International Political Science Association (IPSA) 23rd World Congress of Political Science “Challenges of Contemporary Governance” 19-24 July 2014 Montréal. Québec. Canada. Session: RC13 Democratization in comparative perspective Panel: Emergency Politics in Democratic Contexts - Session 2 Chair: Dr. Claire Wright Co-chair: Claudia Heiss Title of the paper: Argentina in times of Kirchnerismo ¿continuity or change? Author: Santiago C. Leiras Institutional membership: University of Buenos Aires-Argentina Abstract One of the main axes of the political discussion in recent years in Argentina has gone around the project Kirchner´s "rupture or continuity" character relative to that played by the Menemismo during the 1990s. The radicalization of the political conflict -the conflict with the agricultural sector in 2008 and the hard confrontation between the executive branch and the Clarin media group from the 2008 year to present are emblematic expressions- created the conditions for the radicalization of the intellectual and political debate, being the axis change/continuity one of the main topics in the discussion. Indeed, beyond the rich discussion raised around this issue, a claim policy of reorganizing the state and society is present in Argentina at the beginning of each new political era: what could represent a process of alternating between different political actors is perceived as the beginning of a new chapter in history of the republic that comes to constitute a real hinge of history. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the changes that occurred during the experiences of Nestor Kirchner and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner in power, as well as continuities in relation to the 1990s.
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International Political Science Association (IPSA)
23rd World Congress of Political Science
“Challenges of Contemporary Governance”
19-24 July 2014
Montréal. Québec. Canada.
Session: RC13 Democratization in comparative perspective
Panel: Emergency Politics in Democratic Contexts - Session 2
Chair: Dr. Claire Wright
Co-chair: Claudia Heiss
Title of the paper: Argentina in times of Kirchnerismo ¿continuity or
change?
Author: Santiago C. Leiras
Institutional membership: University of Buenos Aires-Argentina
Abstract
One of the main axes of the political discussion in recent years in Argentina has gone
around the project Kirchner´s "rupture or continuity" character relative to that played by the
Menemismo during the 1990s. The radicalization of the political conflict -the conflict with
the agricultural sector in 2008 and the hard confrontation between the executive branch and
the Clarin media group from the 2008 year to present are emblematic expressions- created
the conditions for the radicalization of the intellectual and political debate, being the axis
change/continuity one of the main topics in the discussion.
Indeed, beyond the rich discussion raised around this issue, a claim policy of reorganizing
the state and society is present in Argentina at the beginning of each new political era: what
could represent a process of alternating between different political actors is perceived as the
beginning of a new chapter in history of the republic that comes to constitute a real hinge of
history.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the changes that occurred during the experiences of
Nestor Kirchner and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner in power, as well as continuities in
relation to the 1990s.
1. Introduction
One of the main axes of the political discussion in recent years in Argentina has gone
around the project Kirchner´s "rupture or continuity" character relative to that played by the
Menemismo during the 1990s. The radicalization of the political conflict -the conflict with
the agricultural sector in 2008 and the hard confrontation between the executive branch and
the Clarín media group from the year 20081 to present are emblematic expressions-, created
the conditions for the radicalization of the intellectual and political debate, being the axis
change/continuity one of the main topics in the discussion.
In this debate, prominent intellectuals sympathetic to the ruling party -as philosophers
Ricardo Forster (2010a, 2010b), chief spokesman of the group Carta Abierta, Horacio
Gonzalez (2011) or José Pablo Feinmann (2011) - as well as important critical voices -as
sociologist Maristella Svampa (2007) and essayist Beatriz Sarlo (2011), who presented this
view in the publication of his authorship between boldness and calculation. Kirchner 2003-
2010- have been participants among others.
Beyond the rich discussion raised around this issue, a claim of reorganizing the state and
society is present in Argentina at the beginning of each new political era: what could
represent a process of alternating between different political actors is perceived as the
beginning of a new chapter in history of the republic that comes to constitute a real hinge of
history.
In a recent publication the Argentine philosopher Thomas Abraham affirmed:
We are used to the founding myths. Regenerative point is a commonplace then
repeated by each of the national crises (Abraham, 2012)
At the same time, the Argentine philosopher asked himself about the peculiarities of our
political culture:
¿May it be possible that every time a government staff takes in charge a mutation
of the value system is announced?
As if it would exist a zero grade of the culture. Saints, martyrs, excomulgated. A
new epiphany consecrates a new power shift and proclaim a recent victorious in
a cultural battle (Abraham, 2012: 246-247)
So then it's like during the government of Raúl Alfonsín this foundational claim was
present and established the 1983 year as the boundary between democracy and dictatorship,
1 In this context the debate about the role of media took place and the Audiovisual Communication Services
law was passed in 2009.
Dated October 29, 2013, the opinion of the Supreme Court in favor of the constitutionality of Law 26522
(Law on Audiovisual Communication Services) was met. See synthetic version Judicial Information Center: "
La Corte Suprema declaró la constitucionalidad de la Ley de Medios" http://www.cij.gov.ar/nota-12394-La-
You can also consult the full version of the judgment in Supreme Court: "Grupo Clarín y otros c/Poder
Ejecutivo Nacional y otros/acción meramente declarativa" Buenos Aires, October 29, 2013.
in the aftermath of a military regime in frank and disorderly retreat after the military
debacle of the Falklands war.
With the Carlos Menem´s assumption in 1989, in the middle of the hyperinflation process
that forced the Raúl Alfonsín´s resignation, the same year 1989 was constituted in the new
Argentinian political hinge and established a continuity between civilians, civil-military,
democratic or pseudo democratic governments as expressions of the same Second World
War statist model.
This inclination to inaugurate a new historical time (Perez Liñán, 2013) will not be absent
during the Nestor and Cristina Kirchner´s experiences, being the 2003 year the turning
point of history hitherto lived. The construction of this new political narrative was framed
in the context of the terminal crisis of Argentina between late 2001 and early 2002.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the changes that occurred during the experiences of
Nestor Kirchner and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner in power, as well as continuities in
relation to the 1990s.
In the first part we will approach on the foundational claim during the Raul Alfonsin and
Carlos Menem administrations, as part of the foundational vocation present in the
Argentinian politics after each one of the “terminal crises”.
After introducing this foundational claim, we will point out briefly the genesis of the
kirchnerism and then we will focus on the debate at times of kirchnerism in a second part.
2. The foundational vocation during the Raul Alfonsín´s time.
The democratic political system begins to be the anchor point for the institutional
organization policy with the triumph of the radical formula, Raul Alfonsin- Victor
Martinez, in the presidential elections of October 30, 1983 and the subsequent inauguration
on December 10 of that year. Its establishment was the result of the process of democratic
transition that the Armed Forces began in the aftermath of his government, nor as a result
of his repeated failures than their own convictions.
Indeed, after the military defeat with Great Britain in the Falklands War in the month of
June 1982 a process of transition to democracy, characterized by two central features,
began.
The first of these has been the inability to establish some sort of institutional pact aimed at
defining among political actors the rules of the democratic reconstruction. In this regard,
our country is a good example of what the academic literature in those years was termed as
"Transition by rupture" (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1989), characterized by the absence of
mutual guarantees between the installed new government and the replaced authoritarian
regime.
After the collapse of the military regime, provoked by the military defeat in the South
Atlantic conflict, the Armed Forces were strongly questioned because of its governmental
and professional performance, being the latter questioned because of its action in this war.
For the foregoing reasons, political leaders found insufficient incentives to negotiate with
the armed forces all the issues related to the agenda of the democratic transition, as it
happened in Brazil, Chile and Uruguay (Stepan, 1988; Garreton, 1987; Gillespie, 1995),
paradigmatic experiences of South America, or the cases of Spain and Italy (Maravall and
Santamaria, 1989; Morlino, 1986, 2000; Pasquino, 2002) seen at this time as examples of
successful experiences of political democratization.
The second feature was the absence of any kind of a party agreement by civil forces that
could have more and better institutional resources to take over the difficult legacy they
would receive from the Armed Forces government (Mustapic and Goretti, 1992)2.
The absence of these agreements put the political forces in open competition with each
other, without prior agreement on the central issues on the public agenda, nor about a form
of power-sharing that was largely independent of the electoral results (Mustapic and Goretti
1992).
The two major political parties in Argentina, the United Cívica Radical (UCR) and the
Justicialist Party (PJ), faced the new democratic situation playing their roles according to
the characteristics of a consolidated democracy rules, while both parties must face the
dilemmas of the democratic transition.
The challenges and demands that the new democracy had to face were substantial then. The
citizen and fundamentally the strategic actors (Coppedge, 1994)3 had to accept the postulate
that the only valid principle of political legitimacy came from the popular legitimacy. At
the same time, the new political regime had the obligation to set rules and procedures for
determining the ways of access to elective office. However, the biggest challenge was to
ensure continuity and institutional validity such that the rules and procedures were accepted
at least by those who were determined as participants in the process by these rules.
Moreover, Argentinian democracy debuted with ethical requirements. Citizens demanded
to clarify the facts and prosecute those responsible for the 1976 coup and the systematic
violation of human rights. The indelible wounds that the process had left in the collective
imagination were decisive for the meaning that a democratic political order had in order to
organize the social life, to channel social conflicts and resolve the political antagonism.
Therefore, ensure freedom of association and information without prohibitions, bans or
2 The commitments made during the instauration of democracy, such as the Pact of Punto Fijo in Venezuela
(1958) or Moncloa Pact in Spain (1977), aimed to reduce conflicts and set limits to political competitiveness
in order to strengthen the commitment of all stakeholders to sustain the democratic institutions. 3 We define here as strategic actors to those groups that have sufficient resources to influence, obstruct and
even oppose the process of affirmation of the political regime power. This definition has been reworked from
what Michael Coppedge meant by strategic actors "who are capable of undermining governance by
intervening in the economy or public order or use certain resources for their own political benefit".
censorship and the citizen participation to strengthen the loyalty to the institutions was a
non-negotiable obligation of officers elected by universal suffrage.
In consequence the '80s was the time of democracy, identified as a non-return time in the
recent past. It is definitely a time of great moral imperatives and large social requirements.
Belief about the goodness of democracy to organize social behaviors and lifestyles and
socially shared meaning that identifies democracy with good governance and as such able
to resolve the multiplicity of problems inherited from the armed forces time is generalized.
The tripod popular legitimacy/ethical imperatives/effectiveness of democracy summarizes
this time and exposes how difficult was to find to Argentinian democracy not to break their
promises that ultimately were his own base4.
A Strong demand linked to claims of substantive justice long delayed due to the
institutional action of the military government, which will lead to a reevaluation of political
democracy as a framework for meeting the diverse and heterogeneous sectorial demands,
existed then in the Argentinian society by 1983. In consequence there was not scope for
Reform and Structural Adjustment policies (Torre, 1998) which could generate the
existence of new "social victims" (Novaro and Palermo, 1996).
This will explain the conviction that posautoritarian reconstruction was exclusively a
political and institutional phenomenon5.
The change of Political Regime was the central
problem of the democratic transition´s political agenda and it was defined as Transition
from Authoritarianism to Democratic Regime. Because of the building a democratic system
of government was exclusively privileged, it was not warned that the process should
necessarily include the reorganization of the economy (Portantiero, 1993; Torre, 1994).
From this conviction a democratic society refunding project was proposed to the society in
the economic –Austral Plan and State Modernization-, institutional -.constitutional reform
proposal6-, administrative–Relocation of the capital city to Viedma- and moral/intellectual -
Raised in the guidelines given by Raúl Alfonsín at the site of Parque Norte on December 1,
1985- plans.
This conviction explained above found his first boundary in the elections held in Argentina
on 6 September 1987. Its main consequences were first, the beginning of the end of the
Alfonsin´s vast project of reform and second the installation of the debate over the
presidential succession with different impacts on the majority parties7.
The economic collapse produced during the 1989/1990 years represented the second limit
and it meant a strong redefinition in the notion of the democratic transition: The reform-
4 See Kerz and Leiras 2004.
5 This strong conviction was present in the social sciences of the time. See Agulla, 1996; Fernández, 2002;
Floria, 1988; Grossi and Dos Santos, 1984; O´Donnell and Schmitter, 1989; Portantiero, 1984 among others.
Newest and of special interest is Bercholc J. and Bercholc D, 2012
6 See Bosoer and Vázquez 2012.
7 See Leiras 2009, 2011.
reconfiguration of State Power metaphor replaced the political change as a definition of the
new political cycle of the democracy.in Argentina.
3. The foundational vocation in the Menemato´s time
The 1990s will show how the logic of the market, which by its nature generates social
inequality, threatens democratic logic. The neoliberal hegemonic discourse flag was the
virtuous circle between economic openness, minimal state and democracy´s promise. More
the economy is open to the world and the state was reduced at his minimal expression and
the democracy make possible the previsibility in all the proceedings, more these virtuous
circle benefits will be shared.
Its consequence was the breakdown of the contract between the market and the democracy,
which characterized the European welfare state and/or our version of the welfare state,
breaking in consequence the virtuosity of that circle described above. The spillover became
a moral postulate and greater material benefits for all had reconverted into profits for a few
and anxieties for many people.
The existence of international forces, imposing severe limits to the nature and type of
economic and social welfare policies, were accepted during the presidency of Carlos
Menem (1989-1999) who faithfully adopted the Washington Consensus guidelines, and
confined their political and economic choices within the parameters set by this consensus;
the dominant belief was: the requirements beyond national borders should be accepted
without questions to ensure success in the action of government.
Because an unavoidable extension of market logic on the democracy took as a kind of
historical determinism, the representative democracy Argentina suffered its own
metamorphosis. The forms of manipulation, that were adopted for the construction of
operating agreements, were developed either under the representative mechanism´s shadow
or practicing forms of cooptation of individual wills in order to incline the debate in a
direction of deliberative resolutions that contributed to the success of the economic
program adopted.
This "transition from statism to market" will also operate in the middle of the building of a
new ideological matrix (Bosoer and Leiras, 2001) of democracy in Argentina based on
three structural axes:
a) A redefinition of the authoritarianism regime and the first period of democratic
rule´s crisis as a final step in the crisis of the state model of economic development
and social regulation, from which the 1983 historical hinge is moved to 1989 as a
true moment of rupture with the past.
b) A reevaluation of the Raúl Alfonsín´s presidential administration, taking into
account the last part of his term, as an administration marked by progressive
weakness in the exercise of power that produces finally the forward delivery of
government five months before the end of their constitutional mandate. This end is
attributed not only to the loss of support and the lack of results of government
policies tested to overcome the situation of emergency but also and especially to the
exhaustion of a larger reformist project, which was questioned from different
sectors of power for whom this political project was a threat.
c) A project of Reconstruction / Redefinition of State Power, with the centrality of
market-oriented policies in its three main dimensions: Ideological (neo
decisionismo) Bureaucratic Functional (Reform State), and Legal (Constitutional
Reform).
All this redefinition took place in the middle of a democratic regime that was developed
under a State of Emergency (Leiras, 2010) which will be invoked permanently during the
last decade; in consequence the appeal will enter at odds with the political narrative´s
foundational claim of the 1990 decade.
It must be highlighted that the presidential succession of 1989 in Argentina took place in a
new context, for the first time since the discontinuous democratic history of this country,
characterized by the transfer of power between different partisan president’s sign. At the
same time, this replacement took place under the most severe economic crisis known until
then, because of hyperinflation that led to the resignation of Dr. Raúl Alfonsín five months
before the end of his presidential mandate –the "resignation" was presented to the
Legislative Assembly on June 30, 1989- and the inauguration, on 8 July of the same year,
by Dr. Carlos Menem.
The balance is ambiguous: The (neo) decisionismo8 demonstrated functional and successful
to resolve a crisis of governance and close the gap between state government, rule of law
and basic contracts of the social and economic structure.
But at the same time, it contained in its core reason their own limitations, which affected
the quality of Argentina institutional democracy itself, as it was his inability to be
institutionalized, resting ultimately on the figure of the plebiscitary leader as the sole source
of the effective decision and the guarantee of the political and economic stability. It found
in the confines of their political power the circumstances which led to power, being
necessary to recreate their support base argument. In Hobbesian terms, out of this principle
the state of nature permanently stalks.
This scenario, far from a normalization of the Argentine political system with a possible
alternation between forces and/or coalitions able to pursue an agenda of consensus and
8
We mean by "neo decisionismo", a model of political decision heavily concentrated in the presidency, a
rethinking and adaptation of the presidential system in the context of a double transition, from
authoritarianism to democracy and the economic statism to the market deregulation and active integration to
the rhythms imposed by the process of capitalist globalization. This new decisionismo is based on a
conception of governance sustained in the prerogatives and the "performance" of the prevailing Executive,
with all its attributes, over the other branches with their attributes and functions. See Bosoer and Leiras (1999,
2001).
However, the experience of the "decisionist kirchnerism" leads to rethink this definition to the extent that
this neodecisionismo allows us to establish a separation between the substantive content of public policy and
the political style. See Perez Liñán, 2012.
dissent, would be the danger of ungovernability and illegitimacy from the moment that
Carlos Menem concluded his presidency. The false prophecy self-fulfilled with the
successive crises produced both during the Alliance government what would happen from
December 10, 1999 as well as during the interim between Peronist governments in the last
days of December 2001 and early 2002, and gave ground with many of the democratic
process assumptions, sustained on the political normalization´s reading:
a) The case of bribery´s in the national Senate that would lead to a public showdown
between the president Fernando De La Rua and his Vice President Carlos "Chacho"
Alvarez; this episode culminated with the latter's resignation on October 6 in 2000.
b) The economic crisis that led to the Domingo Cavallo´s arrival in the Economy
Ministry in March 2001.
c) The unfavorable electoral results of the parliamentary elections in October 2001 for
the ruling, as an expression of a deeper phenomenon of increasing political apathy
in the electoral arena.
d) The political events of December 2001 which resulted in the resignation of
Fernando De La Rua, in the middle of a tragic toll of 30 dead and hundreds of
injured across the country, and the most profound institutional crisis experienced
until then.
e) The abrupt departure from the convertibility with the consequent breaking of the
rules prevailing throughout the 1990 decade macroeconomic game and the
declaration of default on the debt to private creditors during the presidencies of
Eduardo Duhalde and Adolfo Rodriguez Saa respectively.
This "Menemismo and then", its legacy, consequences and projection of this legacy will be
approached briefly below (Baldioli and Leiras, 2010).
4. The genesis of kirchnerism
Because it is hard to understand the emergence of the kirchnerism without referring to the
context of the 2001/2002 terminal crisis, we will approach briefly, in the first place, to the
central aspects of this phase of the Argentinian politics taking as a point of departure the
collapse of the Alliance experience and the transition of Eduardo Duhalde between 2002
and 2003.
Fernando De La Rúa was elected in the presidential elections of October 1999 with a
percentage of almost 49 per cent of the votes as the candidate of a political coalition
(Alianza por la Educación, la Justicia y el Trabajo), between the centenary party, Union
Cívica Radical (UCR) and a political aggrupation constituted by dissident peronist sectors,
FREPASO –Frente por un País Solidario-.
The experience of Fernando De La Rúa began in a context of severe restrictions in matters
of economic resources but also political and organizational resources also; in the beginning
of august 1997 the Unión Cívica Radical and The Frente por un País Solidario conformed
an electoral coalition, in order to defeat the Menemismo –expression of the Peronism
during the 1990 decade-. The success was immediate: the alliance won in the legislative
elections in 1997 and two years later in the presidential elections of 1999.
The internal disagreements produced in the alliance were produced of, on one hand the
absence of rules that allow to process the natural conflicts that could happen in the political
coalition (Serrafero, 2002) as a lack of an internal debate about the bases of a coalition
government and on the other hand the gap between a formal leadership, represented in the
figure of De La Rúa and a real leadership represented in the figures of Raúl Alfonsin and
Carlos “Chacho Alvarez.
The consequence of these disagreements was the existence of chronic crisis in the
administration of the Alliance. From the vice president´s resignation to the own De La
Rúa´s resignation, the alliance was in a permanent crisis of governability.
After the De La Rua´s resignation, a brief and temporary presidency of Adolfo Rodriguez
Saa –who will declare the default of the Argentinian public debt- and successive
institutional coming and going, Eduardo Duhalde was elected by the legislative assembly as
president on January 1st 2002, with the objective of complete the De La Rúa´s presidential
period. The head of the Buenos Aires PJ, at this time, accepted the presidential baton from
his peers in the congress, the same one that citizens denied him through the vote two years
earlier (Abos, 2011), having to resolve from economic to political issues of great
complexity.
In spite of the efforts in economic and social matters in the context of the public
emergency, the social crisis had its manifestation through the Avellaneda incidents that had
serious consequences from the political point of view. Two political activists, Maximiliano
Santillán and Darío Kosteki were killed and 34 persons were hurt by plumb bullet.
Because of this situation, the president Duhalde, in the context of a broad reorganization of
his cabinet, decided to advance the presidential elections, establishing on April 27th
2003 as
date of these elections.
Under these circumstances, the main challenge was to complete the last stage of the
"transition" successfully and ensure, "adequacy" by means of electoral engineering, the
victory of a candidate related to the management of this transition (Baldioli and Leiras,
2012a).
After the failed installation of the presidential candidacies of Carlos Reutemann and José
Manuel de la Sota, Eduardo Duhalde ends up giving his support to the then governor of the
province of Santa Cruz, Nestor Kirchner, with the purpose to face Carlos Menem and
Adolfo Rodríguez Saa in a "Peronist open primary" in the same presidential election.
A smart campaign strategy made possible the entry of Kirchner in the second round.
Indeed, in the presidential elections of April 27, 2003, Nestor Kirchner obtained a 21.99%
of the votes, finishing second behind Carlos Menem, who obtained 24.34 % of the votes.
Table I
Presidential elections in Argentina
April 27th 2003
CANDIDATE AND PARTY VOTES PERCENTAGE
Carlos Menem
Frente por la Lealtad 4.677.213 24,34
Néstor Kirchner
Frente para la Victoria 4.227.141 21,99
Ricardo López Murphy
Movimiento Federal Recrear 3.142.848 16,35
Elisa Carrio
Alternativa por una República de Iguales 2.720.143 14,15
Adolfo Rodríguez Saa
Frente Nacional y Popular 2.714.760 14,12
Others candidates 1.531.527 7,97
blank and impugned votes 214.294 1,08
Source: Georgetown University. Political Database of America (PDBA)
The ballotage would be held on May 18, 2003. Previous surveys indicated an intention to
vote for Governor of Santa Cruz between 60 and 70 % of the electorate. This didn´t mean
an explicit support for the merits of Nestor Kirchner, but a rejection of the possibility that
Carlos Menem ruled the country again. However, the ballotage would not take place: on 14
May the former president Menem, after a long string of rumors and denials, announced his
decision to renounce his candidacy; this declination became Néstor Kirchner automatically
as elected president.
5. ¿Continuity or change? Debate in the kirchnerismo´s time
The response to the crisis during the Menem years, as a real attempt to develop a new
ideological matrix, acquired its expression through a legitimating discourse of high
symbolic efficiency. Such efficacy would emerge from the fact that government relief
occurred in December 1999 did not involve a substantive reformulation of the legal
ideological and organizational assumptions contained in this matrix and present throughout
the 1990s, but rather a ratification and deepening of such program, which remained in force
until present even in a context characterized as "terminal": the 2001 crisis.
However, the rise to power of Nestor Kirchner to the presidency of the nation has been
defined as "an unpredictable and unexpected crack in the evolution of Argentina's history"
by intellectuals sympathetic to the ruling party as the philosopher Richard Forster (Forster
2010a), since the same was the result of the traumatic events of December 2001 and the
collapse of the government of the “Alianza” (Leiras, 2003; Novaro, 2002; Serrafero, 2002).
The pillars, on which was described this Argentina´s “new historical cycle”, would be four:
first, the launch of a new productive development with social inclusion and radical
redistribution of income model, second, an improvement in the quality of democratic
institutions, third the implementation of a policy in the field of human rights that came to
put an end with a cycle of impunity consecrated in the Punto Final and Obediencia Debida
laws enacted under Raul Alfonsin´s administration and Carlos Menem's pardons and finally
the recovery of the role of the state, absent during the '90s.
It must be highlighted that the start of a "new productive cycle" dates from late 2001 and
early 2002 when, under the most serious crisis in Argentina's political history, former
presidents Adolfo Rodriguez Saa and Eduardo Duhalde adopted strategies of drastic
adjustment in the beginning of this new cycle that consisted in the declaring of the default
on foreign debt in the first case and the devaluation of the peso and the “pesification” of the
economy in the second one, carrying out the implementing of the new model´s "dirty
work". After the sharp initial adjustment, the Argentine economy had high recovery rates of
gross domestic product practically until to present.
Table II
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) - Real growth rate (%)