Like the Albania of Enver Hoxa, the Libya of Muammar al-Qaddafiwill require significant support to overcome the legacies of 42 years of misrule. The presence of largeand easily available oil reserves creates opportunities to manage such a transition with less economicstress than in some other cases. Yet the governance of oil resources itself poses important challenges.

What is the U.S.s relationship with Libya? How might the current events change that relationship? At present, the U.S.-Libyan relationship is not strong. The U.S. broke off diplomatic relations with Libya in1981, prohibited imports of Libyan oil in 1982, and subsequently imposed a variety of economicsanctions on the Libyan government in response to Libyas role as a sponsor and organizer of terrorism.In 1991, the U.S. indicted Libyan nationals for their role in the December 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight103. Clandestine Libyan efforts to develop a nuclear weapons capability exacerbated tensions betweenLibya and the U.S. In 2003, Libya abandoned its nuclear weapons program and in exchange the U.S.reestablished diplomatic relations. Nonetheless, the relationship was not a warm one, and continued tobe marked by significant tensions and disagreements. The U.S. government welcomes the possibility of ademocratic transition in Libya, but acknowledges the difficulties that such a transition will need toovercome if it is to succeed. Immediate U.S. priorities for Libya include humanitarian assistance for


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Libyans affected by the current conflict, protection of U.S. citizens still trapped in Libya, and strongsupport for diplomatic efforts to bring about Qaddafis removal from power. Should these effortssucceed, it is likely that the U.S. would stand ready to assist in the establishment of a new, independent

and democratic government in Libya, should Libyans themselves request such assistance.

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Do No-Fly Zones Work?By: Joshua E. Keating.Source: Foreign PolicyDate: Feb 28, 2011

Joshua E. Keating is an associate editor at Foreign Policy

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton acknowledged on Monday that the United States and its allies areactively considering imposing a no-fly zone over Libya as a means to prevent Muammar al-Qaddafi'sgovernment from cracking down on rebel forces as the country seemingly spirals into civil war. Therehave been widespread reports of Libyan Air Force jets bombing and firing on protesters; rebelsreportedly shot down a plane while it was firing on an anti-Qaddafi radio station on Feb. 28. Some 200Arab groups from throughout the Middle East signed a letter over the weekend in support of a U.N.sponsored no-fly zone. How exactly do these zones work?

It depends on the circumstances. There are two primary types of no-fly zones imposed by air forces. Thefirst is imposed by one military over another, while the two sides are at war. In practice, this type of no-

fly zone amounts to a warning from one side that it will engage the other's aircraft if they are spotted ina given territory.

The second type, more applicable to the situation in Libya, is when an outside power possessingoverwhelming air superiority restricts flights over a given country in order to discourage an internalconflict or humanitarian crisis. This is a relatively recent tactic, which was used most famously in Bosniaand Iraq during the 1990s. No-fly zones are often a compromise in situations where the internationalcommunity is demanding a response to ongoing violence, but full military intervention would bepolitically untenable.

The establishment of no-fly zones is authorized under Chapter 42 of the U.N. Charter, which states that if

non-military methods are insufficient for responding to a threat to international peace, "demonstrations,blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations" may beemployed.That's pretty vague, so the actual terms and rules of engagement are set up in the resolution thatauthorizes any specific no-fly zone. In the case of Bosnia, "Operation Deny Flight" as it was called, wasimposed by U.N. Security Council Resolution 816 in 1993 , and applied to all "fixed-wing and rotary-wingaircraft in the airspace of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina." The already established U.N.Protection Force was charged with monitoring the airspace as well as authorizing exceptions to the ban,such as humanitarian aid flights. Deny Flight followed an earlier, less-stringent operation -- Sky Monitor -- under which only military flights were banned and U.N. Forces only could only document violations,rather than engaging the aircraft.


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The ban made sense for the Yugoslav war, as virtually all the fixed-wing military aircraft in the regionwere under the control of one side -- the Bosnian Serbs. The zone was tested on Feb. 28, 1994, when sixSerbian fighter planes were shot down by U.S. Air Force F-16s, in what became known as the Banja Luka

incident.The effectiveness of Deny Flight, however, is debatable. NATO credits it with removing air power as aweapon for the Bosnian Serb forces and pushing the conflict toward an earlier conclusion. Criticscontend that it did little to prevent the worst abuses of the conflict, including the 1995 Srebrenicamassacre. The mission was later expanded into an active NATO bombing campaign.

The other most notable examples of no-fly zones were those imposed by the United States and its alliesover northern and southern Iraq following the 1991 Gulf War. Operations Northern Watch and SouthernWatch (later, Southern Focus) aimed to prevent Saddam Hussein's air force from attacking Iraq's Kurdishand Shiite minorities. (Iraqi Mig and Mirage fighter planes were used in the 1988 gas attack on theKurdish city of Halabja, which killed up to 5,000 people.)Unlike Deny Flight, the Iraqi operations were never specifically authorized by the U.N. Security Council.The United States, Britain, and France claimed authority under Security Council Resolution 678, whichstated that member states could use "all necessary means" to ensure that Iraq complied with its post-war disarmament obligations. However, many observers felt there was no basis in international law forthe zones and the debate over their legality continues to this day.The mechanism for enforcing a no-fly zone depends on the situation and the country doing theenforcement. In the case of Iraq, the zones were monitored by AWACS surveillance planes that wouldcontact allied fighter jets, which flew regular missions, if a violation was detected. The operation wasrelatively effective -- very few violations of the zones were recorded between the end of the Gulf Warand the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 when it was finally lifted -- though human rights abuses against thesouthern Shiites by Iraqi ground forces continued. For those who argue that a no-fly zone would hastenQaddafi's departure from power, it's also worth considering that Saddam Hussein ruled under one forover a decade. But the Iraqi experience also demonstrated the dangers of no-fly zones : In a 1994incident, two U.S. Blackhawk helicopters were shot down by American F-15 fighters after being mistakenfor Iraqi aircraft.In the case of Libya, nearby Italy has suggested that it might allow its military bases to be used to stagethe enforcement of a no-fly zone. The U.S. has its own airbase in the country as well. The United States isalso positioning an aircraft carrier off the coast of Libya, which a Pentagon spokesman said will "provideflexibility" for future military options. The main obstacle to imposing a no-fly zone on Libya may bepolitical, rather than military: U.N. diplomats say that 15-member Security Council is unlikely to agree toa zone unless there's a dramatic escalation of violence by the Libyan Air Force, and this time, it's unlikely the United States or its allies have the appetite to go it alone.In any case, while a no-fly zone could presumably prevent Qaddafi's planes from firing on protesters orrebel forces, it would do nothing to stop his ground forces and mercenaries from continuing theirassault. Given the limited utility then, the U.S. and its allies must now decide if all the trouble involved insetting up a zone -- including inevitable questions of legality -- are worth the risk.

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Bahrains Shia QuestionBy: KRISTIN SMITH DIWAN.Source: Foreign AffairsDate: Mar 2, 2011

KRISTIN SMITH DIWAN is Assistant Professor of Comparative and Regional Studies at the School of International Service at American University.

Summary: The democratic uprising taking place in Bahrain has been accompanied by concerns of Shiainsurrection and resurgent Iranian influence. The United States should not buy into this fear.

The spirit of Cairos Tahrir Square was reborn on February 16, as a diverse group of Bahrainis gathered in

Pearl Square in Manama, the countrys capital. Two days before, a Facebook-organized Day of Ragehad ended in two deaths as security forces cracked down on protesters. Now, the demonstratorsmarched from the funeral toward Pearl Squares traffic roundabout, determined to continue the fight fora new Bahrain. Officials from the main Shia political society, the Islamic National Accord Association (Al-Wefaq) brought cleaning supplies to scrub graffiti off the Pearl Square fountain. The leader of the leftistsecular National Democratic Action Society (Waad) movement spoke of Bahrains proud history of cross-sectarian labor activism and proposed the formation of a new national organization to press for agenuine constitutional monarchy. Shia and Sunni prayed together. By nightfall, thousands of unalignedBahrainis had crowded the square to join what, by then, felt like a celebration.

Yet that celebration was cruelly extinguished at three in the morning by a surprise police attack on thesleeping encampments. Security forces wounded hundreds and killed four in the brutally efficient raid.Even health workers seeking to aid the wounded were attacked. By morning, the space where Bahrainspro-democracy activists, Shia and Sunni, had come together was encased in barbed wire. The ruling al-Khalifa monarchy did not want that unity to continue.

Like much of the news media covering Bahrains uprising, it prefers a simpler narrative of Shia againstSunni. Just as Hosni Mubarak held Egypt hostage for decades to a false choice between staying loyal tohis regime or facing an Islamist takeover, the ruling al-Khalifa family resisted democratic reform bypresenting themselves as protectors of the Sunni community against the Shia majority. Theextraordinary meeting of foreign ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in Bahrain on the sameday as the Pearl Square raid both reinforced and broadened this threat by sharply denouncing foreign(read: Iranian) intervention in Gulf countries. During the meeting and since, the GCC have been revivingthe fear that plagued the region after Irans 1979 Islamic revolution -- that Iran would foment unrestamong Shia communities of the Gulf.

The GCC warning resonates in the United States, which bases its Fifth Naval Fleet in Bahrain and is lockedin its own confrontation with Iran. But it should not. In fact, separate from the Iranian question, theempowerment of the Shia majority is a necessary component of political liberalization. Shias should beable to engage as full citizens, and their role in building Bahrain should be respected. This would be thebest way to curb Iranian influence. A more democratic Bahrain that fully integrates its Shia public wouldbe less susceptible to appeals from the Islamic Republic. Over time, the political relevance of Shia


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identity might even decrease, since Shias would have less reason to seek communal protection from adiscriminatory state.

Contrary to Western fears and the Bahraini regimes announcements, the countrys largely Shiaopposition movement is not an Iranian implant. Indeed, its strength is a product of the Bahrainigovernments own policies. Al-Wefaq, for example, is a deeply communal movement that emerged inthe wake of the violent suppression of a Shia uprising in the 1990s. When I met with the movementsquietly charismatic leader, Sheikh Ali Salman, a number of years ago, he explained that the bestdemocracy is practiced on the street, meaning that the key to effective political change is constantcommunication with the people. It is this connection, combined with its religious legitimacy, that allowsAl-Wefaq to mobilize Bahrainis so impressively when it wants to. Even in 2005, it drew more than 50,000Shia -- nearly one in ten Bahrainis -- to a demonstration in support of constitutional reform, a demandthat still unites protesters of all factions today.

Those protests were ultimately unsuccessful. In 2006, Al-Wefaq ended a four-year boycott of theparliament, demonstrating a willingness to work within a flawed system and accept the necessity of incremental reform. The move was costly for the Shia opposition. One of Al-Wefaqs founders, HassanMushaima, left in protest to form a rival organization, the Haq Movement for Liberty and Democracy.This would have been a tremendous opportunity for the al-Khalifa government to broaden its legitimacy,but instead of reaching out to Al-Wefaq -- inviting cooperation to lessen systematic discriminationagainst Shias in housing, government hiring practices, and political districting -- the ruling family workedto isolate the Shia opposition. So although it portrayed the Shias as dangerously sectarian, in reality itwas the one fomenting sectarian distrust.

By gerrymandering districts and holding strategic naturalizations of Sunnis from neighboring states, theregime prevented Al-Wefaq from gaining its rightful majority position in the elected lower house. At thesame time, the government prevented the popular leftist cross-sectarian opposition headed by Waadfrom gaining any parliamentary seats. As a result, the 2006 parliament was a strictly sectarian affair inwhich Sunni Islamists from both the Salafi and Muslim Brotherhood traditions faced off against thecleric-led Al-Wefaq. This composition belied the diverse views of the Bahraini public and solidifiedsectarian identities in the formal political sphere.

Still, the al-Khalifa regimes strategy did little to advance its stability. Indeed, it ultimately cost it aprecious asset: a legitimate national Shia movement willing to work within the system. Al-Wefaqsminority position in parliament left it burdened with the responsibility of governance without thestructural power to force accountability and change. Former supporters decried Al-Wefaqs inability tocurb royal corruption while at the same time supporting the implementation of the Gulfs first incometax. Disillusionment returned to the Shia street -- a wave of tire-burning protests hit Shia villages, and thepopularity of Haq rose. The organizations confrontational program of civil disobedience andinternational human rights activism siphoned support from al-Wefaq, particularly among the youth. Theregime responded forcefully and brutally in 2010, arresting 23 dissidents, including human rights workersand a well-known blogger, allegedly subjecting some to torture while in detention.

The outbreak of the Arab revolutions this year, then, came at a critical point in the evolution of Bahrainsopposition politics. By providing a model of regime change through mass protest, the Tunisian andEgyptian examples reinforced the Bahraini oppositions drift away from formal politics back into thestreet. The protests across the Arab world returned the oppositions focus to core democratic issues:


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freedom and dignity. The al-Khalifa regimes lethal crackdown hardened its resolve. Many in Bahrain nowwant more than constitutional reformation. They want to achieve what Tunisia and Egypt have done -- tofell the regime.

After the violence in Pearl Square, King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa apparently regained control from a hard-line faction of the ruling family that had been running the crackdown, and tried to appeasedemonstrators by calling for national unity and a dialogue among all parties. To entice the opposition toenter negotiations, the King has met two of their key demands -- withdrawing troops from the streets,allowing the protesters to retake the symbolic Pearl Square, and releasing hundreds of prisoners,including the prominent Shia dissidents he had accused of plotting terrorism. But by calling all Bahrainifactions to the table to talk, the regime has effectively diluted the oppositions power by adding moreconservative and pro-monarch parties to the conversation.

The rival rallies held on February 21 by the opposition in Pearl Square and by monarchy loyalists in Al-

Fateh mosque reinforced the image of a society hopelessly divided between Shia democrats and Sunnimonarchists. The potential for sectarian polarization to harden to the point where compromise isimpossible is real, but it belies the fluid situation on the ground. Fearing the loss of national unity, allsides present themselves as speaking for all Bahrainis, regardless of religion. The mass of people incontrol of Pearl Square still contains a number of cross-sectarian democratic and labor movements. Andeven the ostensibly pro-monarchy gathering at Al-Fateh mosque challenged the monarchy to enactdeeper social and political reforms.

As attention drifts elsewhere in the Middle East, the Bahraini public is still politically mobilized to anastonishing degree. It will take tremendous skill to find a solution that will avoid dangerous sectarianpolarization and further bloodshed. Not having taken advantage of Al-Wefaqs parliamentary inclusion,the al-Khalifa family now faces the street. The street wants revolution, but the majority of the Sunnicommunity will not support the fall of the monarchy, and Saudi Arabia, just across the causeway, will notallow it. The best solution is reform -- substantial reform -- to put the island on the path of genuineconstitutional monarchy.

The U.S. confrontation with Iran has heightened sectarian tensions across the Middle East. Bahrain offersan opportunity to push back against this dangerous trend. The promise of the Pearl uprising -- thatBahraini Shia could be integrated through a broader democratic movement -- should be realized.Although the empowerment of Shias poses some risks, the alternative is much worse. If the Gulfs firstattempt at an Egypt-inspired democratic revolution ends in sectarian strife and violent suppression of the Shia majority, the unrest will not be restricted to the tiny island. And the government in Iran will finda much more receptive political environment across Arabia for its hard-line message.

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Is Syria the Next Domino?By: Ribal Al-Assad.Source: Project SyndicateDate: Mar 02, 2011

Ribal Al-Assad is Director of the Organization for Democracy and Freedom in Syria.

LONDON With the Tunisian and Egyptian regimes gone and street protests roiling cities from Algiers toTehran, many people are now wondering which domino might fall next. Syria, whose secular, militarizeddictatorship most closely resembles the fallen regimes of Tunisia and Egypt, may not be next in line, butappears nonetheless to be approaching a tipping point.

Of course, the old domino theory in international relations was only a crude way of emphasizing thatdifferent parts of any region are linked to each other. For todays Arab world, a better metaphor mightbe a chessboard, from which the removal of even a pawn inevitably alters the relationships among allthe other pieces.

Today, as protests mount and multiply, the government of every Arab state in the Middle East and NorthAfrica probably believes that, if left to its own devices, it can contain internal dissent.

In Syria, it seems inevitable that protest may soon crack the regimes brittle political immobility. Mostordinary Syrians face extremely difficult economic and social conditions, including high unemployment,rising food prices, constraints on personal freedom, and endemic corruption. These factors are no

different from those that brought people on to the streets in North Africa and the Middle East. Whatbegan as protests over living conditions became full-scale demands for freedom and democracy.

The regime in Damascus is fearful of similar unrest, as it should be. The best way to avoid a confrontationbetween the people and the security forces is a process of genuine reform leading to elections and agovernment of national unity. The ingrained inertia of the current regime, however, seems to precludeany early move toward that.

Instead, Syrias rulers are offering inducements to ensure that key constituencies remain in line laptopsfor teachers, subsidies for public-sector workers, and empty reformist rhetoric. But the current situationcalls for far more serious measures. Lifting the state of emergency that has been in force since 1963 giving sweeping powers to the regime and its security services would be both a symbolic and tangiblestep in the right direction.

Unless Syrias rulers, like other leaders in the Arab world, begin to appreciate that freedom is afundamental human right, even the most quiescent peoples patience may wear dangerously thin. Highfood prices may have served as a trigger in North Africa, but the speed with which the protesters turnedtheir attention to political reform caught everyone off guard.

Putting this genie back in its bottle would be virtually impossible without bloodshed of the type we arenow witnessing in some parts of the Arab world. So the Syrian leadership knows that it must respond hence the half-hearted reform agenda that it recently outlined. But trying to address deep-rooted


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popular grievances with flowery language and a bouquet of subsidies is like trying to extinguish a forestfire with a water pistol. The solutions to Syrias problems must be as substantive as the problems areserious.

Until now, Syrias rulers have relied on their anti-Israel, anti-Western rhetoric to protect themselves. Butcries about the Israel-Palestine conflict were rarely heard in the protests in Tunis and Cairo.Furthermore, in the last few years, when Israeli planes struck targets in Syria, there was no answer fromthe regime and still none when Israeli planes flew over the presidential palace.

The regime claims that it is part of the 'resistance' with its senior partner Iran. However the WikiLeakscables show that the Syrian leadership told the Iranian regime not to count on it in any war with Israelbecause it is too weak. So the regime is making a fatal error if it thinks that its old diversionary tactics willcontinue to provide it with immunity. On the contrary, with a young, well-educated population unable tofind suitable work, the regime has created its own cadre of potential protestors, who are aware that it is

using empty slogans to keep the state of emergency and stay in power.

The Syrian people are strong, patient, resilient, and resourceful. Family and social bonds remain potentin the face of adversity. When food is scarce, people share. When the regime cracks down on theInternet, people use proxy servers.

But they should not have to make do. They should not have to risk their safety when they seek to engagewith the world online. No one wants to see the streets of Damascus consumed in protest, or a violentconfrontation erupt between protesters and security forces. What the Syrian people want is ameaningful dialogue with the regime.

The regime must appreciate that, despite its best efforts, Syrians have been watching events in theregion with as much interest as the rest of the world. Syrias people may have no predilection forviolence, but the birth of freedom, once witnessed, is not easily forgotten or trumped by statehandouts and vacuous statements by a distant, self-isolated leadership.

People said the Berlin Wall would not fall. They said that Mubarak would not stand down. And still somesay that Syria cannot change. But Syria will change, and I, like my compatriots, pray that when changecomes, it is peaceful and harmonious.

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Rage Comes to BaghdadBy: RAAD ALKADIRI .Source: Foreign AffairsDate: Mar 3, 2011

RAAD ALKADIRI is a Partner at PFC Energy. He was Assistant Private Secretary to the United Kingdom Special Representative to Iraq from 2003 to 2004 and Political Adviser to the United Kingdoms Ambassador to Iraq from 2006 to2007.

Summary: Although the current protests in Iraq are unlikely to lead to the country's collapse, Iraqispatience with their governments inadequacies is wearing thin. Should Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki benervous?

Saddam Hussein may have been overthrown in 2003, but the dawn of more representative governmentin Iraq has not inoculated the country from the popular unrest now sweeping through the Arab world.Over the past month, demonstrations protesting the woeful lack of services and widespread corruptionhave taken place throughout the country. These culminated in a violent day of rage in a number of Iraqi cities, including one in Baghdad on February 25 that left more than 20 protesters dead.

These protests have not reached the scale of those witnessed in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia, anddemonstrators have not demanded regime change per se. Nonetheless, the tight security measurestaken to contain the day of rage protests in Baghdad -- including blocking access to the city and puttinga tight military cordon around Tahrir Square, the focal point of the demonstrations -- and Prime MinisterNouri al-Malikis efforts to link the unrest to al Qaeda and Baathist provocateurs suggest that hisgovernment is rattled. And with good cause, because if Baghdad cannot respond effectively to populardemands, the current governments political survival is no less at stake than those in Cairo, Tripoli, andTunis.

Although there is undoubtedly an element of contagion influencing events in Iraq, which began withsmall demonstrations in Baghdad led by intellectuals and professionals, the protests there are driven bylocal grievances. Popular anger at the persistent lack of services -- especially electricity -- has been risingsteadily over the past few years. Demonstrations protesting power shortages occurred in Basra lastsummer, expressing a frustration common to Iraqis across the country; some parts of Baghdad, forexample, received around two hours of electricity per day from the national grid in early February. Iraqisalso share growing resentment toward pervasive government corruption, a factor that has beenparticularly important in driving demonstrations against the regional administration in Kurdistan. Iraqranked 175 out of 178 countries on Transparency Internationals 2010 corruption index. Meanwhile,there is broad resentment of the high salaries and generous benefits that public officials have grantedthemselves, especially given the governments apparent ineptitude.

None of these grievances is new; Iraqis have complained about poor services and unresponsivegovernment since the U.S. invasion in 2003. But in the bloody, chaotic years that followed Husseins fall,security was the biggest popular concern. Now that levels of violence have diminished, Iraqis patiencewith their governments inadequacies is wearing thin.


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Iraqs leaders were slow to recognize this simmering popular frustration. In the early days of unrest inEgypt and Tunisia, Iraqi officials were blas and almost smug, lecturing their Arab counterparts on theneed for democratic government and dismissing the chances of similar disturbances in Iraq. The

warnings that were issued over the risk of domestic turbulence had a clear political bent and seemed tobe aimed more at casting aspersions on Malikis leadership than anything else.

Consequently, Baghdad was caught unawares when protests did break out in the capital and in citiessuch as Mosul in early February, and its initial response was rather panicked. Following a now well-trodden path, Maliki announced on February 5 that he would not seek reelection for a third term, onlyfor his official spokesman to claim a day later that the prime minister had been misquoted. Maliki, hiscabinet ministers, and members of the Council of Representatives also discussed slashing their salaries.As a temporary measure to compensate for the poor state of services, the government pledged freeelectricity for approximately one million of Iraqs poorest families. Maliki also promised that everyperson would be given 15,000 dinars (roughly $13) as compensation for deficiencies in the national

ration card system, a program to supply basic foodstuffs that was first introduced by Saddam Hussein inthe early 1990s, when Iraq was under international sanctions.

Faced with continuing protests, the government followed up with a slew of other initiatives, includingshifting spending priorities in the 2011 budget. The state will double its spending on the national rationcard and increase capital spending on infrastructure projects at the expense of current spending(although its room for maneuver is limited, as the latter is dedicated mostly to salaries and wages). Mostgovernment officials have escaped salary reductions for the moment, but the prime minister, president,and speaker of the Iraqi parliament will assume 20 percent pay cuts. To address energy concerns, Malikiseparately announced that factories will be removed from the national electricity grid between May andSeptember to divert more power to households, and he has proposed a plan to distribute small

generators to villages to supplement patchy national distribution.

These proposals have yet to mollify the protesters. And although the initiatives look good on paper, thegovernment faces a steep challenge in implementing them. Twenty years of war, sanctions, and invasionhave hamstrung the fledgling Iraqi government. Maliki must confront a debilitating set of political andadministrative weaknesses that severely undermines his governments capacity to design and implementpolicy. Maliki himself has been the first to acknowledge that his new cabinet, much like its predecessor,sacrifices effectiveness for political inclusiveness. All the main parties and blocs in the Council of Representatives are represented in the new government -- including Ayad Allawis Iraqiya party, whichnarrowly defeated Maliki in last years elections -- largely because the factions feared being marginalizedin opposition. But they have not committed to a common program, and political differences among themremain stark. Maliki may have secured his post by outmaneuvering his opponents, but his actions merelyincreased their distrust of him -- and, in some cases, their determination to weaken and even unseathim.

Compounding these political problems is the diminished capability of Iraqs public service ministries. Theoverall quality of the countrys civil servants has steadily deteriorated over the past eight years. Althoughviolence and de-Baathification have taken a toll, time itself is an enemy. Iraqs most capable technocrats-- many of whom came from the last generation to be educated abroad in the mid-1980s -- have passedretirement age. Many of the current senior civil servants are simply out of their depth, having sufferedthrough years of isolation under sanctions and having been promoted rapidly, as a result of politicalconnections or the need to fill the leadership vacuum. Moreover, they are forced to operate in ministries


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that -- particularly in the case of service branches -- have become political fiefdoms serving party orconstituency interests rather than the country at large. Such provincialism results in little or nocoordination between ministries and undermines the capacity for broad strategic planning and

implementation -- both of which are necessary to solve the countrys infrastructure and services deficits.

None of this is to suggest that Iraq is on the brink of collapse. With continued oil revenues --conservatively estimated at around $70 billion this year but liable to rise if crude oil prices remain attheir current elevated levels -- the government will retain a powerful means of increasing social spendingand, more important, protecting the crucial patronage networks relied on by various ruling parties topreserve their influence. At the very least, these funds will help the government maintain the status quo.

But the threats posed by the protest should not be underestimated. It is possible that the shock of theprotests, combined with the impending loss of the safety net that U.S. troops have provided for the pasteight years, will force Iraqs leaders to assume greater responsibility. This shift would not immediately

change conditions on the ground, but it could improve the governments administrative capacity andnudge it toward more realistic and manageable policies to address Iraqs social and infrastructurechallenges.

Or, more worringly, Iraqs dearth of administrative and technocratic capabilities could remain anobstacle to implementing even small-scale government initiatives. Worse still, Malikis rivals may beginto try to take political advantage of the current protests. Leaders from across the political spectrumsense the opportunity, and some, Iraqiya, are already hinting at a parliamentary vote of no confidenceagainst the prime minister. The Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadrs call last week for his followers to give thegovernment a six-month grace period in which to improve services seemed to provide Maliki with somerespite, especially as the Sadrists are a key government ally, representing some of the poorest andpotentially most disruptive parts of Iraqi society. But even this reprieve has been temporary. Sadr and hislieutenants have joined a chorus of attacks on the prime minister sung in recent days by many of theother major parties. The fact remains that Maliki has made a host of enemies among rival political blocsover the past five years, all of whom would be happy to see him fall.

Consequently, unless conditions improve in Iraq, Maliki may face the unpalatable choice of allowinghimself to be replaced or clinging to power through authoritarian means. It is by no means clear that hewill choose the former. As he showed during the nine months of painful negotiations over governmentformation last year, he will not yield power easily, and his reaction to the recent day of rage was areminder of his authoritarian streak. In the time-honored fashion of Arab strongmen, the prime ministerhas sought to establish personal control over Iraqs security services over the past few years, and hisinstinctual response to the latest crisis has been to consider further centralizing his control byestablishing overseers for each ministry based in his office and appointing special representatives in theministries themselves.

Such actions would have a corrosive impact on the countrys representative politics. Iraqis have alreadyshown unmistakable signs of disillusionment with the new order. Voter participation has dropped overthe last five years -- official turnout fell from 79.6 percent in 2005 to 62.4 percent last year -- and manyof those who did vote in last years general elections expressed their frustration with business-as-usualpolitics through a clear anti-incumbency vote for Allawis Iraqiya party. The fact that incumbents -- Malikichief among them -- were largely able to protect their power and prerogatives simply widened thechasm between Iraqs rulers and its ruled. The Maliki governments failure to respond effectively to the


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latest protests will expand that gap further. An Egypt- or Tunisia-style revolution is not in the cards forIraq -- at least not yet. But if Iraqis are forced to endure another hot summer without sufficientelectricity supplies, protests will continue and pressure on the government will grow. Worse yet, the

Iraqi people may lose faith altogether in electoral politics, which would put not just Malikis future at riskbut also the stability of the entire post-2003 political order.

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Up in ArmsBy: Alice Fordham.Source: Foreign PolicyDate: Feb 28, 2011

Alice Fordham is a Middle East correspondent who has reported from Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, and Egypt.

BAGHDAD The only way to get to Baghdad's Tahrir Square -- yes, it has one too -- on Feb. 25 was towalk. It was a treat to stride down roads usually solid with traffic, but the silent city also felt ominous.Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki had warned that the long-planned "Day of Rage" protests would beinfiltrated by al Qaeda and remnants of Saddam Hussein's Baathist regime, and imposed a ban on allvehicles within city limits to reduce the risk of car bombs. Religious leaders warned people to stay away,while security officials made doom-laden predictions of violence. Most people were too scared toventure outside.

The hush throughout Baghdad made the clamor in Tahrir Square seem all the louder. Thousands of

demonstrators had walked for miles to gather there, not even bothering to go to Friday prayers first.They were mostly men -- some university graduates, others day laborers, but all with the samegrievances. We have no electricity and no water, scant job opportunities, and our politicians are liars andthieves, they said. They flung themselves against the blast walls blocking the entrance to the GreenZone, a symbol of the distant and unaccountable elite that they were raging against.

The protesters' banners were homemade and simple in their demands. "The government in the GreenZone is afraid of the people," said one. "Yes to democracy and public services," another proclaimed.

Settar al-Sammarai, a soldier with six children who had been retired on a pension of $200 a month whenSaddam Hussein's army was disbanded, said, "I would like my voice to be heard by the government -- I

would like to be heard condemning the robbery of public funds."

The Baghdad protests highlight the same frustrations that led Tunisians and Egyptians to topple theirautocrats. A generation of Iraqis has grown up with even less control over their lives than youthelsewhere in the Arab world. They went from brutality and scarcity under Saddam Hussein to a U.S.-ledliberation they never asked for. Foreign troops patrolled their streets, searched their houses at night,yelled at them in a language they didn't understand, and, as the WikiLeaked war logs show, killedwithout good reason. The ensuing chaos placed them at the mercy of Iraq's fearsome militias. And now,they're living under a prime minister who is undermining some of the crucial checks and balances thatare meant to make the Iraqi government accountable to its people.


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Maliki, who has undoubtedly kept a close eye on the unrest that is threatening leaders across the Arabworld, has tried to respond to the growing tumult. In a conciliatory speech on Feb. 27, he gave hisministers 100 days to evaluate their performance and suggest reforms to their ministries. He also

declared that he would halve his salary and would not seek a third term as prime minister. On Feb. 28,Maliki announced his support for a law that would allow Iraq to hold early provincial elections, sayingthat it would allow citizens to make their demands for change felt.

At this point, as with last-minute concessions made by other Arab leaders, it may be too little too late.It's true that the past few years have brought a measure of stability and democracy to Iraq that wassorely lacking before. Last year, more than 60 percent of the electorate risked terrorist attacks toparticipate in parliamentary elections, which were declared free and fair by international monitors.

But what came next made their bravery seem futile. Iraq's politicians took more than eight months tobuild a ruling coalition. During this undignified ethnosectarian tussle, the country's shoddy services and

security improved not one bit. Maliki was eventually renominated as prime minister despite the fact thathis bloc did not win the most seats in the election.

Lawmakers continue to live an insulated life in the heavily guarded Green Zone, an institution of theinvaders that the new Iraqi elite seem in no hurry to get rid of. Parliamentarians make a fat $22,500 amonth and are immune to the electricity shortages and curfews that make life so tedious for everyoneelse. The Iraqi press, who sit around parliament waiting for work to start, joke that it's the only place inthe country with 24-hour electricity. The debates usually start hours late and sometimes go on pastmidnight, leaving everyone else, from the boys who fetch tea to TV crews, stuck explaining to aggressivecheckpoint security officers why they're out past curfew. Meanwhile, politicians travel the short distancehome in armored convoys.

There is more to democracy than elections, and, in some crucial ways, Iraq is becoming more autocratic.Iraq's Supreme Court ruled in January that several independent institutions -- including the central bank,the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC), and human rights and anti-corruption committees --should be under the control of the government's council of ministers led by Maliki. The prime minister'scritics have accused him of pressuring the court to issue the ruling. The bloc led by Ayad Allawi, theformer interim prime minister and Maliki's rival, issued a statement condemning the verdict as "a coupagainst democracy."This decision will have a significant and pernicious effect on Iraq's nascent democratic system. QassimAboudi, an Iraqi judge and IHEC official, condemned the Supreme Court's decision, raising fears thatfuture elections could see more meddling if the elections commission is not politically independent. Thehuman rights committee is also an important check on the security services' behavior. A recent HumanRights Watch report, detailing abuses at secret prisons run by a security force close to the primeminister, is just the latest example of the sort of issue that the committee cannot be expected toinvestigate objectively if it is under political control.The protest in Baghdad was dispelled at dusk with no major injuries. Protesters elsewhere in Iraq,however, were not nearly so lucky. At least a dozen people were killed in clashes with Iraqi securityforces in Mosul, Fallujah, Basra, and near Kirkuk during similar protests on Feb. 28.

The spasm of violence in Iraq's usually peaceful Kurdish region, where at least three protesters and apoliceman have been killed in clashes at demonstrations in the last two weeks, is particularly notable.The semiautonomous area ruled by the Kurdistan Regional Government markets itself as the "other Iraq"


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-- a region that is safe, secular, and democratic. But Kurdish politics are dominated by two parties, bothof which maintain corrupt patronage networks that bear more than a passing resemblance to theinstruments of control wielded by autocrats throughout the Arab world.

The focus of the protests in Iraqi Kurdistan is the chilly mountain town of Sulaymaniyah, where citizenssay they have had enough of the region's scant resources being awarded according to political allegiance.But the demonstration became a perfect example of the repressive tools Kurdish leaders are prepared towield to remain in power. Only one television station, run by the Nalia company, showed live coverage of the growing protests in Sulimaniyah. Two days after the protests began, it was mysteriously shot up andburned down in the middle of the night.

What next? Iraqi authorities seem shaken. Three provincial governors have resigned, and some localgovernment buildings in Anbar province have been reduced to ashes. Mosul, the violent northern citywhere five people were killed in protests, witnessed another rally on Feb. 27. Iraqis have seen what an

impact an angry population can have on their government -- and few people have greater reason torage.*********************

Saving the Egyptian RevolutionBy: Shlomo Ben Ami.Source: Project SyndicateDate: Mar 03, 2011

Shlomo Ben Ami is a former Israeli foreign minister who now serves as Vice President of the Toledo International Centre for Peace.

TEL AVIV Revolutions throughout history have proven to devour their children. Their final outcomesare seldom congruent with their prime movers intentions. Too frequently, revolutions are hijacked by asecond wave, either more conservative or more radical than what was first contemplated by theinitiators of change.

What started in France in 1789 as an uprising of the middle classes in alliance with the sans culottes ended up with the return of the monarchy in the form of Napoleons dictatorship. More recently, thefirst wave of the Iranian revolution, under the presidency of Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, was by no meansexclusively Islamist; the second wave, led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, was.

The question for Egypt is whether the agenda of a truly pluralistic democracy proclaimed by the avant-garde young protesters at Tahrir Square, the admirably self-empowered Facebook and Twittergeneration can prevail against the resilient forces of the past. Indeed, according to a Pew ResearchCenter poll, only 5.5% of people have access to Facebook, while 95% want Islam to play a major role inpolitics, 80% believe that adulterers should be stoned, 45% are practically illiterate, and 40% live on lessthan $2 a day.

Ideally, the new democratic order should be based on a common platform adopted by the forces of change, both secular and Islamic, and on a transition pact between these forces and those representing


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the old system, first and foremost the army. Indeed, one of the Egyptian revolutions odd features is thatit now operates under the exclusive trusteeship of a conservative army.

True revolutions occur only when the old repressive system is thoroughly dismantled and purged. ButEgypts revolution is one whose initial stage ended with power fully in the hands of the old regimesrepressive apparatus. The risk is that the fraternal ties between the army not exactly innocent of theMubarak regimes repressive practices and the protesters might prove short-lived.

So far, the army has acceded to only one of the protesters central demands getting rid of Mubarak. Ithas not endorsed the wide array of liberal demands voiced by the revolutionaries of Tahrir Square.

Arguably, the military concurred with the protesters demand for Mubaraks removal as the best way tocircumvent a move towards a dynastic republic under Mubaraks son, Gamal. The masses called for arevolution, while the army conducted its own coup detat in the hope of saving what is essential in the

system while sacrificing the man who embodied it.

The armys temptation to limit change reflects the conservative profile of its hierarchy, the extraordinaryprivileges it enjoys, and the economic interests with which it has been tied. Egypt was ruled as a policestate, and, with a gigantic and all-pervasive security apparatus, the army might be tempted to assumethe role of guardian of order and stability if democracy proves too messy.

Fortunately, there are limits to the Egyptian militarys capacity to impede change. A Western-leaningarmy, funded and trained by the United States, it cannot allow itself the liberty of shooting peacefulprotesters. Indeed, limiting the armys political role will certainly be a fundamental condition formaintaining Egypts warm relations with the West. A free-trade agreement with the US and improvedaccess to EU markets might be powerful incentives that the West can offer to Egypts young democracy.

So, no matter how conditioned the Egyptian army may be by its worldview and vested interests, it has nooption but to facilitate the democratization process. It should have to accept, however , that no Arabdemocracy worthy of the name could refuse to open the electoral gates to political Islam.

Indeed, Egypts formidably historic task now is to refute the old paradigm according to which the Arabworlds only choice is between secular and repressive autocracy or obscurantist and repressivetheocracy. But the regime that emerges is bound to be more attuned to local conditions, and thus toreligions vital role in the social fabric.

A democracy that excludes religion from public life entirely, la France, cannot work in Egypt. After all,such a democracy does not work in Israel, or even in the US, a country that G. K. Chesterton described ashaving the soul of a church. Building a modern secular state for a devout people is Egypts mainchallenge.

That said, a scenario in which the Muslim Brotherhood usurps the revolution does not seem plausible, if only because this might lead another strongman on horseback to take over. Although still inspired bystaunchly anti-Western conservatives who believe that the banner of Jihad should not be abandoned,the Brotherhood today is not the unconditionally jihadist organization that Mubarak regimes portrayedto the West. It has long disavowed its violent past and has shown an interest in peaceful politicalparticipation.


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The tense relationship between the incumbent Arab regimes and political Islam is not necessarily a zero-sum game. It is in this context that the abortive Palestinian Mecca Agreement between the religious(Hamas) and the secular (Fatah) to form a national-unity government for Palestine might have

established a new paradigm for the future of regime change in the Arab world. Such compromises maybe the only way to stem the slide to civil war, and possibly co-opt Islamists into a settlement with Israeland rapprochement with the West.

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Egypts Draft Constitutional Amendments Answer Some Questions and RaiseOthersBy: Nathan J. Brown.Source: Carnegie Endowment Date: Mar 1, 2011

Nathan J. Brown, a professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University. Michele Dunneis a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Proposed amendments to Egypts constitution meet some longstanding opposition and civil societydemands but also create new uncertainties. A committee appointed by the Supreme Council of theArmed Forces presented the amendments on February 26, allowing for a brief period of public discussionand possible further changes before a public referendum, which might be held as soon as March 19. Theproposed changes shorten the presidential term and create a two-term limit, significantly expand thepool of eligible presidential candidates, restore judicial supervision of elections, pave the way for a new

constitution after elections, and restrict the ability to declare and renew a state of emergency.

At the same time, some surprising amendments raise questions about whether the changes servespecific agendas within the military or other leadership circles. In particular, a change in the eligibilitycriteria for the presidency disqualifies any Egyptian who has dual nationality or is married to a non-Egyptian. This was not a step demanded by the opposition or civil society and seems designed to excludeprominent expatriates, such as Egyptian-American Ahmed Zewail, from running. Mohammed ElBaradeidenies that he has held any citizenship other than Egyptian, but there have been rumors neversubstantiated that his Egyptian-born wife has foreign ties.

The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces announced on February 28 that parliamentary elections willbe held in June, followed by a presidential election later in the summer. But it is still unclear whetherthere will be a change in the electoral system for the parliament before these elections take place.Without major amendments, use of the current system (in which deputies are elected by district) wouldwork in unpredictable ways, as the only experience with that system came when the NationalDemocratic Party was strongly dominant. In the new environment, the system might result in a diverseparliament dominated by local leaders.

There has also been talk of moving to a different electoral system from the current system of individualdistricts; the constitution was amended in 2007 to permit a change to either a proportional


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representation or mixed system. Such a change would require the ruling military council to issuecomplicated new legislation by decree very soon. This type of system would be difficult without alsoliberalizing the party system, a complicated step but also one widely expected at some point. Whatever

system is used, these uncertainties raise the prospect that parliamentary elections will be held only afew months after the establishment of new parties, leaving little time for them to mobilize support.

The committee did not address controversial Article 5 of the constitution, which bars any political activitywith a religious frame of reference despite the fact that a Muslim Brotherhood politician, SobhiSaleh, served on the committee. While the Muslim Brotherhood could still try to form a party by writinga platform that meets the current constitutional requirement, the movement has said that it will nottake any steps that require it to apply to the existing parties committee, a body established by law thathas been very stingy with approvals in the past. Thus the Brotherhood may very well not move beyondinternal preparations for establishing its new party before the elections. Tentatively named theFreedom and Justice Party, the party is led by Saad al-Katatny, who headed the alliance of independentBrotherhood deputies in the parliament elected in 2005.

The Proposed Amendments in Detail

The amendments have provoked a mixed reaction from Egyptians. The general spirit of their proposalshas been welcomed widely, but a large number of activists anxious for a more thorough transitioncontinue to say there is no point in trying to tinker with minor constitutional amendments and that itmakes more sense to move immediately to a wholly new document. Others worry about a rapid series of elections in a still inchoate political environment.

Despite such concerns, many leading political figures and some opposition movements have beensupportive and enthusiastic that some concrete political changes are finally imminent. Most of thecommentary thus far has focused on the general thrust of the amendments, though as more timeelapses, more detailed reactions are likely to be forthcoming.

The most significant changes are:

Candidates will have three ways to get on the presidential ballot: nomination by a party with atleast one parliamentary seat; endorsement by 30 members of the parliament; or attainment of 30,000 signatures of citizens eligible to vote.

The president will serve for four years and be limited to two terms.

The president will be obligated to appoint at least one vice president.

The judiciary is returned to active supervision of elections and will be the final arbiter of thevalidity of legal challenges to results.

The president or half of the members of parliament may call for a new constitution and a 100-member assembly can be convened to draft a new constitution.


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The president may declare a state of emergency with parliamentary approval; any extensionbeyond six months would require approval in a public referendum.

An article setting aside constitutional human rights provisions in terrorism cases will be removedentirely.

A more detailed discussion of the amendments, article by article:

Article 75: Adds that the president may not be a dual national or married to a non-Egyptian. This changeis a surprise, as it was not among the protestors demands and was not mentioned in the original list of articles that the committee was tasked with amending. And it is ironic as well, since the draftingcommittee includes members from the countrys Supreme Constitutional Court, a body that actuallystruck down a law imposing a similarly stringent ban on Egyptians married to foreigners serving asjudges. It might be intended to exclude some expatriates considering presidential campaigns.

Article 76: Eases procedures to get on the presidential ballot in such a way as to create the possibility of real competition. Before 2005, the parliament nominated a single presidential candidate, who wasconfirmed in a public referendum. In 2005, the public voted directly for the president but it was virtuallyimpossible for any independent candidate to get on the ballot, and even political parties faced stringentrequirements in choosing a candidate. The new amendment would create three ways to get on theballot: endorsement by 30 members of the Peoples Assembly or Shura Council, endorsement by 30,000eligible votes (endorsements must be from at least fifteen provinces with at least 1,000 endorsementsfrom each), or membership in a political party with at least one seat in either of the houses of parliament.

The amended article also establishes a commission composed entirely of senior judges by virtue of theirposition (no appointees) to supervise the presidential election from the opening of the nominationperiod through the announcement of results. The commissions decisions will be final. The insistencethat presidential elections be returned to judicial supervision has been a core opposition demand. Whilesuch a system is unusual internationally most countries have opted in recent years to createindependent electoral commissions Egyptians experience with supposedly independentcommissions is a bitter one. Such commissions introduced in the past decade were woefully short of true independence. But while judges have a reputation for professional integrity, they are not generallytrained to oversee electoral processes; the commission is likely to need some technical assistance.

Amended Article 76 also calls for prior review by the Supreme Constitutional Court of theconstitutionality of laws pertaining to presidential elections. The requirement that the ConstitutionalCourt review legislation before elections is presumably to ensure that there is no challenge to thelegitimacy of an election after it is held; on previous occasions, the Court has found the electoral law forthe parliament unconstitutional, casting doubts about the validity of legislation passed and forcingimmediate new elections. The electoral commission is also given final and absolute authority over theprocess, perhaps to ensure there can be no doubts about the legality of any election.

Amended Article 76 is also important for what it implies about the sequence of elections and about


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postponing changes to the party system. When it created the constitutional review committee, the rulingmilitary council specified that first there would be a referendum on the constitutional amendments andlater parliamentary and presidential elections. It was not clear, however, in which order the elections

would be held. As the existing parliament has been dissolved, the first and third routes to nomination forthe presidency would work only if the parliamentary elections preceded the presidential elections.

Article 77 : Shortens the presidential term from six to four years and establishes a limit of two terms. Thishas been a principal opposition and civil society demand since at least 2004.

Article 88: Establishes complete judicial supervision over all elections and referenda from theannouncement of elections to the announcement of results and specifies that electoral rolls, voting,and counting will be supervised by members of the judicial apparatus nominated by their higher

commissions.

This amended article would return Egypt to a system of full judicial supervision. But it would go muchfarther than simply return it the article specifically ensures that the committee is fully judicial and thatit has full control over all aspects of the electoral process. In the past, even when judicial supervisionoperated, the regime attempted to remove strategic parts of the electoral process from such supervisionand also worked to squeeze non-judicial personnel into the process. For instance, the electoral rolls werenotoriously manipulated and kept out of judicial control by the interior ministry. This enhanced rolewould put a real burden on the judiciary and probably force elections to be carried out in stages(because there are not enough judges to supervise the process country-wide in a single day). And thejudges would likely need considerable technical assistance and administrative support.

Article 93: Gives the Supreme Constitutional Court, not the parliament itself, the authority to decide andenforce legal challenges to parliamentary races. Formerly, electoral challenges for most cases went tothe Court of Cassation, Egypts highest court of appeals. It would issue its judgment but then refer toparliament for enforcement. This procedure was justified on the separation-of-powers grounds. But italso was seriously abused as large numbers of deputies were simply allowed by their colleagues in theparliament to hold their seats even after the Court had ruled their election invalid.

Article 139: Obligates the president to nominate one or more vice presidents within 60 days of beingelected in an apparent effort to avoid the confusion and anxiety that accompanied former PresidentHosni Mubaraks last years in office. There was some speculation that the commission would move

toward an elective vice presidency; it has apparently decided not to do so.

Article 148: Restricts the ability to impose a lengthy state of emergency by saying that the presidentmust submit a declaration of emergency to the parliament within seven days. It also restricts theduration of the emergency period to no more than six months, which can be extended only by approvalin popular referendum.

As Egypt has been in an almost continuous state of emergency (with only brief interruptions) since 1939and since the state of emergency has been routinely renewed sometimes for years at a time, this is amajor change. There are gaps, however for instance, some emergencies might make the referendum


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impossible, or it might be possible to allow the emergency to lapse for a single day and then declare itagain. Also, it is not clear how the approval of this article would affect the current state of emergencywhich the Supreme Military Council has not yet lifted despite persistent demands from the public

should it still be in place at the time of the referendum. And indeed, the military council has alreadymade use of its emergency powers by trying some civilians (accused of violence against protesters) inmilitary courts (bodies that are notorious for quick and reliable convictions).

In addition to revising the constitutional provisions for a state of emergency, attention also needs to begiven to the law that governs states of emergency, because it is this law that determines what theauthorities can and cannot do. It is unclear if such legislative changes are contemplated any time soon.

Article 179: Eliminates this entire article, which allowed constitutional provisions to protect humanrights to be waived in cases of terrorism. The 2007 amendment to Article 179 was clearly aimed at takingemergency measures that had been in effect for a long time and embedding them in the constitutional

text. Elimination of this article reverses that process.

Article 189: Adds a provision for a new constitution to be requested by either the president (with cabinetapproval) or at least half of the members of both houses of parliament. It calls for a constituent assemblyof 100 members to be elected by a majority of the elected members from a joint session of the PeoplesAssembly and Shura Council, which would draft a new constitution within six months and submit it to apopular referendum.

There has been much debate among Egyptians about whether to amend the 1971 constitution or abolishit and start over. The constitutional revision committee was authorized only to suggest amendments tothe 1971 constitution, but they have used this article to allow for a completely new text. And the chair of

the committee has made clear he believes that the amendments are designed to render the 1971constitution provisional. That said, this article only allows such a process rather than requires it, as someof the committee members suggested they had planned to do. Moreover, it allows the parliament,rather than the public, to choose the members of a constituent assembly; this it is a half-way measure.

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Women and Egypt's RevolutionBY: LAUREN E. BOHN, SARAH LYNCH .Source: Foreign policy Date: Mar 2, 2011

LAUREN E. BOHN, SARAH LYNCH . Bohn is a Fulbright fellow and multimedia journalist based in Cairo. h Lynch is a Beirut-based multimedia journalist.

CAIRO When 19-year-old Nahal protested in Tahrir Square several weeks ago, she wasn't there tofight for her rights as a woman, but to fight for her rights as an Egyptian. "There are no differencesbetween men and women here," she said. "We are all one hand."


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Thousands of women echoed Nahal's sentiments as they raised brazen signs, led lively chants, and stoodnext to men in what some have deemed an unprecedented display of equality between the sexes inmodern Egyptian history.

Although the movement that ended a dictator's 30-year reign in just 18 breathtaking days had li ttle to dowith feminist concerns, in the weeks following the country's uprising, women are saying theempowerment they felt during the demonstrations should be used to effect change for womenthemselves.

"In the square, I felt for the first time that women are equal to men," said activist and feminist Nawal ElSaadawi. Now more than ever before, she says, there is a promising opportunity to act. "It's like I carrieda burden on my back, and now I feel free."

Saadawi, a a spry octogenarian, has led the fight for women's rights in Egypt for decades. She was

arrested and censored for her work under Anwar Sadat's and Hosni Mubarak's regimes. "SuzanneMubarak silenced women, killed the feminist movement, and did nothing for us," she said, dismissing theformer first lady's "National Council of Women" as little more than a PR campaign for the regime.

Women have long faced challenges in Egypt, from sexual harassment on the streets to prejudice at workto paternity laws upheld in the courtroom, Egyptians say.

As the country grapples with a transition to democracy, some worry that these problems could get worsewith an Islamic revival. Many, however, do not see this as a real threat. "The younger generations of theMuslim Brotherhood believe in a secular constitution, believe in equality between men and women,equality between Muslim and Christians," Saadawi said. "So we are not afraid of the Muslim

Brotherhood."In 2005, designer-turned-activist Hind el-Hinnawy created a national scandal when she took famousEgyptian actor Ahmed el-Fishawy to court to prove that he was the father of her child. Egyptian lawstipulates that if a woman gives birth outside legal marriage, the child is illegitimate and is notrecognized under the law.

Hinnawy sought to prove that an urfi marriage contract -- an Islamic agreement that binds a coupleunder God -- existed. "It was only when I faced the laws and talked to lawyers that I understood howdifficult it would be," said Hinnawy, who hurdled legal battles to eventually win the landmark case.

Legal cases like Hinnawy's are just one set in a series of struggles facing Egyptian women, says Hala Galal,

who directs films that deal with women's rights. "[A woman] doesn't have the right to wear what shewants, to marry who she wants, to go out in the street any time she wants," Galal said. "Small things likethis show she doesn't choose her life. She's not a free person."

A 2008 report conducted by the Egyptian Center for Women's Rights found that nearly half of Egyptianwomen are sexually harassed every day. Eighty-three percent of the Egyptian women surveyed reportedbeing harassed on the street at least once in their lives.But some old habits changed in the days leading up to Mubarak's ouster. Despite isolated, albeitextremely disturbing, incidences of sexual violence such as that experienced by CBS News correspondent


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Lara Logan, many Egyptian women say cases of abuse in Tahrir Square were unusually low -- even withmen and women pressed shoulder to shoulder on some of the square's most crowded days.

In the weeks ahead, activists vow there will be more transformations. "The future will show us a lot of systematic and organized groups of women fighting for their rights more than ever before," Galal said.

Fatma Emam, head researcher for Cairo's women's rights research organization Nazra, is documentingexperiences of women in the revolution, establishing a forum to aggregate young feminists' demands inthe upcoming era, and taking steps to stop legal discrimination against women.Some are already beginning to see change. "Before [the revolution], my dad would only really talk aboutpolitics with my brother," said Sarah Abdelrahman, a student at the American University in Cairo whowas featured on the cover of Time magazine. "But now he's talking about it with me. It's like a barrierwas lifted and I feel more empowered and appreciated than ever."Still, activists concede many challenges lie ahead. "I am optimistic, but I also believe that we shouldn't

think it's going to be something that will come mechanically," said Iman Bibars, regional director of Ashoka Arab World, an NGO that develops the citizen sector through entrepreneurship. She has lobbiedfor decades to have women included in important governmental committees. But as recently as lastweek, efforts were clearly lagging . The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces appointed a committee toamend the country's constitution, but not one woman was included.

In fact, it wasn't until 2003 that Egypt appointed its first female judge, Tahani el-Gebali. In 2007, theSupreme Judicial Council swore in 30 female judges to preside over family courts in what feminists sawas a major step for women's rights. But in February 2010, council members voted to bar female justicesfrom serving in administrative courts. The new Egyptian cabinet includes few women, with less than ahandful of female ministers.

Amy Mowafi, managing editor of Egyptian women's magazine Enigma , counsels patience. "Democracy,as history has shown, is the first step," Mowafi says. "Then we start to look at subtitles of that, and oneof those things is equality and freedom for women."

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Saudi Arabia's Musk RevolutionBy: Simon Henderson.Source: The Washington Institute.Date: Mar 1, 2011

Simon Henderson is the Baker fellow and director of the Gulf and Energy Policy Program at The Washington Institute .

"The king is dead, long live the king" is a call which, in its Arabic form, is sure to be heard before too longin Saudi Arabia. In the latest chapter of the saga of the House of Saud, the ailing and aged King Abdullahreturned to the kingdom on Feb. 23 after a three-month absence, which included two back operations inNew York City and a month's recuperation at his palace in Morocco.


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It wasn't quite a triumphant return. Upon his arrival in Morocco, the king was brought down to earth in awheelchair, carried from his aircraft in a scissor-lift disabled-passenger vehicle modeled on the design of a catering truck. A similar contraption was employed on his return home to Riyadh. The gerontocratic

monarch is, obviously, on his last legs.

The real story of the king's return, however, was the gifts that he lavished upon his population. The kingtook the opportunity of his arrival to announce financial handouts to the Saudi population worth anastonishing $36 billion, including, according to the Financial Times, a 15 percent salary raise for publicemployees, reprieves for imprisoned debtors, and financial aid for students and the unemployed. And allthis on top of Saudi Arabia's planned budgeted expenditure of $400 billion through the end of 2014 onimproving education, infrastructure, and health care.

King Abdullah's largesse looks a lot like preventive medicine to ensure that Saudi Arabia does not catchthe revolutionary disease spreading from Tunisia and Egypt across the Arab world. But few serious

analysts of Saudi Arabia think that politics in the kingdom could play out as dramatically as the events inNorth Africa.

A tweet or two by a young, foreign-educated, Saudi woman resentful of her lack of rights does not makea Riyadh Spring. And it is unlikely that much will come of a Facebook campaign calling for a day of protests on March 11, or that an online petition signed by more than 100 Saudi academics and activistsdemanding a constitutional monarchy gains momentum. The kingdom is, in the judgment of many, anextraordinarily conservative place, where people know their place and do what their parents tell them.To the extent there is a national sport, it is either driving dangerously or lethargy.

But it appears that not even Saudi Arabia can escape the currents of unrest sweeping through the Arabworld. And the royal family, through its mismanagement of the kingdom's public infrastructure, mighthave brought some of it on itself. This has been one of Saudi Arabia's wettest winters, bringingcalamitous floods to the coastal city of Jeddah. During one stormy night, three months' worth of rainarrived in a few hours. At least 10 have died, and more are missing. It was during one of January's stormsthat the fleeing ex-President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia arrived with his entourage.

The sewage system of Jeddah is basically nonexistent; at best, it is inadequate. In many houses, thewaste from the bathrooms flows into underground tanks that are emptied every few days by fleets of tanker trucks. The trucks used to drive into the hills to the east of the city and dump their cargo into thedeceptively named Musk Lake. That was until 2009, when heavy rains raised concerns

International Think Tank Resources Issue 28

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