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International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim
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International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

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Page 1: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

International Secu-rity and Peace

Cold War, Technology, and Warfare

Prof. Jaechun Kim

Page 2: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

What was the Cold War? BIG TIME COMEPETITION between two superpow-

ers BAD

very costly (The US spent about 5 trillion $) very unhappy time lower savings rate in

the late 1950s and early 1960s GOOD?

Recovery of Europe (Marshall plan) and Japan NATO and other cooperative international institu-

tions Ideological competition

all encompassing ideological gloss put on all as-pects of the competitions! cf. competition between France and England in the 19th c.

COLD WAR

Page 3: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

Life of the Cold War Nuclear arms race was perhaps the most stable area of cold

war competition Standoff in Europe was almost as stable as the nuclear arms

race Competition in the Third World, most unstable

Origins of the Cold War: Who (What) caused the Cold War? Prevailing western view: Soviet blaming view

(Gaddis) – Soviets had the master plan

Revisionist view: American blaming view US should’ve been more tolerant of the Soviets

Page 4: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

Ideological explanation – conflict was imposed by historical destiny (Western Liberalism or Capitalism vs. Marxism and Leninism)

Spiral model (International Systemic Explanation) Misperception and Security Dilemma No aggressors and defenders

Psychological model (1st level of analysis) Wrong (?) historical analogy (lessons of Munich)

State level explanation – interests of military indus-trial complex in the US wanted to prolong the conflict / Soviets waging the Cold War to maintain brutal regime… too deterministic??

Page 5: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

Development of US strategic thinking (late 1940s and early 1950s)

Hungary (1947) – establishment of communist regime

Czech coup (1948) Munich analogy.. Berlin Blockade in 1948 airlift program… Blockade led the NSC to write NSC-9 (call for NATO) Preventive War Thinking in the US in the late 1940s

and the early 1950s ! e.g. Bertrand Russell, Bernard Brodie, George

Kennan; Churchill – “you must either withdraw from E Germany or you will have to see your cities destroyed by atomic bombs!”

Page 6: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

The basis of preventive war thinking - Nuclear monop-oly (can’t allow nuclear monopoly to become “wasting assets”…)

Two shockers in 1949 major reshuffling of American strategy and drawing of NSC 68

NSC 68 Paul Nitze - George Kennan’s successor as head of

the State Dept’s Policy Planning Staff (cf. Dean Ache-son)

Not a defensive-minded, status quo-oriented docu-ment

we have to go beyond merely balancing Soviet power… we have to create overwhelming power…

We should base our policies on what they were able to do..

Page 7: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

What they are able to do: They could overrun WU; move on to the oil bearing areas of ME; consolidate communist gains in Far East; launch air attack on British Isles; attack selected targets with nuclear weapons including Canada and the US

The threat is world wide! No distinction between vital and pe-ripheral interests Domino Theory!! Call for increase in de-fense budget..

But the US Congress was still in isolationist mode

But Korean War changes everything US defense spending rose from 30% of budget to 60%, from

5% of GDP to 18%. Transforms NATO from a loose alliance to an integrated mili-

tary structure Speeds decision to rearm W Germany Signs treaty with Japan The US military buildup after the Korean War was unprece-

dented in US peacetime history…

Page 8: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

What ended the Cold War? Power politics vs. Liberalist view

Reagan victory school Reagan’s ideological counter-offensive and military

buildup was crucial Manifestation of “peace-through-strength” strategy

and victory of Western containment

The role of Gorvy … It was not Regan but Gorvy who ended the Cold

War…

Page 9: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

The role of technology is missing in Clausewitz… Squaring Clausewitzian triangle?

Theory of Offense-Defense Balance (3rd level, Real-ist theory)

– “Importance of Technology”

Logic of the theory of O-D balance Anarchy (no central government in IR) Self-help system Security Dilemma Arms race temptation of preventive wars…

Technology and Warfare

Page 10: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

Balance of Offense and Defense” determines how perni-cious the security dilemma is … Defense advantage (if it’s easier to defend..) – IR stable

Less intense security dilemma; Expansion is difficult Offense advantage – IR unstable

Intense SD; Expansion is easy..

Technology comes into play big time… Why? Technology determines balance of O &D… Technology plays an important role, here!

Four watershed technological innovations since 1850 Emergence of railroads in the 19th c. Artillery and small arms revolution of the late 19th c and early 20th

c. WWI Innovation of the tank in the first half of the 20th c. WWII Nuclear revolution of the latter half of the 20th c. Cold War

Page 11: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

How does technology affect the O-D balance? Mobility favors offense; firepower innovations favor defense

(they say…)

Hypothesis one: mobility-enhancing technologies

favor offense Strategic mobility – ability to transport your military

forces from your homeland to a theater of operations Operational mobility – ability to move your forces

within a theater Tactical mobility – ability to move forces on the battle-

field Counterarguments – not clear why the ability to

transport forces far from your homeland gives an at-tackers an advantage, but not defenders...

Page 12: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

Hypothesis two: firepower-enhancing tech favors de-fense

if you are a defender and have a strong firepower, it allows you to threaten the attacker’s concentration of forces be-fore they attack…

Counterargument: the attackers can use firepower to disperse defender’s forces as well… no??

Validity of the Hypotheses - Impact of Railroads, Fire-power Revolution, and Tanks

Railroads (second half of the 19th c.) Armies were able to move up to 15 times faster than the marching

troops; greatest revolutionary development in military mobility… Wars of German Unification Military outcome Decisive and short offensive campaigns… (e.g., 7

weeks war (Austro-Prussian War)) Political impacts afterwards Cult of Offensive; now the major Euro-

pean countries trying to copy Prussian military system and war plans (based on the advantage of offense!)

Page 13: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

Small Arms and Artillery Revolution (late 19th and early 20th)

Rifles, breech-loading small arms (machine guns), and ar-tillery

WWI – evidence that defenders armed with modern rifles, machine guns, and artillery had gained enormous advantage against assaulting infantry… defense actually became eas-ier…

Military outcomes defensive advantage over offense ‘Old’ Moltke “In the age of breech-loading rifle, no combina-

tion of bravery and superior numbers could overcome the problem of attacking frontally open ground against modern firepower. The attack is becoming notably more difficult than defense.”

cf. Little Moltke and A. von Schlieffen Military failed to grasp the meaning of this technological

change. Rather they still believed O had adv over D (cult of offensive)!!

Political outcomes WWI source of cult of defensive…

Page 14: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

Tanks (from the end of WWI through WWII ) Military outcome: resulted in a greater offense dominance !?

Offenders can move faster and tanks can endure defender’s firepower… Hitler’s new doctrine of warfare, “Blitzkrieg” was based on the revolutionary potential of armored forces…

Quick envelopment of Polish forces in 1939, quick and deci-sive defeat of France in 1940, and invasion of the SU in 1941…

But leaders didn’t realize the power of offense! Nonetheless, “Cult of Defensive” from the experience of

WWI Political outcomes appeasement policy

“Perceptions” of Balance of O&D rather than real Balance of O&D matters more in political outcomes! Hard to tell whether one particular weapon increases offensive or de-fensive power…

Page 15: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

Nuke revolution (revolutionary impact on strategies…) The most important technological change in military history… Favoring offense or defense???

Squaring the Triangle? Non-material factors vs. material factors (technology and

economy) Technology introduced a new qualitative dimension to

warfare… Clausewitz seems to have emphasized quantitative di-

mension.. Intelligence has become fairly accurate… invention of ra-

dio, telegraph, satellites, computers…

Page 16: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

Development of Nuclear Revolution Little Boy (Hiroshima, August 6, 1945)

Exploded 1,800 feet over Hiroshima with a force of 13 kilotons of TNT; immediate deaths of 130,000

uranium gun-type device Unstable

Fat Man (Nagasaki, August 9, 1945) plutonium implosion weapon 20 kilotons of TNT; immediate deaths of 45,000

Reaction to danger and inefficiency of WWII fission weapon boosted fission weapons

Ivy Mike - first real fusion bomb (1952) era of hydro-gen (thermonuclear) bomb - 10.4 megaton of TNT

Why did Truman decide to develop fusion bomb? Nuke arms race bet. the US and USSR was very competitive in

the early Cold War era…

Page 17: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

Fatman – Little Boy

Page 18: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

Enola gay

Page 19: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

Hiroshima

Page 20: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

Nagasaki

Page 21: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

Did nuke revolution favor Offense or Defense???? Not easy to tell…

Technical effects of the nuclear revolution

Effect 1: Hydrogen bombs offer an increase of six orders of magnitude over the power of the TNT

Hydrogen bomb changed strategic paradigm!

Effect 2: Nuclear weapons pack tremendous explosive power in devices that are cheap, light, easily hidden, protected,

and delivered.

Nuclear Revolution

Page 22: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

Effect 3: Due to the effect 1 and 2, MAD develops between nuclear powers; “Second Strike Retaliatory Capacity” – not that difficult to obtain this ability…

Effect 4: Flat of the Curve dynamics develop… Capabilities are abso-lute…

Effect 5: Multiplier Effect - second strike retaliatory capacity in-creases if you have more… in relations between nuke powers, more maybe better…!!

Alternative Nuclear Strategies : Countervalue vs. Counterforce

1. Countervalue: Enemy’s society is targeted Political aims are achieved by threatening to punish your enemy by

destroying its population and industry. Capacity required: A second-strike countervalue capability; rela-

tively easy to execute

Page 23: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

2. Counterforce: Enemy’s nuclear forces is targeted

Political aims are achieved by threatening to disarm the enemy … by threatening to remove the enemy’s second strike capacity…

Capacity required: A first-strike counterforce capability; almost impossible!

Effect 6: Defense Dominance? Between nuclear power preemptive (or preventive) war is (al-

most) impossible… the only way to make nukes more offensive is to eliminate the defender’s second-strike capacity (to build first-strike counterforce capability)… very difficult…

Hence defense dominance! Therefore ‘Nukes’ are fundamentally defensive weapons..

Long Peace in the latter half of the 20th century – Why? Because of Nukes? Because of defense dominance? Realist account…

The Impact of the Nuke Revolution If states are sane and civilized… What if the states are not sane and civilized?

Page 24: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

MAD may be pacifying, but the road to MAD can be dangerous. Think about the relationship between the US and North Korea,

and the relationship between the US and Iran But what about the relationship between India and Pakistan?

Page 25: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

More nukes better then (the little book)? Waltz vs. Sagan Waltz – more maybe better

• Waltz advocates both horizontal and vertical nuclear prolifer-ation… ???

Sagan – not necessarily • Nuclearization may invite preventive wars• What if new nuke states fail to develop 2nd strike

capability?• What if civilians won’t have control over the nukes

in new nuke states? • Accidents do happen…

Page 26: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

Development of American Strategic Thinking Regarding Nukes Americans in the late 40s and early 50s thought nu-

clearized world would be inherently unstable; nuke arms race with the Soviets would lead to disaster..

Preventive war thinking!!! Rejected by Truman and Ike… Didn’t think of the relationship with the Soviets in terms of

MAD; The US initially thought that nukes were offensive weapons..

In the 1960s – After Cuban Missile Crisis leaders in both US and USSR began to think of their relationship in terms of MAD…

1972 – ABM treaty with the Soviets; prohibits both from building defenses against nuke attack

But throughout the Cold War both tried to escape from MAD…

Page 27: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

1980s – Reagan – SDI = Star Wars Space-based missile defense system Technologically impossible… Militarization of space… Destabilization of nuclear parity…

2001 – American withdrawal from the Treaty; MD Land-based and sea-based missile defense system NMD: a military strategy and associated systems to shield an

entire country against incoming Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs)

TMD: Targets medium-range theater ballistic missiles, which travel at about 3 km/s (6,700 mph) or less. In this context the term “theater” means the entire localized region for military operations, typically a radius of several hundred kilometers.

Criticisms… why? 2002 – NPR(Nuclear Posture Review) 2005 – Nuclear Bunker Busters ‘Robust Nuclear Earth

Penetrator’ Conventional Bunker Buster

Page 28: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

NPR (2002) The US needs to be prepared to use nuclear

weapons against China, Russia, North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya – preemptive nuclear war???

The US needs to be prepared to launch nuclear first strike when (1) NK attacks SK; (2) Iraq or Iran attack Israel; (3) China attacks Taiwan

The US needs to produce new nuclear weapons that have a lower yields and less nuclear fallout

Page 29: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

Bush’s decision to deploy MD in Poland and Czech republic Detection Radar in Czech 10 Interceptor Missiles in Poland Russian response.. In 2009, Obama cancelled the deal the U.S.

had with Poland and the Czech Republic

China’s response… to American MD in North Asia… American decision to deploy MD on Japan’s AEGIS South Korea’s position on this?? Is South Korea a

part of the US MD in the region? Korean aegis, Sejongdaewang…

Page 30: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

2006 nuclear deal between the US and India India, non member of NPT, but the US pledged to

help (peaceful) use of nuke in India in violation of nonproliferation regime based on NPT…

US also developing new nuke weapons..

US nuclear strategies during GWB Develop small nuke warheads that you can use at

battle.. MD* Bunker Busters!!

Page 31: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.
Page 32: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

I speak of peace because of the new face of war. Total war makes no sense in an age where great powers can maintain large and relatively invulnerable nuclear forces and refuse to surrender without resort to those forces. It makes no sense in an age where a single nuclear weapon contains almost ten times the explosive force delivered by all the allied air forces in the Second World War. It makes no sense in an age when the deadly poisons produced by a nuclear exchange would be carried by wind and water and soil and seed to the far corners of the globe and to generations yet unborn… Some say that it is useless to speak of peace or world law or world disarmament, and that it will be useless until the leaders of the Soviet Union adopt a more enlight-ened attitude. I hope they do. I believe we can help them do it. But I also believe that we must reexamine our own attitude, as individuals and as a Nation, for our attitude is as essential as theirs… No gov-ernment or social system is so evil that its people must be considered as lacking in virtue. As Americans, we find communism profoundly re-pugnant as a negation of personal freedom and dignity. But we can still hail the Russian people for their many achievements in science and space, in economic and industrial growth, in culture, in acts of courage.

- J F K speech delivered at American University

Page 33: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

Guided Bomb Unit-28 (GBU-28) BLU-113 Penetrator = One of Smart Weapons

Page 34: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

Obama’s nuclear weapons policy in a nut-shell Nuclear-free world!! (2009, April 5th Prague) In order to make the world nuclear weapons

free, he promised the US will work for non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament, and peaceful use of nuclear energy…

For nonproliferation, he promised to strengthen IAEA and NPT

Page 35: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

For nuclear disarmament, he promised to re-duce the role of nuclear weapons in American military and security policies, start NEW START (New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) with Russia, and to ratify CTBT

For peaceful use of nuclear energy, he promised to support NPT’s clauses 4 and 5…

Page 36: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

2010 NPR

NSA (Negative Security Assurance)• American nukes will be mainly used to deter others’ nuke at-

tacks!• If countries are members of NPT and respect norms of non-

proliferation, the US will not use nukes against those coun-tries (even though those countries attack the US with other WMDs). NSA!!!

• But if countries aren’t, the US will use nukes if they attack the US and allies even with other WMDs. Specified NK and Iran.

Withdrawal of the concept, “nuclear preemptive strike”… but still the US can use nukes first…

Obama was thinking to adopt “No First Use (NFU)” principle, but…

Page 37: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

Essay Questions for Technology and Warfare

1. Some pundits argue that spread of nuclear

weapons will bring more stability to the interstate

relations, while others claim that unfettered

spread of nuclear weapons will be inimical to the

security of nation states. What are the bases of

each argument? In what ways do you think

spread of nukes will affect interstate relations?  

Page 38: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

2. During the Cold War, MAD (Mutually Assured De-

struction) apparently made for a stable and peaceful

conflict between the US and the USSR. MD (Missile

Defense) initiative that the US is pursuing may dis-

rupt the nuclear parity that might have been the

foundation of stable superpower relations. Do you

believe this to be a wise policy? What might be an

alternative strategy for the US to ensure her secu-

rity?

Page 39: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

Essay question for the Korean War

Thomas Schelling, a famous American strategist,

once said that the cost of the Korea war (35,000

US dead) was a cheap price to pay for maintaining

the American reputation. From the benefit of hind-

sight, do you or do you not agree with Schelling’s

observation? Analyze from the Clausewitzian prin-

ciple that war is politics by other means.

Page 40: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime

Establishment of IAEA Nuclear competition between great powers; the US

(45), USSR (49), US (51, H bomb), USSR (53, H bomb), the UK (52) too dangerous!

1953, Ike calling for “Atoms for Peace”; calling for establishing IO that can promote peaceful use of nukes and monitor nuclear operations…

1957 IAEA(International Atomic Energy Agency:) was established!

Support Peaceful Use of Nuclear Power…!! Monitor and inspect to make sure that peaceful use of

nukes would not be diverted to military purposes… Member countries have to enter Safeguards Agreement with

IAEA – obligation to receive monitoring and inspection…

Page 41: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

IAEA’s limitations and ratification of NPT IAEA member countries going nuclear in 1960

(France), 1964 (China) need for more strin-gent non-proliferation system need for NPT(Non-Proliferation Treaty)

US and USSR playing a proactive role…! (1966)

Opposition from non-nuke countries.. It encourages non-nuke countries to abandon nu-

clear ambition.. but doesn’t specify that nuke coun-tries need to get rid of existing nukes!

It discourages even peaceful use of nukes!Rewrote NPT, and 1970 NPT ratified…

Page 42: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

Objective of NPTClauses 1,2,3 – deals with horizontal prolifera-

tion4,5 – recognizes inherent rights to use

nuke for peaceful purposes.. 6, 7 – deals with vertical proliferation; nuke

countries have duty to disarm nukes..

Attitude of Nuke Countries… Keep the status quo! Enthusiastic about stopping horizontal prolif-

eration, but haven’t really abided by 4, 5, 6, 7..

Page 43: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

Limitations of IAEA and NPT Non NPT members, India, Pakistan, Israel going nu-

clear.. NPT didn’t do anything…! When withdrawing IAEA and NPT, they are not able to

do anything meaningful! North Korean example!

Perception that NPT is discriminatory.. Nuke countries do not interpret NPT 6, 7 as obligatory clauses.. Hence IAEA cannot monitor nuke activities of nuke power..

1995 NPT review conference – NPT will be ratified indefinitely…!

2005 review conference – stalemate… non-nuke member countries want to secure and develop nu-clear power for peaceful purposes…

2010 review conference???

Page 44: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: CTBT 1963 US, USSR, UK signed Partial Test Ban

Treaty (PTBT) – ban nuclear test in the air and on the ground and under water…

What about underground? So CTBT was signed aiming to ban any kinds of test any-where… at 1993 UN Conference.

154 signatories.. Only 51 ratified…US, Russia, China not ratifying the treaty!

Clinton and Obama pushing for ratification…

Page 45: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

Nuclear Export Control Regime Zangger Committee: ZC, 1974

For efficient implementation of NPT section 2 of clause 3 35 member countries Pass domestic laws to prevent export of nukes.. Member countries share information… punish other member

countries exporting items on the “control list”!

Nuclear Suppliers’ Group: NSG in 1978, aka London Club…

India going nuclear with help from Canada.. (1974) Need for a more stringent control mechanism than ZC 45 member countries Control “dual-use goods” as well… US takes on the leading role…

Voluntarism… not IOs! Find more about them on their respective websites and

wikipedia…

Page 46: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

Nuclear Security Summit The goal of the summit process is to address the

threat of nuclear terrorism by enhancing interna-tional cooperation to prevent the illicit acquisition of nuclear material by non-state actors such as terrorist groups and smugglers.

In addition to the Sagan’s arguments, nuclear terrorism is why proliferation is such a bad idea!!!

2010 – in the US 2012 – South Korea

• The ‘nuclear security’-’nuclear safety’ nexus was raised in particular following the March 2011 nuclear disaster in Fukushima, Japan.

• Two major concerns now – nuclear security and nu-clear safety…

Page 47: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

Other WMD Control Regimes

Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) The Wassenaar Arrangement has been established in order to

contribute to regional and international security and stability, by promoting transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing destabilizing accumulations. Participating states seek, through their national policies, to ensure that transfers of these items do not contribute to the development or enhancement of military capabilities which undermine these goals, and are not diverted to support such capabilities.

COCOM (The Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls) is the predecessor…

http://www.wassenaar.org/ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wassenaar_Arrangement

Page 48: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) The Missile Technology Control Regime is an informal

and voluntary association of countries which share the goals of non-proliferation of unmanned delivery systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, and which seek to coordinate national export licensing efforts aimed at preventing their proliferation. The MTCR was originally established in 1987 by Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. Since that time, the number of MTCR partners has increased to a total of thirty-four countries, all of which have equal standing within the Regime.

http://www.mtcr.info/english/index.html http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Missile_Technology_Control_

Regime

Page 49: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

HCOC The Hague Code of Conduct against Bal-

listic Missile Proliferation (HCoC) is the result of enforced efforts of the interna-tional community to internationally regu-late the area of ballistic missiles which could be capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction.

http://www.hcoc.at/index.php

Page 50: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

Australia Group (AG) The Australia Group (AG) is an informal forum of

countries which, through the harmonization of export controls, seeks to ensure that exports do not contribute to the development of chemical or biological weapons. Coordination of national export control measures assists Australia Group participants to fulfill their obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention to the fullest extent possible.

http://www.australiagroup.net/en/index.html http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Australia_Group

Page 51: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

an international effort led by the United States to interdict transfer of banned weapons and weapons technology. The PSI is primarily focused on combating proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and materials. The initiative is designed to work within the framework of other international agreements and the role of participating countries varies. The PSI consists of 15 core countries, which alongside the US include Russia, Japan, France, Germany and the United Kingdom. A further 60 countries have agreed to cooperate on an ad hoc basis.

In September 2005, the People's Republic of China announced that it would not be participating in PSI due to concerns over its legality. India has so far resisted signing on to PSI. However, India, US, Japan, Australia & Singapore are conducting PSI exercises in the Bay of Bengal (Malabar Exercises - September 2007).

Page 52: International Security and Peace Cold War, Technology, and Warfare Prof. Jaechun Kim.

C is obsolete/ relevant in nuke age?

What political objectives can justify the usage of nukes?

Annihilation of enemy may become meaningless in nuke age…

C’s emphasis on the primacy of politics is still valid..