International Negotiation 03

Stephan Langdon, MBA M.Ed

• Isabella has worked as the executive assistant to Martina

for ten years. Isabella has worked overtime on many

occasions when Martina had special projects to

complete. Martina has not given Isabella a raise in her

salary for three years and Isabella is thinking about

looking for a new position which could pay her more

money. Martina is concerned about losing Isabella to

another employer but is worried that her own company

has not made a profit in the last two years. Isabella and

Martina sit down in the conference room to negotiate a

possible raise in salary for Isabella.

• ROLE #1: ISABELLA

• ROLE #2: MARTINA

• ROLE #3: OBSERVER (Take notes and report about

negotation)

5Reference Text: Contract Negotiations, by Gregory A. Garrett, CCH, Inc. (2005), pg. 13.

• Mark H. McCormack, best-selling author of “What They

Don’t Teach You at Harvard Business School,” has stated

the perfect negotiator should have:

• Faultless people sense

• A strong competitive streak

• A view of the big picture

• An eye for the crucial detail

• Unimpeachable integrity

6

Negotiation planning and preparation.

• Extremely important.

Beginning to interact

• orientation to situation,

• relationship with other side,

• information exchange.

Initial proposal

• offer or demand

• making concessions

• narrowing of differences.

Closing

• Getting commitment.

Preparation and Setting

Goals

Initial Interaction and Offers

Exchanging & Refining Information

Bargaining

Moving toward Closure

Bridging impasse &

make decisions

Finalizing Agreement

Cooperation

Competition

Enlightened self-interest.

Triad of Concerns

Economic

Social

Emotions

• Social• How will others view the

agreement

• Emotional• How will you feel about the

agreement

• Successful Negotiations

• Lewicki and Fisher

• Economic• Will you be satisfied with the

economic results

Triad of concerns

• Subjective. Always check your views, opinions and

analysis of your position

• One’s view of fairness. (Barry Bond’s homerun).

• Be very careful of your client's (and your own) perception

of fairness.

• Frames

• the erroneous belief that the other party’s interests are

directly opposed to one’s own interests when, in fact,

they are often not completely opposed.

• Explored the consequences for outcomes.

• They measured individual fixed-pie perceptions after just five minutes of negotiation

• They found fixed pie predicted individual and joint negotiation payoffs such that fixed-pie perceptions were associated with lower individual and joint profits.

• Negotiators with strong fixed-pie perceptions failed to identify interests that could be profitably logrolled or that were completely compatible.

• Biased information search

• (negotiators’ faulty search for necessary information)

• Biased information processing

• (negotiators’ faulty processing of available information).

• Partisan perceivers believe that their own perceptions map onto objective reality.

• When they realize that the other side’s views differ from their own, they first attempt to “straighten out” the other side; when this does not work, they regard the other side as extremist.

• partisan perceivers tend to view the other side as having interests that are more opposed to their own than is actually the case.

1. Exacerbates conflict1. Partisan perceivers ascribe more negative traits to their

negotiating partner even when partisanship has been randomly assigned right before the negotiation

2. Reduces the likelihood of reaching comprehensive integrative agreements during face-to-face negotiations

• Negotiators discount or dismiss concessions made by the

other party merely as a function of who is offering them

• Experiment• Participants negotiated with a confederate over the policy of their university regarding a

political issue.

• Constant• The antagonism of the negotiating confederate was held constant.

• During the negotiation, the confederate for a time adopted a stubborn position.

• Concession• In two experimental conditions, however, the confederate ultimately made a concession;

in the third (control) condition, no concession at all was made.

• Rating• Subsequently, participants rated the attractiveness and significance of a number of

different proposals, including the ones that had been offered in their negotiation session.

• Results • Non-offered concessions were rated as more attractive and significant than offered

concessions:

• The very fact that their counterpart offered them a concession diminished its value in the eyes of the participants.

• People tend to view A. their own behavior as largely determined by the situation

BUT

B. regard other’s behavior as driven by chronic dispositions

• Larrick and Su (1999) • Demonstrated this bias operated in negotiation.

• Negotiators erroneously attributed tough bargaining behaviors to difficult personalities rather than to situational factors.

• Fundamental attribution error often results from lack of sufficient information about the opponent’s situation.

• People erroneously believe that

A. coercive tactics will be effective in generating concessions when dealing with opponents

BUT B. believe that these same tactics, when applied to the self, will have the opposite effect—that is, to increase their resolve not to concede.

• Rothbart and Hallmark (1988) in-group and outgroup members differed in the judged efficacy of coercion and conciliation as social influence strategies.

• Out-group members perceived coercion as more effective than conciliation when applied to others,

• In-group members perceived coercion as less effective than conciliation when applied to their own social or categorical group members.

• Framing: constructing and representing interpretations.

• Defining key issues and key problems.

• Perspective.

• Separates issue from other ideas.

• Aggregate and process information.

• Language we choose engage. notion of what we are doing: discussion, argument, fight

• Frames persist as long as they are useful.

• When people hold to their frames, conflict can occur.

• Frames can be transformative.

• Change frame, change conversation.

• Frames can be shifted.

05/09/08 24

• Make outcomes appear less attractive.

• Make the cost of obtaining goals appear higher.

• Make demands and positions appear more or less attractive to the other party-whichever suits your needs.

• Haga que los resultados aparecen menos atractivos. Haga el coste de obtener metas para aparecer más arriba. Haga que las demandas y las posiciones aparecen más o menos atractivas a la otra partido-cualquiera se adapta a sus necesidades

05/09/08 25

• Plan disruptive action:

– Raise the costs of delay to

the other party.

• Form an alliance with

outsiders:

– Involve (or threaten to

involve) other parties that

can influence the outcome

in your favor.

• Manipulate the scheduling of

negotiations:

– One party is usually more

vulnerable to delaying than

the other.

• Acción que disturba del plan: Levante los costes de esperar al otro partido. Forme una alianza con otras: Implique (o amenace implicar) otros partidos que puedan influenciar el resultado en su favor. Manipule la previsión de negociaciones: Un partido es generalmente más vulnerable al retraso que el otro.

05/09/08 26

• Opening Offer

– Where will you start?

• Opening Stance

– What is your attitude? Competitive? Moderate?

• Initial Concessions

– Should any be made? If so, how large?

• Oferta de abertura ¿Donde usted comienzan? Postura de la abertura ¿Cuál es su actitud? ¿Competitivo? ¿Moderate? Concesiones iniciales ¿Deben cualesquiera ser hechas? ¿Si es así cómo grande?

• Negotiators who understand framing may understand how to have more control over the negotiation process.

• Frames may be malleable and, if so, can be shaped or reshaped during negotiation.

• Frames shift and change as the negotiation evolves.

• Los negociadores que entienden enmarcar pueden entender cómo tener más control sobre el proceso de la negociación.

• Los Marcas pueden ser maleables y, si es así se pueden formar o formar de nuevo durante la negociación.

• Los arcas cambian de puesto y cambian mientras que la negociación se desarrolla.

• Categories of experience

• Interests, rights, power

• Process of issue development

• Ohio negotiation.

• Environmentalist.

• Developers.

• Environmentalists.

• Called polluters developers.

• Conflict.

• Result of nonverbal looks and glances.

• Polarizing language.

• Trust distrust different frames.

• Main role of negotiator / mediator.

• Decide which you are doing: • Building trust.

• Managing distrust.

• Marcos de la desconfianza de la confianza diversos.

• Posicion principal del negociador/del mediador.

• Decida cuál usted está haciendo: • Confianza del edificio.

• Desconfianza de manejo.

• Trust Frame.

• Little step by step process.

• Reliability.

• Competence.

• Distrust Frame.

• Apologies.

• Reparation.

• Say vs Do.

• Marco de la confianza.

• Marcos de la desconfianza de la confianza diversos.

• Papel principal del negociador. Poco proceso paso a paso. Confiabilidad. Capacidad.

• Marco de la desconfianza.

• Apologías.

• Reparación.

• Diga contra hacen.

• Creating positive

expectations.

• Confident expectations

about the other.

• Shape them by:

• Language.

• Clear exceptions.

• Manage expectation.

• Crear expectativas

positivas.

• Expectativas confidentes

sobre la otra.

• Fórmelas cerca:

• Lengua.

• Excepciones claras.

• Maneje la expectativa.

• Tools.

• Boarders.

• Boundaries.

• Processes.

• Not trust building.

• Manages downside risk.

• Distrust binding.

• Prenuptial agreement.

• Herramientas.

• Huéspedes.

• Límites.

• Procesos.

• No edificio de la confianza.

• Maneja riesgo de baja.

• Atascamiento de la

desconfianza.

• Acuerdo Prenuptial.