International Policy Digest Volume I Issue V

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A �eed for Pan-Asian Institutions in Asia

by Dr. Anis Bajrektarevic 3

American Terrorists Abroad and Due Process

by Alejandro M Sueldo 5

International Criminal Court: Successes and Failures

of the Past and Goals for the Future

by Daniel Donovan 8

Ireland’s Debt and the Heart of St. O’Toole

by Conn M Hallinan 23

On Power and Delusions Granduer

by Deepak Tripathi 24

Can Jim Yong Kim Reinvent the World Bank?

by Peter Bosshard 26

Commentary: The Credible Conservative

by James Kane 27

Disengagement the Best Engagement for �orth Korea

by John KYi 7

The Effects of the US Resolution Against Sri Lanka

by Gibson Bateman 12

Why �ot Get the Law and Politics Right in Iran?

by Richard Falk 13

Argentina’s Economic Policy: Failing to Learn from History

by Patrick Hall and John Hall 19

International Policy Digest Volume I Issue V

The U.S. Presidential Candidates on Cybersecurity

by Anneleen Roggeman 14

Peace Corps Diary: Ethiopia 1962-1964 Part 9

by Richard Lyman 16

Post-Geneva Delusions: The �ext Steps in Sri Lanka

by Gibson Bateman 21

The Health Care Argumant That Should Have Been

Made

by B. Lee Drake 28

Assessing China’s Role and Influence in Africa

by Ambassador David H Shinn 30

Romney’s Foreign Policy and Russia

by John Lyman 34

Managing Country Risk

by John Lyman 37

Correction: In the initial March edition (1 March 2012 through 15 March 2012), the citation for the cover photo is missing. The photo is "Arab League to Monitor

Syria - Source: BBC". We apologize for the oversight.

March 15th - 31 st

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in the Asian theater?

While other major theaters have had institutions in place for

many decades, such as the Organization ofAmerican States (OAS)

in the Americas, the African Union (AU) in Africa, the Council of

Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in

Europe (OSCE) in Europe, the situation in the world’s largest

continent is rather different.

What becomes apparent at first glance is the absence of any

pan-Asian security or multilateral institutions. Prevailing security

structures are bilateral and mostly asymmetric. They range from

the clearly defined and enduring non-aggression security treaties,

through less formal arrangements, and ad hoc cooperation accords

that address specific issues.

The presence of the multilateral regional settings is limited to a

very few spots in the largest continent, and even then, they are

rarely mandated to deal with security issues. Another striking

feature is that most of the existing bilateral structures have an

Asian state on one side, and either a peripheral or external protégé

country on the other side (which makes them nearly per definition

asymmetric).

The examples are numerous: the US–Japan, the US– S. Korea,

the US–Singapore, Russia–India, Australia–East Timor,

Russia–North Korea, Japan –Malaysia, China–Pakistan, the

US–Pakistan, China–Cambodia, the US–Saudi Arabia, Russia

–Iran, China–Burma, India–Maldives, Iran–Syria, N.

Korea–Pakistan, etc.

Indeed, Asia today resonates with a mixed echo of the Euro-

pean past. It combines features of the pre-Napoleonic, post-

Napoleonic and the League-of-Nations Europe.

What are the useful lessons from the European past? Well,

there are a few, for sure. Bismarck accommodated the exponential

economic, demographic and military growth as well as the

territorial expansion of Prussia by skillfully architecturing and

calibrating the complex networks of bilateral security

arrangements of 19th century Europe.

However, as soon as the new Kaiser removed the Iron

Chancellor (Bismarck), the provincial and backward–minded,

insecure and militant Prussian establishment contested (by their

own interpretations of the German’s machtpolitik and weltpolitik

policies) Europe and the world in two devastating world wars.

That, as well as Hitler’s establishment afterwards, simply did not

know what to do with a powerful Germany.

The aspirations and constellations of some of Asia’s powers

today remind us also of the pre-Napoleonic Europe, in which a

unified, universalistic block of the Holy Roman Empire was

contested by the impatient challengers of the status quo. Such

3

A Need for Pan­Asian Institutions in AsiaBy Dr. Anis Bajrektarevic

20 March 2012

What becomesapparent at firstglance is theabsence ofanypan-Asian securityor multilateralinstitutions

first and foremost, of Europe between the Vienna Congress of

1815 and the revolutionary year of 1848.

At any rate, let us take a quick look at the most relevant

regional settings in Asia.

By far, the largest institution in Asia is with the Asia-Pacific

Economic Cooperation (APEC), an organization engulfing both

sides of the Pacific Rim. Nevertheless, this is a forum for member

economies (not of sovereign nations), a sort of a prep-com or

waiting room for the World Trade Organization (WTO). To use

the words of one senior Singapore diplomat who recently told me

in Geneva, “what is your option here?…to sign the Free Trade

Agreement (FTA), side up with the US, login to Facebook, and

keep shopping on the internet happily ever after…”

Two other crosscutting settings are the Organization of Islamic

Cooperation (OIC) and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The

first is with a permanent secretariat and the NAM is without one.

The OIC and NAM represent well-established political multilateral

bodies. However, they are inadequate forums as neither of the two

is (strictly) mandated with security issues. Although both trans-

continental entities do have large memberships (being the 2nd and

3rd largest multilateral systems, right after the UN), neither covers

the entire Asian political landscape – having important Asian

countries outside the system or opposing it.

Furthermore, one should mention the Korean Peninsula Energy

Development Organization (KEDO) (Nuclear) and the Iran-related

Contact Group (Quartet/P-5+1 ).

In both cases, the issues dealt with are indeed security related,

but they are more of an asymmetric approach to deter and contain

a single country by the larger front of peripheral states that are

serious centripetal and centrifugal oscillations of

Europe were not without grave deviations: as much

as Cardinal Richelieu’s and Jacobin’s France

successfully emancipated itself, the Napoleon III and

pre-WWII France encircled, isolated itself, implicitly

laying the foundation for the German attack.

Finally, the existing Asian regional settings also

resemble the picture of the post-Napoleonic Europe:

For over a decade, many relevant academic journals have

prophesized the 21 st century as the Asian century. The argument is

usually based on impressive economic growth, increased

production, trade and booming foreign currency reserves.

Undoubtedly, the fact that Asia holds nearly 1 /3 of the total

world population doesn’t hurt its chances from overtaking the

United States and Europe in many areas.

However, history serves as a powerful reminder by warning us

that economically and/or demographically mighty geographic

centers run into problems, especially when the periphery is

weakened by several factors. This means that any (absolute or

relative) shift in economic or demographic strength will inevitably

put additional stress on the existing power equilibriums that

support this balance in the particular theater (implicit or explicit

structure).

Thus, what is the state of Asia’s security

structures? What are the existing capacities of Asian

countries of preventive diplomacy and what

instruments are at their disposal when it comes to

conflict prevention and resolution, exchange

mechanisms, reconciliation, capacity and confidence

International Policy Digest Volume I Issue V

opposing a particular security policy, in

this case, North Korea and Iran.

If some of the settings are remini-

scent of the pre-Napoleonic Europe, the

Shanghai Cooperation Organization

(SCO) and the Cooperation Council for

the Arab states of the Gulf (GCC) they

remind us of the post-Napoleonic Europe

and its Alliance of the Eastern

Conservative courts (ofMetternich). Both

arrangements were created on a pretext of

a common external (ideological and

geopolitical) threat, on a shared status

quo security consideration. Asymmetric

GCC was an externally induced setting by

which an American key Middle East ally,

Saudi Arabia, gathered the grouping of

the Arabian Peninsula monarchies. It has

served a dual purpose; originally, to

contain the leftist Nasseristic pan-

Arabism which was introducing a

republican type of egalitarian government

in the Middle Eastern theater. It was also

(after the 1979 revolution) an instrument

to counter-balance the Iranian influence

in the Gulf and the wider Middle East.

The response to the spring 201 1 tur-

moil in the Middle East (including the

deployment of the Saudi troops in

Bahrain, and including the analysis of the

role of influential Qatar-based and GCC-

backed Al Jazeera TV network) is the

best proof of the very nature of the GCC

mandate.

The SCO is internally induced and

more symmetric setting. Essentially, it

came into existence through a strategic

Sino-Russian rapprochement (based, for

the first time in modern history, on parity)

to deter external aspirants (the US, Japan,

Korea, India, Turkey and Saudi Arabia)

and to keep the resources, territory,

present socio-political culture and

political regime in Central Asia, Tibet

heights and the Xinjiang Uighur province

in line.

The next to consider is the Indian sub-

continent’s grouping, the South Asian

Association for Regional Cooperation

(SAARC). This organization has a well-

established mandate, is well staffed and

has a permanent secretariat. However, the

Organization is strikingly reminiscent of

the League of Nations. The League is remembered as an altruistic setup which repeatedly

failed to adequately respond to the security quests of its members as well as to the

challenges and pressures of parties that were kept out of the system (e.g. Russia until well

into the 1930s and the US remaining completely outside the system, and in the case of

SAARC surrounding; China, Saudi Arabia and the US).

SAARC is practically a hostage of the mega confrontation of its two largest members,

both confirmed nuclear powers; India and Pakistan. Pakistan and India continue to

challenge each other geopolitically and ideologically (existence of one is a negation of the

existence of the other; the religiously determined nationhood of Pakistan is a negation of

multiethnic India and vice verse).

Additionally, SAARC, although internally induced, is an asymmetric organization.

It is not only the size of India, but also its position: centrality of that country makes SAARC

practically impossible to operate in any field without the direct consent of India (be it

commerce, communication, politics or security).

For a serious advancement of multilateralism, mutual trust, a will to compromise and

achieve a common denominator through active co-existence is the key. It is hard to build a

common course of action around the disproportionately big and centrally positioned

member (which would escape the interpretation as containment by the big or assertiveness

of its center by the smaller, peripheral members).

Finally, there is ASEAN – a grouping of 10 Southeast Asian nations, exercising the

balanced multi-vector policy (based on the non-interference principle) internally and

externally. This, Jakarta/Indonesia headquartered organization has a dynamic past and an

ambitious charter. It is an internally induced and relatively symmetric arrangement with the

strongest members placed around its geographic center (like in case of the EU equilibrium

with Germany-France/Britain-Italy/Poland-Spain geographically balancing each other).

Situated on the geographic axis of the southern flank of the Asian landmass, the so-called

growth triangle of Thailand-Malaysia-Indonesia represents the core of ASEAN not only in

economic and communication terms but also by its political leverage. The EU-like ASEAN

Community Road Map (for 2015) will absorb most of the Organization’s energy.

However, ASEAN has managed to open its forums for the 3+3 group/s, and could be

seen in the long run as a cumulus setting towards the wider pan-Asian forum in future.

Before closing this brief overview, let us mention two other institutions, both based on

external calls for burden sharing. One, with a Wall Street banker’s j ingoistic-coined name,

BRICS, which includes two important Asian states, India and China, and one peripheral

state, Russia. Indonesia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Iran are a few

additional Asian countries that have strongly advocated for membership in BRICS. The

G–20, the other informal forum, is also assembled on an ad hoc (pro bono) basis following

the need of the G–7 to achieve a larger approval and support for its monetary (currency

4

March 15th - 31 st

exchange accord) and financial (austerity) actions introduced in

the aftermath of (still unsettled) financial crisis.

Nevertheless, the BRICS and G-20 have not provided the

Asian participating states with more leverage in the Bretton

Woods institutions (aside from burden sharing), or have they

helped to tackle indigenous Asian security problems. Appealing

for national pride, however, both informal gatherings may divert

the necessary resources and attention to Asian states from their

pressing domestic, pan-continental issues.

Even though the ASEAN member states are members of the

UN General Assembly and various other international institutions,

they have no suitable standing forum to tackle and solve their

collective security issues. An organization similar to the Council

ofEurope or the OSCE is still far from emerging on Asian soil.

There is hardly a single state in Asia that does not have a

territorial dispute with a neighbor.

From Central to South Asia, Southeast Asia, the Indian sub-

continent, mainland Indochina, and the Far East, many countries in

these regions are suffering countless border disputes.

The South China Sea accounts for over a dozen territorial

disputes, in which mostly China presses its peripheries to break

free from a perceived encirclement. China’s neighbors often

interpret these moves as dangerously assertive.

organization urgent.

Clearly, there is no emancipation of the continent; there is no

Asian century, without a pan-Asian multilateral setting. ■

5

The numbers ofwarheads anddelivery systemsare not sufficientand sophisticatedenough to offersecond strikecapability

Unresolved territorial issues, sporadic irredent-

ism, conventional armament, nuclear ambitions,

conflicts over exploitation of and access to the

marine biota, other natural resources including fresh

water access and supply are posing enormous

stresses on the external security, safety and stability

in Asia.

It is somewhat inappropriate to compare the size

ofAsia and Europe (the latter being an extension of a

huge Asian continental landmass, a sort of western Asian

peninsula) but the interstate maneuvering is comparable. Yet, the

space between the major powers of post-Napoleonic Europe was

as equally narrow for any maneuver as is the space today for any

security maneuver of Japan, China, India, Pakistan, Iran and the

like.

Besides holding huge stockpiles of conventional weaponry and

numerous standing armies, Asia is home to four (plus peripheral

Russia and Israel) of the nine known nuclear powers (declared and

undeclared). Only China and Russia are parties to the Non-

proliferation Treaty (NP). North Korea walked away in 2003,

whereas India and Pakistan both confirmed nuclear powers

declined to sign the Treaty. Asia is also the only continent where

nuclear weapons have been deployed in times of war. This

discounts the countless nuclear tests that have been conducted by

the world’s nuclear powers.

Asian states that are nuclear armed bring up the annoying fact

that each state has a history of hostilities, armed frictions and

confrontations over unresolved territorial disputes along mutually

shared borders, all combined with intensive and lasting ideological

rivalries. The Soviet Union has had bitter transborder armed

conflicts with China. China has fought a war with India and as a

result acquired a significant territorial gain. India fought four

mutually extortive wars with Pakistan over Kashmir and other

disputed border regions. Finally, the Korean peninsula is divided

as a result of a bloody conflict.

Only India and post-Soviet Russia have strict civilian control

over their nuclear arsenals. In North Korea and China, control is in

the hands of an unpredictable and non-transparent communist

leadership. In Pakistan, it is completely in the hands of a

politically omnipresent military establishment.

Nuclear stockpiles in Asia are considerably modest. The

numbers of warheads and delivery systems are not sufficient and

sophisticated enough to offer second strike capability.

One of the greatest thinkers and humanists of the 20th century,

Erich Fromm wrote: “…man can only go forward by developing

(his) reason, by finding a new harmony…”

Asia, collectively the largest continent, should consider the

creation of its own comprehensive pan-Asian multilateral

mechanism. Regarding its institutional arrangement, Asia can

closely revisit the well-envisioned SAARC and ambitiously

empowered ASEAN. By examining these two regional bodies,

Asia can find and skillfully calibrate the appropriate balance

between widening and deepening of the (security) mandate of such

future multilateral organization – given the number of states as

well as the gravity of the pressing socio-political,

environmental and politico-military challenges.

In the age of unprecedented success and the

unparalleled prosperity of Asia, an indigenous

multilateral pan-Asian arrangement presents itself as

an opportunity.

Contextualizing Hegel’s famous quote, “free-

dom is…an insight into necessity” let me close by

stating that a need for a domesticated pan-Asian

International Policy Digest Volume I Issue V

are targeted and killed.

Due process aims to protect persons

from state policies that exceed the limits

of governmental authority. In the case of

targeted killing, due process mainly

concerns how and who the Executive

Branch may kill. In his speech, Holder

asserted that assuming there is no

opportunity to capture American terrorists

overseas unharmed, the Executive Branch

has no obligation to afford these citizens

with due process before it targets and

kills them. Rather, Holder said, a “careful

and thorough” review of the evidence

used to justify their targeted killing

amounts to due process.

The Administration has thus adopted

a form of “administrative” due process

that negates both the constitutional

protections afforded to persons by the

Fifth Amendment of the Constitution and

the role of the courts in protecting their

At the same time, constitutional and operational prerogatives counselagainst submitting

this policy to judicial or legislative scrutiny, except as required by statute and the relevant

congressional committees. Indeed, the Constitution does not require judicial approval

before the Executive Branch may use force to eliminate imminent threats abroad, even if

that threat is an American citizen, and particularly when the risk to U.S. ground forces is

deemed too great.

Importantly, such scrutiny would also encroach upon the Administration’s power to

protect the nation pursuant to Article II of the Constitution and the congressional

authorization enacted after 9/1 1 . In other words, the Executive Branch has a duty to

eliminate imminent terrorist threats, particularly when targeted killing through drone strikes

has proven so far to be not only the most effective method to target an enemy that disguises

as civilians, avoids confrontation, and hides among populations, but also the most

humanitarian option today to reduce collateral harm to non-combatants.

The Founders designed a strong presidency to counter foreign threats, thus recognizing

that the Congress (and implicitly the Judiciary) is too slow and too large to effectively

counter threats such as terrorism. In this vein, and as held by the U.S. District Court in al-

Aulaqi v. Obama, judicial scrutiny of the government’s policy would also contravene the

political question doctrine which prohibits the courts from deciding on non-legal issues

upon which it lacks expertise and capacity to review. In essence, targeted killing concerns

political questions best decided upon democratically by elected leaders. Indeed, the

imminent and unpredictable nature of terrorism makes judicial review infeasible and would

hinder the Executive Branch’s ability to counter terrorism.

6

The Administrationhas thus adopted a

form of“administrative”due process thatnegates both theconstitutional

protections and therole ofthe courts inprotecting theirright to life

American TerroristsAbroad and Due Process

By Alejandro M. Sueldo

20 March 2012

Imagine you are an American citizenoverseas dedicated to recruiting terrorists,

planning terrorist acts aimed at the United

States, and publicly calling for j ihad

against America. This was the life of

Anwar-al-Awlaki, an American terrorist

overseas. To the Obama Administration,

Anwar al-Awlaki was an illegal enemy

combatant that was due no judicial

hearing before the CIA targeted and

killed him in Yemen in September 201 1 .

In a speech defending the Obama

Administration’s policy to afford

American terrorists overseas, like al-

Awlaki, with no judicial hearing prior to

their targeted killing,

Attorney General Eric

Holder passed on explaining

the policy’s implications for

the due process rights of

these citizens. A deeper

examination of due process,

however, supports the

Administration’s policy that

judicial hearings for

American terrorists overseas

need not occur before they

right to life. In so doing, the Administration is essentially saying, “trust us” in how we

eliminate the imminent threat posed by American terrorists overseas.

Though critics question if the Administration’s policy respects due process and insist

that it be vetted by the courts and the Congress, this is unnecessary. The due process rights

of American terrorists overseas are invalidated when they choose to become actively

involved with terrorism aimed at the United States. The Administration’s

policy of eliminating the imminent threat they pose is legal as a form of self-

defense.

In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court examined whether persons

are due a judicial hearing prior to state actions that implicate their due process

rights. In applying the due process test outlined in Mathews to the targeted

killing of American terrorists overseas, it is readily evident that the test

weighs heavily for the government. In other words, the Executive Branch

asserted interest in protecting the nation against terrorist threats, versus the

administrative, financial and security burdens it would incur by providing

American terrorists overseas with unharmed capture and judicial hearings,

greatly outweigh the rights which would be affected by their targeted killing.

March 15th - 31 st

In essence, Holder was saying that the Administration holds

the power to decide who is targetable and when and how

American terrorists overseas will die. This is not to say that the

President has free reign to kill. Indeed, due process concerns arise

as to the accuracy of the intelligence used to justify targeted

killings, and demand that the Executive Branch implements

procedures to ensure that the Administration’s “thorough and

careful review” standard is reliable and responsible. Doing so will

still allow the President to counter the unique threat of terrorism. ■

7

Disengagement the Best Engagementfor North Korea

By John K. Yi

21 March 2012

It took a record one month for U.S.-North Korean talks overa food for nuclear freeze swap to fall into the all too common war

ofwords where Pyongyang threatens with war against the U.S. and

South Korea. And while admittedly this game of hot and cold isn’t

anything new, what’s different this time is the record speed in

which it happened.

On Wednesday, February 9th, U.S. officials announced a

breakthrough in talks with the DPRK. In exchange for food aid,

North Korea would freeze its Yongbyong nuclear facility and all

missile tests.

Fast-forward nearly forty days later, as the U.S. and its allies

head to Seoul for the 2012 Nuclear Summit, Pyongyang is calling

any criticism of its nuclear weapons program as an act of war.

Furthermore, the regime scheduled an April satellite test, widely

seen as a cover for a long-range missile test, a clear violation of

the food aid agreement.

While the former North Korean strongman, Kim Jong-il, would

have stringed the international community along for a few months

or even a year, this sudden about face is uncharacteristic of

Pyongyang. There wasn’t enough time to extract aid, such as oil

shipments in 2002, or political concessions, such as the removal of

the regime from the list of state sponsors of terrorism in 2008.

There was no direct benefit to the regime aside from reassurance

that the U.S. was, as it has always been, willing to negotiate with

the DPRK.

So what could explain this behavior? Many speculate a

possible schism amongst the Pyongyang elite. With the absence of

Kim Jong-il, who ruled for nearly a decade, once dormant interests

groups are perhaps surfacing under the rule of the younger less

experienced son, Kim Jong-un. Others simply write off this event

as business as usual. After all, erratic and often times irrational

behavior is nothing new to the regime and there’s no reason why it

should disappear with the family succession.

However, as the sudden death of Kim Jong-il, which was kept

a secret for nearly two days from the rest of the world, taught us,

no one really knows what’s going on in Pyongyang. So instead of

asking why, I suggest a simpler question of “So what?”

So what ifNorth Korea has decided to torpedo another chance

at engaging with the U.S. through nuclear disarmament? It has

International Policy Digest Volume I Issue V

done it in the past and considering the longevity of the regime and

the recent lesson learned from the death of Libya’s Muammer

Kaddafi, who gave up his nuclear weapons, Pyongyang seems

bound to do it again.

Perhaps the lesson for U.S. foreign policy from the quick

death of negotiations is that at the end of the day talks with the

North just aren’t going to work; a reverse of the old breakup adage

“it’s not me, it’s you.”

Instead, I would suggest that the best engagement with North

Korea would be no engagement at all. With an ever increasing

flow of information among its population, increase in use of

cellular phones, and the growing black market and development of

a tiny merchant class, doing nothing may perhaps be the most

effective policy in denuclearizing North Korea.

What a decade of fruitless negotiations have taught us it that

no amount of pressure from the West or its closest allies, China

and Russia, will be able to dissuade the regime from its nuclear

ambitions. For the Pyongyang regime, its nuclear weapons

capability is a form of regime survival. It serves as the vehicle to

engage the West, extort occasional aid, and prevent any possibility

of outside intervention. Any attempt to take away this form of

regime security will be categorically rebuffed.

Only when nuclear weapons ceases to be a sufficient form of

regime self-preservation can North Korea truly be disarmed. And

perhaps the only realistic scenario where the Pyongyang regime’s

security concerns cannot be satisfied by its nuclear weapons is if

the threat comes from within.

Popular protest movement, insurrection of regional or party

leadership are all circumstances where the regime’s nuclear

arsenal would be powerless to save the regime. If such a threat

were truly to come into fruition, perhaps then Pyongyang would be

more flexible in negotiating with the U.S.

In this regard, there is little the U.S. currently can do diplo-

matically by engaging directly with the DPRK. Instead, the U.S.

and its allies should undertake other more feasible goals in its

approach to North Korea. Tackling the North Korean refugee crisis

in China, pressuring Beij ing to cease repatriation of refugees, and

even assisting with remittance transfer into North Korea are all

more effective, albeit small steps.

Furthermore, the U.S. can. refocus more of its energy on

enforcing compliance of UN sanctions against North Korea and to

prevent the export of nuclear weapons and technologies.

It would be naive to balance the denuclearizing of North Korea

on the prospect of an Arab Spring like movement in the North.

However, in this all too old game of bait-and-switch perhaps it is

equally naive to hope for a different outcome in negotiating with a

party whose conclusions have become all too predictable. ■

8

International Criminal Court: Successesand Failures of the Past and Goals for the

FutureBy Daniel Donovan

23 March 2012

In 1998, a groundbreaking idea turned into reality, and 50years of debate ended as the first International Criminal Court

(ICC) was established as a result of the Rome Statute. This judicial

body took shape and created the foundation of a permanent court

to prosecute persons that committed war crimes, crimes against

humanity and genocide. This paper will discuss the arduous

history and inevitably the establishment of the International

Criminal Court, as well as its successes and failures, and short and

long-term goals for the future in order to improve the strength and

efficiency of the court and ensure its success in the prevention and

punishment of people who commit international crimes during

times ofwar.

The idea of an international criminal court came about from

many factions. At the end of World War II the Allied Powers

responded swiftly after the discovery of crimes committed by the

Axis Powers. They therefore created the Agreement for the

Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the

European Axis and the Charter of the International Military

Tribunal (IMT). The IMT contained the first definition of crimes

against humanity, which would later be included in the Rome

Statute and fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC. Specifically in

Article 6(c) the definition was as follows:

“Crimes against humanity: murder, extermination, enslavement,

deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against civilian

populations, before or during the war; persecution on political,

racial or religious grounds in execution ofor in connection within

the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the

domestic law ofthe country where perpetrated.”

Shortly after, a similar document was drafted in response to

the crimes committed by the Far East Axis powers, namely Japan,

labeled the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. These

two tribunals laid the groundwork for the prosecution and

convictions of soldiers and commanders that committed crimes in

World War II. The importance of these tribunals comes in its

direct definition of crimes against humanity and war crimes, and

the initial recognition for the need of a global criminal system.

The first ever international trials were held shortly after the

establishment of these Tribunals. The victorious Allies insisted on

March 15th - 31 st

the punishment of crimes committed by individuals during the war

by both the German and Japanese powers. These courts prosecuted

fifty defendants, and several thousand more were prosecuted

through occupational tribunals established for less-senior

defendants. As the heinous crimes committed by the Axis power’s

senior and low level officials became exposed to the world, it was

evident that justification for a permanent international criminal

court had been established.

Shortly thereafter, two major events happened that would

shape the rules and ideologies for international criminal law

forever. The first of these events was the 1948 Genocide

Convention and then the four 1949 Red Cross Geneva

Conventions.

The Genocide convention, officially labeled The Convention

on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, laid

the groundwork for what has been labeled the ‘most heinous

international crime’ . As stated in King, “The term “genocide”

means the destruction ofa national, racial, or religious group. The

definition comes from the Greek word “genos” (race, tribe) and

the Latin “cide” (killing)”.” This convention was formed from the

discovery of Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany’s plan to eradicate

the Jewish population in Europe.

The convention is extremely important as it established

genocide as a war crime for the first time. This crime later became

adopted into the Rome Statute of 1998 as one of the three original

crimes that would fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC.

The Geneva Conventions that followed continued the trend of

establishing laws to prevent crimes during times of war. The four

Geneva conventions and the additional Protocols added later built

upon the previously recognized idea of International Humanitarian

Law (IHL), which, when combined with genocide, formed the

three crimes that fall under the direct jurisdiction established in the

Rome Statute of 1998 and therefore are prosecutable in the ICC.

As Van Krieken states, “The Geneva Conventions and their

Additional Protocols are part of international humanitarian

law—a whole system of legal safeguards that cover the way wars

may be fought and the protection ofindividuals”.

The four conventions covered several different topics as

follows: the 1 st Convention discussed rules for wounded soldiers

on the battlefield; the 2nd Convention covered the wounded and

shipwrecked at sea, the 3rd laid rules for prisoners ofwar (POWs),

and the fourth protected civilians under enemy control.

Thus Ius in Bello, literally translated as “Oath upon to Wage

War” or more accurately, the rules with which war is to be fought,

were created. These two conferences also created the first idea of

International Humanitarian Law for which the ICC currently

upholds.

Despite these laws being established and ratified as a treaty

(currently 140 nations are party to the Genocide Convention, and

194 nations have agreed to the Geneva Conventions), there

remained no court that could uphold these laws or prosecute the

perpetrators that committed these abhorrent crimes against fellow

soldiers and civilians. However, in 1993 and 1994, two ad hoc

courts were created for specific regions in which it became evident

that the rules of the previously stated conventions had been

knowingly broken repeatedly by many people involved in these

internal conflicts.

In 1993 the International Criminal Tribunal for the former

Yugoslavia (ICTY) was created in light of the vicious crimes

committed against the civilian population throughout the former

Yugoslavia. As Askin writes, “After receiving nearly two years

worth of consistent reports ofwidespread and systematic murder,

rapes, and other crimes committed in the Balkan conflict, the

International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was

formally established by the United !ations Security Council in

1993”. The ICTY was a unique creation as it marked the first time

a court had been established to prosecute individuals who

committed heinous crimes against their fellow man in a regional

setting. This creation also ended a fifty year system of having the

laws and treaties in place to govern the rules during warfare, but

no real system to prosecute individuals who broke these laws.

Shortly after the creation of the ICTY, another ad hoc court

was being established in the wake of the horrific events that

occurred in the African nation ofRwanda in 1994.

“Between April and June 1994, an estimated 800,000

Rwandans were killed in the space of 100 days. Most of the dead

were Tutsi’s – and most of those who perpetrated the violence

were Hutus”. The shock that embodied the world after the

discovery of such a systematic genocide was overwhelming, and

the UN Security Council moved quickly to bring the leadership

and perpetrators to justice. In November of 1994, through Security

Council Resolution 955 the temporary ad hoc court became a

reality.

The court mirrored many of the same rules established through

the ICTY, but the prosecution focused specifically on Rwandans

that committed the act of genocide during the terrible and short-

lived civil war.

These two courts laid the foundation that would later become

the Rome Statute and the establishment of the ICC. Some other ad

hoc tribunals have been created by the Security Council to deal

with local issues, such as Sierra Leone, Cambodia and the Special

Tribunal for Lebanon (STL).

Finally in 1998, a Conference was called in Rome to discuss

the possibility of a permanent International Criminal Court. Many

struggles and oppositions needed to be overcome in order adopt

the Rome Statute and create the ICC. As Combs describes “The

achievement was an unlikely one. When the Rome Conference

opened, no important issues had been agreed upon… Delegations

had diametrically opposing views on such core issues as which

crimes should be within the Court’s jurisdiction, how many cases

should come before the Court, and what powers the Prosecutor

should possess”. Also, as Combs affirms “The tension between the

desire to create a strong, credible court and the need to respect

the State prerogatives arose most pointedly in connection with

four main issues: the ICC’s complimentary regime, its jurisdiction,

the role ofthe Prosecutor, and its enforcement powers”.

9

International Policy Digest Volume I Issue V

Despite all of these differentiating opinions and opposing views several

compromises were made, and in the end the treaty passed with a lopsided vote of

120 to 7, with 21 countries abstaining. The most remarkable thing about the Rome

Statute and the creation of the ICC was the fact that the treaty required sixty of the

signees to ratify it before it would be entered into agreement, and the ICC could be

created as an international entity of criminal law.

Many people speculated that it would be a decade before this judicial body

could be created, but a mere four years later, the 60th state ratified, and the ICC was

created.

It opened its doors in July of 2002, and by the following March eighteen judges

were nominated and the first international prosecutor, Luis Moreno Campo, was

elected.

According to the International Criminal Court website, the Rome Statute

currently has 1 39 signees, and 1 17 ratifications. The ICC is currently working on

seven open cases in Sudan, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central

African Republic, Kenya, the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire and Libya, with many more

situations being monitored for possible further indictments.

It took many years of law evolution, and a series of horrendous events to justify

establishment of an international criminal court, however, based on the support it

received, not only at the Rome Conference, but also the continued ratification by

nations, it is evident that the need for the court is considered important by many

nations.

The Successes of the ICC

The ICC is a fairly young institution, having only been open and active since

2003.

Therefore the institution, like the Tribunal courts before it, have to take into

account small successes, especially when dealing with doctrine and law that the

court achieves in order to evolve its uses and expand its powers through increased

efficiency and reduced state opposition. In order for the court to fully realize its

potential, it must show the world that it can be a successful permanent institution in

international law with clear standards and goals, as well successful indictments,

prosecutions and convictions of heinous war criminals in different parts of the

world.

This chapter will examine the successes of the court in its eight short years of

existence, especially the groundwork established through the Rome Statute of 1998,

and some amendments since then.

The initial successes of the ICC came quickly and have compounded over time,

definitely laying a foundation for what could be an extremely efficient and

successful judicial entity. The fact that the Rome Statute passed with such a

lopsided victory, despite all of the objections from different sides regarding the

semantics of the document, was a major victory

in itself. Then, the rapidness of the ratification of

the treaty, just four short years after the

monumental signing, showed that the need to

establish a world criminal court was present.

Since the inception of the court, fifty seven

additional nations have joined the court, with

more coming all the time. The support for the

ICC is definitely growing, especially among the

smaller nations of the world, as they view the

ICC as a support system to their own domestic

judicial institution.

When the outline for an international criminal

court was established, it quickly became evident

that in order for the court to not only appease the

reluctant states, but maximize its usefulness on

the international stage, the court had to be

complimentary. This role of a complimentary

institution maintains the domestic jurisdiction of

the individual states to prosecute their own

criminals if they find the evidence to prosecute as

well as possess a functioning judicial body to

properly convene a fair and just trial.

As Van Krieken explains, “The jurisdiction

of the ICC is based on ‘complimentarity, ’ which

allows national courts the first opportunity to

investigate or prosecute. It will not act if a case

is investigated or prosecuted by a national

judicial system unless the national proceedings

are not genuine”.

By limiting the role of the ICC to compli-

mentary, the Rome Statute and the states that are

party to the treaty created a last resort institution

that will only be utilized if the country is unable

or unwilling to prosecute their war criminals.

This entails many factors that must each be

examined before an indictment or even an

investigation is launched by the ICC.

First, is the country’s judicial system intact?

Many war crimes are committed during times of

civil war, or in the recent case of Libya, the civil

war often leads to regime change. If a new court

is not established, and the state is therefore

unable to launch an investigation or hold a court

proceeding, then the ICC can step in as a support

unit and take over the case.

Also, if circumstances arise that invoke a

sense of bias for or against a criminal who is

being prosecuted, such as the case of President

Al-Bashir of Sudan for the crimes committed in

Darfur in which his country will never consider

indicting him, then the ICC can step in and

takeover the case, as they have done.

1 0

March 15th - 31 st

Combs explains both of these scenarios, “To determine

whether a State is so unable, the Rome Statute instructs the Court

to consider whether, ‘due to a total or substantial collapse or

unavailability ofits national judicial system, the State is unable to

obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or

otherwise [is] unable to carry out its proceedings”.

In order to determine if the state is unwilling the court needs

to examine if the proceedings are impartial, if the criminal is being

shielded by government lackeys or whether there is an

unjustifiable delay in the proceedings.

The role of a complimentary court counts as a success because

it limits the authority the court possesses, and it enables the states

themselves to take the initiative in prosecuting their own criminals.

By limiting the power of the court, the Rome Statute correctly

prevented the court from growing into an unrestricted power.

Another success of the ICC is the clearly defined roles that the

different organs operating within the confines of the Rome Statute

have and how they are utilized to the advantage of the court and

the international stage, especially the unique role of judges and the

use of the appeals process.

First, the court’s decision making process is common law,

which means that judges, and not a jury, decide the fate of the

accused based on legal precedence and knowledge of the law.

Although this is contrary to the United States legal system, it

definitely has its benefits.

As Judge Anita Usaka articulates in a 201 1 speech, “one

practical benefit of using professional judges instead of a jury is

that many ofthe rules relating to admissibility ofevidence, such as

hearsay, which may be intended to shield a lay-person juror from

bias, may not be necessary when the finder offact is a professional

judge”.

The common law practice definitely ensures that the rights of

the individual, as well as the palpability of the court are handled

by professionals. This is very important with an international

forum because of the vast differences between hundreds of judicial

systems. A civil law court at the international level is simply not

practical. By granting the fate of indictees to the judges, a system

of checks and balances has also been included in the Rome Statute

and is therefore utilized by the court. The appeals system for the

ICC creates an atmosphere of fairness and justice that protects all

individuals, from the defendants to the victims, of their alleged

crimes.

In the ICC an appeal can not only be granted for guilty

verdict, but also an acquittal. This additional appeal gives the

prosecutor a second chance to submit additional evidence that may

change the determination of the judgment.

This gives an extra layer of protection to victims in case the

prosecution did not present a convincing enough case the first

time. The second appellate system in place is called interlocutory

appeals, which are “appeals against interim decisions of the Pre-

Trial and Trial Chambers before the final judgment”. This appeal

process is necessary for the development of the court as it is such a

young institution that criminal precedence is limited and therefore

interpretation of evidence and process are needed at every level.

As Usaka explains, “One reason for this is that, as a new judicial

institution, there are many aspects of the interpretation and

application ofthe Court’s core legal instruments which are ‘issues

offirst impression’ and still need to be definitively answered”.

In creating a system in which the court can interpret inter-

national criminal law, it has correctly identified the issue that

needs to be addressed in order for the court to blossom and reach

its full potential. It will need to create a system in which

precedence can be established and therefore common law is

correctly carried out.

In 2010, a major breakthrough for the court came into exist-

ence which has been viewed not only as a display of the flexibility

of the states party to the Rome Statute, but a necessary addition to

the constantly changing international community. The Conference

in 2010 in Kampala, Uganda took direction from the UN Security

Council a step further and inducted a definition of aggression

based on SC Resolution 3314, and added it to genocide, war

crimes and crimes against humanity as a list of possible crimes

that fall under the umbrella of the ICC.

As aggression is defined by Van Krieken, “The definition

criminalizes the use of armed force by one State against another

and carried out in contravention to the U!Charter. On this basis

individuals responsible for unlawful acts ofwar may be subject to

prosecution before the court”.

Although Kampala has not been entered into effect as a treaty

yet, it cannot take effect until January 1 , 2017, this amendment to

the Rome Statute showed the flexibility of the court and its states

members to adjust to a constantly changing world.

Adding aggression to the list ofwar crimes ensured that despite

the solid foundation from the Rome Statute, the ICC was able to

add new amendments that would further extend its jurisdiction and

ensure international peace.

Another example of this adaptability occurred in 2009 when a

Review Conference convened and stated that an amendment

should be considered to include terrorism to the list of crimes

falling under the ICC’s jurisdiction. This document called Annex

E, laid out a fairly acceptable definition of terrorism, which has

been one of the major stepping stones in the process of including it

in international criminal law, and went as far as to almost

recommend that the Rome Statute should include terrorism as

another crime added to the list for ICC jurisdiction. Although the

steps have not yet been taken to establish an amendment for a new

inclusion, the groundwork has been laid, and therefore the idea of

including terrorism has been mulled over. This is just another

example of the constant flexibility and adaptability of the ICC and

the Rome Statute, which is absolutely essential to the success and

survival of the court.

Overall the major successes of the court have been almost

exclusively on paper and not in the actual prosecuting or

sentencing of criminals, which will be discussed in the next

section, the legal precedence, general international acceptance and

Continued on Page 38

1 1

International Policy Digest Volume I Issue V

Europe and most of Latin America supported the US

resolution against Sri Lanka at the Human Rights Council’s (HRC)

19th session in Geneva. China, Russia, and several countries in

Africa and Asia voted against it. Unsurprisingly, Cuba and

Ecuador also opposed the resolution. Having never before voted

for a “country-specific resolution,” India’s vote was significant,

both symbolically and materially. It is unclear what Delhi’s

decision will mean when it comes to US-Indian relations in the

coming years or what effect it will have on Indo-Sri Lankan ties.

The Sri Lankan government has already stated said that the

“intimate relations” between India and Sri Lanka will not be

affected, but that is just simplistic government braggadocio. Indian

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh recently said that India does

“not want to infringe on the sovereignty of Sri Lanka,” which

appears to be incompatible with the vote his country cast on

Thursday in Geneva. India was in an extremely difficult position,

but it is still hard to believe that they did not abstain.

A little over a week ago, the Indian government reminded the

Indian Parliament (and the international community) that India

wound not support a country-specific resolution.

On the other hand, India had a lot to do with “toning down” the

draft resolution that the US had originally tabled, ensuring that an

already weak resolution became even more irresolute.

As a result of the resolution, which passed by a 24-1 5 margin

(with 8 abstentions) the Sri Lankan government will probably

present some sort of “action plan” which shows how the

government will implement some of the recommendations from

the Final Report of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation

Commission (LLRC).

The resolution also calls for the government to “address

alleged violations of international law.” This will not happen. An

international probe into what transpired during the final stages of

Sri Lanka’s civil war will never occur as long as the Rajapaksa

regime remains in power. Such an investigation might not ever

take place.

Sri Lanka will not be on the formal agenda of the 20th session

of the HRC. Sri Lanka will probably not be on the formal agenda

of the 21 st session either, since a report from the Office of the

High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) should be

forthcoming at the HRC’s 22nd session, according to the US

resolution. This leaves more than a year for the Sri Lankan

government to receive “advice and technical assistance” from

OHCHR.

Given the Sri Lankan government’s well-known aversion to

any form of international assistance on matters related to human

rights, one should not expect that much collaboration between

Colombo and OHCHR over the next twelve months. Furthermore,

according to the resolution, such cooperation would only take

place “in consultation and with the concurrence of the

Government ofSri Lanka.”

If someone is going to put serious pressure on Sri Lanka

during the next session of the HRC, it almost certainly will not be

the United States. The Obama Administration will be occupied

with an electoral battle that will focus on domestic policy. Sri

1 2

The Effects of the US Resolution Against Sri LankaBy Gibson Bateman

23 March 2012

March 15th - 31 st

Lanka's human rights record does not and will not appear, even on

the periphery, of topics that matter to the American public.

The administration of Mahinda Rajapaksa has only become

more controlling since winning the civil war in 2009. Still, this is a

disgraceful moment for the Rajapaksa regime; the Sri Lankan

government’s (usually effective) rhetoric is no longer working.

Nonetheless, it is hard to imagine that “Sri Lanka” will garner

more attention that it already has. Given the government’s

propensity for authoritarianism and continued efforts to infringe

upon the rights of the country’s ethnic minorities, significant

policy shifts will not come from Colombo in the near term. On the

other hand, the Sri Lankan government should make some moves

to reduce international pressure in the coming year, especially as it

relates to demilitarization and the rule of law.

The US resolution was never about human rights alone. The

very same day that the resolution was passed, the US State

Department announced that defense sales to the Sri Lankan

government would become less restrictive.

Even though the State Department has said that the two

developments are not connected to one another, this is a

discouraging announcement. It, among other considerations,

makes it seem like the resolution at the HRC was mostly about

power and the US, yet again, exerting its influence on a small,

developing country for reasons less noble than those which are

advertised. ■

13

Why �ot Get the Law and Politics

Right in Iran?By Richard Falk

24 March 2012

the only question that seems worth asking is whether to rely on diplomacy backed by harsh

sanctions to achieve the desired goal or that only an early attack to stop Iran from crossing the

nuclear threshold.

It seems perverse that this public debate on policy toward Iran should be framed in such a

belligerent and seemingly wrongheaded manner. After all the United States was stampeded

into a disastrous war against Iraq nine years ago on the basis of deceptive reports about its

supposed stockpile of weapons of mass destruction, trumped up exile allegations, and media

hype. I would have assumed that these bad memories would make Washington very cautious

about drifting toward war with Iran, a far more dangerous enemy than Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.

It would seem that at present the politicians are distrustful of reassuring intelligence reports

and completely willing to go along with the intelligence community when it counsels war as

‘a slam dunk.’

Reinforcing this skepticism about Iran’s nuclear intentions is a realistic assessment of the

risk posed in the unlikely event that the intelligence community’s consensus is wrong, and

Iran after all succeeds in acquiring nuclear weapons. As former heads of Mossad and others

have pointed out the existential threat to Israel even then would still be extremely low. It

would be obvious that Iran’s few bombs could never be used against Israel or elsewhere

without producing an annihilating response. There is no evidence that Iran has any disposition

to commit national suicide.

In his important article in the NewYork Times, March 17, 2012, James

Risen summarized the consensus of the

intelligence community as concluding

that Iran abandoned its program to

develop nuclear weapons in 2003, and

that no persuasive evidence exists that

it has departed from this decision.

It might have been expected that

such news based on the best evidence

that billions spent to get the most

reliable possible assessments of such

sensitive security issues would produce

a huge sigh of relief in Washington, but

on the contrary it has been totally

ignored, including by the highest

officers in the government.

The president has not even bothered

to acknowledge this electrifying con-

clusion that should have put the brakes

on what appears to be a slide toward a

disastrous regional war. We must ask

‘why’ such a prudent and positive

course of action has not been adopted,

or at least explored.

Given that the American debate

proceeds on the basis of the exact

opposite assumption– as if Iran’s quest

for nuclear weapons is a virtual

certainty. This contrary finding that it

is a high probability that Iran gave up

its quest of nuclear weapons almost a

decade ago is quite startling. Listening

to the Republican presidential can-

didates or even to President Obama

makes it still seem as if Iran is without

doubt hell bent on having nuclear

weapons at the earliest possible time.

With such a misleading approach

International Policy Digest Volume I Issue V

There is a further troubling aspect of how this issue is being

addressed. Even in the Risen article it is presumed that if the

evidence existed that Iran possesses a nuclear weapons program, a

military attack would be a permissible option. Such a presumption

is based on the irrelevance of international law to a national

decision to attack a sovereign state, and a silent endorsement of

‘aggressive war’ that had been criminalized back in 1945 as the

principal conclusion of the Nuremberg Judgment.

This dubious thinking has gone unchallenged in the media, in

government pronouncements, and even in diplomatic posturing.

We need to recall that at the end of World War II when the UN

was established states agreed in the UN Charter to give up their

military option except in clear instances of self-defense. To some

extent over the years this prohibition has been eroded, but in the

setting of Iran policy it has been all but abandoned without even

the pressure of extenuating circumstances.

Of course, it would be unfortunate if Iran acquires nuclear

weapons given the instability of the region, and the general

dangers associated with their spread. But no international law

argument or precedent is available to justify attacking a sovereign

state because it goes nuclear. After all, Israel became a stealth

nuclear weapons state decades ago without a whimper of

opposition from the West, and the same goes for India, Pakistan,

and even North Korea’s acquisition of weapons produced only a

muted response that soon dropped from sight.

There are better policy options that are worth exploring, which

uphold international law and have a good chance of leading to

regional stability. The most obvious option is containment that

worked for decades against an expansionist Soviet Union with a

gigantic arsenal of nuclear weapons.

A second option would be to establish a nuclear weapons free

zone for the Middle East, an idea that has been around for years,

and enjoys the endorsement of most governments in the region,

including Iran. Israel might seem to have the most to lose by a

nuclear free zone in the Middle East because it alone currently

possesses nuclear weapons, but Israel would benefit immensely by

the reduction in regional tensions and probable economic and

diplomatic side benefits, particularly if accompanied by a more

constructive approach to resolving the conflict with the Palestinian

people.

The most ambitious option, given political credibility by

President Obama in his Prague speech of 2009 expressing a

commitment to a world without nuclear weapons, would be to

table a proposal for complete nuclear disarmament on a step-by-

step basis. Each of these approaches seem far preferable to what is

now planned, are prudent, accord with common sense, show

respect for international law, a passion for the peaceful resolution

of conflict, and at minimum deserve to be widely discussed and

appraised.

As it is there is no legal foundation in the Nonproliferation

Treaty or elsewhere for the present reliance on threat diplomacy in

dealing with Iran.

These threats violate Article 2(4) of the UN Charter that wisely

prohibits not only uses of force but also threats to use force. Iran

diplomacy presents an odd case, as political real politik and

international law clearly point away from the military option, and

yet the winds of war are blowing ever harder. Perhaps even at this

eleventh hour our political leaders can awake to realize anew that

respect for international law provides the only practical foundation

for a rational and sustainable foreign policy in the 21 st century. ■

14

March 15th - 31 st

The U.S. Presidential Candidates onCybersecurity

By Anneleen Roggeman

24 March 2012

In January 2012, the U.S. Department of Defense released itsnew strategic guidance outlining plans for a “leaner” U.S. military.

The plans envision budget reductions of $487 billion over 10

years. Cybersecurity, however, continues to rise as a priority: the

strategy calls for increased investment in cyber capabilities.

How to adapt the U.S. military to a technology-driven future

will be an important question for any U.S. president. Below, a look

at what the leading candidates in the 2012 election—President

Barack Obama, Mitt Romney, Rick Santorum, and Newt

Gingrich—are saying about cybersecurity and how they are

planning to address what they see as growing cyber threats.

Barack Obama

Obama has identified cybersecurity as one of the most serious

economic and national security challenges facing the United

States. Shortly after taking office, he directed a 60-day “clean-

slate” review to assess U.S. policies and structures for

cybersecurity, resulting in a 2009 report titled Cyberspace Policy

Review. To implement the recommendations in this report, Obama

appointed Howard A. Schmidt to serve as White House

Cybersecurity Coordinator. The strategy is twofold: first, it aims to

improve the country’s resilience when confronted with cyber

incidents; second, it seeks to reduce the cyber threat.

In the last year, the administration issued two strategies that

address major items on the action plan: the National Strategy for

Trusted Identities in Cyberspace and the first comprehensive

International Strategy for Cyberspace, which provides a unified

foundation for U.S. international engagement on cyberspace

issues.

Last May, Obama declared in his State of the Union address:

“To stay one step ahead ofour adversaries, I’ve already sent this

Congress legislation that will secure our country from the growing

dangers ofcyber threats.”

The legislative proposal would give the government new

authority to ensure that corporations with assets critical to national

security and economic prosperity are adequately prepared to

defend them. Moreover, the proposals would give the government

new authority to share information about cyber threats with

businesses, and, when asked, provide them with federal assistance

to prevent attacks and defend against intellectual property theft.

According to Howard Schmidt, the “proposals would provide new

tools to help our citizens and law enforcement professionals

defend against cyber crime and identity theft, while, at the same

time, safeguarding individuals’ privacy and civil liberties.”

In the face of defense cuts as part of the administration’s

efforts to reduce deficits, the strategy calls for increased

investment in cyber capabilities. “Operate effectively in

cyberspace and space” is cited as one of the primary missions of

the U.S. armed forces.

The Defense Department and the State Department have also

been more active on cyberspace issues during the Obama

administration. In 2010, the Pentagon established a cyber

command to fight in cyberspace and defend the country’s

computer systems. In February 201 1 , Hillary Clinton appointed

Christopher Painter to serve as the State Department’s first

coordinator for cyber issues. Painter is leading the new Office for

Cyber Issues and is tasked with bringing together the many parts

of the State Department working on cyber issues to advance U.S.

cyber interests more effectively.

The administration has framed intellectual property protection

and cybersecurity initiatives as complementary. With regard to the

controversial Stop Online Piracy Act and Protect IP Act, the White

House issued a statement in January saying it “will not support

legislation that reduces freedom of expression, increases

cybersecurity risk, or undermines the dynamic, innovative global

Internet.”

Mitt Romney

On the Republican side, former Massachusetts Governor Mitt

Romney is considered the front-runner for the nomination. His

stated security strategies also prioritize cybersecurity.

In October 201 1 , Romney released a white paper on foreign

policy “An American Century – A Strategy to Secure America’s

Enduring Interests and Ideals,” outlining his view on some of the

most significant foreign policy and national security challenges.

He calls for a “strong America” and “will strive to ensure that the

21st century is an American Century.”

In his white paper, Romney underlines the importance of

cybersecurity and marks it as one of eight actions for the first 1 00

days. According to the paper, he would “order a full interagency

initiative to formulate a unified national strategy to deter and

defend against the growing threats of militarized cyber-attacks,

Advisory Team. Among more than 20 advisers are Michael

Chertoff, currently chairman of the Chertoff Group and former

U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security (and an EWI board

member); and Michael Hayden, former director of the CIA and

NSA. In an interview with National Journal, Hayden indicated that

cybersecurity is one of the issues he discussed with the Romney

camp and that his future advice would mirror his public statements

on the issue. Hayden is in favor of a stronger, more centralized

federal office to oversee cybersecurity and would like to see the

NSA taking a more active role in protecting U.S. networks.

Rick Santorum

Like Obama and Romney, Santorum has a list of initiatives on

national security. On his campaign website, Santorum announces a

ten-point plan to “reestablish America’s standing in the world”

and states it is time that “America stop leading from behind and

stand for freedom once again.” Advocating increased military

preparedness, he describes Obama’s defense cuts as “wrong

signal, wrong effort and wrong time.” He has staked out some

hawkish positions, notably on Iran and China, and states that the

United States is “facing a global alliance that includes Russia,

!orth Korea, China, Iran, Syria, Venezuela, Bolivia, !icaragua,

Ecuador and ofcourse Cuba.”

The former senator from Pennsylvania has not expressed a clear

position on cybersecurity and how he thinks cybersecurity threats

should be addressed. On the Stop Online Piracy Act, Santorum

agrees with the other Republican candidates that the law goes too

far. During the South Carolina debate in January, he added that he

“will not agree with everybody up there that there isn’t something

that can and should be done to protect the intellectual property

rights of people…The Internet is not a free zone where anybody

can do anything they want to do and trample the rights of other

people.”

�ewt Gingrich

On his campaign website, former Speaker of the House Newt

Gingrich put forward a plan to tackle the job crisis and meet the

challenges of the 21 st century. He calls it the "21 st Century

Contract with America.” The contract consists of four parts

including a set of legislative proposals and a so-called “Day One

Plan” of executive orders.

1 5

International Policy Digest Volume I Issue V

cyber-terrorism, cyber-espionage, and

private-sector intellectual property theft.”

While recognizing that Obama has

made some progress in this area, Romney

argues that the administration has not yet

updated the national cybersecurity

strategy of 2003. Romney maintains that

a much more coordinated interagency

effort is necessary, involving the

Department of Defense, the intelligence

agencies, the Department of Homeland

Security, and the Departments of

Commerce and the Treasury.

Back in October, Romney introduced

his Foreign Policy and National Security

One of Gingrich’s legislative proposals is to “revitalize our

national security system to meet 21st century threats by

restructuring and adequately funding our security agencies to

function within a grand strategy for victory over those who seek to

kill us or limit American freedom.” He has called for a new

strategy, pointing to cybersecurity-related threats: “There are new

emerging technologies endangering us – for example

electromagnetic pulse weapons, cyberwar and lawfare, which we

are not prepared to deal with.”

Gingrich ranks cyber warfare as a threat on a par with an

electromagnetic pulse and a nuclear weapon in an American city

and argues those threats require greater attention. During the

Republican national security debate in Washington, D.C., in

November 201 1 , candidates were asked what national security

issue they worry about that nobody is asking about. Gingrich said

a cyber attack is a primary concern, reiterating that the current

system does not have the capacity to deal with this threat. The

issue of cybersecurity was only addressed in the debate closing.

Paul, Romney and Santorum did not mention cybersecurity in that

debate.

Gingrich would abolish the position he calls a Cybersecurity

Czar (White House Cybersecurity Coordinator). He claims the

president does not have the authority to appoint bureaucrats to

power who are not accountable to Congress. If those positions

were still needed, he argues they should be installed with the

advice and consent of the Senate.

Regarding cybersecurity threats originating from China and

Russia, Gingrich has said he would seek to engage both countries

in a high-level conversation and present them with an ultimatum

saying “there are games we’re not going to tolerate being played;

we either need an armed truce or we’re going to engage as

aggressively as you are.” Talks should be “top secret” and include

people from the defense sector, Gingrich continues. He says cyber

espionage should be considered an act ofwar.

During the Michigan debate last November, Gingrich said that

the U.S. should “find ways to dramatically raise the pain level for

the Chinese cheating, both in the hacking side, but also on the

stealing and intellectual property side. I don’t think anybody today

has a particularly good strategy for doing that.”

Gingrich calls for disrupting Iran’s nuclear program through

covert action, including “taking out their scientists” and cyber

warfare. He would “wage real cyber warfare” to bring about

regime change in Iran, and would be “prepared to use military

force” as a last resort to keep Iran from obtaining a nuclear

weapon. He continues “we could wage real cyber warfare against

Iran and probably be remarkably effective at closing it down.”

Conclusion

Both Romney and Gingrich are critical of Obama’s foreign

policy approach. They call for a strong America and “peace

through strength” policy. They understand the importance of

cybersecurity and the related threats. Romney claims Obama has

not done enough in this area (i.e. interagency coordination) and

makes cybersecurity one of his priorities during the first 1 00 days.

He has also surrounded himself with experienced advisors in the

cybersecurity arena.

Gingrich proposes some concrete actions including revitalizing

the national security system, abolishing the “cybersecurity czar”

position, and engaging China and Russia in conversations on

sensitive issues. Both Romney and Gingrich say the U.S. needs to

become tougher when it comes to China and intellectual property

protection in particular. It is not entirely clear how Santorum feels

about cybersecurity, but his current rhetoric lets us believe that he

might be tougher on China in certain areas (i.e. trade) than

Romney and Gingrich.

No matter what happens in the 2012 election, there’s no doubt

that cybersecurity will continue to rise higher on the Washington

policy agenda. It’s an issue that any president will have to keep

addressing. ■

16

March 15th - 31 st

Peace Corps DiaryEthiopia 1962­1964 Part 9

By Richard Lyman

25 March 2012

Days after our arrival in Gondar we were approached by

numerous students asking for employment in our house in

exchange for a place to stay and a small stipend.

While, as I’ve indicated in a previous chapter, we were

reluctant to admit we needed help we were impressed by the story

of one tenth grade student, Yimer Mekonnen.

In exchange for Yimer’s help with laundry and market

purchases we converted a “summer kitchen” off of the porch into

his room.

Like most students Yimer was from a small farming village far

away in the province.

In my “Peace Corps Diary: Ethiopia 1962-1964 Part 2” I wrote

of our cross country walk from Lalibela to Debre Tabor. We

walked within sight of Yimer’s village, however, although we

offered, he declined to visit.

Yimer was fortunate to have family, an aunt and uncle living in

Gondar. Most students were living away from their villages for the

first time and were subsisting entirely on a small monthly stipend

($15 Eth.) from the Ministry of Education. When the time came

for Yimer to leave his village to attend secondary school in

Gondar, his local priest took him aside for a heart to heart talk.

The priest warned Yimer that moving to a big place like Gondar

meant that he might begin to not observe the fasts of the Orthodox

Church and then he would begin to have religious problems and

finally, worst of all, he might start to eat pork.

To leave one’s village was a big deal. Students frequently

would refer to it as “going to another country.”

Rereading Yimer’s comments about leaving his village

reminded me of my own family’s reaction to my announcement

that I was going to Africa with the Peace Corps. I got to share the

comments with others while in training at Georgetown University

during the summer of 1962. The Peace Corps psychologist

conducted small group sessions to judge our suitability for

participation in the program. I remember in one session the

question was asked whether we had thought of being homesick

while abroad.

It gave me an excuse to tell the group the story of my

Grandmother, Evelyn Brackett Lyman’s, reaction to the news that

I was going to Africa . She was the matriarch of the family and I

was the only grandson so she pulled me aside one day to ask

“How can you go to Ethiopia? I won’t see you again.” My reply

to her was “We both know you are too stubborn to die!” Sure

enough she was there two years later at the Minneapolis/St Paul

Airport when I stepped off the plane.

My diary entries for February 1964 often mention listening to

reports on the BBC, VOA and Ethiopian radio of the fighting

between Ethiopia and Somalia.

On Sunday Feb. 9 I wrote: “The Ethiopian government has

taken responsibility for the Somalia border area out of the

Ministry of Interior and reassigned it to the Ministry ofDefense.

Ethiopian Radio claims that Somali casualties are at the rate of4

to 5 per Ethiopians killed. In the afternoon the school lost its

soccer game with the army 2 to 1. We watched the game from the

high bank overlooking the end ofthe Zobel field so that we would

be out ofrock throwing range.

Yimer’s uncle, brother and cousin came to Gondar this

morning. They’d been walking for four days from their village

near Debre Tabor. They came to our house and Yimer introduced

us. They showed great respect for us by bowing and shifting their

shammas off of their shoulders. Yimer proudly showed them his

room, bed, books, watch and clothes. They came to Gondar

because someone in their village tried to bomb the uncle and they

needed to report the incident to the provincial officials because the

brother had witnessed the incident.”

On February 10 I wrote: “Somali radio claims to have blown

up an Ethiopian ammunition depot and killed 350 Ethiopians.

Yimer took the day off from school to take his relatives to the

court. He says it was a good thing he did because ‘they are just

country people and would have been run over by cars. ’ Every time

a car came towards them they would panic. In the court they were

so awed they forgot their own names. Yimer says they are very

anxious to leave tomorrow and get back to the safety of their

village.”

Yimer, was a wonderful source of folklore and culture. He was

able to help us understand what was happening around us. He

started life as a shepherd boy in his village. He related that at times

when there was frost on the ground he and the other shepherds

would tie leave from the false banana plant to their bare feet. We

never asked the ages of our students for two reasons. First, they

might not really know and secondly, they might in all likelihood

ask our ages.

I assumed that Yimer and many ofmy other students had been

shepherds and had started school at an older age and they well

might be older than I.

Scattered throughout my six volumes of diaries are many

quotes from Yimer:

“Solomon Abate wore a deflated soccer ball to school in the

afternoon. It makes a swell rain hat. His father Ato Abate is a

judge and is also the fattest man in Gondar. Yimer says that Ato

Abate once tried to ride in a horse drawn garry and broke it.

Yimer bought me a policeman’s raincoat (zenab libs) for $8.50.

Policemen were given two coats a year so ifthey have a spare they

sell it. ”

“Yimer told us that the former mayor ofGondar (the one who

paved the streets) has died in Addis and there will be a ceremony

ofpublic mourning tomorrow morning under the big tree near the

market. Yimer said it will be a traditional ceremony with ‘the

slaves carrying empty talla jars on their backs.”

“Yimer told Marty why Ethiopians want so many children.

They believe that success comes only through luck so if they have

seven children the chances are greater that one child will be lucky

and will thus be able to support the whole family.”

“Yimer and I went to the arada (market) . He showed me the

different kinds ofsheep. Those from !orth ofGondar, near Dabat,

have short tails while those from south of Gondar, near Debre

Tabor have fat tails. A number ofwomen were selling butter which

they took out ofa gourd and melted over a charcoal fire. This was

cooking butter. The hair butter is sold in a little solid pat between

two fresh leaves.”

About once a month Yimer would gather up all our empty

bottles and tins and recycle them by selling them in the Saturday

market. When my son, John, and I were in Gondar six years ago

empty bottles were still sought after.

A stone mason working to restore the wall at the Bath of King

Fasil very politely asked if he could have the empty water bottle I

was carrying.

On 19 June 1963 I wrote: “Today is Wodaja which is a pagan

celebration that occurs three times a year. People believe they

must kill a multi-colored chicken in their houses. As a result the

price ofchickens has been very high this week. In addition there is

a great deal ofdancing. We could hear the drums during the night.

Yimer tells me that Wodaja is an appeal to the pagan deity Zafffor

mercy in case ofillness in the coming year.”

I took this photograph of Yimer’s Aunt and Uncle standing in

the doorway of their house. I regret that I never wrote down their

names and after fifty years I cannot remember them.

If records of the Gondar Health College sanitarian department

still exist from the period when the sanitarians took the census and

17

International Policy Digest Volume I Issue V

assigned each house a number then their house number would

answer the question. They were a handsome couple and extremely

gracious. They often included us in neighborhood and family

gatherings.

Pinned to the wall of their house was a photograph of the

uncle proudly posing as a dashing young man in his Italian police

uniform. On a number of occasions during visits to the homes of

students I met uncles, fathers or grandfathers who had worked for

the Italians during the occupation. I guess that would be expected

because Gondar had been the center of the Italian occupation and

contained upwards of 20,000 Italians. In spite of stories of Italian

atrocities I did not hear of reprisals against those Ethiopians who

had served them.

Once an Ethiopian teacher whispered a joke in my ear. “Who

were the two most foolish men in the world? First was Mussolini

for wanting Ethiopia. Second was Haile Selassie for taking it back

before the Italians had finished building it.”

On weekends I would often be invited by students to take

walks with them and explore their favorite places in Gondar.

Frequently we spent time at their families’ and friends’ houses

drinking talla and tea and eating ingera. I was always honored to

be invited into their homes.

One Saturday Yimer and Mulattu took me on a round about

journey to the Falasha village north of Gondar. It wasn’t the usual

route of going through the Piazza and turning left onto the Asmara

road.

On the walk, Yimer (with no embarrassment) pointed out the

house where his aunt lived as the mistress of an Italian soldier

during the occupation.

Here is what I wrote on that April 1 964 day:

“The area then had its own hospital, cinema and was full of

barracks buildings. Tukul Hill which towers up behind the Post

Office was called Tigre Mecha because centuries ago when the

Emperor lived in Gondar the Tigres from the north would come to

see him and always camp on the mountain side.”

“Mulattu’s father was an officer in the Italian army. From

Mullatu’s comments it sounded as if he commanded some Italian

troops. After the war his father quietly switched sides and joined

the Ethiopian police. When we crossed a bridge on the Asmara

road near the Incode (Israeli) meat packing plant Mulattu recalled

when it was built ten years ago because at that time he used to

watch his father’s cattle on a nearby hill. ”

“After visiting the Falasha village we returned to Gondar

through the Megech River valley. An eleventh grade student was

rounding up his father’s donkeys in order to take some grain into

Gondar. Along the River there are the ruins ofItalian block houses

and irrigation works. Big pipes still lead into some fields but the

pumps are now gone. We climbed the mountain behind the Roman

Catholic Church. On the way we passed more ruined forts and the

foundations of the little round huts where the Ethiopian Italian

troops were housed.”

“We stopped at the house of a mentor to Yimer whom he

referred to as ‘his brother’. There we had tea and ingera with a

glob of pepper paste on it. The family was preparing to go to a

celebration ofthe marriage ofan eight year old girl. Two families

were concerned about keeping their adjoining land in the family so

they are marrying two oftheir eight year olds. Up the street there

was a tent set-up and the people under it were wailing because

Mekuria (a ninth grade student last year) had died in Addis.

Mekuria’s father was a policeman and had been transferred to

Addis last year. While in Addis Mekuria had been sick most ofthe

year.”

18

March 15th - 31 st

On 27 April 1 964 I wrote: “Yimer invited me to his aunt’s for

lunch. She served miser (lentil) and sherro (chickpea) wats and

lots of talla. The aunt and uncle have a new servant girl (Abebe)

who appears to have caught Yimer’s eye. Abebe recently divorced

her husband in Yimer’s village and moved to the big city. The area

ofGondar where the aunt lives is called ‘Shameye Seffer’ after the

man who came from Dessie with his followers during the war. It is

only halfa mile from our house. An Ethiopian soldier who served

with the U! in the Congo is building a $5,000 house in the

neighborhood. He plans to rent it out. Yimer says even a common

soldier returned from the Congo with over $1, 500. The roofofthe

aunt’s house has been used five different times. It’s Italian roofing

steel and is worth the same as the thin Japanese sheets that are

now sold. On the walk back to our house on the shady lane, a

neighborhood talla seller told Yimer that she would like to marry

me.”

1 March 1964 I recorded another event:

“Yimer invited us over to his aunt’s for an afternoon party.

Every year just before the Easter fast she has a celebration for the

neighbors and people who attend a certain church. The people

who live far away come for the afternoon while the near neighbors

wait for the evening performance. At the side of her rectangular

chika (mud) walled house she created a flat topped little hut for

the party. The corners had posts dug into the ground and walls

and ceiling were made out ofbranches and blankets. The dirt floor

was covered with eucalyptus leaves. We sat on woven mats placed

along the side walls. Many of the afternoon guests had come to

Gondar during the occupation. They had accompanied a Ras

(leader) and when he died they remained in Gondar. All ofus were

given glasses that were kept full of talla. Two servants tended the

talla jugs which were as large as beer kegs. It was all two men

could do to lift a full one into place.”

“Two priests sat along one side. A servant to one man sat in

the center of the floor by himself. After a while one of the priests

stood up and delivered a prayer. The other priest then got up and

said it was a happy time that everyone could be present. He then

quoted an Ethiopian proverb to the effect that when everyone else

is present at a gathering, white men will come.”

“Yimer estimated that his aunt spent $25 for the teff for the

injera and $50 for the dagussa and barley for the talla beer. The

ingera was served with a paste made out of water, beriberi and

perhaps sesame seed oil.”

“On the way back to our house we passed a wedding party on

the road in front ofthe Davises’ house. The bride and groom were

on one mule and another man followed them on a second mule.

The bride was wrapped in a shamma and she appeared to be no

older than fourteen. All around the two mules six other young men

danced, sang and just jumped about. They periodically raced each

other down the road as they returned to their village in the

mountains.”

This brief “Part 9” from my Ethiopian Diary celebrates the

contributions Yimer Mekonnen and his family made toward

enriching my two years in Gondar. ■

19

International Policy Digest Volume I Issue V

Argentina’s Economic PolicyFailing to Learn from History

By Patrick Hall & John Hall28 March 2012

Argentina is heading toward its second economic crisis in

just over a decade and national leaders are unwilling to publicly

acknowledge that the country’s growth is unsustainable.

Since the country’s economic collapse a decade ago, President

Nestor Kirchner (2003-2007) and President Christina Fernandez

de Kirchner (2007 – present) have allowed the national economy

to function without interference or direction. Senior officials have

refused to dictate economic policy because domestic markets have

been expanding and strengthening independently. They defend

their position by citing the nation’s cheap currency and continual

trade surpluses.

The reason for Argentina’s economic success is due to self-

deception on the part of the national leadership. The international

community has vocalized concern that it would be in Argentina’s

best interest to slow down economic progress; however, these

concerns were met with increased transportation and energy

subsidies, as well as more funding being allocated for social

programs. These policies were initially subsidized by the

nationalization of private pensions, but, as spending continued to

grow, the Central Bank began printing money.

Subsidies and spending increases are causing the Argentinean

economy to lose nearly $2 billion per month and, unless the

country’s export portfolio is diversified and strong relations are

built with other countries, the only way in which Argentina’s

economy will be able to grow is through stimulus spending, which

will only create more inflation.

Latin America’s current growth trends and long-term stability

relies on a number of factors, one of which is the strength and

success of the Argentine market. Since the 1960s, the region has

suffered greatly from economic collapses – from internal and

external forces alike – that have undermined development.

Regional Impediments

Latin American countries have historically struggled with

modernization and urbanization strategies. Over the past two

decades, the region has been in a political transition becoming

increasingly democratic, which has had a positive effect on

domestic economies. Progress has been slow as many Latin

Americans have come to expect pseudo-authoritarian governance

from national leadership, which has limited alterations to national

policies and slowed economic progress.

Argentina’s slow economic collapse.”

“In 1994, the World Bank urged the Argentinean government

to initiate social security privatization during a time of massive

economic reform, exacerbating an already weakened national

system. During this period, concessions also had to be made to the

IMF in order to receive the finances already promised to

Argentina to cover the nation’s debt. By 2001, the IMF forced

Argentina to make a series of cuts to its existing social security

program – an action that world not have been advised in the

developed world. The lending guidelines established by these

institutions led to the enacting ofreforms focused on benefiting the

private sector. Furthermore, they proscribed counter-cyclical

policies that were used to insure the monetary investments of

international investors made in regional markets. The domestic

market situation coupled with external pressure led to a national

economic collapse that has lasted over a decade.”

Overheating

The global economic crisis in 2008 continued the discrediting

of the Washington Consensus’ ideological underpinnings;

predominately the concepts surrounding the accumulation of

national debt and the influence of foreign capital in domestic

markets. Many countries began to focus their attention on

developing a stronger state regulatory capacity as well as construct

20

Trade negotiations conducted by IGOs wereand are disproportionately dominated bythe developed world, and often imposeagreements and policies that aredetrimental to the interests oflesser-

developed countries

Many countries remained

isolated from potential inter-

national partners because inept

national policies failed to promote

a more collaborative trade envi-

ronment.

While leaders are adept at espousing rhetoric focused on their

desire to create a more efficient and effective infrastructure, the

failure of national governments to invest or innovate is matched by

their lack of interest in changing national economic policies.

Furthermore, an unwillingness to legitimately fight against

nepotism and corruption has further undermined domestic markets.

Over the years, reluctant national leadership has restrained

international expansion while providing governments an

opportunity to construct and execute nation-specific policies and

programs. National leaders strived to strengthen Latin America’s

position in the international market by focusing on what would

benefit the country, or region, rather than on what would be useful

to entice corporate leaders and foreign powers.

Corruption and the government’s disinclination to cede power

to the people was not the only reason for Latin America’s lack of

progress. The private sector languished as a result of tight credit

controls that were implemented to counteract inflation; a policy

dictated by the international community. For the long-term, these

policies diminished Latin America’s international competitiveness

and undermined the ability of domestic industries to compete

globally.

Interference

Globalization’s influence has forced many nation-states to

redefine their sovereign rights as international financial

organizations were being developed with the intent to bring parity

to the international system. By the 1980s, the mission defining

these institutions changed with a reformation in debt financing,

affecting the relationships between multi-national corporations and

national governments.

Eventually, as described by Michael Albert in Parecon: Life

After Capitalism, many IGOs were no longer “working to

facilitate stable exchange rates and…help countries protect

themselves against financial fluctuations”.

For countries in the developing world,

“The IMF’s priority [became] bashing down all obstacles of

capital flows and unfettered profit-seeking…and the World Bank

became a tool of the IMF,…financing projects not with an eye to

enlarge benefits for the recipient country but to seeking profits for

major multinationals”.

Trade negotiations conducted by IGOs were and are dispro-

portionately dominated by the developed world, and often impose

agreements and policies that are detrimental to the interests of

lesser-developed countries.

Past aspirations for similar programs led to the introduction

of IGOs, such as World Bank and IMF, into domestic affairs

which eventually created policy mismanagement and economic

stagnation. In our previous article, “Latin American Success: A

Case for Comparative Advantage”

we stated:

“For Latin Americans, the

inequality that arises from

policies and programs instituted

by IGOs is illustrated by

March 15th - 31 st

a sound public domain. Investing in job-creating sectors in

competitive and productive areas and strengthening social

programs was found to be more important than the single-minded

pursuit of integration into world markets. Governments introduced

national policies that stabilized exchange rates, regulated financial

institutions and central banks, and reinforced existing social

programs. Learning from the past over-reliance on IGOs for

stability and security, national leaders began building programs

and policies that benefited domestic development. This response

placed distance between the region and the global North and

provided them the opportunity to advance.

During this period of growth, Argentina continued to struggle

from its collapse in 2002, though it finally began gaining

momentum with the rise in commodities pricing. The country’s

success has been rampant to the point of being unsustainable over

the long-term.

The fly in the ointment here is overheating domestic markets in

the global South have become a primary concern for international

analysts, and, as The Economist outlined, Brazil and Argentina are

the top two markets at “risk ofboiling over”.

Sri Lanka’s Minister of External Affairs, G.L. Peiris, has

recently given one additional reason for the passage of a resolution

on Sri Lanka at the UN’s Human Rights Council (HRC) in

Geneva: “collective commitments.”

Evidently, Mr. Peiris had been informed by one of his

European counterparts that certain members of the European

Union (EU) were unsupportive of the resolution, but were

compelled to vote in favor of it, since a group decision had been

taken by the EU.

Mr. Peiris went on to say that even some US Congressman did

not view the HRC in a positive light, due to the fact that the body

is “politicized.” (It is unclear to this writer how a United Nations

forum where nation states meet to discuss human rights could be

apolitical, but I will not belabor that point).

In addition, Mr. Peiris also announced in Parliament that the

government would not tolerate foreign intervention of any kind.

If this is post-Geneva government policy, what does all of this

mean?

The Sri Lankan government mismanaged its time and

resources in Geneva. Besides, it was never really clear who was

leading the delegation anyway. Was it G.L Peiris or was it

Plantation Minister and Special Human Rights Envoy Mahinda

Samarasinghe?

21

There have been numerousreports that Secretary oftheInterior Guillermo Morenohas threatened independenteconomists willing to reportcontradictory estimates

financial vulnerabilities, while responding appropriately to the

souring external environment [and] a temporary pause in

monetary tightening could be considered until uncertainty

abates”.

Argentina’s government has acknowledged the IMF Outlook,

but, as expected from a country that entered into default as a result

of international interference, the Argentine government and the

Central Bank have stated that they will continue to implement the

policies that best represent the interests of the Argentine people.

Even though President Fernandez has yet to make any state-

ments concerning a change in the country’s domestic market

policies, it is expected that the economy will become central to the

national agenda in President Fernandez’s second term with the

appointment, last year, of Economy Minister Amado Boudou as

Vice President.

The only way President Fernandez will be able to move the

nation on to a truly stable path is to take the reins and direct

economic policy, rather than be led by it. ■

Research conducted by Vox and BNY

Mellon have also illustrated the issues

enveloping Argentina’s markets; a situation

that can be easily managed once the

government is willing to openly acknowledge

and work towards reducing inflation.

As in all countries, part of the economic problem is political.

Argentine leadership has been reluctant to change course

because the policies being implemented were, at minimum,

moving the economy forward. Moreover, there is a strong concern

that making any economic issues public would lead to wide-spread

unrest; the population would likely not remain silent if it was

forced to endure a fourth economic crisis in three decades.

These reasons have led national leaders to continue to ignore

the warning signs and press forward with economic policies more

ambitious than the last. This has created inflation, by private sector

estimates, at nearly 25%, leading to currency overvaluation.

Government officials, however, place inflation numbers closer to

10%, and there have been numerous reports that Secretary of the

Interior Guillermo Moreno has threatened independent economists

willing to report contradictory estimates.

Reluctant Optimism

The 2001 default – brought about by high inflation, currency

overvaluation, borrowing from IGOs at increased interest rates,

and privatizing social programs during a recession – is different in

many ways from the economic situation arising today, but the

implications remain the same. The affects of another recession in

Argentina could negate regional gains achieved over the past

decade.

The economy is not under threat of imminent collapse, and the

IMF World Economic Outlook from the fall of 201 1 stated that:

“Policies need to be designed to address two offsetting forces:

containing domestic overheating pressure and the buildup of

Post­Geneva Delusions: The Next Steps inSri Lanka

By Gibson Bateman

31 March 2012

International Policy Digest Volume I Issue V

It will be interesting to see how Rajapaksa’s administration

handles questions related to the resolution, national reconciliation

and international diplomacy moving forward. Having just been

embarrassed in Geneva, now would be an appropriate time to

show more political maturity and to craft a practicable strategy that

the government can act upon over the next twelve months.

What �ext?

The recent remarks made by G.L. Peiris miss the point:

irrespective of “collective commitments,” the flaws of the HRC

and the seemingly contradictory stance of some Western nations

on this matter, the resolution on Sri Lanka has been passed. The

Rajapaksa administration should spend more time talking about

how it is going to comply with the resolution and less time making

excuses for its feckless diplomacy and failed policies, both

domestic and foreign. Instead, President Rajapaksa is busy talking

about how his country has been “victimized” as a result of biased

media coverage.

The president forgot to mention that, when it comes to media,

Sri Lanka is one of the least free places in the world. And,

particularly when it comes to print media, there are virtually no

strident critics of government policy.

Unfortunately, these are all early indications that Rajapaksa’s

insecure government is still unable to face reality. The merits of

the resolution on Sri Lanka can be debated endlessly, but the fact

that 40 nations signed on as co-sponsors is telling. It appears that

Sri Lanka’s shoddy human rights record will continue to garner

attention, at least until March 2013. At that time, the HRC will

reconvene for its 22nd session and the UN’s Office of the High

Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) will present a report

as to how it has worked with the Sri Lankan government to

implement the LLRC recommendations.

Now, according to the resolution, OHCHR can only “assist”

the government with the regime’s consent. But, just a few days

after the passage of this resolution, the government is still talking

about Western conspiracies, lamenting the faults of the HRC and

making it clear that it wants and needs no foreign assistance.

It is unfortunate that the appetite for a stronger resolution in

Geneva did not materialize this time around. However, what will

happen if the government continues to prevaricate when it comes

to implementing the LLRC recommendations and responds tepidly

to offers of international support?

The Endgame

If the Rajapaksa administration does not take this resolution

seriously, it is obviously making the following political

calculation: Nothing will happen (except inertia and empty

rhetoric) at the 22nd session of the HRC.

Relatedly, political grandstanding and intransigence on this

issue, while concurrently extolling the virtues of Sinhala

nationalism, will continue to resonate with the masses in Sri

Lanka; so the Rajapaksa administration will keep those

exhortations alive.

If the government is right about the HRC, President Rajapaksa

will have played his hand brilliantly and would further consolidate

his power. Yet, if he is wrong, Sri Lanka will again be

embarrassed at a United Nations multilateral forum and may face

consequences (like another (tougher) resolution or perhaps

economic sanctions) at that time.

And, most distressingly for the Rajapaksa administration, that

dreaded “A” word, accountability, will be the elephant in the

room. The continued deterioration of the rule of law, the lack of

respect for minority rights and, most importantly, the

government’s refusal to act upon the recommendations outlined in

its own presidentially-appointed commission are what (hopefully)

give the words “independent investigation” meaning nearly three

years after the end of the civil war. ■

22

March 15th - 31 st

S omeone has pinched the

heart of St. Lawrence O’Toole,

and thereby hangs a typical Irish

tale filled with metaphors,

parallels, and some pretty serious

weirdness.

Who done it? The suspects are

many and varied.

Could the heist from Dublin’s

Christ Church Cathedral have

been engineered by the infamous

“troika” of the European

Commission, the European Bank,

and the International Monetary

Fund? Seems like a stretch, but

consider the following:

O’Toole—patron saint of

Dublin—was, according to the

Catholic Church, famous for

practicing “the greatest

European Treaty, but was forced to put it up for a public referendum at home (no other EU

county is being allowed to vote “yea” or “nay”).

Kenny is pressing for a “yes” vote, and Labor’s Tánaiste Eamon Gilmore argues that a

“yes” vote would be a “vote for economic stability and a vote for economic recovery.”

The Treaty will not only continue the austerity program, it will move decision-making

to EU headquarters in Brussels. This means that governments will be powerless when it

comes to the economy. Think “Model United Nations” and lots of earnest high school

students.

Who will make these decisions? Good question. Well, it turns out that a committee of

the German Bundestag debated the Irish austerity proposals before the Dublin government

even got a chance to look at them. How did that happen? Again, good question, but no

answer yet.

Maybe German Chancellor Andrea Merkel lifted O’Toole’s heart. She certainly has a

motive: Merkel is leading the “austerity is good for you” charge, a stance that has battered

economies from Spain to Greece. In any case, the Irish are already suspicious of the

German chancellor. An anti-austerity demonstration outside the Dail, Ireland’s parliament,

featured a poster calling government ministers “Angela’s Asses.”

Much of the economic crisis in Europe—and virtually all of it in Ireland— is due to the

out-of-control speculation by German banks, along with the Dutch, Austrian, and French

financial institutions. “Yet it is the working people of Ireland and Europe who are being

asked to pay the price,” argues Des Dalton of Sinn Fein. It appears that the Germans have

discovered that one does not need Panzer divisions to conquer Europe, just bankers and

compliant governments.

“Compliant,” however, has run into some difficulties in Ireland, a place where

“difficulty” is a very common noun. On Mar. 2, Sinn Fein President Jerry Adams trekked

out to Castlebar in the west of Ireland to resurrect the ghost of Michael Davitt, founder of

the Land League and leader of the 1878 Land War (there was an earlier one from 1761 to

1784, but more on that later). Adams told the Mayo County crowd “The Irish people

cannot afford this treaty.”

The Castlebar symbolism was about as heavy as you can get. Davitt, along with the

great Irish Parliamentarian Charles Stewart Parnell, launched the land war from that city,

calling up the words of the great revolutionary, James Fintan Lalor: “I hold and maintain

that the entire soil ofa country belongs by right to the entire people ofthat country.”

These days that is not a popular sentiment in most European capitals, where gov-

ernments are shedding public ownership in everything from airlines to energy production.

The Irish government is trying to sell off several lucrative holdings, including Aer Lingus,

Ireland’s natural gas company, and parts of its Electricity Supply Board. The state’s

forestry will be sold as well. “It is the depth oftreachery to sell billions ofEuros worth of

State assets to pay bad gambling debts,” Socialist Party member Joe Higgins said in the

International Policy Digest Volume I Issue V

23

Ireland’s Debt and theHeart of St. O’Toole

By Conn M. Hallinan

16 March 2012

austerity.” Lawrence liked to wear a hair

shirt underneath his Episcopal gowns and

spent 40 days in a cave each year.

That is a point of view the troika can

respect. They have overseen a massive

austerity program in Ireland that has

strangled the economy, cut wages 22

percent, slashed education, health care,

and public transport, raised taxes and

fees, and driven the jobless rate up to

15%—30% if you are young. At this rate

many Irish will soon be living in caves,

and while hair shirts may be

uncomfortable, they are warm.

There are other suspects as well. For

instance, St. O’Toole was friendly with

the Norman/English King Henry II, who

conquered the island in 1 171 . The Irish

are not enamored of Henry II, indeed

most of them did their level best to drive

the bastard into the sea. Not Lawrence.

He welcomed Henry to Dublin and,

according to the Church, “Paid him due

deference.”

So “deference” establishes yet an-

other suspect: the current Fine Gael/

Labor ruling coalition. Fine Gael leader

and Irish Taoiseach (Prime Minister)

Edna Kenny has already signed the new

International Policy Digest Volume I Issue V

Dail.

The land wars were a reaction to efforts by the English to

apply to Ireland the Enclosure Acts, a policy that sold “common

land” to private landowners and forced the rural population of

England, Scotland and Wales into the hellishness of industrial

Manchester, Birmingham, Glasgow and Liverpool.

As Laura Nader and Ugo Mattei maintain in their book

Plunder: When the rule of law is illegal, what is currently

happening in Ireland (and all over Europe) is a 21 st century

version of the Enclosure Acts. The last vestiges of public

ownership are being systematically auctioned to the highest

bidder, and the concept of “the common good” is fading like the

ghost of providence.

But not without a fight.

While Adams was resurrecting the spirit of Michael Davitt,

demonstrators were besieging Parliaments in Greece, Spain and

Romania.

Ireland rejected two previous European treaties, only to pass

them in a second round of voting. However, under the new rules, it

no longer has veto power. If 12 out of the 17 Euro Zone countries

endorse—pretty much considered a slam-dunk—then the new

treaty goes into effect.

A number of commentators are saying that the 12 country

threshold makes the Irish referendum irrelevant, but a “no” vote

will be a blow to the Euro currency, and it might eventually

encourage similar “no” votes in other countries. In that sense, the

Irish tail could end up wagging the European dog.

Since Irish stories always include parallels, there is certainly

one to be made between the first land war and the current debt

crisis. The 1761 effort by English landlords to apply the Enclosure

Acts to Ireland ignited resistance, first in Limerick, then spreading

to Munster, Connacht and Leinster. Crowds of Irish tenants

dressed in linen masks and coats—hence their generic name, the

”Whiteboys”— burned hayricks, knocked down enclosure walls,

and hamstrung cattle. On occasion they pitched land agents into

the local bog.

The Irish resistance to the Enclosure Acts was not unique, but

a very odd thing happened in Ireland: they won. A combination of

population growth and war had driven up the price of food, so

even the small-scale agriculture practiced by the Irish was

profitable. Plus the rent capital skimmed off the Irish peasantry

was playing an important role in helping to capitalize the English

industrial revolution. Add to this the resistance, and the English

decided that it was in their best interests to back off.

The average Irish tenant knew nothing about international

finance or capital accumulation, but they got the idea that if you

dug in your heels and went toe-to-toe with the buggers, you could

beat them. It was a momentous experience, and a collective

memory that would help fuel more than 150 years of rebellion.

Can the current Irish resistance movement turn the tide against

the austerity madness that has gripped the European continent?

Well, the Left is on the rise (in some places, so is the Right). Sinn

Fein’s support in the most recent opinion polls shows a 25 percent

approval ratting, up 4 percent.

In comparison, Fianna Fail — the party that ushered in the

current crisis—has dropped from 20 percent to 16 percent. Labor

has fallen to 10 percent, and Fine Gael is at 32 percent. Other Left

parties are also doing well.

Indeed, the Left seems to be resurging in other countries as

well. A center-left party in Slovakia ousted a right-wing govern-

ment, and France seems posted to vote socialist. The Greek Left

is fractious, but its various stripes now make up a majority.

Weirdness. Remember weirdness? For starters, an 832-year-

old heart is pretty strange. And it wasn’t just the heart that was

snatched. Someone also stole a splinter of the “true cross” (if one

added up all the splinters in all the Cathedrals of Europe you end

up with a fair size forest). And then there is the matter of the

cheekbone of St. Brigid that just missed getting lifted from a

church in North Dublin.

In the end, saints will not preserve Ireland from an invasion

of the austerity snakes.

The Irish people will have to do that. But they sport an impressive

track record of overturning imperial designs, and they have long

memories: put enough people into the streets of Castlebar (Dublin,

Cork, Waterford, Galway, Limerick, etc) and the bastards will

back off.

As Adams said in Castlebar, “Stand together, stand united,

and there is nothing we cannot achieve.” ■

24

March 15th - 31 st

On Power and Delusions of GrandeurBy Deepak Tripathi

18 March 2012

F irst the video of United States Marines urinating on bodies

ofAfghans who had been killed. Then the revelation that copies of

the Quran had been burned at Bagram Air Base, which also serves

as an American prison camp in Afghanistan. Nearly thirty Afghans

and several NATO troops died in the violent reaction. And as I

mentioned in Just Plain Stupidity or failure by Design the BBC

Kabul correspondent described these events, and the violent public

reaction to them, as the tipping point for NATO in the Afghan

War.

Just as the U.S. commander Gen. John Allen and President

Obama hoped that apologies from them would help calm the

situation comes another disaster.

If official accounts are to be believed: an American soldier left

his base in the middle of the night, entered villagers’ homes, woke

up Afghan families from sleep and shot his victims in cold blood.

After the killings, the soldier was reported to have turned himself

up to U.S. commanders, and flown out of the country. He has since

been named as St. Sgt. Robert Bales.

Other reports tell a different story, indicating that a group of

soldiers was involved. Looking drunk and laughing, they engaged

in an orgy of violence, while helicopters hovered above.

The massacre was committed in Kandahar, a province where

NATO forces regularly carry out night raids on Afghan homes.

They capture and kill men sweepingly described as Taliban; their

March 15th - 31 st

supporters or sympathizers. Male family members, therefore, leave

their homes at night to escape foreign forces. This explains why 9

of the 16 murdered were children. The rest included at least four

women; five Afghans were wounded. Several bodies were burned.

The massacre of Kandahar has echoes ofMy Lai––a village in

South Vietnam where American troops massacred unarmed

civilians including women, children, and old people almost exactly

44 years ago, on March 16, 1 968. The full horror of the My Lai

massacre took time to surface for many attempts were made to

downplay it. Soldiers who had tried to stop the killings were

denounced by U.S. Congressmen and received hate mail and death

threats. It took thirty years before they were honored. Only one

American soldier Lieutenant William Calley was punished. He

spent just three years under house arrest despite being given a life

sentence.

The conduct of the U.S. authorities following the massacre of

Afghans will be under critical scrutiny. Those who must bear

ultimate responsibility will have to live with the guilt for years to

come. And the carnage will continue to haunt the conscience of

many people in America and elsewhere. The general sentiment in

Afghanistan had already been turning dangerously hostile to

foreign troops. Now, reports from Kabul say that Afghans “have

run out ofpatience.”

In the midst of these events (U.S. Marines urinating on dead

bodies in January, Quran burning in February, massacre in March),

President Obama decided to invoke a comparison between himself

and two of history’s legendary figures: Mahatma Gandhi and

Nelson Mandela.

To this author, the latest events in Afghanistan are dismaying,

and the timing of the President’s attempt to invoke parallels with

Gandhi and Mandela is sickening. It goes to show what power

does to its holder.

Much has been written about the New York fund-raiser where

President Obama gave his address as he sought support for a

second term. I repeat the obvious to say that the country he leads

has been engaged in a number of wars resulting in deaths and

destruction on a vast scale. Their legacies will continue to take a

heavy toll. Even when U.S. forces have withdrawn from occupied

of international relations, trade and so forth.

Despite the U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq and the

Afghan project heading toward an end, there exists a more

explosive situation from South Asia to North Africa. The scenario

of a majorwar in the region haunts many. Obama may appear

reluctant to attack Iran or Syria. But that clandestine warfare by

major powers and their proxies continues is hardly in doubt. The

Obama administration’s aggressive, interventionist instinct is on

open display. And to draw parallels between himself and great

souls such as Gandhi and Mandela is a grotesque parody of their

historic struggles.

At the New York fund-raising event, Obama said that “the

change we fought for in 2008 hasn’t always happened as fast as

we would have liked…real change, big change, is always hard.”

Next, making a leap into history, he continued, “Gandhi, !elson

Mandela––what they did was hard. It takes time. It takes more

than a single term…”

Corruption infects our world in many forms: material and

moral, visible and invisible, direct and indirect. But the underlying

motive behind all things corrupt is a strong opportunistic instinct

to benefit oneself at the cost of others by allurement or deception.

No wonder politics has fallen so much into disrepute. The

aphorism of the nineteenth-century English historian Lord Acton

that “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts

absolutely” has acquired a special meaning today.

Employing his political mantra of “change” and attempting to

show likeness with Gandhi’s and Mandela’s life and achievements

is one thing. Truth is a different matter. Gandhi never aspired for

any political office, never held one, and did not fight any election.

After his incarceration in prison for 27 years, Mandela was a

reluctant president of South Africa. And he made clear that he

would serve only one term while a new generation of successors

was groomed.

Above all, Mandela used his presidency to avoid a bloodbath

and stabilize the country as apartheid collapsed. Precisely for these

reasons, both Gandhi and Mandela were such formidable

opponents of the unequal and unjust systems which they fought.

Non-violence was Gandhi’s tool. When violence erupted,

International Policy Digest Volume I Issue V

25

lands, or high-altitude bombing without

deploying American troops on the ground

has ceased, we will not know how long

and in how many places Obama’s secret

wars are waged. In the November 2008

election, he had offered a hope of change

for good. It remains as illusive as it was

under his predecessor, George W. Bush.

Obama and NATO have moved and

expanded the war theater ––in Pakistan,

Libya, Yemen, Syria, Kenya, Somalia

and possibly other places we are unaware.

His tactics have steadily become more

threatening, with foes and friends alike,

linking ever more war and routine matters

International Policy Digest Volume I Issue V

Gandhi withdrew his movement against the British. He thought of

others, Muslims and Untouchables he called Harijans (Children of

God). He paid the ultimate price when a Hindu fundamentalist

assassinated him in 1948. Neither Gandhi nor Mandela considered

attacking another country, signing assassination orders,

exaggerating or inventing facts about people they saw as

adversaries.

Mandela’s African National Congress was inspired by Gandhi.

But once the organization had realized that South Africa’s vast

black majority was up against an apartheid regime whose brutality

was exceptional, the ANC did engage in a low-intensity war. And

the United States and Britain listed Mandela as a “terrorist.”

President Obama recently justified his drone attacks inside

Pakistan by saying that they “have not caused a huge number of

civilian casualties.” It is impossible not to interpret this as an

admission that drones do kill and wound civilians. But it is a minor

matter in the president’s eyes. Only a few days ago, the German

news magazine Der SPEIGAL said that while under the Bush

presidency there was a drone attack every 47 days, the interval

now under President Obama, the Nobel Peace Prize winner, is just

four days. The Americans have “already executed 2, 300 people in

this manner.” Nobody has a chance today if this president decides

that their time is up.

Gandhi’s agitation for boycott of British goods in favor of

home-made products and his advocacy for an austere life were

fundamental elements of the anti-globalization movement of his

time. His ethos was “to consume less for the uplift ofothers from

poverty and deprivation.” He lived the life he preached, for which

Winston Churchill, then leader of the Empire, disparagingly called

him the “naked fakir.”

In the world ruled by President Obama today, Mahatma

Gandhi and Nelson Mandela, were he not in his nineties and so

frail, would be his greatest enemies. And they could well have

been on Obama’s list for drone attacks. Mercifully that is not the

case, and this president can indulge in comfort.

Great people like Gandhi and Mandela use power to curb

Jim Yong Kim – a public health expert, President of

Dartmouth College and astute rapper – is the US government’s

candidate for the presidency of the World Bank. As Dani Rodrik, a

development expert at Harvard University, summed it up this

morning: “It’s nice to see that Obama can still surprise us.” Will

the new candidate, who was not on anybody’s shortlist for the

position, be able to reinvent the World Bank?

The current process, in which the US and European govern-

ments divide up the World Bank and IMF’s top posts among

themselves, is a farce and needs to be changed.

Southern governments have put forward Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala

and Jose Antonio Ocampo, the Finance Ministers of Nigeria and

(formerly) Colombia, for the position.

By nominating a candidate without any experience in global

finance and politics, the Obama administration appears to poke a

finger in the eyes of these governments.

Lant Pritchett, a former World Bank official, has already decried

Kim’s nomination as “an embarrassment for the US.”

Civil society groups from the South and North agree on the

need to democratize global governance. The colleagues behind the

World Bank President website even carried out a poll among nine

potential heavy-weight candidates from developing countries.

While I share the critique of the current process, I do not

understand why NGO activists need to support representatives of

the status quo such as South Africa’s Finance Minister Trevor

Manuel or in fact Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, who was the World

Bank’s Managing Director for many years.

So what is the track record of the new candidate? In 1987, Jim

Yong Kim co-founded Partners In Health, a healthcare non-profit,

with four other public health experts.

PIH believes that health care is a right, and makes diagnosis

and treatment available to all patients for free. The organization

26

March 15th - 31 st

power.

Barack Obama stands

among those who use power to

accumulate more of it. Therein

lies the moral of any

comparison in this debate. ■

Can Jim Yong Kim Reinvent the WorldBank?

By Peter Bosshard

24 March 2012

March 15th - 31 st

International Policy Digest Volume I Issue V

supports a preventive approach by promoting people’s right to

food, water, education and housing. It relies on community

activists rather than expensive experts to promote disease

prevention and deliver medicines for the treatment of AIDS,

tuberculosis and other diseases that afflict the poor.

Through the Institute for Health and Social Justice, PIH also

exposes the social and economic roots of the public health crisis in

poor countries. In Dying for Growth, a book that was edited by

Jim Yong Kim, the Institute documented that lacking access to

health care was not a question of insufficient resources but unequal

power, and that the economic policies of governments, funders and

corporations can deepen the health crisis of the poor. While I

cannot claim to know Jim Yong Kim’s work in detail, this

approach is certainly closer to my heart than the policies espoused

by other candidates for the World Bank job.

The World Bank needs to reinvent itself. Since Southern finan-

ciers have overtaken the institution in terms of lending, this is no

longer simply the position of NGO activists. The Bank currently

tries to cut its administrative costs by focusing on big, centralized

infrastructure projects such as multipurpose dams. As I have

shown elsewhere, this approach has bypassed the rural poor since

it first became en vogue in the 1950s and 1960s.

Decentralized, bottom-up solutions such as solar panels,

improved cooking stoves, treadle pumps and drip irrigation could

address the energy and water needs of the poor more effectively

than the centralized mega-projects of the past, in the same way that

the cell phone revolution has made the landline approach obsolete

in the communication sector. The experience that Jim Yong Kim

gained with PIH in the villages of Haiti and the slums of Peru

could help him understand how to address poverty and injustice

through bottom-up solutions.

Could Jim Yong Kim’s presidency offer a chance to reinvent

the World Bank?

Redirecting the supertanker of multilateral development

finance will take more than a change of presidents. The entrenched

interests in the Bank’s management and board will try to prevent a

change of course. But why would the Obama administration

nominate Jim Yong Kim if it were not prepared to back a new

approach?

Again, the selection process for the World Bank presidency

needs to change. But Jim Yong Kim appears to be the most

interesting and promising candidate regardless of his (US and

Korean) passports. The World Bank is facing exciting times. ■

other presidential candidates on the ballots were walloped.

Ron Paul, the libertarian member of Congress from Texas,

campaigned lightly in both states, spending more time in

California. His apparent ‘caucus strategy’ has not worked as well

for him as Barack Obama’s did for the then-Illinois senator four

years ago. To date, Dr. Paul has not won a primary 0r caucus,

although he made impressive showings in Maine and the U.S.

Virgin Islands, and landed a solid third-place finish in New

Hampshire back in January. Moving forward, he may be gambling

on a high delegate tally in California to retain any relevance at all.

The real loser in the primaries on Tuesday and Saturday this

past week was former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich.

Though he campaigned in both states, he lost badly in both. While

Gingrich put a greater emphasis on doing well in Louisiana, he

would have done better to skip the Land of Lincoln entirely to

focus more on his less-than-stellar Southern Strategy instead.

Nonetheless, the prospects for Gingrich in Louisiana were not very

good anyway, given the high vote percentage threshold that state

put on awarding any of the delegates at stake. Gingrich, like Paul,

may be looking to the second Louisiana contest, its caucuses,

where the remainder of its delegates will be determined ahead of a

state party convention.

27

International Policy Digest Volume I Issue V

Commentary: The Credible ConservativeBy James Kane

25 March 2012

Following the primary election held in Louisiana on

Saturday one thing is abundantly clear; the race for the Republican

Party presidential nomination is a two-man race.

Though Rick Santorum was the big winner in Louisiana,

Romney played well in Peoria on Tuesday with his equally

impressive victory in Illinois. Neither candidate gained a majority

of votes cast in either contest, but their wins were decisive. The

Despite the dynamics at work in the Republican Party

presidential nomination contest this year, only one candidate has

any chance at all of defeating President Obama in November. Of

the two, that candidate is the core conservative, whose career and

public life exude an essence not always apparent in the policy

proposals put forward by said candidate.

Republicans have a real choice this year, one which could

have consequences for the direction of their party now and into the

future.

In many ways, the Republican presidential contenders are

really quite similar. This is the first year in recent memory when

neither serious contender has any sort of military service record.

Though both Santorum and Romney have graduate degrees in law

and business, the two candidates have led very different public and

professional lives. Similarly, both candidates have changed their

positions on significant political issues. While Santorum

supporters contend that Romney is anathema to them due to his

past support of abortion rights, they either forget or do not know

that Santorum’s position has changed as well. Both of these

candidates have policy records that are in some ways unflattering

to modern conservatives.

Romney has been criticized for the health reform bill he

signed into law in Massachusetts. In key respects, it shares real

similarities with the federal Patient Protection and Affordable Care

Act that marked its second anniversary Friday. But, any

conservative who has read the constitution knows that the tenth

amendment to that great charter of this republic states that all

powers not granted to the federal government belong to the states,

and to the people in that order. Thus, while Romney’s record as

governor may be too statist for some tastes and less than ideal, his

governorship reflects the sense of separation of powers that,

arguably, Rick Santorum ignored his whole career as a legislator.

Separation of powers doctrine in the United States, rightly

understood, is not merely how powers are allocated between the

legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government, but

between federal and state governments as well.

In his defense, Santorum has said that he repudiates some of

his former votes, but this has curiously not inhibited him from

attacking Romney for his changes of position. Since the rise of the

Tea Party movement, conservatives have emphasized the

importance of principle over party. But to hold such a view should

be to disqualify Santorum from consideration, who, in his own

words, has defended his record by saying that he was a ‘ team

player’ while a member of the United States Senate. If, however,

the incumbent has demonstrated anything, it is that the modern

presidency requires leadership out in front, and not someone more

concerned about playing nice with fellow partisans.

Rick Santorum says he is a conservative. Mitt Romney has

lived his life as one. For Republicans, the choice of nominee

should be rather obvious. Republicans need a nominee who

understands that, as President Coolidge once put it, the chief

business of the American people is business. Republicans need not

a candidate who has suggested that libertarians have no place in

that party, a party whose very foundation was on the principle of

expanding individual liberty and facilitating greater commerce

among the states. When all of the facts are considered, there is

only one credible conservative seeking the Republican nomination,

and he happens to be the most electable because of it.

Hopefully the party of Lincoln, Coolidge, and Reagan today

will be the party ofRomney as well. ■

liberal. The country would be united in its resolve to stare down

the enemy.

Fundamental to any Democracy or Republic is the social

contract – a central set of values and agreements that make people

‘a people’ . Inherent in the social contract of the United States is

the obligation to protect the lives of its citizens from existential

threats. Every bullet fired from every military rifle for over two

centuries has followed a course set by this logic. The people

balance freedom and liberty against the need to protect each other

– including those 14,000 children that die each year.

But these 14,000 unnecessary deaths come not from any

enemy, but from a broken healthcare system. The United States

ranks 34th in infant mortality, with 6.81 /1 ,000 deaths. If the US

were to aspire to have the lowest rates in the world, it would need

to get that number down to 1 .92/1 ,000 – the current rate for

Singapore. The real-world difference between those two numbers

are 14,000 infants and devastated families. It doesn’t stop there.

According to the Center for Disease Control, heart disease was

responsible for the deaths of 599,41 3 Americans. Cancer claimed

567,628 lives. Diabetes took 68,705 more. Influenza and

pneumonia killed 53,692. And this was just in 2010 – similar

statistics are available for 2009, 2008, 2007, 2006, 2005, and so

on. These deaths are the consequence of an incomplete social

contract that stems from the founding of the United States.

The social contract was not meant to be static. Thomas Pain

stated that “Every age and generation must be as free to act for

itself in all cases as the age and generations which preceded it.

The vanity and presumption ofgoverning beyond the grave is the

most ridiculous and insolent ofall tyrannies”.

This is also the central meaning of Thomas Jefferson’s oft-

quoted statement that “God forbid we should ever be 20 years

without such a rebellion”.

Both founders called attention to the ephemeral design of the

American social contract – it is meant to be renegotiated each

generation to prevent a tyranny of past values. This wisdom is the

kernel of democratic governance – there may be founding fathers,

but there are no foundational fathers whose rule is forever to be

law. Citizens of the United States were meant to embody the

values of the founding fathers – not merely reflect them like an old

mirror.

The wisdom of this structure can be seen in that other child of

the enlightenment, the scientific revolution. The rapid pace of

scientific discovery accelerated a generation or two after the

founding of the US Republic. Advances in medical technology

vastly improved the quality and quantity of life. For example,

George Washington died of complications resulting from

‘bloodletting‘ – a treatment that has its origins in the belief that

fundamental ‘humors’ govern the health of humans and must be let

out when ill. Washington was 67 – a ripe old age for his time. As

the life expectancy was 35 for people of the 18th century,

Washington enjoyed considerably good fortune.

There was no notion of bacteria or viruses at the time. In fact,

the idea that you needed to clean surgical instruments before use

28

March 15th - 31 st

The Health Care Argument That ShouldHave Been Made

By B. Lee Drake

28 March 2012

Every year in the United States of America, 1 4,000 children

die within the first year of their life – each death is preventable. If

the deaths of these children were due to an enemy state, the US

would declare war in a heartbeat. If terrorists had crept into

hospitals in the dead night and stuck a AK-47 into every one of

those 14,000 cribs, there would be almost no limit to the degree

the government would pursue those organizations. There would be

no difference between Democrat or Republican, conservative or

would not be successfully demonstrated until Florence

Nightingale’s statistical work 100 years later. Science was still

very nascent – the most scientifically inclined of the founding

generation was perhaps Abigail Adams, who inoculated her

children against smallpox using a form of vaccine that would

horrify any doctor living today.

An understanding of the relationship between the founding

social contract of the US and the relationship of the founders to

science (or lack thereof) is essential to understanding the

Healthcare debate in the United States. In 2010, the Patient

Protection and Affordable Care Act was signed by President

Obama after a lengthy debate in Congress and the country.

Healthcare advocates charged that the bill was required to stem the

rising cost and limited coverage of healthcare. Opponents argued

that its central tenant – that every citizen be required to purchase

health insurance, was a major constitutional overstep. It is a

distinct possibility that the Supreme Court will agree with the

law’s opponents, and their will be a legal basis for doing so. But

that will reflect the handicapped and arcane social contract of the

United States. Specifically, it will highlight the failure of

Americans to renegotiate the social contract and instead celebrate

the interpretation of the founding fathers – who didn’t understand

the problem with dumping bodies and refuse into public drinking

water.

Any government is charged with the responsibility of

protecting its citizens. The logic of every American war – right or

wrong – has been that engagement on the battlefield will protect

American lives. A vast surveillance system has been set up in the

post-9/1 1 world with the purpose of saving American lives.

Policeman regularly stop people speeding on the highway because

if everyone drives at the speed limit, then lives are saved. These

sacrifices of individual liberty have been made because in the

American social contract, we accept that some privacy and

freedom must be limited to protect citizens. We tend to disagree

only in the degree to which this compromise is made. The social

contract sees human actors – whether enemy states, terrorists, or

speeding teenagers – as the threat to which a state must respond.

Healthcare is different. It isn’t a terrorist or a tyrant the state

presumes to protect us from – it is the uncontrolled growth of cells

in the pancreas, or a virus too small to see without a microscope.

Threats from human actors – willful or accidental – are seen as

acceptable subjects for a government to address. The founders

would have certainly agreed. But viruses, bacteria, and cancer?

Thomas Jefferson, George Washington, and John Adams would

have never heard these words, and would not have seen them as

threats to the American populace. The critical scientific

information they would have needed would not arrive for another

century.

Unsurprisingly, the word ‘health’ does not appear in either the

Declaration of Independence or the Constitution. This is not an

omission of intent, but rather of ignorance. An examination of the

history of epidemics and civilization can illustrate just how much

of an existential threat is posed by disease. The United States is a

victim of its early founding before these critical concepts were

established.

Japan, a country that had to re-negotiate its social contract

following World War II, incorporated health as a government’s

obligation to its citizens. All Japanese citizens are guaranteed

access to healthcare, and the nation ranks 3rd in infant mortality,

having a rate of 3.1 4/1 ,000. Granted, Japan is burdened by

healthcare expenses, which form an estimated 8.5% of the nation’s

Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

However, as the United States has a breathtakingly less

efficient system with more bankruptcy, more deaths, and less

coverage at the cost of 17.3% of GDP. That is twice as expensive

as Japan’s system – despite the fact that in America the costs of

healthcare are reported as the primary reason for half of all

bankruptcies. In Japan, there are no reports of a single bankruptcy

due to healthcare costs. The United States pays a heavy price for a

broken system that still fails its citizens at a scale unimaginable in

the rest of the civilized world. Despite the high cost of healthcare,

1 4,000 babies continue to die unnecessarily every year.

The debate regarding the government’s role in healthcare in

the United States today reflect a fundamental failure to live up to

the ideal of the founding fathers. Conservatives steadily hold fast

to an outdated view of government’s responsibilities, treating the

founding father’s views of the social contract as written in stone.

Liberals are unable to articulate their view of the social contract –

arguing instead for benefits and statistics instead of shared values.

The Supreme Court’s decision regarding healthcare reform will

very likely not address this core problem in the American social

contract. It may be that citizens of the United States – certainly

those who either die or suffer bankruptcy due to a failed healthcare

system – will be victims of a country founded before the advent of

science. If America is to fix its healthcare system and be a leader

once more in the world, it must recognize that a citizens’s

protection extends from enemy states and terrorists to disease as

well.

Proponents of a better health care system must frame an

argument within the very values of the United States to make a

better future. Until then, many thousands will continue to die or

face financial ruin. ■

29

International Policy Digest Volume I Issue V

Remarks by David H. Shinn to the House Subcommittee on

Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights.

I thank Chairman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of the House

Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee Chairman

Christopher Smith and Ranking Member Karen Bass for inviting

me to participate in this hearing. For the past six years, two of us

have been researching a book on China-Africa relations that is

being published by the University of Pennsylvania Press and will

be available this June. My comments today reflect some of that

research. Unless otherwise noted, the statistics and analysis in this

testimony refer to all fifty-four countries in Africa. China tends not

to make a distinction between Sub-Saharan Africa and North

Africa as the U.S. government often does.

U.S.-China Economic Competition in Africa

The Subcommittee asked that we focus on how China

competes economically with the United States in Africa, how

China serves as an undemocratic model of governance and issues

concerning natural resources, land grabs and human rights.

Let me take the economic competition question first. The most

important difference between the United States and China is the

very structure of the American and Chinese governments and the

way their respective systems engage in Africa.

American commercial activity (trade, investment and bidding

on contracts) in Africa is conducted by private companies with

limited involvement by the U.S. government.

If two or more private U.S. companies are competing for the

same project, the U.S. government must be impartial, providing

essentially equal help to all U.S. interested parties. When this

situation occurs, my experience was that the role of the U.S.

government diminishes even further.

The situation concerning the relationship between Chinese

companies and the government of China is significantly different.

While most Chinese companies operating in Africa are private,

they tend to be small or medium sized and account for a relatively

small percentage of the dollar value of Chinese trade, investment

and wining of contracts in Africa.

The following sectors in China are controlled predominantly

by the state: oil, petrochemicals, mining, banks, insurance, steel,

aluminum, electricity, aviation, airports, railways, ports, highways,

health care and education. Most of the large Chinese companies

operating in Africa are state owned enterprises or SOEs. This

includes nearly all of the large construction companies that are

today building most of Africa’s infrastructure and China’s

principal national oil companies—China National Petroleum

Corporation, China Petrochemical Corporation and China National

Offshore Oil Corporation Ltd. Some SOEs, for example the

Aluminum Corporation of China (CHINALCO), which is a

holding company, has a subsidiary, the Aluminum Corporation of

China Limited (CHALCO) listed on the New York, Hong Kong

and Shanghai stock exchanges. All of the SOEs receive extensive

support from the government of China in the form of financing

and establishing contacts with African governments. Other

companies are owned by provincial governments and also receive

government help.

A few large Chinese companies that are prominent in Africa

are not SOEs. Their corporate structure is sometimes unclear. ZTE

Corporation is China’s second largest telecom equipment provider.

It has forty offices in Africa and a total staff of 4,000 on the

continent. It is a publicly owned company on the Shenzhen and

Hong Kong stock exchanges. Ninety percent of its stock is

privately held and 10 percent held by the government of China.

ZTE benefits from Chinese government loans and appears to have

a close working relationship with the government although it tends

to operate like a private company.

Huawei, which competes with ZTE as well as large Western

telecommunications companies, is an information and

communications technology solutions provider. It has more than

2,000 personnel in Africa and has established training centers in

Nigeria, Kenya, Egypt and Tunisia. It is providing services to

more than thirty African countries. Huawei is sometimes said to be

a private company and on other occasions called a “collective.” It

has never published its ownership structure. It sells no shares on

the stock exchange. It is believed that most of its shares are owned

by Ren Zhengfei, a former People’s Liberation Army logistics

officer who founded the company in 1988. Like ZTE, Huawei

seems to have the full support of the government of China in its

Africa operations.

The links between the government of China and private

companies are less clear. For example, Mindray is a smaller,

publicly-owned medical equipment and technology company that

is listed on the New York Stock Exchange. It has no government

ownership. It competes in Africa with Chinese SOEs in addition to

non-Chinese companies such as General Electric and Philips.

Mindray has subsidiaries in Egypt, South Africa and Kenya; it

sells products to forty-five African countries. Several of its leaders

told us in February that it receives no financing and very little

support from the government. Chinese embassies in Africa have

provided Mindray with useful market information.

The Bosai Minerals Group Company Limited has a single

project in Africa; it purchased a bauxite mine in Ghana in 2009

30

March 15th - 31 st

Assessing China’s Role and Influence inAfrica

By Ambassador David H. Shinn

29 March 2012

after the bottom fell out of the market. It now has 400 employees

and the mine has reportedly become a huge success. Bosai is a

wholly private company that decided to go overseas because it is

easier to compete with Chinese SOEs abroad than in China. Bosai

officials told us in February that the company relies heavily on

government support, especially financing. The government helped

open doors in Ghana and Bosai management representatives said

the Chinese embassy in Accra was extremely helpful in securing

the deal. In this case, there was no Chinese competition for

purchase of the mine.

The very nature of the different U.S. governmental and

economic systems gives a huge advantage to Chinese SOEs and

those, such as Huawei, that have a special relationship with the

government of China. The SOEs often win bids as part of a

package deal of government loans and tied contracts. After the

SOE is engaged in the project, there are additional advantages that

African countries have learned to appreciate. The director of roads

in one African country where Chinese companies are building

most of the roads explained it this way: “Whenever there is a

problem such as a delay in construction or a quality issue I just call

the Chinese ambassador and he sees that the matter is taken care

of. If this were an American or German company, I would be in

court for years.”

While private Chinese companies may not have a significant

advantage over American companies, even some of them seem to

have easier access to government financing than is usually

possible for American companies.

It is also important to acknowledge that since the mid-1990s,

Chinese companies (SOEs, publicly owned and private) have been

more aggressive in Africa than have their Western competitors.

Many of them, especially the mining, construction, and

telecommunications companies, are now better established on the

ground than most of their non-Chinese competition. In seeking to

win bids, they are usually willing to accept a lower profit margin

and, in some cases, to bid below cost in order to break into the

market. In the past five years, Chinese banks have also

significantly increased their engagement in Africa, especially by

purchasing shares ofAfrican banks and European banks with large

exposure in Africa. The 2008 purchase by the Industrial and

Commercial Bank of China for 20 percent of South Africa’s

Standard Bank Group for $5.5 billion underscores this trend. As

Chinese banking increases in Africa, it attracts additional attention

from Chinese companies that were previously reluctant to invest in

the continent because of the paucity of familiar Chinese banking

facilities.

There are persistent reports, which are very difficult to prove,

that Chinese companies are prepared to pay bribes to win

contracts. While this probably ensures consummation of a deal in a

few cases, the far more important reason for the success of

Chinese companies is the direct assistance provided by the

Chinese government to finance projects and sale of products, often

as part of a package arrangement. Most African governments,

where the state continues to have a larger role in the economy than

is the case in the West, understand this policy and often welcome

it. Many African governments have a vision of the government’s

role that is closer to China’s structure than Western structures.

This poses a difficult challenge for any American company that is

competing with a Chinese company offering similar services or

products even when the quality of the American service or product

is usually better.

The price of American products and services is almost always

higher, sometimes significantly so. In much of Africa, lower price

tends to win out over higher quality. In the case ofwinning bids on

large projects, especially infrastructure, the most serious challenge

is obtaining competitive financing and a willingness to accept a

lower profit margin.

�atural Resources

While China has a number of interests in Africa, maintaining

access to raw materials is, in my view, at the top of the list. China

imports just under one-third of its oil from Africa and the total

amount of Chinese oil imports globally is rising rapidly. Between

2009 and 2010, Chinese crude oil imports rose more than 17

percent. China also imports significant quantities of cobalt, copper,

manganese, tantalum, bauxite and iron ore from Africa. About 85

percent of all Chinese imports from Africa are raw materials,

mainly crude oil and minerals. China requires these raw materials

from Africa and other parts of the world in order to help insure the

health of its manufacturing industry and export capacity. This, in

turn, helps to maintain its high GDP growth rate, which has

averaged more than 9 percent annually for the past three decades.

This high economic growth helps keep the leadership of the

Chinese Communist Party in power.

In 2010, China imported 4.8 million barrels per day (bbl/d) of

crude oil. Of this total, 2.2 million bbl/d or 47 percent came from

the Middle East and 1 .5 million bbl/d or 30 percent came from

Africa. Angola was the principal African supplier followed by

Sudan and Libya. In the United States, we are often quick to

criticize China for a trade relationship with Africa that relies

overwhelmingly on imports of raw materials. Even some African

leaders have expressed concern about a trade relationship that

consists primarily of sending raw materials, which one day will

run out, to China in exchange for high value services,

manufactured goods and consumer products from China.

We need to be careful, however, in making this argument. In

2010, the United States imported from the fifty-four African

countries 2.3 million bbl/d or about 800,000 bbl/d more than did

China. Raw materials also dominate U.S. imports from Sub-

Saharan Africa with more than 80 percent consisting of energy

products alone.

Nigeria is the major U.S. supplier followed by Angola and the

Republic of the Congo.

Because of its huge oil imports from Africa and relatively modest

exports to the continent, the United States has a sizeable trade

deficit with Africa. China’s trade with all fifty-four African

countries is close to being in balance.

It is important, however, to put China’s trade with Africa in

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International Policy Digest Volume I Issue V

perspective. China became Africa’s largest trading partner in 2009,

surpassing the United States. Total China-Africa trade in 201 1 was

about $150 billion. Although there has been a sharp increase in

China-Africa trade in the past ten years, Africa only accounts for

about 4 percent of China’s global trade. On the other hand, China

constitutes more than 13 percent of Africa’s global trade. This

disparity is accounted for by the fact that China’s total trade is

about three times the size ofAfrica’s total trade.

The China-Africa trade issue of most concern is the huge

disparity in bilateral trade with certain African countries. Almost

80 percent ofAfrican exports to China originate in five oil/mineral

exporting countries: Angola, South Africa, Sudan, Libya and

Republic of the Congo. Some fifteen African oil/mineral exporting

countries have large trade surpluses with China. More than thirty

mostly poorer African countries have major trade deficits with

China. While China does allow 4,700 items to enter duty free from

Africa’s least developed countries, this policy has not yet resulted

in significantly increased imports from Africa. The leaders of

some of the African countries that have large trade deficits with

China are concerned about the unbalanced trade relationship.

Land Leasing

There has been a considerable amount of inaccurate and

exaggerated reporting on so-called “land grabs” in Africa.

These deals almost never involve the purchase of land. They

are long-term leases, albeit sometimes up to fifty years. China is

often cited as being at the center of these deals. The most thorough

research on this topic has been done by the Oakland Institute, an

independent policy think tank based in Oakland, California. It has

completed seven detailed case studies based on in-country research

in Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Mali, Mozambique, South Sudan,

Tanzania and Zambia.

While this still leaves many countries uninvestigated, these

seven case studies provide a representative sampling and the most

careful analysis so far of the situation in Africa.

The report on Ethiopia found that the only countries seeking

land leases are Egypt and Djibouti while private investors from

India and Saudi Arabia are also engaged.

The Oakland Institute concluded that China was surprisingly

absent from land investment deals in Ethiopia. It did point out that

a Chinese company is prepared to sign a 25,000 hectare

concession to produce sugarcane in the Gambela region. There

have been widespread and unconfirmed reports of Chinese land

deals in Mozambique. The Institute did not find truth to any of

them. South Sudan has been widely criticized for signing

questionable land leases; China is not involved in any of the

projects. There are twenty-two land deals under discussion in

Tanzania; China is not among the potential investors.

A Chinese company reportedly requested two million hectares

in Zambia to cultivate jatropha for an agrofuel project. The

Institute was not able to confirm that the request had even been

made. Out of fifteen projects involving a half million hectares in

Sierra Leone, a Chinese company has asked to cultivate 2,000

hectares of sugarcane and rehabilitate an old sugar mill. The China

Light Industrial Corporation for Foreign and Technical

Cooperation obtained a fifty year lease for 18,000 hectares in Mali

for an undetermined agricultural project. The government of Mali

has a 40 percent share in the project. This is the only Chinese land

lease in Mali out of twenty-two projects involving sixteen foreign

investors. In the seven countries investigated by the Oakland

Institute, there were more land lease projects proposed by

American investors than those from China.

To some extent, China set itself up for criticism as a “land

grabber” in Africa. There apparently were discussions a number of

years ago about leasing large tracts of land in Mozambique before

China realized the political sensitivity of the deals and abandoned

the idea. In 2007, Li Ruogu, the head of China’s Export Import

Bank, commented that many African countries had plenty of land

and urged Chinese farmers to move to Africa. Li added there is no

harm in allowing Chinese farmers to become farm owners in

Africa, and he said the bank would fully support such migration.

In 2008, China’s Ministry ofAgriculture prepared a document

that argued China would not be able to maintain its own food

security, and that it should secure land acquisitions overseas. This

resulted in a sharp response from some Chinese officials that land

acquisition overseas was not a feasible food security strategy due

to logistics and political risk. By the end of 2008, the National

Development and Reform Commission announced a twenty-year

food security strategy that explicitly stated foreign land

acquisitions would not be part of China’s strategy. A number of

Chinese officials subsequently made the point that China is not

interested in acquiring land in Africa to grow food for Chinese.

The issue has been muddied by the media because China has long

had agricultural projects in Africa as part of its assistance program.

These are generally small projects that grow food for

indigenous populations.

Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights

U.S. support for democratization and the amelioration of

human rights abuses in Africa are the topics of sharpest American

and Chinese policy disagreement. The approaches of China and

the United States are philosophically different and not likely to be

bridged in the foreseeable future. China has a firm position that

supports state sovereignty. It accepts whatever government is in

power irrespective of the manner in which it obtained power or

how it rules once it achieves power. Examples are China’s strong

support for Sudan and Zimbabwe. As a result, China has equally

cordial relations with African democracies and autocracies. When

there is a change of government in an African country, China has

been adept at switching support to the new regime even when it

represents a radical departure, whether it becomes more or less

democratic, from its predecessor.

It is during political transitions, especially unplanned ones,

from one government to another that Chinese policy seems to be

most uncertain. For example, China was slow to make the

transition from Gaddafi’s Libya to the National Transitional

Council (NTC). It eventually aligned itself with the NTC. The

recent coup in Mali is an especially interesting case and may

32

March 15th - 31 st

signal a nuanced change in China’s approach.

China initially urged that the situation in Mali be resolved

through dialogue and consultation, a common and neutral response

to regime change. A day later, a Foreign Ministry spokesperson

said China opposes the unconstitutional takeover of power and

called on all parties in Mali to return to normal order and uphold

national unity and stability. While China probably took its cue

from the position of the African Union, this statement does align

its policy closer to that ofWestern countries.

In any event, China is not prepared to pressure African

governments to democratize. It does not attach political conditions

to its loans and foreign aid with the notable exception that a

government must recognize Beij ing and not Taipei. One Chinese

official wryly commented to me: “!o African leader has ever

asked us to attach conditions to our aid.”

Because its own system of government is not constructed

along the lines of Western liberal democracy, it sees no point in

urging African governments to follow such a course. It is just not

realistic to expect China to encourage Western liberal democracy

in Africa.

At the same time, China does not hold itself out to African

countries as a model to follow. China and most African leaders

understand that the differences between China and any particular

African country are too great. China has more than 1 .3 billion

people. Nigeria, the most populous country in Africa, has about

1 55 million.

China has a high national savings rate, a huge pool of cheap

and compliant labor, state-targeted capital investments, a coherent

continent-wide market with a single currency, internal market

integration, a relatively well-educated and highly motivated

workforce with a common language, investment from the Chinese

diaspora, developed state institutions and political unity within a

single ruling party to implement large-scale economic reform

policies. No African country has even half these attributes. This

has not, however, stopped a few African leaders from expressing

interest in emulating China. Nevertheless, the fact is the

differences are too great.

Nor will China be supportive of U.S. and Western efforts to

encourage better human rights practices in Africa. The reason for

this is China’s reluctance to attach political conditions to its ties

with African countries and its internal human rights practices.

Beginning in the mid-1990s, African countries’ political

support played a key role in Beij ing’s successful eleven-year

campaign to avoid censure for its human rights record by the UN

Commission on Human Rights. When Tibet became an issue in

2008, China leaned on the Africans to remain silent or even make

supportive statements. They did. More recently, China has been

sensitive about criticism of its harsh policy toward the Uighur

people in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region in western

China. Again, African leaders have been careful to avoid all

criticism ofChina’s response to the Uighurs. African countries can

depend on China to avoid raising controversial African human

rights issues in the renamed UN Human Rights Council and on

occasion to even support them when they are criticized by Western

countries. This practice also works in reverse.

Political Issues Where U.S. & China’s Interests Overlap

There are controversial and vexing political and security issues

in Africa where U.S. and China’s interests intersect. While China

will be careful to align its policy with the majority view in the

African Union and the Arab League in those African countries that

are members, the United States should try to leverage Chinese

support on those issues where interests overlap. As a general

principle, both the United States and China support political

stability in Africa. In the case of the United States, this usually, but

not always, occurs in the form of support for existing

governments. In the case of China, it almost always results in

support for existing governments.

Both the United States and China support all six UN

peacekeeping operations in Africa: Liberia, Democratic Republic

of the Congo, Western Sahara, Darfur in Sudan, South Sudan and

Côte d’Ivoire. As of the end of February, China had more than

1 ,500 troops, experts and police assigned to these six UN

peacekeeping operations, more than any other permanent member

of the UN Security Council. By comparison, the United States had

thirty-three personnel assigned to the six operations. On the other

hand, the United States pays for a significantly higher percentage

of the total cost of the UN missions. By all accounts, the Chinese

personnel assigned to the peacekeeping operations in Africa have

performed well. It is in the interest of the United States for China

to continue its support of these UN-led efforts. In the case of the

operation in Liberia, the United States and China even

collaborated in building the barracks for UN troop personnel. UN

peacekeeping operations in Africa are strong candidates for

expanded cooperation between the United States and China.

While there are tactical differences between China and the

United States in countering terrorism and al-Shabaab in Somalia,

the overall goal is the same. Both the United States and China

have been supportive of the Transitional Federal Government and

both countries want to see the establishment of a national

government that has the widespread support of the Somali people

and control of the entire country. While there are many other

important actors in Somalia, it is important to encourage China to

become a more active participant in the solution.

Both the United States and China have an interest in ensuring

peace in Sudan and South Sudan and the full implementation of

the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that led to the creation of

South Sudan. China has an added interest—a multibillion dollar

investment in oil infrastructure and the fact that it obtains about 6

percent of its imported oil from South Sudan and Sudan. The

recent shutdown of oil production in South Sudan, which controls

about 75 percent of production coming from both countries, has

directly impacted China. But it also has an indirect impact on the

United States by removing supply from the world market and

contributing to the increase in global oil prices. The disputes

between Sudan and South Sudan are complex and involve far more

than oil. They have the potential to cause a major new conflict

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International Policy Digest Volume I Issue V

between the two countries. This is not in the interest of either the

United States or China. The United States has considerable

influence with South Sudan but little with Sudan. China has

substantial influence with Sudan but more limited leverage with

South Sudan. Working with other key outside interlocutors, this

situation is ready made for close U.S. and China collaboration. ■

make things right with Russian President-elect Vladimir Putin.

Following Mr. Romney’s comments, Mr. Medvedev said

during a news conference that Romney’s assertion that Russia

should not be confused with the same country depicted in many

Cold War espionage films said the comments “smells of

Hollywood.”

34

March 15th - 31 st

Romney’s Foreign Policy and RussiaBy John Lyman

30 March 2012

Despite a still struggling economy and a job performance

polling below 50 percent in most polls, President Obama has been

able to tout his foreign policy accomplishments as one of the

reasons he should be re-elected in November.

Obama’s recently concluded trip to South Korea to liaise with

world leaders to address nuclear security and the Iranian nuclear

saga went according to schedule, until an “open mic” caught

Obama making rather casual comments to Russian President

Dmitry Medvedev stating he believed he would have more

flexibility to address lingering issues related to nuclear arms

reduction after the November election.

“On all these issues, particularly on missile defense, this, this

can be solved but it’s important for him (Vladimir Putin) to give

me space,” Obama, apparently unaware that his mic was on and

recording the conversation, was overheard telling Medvedev.

“This is my last election…after my election I have more

flexibility.”

Dmitry Medvedev responded, “I understand you. I transmit

this information to (president-elect) Vladimir (Putin), and I stand

with you.”

For Mitt Romney – a candidate much like Obama in 2008 –

without any formal foreign policy experience, the “open mic”

moment afforded him an opportunity to undercut the president.

But what Romney expressed is what most politicos and foreign

policy experts already knew – that President Obama will not be

able to negotiate successfully with the Russians over missile

defense and other issues until after November, if he is re-elected.

Most administrations approaching the conclusion of their first

term and seeking a second, find that any significant

accomplishments are unlikely unless completed within their first

two years. The New START Treaty took many months to

negotiate with the Russians, which paled in comparison to the

wrangling that it took to get it passed in the Senate. If the

administration had not gotten the New START Treaty and the

Panamanian, Korean and Colombian free trade agreements passed

when they did, Congress would certainly not have passed them as

of last year.

In critiquing the president in several interviews, Romney also

roiled the Russians with his suggestion that Russia is the “!umber

one geopolitical foe” of the United States. This of course negates

what most observers would regard as the top foreign policy

concern of the United States – whether it be Afghanistan, Israel,

Iran, Syria, or North Korea. If Romney defeats Obama in

“Look at your watch,” Mr. Medvedev said to reporters. “It is

2012, not the mid-1970s. !o matter what party someone belongs

to, he should pay attention to political realities.”

Romney explained to CNN’s Wolf Blitzer that he was alarmed

by Obama’s casual conversation with Medvedev:

“Russia continues to support Syria, supports Iran, has fought

us with the crippling sanctions we wanted to have the world put in

place against Iran. Russia is not a friendly character on the world

stage…For this president to be looking for greater flexibility,

where he doesn’t have to answer to the American people in his

relations with Russia is very, very troubling, very alarming. I’m

very, very concerned. I think the American people are going to feel

the same way. This is a president who is telling us one thing and is

doing something else, and is planning on doing something else

even more frightening.”

Obama, seeking to bury the story, told reporters following

meetings in Seoul, “The only way I get this stuff done is if I’m

consulting with the Pentagon, with Congress, ifI’ve got bipartisan

support and frankly, the current environment is not conducive to

those kinds ofthoughtful consultations.”

Romney’s characterization is not necessarily untrue. Russia

has used its veto power on the U.N. Security Council to block

action on Syria and has shown, through its membership in the

BRICS, a proclivity against tougher economic sanctions directed

at Iran outside of the framework of the United Nations.

U.S.-Russian relations transcend the United Nations and other

multilateral institutions. The United States relies on Russian

assistance in counterterrorism, Afghanistan, shoring up loose

nuclear material in the former Soviet Republics, international

narcotics trafficking, WMD proliferation and reducing American

and Russian nuclear stockpiles, which has become a cause celeb

for Mr. Obama.

Obama has calculated that the Russians would be amendable to

significant reductions in their nuclear stockpiles if he negotiates

with the Russians in good faith over missile defense.

This process was started several years ago in an effort to

“reset” U.S.-Russian relations, when Obama ordered a different

configuration to the missile defense system – the European Phased

Adaptive Approach (EPAA) – planned for construction in Eastern

Europe. The original system envisioned a radar base that was to be

built in the Czech Republic with interceptors housed in Poland.

The EPAA is designed to intercept ballistic missiles launched

from “rogue” nations from interceptors housed in Poland and now

Romania. The Russians have been highly critical of the system

first announced by the Bush administration as they claim it would

undermine their own nuclear deterrent.

“This is not a matter ofhiding the ball,” Mr. Obama said. “I

want to see us gradually, systematically reduce reliance on

nuclear weapons.”

Now that Mr. Romney has antagonized the Russians, he might

find it difficult to negotiate with them over a whole host of issues,

much less getting Russia on board with prodding the Iranians to

return to the negotiating table or facilitating America’s withdrawal

from Afghanistan if he defeats Mr. Obama in November, he will

need a very big “reset” button to attempt to “Look at your watch,”

Mr. Medvedev said to reporters. “It is 2012, not the mid-1970s. !o

matter what party someone belongs to, he should pay attention to

political realities.”

Romney explained to CNN’s Wolf Blitzer that he was alarmed

by Obama’s casual conversation with Medvedev:

“Russia continues to support Syria, supports Iran, has fought

us with the crippling sanctions we wanted to have the world put in

place against Iran. Russia is not a friendly character on the world

stage…For this president to be looking for greater flexibility,

where he doesn’t have to answer to the American people in his

relations with Russia is very, very troubling, very alarming. I’m

very, very concerned. I think the American people are going to feel

the same way. This is a president who is telling us one thing and is

doing something else, and is planning on doing something else

even more frightening.”

Obama, seeking to bury the story, told reporters following

meetings in Seoul, “The only way I get this stuff done is if I’m

consulting with the Pentagon, with Congress, ifI’ve got bipartisan

support and frankly, the current environment is not conducive to

those kinds ofthoughtful consultations.”

Romney’s characterization is not necessarily untrue. Russia

has used its veto power on the U.N. Security Council to block

action on Syria and has shown, through its membership in the

BRICS, a proclivity against tougher economic sanctions directed

at Iran outside of the framework of the United Nations.

U.S.-Russian relations transcend the United Nations and other

multilateral institutions. The United States relies on Russian

assistance in counterterrorism, Afghanistan, shoring up loose

nuclear material in the former Soviet Republics, international

narcotics trafficking, WMD proliferation and reducing American

and Russian nuclear stockpiles, which has become a cause celeb

for Mr. Obama.

Obama has calculated that the Russians would be amendable to

significant reductions in their nuclear stockpiles if he negotiates

with the Russians in good faith over missile defense.

This process was started several years ago in an effort to

“reset” U.S.-Russian relations, when Obama ordered a different

configuration to the missile defense system – the European Phased

Adaptive Approach (EPAA) – planned for construction in Eastern

Europe. The original system envisioned a radar base that was to be

built in the Czech Republic with interceptors housed in Poland.

The EPAA is designed to intercept ballistic missiles launched

from “rogue” nations from interceptors housed in Poland and now

Romania. The Russians have been highly critical of the system

first announced by the Bush administration as they claim it would

undermine their own nuclear deterrent.

“This is not a matter ofhiding the ball,” Mr. Obama said. “I

want to see us gradually, systematically reduce reliance on

nuclear weapons.”

Now that Mr. Romney has antagonized the Russians, he might

find it difficult to negotiate with them over a whole host of issues,

much less getting Russia on board with prodding the Iranians to

return to the negotiating table or facilitating America’s withdrawal

from Afghanistan if he defeats Mr. Obama in November.

As U.S.-Pakistan relations deteriorated following the raid in

May of last year that killed Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad,

Pakistan, the U.S. has sought to find another route to get supplies

into Afghanistan that would bypass Pakistan altogether.

Roughly 52 percent of U.S. supplies travel the Northern

Distribution Network through Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan,

Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Latvia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Through a

deal brokered with the Russian government, the U.S. will continue

to use this route which will become especially important as the

2014-drawdown date approaches.

“These northern routes are far less dangerous than the supply

routes that go through Pakistan, where militants often attack

American and !ATO convoys. As the Obama administration’s

surge in Afghanistan draws to a close and we begin to reduce our

military presence there, these routes will become even more

significant. Indeed, the United States might be able to draw down

its forces from Afghanistan safely, rather than subjecting

American convoys to attacks while passing through Pakistan,”

Dov S. Zakheim and Paul J. Saunders write in the New York

Times.

“!egotiations to withdraw American forces from Afghanistan

through Russia will not be easy; thus far, Moscow has allowed

only the shipment of non-combat supplies. !evertheless, Russia

agreed earlier this year to let certain types of armored vehicles

cross its territory into Afghanistan, and Washington should pursue

further cooperation,” they conclude.

The “open mic” moment and Romney’s characterization of

Russia as America’s “Number one geopolitical foe” has injected

domestic politics into a foreign trip that addressed some

substantive issues: nuclear security, Korean reunification, Iran,

U.S. and Russian cooperation on the cleanup of former nuclear

sites in Kazakhstan and Afghan-Pakistan relations through

meetings between Obama and Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf

Raza Gilani.

While the Romney campaign and conservative bloggers saw an

opportunity to undercut Obama on foreign policy, it is not at all

clear if they’ll be able to use the “open mic” moment to their

advantage.

The “open mic” moment is being broadly used by the Romney

campaign to launch a more strident series of criticisms of the

Obama administration and its handling of foreign policy. Part of

this offensive was an op-ed, “Bowing to the Kremlin”, published

in Foreign Policy were Romney wrote, “The (Obama) record

shows that President Obama has already been pliant on missile

35

March 15th - 31 stInternational Policy Digest Volume I Issue V

defense and other areas of nuclear security. Without extracting

meaningful concessions from Russia, he abandoned our missile

defense sites in Poland. He granted Russia new limits on our

nuclear arsenal. He capitulated to Russia’s demand that a United

!ations resolution on the Iranian nuclear-weapons program

exclude crippling sanctions.”

“Moscow has rewarded these gifts with nothing but

obstructionism at the United !ations on a whole raft of issues. It

has continued to arm the regime of Syria’s vicious dictator and

blocked multilateral efforts to stop the ongoing carnage there.

Across the board, it has been a thorn in our side on questions vital

to America’s national security. For three years, the sum total of

President Obama’s policy toward Russia has been: ‘We give,

Russia gets,” Romney argued.

Time will tell whether the Romney campaign will be able to

undermine the president’s perceived strengths on foreign policy.

Romney has very noticeably adopted neoconservative positions on

military spending, arguing for the need to keep at sea all 1 1

aircraft carrier battle groups, hardening his rhetoric towards China

and Russia, and positioning himself on the side of Senators

McCain, Liebermann and Graham on staying the course in

Afghanistan despite high disapprovals of the war.

Speaker of the House, John Boehner, when asked if he agreed

with Romney assertion, “While the president’s overseas, I think

it’s appropriate that people not be critical of him or of our

country.”

While arguing that Obama has weakened the United States in

all areas of foreign policy, Romney has yet to posit any strong

positions of his own in regards to Afghanistan and Iran, other than

to argue that the Obama administration’s policies have failed.

Romney’s characterization of Russia would preemptively put a

Romney administration in the inevitable position of having to

placate the Kremlin before substantive issues are dealt with.

Daniel Wagner of Country Risk Solutions suggested that there

is a wider issue in regards to Romney’s Russia comments, “Mr.

Romney will ultimately regret having chosen firstly to demonstrate

such a lack ofsophistication about foreign policy in his simplistic

and outdated comments, and secondly having shown once again

that he is a political chameleon who will change his colors and say

just about anything to get elected.” ■

36

March 15th - 31 st

investors and policymakers seek to avoid risks. The international

system traditionally enjoys stability and avoids turmoil. The Arab

Spring clearly demonstrates that regions and states can be

significantly changed. While some applauded the development of

the Arab Spring, Daniel Wagner makes the point that the Arab

uprisings have not necessarily benefited Arab citizens.

“But the aspirations ofthe region’s people as manifest by what

came to be known as the Arab Spring must be considered in the

context of an underlying unease about the scope and impact of

political and economic change. While the region’s businesses

quickly adapted to the many changes that resulted from the onset

of the Arab Spring, many of them also came to recognize that the

likely result would be an extended period ofuncertainty and some

degree of doubt about whether all the change would in the end

result in meaningful long-term benefits,”Wagner writes.

Managing Country Risk is a very digestible book.

The author’s chapter on China’s growing assertiveness on the

world stage, “The Importance of Understanding China and Its

Place in the World”, offered some key points about China’s lost

opportunity to play a positive role in global affairs.

In particular, the author makes the point, which is articulated in

his chapter on China by writing, “China’s rise may be unique, for

it has ascended rapidly onto the global stage by virtue of its total

economic might, even as it retains characteristics ofa developing

country by GDP per capita. China seems to want it both ways: It

plays geopolitical power games as a force to be reckoned with

among equals, yet declines to shoulder the burdens of a great

power, and even demands to be afforded the benefits due to a

developing country.”

misstatements about U.S.-Chinese relations that will be made on

the campaign trail here in the United States.

The chapter “PRI-Political Risk Insurance” highlights an

alphabet of acronyms describing the countless manifestations of

risks one might encounter in a cross-border transaction. Under the

umbrella of PRI fall a myriad of risks that can be mitigated

through a well-crafted insurance program.

“Tales from the Battle Zone” chapter recounts pages of actual

horror stories experienced in the 1990’s by entities engaged in

cross-border activities. A key takeaway was which risks to not

assume, which risks can be safely assumed and finally how to

manage these risks whether through mediation agreements to take

place in a third neutral country or through a broad insurance

program.

Mr. Wagner frequently stresses the need for due diligence.

For example, find out who are the “elites” who own/control the

entities with which you are dealing. Accept nothing at face value.

As you prepare for your sojourn abroad, be sure to pack your

well read copy of “Managing Country Risk” which should include

your own marginal notes reminding you what to ask and do in

order to thoroughly evaluate your own observations and the

information you are given. ■

37

Managing Country RiskBy John Lyman

18 March 2012

The world is full of risks. Whether an average

citizen on the streets in Cairo or a CEO of a Fortune 500

country, the international system is a dynamic place,

which is often defined by risk.

Managing Country Risk, by Daniel Wagner who

has had years of experience in cross-border risk

management, is a “must have ready” reference and

Chapter 7 provides readers who seek a well reasoned and

detailed examination of how China uses its raw economic might to

gain access to mineral rich countries in Africa and the developing

world.

With the U.S. presidential race taking center stage, the

author’s examination ofChina’s economic prowess would prove to

be a valuable read in order to traverse the many statements and

reality guide for any trader, investor, lender

or NGO considering any cross-border

activity.

Failure to properly prepare for the likelihood of

risk, leads to entering at your own peril.

Take the simple example of a business seeking to

enter a new market. If that business fails to do the

necessary amount of research by identifying possible

risks, that business could be at the losing end if the

country suddenly experiences a political sea change

and a new government assumes control of a natural

resource. This has happened in Venezuela under

President Hugo Chavez.

The overall thrust of Mr. Wagner’s book is that

International Policy Digest Volume I Issue V

Continued from Page 11

overall success. The success of the court has not yet been

completely realized, but the framework is in place and is

constantly adapting to the changing world that should ensure the

success of the court in the future.

Failures of the ICC

Despite sufficient groundwork for the ICC laid out through the

Rome Statute and amended to include aggression at Kampala in

2010, the ICC in many nation’s eyes has been a failure. Despite

the doors opening and becoming fully functional in 2003, just

recently, September 2009, the ICC opened its first case,

prosecuting Congolese warlord Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. For nine

years the court has sat dormant due to several different reasons.

This chapter will explain the failures thus far of the ICC, and the

pertinent factors that create an atmosphere of judgmental failure.

When the ICC first opened its doors, it immediately began

investigating various situations, especially in Africa for the crimes

it was established to enforce. The first elected chief prosecutor,

Luis Moreno-Ocampo, an Argentine lawyer who gained fame

through exposing Argentine corruption in the Trial of the Juntas,

was inaugurated in 2003 and opened cases in regions such as

Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Since that time

Ocampo has been widely criticized for his continuous failures and

this disappointment has led to reluctance of the states. As Kaye

states, “The court has failed to complete even one trial, frustrating

victims as well as dozens of governments that have contributed

close to $1 billion to its budget since 2003”.

Although recently, the trial of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo has been

completed and the accused has been found guilty of all charges as

of March 14, 2012, this event stands on the doorstep of Moreno-

Ocampo’s departure from the role of Chief Prosecutor. When the

ICC was established through the Rome Statute it became evident

that the role of the chief prosecutor would be essential to the

court’s success, and in many ways the successes of the court

would mirror the successes of the prosecutor.

This analysis has become accurate, only to the negativity of the

court. Moreno-Ocampo’s failures are directly linked to the failures

of the ICC in its attempt to become a viable force in the stage of

international criminal law.

Some believe that Moreno-Ocampo’s attitude and manage-

ment style are not conducive to the teamwork required in order to

increase the fluidity with which the court is run.

As Kaye also articulates:

“In 2003, before Moreno-Ocampo was elected, then U!

Secretary-General Kofi Annan rightly said that ‘the decisions and

public statements of the prosecutor will do more than anything

else to establish the reputation of the court. ’ By this standard,

Moreno-Ocampo’s tenure has not been a success. Thanks partly to

a management and decision-making style that has alienated

subordinates and court officials alike, he has been dealt repeated

judicial setbacks, which have overshadowed his office’s modest

gains.”

Due to the lack of success, the funds wasted and the fact that

only one trial has been completed, and that taking over three years

with sentencing yet to come, some of the failures of the ICC must

fall on the chief prosecutor’s shoulders.

Furthermore, when his term comes due in mid-2012, a

continued legacy of the Moreno-Ocampo regime will take over

duties as the new Chief Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, Ocampo’s

current ChiefDeputy, and an extension of his tenure.

Although Ms. Bensouda has been in the Ocampo corner for ten

years, she is from Gambia, which may diffuse some of the bias

discussed below that so scarred the Ocampo regime. Hopefully,

Ms. Bensouda can enlist the help of his subordinates instead of

isolating them, and ensure that states follow the jurisdictional

guidelines of the court. This brings about another flaw or failure of

the ICC.

The ICC depends on the cooperation of the states that have

ratified it to turn over suspects, and help in the information

gathering process to speed up and actually complete fair and

efficient trials. Unfortunately for the ICC, this is not always the

case. Specifically, many instances have occurred since the

inception of the court where the prosecutor has the evidence, the

indictment has been issued, but no trial ensues simply because the

indicted is not turned over to the ICC for trial. Therefore the

suspect remains at large as an international criminal. This is

especially the case with Omar Al-Bashir of the Sudan.

As Kaye describes, “Bashir, for one, has managed to travel

around Africa and the Arab world, including to states that are

parties to the Rome Statute, such as Chad and Kenya”.

Due to the lack of cooperation, heads of states indicted, as well

as powerful military leaders continue to purge local populations

without having to answer to their crimes.

Despite ratification of the Rome Statute, the perception of state

cooperation and the actuality of it can be vastly different.

As Demirdjian explains, “Hiding behind the shadow veil of

sovereignty, States continue to contravene international norms

when required to provide cooperation and judicial assistance to

international courts”.

This lackadaisical approach by party states continues to

frustrate the court and its process.

Something must be done to ensure that criminals indicted by

the court appear at the court.

The final major flaw of the ICC definitely stems from the lack

of participation by three permanent members of the UN Security

council. As of this text, China has not signed the Rome Statute,

and neither the United States nor Russia has ratified it. In fact, as

of the Bush Administrational actions of 2002, the United States

actually unsigned it. This lack of participation certainly hinders the

ability to enforce the laws instituted by the court. The lack of U.S.

participation especially hinders any palpable advancement of the

court. Why does the U.S. not support the court?

As Combs states, “objections that stemmed from the United

States’ beliefthat ‘its unique international policing responsibilities

will expose it to politically motivated prosecutions before an

unaccountable court’”.

38

March 15th - 31 st

While this conclusion may carry some merit, as the U.S. does

deploy many troops overseas each year, full participation from the

U.S. and the other permanent members of the Security Council is

essential to the survival and effectiveness of the court. Granted

veto power for permanent member status, if any of these three

powers considers an indictment contradictory to the agenda of

their nation, they can veto the indictment and allow the crimes and

the perpetrator to go on unpunished.

Not only is the U.S. not signing or party to the Rome Statute,

they had established a confrontational approach to the Statute

under the Bush presidency. As Combs affirms, “(the U.S. ) has

indeed spent the last few years pressuring Rome Statute States

Parties to enter bilateral agreements with the United States

pledging they will not transfer American nationals to the court”.

The U.S. has over fifty treaties of such, and is therefore

undermining the justice and integrity of the court. Now however,

the new administration, under President Barack Obama has begun

to show some semblance of cooperation to the court and its

functions.

As explained by Dunbar from the American Non-Govern-

mental Organization Coalition for the International Criminal

Court, “The Administration has expressed its desire to engage in

effective cooperation with the ICC and to support all of the ICC’s

investigations and prosecutions”.

Although this is a step in the direction of support, the U.S. has

not gone as far as signing the Rome Statute, or giving its full-

fledged backing.

Therefore, the overall lack of Security Council support which

still exists, even from the teetering U.S., will need to be resolved

in order for the ICC to reach its full potential.

Overall, despite a strong foundation laid out at the Rome

Conference, the ICC has had few tangible successes since its

inception. Some of this can be attributed to the youth of the court,

but much can be realized specifically from the three major flaws

previously discussed, the ineptness of the prosecutor’s office, the

unwillingness of states party to the treaty to cooperate with the

wishes of the court, and the lack of support from permanent

members of the UN Security Council which holds veto powers

over the cases of the ICC. Due to hindrances such as these, the

court has struggled to carve out its niche in the world of

international criminal law.

Short-Term and Long-Term Solutions

In order to ensure the long-term success and stability of the

ICC, the failures must be addressed, and the accomplishments

must be enlisted as a tool for building. Over the next decade,

several adjustments must be made in order to secure a foothold in

the global world. This chapter will address the short and long-term

solutions that can be utilized to enable the ICC to not only survive,

but thrive.

The first thing that needs to be recognized about the ICC is the

relative adolescence of the court itself. For many institutions,

especially those crossing so many international boundaries, it

needs to be expected that time will help evolve and shape the

future of the institution. When referring specifically to the infancy

of the court it helps to examine the early years of other

international judicial institutions such as the ICTY and ICTR.

When the ICTY and the ICTR were established in 1993 and 1994

respectively, the groundwork for these two institutions was

essentially a revolutionary idea, where as a civil war and

specifically crimes committed during those civil wars were being

punished on an international level. Many people questioned the

authority of the UN Security Council to involve itself and establish

a judicial system to deal with domestic disputes. Due to these

factors, as well as monetary issues, both of these courts, although

established quickly, found it hard to secure their foothold on the

international stage.

As Kaye states regarding the ICTY and ICTR, “The early

days were hard going. It took a year to find a chiefprosecutor for

the ICTY, and at first even supportive governments contributed

only small amounts to the courts’ budget. Other states were

obstructionist”.

The ICC has faced many of the same problems early on, and

with the broadness of its jurisdiction, some of the problems facing

the ICC are compounded by sheer convolution of judicial

interaction with so many different states.

As it stands right now, one of the main goals for the ICC is to

prevent itself from becoming irrelevant. Both the ICTY and ICTR

struggled in the early stages, but now both are thriving and have

become fully recognized functioning institutions of international

judiciary law. As Kaye affirms, “The two tribunals have

significantly developed international criminal jurisprudence, and

they have deeply influenced the training, if not behavior, of

military officers worldwide”. This influence has just recently

gained prominence, and in order for the ICC to mirror the

successes of these tribunals, the key will be patience.

The second short term goal of the ICC, in order to maintain

relevance and support, is to ensure the new figurehead, Ms.

Bensouda, becomes a charismatic figurehead to be the face of the

court for many years to come. Moreno-Ocampo has obviously not

fulfilled the exorbitant expectations that were placed directly on

his shoulders when he ascended to the office of chief prosecutor.

Despite the intentions of firm policy and pursuant of miscreants,

Moreno-Ocampo’s record has not withstood the enormous

expectations placed on him at the time of his election. Instead he

has alienated staff and produced little results, while at times being

categorized as abrasive or uncooperative.

The next chief prosecutor needs to be charismatic and assertive

while simultaneously working in the confines of the international

system. This can be a very fine line to walk. On one hand, the

authority of the ICC must be upheld, but on the other it also must

be understood that the court uniquely deals with many nations, and

the diplomacy involved in receiving full cooperation from the

parties of the Rome Statute must be a priority.

In other words, the Prosecutor Besouda has an enormous task

of not only locating and indicting the correct situations and

criminals, but also receiving the full cooperation of the states

39

International Policy Digest Volume I Issue V

Due to recent events, especially those pertaining to Omar Al-

Bashir and the Darfur conflict have exposed the ICC’s weakness

on the international stage in regards to persuading states to turn

over criminals indicted by the court. The ICC constantly finds

itself in a precarious situation, juggling the rules established as a

responsibility of the court and the constant interference or agenda

of all states, including those states that have ratified and also those

that have not ratified the Rome Statute.

As Usaka describes in her speech (201 1 ), “the ICC must

operate in an international environment where political bodies,

States, non-governmental organizations and victims all

simultaneously contribute to and complicate the proceedings”.

In order to ensure the support of the global environment

especially the specific parties to the treaty, the next conference

needs to reiterate the importance of state cooperation in the

apprehension of ICC fugitives. Consequences for disobedience of

the Treaty, and therefore breaking international law, such as

economic sanctions or aid reduction from other party nations need

to be discussed and perhaps implemented in order to ensure that

criminals do not go unapprehended indefinitely.

This is simply a small step to reaffirm that states which harbor

or fail to apprehend fugitives within the confines of their borders

must face consequences in the form of international ridicule, as

well as possible trade sanctions or aid reduction.

As Demirdjian affirms, this may be difficult, “despite the

binding effect of the general legal framework establishing

international courts, cooperation with international courts is a

delicate topic and generally speaking, it is a fragile scheme

considering the lack of enforcment mechanisms”. This statement

implies the need for a permanent policing force directly under the

umbrella of the ICC. While this idea may have merits, the reality

of states willingly granting the court an international police force

is unlikely. Despite the fact that the cooperation of states is

included in the Statute, not all states interpret this as such.

As reiterated in Combs, “States Parties that refuse to comply

with a surrender request pursuant to Article 98(2) agreement will

likely violate international law”.

In order to enforce the article a conference needs to be called

to reiterate and maybe even amend the Rome Statute to take a

firmer stance on state cooperation in the apprehension of the

indicted, with possible economic sanctions, or loss of foreign aid

as possible consequences for insubordination to the treaty. This

scenario seems more likely, and may produce positive results

through understanding.

A last short term goal for the ICC will involve the long and

arduous task of courting the United States to sign and ratify the

treaty in order to receive more support and power, enabling the

court to function properly. This will not be a simple process, and

therefore the short term goals need to focus on simply bridging the

enormous gap between the ICC and the United States. The first

step in this process should be the acceptance of Annex E into the

legal framework of the ICC as an amendment.

Considering the U.S.’s “war on terror” the inclusion of

terrorism and terrorist acts as defined in Annex E will provide a

basis with which may successfully barriers may be broken

between the two parties. Terrorism may be the most explosive

threat to all global states, and therefore inclusion into court

doctrine seems to be the a natural progression. As Van Krieken

states, “That, however, does not mean that one should not prepare

for adding terrorism to the list ofcrimes for which the ICC would

have jurisdiction”. The court must proceed knowing that the

inclusion of terrorism under its jurisdiction will not instantly

convince the U.S. to sign and ratify the treaty. It may be a small

step towards creating an atmosphere of bilateral thinking opening

the waves of diplomacy and communication for both parties.

Since the U.S. has gone out of its way to isolate countries

through separate treaties even with those party to the Rome

Statute, but recently showed some signs of bending toward the

jurisdiction of the court, the court must find a way to deter

American disapproval of the jurisdiction of the court.

Including Annex E as an amendment to the Rome Statute may

be the first step in the long courting process of the U.S. and

possibly the UN Security Council.

The face of the ICC for the long-term remains extremely

convoluted. The willingness to adapt to the wishes of the majority

of the permanent members of the UN Security Council remains its

most compelling and arduous task. Bridging the gap between

powers such as the United States and China will ultimately make

or break the court in the long run. In certain circumstances the

wishes of these major powers may need to be compromised and

included for the court to reach its full potential. This is a fine line

considering the court must also uphold its own authority and

integrity. The court needs to broaden its spectrum in regards to

intercontinental examination. Currently all of the cases being

brought before the court are located in Africa. Now, as some

Africans claim bias, the turmoil in Africa is no secret. As Kaye

states, “with its formal investigations targeting African States—the

Central African Republic, Congo, Kenya, Libya, Sudan and

Uganda—the court has also invited the charge that it is an agent

for postcolonial Western interests”.

While this charge may be unfounded, it is definitely an issue

that needs to be addressed. With the election of an African Chief

Prosecutor, the court has definitely addressed those intitial

concerns. Furthermore, the indictment of war criminals in other

parts of the world, for example, Afghanistan, Burma, Honduras or

Palestine, the court must make it a priority to shake the label of

being a lackey to the West.

These long-term goals, while complicated, must be addressed

with concern to the evolution of the court.

The goals of the ICC will absolutely need to focus on bringing

criminals to justice, successfully prosecuting them, and sentencing

them for the crimes committed during times of war. Ultimately

without successful prosecution the ICC will continue to face

international opposition, and therefore this must be their main

priority.

The successful prosecution of Lubanga Dyilo is a start.

40

March 15th - 31 st

However, in order to continue to receive support and possibly

enlist new support, the ICC must complete the task it was

established to do, and that is convicting war criminals of the

atrocious crimes they have committed.

The other short term solutions suggested above will only

increase the efficiency and success of the court, but ultimately

judgment of the court will lie in the hands of its ability to function

cohesively.

Conclusion

Throughout the history and evolution of an international

criminal court from World War II on, the need has never been a

debatable topic. The need, due to the inevitability of humans

acting inhumane towards their fellow man, especially in conflict

areas, will always be present.

Overall, the ICC needs to be examined in the perspective of its

context. It is an adolescent institution that must function in an

international system without full global support and especially

lacking in support from major global powers. This can be a very

precarious situation to bridge and maintain. However, success will

be the foundation of its power. The more successful and justifiable

cases that are brought and handled before the ICC, the more that

its niche in the international stage will be carved. When this

occurs, major powers such as the U.S. and China can ill afford to

ignore the criminal court.

In order to do this, the ICC will need to be willing to be

flexible, but simultaneously relevant, as well as find a charismatic

champion to become the face of the court, and revert back to some

of the fantastic foundations from which the Rome Statute was

derived.

If all of these things can be accomplished, and the ICC can

successfully complete cases and see things through to the end, then

the importance of the court will only grow exponentially in the

global forum. ■

41

International Policy Digest Volume I Issue V

March 15th - 31 st

42

Cover – Argentina Flag Source: Investment Lines

Page 4 - President Barack Obama attends the APEC working lunch at the InterContinental Yokohama Grand Hotel in Yokohama, Japan, Nov. 1 3, 2010. Official

White House Photo by Pete Souza

Page 5 - Attorney General Eric Holder. Holder asserts that assuming there is no opportunity to capture an American terrorists overseas unharmed, the Executive

has no obligation to afford these citizens with due process before it targets and kills them. Source: European Parliament

Page 7 - North Korea's Kim Jong-un. Source: Zennie Abraham

Page 10 - The International Criminal Court in The Hague. Source: ekenitr/Flickr

Page 12 - Ambassador Eileen Chamberlain Donahoe, U.S. Representative to the Human Rights Council, addressing the Council on Item 4, on Monday, March

15, 2010. Photo by Eric Bridiers/U.S. State Department

Page 13 - President Barack Obama talks on the phone with President-elect Vladimir Putin of Russia while aboard Air Force One en route to Richmond, Va.,

March 9, 2012. Official White House Photo by Pete Souza

Page 15 - Photo of President Obama by Bill Ingalls/NASA. Photos of Gov. Mitt Romney, Sen. Rick Santorum and former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich

by Gage Skidmore

Page 17 - Yimer Mekonnen Source: Richard Lyman

Page 18 - Yimer's Aunt and Uncle Source: Richard Lyman

Page 19 - The lane to Yimer's Aunt's house Source: Richard Lyman

Page 19 - President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. Photo by Prensa Miraflores

Page 22 - EU Delegate adressing the Human Rights Council (HRC). Photo by Jess Hoffman/UN Photo

Page 23 - Taoiseach Enda Kenny presents President Barack Obama with a hurling stick before his departure from Farmleigh in Dublin, Ireland, May 23, 201 1 .

Hurling is an open-field game, and has been described as a mix of lacrosse and soccer. Official White House Photo by Pete Souza

Page 25 - Afghan commandos sprint to board a U.S. Army UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter during a mission in Chawkai district, Kunar province, Feb. 25. U.S.

Navy photo

Page 26 - Outgoing World Bank President Robert Zoellick during a press conference at the 201 1 World Bank Group and International Monetary Fund Annual

Meetings. Photo by Ryan Rayburn/World Bank

Page 27 - Gov. Mitt Romney, Sen. Rick Santorum, Rep. Ron Paul and Newt Gingrich. Photos by Gage Skidmore

Page 29 - President Barack Obama answers questions during a health care town hall meeting at Shaker Heights High School in Cleveland, Ohio. Official White

House Photo by Samantha Appleton

Page 30 - Chinese Investments in Africa. Source: 5election

Page 34 - President Barack Obama jokingly covers the microphone before the start of the Nuclear Security Summit plenary session 1 at the Coex Center in Seoul,

Republic ofKorea, March 27, 2012. Official White House Photo by Chuck Kennedy

Page 37 - Traders, investors, lenders or NGOs should consider reading "Managing Country Risk". Photo of protestors at Al-Azhar University. Photo by Nasser

Nouri