INTERNATIONAL COLD WAR BULLETIN HISTORY PROJECT

THE COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT

In November 1991, CWIHP researcherP.J. Simmons visited Budapest, Prague andWarsaw to investigate the situation of Hun-garian, Czechoslovak and Polish archivesrelevant to Cold War research. His findingsare based on interviews with scholars andarchivists in the three capitals, and are avail-able in more extensive form in a workingpaper ("Archival Research on the Cold WarEra: A Report from Budapest, Prague andWarsaw") obtainable free of charge on re-quest from CWIHP.

The situation and conditions of accessto archives in Budapest, Prague and Warsawdiffer strikingly. Yet one all-too-familiar

theme of the communist period is sadlycommon to all three—the importance ofpersonal connections and influence. Exist-ing archival laws are sufficiently vague togive archive directors room for wide-rang-ing interpretations. Consequently theirdecisions to provide documents are oftenbased on the extent an archivist trusts orknows the scholar or institute seeking ac-cess. Yet the extent to which influenceplays a role varies greatly in these coun-tries, and a wealth of information concern-ing the post-war period is nevertheless nowavailable.

Continued on page 7

Report from Moscow:

SOVIET ARCHIVES:

The Opening Door

By James G. Hershberg

For Cold War historians, frustrated fordecades by the secrecy enshrouding the So-viet archives, the long wait appears to beending. The collapse of the Soviet Unionand Communist Party last year and the riseof a fledgling democracy in Russia promptshigh hopes that scholars will finally be ableto sift through the secret files of Sovietleaders from Lenin to Gorbachev to explorethe myriad mysteries and controversies ofthe Soviet-American relationship and theCold War era. Indeed, since last August’sfailed coup, the international race to exhumediscoveries from the Soviet crypt has pro-duced a fast-growing number of ambitiousinitiatives, agreements, exchanges, and plansfor scholarly cooperation and publicationsinvolving Russian and Western partners, aswell as a stream of titillating revelations.

At the same time, the excitement hasbeen tempered by the continuing politicaland economic crisis in Moscow that is com-plicating efforts to organize and make avail-able for international scholarly research thevast amount of Soviet state and party mate-rials inherited by the Russian Government.Logistical, technical, political, bureaucratic,psychological, and fiscal obstacles will in-evitably hamper a smooth and rapid transi-tion to archival transparency and accessibil-ity. Already, confusion over rules, jurisdic-

Continued on page 12

Post Cold War Sources:

REPORT FROM EASTERN EUROPE

INSIDE:

Cuban Missile Crisis 2Chinese Cold War Sources 4Novikov's Memoirs 16Beria's Downfall 16Molotov's Conversations 17Update 28Documentation: The CIA and History 31

COLD WARINTERNATIONAL

HISTORY PROJECTBULLETIN

Dear Colleague:

The Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) was established at theWoodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. in late1991 with the help of a generous three-year grant from the John D. and CatherineT. MacArthur Foundation. The project seeks to disseminate new information andperspectives on the history of the Cold War emerging from previously inacces-sible sources on “the other side” of the superpower rivalry that dominatedinternational relations after World War II.

The project supports the full and prompt release of historical materials bygovernments on all sides of the Cold War, and aims to accelerate the process ofintegrating new sources, materials and perspectives from the former “Communistbloc” with the historiography of the Cold War evolved over the past few decadeslargely by Western scholars reliant on Western archival sources. It also seeks totranscend barriers of language, geography, and regional specialization to createnew links among scholars interested in Cold War history.

The project is overseen by an advisory board chaired by Prof. John LewisGaddis of Ohio University, and including Dr. Samuel F. Wells, Jr., DeputyDirector of the Wilson Center; Prof. Warren Cohen of Michigan State University;and Prof. William Taubman of Amherst College. Inside the Wilson Center, theproject is located in the International Studies Program, headed by Dr. Robert S.Litwak, and run on a day-to-day basis by Dr. James G. Hershberg.

The project’s undertakings fall under several categories:First , by publishing the Bulletin and periodic working papers (see page 27),

CWIHP hopes to serve as a bulletin board and clearinghouse for information onnew sources, findings, and activities related to Cold War history.

Second, CWIHP awards fellowships to young historians of the cold war fromContinued on page 6

Issue 1 Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C. Spring 1992

2 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Tactical Weapons Disclosure Stuns Gathering

The Havana ConferenceOn the Cuban Missile Crisis:

had concluded that the Soviets’ primarymotivation was to deter a U.S. attack, as theSoviets had claimed, while others continuedto believe (as almost all had in 1962) thatdefending Cuba had been only contributoryto Moscow's principal interest in improvingits strategic position.

Nature of the Soviet Military Buildupin Cuba. Beginning at Moscow, and in stillgreater detail at Havana, the Soviets dis-closed the extent of the nuclear and conven-tional buildup in Cuba their country hadplanned and actually carried out in 1962.The intermediate-range missile force wassufficiently identified by U.S. intelligence atthe time: 24 launchers for SS-4 (R-12 inSoviet designation) missiles with ranges of1,020 nautical miles (n.m.), and 16 launch-ers for SS-5 (R-14) missiles with ranges of2,200 n.m. Deployment of the SS-4 launch-ers fully equipped with missiles was com-pleted during the crisis; the SS-5 facilitieswere still under construction and the mis-siles were in transit when cut off by the U.S.“quarantine” blockade. What U.S. officialshad not known during the crisis was whetherthe nuclear warheads were yet in Cuba; inOctober 1962 it was believed they probablywere not, but the consensus prudent assump-tion was nonetheless that they must be as-sumed to be there. At Moscow a Sovietgeneral said that 20 warheads reached Cubaand that 20 more were cut off in transit. AtHavana, a different Soviet general—Gen-eral of the Army Anatoly Gribkov, who wasresponsible for planning the operation in1962—said they had assigned fifty percentrefire missiles (36 in all), and the 36 nuclearwarheads for the SS-4s were there; those forthe SS-5s, as well as the SS-5 missiles them-selves, he confirmed, never reached Cuba.(The best retrospective U.S. intelligenceanalysis concluded that probably 24 nuclearwarheads for the SS-4s had been there.)

By far the most interesting and unex-pected revelation was a statement by Gen-eral Gribkov that the contingent of Sovietground troops in Cuba also had available sixshort-range tactical rocket launchers withnine tactical nuclear warheads (in the 2-25kiloton range) for contingent use against anyU.S. invasion force that landed in Cuba.While U.S. intelligence had spotted the dual-capable tactical (30-40 km. range) rocketlaunchers in 1962, there was no evidence,and no presumption, that they were armedwith nuclear weapons. But the most alarm-

No event in the Cold War hasreceived more popular and scholarlyattention than the Cuban Missile Crisis.Yet only recently has the study of thecrisis expanded beyond the United Statesto include scholars and officials from theSoviet Union and Cuba. In this article,Raymond L. Garthoff reports on ameeting of U.S., Russian, and Cubanscholars and officials (including FidelCastro) in Havana in January to discussthe crisis. It culminated a five-yearinternational scholarly experiment,organized at first by Harvard University’sCenter for International Affairs and laterby the Center for Foreign Policy Develop-ment at Brown University, in what itssponsors called “critical oral history” —the synthesis of recollections of partici-pants with declassified documentationand the analyses of historians. The firstgathering, in March 1987, involved onlyU.S. scholars, officials and documents,but three Soviets attended the secondmeeting, held in Cambridge, Massachu-setts, that October. A third conference,sponsored by the USSR Academy ofSciences, was held in Moscow in January1989.1 For the first time Cubans partici-pated, and they subsequently offered tohost a meeting. After a preparatorysession in Antigua in January 1991, andafter considerable uncertainty over thedeclassification of documents by all threegovernments and over the Soviet collapse,the Havana meeting finally took place,yielding new disclosures and a furtherexchange of views among Americans,Cubans, and, now, Russians. Garthoff’sreport:

Castro’s conversations with UN SecretaryGeneral U Thant.2 The Soviet military alsoreported some interesting new (but not docu-mented) information. A few days earlier, inresponse to a Freedom of Information Actrequest filed by the National Security Archive,the State Department released those Kennedy-Khrushchev letters concerning the crisis thathad not previously been available.3 TheHavana meeting was a useful and successfulconclusion to the series of conferences.

Highlights of the Havana conferencecan be summarized under four headings,reflecting a subjective analytical framework,but concentrating on what was new.

Factors Leading to the Crisis. Fromthe Moscow conference on, three differentperspectives were developed: the Cubans(and Soviets) emphasized what they hadperceived to be a growing threat of U.S.invasion throughout 1961-62, the Russiansstressed their desire to deter an Americanattack on Cuba and later to get U.S. assur-ances against an invasion, and the Ameri-cans highlighted concerns over Cuban sub-version and threats to U.S. security allegedlypresented by a Cuban-Soviet military tieconfirmed by the secret installation of Sovietstrategic nuclear missiles in Cuba. As thethree sides attempted to integrate these per-spectives at Havana, the most interestingnew element was Castro’s declarations that:(1) the Cubans had accepted the Soviet offerof missile deployment not to defend Cuba,but to strengthen the camp of Socialism inthe global correlation of forces; and (2) henow believed that the main Soviet motiva-tion had been to shore up Moscow’s thenvery weak position in the strategic nuclearbalance with the United States. Moreover,he acknowledged that he had, in 1962, be-lieved Soviet propaganda about being stron-ger than the United States in missiles, andindeed only now at the Havana conferencehad come to realize how weak the SovietUnion was then. “If I had known,” he said,“I would have counseled prudence.”

This Cuban view intersected sharplydivided views among the Americans; some

In addition to further documents andsome new participants from all three coun-tries, President Fidel Castro attended theentire three days of formal conference meet-ings and provided his own recollections andinterpretations, as well as introducing somenew materials: the Soviet-Cuban agreementon stationing Soviet forces in Cuba, twoletters from Khrushchev to Castro, and

COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 3

ing disclosure was General Gribkov’s asser-tion that the Soviet military commander inCuba (General of the Army Pliyev) had beengiven discretionary authority to fire the tac-tical nuclear rockets at a U.S. invasion forceif he considered it necessary, without need toseek further authority from Moscow. (Notthe least disturbing aspect of the discussionthat followed was General Gribkov’s appar-ent inability to understand why his disclo-sure caused such consternation among theAmericans—and this from the man who hadbeen chief of staff of the Warsaw Pact from1976 through 1988!)

Historians must also ponder the belatedrealization that the Soviet expeditionary forceincluded not only the 40 strategic missilelaunchers but also a ground, naval, and airdefense combined command (a “Group ofForces”) totaling some 42,000 men, abouttwice the size estimated by U.S. intelligenceafter the crisis, and four times the numberestimated at the time the missiles were dis-covered. In 1962, U.S. intelligence identi-fied 4 reinforced motorized rifle regiments,4 coastal defense cruise missile sites (with 8launchers and 32 missiles), 12 missile-armedpatrol boats, 24 surface-to-air missile siteswith 144 launchers, 42 MiG-21 fighters, and42 IL-28 jet light bombers. But they wereassumed either to be weapons that Moscowhad provided to the Cuban armed forces or,in the case of the four army regiments, tohave been sent to protect the Soviet strategicmissile sites. U.S. intelligence missed alto-gether 20 launchers with 80 conventionallyarmed cruise missiles for tactical groundforce support; the cruise missiles were sightedbut assumed to be backup for the similarcoastal defense launchers.

What if the Soviet Union had sent onlya conventionally armed combat force toCuba? President Kennedy had warnedagainst that possibility, but it would havebeen much more difficult to argue that theforce posed a threat to U.S. and hemisphericsecurity. What if the Soviet Union and Cubahad publicly announced their plans to de-ploy Soviet forces, even the missiles, inCuba? The Cuban leadership wished to doso, and urged at least publication of an agree-ment on stationing Soviet forces that hadbeen negotiated and drafted that did notexplicitly mention the missiles. ButKhrushchev insisted on doing it surrepti-tiously and planned to spring the deploy-ment on the United States in late November

as a fait accompli.Management of the Crisis. This sub-

ject for twenty-five years dominated discus-sion of the crisis, and to a large extent thefirst three conferences. But at Havana therewas little more to add, with one major andone minor exception. The minor one was afurther explanation (beyond the Moscowconference) of the Soviet decision to shootdown the U.S. U-2 aircraft on October 27,resulting in the pilot's death and spurringfears of further military escalation. It now isclear that local Soviet air defense command-ers decided, once Castro had ordered hisown anti-aircraft artillery into action, to in-terpret freely their own instructions to fireonly in case of hostilities, or if attacked (wedon’t have the text). For this initiative—important in Washington's deliberations, andso unexpected by Khrushchev that at first hebelieved the Cubans had shot the planedown—the local Soviet military commandreceived only a mild reprimand from Mar-shal Rodion Malinovsky, the Soviet De-fense Minister.

At the Moscow conference, SergeiKhrushchev (son of the late Soviet leader)had said that Castro had urged his father toinitiate a nuclear strike on the United Statesif it invaded Cuba. Castro denied later pressreports of that disclosure that he had recom-mended a “preemptive strike,” and last yearreleased the text of his message of October27.4 But the text seemed to justify thecharge—Castro urged Khrushchev that incase of an invasion the Soviet Union “mustnot permit the creation of conditions suchthat the imperialists dealt a nuclear strike onthe USSR first.” In Havana it became clearfrom Castro’s own explanation that he hadregarded an invasion to destroy socialism inCuba as an attack by Imperialism on Social-ism, so that a Soviet nuclear strike on theUnited States would be a response to anaggression already launched. As a tacticalmatter, he reasoned, Khrushchev should notwait for the United States to strike the firstblow on the Soviet Union. Khrushchev, ofcourse, did not see things that way andwould not have regarded a U.S. invasion ofCuba as an attack on the Soviet Union or asan initiation of a global war. But Castro, itnow appears, was thinking in those terms.

Settlement after the Crisis. In view ofthe fresh release of the Kennedy-Khrushchevletters and press coverage placing emphasison the absence of a firm U.S. commitment

not to invade Cuba,5 the subject ofWashington’s assurances against an inva-sion was expected to be a lively subject at theconference. Yet there was no discussionwhatsoever on this point until after the for-mal conference had ended. Then, at a jointpress conference in Havana, the official U.S.view was given in answer to a question andRussian and Cuban objections were promptlyraised. I believe the Russian representa-tives, aware of the differing U.S. interpreta-tions, had preferred to leave the matter inabeyance. The Cubans had, of course,strongly argued to the Soviets in 1962 thatthe alleged U.S. assurances were worth-less—and the U.S. position seemed to jus-tify that criticism. In fact, President Kennedyhad made clear publicly and privately afterthe crisis that the United States did notintend to invade Cuba. But the United Stateswould not make any formal commitmentunless it was clear and explicit that its obli-gations and rights under Article 51 of the UNCharter, the Rio Treaty, and other treatieswould not be diminished. In short, if thesituation changed owing to Cuban or Sovietactions, U.S. hands would not be bound.

Fidel Castro reiterated the strong Cubanunhappiness over Khrushchev’s actions innegotiating and reaching an agreement withKennedy to conclude the crisis without eveninforming the Cuban leadership, much lessconsulting it. Castro and his associates re-sented the fact that this cut Cuba out of theaction—Cuban desires and interests wereignored, and Cuba was not brought into adiplomatic dialogue with the United States.

Clearly, Castro saw the 1992 Havanaconference not only as an opportunity 30years later at least to enter the dialogue onpast history, but also to get into a dialoguewith the United States today as the SovietUnion vanishes and Russia rapidly disen-gages from the special relationship of thepast 32 years. The Havana conference rep-resented for Castro not only an opportunityto present for posterity his views on the 1962crisis, but also to turn a historical review tocurrent political purpose.

1. For the results of the Cambridge and MoscowConferences, see James G. Blight and David A. WelchOn the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine theCuban Missile Crisis (New York: Hill and Wang,1989; rev. ed., Noonday Press, 1990). Other recentreassessments include Raymond L. Garthoff, Reflec-tions on the Cuban Missile Crisis (Washington: Brook-ings, 1987, rev.ed., 1989), and Michael R. Beschloss,The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-


Before the post-Mao reform movement,scholars studying China’s foreign policyduring the Cold War worked with docu-ments familiar to students of Soviet foreignpolicy: official Chinese statements, con-temporaneous periodical literature, Ameri-can archival materials, etc. However, afterthe mid-1980's the situation underwent adramatic change. Although the official ar-chives of China remained inaccessible tomost scholars, a wide range of materialsbecame available which contained muchnew material on the major events and politi-cal figures of these years.

At a workshop on Chinese foreignpolicy held at Michigan State University on1-2 November 1991 under the auspices ofthe Cold War International History Project,several papers which drew on these newdata were presented on topics ranging fromthe origins of the Korean War to the TaiwanStraits Crisis of 1954 to China’s role in thefirst Indochina War.1 The purpose of thisnote is to introduce readers to the sourcesfound in these papers as well as to discusssome of the opportunities and pitfalls inher-ent in their use.

In general, these materials can be placedunder eight general rubrics:

a. Collections Which Contain Previ-ously Unpublished Speeches or Docu-ments. Included in this category would be:Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao [Manu-scripts of Mao Zedong from the Period afterthe Nation’s Founding] (Beijing: Zhongyangwenxian chubanshe, 1987-1991, five vol-umes published thus far covering 1949-

documents have been included.b. Diaries. Included in this category

would be that of the principal Chinese mili-tary adviser to the Vietminh, Chen Geng Riji[The Diary of Chen Geng] (Beijing:Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1984).

c. Interviews. Since the mid-1980s anumber of scholars have had access to Chi-nese decision-makers and historians. In somecases the results have appeared in articles. Inothers, some of their substance has beenpublished. An example of the former can befound in Han Yufan and Zhai Zhihai,“China’s Decision to Enter the Korean War:History Revisited,” The China Quarterly121 (March 1990), 94-115. An example ofthe latter is Warren Cohen, "Conversationswith Chinese Friends: Zhou Enlai’s Associ-ates Reflect on Chinese-American Relationsin the 1940’s and the Korean War," Diplo-matic History 11:3 (Summer 1987), 283-89.

d. Memoirs. This is probably the areawhere the quantity of publications has beenthe greatest. Since the mid-1980s there hasbeen a veritable flood of memoirs by China’spolitical leaders and people close to them.The most important include: Wu Xiuquan(diplomat), Zai waijiaobu banian di jingli[Eight Years Experience in the Ministry ofForeign Affairs] (Beijing: Shijie zhishichubanshe, 1983), translated as Eight Yearsin the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Beijing:New World Press, 1985); Li Yingqiao(Mao’s bodyguard), Zhouxia shentan de MaoZedong [Mao Zedong—No Longer a God](Beijing: Zhongguo wenhua chubanshe,1989); Hong Xuezhi (military figure),KangMei yuanChao zhanzheng huiyi [Rec-ollections of the War to Resist America andAid Korea] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe,1990); She Zhi (interpreter for Mao and LiuShaoqi in talks with the Soviets) “PeitongMao zhuxi fang Su” [Accompanying Chair-man Mao on a Visit to the Soviet Union],

1955). This is a generally reliable compila-tion of original and unedited notes, lettersand cables written by Mao to others—bothChinese and foreign (e.g. Stalin). This shouldbe used in conjunction with other collectionsof Mao’s writings such as Mao Zedong junshiwenxuan [Selected Military Writings of MaoZedong] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe,1981) as well as with the published compila-tions of writings by other major Chineseleaders such as Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi,Deng Xiaoping, Wang Jiaxiang and ChenYun. Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan [TheSelected Diplomatic Papers of Zhou Enlai](Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe,1990) collects some of the writings of China’sfirst foreign minister and its premier until hisdeath in 1976.

Document collections include:Zhonggong zhongyang kangRi minzu tongyizhanxian wenjian xuanbian [A Selection ofChinese Communist Central CommitteeDocuments on the Anti-Japanese NationalUnited Front] (Bejing: Zhonggongzhongyang tongyixian bu, 1984, three vol-umes); Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji[Selected CCP Central Committee docu-ments] (Beijing: Zhonggong dang’anguan,1987, fourteen internal volumes plus twosupplements covering up to the early 1940s.)These documents are unedited and were se-lected from larger collections of documentsfound in Party archives. In contrast to Mao’sfive-volume Selected Works published fromthe 1950s until the 1970s, documents in thesecompilations have not been emended. Theproblem is rather one of selectivity—not all

1963 (New York: Harper Collins, 1991).2. Ed. note: The documents released by the Cubans atHavana are available from the Center for ForeignPolicy Development, Brown University, Box 1948,Providence, RI 02912, (tel.: 401-863-3465). See alsostatements at the Center's press conference at theNational Press Club in Washington, 21 January 1992.3. Ed. note: The newly released Kennedy-Khrushchevcorrespondence, dated between 30 October and 14December 1962, offers a glimpse into the tense bar-gaining between the two leaders to defuse the crisis, asMoscow sought a lifting of the blockade of Cuba and

Washington insisted that the Soviets withdraw theirlong-range bombers from the island as well as theoffending missiles. For copies, contact the State Depart-ment or the National Security Archive (1775 Massachu-setts Avenue, NW, Suite 500, Washington, DC 20036),which in cooperation with Prof. Philip Brenner of Ameri-can University filed the Freedom of Information Actrequest that led to the documents’ release. On 24 April1992, the National Security Archive released severalhundred additional documents relating to the crisiswhich it obtained from the State Department through aFOIA lawsuit.

4. Available from the National Security Archive--ed.5. “The Cuba Missile Crisis: Kennedy Left a Loop-hole,” New York Times, 22 January 1992.

Raymond L. Garthoff, a senior fellow at the BookingsInstitution in Washington, D.C., was an analyst at theState Department during the Cuban Missile Crisis andlater served as an arms control negotiator and as U.S.ambassador to Bulgaria from 1977 to 1979. He hasauthored numerous works on U.S.-Soviet relations andthe Cold War, including Detente and Confrontation andReflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis

Post-Cold War Sources:

NEW CHINESE SOURCES

ON THE HISTORY OF THE COLD WAR

By Steven M. Goldstein and He Di


Renwu 2 (1988); Liu Xiao (diplomat) ChushiSulian banian [Eight Years as Ambassadorto the Soviet Union] (Beijing: Renminchubanshe, 1986); Nie Rongzhen (militaryfigure), Nie Rongzhen huiyilu [Memoirs ofNie Rongzhen] (Beijing: Jiefang chubanshe,1984) translated as Inside the Red Star: TheMemoirs of Marshal Nie Rongzhen (Beijing:New World Press, 1988); Wang Bingnan(diplomat), “Zhong-Mei huitan jiunian”[Nine Years of Sino-American Talks] ShijieZhishi 4-8 (1985) translated as “Nine Yearsof Sino-US Talks in Retrospect—Memoirsof Wang Bingnan,” JPRS: China Report,Political, Sociological and Military Affairs079 (7 August 1985); and Bo Yibo (partybureaucrat), Ruogan zhongda juece yushijian de huigu [Reflections on CertainImportant Decisions and Events] (Beijing:Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe,1991).

e. Official or Semi-Official Histories.Such works are usually collective effortswhich draw on unique access to archivalmaterial. Of particular use are histories ofmilitary institutions or activities which pro-vide much information on Chinese securitypolicy as well as on international coopera-tion and confrontation. Examples are: HanNianlong, et. al., eds., Dangdai Zhongguowaijiao [Contemporary Chinese foreign af-fairs] (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui kexueyuan,1988); Zhongguo junshi guwentuan yuanYuekangFa douzheng shishi [A Factual Ac-count of the Participation of the ChineseMilitary Adviser Group in the Aid Vietnam,Resist-France struggle] (Beijing: Jiefangjunchubanshe, 1990); Han Huaizhi, et. al., eds.,Dangdai Zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo[The Military Activities of the Contempo-rary Chinese Army] (Beijing: Zhongguoshehui kexueyuan chubanshe, 1989); YangGuo, et. al., Dangdai Zhongguo Haijun [TheContemporary Chinese Navy] (Beijing:Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan chubanshe,1987); Dangdai Zhongguo kongjun [TheContemporary Chinese Air Force] (Beijing:Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan chubanshe,1989); Xin Zhongguo waijiao fengyun [TheDiplomatic Experiences of the New China](Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1990);and Sheng Zenghong, et. al. Zhongguorenmin zhiyuanjun kangMei yuanChaozhanshi [A Wartime History of the Resist-America, Aid-Korea War of the ChinesePeople’s Volunteers] (Beijing: Zhongguoshehui kexueyuan chubanshe, 1989).

Also useful are chronologies (nianbiao)such as Zhonggong dangshi dashi nianbiao[Major Events in the Party History of theChinese Communists] (Beijing: Renminchubanshe, 1989); Zhongguo gongchandangzhizheng sishi nian, 1949-1989 [Forty Yearsof the Chinese Communist Party in Power,1949-1989] (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshiziliao chubanshe, 1989); Nanfangju Dangshiziliao dashiji [Materials from the Party His-tory of Southern Bureau, a Chronicle ofEvents] (Chongqing: Chongqing chubanshe,1989); and Zhonghua renmin gongheguodashiji [Chronicle of Events of the ChinesePeople’s Republic] (Beijing: Guangmingribao chubanshe, 1989).

f. Biography. These are oftenhagiographies rather than biographies, oftentaking the form of chronicles (nianpu), col-lected reminiscences of colleagues or moreconventional narratives. Among the mostuseful are: He Xiaolu, Yuanshuai waijiao jia[Marshal, diplomat (biography of foreignminister Chen Yi)] (Beijing: Jiefangjunwenyi chubanshe, 1985); He Jinxiu,Mianhuai Liu Shaoqi [Remembering LiuShaoqi] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxianchubanshe, 1988); Jin Chongji, et. al. ZhouEnlai zhuan [A Biography of Zhou Enlai](Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe,1989); Pei Jianzhang, Yanjiu Zhou Enlaiwaijiao sixiang yu shijian [Studying ZhouEnlai’ s Diplomatic Thought and Practice](Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1989);Chen Geng jiangjun zhuan [A Biography ofGeneral Chen Geng] (Beijing: Jiefangjunchubanshe, 1988); Zhou Enlai nianpu, 1898-1949 [Chronicle of Zhou Enlai, 1898-1949](Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe,1989); Zhu De nianpu [Chronicle of ZhuDe] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1986);and Dong Biwu nianpu [Chronicle of DongBiwu] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1990)

g. Monographs or articles. These areusually by scholars or bureaucrats who havebeen granted unique access to archives, per-sonal papers and historical figures. Examplesinclude: Yao Xu, Cong Yalujiang daoPanmendian [From the Yalu River toPanmunjom] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe,1985); Chai Chengwen and Zhao Yongtian,Panmendian tanpan [The Panmunjom Ne-gotiations] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe,1989); Supplementary Issue on the Rela-tions Between the Soviet Union and theChinese Revolution, Zhonggong dangshiyanjiu [Studies in the History of the Chinese

Communist Party]; Zhu Yuanshi, “LiuShaoqi yijiusijiu nian mimi fangSu” [LiuShaoqi’s Secret Visit to the Soviet Union in1949], Dangde wenxian (Party historicaldocuments) 3 (1989); and Huang Zhen, HuZhiming yu Zhongguo [Ho Chi Minh andChina] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe,1987).

There are a number of magazines thatroutinely carry articles of historical interest:Zhongyang wenxian [Central documents];Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu [Studies in theHistory of the Chinese Communist Party];Junshi yanjiu [Studies in Military History];Junshi ziliao [Materials in Military His-tory]; and Zhonggong dangshi ziliaoxuanbian [Selected Materials on the Historyof the Chinese Communist Party].

h. Fictional Accounts. It is not uncom-mon for historical novels to lend insightsinto the background of actual events. How-ever, they are still fiction and must be usedwarily. One prominent example: Hei xuezi[Black Snow] (Beijing: Zuojia chubanshe,1986), a novel of the Korean War.

Let us close with a few caveats. First,readers should know that this inventory islimited in two senses. We have only pre-sented materials from the period of the ColdWar which was covered at the workshop (thelate 1940s through the mid-1950s) and, evenwithin that period, we have merely pre-sented a sampling of the available materials.

Second and more important are the quali-tative limitations of these materials. Sincethe readers of this newsletter are not withoutexperience in the uses of these types ofmaterials, it may be presumptuous for us toadd some cautionary notes; but they are inorder. Although they add geometrically toour knowledge of the events of these years,none of these sources is pure archival data inthe strictest sense of the word. Researchersmust not allow their excitement over therichness of these new materials to dull theintellectual skepticism and sensitivity tocontext that are so necessary in analyzingany body of historical documentation.

For example, as noted above, there is noassurance that the documentary collectionsare complete. Moreover, the body of mem-oir literature is vast and is in need of a morethorough evaluation than can be providedhere. Such writings are, of course, vulner-able to the special pleadings of the source aswell as to the fallibilities of aging memories.These problems seem to be particularly com-


mon in those memoirs that have been writ-ten by the historical figures themselves (e.g.Liu Xiao). Recently, writing groups havebeen organized by leaders and given accessto their archives. The quality of these worksis much higher than that of their predeces-sors, although they often seem more likearchival collections than memoirs. Examplesof such works are Bo and Hong's memoirs.

Because so little of the policy processin China is documented, interviews are par-ticularly important. Chinese scholars havebeen actively interviewing since 1986 andin recent years many non-Chinese scholarshave also done so. Of course, facts refer-enced as “interview with an official” withno further attribution, and even the infre-quently available interview protocols, shouldbe used at the scholar’s own risk. Wherepossible, such interview material should bechecked against documentary informationor other interviews. Still, despite all thepitfalls, interview material can be extremelyvaluable to the judicious researcher. Fi-nally, when dealing with secondary worksbased on archival resources, we are at themercy of the author’s judgement as well asthe limitations of the materials to which heor she may been given access.

However, perhaps the most importantarea for researchers to exercise caution is inregard to the political context within whichpublished materials emerge. Very often his-torical figures such as Mao or Zhou are castand recast to suit present political needs.Similarly, the presentation of past diplo-

macy has clearly been shaped by contempo-rary circumstances. For example, the rela-tive abundance of materials on Chinese aid toVietnam during the 1950s is unquestionablyrelated to Beijing’s efforts to score propa-ganda points by demonstrating Hanoi’s in-gratitude for past generosity. Similarly, thecomplex configuration over the past decadeof China’s relations with North Korea, theUnited States, and the Soviet Union hasundoubtedly influenced the quantity and sub-stance of recent documentation.

The domestic political context is alsoimportant. Most of this new material becameavailable in the post-Mao reform period—particularly after 1978 when greater intellec-tual openness and a mandate to scrutinize thepast encouraged their publication. The im-pact of the Tiananmen events of 1989 hasbeen somewhat contradictory. Publicationof new works has continued. This can beattributed to the desire of many of China’saging leaders to publish their memoirs aswell as to the simple fact that much wasalready in press at the time of the demonstra-tions. However, in general, it has been notedthat the materials now becoming availableseem more repetitive and less revealing thanhas been the case in the past.

Still, despite all these cautionary noteswe should not lose sight of the fact that thestudy of China’s foreign policy has beenenriched enormously by the release of mate-rials such as those described above. It wouldbe no exaggeration to say that our under-standing of post-revolutionary Chinese di-

plomacy has been advanced more in the pastfive years than in any other period since1949. Indeed, at no time in the last forty-twoyears has it been so absolutely essential forstudents of China’s foreign policy to keep upwith the scholarship of the Chinese them-selves. It has become an indispensable andexciting source of knowledge that is likely togrow in importance in the years ahead.

1. Chen Jian (State University of New York at Geneseo),Qing Zhai (Auburn University) and Zhang Shuguang(Capital University) presented papers that are pioneer-ing works in the skillful use of the sources discussedbelow. (Chen Jian’s paper, “The Sino-Soviet Allianceand China’s Entry into the Korean War,” is available asa working paper from the Cold War International His-tory Project.) In addition, Chen Jian was kind enoughto share additional papers with us. The bulk of citationslisted below come from these fine papers. We thankthese scholars, as well as Nancy Hearst, for sharingtheir materials and knowledge with us.

Special note should also be made of anotherarticle on this topic which discusses several of thesources included here: Michael H. Hunt and Odd ArneWestad, “The Chinese Communist Party and Interna-tional Affairs: A Field Report on New HistoricalSources and Old Research Problems,” The China Quar-terly 122 (June 1990), 258-72. This article providesimportant information on the nature, origins, opportu-nities, and pitfalls of this new documentation.

Steven M. Goldstein is a Professor of Politi-cal Science at Smith College; He Di, assis-tant director of the Institute of AmericanStudies at the Chinese Academy of SocialSciences, is a guest scholar at Johns Hop-kins School of Advanced International Stud-ies.

Cold War International History ProjectContinued from page 1

the former Communist bloc (including butnot limited to the former Soviet Union,Eastern Europe, and China) to study in theUnited States and to work in U.S.archives. Agreement has been reached forthe scholars to be based at GeorgeWashington University’s Institute forEuropean, Russian and Eurasian Studies.The initial round has resulted in grants to:Vladimir Batyuk , Institute for the Studyof the USA and Canada, Moscow (6months); Chen Xialou, Beijing Instituteof International Strategic Studies, Beijing(3 months); Csaba Bekes, Institute for theStudy and Documentation of the 1956Revolution, Budapest (3 months); Ilia

Gaiduk, Institute of General History,Moscow (6 months); Petr Mares, CharlesUniversity, Prague (9 months); and NiuDayong, Department of History, BeijingUniversity (1 year). We welcome addi-tional nominations and applications (withCV, three letters of recommendation, and aproposed research project).

Third , CWIHP will organize interna-tional conferences and meetings forscholars from east and west to present anddebate new findings. So far, workshopshave been held on Chinese foreign policylast November at Michigan State Univer-sity and on Soviet archival sources inJanuary at the Institute of General Historyin Moscow. CWIHP is exploring ideas forfuture conferences, including a proposedmeeting in Moscow in cooperation with

the Storage Center for ContemporaryDocumentation, which contains the filesof the Soviet Communist Party CentralCommittee, and with the Russian Acad-emy of Sciences. CWIHP also organizes aspeaker series at the Woodrow WilsonCenter in Washington. (For furtherinformation on CWIHP activities, see thebox on page 22.)

I hope you will check the box on theenclosed insert indicating your desire tocontinue receiving the Bulletin, and I lookforward to working with you in the yearsahead.

Sincerely,

Jim Hershberg, Coordinator


EASTERN EUROPEContinued from page 1

HUNGARY

GENERAL RESEARCH CLIMATEAmong the three countries visited, I

found the situation of archives and researchin Budapest most encouraging. In 1989, a“30-year rule” was passed at the urging ofhistorian and then-Cultural Minister FerencGlatz. This new law effectively openedaccess to most State and Party records up to1961. Several problems remain, however:individual archives and departments can ar-bitrarily deny any requests they view unfa-vorably; the Cultural Ministry— which gen-erally controls all archives except the PartyArchives—is heavily staffed by bureaucraticholdovers from the communist era; and ex-isting legislation on the major issues of de-classification and personal rights to privacyis either unclear or nonexistent. Neverthe-less, permission to research documents cre-ated over 30 years ago is almost alwaysgranted, and exceptions to the 30-year ruleare increasing.

Paradoxically, the Party archive is themost easily accessible, according to Hun-garian researchers. This relative opennessderives from the Socialist Party’s struggle tomaintain control over its documents. Amovement is underway to transfer the au-thority over the party archive to the State,and the Socialist Party is trying to impedethis movement by avoiding accusations thatit withholds information or blocks access.

A relatively new group, the Committeefor Contemporary History (whose board in-cludes György Litván, director of the Insti-tute for the History of the 1956 HungarianRevolution), is trying to promote the open-ing of archives through the legislative pro-cess. Committee members and many archi-vists recognize the need for legislation thatmore precisely clarifies the meanings of“personal rights” and “state secrets.” Underthe current ambiguous laws, archivists maketheir own legal interpretations, and therebyassume ultimate responsibility for the re-lease of sensitive information. So althougharchivists wield considerable power in mak-ing declassification decisions, they also riskfuture political backlash and legal action.Presently, however, there are no bills underconsideration that would establish clear cri-teria for archive-related decisions involving

personal rights or declassification. There-fore archivists can be expected to remainjustifiably cautious of providing access topersonal papers and information they fearwill be misused for sensational purposes.

The archivists' and researchers' fears ofbeing accused of "misusing" personal infor-mation were exacerbated recently by thepassage of a law aimed at punishing formercommunist officials. In November 1991,the Hungarian Parliament approved a lawlifting the statute of limitations on "treason,murder and grievous harm committed in thename of communism." In March 1992,however, the Hungarian Constitutional Courtruled that the November law was "vague,ambiguous and unreliable" and found un-constitutional its provision to remove thestatute of limitations (Washington Post, 4March 1992). One suspects that this rulingmay lead to a less incendiary and vengefulpolitical atmosphere and therefore to a moreliberal and less fearful situation for research-ers and archivists alike.

A related committee of the Council ofMinisters was created in August 1991 tooversee the declassification process. Thisdeclassification council includes represen-tatives from the offices of the Prime Minis-ter, Foreign Ministry, Defense Ministry, Fi-nance Ministry, State Prosecutor, and thedirector of the New Hungarian CentralArchive, István Vass. It is currently review-ing sensitive documents of the late 1940s fordeclassification.

Overall, gaining access to archival in-formation in Hungary is relatively easy;however, connections play a significant rolewhen one is trying to locate documents.Archivists exert considerable control overthe research process by denying or offeringinformation that facilitates the location ofdocuments. The more connections one has,the greater the likelihood of finding impor-tant papers.

Researchers interested in working inany Hungarian archive are advised to con-tact the director of each archive first. Thedirector will then forward research propos-als, usually with a recommendation, to theministry that created the documents. If per-mission to research is secured, however, itdoes not automatically entitle a researcher topublish documents. Special permission isalmost always needed to publish documentsfrom Party archives, and it is sometimesrequired from other archives. Since legisla-

tion governing publication of such informa-tion is broad, it is important that appropriatepermissions be obtained. The directors ofboth the State and Party Archives insist thatforeign and domestic researchers are treatedidentically and are governed by identicalrules.

INDIVIDUAL ARCHIVESThe Archives of the Institute of Political(formerly “Party”) History

This archive remains under the controlof the Hungarian Socialist Party. It containsHungarian Socialist Workers Party (HSWP)documents which are well organized andeasily accessible to 1961. The collectionwas expanded in 1989 when the Social Demo-cratic Party, Hungarian Peoples’ Party, andthe Smallholders’ Party relinquished theirdocuments to this archive. Of greatest inter-est to Cold War researchers are: materials ofthe Politburo, Central Committee, and Sec-retariat; documents of various organs of theCentral Committee such as the InternationalDepartment, Propaganda Department, StateEconomic & Administrative Department,Organizing Committee, and Military Eco-nomic Committee; and materials of varioussecretaries, including those of Gerö, Nagy,Farkós, and Rákosi.

On 1 October 1991, a new director,György Földes, was appointed to replaceSandor Balogh. Földes’ deputy who over-sees international affairs-related documentsis Dr. Székelj. Hungarian researchers fromthe 1956 Institute and Institute of Historyfind this archive to be most accessible amongthe Hungarian archives, and view Földes aslikely to waive the 30-year or “personalrights” rules.

The documents here may clarify inter-bloc relations, Soviet-East European rela-tions, Soviet-Yugoslav relations (since Hun-gary was assigned the lead role in the bloc inrepresenting Soviet policy toward Yugosla-via), and Soviet-West European relations.

In addition to the HSWP documents,the archive also holds Russian documentsconcerning the USSR’s attempts to concealits involvement in the 1956 invasion and invarious show trials, including the January1957 trial of József Dudas, the leader of the“Hungarian Revolutionary Committee.” Inaddition, there are evidently quite interest-ing letters from Rákosi to Stalin and toDimitrov, the Bulgarian party leader whowas Secretary-General of the Comintern and


who oversaw inter-bloc affairs. Some docu-ments here— as well as in the Interior Min-istry— reveal connections between the KGBand the Hungarian Secret Police, but accessto them requires permission from the lesscooperative Interior Ministry.

Miklós Dérer, a founder of the Centerfor Security and Defense Studies, explainedthat documents of the Military EconomicCommittee would reveal the HungarianCommunist Party’s attitude towards Sovietmilitary goals and agenda more than any inthe archives of the Institute of Military His-tory. Party archive director György Földessaid some Warsaw Pact proposals and min-utes of full sessions can be found in thisarchive, but the related military contracts,plans and strategies can only be found at theInstitute of Military Affairs.

In 1990, the Institute of Political His-tory published a general “Fund List” of itsholdings, organized by topic. More detailedfinding aids on individual topics exist, thoughfinding aids for post-1957 documents areless comprehensive and are under revision.Documents affecting “personal rights” re-quire special permission from the director.

The New Hungarian Central ArchiveThis archive houses all central State

documents from 1945 to the present. Itincludes papers from all ministries (exceptthe Ministries of Interior and Defense), theCouncil of Ministers, the ParliamentaryCommission, the Prime Minister’s office,the People’s Patriotic Front and other state-controlled organs such as the Refugee Of-fice. Documents are well organized andgenerally accessible to 1961. Access todocuments whose release would affect “per-sonal rights” (such as debates concerningthe appointment of a new ambassador orhigh official or personal information on anaccused criminal) is problematic and de-pendent on individual cases. An unpub-lished, general list of holdings is available toresearchers upon request, and several de-tailed finding aids exist for individual top-ics—many of which are in manuscript form.This archive appears to be adequately staffedand helpful to researchers, and the directorrecently decided to provide researchers withall finding aids.

The director, István Vass, seems in-clined to grant researchers exceptions toboth the 30-year and “personal rights” rules.He was described by one young researcher

as “kind and liberal.”Each government ministry is required to

deposit documents older than 15 years at thisCentral Archive. However, each ministryhas the broad right to retain any documents ituses regularly. According to Vass, the Inte-rior Ministry has not complied with thisrequirement to surrender documents since itplans to create its own archive.

Similarly, the Foreign Ministry has notturned over all its documents older than 30years, but instead retains some importanthistorical documents because it considersthem “operational documents.” Vass has noidea which records are being withheld, so hecannot catalog the foreign policy documentswhich may still be at the Foreign Ministry.However, he believes that most Foreign Min-istry documents created before 1975 havebeen turned over.

The 30-year rule generally applies, ex-cept in the following circumstances: (1) a 70-year rule “to protect the individual” appliesto documents of the State Prosecutor’s Of-fice concerning closed hearings; (2) A 50-year rule applies to all other documents whichmight adversely affect an individual; (3)documents originally designated as “classi-fied” which have not yet been declassified(about 1200 meters of Council of Ministersdocuments and 800 meters of Foreign Min-istry documents out of 20,000) are presentlyunavailable. The last category requires “spe-cial permission,” leading researchers to claimthat access is more difficult than at the PartyArchives. Some researchers, such as UnionCollege political science professor CharlesGati, have been granted special permissionto view many of these documents.

Photocopying is uniformly allowed ex-cept for documents requiring special permis-sion to be researched. In that case, specialpermission must also be granted to photo-copy and publish materials.

Foreign Ministry Documents (not yet sur-rendered to New Hungarian Central Archive)

The post-1945 Foreign Ministry docu-ments are supposed to be forwarded to theNew Hungarian Central Archive, yet numer-ous documents are still held at the Ministryas “living documents.” Access to documentsstill possessed by the Ministry is difficult toobtain and requires special permission fromthe Secretariat of the Foreign Ministry. Toview Ministry documents, one must firstapproach the director of the New Hungarian

Central Archives, who will then submit anapplication to the Foreign Ministry. Amongthose documents available at the Ministryare interesting papers on the Comintern ma-terials, as well as aide-memoirs recountingvisits by Soviet officials.

Some Hungarian researchers havewaited six months for approval of researchapplications, while others have utilized per-sonal connections in the Ministry and havethus gained speedy access. István Vida andhis colleagues at the Institute of Historyhave been the most successful at retrievingimportant Foreign Ministry papers, as evi-denced by their numerous foreign policypublication projects.

But for scholars without connections,access has been elusive. One prominentyoung researcher reported his research ef-forts had been repeatedly frustrated by “mind-less” bureaucrats at the Foreign Ministry.He said the excuses given for keeping cer-tain foreign policy documents classified are“frightening” and reflected bureaucrats’ ig-norance of foreign policy matters. Appar-ently, he said, many ministry officials fearthe release of certain documents would harmHungary’s “world image,” potentially “up-setting the British or the Americans.” Henoted that if the bureaucrats had read appro-priate volumes of the State Department’sForeign Relations of the United States se-ries, they would realize that many of the verydocuments they perceive to be sensitive havealready been published in the West.

In contrast to the situation at the Insti-tute of Political History, the Foreign Minis-try requires special permission be obtainedfor the photocopying of any materials.

The Interior Ministry PapersThe Interior Ministry is required to de-

posit its papers in the New Hungarian Cen-tral Archive, but it is withholding docu-ments with intent to create its own officialarchive. The ministry’s most valuable pa-pers to Cold War researchers reportedlyinclude the intelligence department papersof the State Security Police and reports offoreign embassies in Budapest that wereintercepted by the Ministry. Access is diffi-cult, and researchers are often denied accessfor reasons of “reorganization” and “disor-der.” According to 1956 Institute directorGyörgy Litván, the documents concerningpolitical investigations are well organized,while those of the Ministry itself are in


complete disorder.The new director of the documents col-

lection at the Interior Ministry is GáborBaconi. His cooperation is essential to win-ning access. Yet his relatively liberal influ-ence is hampered by the foot-dragging of thebureaucratic holdovers who actually reviewdocuments and release only a handful of“appropriate” ones. Baconi said that the 30-year rule generally applies, except in thefollowing cases: (1) a 50-year rule for StateProsecutor’s documents; (2) a 70-year rulefor personal papers and documents; (3) a 90-year rule for documents concerning some-one whose name was changed (presumablyfor espionage purposes). Foreign research-ers need permission from both Baconi or theInterior Minister and the Foreign Ministry.

I learned of only a few researchers al-lowed to review Interior Ministry documents.They include Professor Charles Gati andfour members of the 1956 Institute— GyörgyLitván, János Rainer, Eva Stándeisky andAndrás Hegedüs. Litván has played a keyrole in gaining access for researchers, andhas been asked by the Ministry to writerecommendations for individual researchersapplying to work in the Interior Ministry.According to Litván, Charles Gati has beenmost successful, and the others have seenquite a number of key documents.

Those who emerged successfully fromthe lengthy application process have beengiven the documents that the Ministry bu-reaucrats (former secret police members,not archivists) have deemed relevant to theirtopic. According to one researcher, “theMinistry provides free coffee and even freephotocopies—but no finding aids.” Baconiquipped that the only finding aid he couldoffer would be a “long conversation.” Schol-ars who learn of the existence of certaindocuments before applying have a clear ad-vantage. Yet, without permission to siftthrough documents and review inventories,most researchers can see only what the Min-istry wants them to see.

Even with access to Interior Ministrydocuments, researchers will not benefit fromcomplete files in the Interior Ministry be-cause of deliberate document destruction onat least two occasions. The first occurred inthe early 1960s, when a secret party resolu-tion called for the destruction of papersrelating to Laszlo Rajk's trial; a second wavereportedly coincided with the rise of non-communist leaders in Hungary during the

winter of 1989-90.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

GENERAL RESEARCH CLIMATEResearchers interested in delving into

the Prague archives should initially expectconsiderable frustration. A 50-year rule ex-ists concerning document release, archivesare short-staffed and inadequately fundedand organized, and scholars interested inCold War research are in short supply. Inaddition, information is often contradictoryand hard to come by, and one must often digdeep below the surface to uncover the real-ity. Yet those who persevere will find thatwhat appears at first to be impossible is oftenquite possible in the end.

For example, one can often turn a seem-ingly bleak situation into a bright one throughthe use of good connections. Similarly,scholars can usually bypass obstructionistbureaucrats and gain access to documents bywinning the trust of the right authorities.Archivists are still reluctant to trust andgrant access to newcomers. In this reluc-tance one sees much of the legacy of thecommunist period: people are still hesitantto give information freely, to take responsi-bility for their actions, and to trust others.They are especially wary of allowing re-searchers to sift through unorganized files;this is a major hindrance, since most Stateand Party documents are not well organized.Researchers who understand the concerns ofarchivists and approach them accordinglymay ultimately be most successful.

The archivists’ hesitation to providefreer access is also partially due to fearsgenerated by the recently enacted and con-troversial lustrace or screening law, whichaims to identify collaborators of the commu-nist regime and to prevent them from hold-ing office in the civil service. In this climate,archivists are understandably wary of any-one who is seeking out information solelyfor its sensational value. In addition, archi-vists face mounting pressure from the StateProsecutor’s office to restrict access.

A new law on archives has been pro-posed to the Parliament that would reducethe 50-year rule to a 30-year one. Though itwill likely encounter little opposition once itreaches debate, the bill’s passage has beendelayed due to the Parliament’s current preoc-cupation with the fate of the federation itself.Lawmakers were advised by the Czechoslo-

vak "Council of Archivists" as the law wasbeing drafted, but the Council has since beenineffective in promoting the law's passage.The Council’s chair, Ivan Hlavácek, be-lieved the group would have no influence inspeeding up the legislative process.

INDIVIDUAL ARCHIVESThe State Archival Administration

This body, headed by Dr. OldrichSládek, oversees all the State and Party ar-chival documents in Czechoslovakia, ex-cept those of the “special” archives of theMinistry of Foreign Affairs, Defense Minis-try, post-1949 Interior Ministry documents,National Museum, and Chancellory of thePresidency. The Administration providesonly technical advice to these “special” ar-chives. According to Sládek, “the directorsof individual State archives make the finaldecisions” regarding permission and excep-tions to the 50-year rule, but he can greatlyinfluence the process. He said, however,that exceptions are rarely granted unless aresearch project is part of a government-sponsored project or program.

The Central State ArchiveThe Central State Archive’s director,

Ivan Pechácek, seems very cooperative. Hisarchive holds most State documents andsince January 1991 has also controlled thedocuments of the Czechoslovak CommunistParty (CPCz).

The CPCz documents were poorly or-ganized before the transition to the CentralState Archive, and the archivists here havehad neither the staff nor the funds since toimprove the situation. At present, there isonly one archivist working exclusively onrevising the existing vague inventories andorganizing the CPCz documents. The archi-vists themselves are not yet entirely familiarwith the contents of the CPCz collection,and have not had much time to evaluateexisting finding aids since much of theirtime has been spent on research for officialgovernment projects. They readily admitthat outside researchers probably know moredetails about the contents of the CPCz ar-chives than they do.

The archivists showed us general in-ventories of documents but would not pro-vide copies because they said they were too“incomplete” and “inadequate.” They in-sisted that finding aids are readily availableto researchers, and that good finding aids


exist for documents up to 1965. The presentstate of disorganization and the shortage ofarchivists, however, are the major impedi-ments to allowing access. Nevertheless,Pechácek insists that he will allow seriousforeign researchers to work with documentsmore than 30 years old, as long as theyrespect the personal rights of those men-tioned in the documents. One can be opti-mistic that Pechácek will follow through onthis commitment, as he and Sládek haveallowed some members of the Institute ofContemporary History and the Institute ofInternational Relations to research CPCzdocuments created before 1961.

The CPCz collection includes all docu-ments from the Central Committee archives,documents of all CPCz decision-makingbodies, and papers, memoirs, photographsand other items from the former Institute ofMarxism-Leninism of the Central Commit-tee. Sládek of the Archival Administrationsuspects that many documents of the Inter-nal and Security Departments of the CPCzare missing, as are documents of other Cen-tral Committee CPCz counterparts to statedepartments. Some of these documents arenow suspected to be housed in the archivesof the former Soviet Union.

Besides the CPCz collection, the Cen-tral State Archive houses documents of theOffice of the Prime Minister and all thefederal government ministries, with the ex-ception of the Foreign Affairs Ministry andDefense Ministry, and post-1949 InteriorMinistry documents. The post-1949 Inte-rior Ministry documents are under the con-trol of the Federal Ministry of the Interiorand are generally inaccessible. The PrimeMinister’s Office documents, however, arewell organized to 1964 and easier to re-search. In general, all of these State docu-ments are much better organized than CPCzdocuments, yet only 15 archivists are as-signed to all documents from 1945-1991.Consequently, scholars cannot expect thepoorly paid and understaffed group of archi-vists to locate documents quickly. Re-searchers are thus encouraged to requestspecific documents and boxes by numberwhenever possible.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs ArchivesThough researchers may be told that

access to Ministry documents younger than50 years is nearly impossible, one shouldnevertheless persevere. The director of the

Federal Ministry of Defense, receives onlytechnical advice from the State ArchivalAdministration. The directors of the archivecannot allow researchers to review docu-ments without permission of the Ministry,which is extremely difficult to obtain.

Archivists said that finding aids do notexist for the years 1947-1955, that post-1955 materials are better organized, and thatmaterials from World War II are in the bestcondition. While more important documentson decision-making will undoubtedly befound in Party archives, researchers in theMilitary Historical Institute said interestingdocuments do exist in the Military Ar-chives— including papers of political orga-nizations established to maintain Party con-trol over the army.

Oddly, the Military Archive has heldthe Benes archival collection since the formerowner— the Institute of Marxism-Le-ninism— was evicted from its building. TheMasaryk papers are contained here as well.The Benes papers are apparently well orga-nized and less difficult to see than othermilitary documents.

National Museum ArchiveAccording to the director, Dr. Cechura,

all documents in this archive are accessibleto any researcher who will use materials for“serious purposes.” Since the archive is notunder Sládek’s State Archival Administra-tion, Cechura is able to grant exceptions tothe 50-year rule and has thus far refused noone. This collection includes private paperswhich might be of interest to Cold Warscholars, including 140 boxes of PresidentBenes’ personal papers, acquired when hiswidow died. Detailed finding aids exist, buthave not been published due to lack of funds.A descriptive inventory of all the privatepapers collections is available.

Interior Ministry ArchiveI did not meet with the director of this

archive, Mr. Frolík, but was repeatedly toldthat access to documents of the Cold Warperiod would be nearly impossible. Accord-ing to Czech scholars, the heads of theMinistry’s collection are not archivists, butformer secret policemen who are not willingto grant exceptions to the 50-year rule. As aresult, scholars doubt that even the directorsknow exactly what information the fileshold.

The Institute for Contemporary History

MFA Archives, Marta Kapalínová, and herdeputy director, Véra Kozinkova, generallydo not make exceptions to the 50-year rule,but may consider if convinced that a re-searcher will use information responsibly.The directors encourage foreign researchersinterested in working at the archive to be-come affiliated with a Czechoslovak institu-tion first. Chances of approval would bebetter with affiliations, they said, since theseinstitutions would be less inclined to usematerials for commercial purposes.

CZECH COMMISSION NEEDS WESTERN AID

TO PUBLISH DOCUMENTS ON PRAGUE SPRING

The Government Commission to Analyzethe Years 1967-1970 has set up an Editorial Boardto oversee the publication of Czech sources on thehistory of the Prague Spring. It hopes to publishby the end of 1993 a nine volume collection offormerly secret documents in Czech and Slovakas well as a one volume abridged edition inEnglish. The entire set is expected to total 5,000pages and cost more than 1,000,000 Czech crowns(about $30,000).

The Board seeks financial aid to subsidizethe project. Interested individuals or institutionsmay contact Prof. Radomir Luza, History Dept.,Tulane University, New Orleans, LA 70118,(504) 865-5162.

Foreign Ministry documents older than50 years are well-organized and completelyaccessible. And despite the absence of com-puters and a staff of only three people, evenlater records seem to be in excellent orderthrough at least 1970, with detailed findingaids prepared by professional archivists.While many subject inventories exist, onlychronological inventories are available forthe Cold War period. Finding aids coveringdocuments younger than 50-years are onlyavailable to researchers whose applicationfor research has been approved.

Kapalínová says she hopes the 30-yearrule will be passed, since the ambiguities ofthe present law put her in a difficult situation.When the law is passed, she said, approvingaccess will be a mere formality and “every-thing will be available—including previouslyclassified materials.” The only exceptionwill be documents concerning personal prop-erty or violating personal privacy. Kapalínovásaid “personal” documents are already physi-cally separated from other documents, sothere will be no need for a formal declassifi-cation process.

Military ArchiveThis archive, formally controlled by the


is the only institute of which I am awarewhich has an agreement with the Ministry.The Ministry has agreed to provide data tothe Institute on the dates of death of ex-diplomats and ambassadors who were purgedafter 1948. No one in the Institute, however,enjoys direct access to the archive. There islittle hope that anything will change beforethe passage of the 30-year rule.

Archive of the Chancellory of thePresidency

The documents of the President’s Of-fice are located in the “Hrad” (Castle) andorganized under two categories: (1) “gen-eral” documents existing to 1964; and (2)“secret” documents existing to 1953. TheBenes, Masaryk, and other collections wereoriginally sent to the Institute of Marxism-Leninism and are now housed at the MilitaryArchives and the CPCz archives.

Until recently, very few historians wereallowed to work in this archive. Yet thedirector, Eva Javoroká, is more than willingto allow researchers to use documentsyounger than 50 years, provided the docu-ments are organized. She showed me inven-tories of documents, organized chronologi-cally and sometimes by subject, for both thegeneral and secret collection. The generaldocuments, consisting of such items as birth-day wishes to Gottwald, seem irrelevant tomost Cold War topics. Yet the secret docu-ments might be useful, and titles listed in theinventory include: confiscation of land ofdissenters and collaborators; AmericanEmbassy in Prague; American military ma-terial; takeover and purges; Czechoslovakdiplomatic mission reports; prosecution ofGerman war criminals; Czechoslovak del-egations to the U.N.; Czechoslovaks in Po-land; refugees; secret Slovak radio broad-casts; requests for pardons for collaborators.Many items in the Archive are duplicates ofdocuments in the MFA and Interior MinistryArchives.

POLAND

GENERAL RESEARCH CLIMATEThe number of serious historians ac-

tively working on recent history has dwindledto a small number, due to a massive migra-tion by historians from academia to publicservice. Researchers in Polish archives mustcontend with a host of obstacles similar tothose in Czechoslovakia, including a strict

30-year rule, bureaucratic holdovers reluc-tant to provide information, and disorgani-zation due to lack of space, understaffing,and poor funding.

Yet the greatest challenge to Polish andforeign scholars interested in the Cold Warperiod is the necessity of tracking downprivate collections to obtain the most inter-esting documents. Apparently, very fewminutes were taken at high level meetingsafter 1948 due to fears of Soviet recrimina-tion and mistrust among the Party elites.Because of the unusually gradual transfer ofpower to non-communist forces, the rulingcommunist elites had ample time to confis-cate remaining sensitive and/or incriminat-ing documents from archives, files and pri-vate safes.

To make matters worse, Polish scholarsand journalists said, numerous documentswere destroyed— especially in 1955-1956,1970, and August 1989. The 1989 burningof documents reportedly took place twoweeks after the Sejm created a special com-mission to study the activities of the secretpolice. As a result, the archives are appar-ently missing crucial documents, such asmany minutes of Politburo and other high-level meetings. Hence, connections to thosewho know “who has what” play a crucialrole in conducting successful research on thecontemporary period. In addition, most re-searchers believe that connections are vitalin obtaining permission to research withinthe 30-year limit.

A new law on archives has been pro-posed which would more clearly define rulesconcerning document access and organiza-tion of archives. It has been virtually ig-nored, however, due to the confusion sur-rounding the November 1991 elections andthe formation of a new government.

INDIVIDUAL ARCHIVESSupreme Board of National Archives

As in Czechoslovakia, a central bodyoversees all archives, except for “special”archives such as those of the Ministries ofForeign Affairs, Interior and Defense. Itsdirector is Marian Wojciechowski, and for-eign researchers must secure his permissionto work in the Central Archives of ModernRecords. Wojciechowski says he abidesfirmly by the 30-year rule, and will onlymake finding aids available once permissionto research is granted. He said inventoriesare available only to 1958, and that none can

be seen for the 1960s or later. He also saidthat his permission is required before publi-cation of any materials from the CentralArchives.

Central Archives of Modern RecordsThis archive preserves 15 kilometers of

Polish United Workers Party (PUWP) docu-ments, as well as all post-World War II Statedocuments (except post-1944 Ministry ofForeign Affairs and Defense Ministry files).Regional Party documents are held in the 17district Party Archives. Included are files ofthe Central Committee of the PUWP and itsvarious key organs, including the Interna-tional Department, the Council of Ministers,the Chancellory of the Parliament, the Su-preme Control Chamber, and the CentralPlanning Office and other central adminis-tration offices. Also available are tradeunion documents and workers’ movementmaterials from as early as the mid-19th cen-tury. Private collections include those of B.Bierut, W. Gomólka, J. Bermen, Z.Modzelewski and materials and memoirs ofother PUWP officials. While the minutes ofmany key Politburo meetings are said tohave been destroyed or fallen into privatehands, political scientist Andrzej Paczkowskireported seeing some minutes of Politburomeetings from as recent as January 1990—three weeks before the Party dissolved itself.

Archivists here said that Party docu-ments were well organized to 1970, yethistorian Andrzej Garlicki said that findingaids are often vague and documents aremisfiled. The archive is now organizing thePUWP documents and revising finding aids,and approximately ten people are assignedto the task. The director feels this is anadequate number of experts to arrange thematerials. A total of 90 people are employedat the Central Archives.

The Central Archive’s director, BogdanKroll, has worked at the archive for 20 years,serving as its director for the past ten. Ed-ward Kolodziej, the chief of the archive’sDepartment of Information, has been em-ployed by the archive for 27 years. Kolodziejtold me that all documents older than 30years are fully accessible, but that excep-tions to the 30-year rule are rarely granted.He contradicted Wojciechowski of the Su-preme Board of National Archives by insist-ing that researchers with permission to workin the archive are entitled to publish anymaterials over 30-years old without prior


approval. He also said that the archive isworking with the Pilsudski Institute in NewYork and Maciej Siekierski of the HooverInstitution on War, Revolution, and Peaceto exchange documents and microfilm. Thearchive hopes to obtain many importantForeign Ministry documents of the WorldWar II period now only available at Hoover.

The archive is moving many documentsto a larger building since it has no moreroom to store documents. Only five peopleare coordinating the move. Three majorcomplications have resulted: (1) state agen-cies and ministries are forced to withholdmany important documents due to “lack ofspace”; (2) ministries can conveniently citethe space problem if they do not wish tosurrender sensitive documents; and (3) re-searchers are often told that documents are“unavailable” since they are being “moved,”yet they have no way of verifying suchinformation or tracking down documents.Andrzej Garlicki told me that in some in-stances, people have waited 2-6 months forspecific documents they requested.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs ArchiveMarek Sedek, a professional archivist,

has been the director of this archive sincethe fall of 1990. The MFA Archive holdspost-World War II documents, while olderdocuments are being handed over to theCentral Archives of Modern Records. Sedeksaid he would allow access to files olderthan 30 years, though he must first receivepermission from the director general of theMinistry, Ryszard Fijalkowski.

One third of the finding aids are ar-ranged in card catalogues, while the remain-der is in the form of “lists of transfer”—thelists created when documents were relin-quished by various departments of the For-eign Ministry. Although the most importantdocuments concerning foreign affairs are inthe Party Archives, various cables and re-ports of ambassadors and embassies mayprove interesting.

Office of State Protection (UOP)This office, according to Wojciech

Roszkowski, is comparable to the FBI andholds the important materials of the InteriorMinistry. Access to archival documents isextremely difficult, and many importantmaterials are still considered “operational”and are therefore inaccessible. Accordingto Andrzej Paczkowski of the Institute of

Political Science, a "gold mine" of interest-ing documents exist here, yet there are virtu-ally no finding aids. Consequently, one isoften a “servant of the archivists,” who pro-vide what materials they deem relevant andappropriate for research projects. He told methat the 30-year rule is irrelevant here if youhave good contacts, and suggests that re-searchers write to the Ministry with detailedproposals well in advance of arriving.

Paczkowski is one of the few scholarsallowed to work in the Office of State Protec-tion on the Stalinist period. His contactshave allowed him to access to important,classified materials, including orders fromministries— organized in 100 volumes chro-nologically—concerning all security mat-ters, such as preparations to arrest “collabo-rators” or suspect individuals; the organiza-tion of secret agents before planned demon-strations on the anniversary of 1956 events;minutes of high-level meetings on securityissues, organized chronologically so he candetermine which items are missing; and docu-ments linking activities of the Polish SecretPolice (UB) with those of the Hungarian andCzechoslovak police.

Military DocumentsLittle is known about the documents at

the Central Army Archive or the files of theArmy’s General Staff, located in the out-skirts of Warsaw. Military documents arestill considered to be “top-secret”—even forthe 1940's and 1950's The Minister of Na-tional Defense can technically intervene andgrant access to researchers, but I learned ofno researchers for whom any exceptions hadbeen made. Scholars interested in militarydocuments should contact Dr. J. Poksínski atthe Academy of National Defense.

Paczkowski said, interesting and moreaccessible military documents of the PolishBorder Security Service are located are lo-cated in Ketscyn, about 200 kilometers fromWarsaw. He believes these hitherto unex-plored materials concerning Poles who es-caped the country might interest Cold Warhistorians and should be researched.

P.J. Simmons, a graduate of Tufts Univer-sity, spent a year in Belgrade as a FulbrightScholar. He will enter the Johns HopkinsSchool of Advanced International Studies inBologna, Italy in the fall of 1992.

SOVIET ARCHIVESContinued from page 1

tion, and norms of scholarly conduct hasbecome rampant. It is a sad irony thatcontemporaneous with the disappearance oflong-running political obstacles to unfet-tered historical research in the former SovietUnion (censorship, closed archives) , eco-nomic pressures are provoking many re-searchers to shift into business ventures toobtain the hard currency they need to keepfood on their tables. Still, barring the resur-gence of dictatorial rule, the flow of eventsclearly points to a dramatic increase in theaccessibility of Soviet and Communist ar-chives compared even to the flowering ofglasnost during the 1985-91 reign of MikhailS. Gorbachev, and, eventually, to undreamedof opportunities to research and write thehistory of the Cold War on the basis ofsignificant access to the internal documentsof both major actors.

These are among the conclusions thatemerge from conversations and publishedreports in recent months on the situation ofarchives in the former Soviet Union.1

Thisreport draws on various sources, especially:comments by Russian historians and ar-chives officials gathered during visits toMoscow in January and March by represen-tatives of the Cold War International HistoryProject (CWIHP), which organized a work-shop on Soviet Cold War sources in coordi-nation with the Institute for General Historyof the Russian Academy of Sciences; de-tailed surveys of the post-coup Soviet ar-chives situation by Patricia Kennedy Grim-sted;2 and presentations by scholars andarchivists, including the head of the RussianGovernment’s archives commission, RudolfG. Pikhoia, to a conference sponsored by theNorwegian Nobel Institute and held nearOslo, Norway, on 28 February-1 March1992.3

To put the present situation in context,a brief look back is necessary. WhileGorbachev’s glasnost significantly relaxedtaboos on the discussion of sensitive “blankspots” in Soviet history, permitted the emer-gence of a far more self-critical analysis ofKremlin actions by Russian scholars, andfostered a more liberal attitude toward coop-eration with Western historians, only a trickleof internal documents on the post-WorldWar II era became available for scholarlystudy. Moreover, the entrenched state bu-reaucracy of the Communist era — embod-


ied by Glavarkhiv, the Main Archival Ad-ministration of the USSR Council of Minis-ters, and its cautious leader, Feodor Vaganov—kept a firm grip on the archives systemand regulations, closely monitoring andtightly restricting outsiders’ access to therecords most vital to the study of Sovietforeign policy and the Cold War.4

After the failure last August of thehardliners’ coup in Moscow, President BorisYeltsin moved quickly on behalf of the Rus-sian Federation government to seize controlof the records and archives of the old guardinstitutions accused of supporting the mili-tary takeover. Reasoning that “the CPSUwas part of the state apparatus,” Yeltsinissued on August 24 decrees placing thearchives of the Soviet Communist Party andthe KGB under the authority of the Russiangovernment’s Committee for Archival Af-fairs (Roskomarkiv), and local police andprosecutors impounded records belongingto both in search of incriminating evidence.5

Rudolph G. Pikhoia, an historian ofprerevolutionary Russia from Yeltsin’s po-litical base of Sverdlovsk (nowYekatarinaburg), chairs the Russian Com-mittee on Archival Affairs, with AnatoliiStefanovich Prokopenko, VladimirAlekseevich Tiuneev, and Valerii IvanovichAbramov as deputies.6

Pikhoia’s commission was given broadauthority to chart the new direction of Rus-sian archival management, although ofcourse in conformity with Yeltsin’s ownwishes and in consultation with the Russianparliament, which created its own commis-sion on archival matters, headed by militaryhistorian Dmitrii Volkogonov. Pikhoia alsohas considered a number of Western initia-tives, including an effort by the Library ofCongress to begin exchanges of archivists,documents, scholars, and exhibitions, and atechnically ambitious plan put forward bythe American Enterprise Institute, the HooverInstitution on War, Peace, and Revolution,and Radio Liberty/Radio Free Europe tobegin putting the Russian archives in desk-top-accessible computer storage.7 Accord-ing to a recent interview with Pikhoia, an-other “memorandum of intention” envisionsmicrofilm copies of materials from bothHoover and Russian state archives to bedeposited at the Hoover Institution and theLibrary of Congress in the United States,and at Roskomarkhiv and the Lenin Libraryin Moscow. The British publishing firm

Chadwyck-Healey is to handle worldwidesales and marketing, with proceeds dividedamong themselves, Roskomarkhiv, andHoover, Pikhoia noted.8

In late 1991, as the all-union govern-ment staggered toward official dissolutionin December, the transition to Russian au-thority over archives accelerated despite re-sistance from Glavarkhiv. With Glavarkhiv’sofficial disbanding, Roskomarkiv took fullauthority to oversee archival affairs in theRussian republic and took control over theSoviet archival agency’s vast network ofassets and holdings.9

The scale of the takeover was massive— and simply taking inventory of the hold-ings of the Soviet state and CommunistParty has proven to be a time-consumingand complicated task. Pikhoia reported re-cently that the number of files under thecontrol of the Russian Government jumpedfrom 100 million files at the beginning of1991 to over 204 million files a year later,including 70 million files of the defunctCommunist party, 4 million files belongingto the KGB, and 20 million files previouslyunder the control of Glavarkhiv.10 As theUSSR officially lapsed, moreover, the pres-ervation and organization of the archives of72 Soviet ministries that had gone out ofexistence suddenly became the responsibil-ity of the financially-strapped Russian Gov-ernment, Pikhoia said.11

Although most of the documentary col-lections appear to be well-preserved (withthe exception of potentially-incriminatingrecords destroyed as last August’s coup wentdown to defeat), Russian archival officialsuniversally bemoan shortages of technicalequipment needed to process, declassify,and handle the expected flood of requestsfor, documents. When speaking to archiveofficials, it was common to hear pleas forphotocopiers, paper, microfilm readers andcameras, and fax machines, as well as formoney to pay trained staff. Besides thegeneral economic collapse, contributing fac-tors to the sad state of affairs include thedevaluation of the ruble, which has left manyarchivists and scholars receiving monthlysalaries of 500 or so rubles (about $5), andthe termination or drastic curtailment ofstate subsidies as the archives system andthe Academy of Sciences institutes networkshifted from Soviet to Russian control.12

(Nevertheless, the Academy of Sciencesinstitutes continue to be important centers of

academic research and logical contact pointsfor Western scholars, particularly the Insti-tute of General History, the Institute for theStudy of the USA and Canada, the Institutefor Slavic and Balkan Studies, the Instituteof the Far East, and the Institute of Interna-tional Economic and Political Studies [for-merly the Institute for the Study of the WorldSocialist System]. In addition, a growingnumber of private enterprises have beencreated by scholars offering translation andresearch services in exchange for hard cur-rency; though such groups could serve avaluable function for foreign scholars lack-ing Russian language skills or resources tovisit Moscow, their reliability and capabili-ties remain to be tested. Two groups solic-iting inquiries are the Russian ScientificFoundation,13 created in the summer of1991 by scholars of the USA/Canada insti-tute, and the Social-Scientific Center forHumanitarian Problems[Obschchestvennyi Nauchnyi TsentrGumanitarnykh Problem] at Moscow StateUniversity.)14

The status and fate of the archives havealso been clouded by the legal and constitu-tional vacuum opened up by the lapsing ofSoviet authority and the rough transition toRussian rule, and by the uncertainty loom-ing over the Commonwealth of IndependentStates. As of last fall, the all-union USSRCongress of People’s Deputies was consid-ering competing draft laws on archives, butthat debate was mooted when the Congresswent out of existence and decision-makingpower passed to the Russian government. Inthe Russian parliament, a draft law on ar-chives has been under consideration sincelast fall; scholars say it contains some am-biguous language but generally favors theprinciple of equal scholarly access (for Rus-sians and foreigners alike) to materials morethan thirty years old and enjoins state agen-cies from destroying records. As of lateApril 1992, no final action had been taken onthe bill. When and if it passes, however, thearchives law must also be meshed with newlegislation on secrecy that is expected toestablish criteria for deciding what sort ofmaterials can finally be released.15

On 14January 1992, Yeltsin issued a decree “Onthe protection of state secrets” that report-edly barred the release of minutes of theSecretariat of the Central Committee of theCPSU less than ten years old, to all KGB andGRU (Central Intelligence Department)


documents, and to materials related to CPSUforeign policy for the period 1961-1981.16

However, as of late April, a detailed law onsecrecy still awaited parliamentary approval.

Until the legal situation is clarified,U.S. and Russian scholars say, the potentialis increased for mercenary exploitation andabuses since individual Russian archivistsand officials, under intense economic pres-sures, are tempted to make deals to grantexclusive access to high-paying Westerncustomers. “Why should I bother to talk toyou when German television will offer us$20,000 for one file?” a senior Russianarchives official asked us during our visit toMoscow in January. At one major archive,officials said individual researchers wouldbe given equal access to archival materi-als—but then offered an exclusive accessagreement in exchange for a lump sumpayment of $25,000 to pay staff salaries.Though few cases have been documented,stories abound of Western professors andjournalists handing out $100 bills to Rus-sian archivists or former officials to buyaccess to documents.

Many Western scholars warn that suchpractices will hamper the development offair policies and procedures to permit schol-ars full and equal access to Soviet archives,with less wealthy or connected scholarsfrozen out; they may also inflate Russianexpectations, causing documents to bedribbled out piecemeal to the highest bid-der. One appeal to U.S. scholars to refrainfrom exploiting the current “anything goes”atmosphere in Moscow emerged from anacademic meeting last fall sponsored by theSocial Science Research Council. “Unfor-tunately,” its authors stated, “the dramaticrelaxation of traditional Soviet restrictionson permissible research activities hasprompted some Western and Soviet re-searchers to engage in practices whose long-range consequences could be detrimental tothe health of scholarly research on the So-viet Union, its history and its culture.” Inparticular, the authors discouraged prac-tices leading to “hierarchies of access” andurged scholars to assure that their contactswith and any payments to Russian partnersdo not create bad precedents that will ham-per the creation of normal and uniformpolicies for archival access.17

Russian political and psychological sen-sitivities also pose dangers to future pros-pects for open archival access, particularly

in the turbulent atmosphere of post-revolu-tionary Moscow. There is, to start with, alarge percentage of archive workers whowere trained as apparatchiks under the com-munist regime, when archives dealing withsensitive political, military, and foreign policytopics were designed to serve the party andstate, not independent researchers. In thiscontext, even the routine provision of findingaids to scholars is a major breakthrough. Butas Patricia Grimsted notes in her new reporton the subject, even with new regulationsmandating openness, the extent of support,flexibility, reference aids, and accessibilityconsidered normal and prerequisite to foster“intellectual access” in Western archives maydevelop slowly. “Time will tell,” Grimstedconcludes, “how quickly nascent computer-ization under democratically-oriented newregimes can counteract the legacy of seventyyears of authoritarian rule and ideologicalrestraints on access to information that haveshaped archival policies and procedures.”18

Misunderstandings between Russiansand foreigners trying to adjust to the newsituation constitute another potential troublespot. Some Russian archivists and scholarsmay resent any implication, even unintended,that Western scholars have gained the upperhand as a result of Russia’s political andeconomic problems, and are likely to de-mand reciprocity in exchanges and collabo-ration as evidence that they are not simplyselling off Russia’s treasures (or even photo-copies of them) to foreigners. The newspa-per Izvestia and the archivist Yuri Afanasiev,rector of the Russian State HumanitarianUniversity, are among those who have raisedquestions about Roskomarkhiv’s dealingswith Western partners, suggesting that Pikhoiamay have sold the rights to microfilm copiesof archival materials too quickly and for toolow a price. While applauding the principalof exchanging information, Afanasiev la-mented what he said was the “incomprehen-sible speed and secrecy with which thesedeals are being made” and asked: “Aren’t werushing to hand things over—even if for aseemingly large sum—large chunks of ourhistorical memory?” Pikhoia promptly con-tested such charges and asserted that thearrangements that Roskomarkhiv was con-templating with Hoover, Chadwyck-Healeyand other foreign partners were equitable andmutually profitable and in the best interestsof Russian and world scholarship.19

These concerns can also reverberate

politically, as was shown in two recent inci-dents that drew much comment in Moscow.Historians scavenging the Comintern ar-chives reported locating a 1943 letter fromthe Italian Communist party leader express-ing indifference to the fate of tens of thou-sands of Mussolini’s troops held in Sovietprison camps. The discovery elicited painedprotests from communists and an officialinquiry in Italy. Nevertheless, Pikhoia in-sisted that he would not constrict access.20

Another, potentially more serious con-troversy erupted in early February when, inthe midst of the British election campaign,the London Sunday Times printed what itsaid was evidence from Central Committeearchives documenting a cozy liaison in theearly 1980s between the Labor Party and itsleader, Neil Kinnock, and the Soviet Em-bassy in London.21 The story caused anuproar in England, and it was later shownthat the records were essentially routine andalso documented conversations with Con-servative officials. But complaints arose inMoscow that foreigners were gaining privi-leged access to documents, and that sensi-tive materials on foreign relations had beenimproperly and prematurely disclosed.

Archives officials denied any impro-priety. But Sergei Mironenko, deputy direc-tor of the archive housing the CommunistParty Central Committee files of the post-Stalin era, said the incident “made us under-stand that before giving out such delicateinternal documents, we must expose them toa serious examination. What is more, wehave no law on state archives in Russia. Weare operating in a legal vacuum. We must bevery cautious.”22

Finally, issues of personal privacy alsohave political implications. As in EasternEurope, political, academic and archivalfigures must balance imperatives to studyand ventilate past abuses and at the sametime to safeguard the privacy rights of indi-viduals; this dilemma is particularly acute inthe case of the KGB (see below). Pikhoiasaid current plans call for a 75-year restric-tion on materials that impinge on personalprivacy, except for official documents andthose documenting state persecution orcriminal activity.23

MAJOR RUSSIAN ARCHIVES RE-LATING TO COLD WAR HISTORY

Communist Party Archives


Since last August, two major centershave been created by the Russian Govern-ment to house collections of CPSU docu-ments; their somewhat cumbersome namesreflect both the changed political situationand a declared ambition to become scholarlyresearch centers as well as mere storagefacilities.

1. Storage Center for ContemporaryDocumentation, also translated as theCenter for the Preservation of Contem-porary Documents [Tsentr khraneniiasovremennoi dokumentatsii — TsKhSD].Address: ul. Ilyinka [formerly ul.Kuibysheva], 12, driveway 8; 103132 Mos-cow; Metro: Kitai Gorod; Telephones: 208-3814; 206-2936; 206-2321; 206-5228. Keyofficials: director, Rem Andreevich Usikov;deputy director, Sergei VladimirovichMironenko ; director of publication depart-ment, Vladimir Nikolaevich Chernous (for-merly director of the Moscow Obkom andGorkom Party Archives).

The Storage Center for ContemporaryDocumentation (SCCD) houses the CPSUCentral Committee Archives from October1952 through August 1991, as well as se-lected earlier materials transferred from theCentral Party archives because of their sen-sitivity or usefulness to party and state offi-cials in the post-Stalin era. Located in theformer headquarters of the Central Commit-tee in Old Square (Staraya Ploshad’) near theKremlin, the building and its vast centralhall, now used as a reading room, drip withthe red-carpeted splendor and iconographicsolemnity befitting the nerve center of theCPSU apparatus.

According to one report, the materialsare roughly divided into two main archives,the Party Leadership Archives [Arkhivrukovodlashchikh kadrov], containing thefiles of ranking party officials, and the Cur-rent Affairs Archives [Tedushchii arkhivKPSS] or Leading Bodies’ Archives [Arkhivrukovodlashchikh organov].24 Althoughsome of the most sensitive materials for thisperiod, such as Politburo transcripts and thepersonal/political archives of Party generalsecretaries apparently remain in the Kremlinor Presidential archives (see below), theSCCD contains massive and well-preservedholdings documenting the internal workingsof the Soviet Communist Party and its ties toCommunist parties around the world. In-

cluded in its collections, said to constitutethe largest archive in the former USSR butnot necessarily declassified and available toscholars, are the papers of the Central Com-mittee secretariat, whose departments dealtwith both domestic and international affairs.A recent perusal of finding aids indicatedthat substantial materials exist on Sovietpolicy toward China, Eastern Europe, Aus-tria, Germany, Indochina, and the CubanMissile Crisis; materials on Soviet interven-tions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia aresaid by SCCD officials to be substantial,though there have been reports that docu-mentation on the Soviet invasion of Af-ghanistan has been deliberately destroyed.In addition, the Central Committee archivespresumably contain reports from other agen-cies, such as the KGB and foreign ministry,that were used to formulate policy.

The SCCD’s leadership troika presentsan interesting assortment; director Usikov isa long-time official who has worked in theCentral Committee archives for a genera-tion; his deputy, Mironenko, a much youngerman, specialized in 19th-century Russianhistory until receiving his new assignmentlast fall from Pikhoia and Roskomarkhiv;Chernous, who formerly headed the Mos-cow Obkom and Gorkom party archives andwas deputy director of the Scholarly andInformation Center for the Political Historyof Moscow, has gained a particularly goodreputation among Western visitors for hiscooperative outlook in working with outsidescholars; he is currently overseeing the newSCCD reading room, open two-and-a-halfdays a week as of 2 March 1992. All expressinterest not only in joint ventures with West-ern academic projects, but in developing theSCCD as a research center in its own right aswell as a resource for outside scholars.

A major problem in using the SCCDarchives concerns declassification. A vastmajority (estimated at from to two-thirds to95-98 percent)25 of the thirty million files ofCentral Committee materials at the SCCD isstill secret, particularly those dealing withinternational affairs, and problems involvedin declassification range from political sen-sitivities to legal uncertainties to fiscal aus-terity. At a news conference on February 25heralding an exhibition of documents andthe opening of a reading room for outsideresearchers, it was announced that initialresearch would be confined to internalrecords of the Central Committee’s domes-

tic departments, with access probably grantedfor materials more than ten years old. Therelease of foreign relations materials will bedelayed, however, pending clarification ofdeclassification procedures, SCCD officialssaid.26

2. Russian Center for Preservation andStudy of Contemporary Historical Docu-ments, also translated as Russian Storageand Research Center for Documents onRecent History [Rossiskii tsentr khraneniiai izucheniia dokumentov noveishei istorii].Address: Pushkinskaia ul., 15; 103009 Mos-cow; Metro: Pushkinskaia; Telephone: 229-9726; 220-5112, 292-5951; 292-9566. Keyofficials: director, Vladimir PetrovichKozlov ; deputy directors, OlegVladimirovich Naumov, Kiril Andersen ,Yuri Nikolayevich Amiantov; director ofpublications & research, Yuri AlexeyevichBuranof.

Known until last October as the CentralParty Archives (TsPA) of the Institute forMarxism-Leninism (later renamed the Insti-tute of the History and Theory of Socialism),the Russian Center for the Preservation andStudy of Contemporary Historical Docu-ments contains the holdings of the SovietCommunist Party central committee andleadership from the Bolshevik revolutionthrough the 19th CPSU party congress inOctober 1952. In addition to housing thearchives of the original Institute of the His-tory of the CPSU and of the October Revo-lution, it holds Lenin’s personal papers andcollections of papers of many other leadingRussian and European Communists, includ-ing Marx, Engels, Trotsky, Rosa Luxem-burg, Zdhanov, Vyshinsky, Molotov, andothers. (According to Pikhoia, it is alsodestined to receive much of the so-calledStalin papers, although the timing and termsof the transfer remain unknown; see below.)

Although the center contains only about1.5 million files as compared to SCCD’s 30million files, reports indicate that historiansof the Cold War’s origins and early evolu-tion will find much of interest here, includ-ing extensive documentation of relationsbetween the Soviet communist parties andits counterparts in Eastern Europe, Germany,and the Far East; materials relating to thecreation and activities of the Comintern andCominform; and Central Committee, Secre-tariat, and Politburo materials that could



A DIPLOMAT

REPORTS

By Scott Parrish

Nikolai V. Novikov, VospominaniyaDiplomata: Zapiski 1938-1947 [Recollec-tions of a Diplomat: Notes, 1938-1947],Moscow: Politizdat, 1989.

Despite all the revelations about Soviethistory which have emerged from the formerSoviet Union in the past few years, manyunexplained “blank spots” remain. Thisgap in understanding is especially evident inthe area of Soviet foreign policy, which wasamong the last issues to be opened to publicdiscussion under Mikhail Gorbachev’spolicy of glasnost. One question of greatinterest which remains relatively undocu-mented concerns Soviet foreign policy dur-ing the early years of the Cold War. We stillhave a very incomplete picture of both howthat policy was formulated and on whatinformation it was based. Nikolai V.Novikov’s memoir, Reflections of a Diplo-mat, makes some small contributions tofilling in some of those blank spots, al-though it leaves many questions unanswered.

Novikov, who served as charged’affaires and then ambassador at the Sovietembassy in Washington from 1945 to 1947,has become familiar to many Western schol-ars as the author of the recently declassifiedand released “Novikov Letter,” a report onAmerican foreign policy written in Septem-ber 1946.1 His memoir, published in 1989,offers some additional insights into thesources of the letter itself, the Soviet percep-tion of the United States in the period 1945-47, and the functioning of the Soviet diplo-matic service during those years.

Novikov’s biography typifies the ca-reer pattern of many Soviet diplomats of hisgeneration. In the early 1930s, in Leningrad,he took a degree in the economics of theNear East. After a few years in SovietCentral Asia, he returned to Moscow topursue graduate studies and a career inacademia. His ambitions were cut short,however, by the closing of his institute in1938. He was then drafted, over his objec-tions, into service at the purge-depletedCommissariat of Foreign Affairs because ofhis knowledge of foreign languages and

turning point in American policy towardsthe USSR. While Roosevelt had pursued afar-sighted policy of cooperation with Mos-cow, Novikov views Truman as driven byaltogether different motives. Novikov de-scribes Truman’s first speech before Con-gress, on 15 April 1945, as a call to “worldhegemony,” signalling a radical shift of U.S.policy. He also notes the negative impact onSoviet-American relations of the first meet-ing, later that month, between Truman andSoviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M.Molotov. Truman’s uncompromising stanceon Poland, Novikov recalls, caused the So-viet government to reach “the appropriateconclusions” as to the possibility of futurecooperation with the United States.

Novikov goes on to observe that by thesummer of 1945, Truman had removed mostcabinet members who supported coopera-tion with the USSR, and appointed James F.Byrnes as Secretary of State. DescribingByrnes as an active proponent of a “biparti-san” foreign policy, Novikov argues thatthis policy was only a “screen for the inter-ests of the monopolies within the countryand the expansion of American imperialismabroad.” After the appointment of Byrnes,Novikov writes, “there was no need of fur-ther speculation as to which direction the


academic training. He thus entered the dip-lomatic service with relatively little special-ized training, but, like many of his colleagues,nevertheless advanced rapidly because ofthe shortage of trained personnel resultingfrom Stalin’s purges. Novikov worked until1943 in the central apparat of the Commis-sariat, and then was sent to Cairo as ambas-sador to Egypt, where he also served asambassador to the Yugoslav and Greek gov-ernments-in-exile.

In early 1945, Novikov arrived in Wash-ington and assumed the duties of deputychief of mission under then-ambassadorAndrei Gromyko. Because Gromyko wasconstantly absent attending to other diplo-matic business, such as the formation of theUnited Nations, Novikov quickly becamecharge d’affaires and de facto head of theSoviet embassy in Washington from January1945 until his appointment as Gromyko’ssuccessor in April 1946. He remained in thatcapacity until his return to Moscow in Octo-ber 1947. He was thus quite well situated toobserve the transformation of Soviet-Ameri-can relations in those years.

Overall, Novikov’s memoir delivers atypical pre-glasnost interpretation of Soviet-American ties in the 1945-47 period. Henever really deviates from the premise that itwas U.S. “imperialism” which caused thefalling out between Moscow and Washing-ton after 1945. As in his “letter” of 1946, henever mentions the possibility that Sovietactions during these years could have rea-sonably aroused American suspicions. Al-though this portrait is one-sided, it should notbe dismissed as mere posturing. By 1989,Novikov could have published an accountmore critical of Soviet policy. That he didnot, and that his analysis utilizes the sameterms and categories as Soviet public state-ments of the late 1940s, suggests that theviews he expresses were sincerely held. Hisinterpretation, then, should not be simplyrejected, but rather looked upon as broadlyindicative of Soviet perceptions of the UnitedStates at the time. One should not forget thateven if Novikov constituted one channel ofinformation about the United States avail-able to the Soviet leadership at this time, hewas an important one. From this perspectivehis views are worth examining, even if we donot know how much influence they had in theSoviet policy-making process.

In accordance with his overall interpre-tation, Novikov views Roosevelt’s death as a

The minutes of the July 1953 Central Committeesessions discussing the alleged crimes of Interior Min-ister and secret police chief Lavrenti Beria are dividedinto two installments and found in the “Political Ar-chives” section of the Isvestia CC - CPSU journal. Mostof the key political figures of that time (Malenkov,Bulganin, Khrushchev, Kaganovich) speak in the firstsection with the exception of Mikoyan whose addressappears in the second installment.

The sessions occurred four months after the deathof Stalin, and two weeks after the June 16-17 anti-communist uprising in East Berlin. The Soviet leader-ship, the transcript shows, is terrified by the ongoingexodus of East Germans to West Germany. At the timeof the plenum Beria, the former head of the NKVD(People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs) and MVD(Ministry of Internal Affairs), has already been secretlyarrested and expelled from the Party. He was accusedof attempting to seize total power, being an imperialistspy, plotting to allow the German Democratic Republic

NEW EVIDENCE ON B“O prestupniix antipartiniix antigosudarstveniixdiestviax Beria.” [“On the Crimes and Anti-Party,Anti-Government Activities of Beria.”] Plenum ofthe Central Committee of the Communist Party of theSoviet Union, 2-7 July 1953, from Isvestia CC -CPSU:1991, 1:140-214 & 2:141-208.


MOLOTOV

REMEMBERS

By Woodford McClellan

Sto sorok besed s Molotovym: Iz dnevnika F.Chuyeva [One Hundred Forty Conversa-tions with Molotov: From the Diary ofF.Chuyev], Moscow: Terra, 1991.

During a meeting at one of his dachas inthe summer of 1945, Stalin pinned a mapshowing the new frontiers to a wall, steppedback, pointed to the north, said he liked whathe saw. Same in the northwest: “The Balticarea—Russian from time immemorial!” Hethen looked to the east, now under the Sovietflag: “all of Sakhalin, the Kuriles, Port Arthur,and Dalny are ours—Well done! China,Mongolia, the Chinese Eastern Railway—all under control.” Then, stabbing a finger atthe southern Caucasus, he exclaimed “Buthere is where I don’t like our frontiers!” (p.14)

Reading The Boss’s mind correctly, theAzerbaijanis demanded the doubling in sizeof their republic, chiefly at Iran’s expense.They would seize a bit of Turkey in thebargain and give Ararat to the Armenians,

perhaps to ease their minds about an enclaveStalin had mischievously given Azerbaijanyears earlier: Nagorno-Karabakh. The Geor-gians, who knew Koba even better, claimeda piece of Turkish territory adjacent to Batumion the grounds that some of their brothers—or maybe second or third cousins—livedthere. The southern frontiers simply had tobe redrawn (pp. 193-204).

Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, whoconsidered it his chief task as foreign minis-ter “to extend the frontier of our Fatherlandto the maximum” (p. 14), sounded out diplo-matic opinion but found no support for thesouthern scheme. It’s worth noting hethought there might be some.

Another project encountered a similarlack of enthusiasm:

It wouldn’t have been appropriate totake Manchuria. Impossible. Contra-dicts our policy. We took a lot . . . [butManchuria] was quite a different matter(p. 101).

Born in 1890, when Alexander III wason the throne, Molotov died peacefully in hissleep (“went to Mogilyov Province,”1 hesaid of contemporaries who predeceasedhim [p. 550]) in November 1986, six weeksbefore Gorbachev liberated AndreiSakharov. Of the Communist Party’s 88-year existence, he spent all but eight in itsranks: as CPSU full Politburo member from1925 onwards, as chairman of the Council ofthe People's Commissars (Premier) from1930 to 1941, and as Commissar (later min-ister) for foreign affairs from 1939 to 1949,and again from 1953 to 1956. To be sure,Khrushchev formally expelled him in 1962,but he continued to have all the rights andprivileges of a high-ranking party retiree,and in another formality Chernenko broughthim back into the fold in 1984.

For hundreds of hours over the last 17years of his life, in what he called the “has-beens' hamlet” (p. 519) of Zhukovka nearMoscow, Molotov regaled a young friendwith stories and patiently replied to ques-tions. The transcripts of 139 conversations—the “140th” was the neighbor’s remarks atMolotov’s funeral—added up to more than5,000 pages, from which Felix Chuyev hasdistilled 700 for this eerily fascinating book,which in effect is Molotov’s memoirs.

The spell is cast in the first few pages.One does not so much as read this book as

engage in a one-on-one conversation with amajor figure in a gigantic criminal organiza-tion. The answers come readily, couchednot in anything resembling normal humanemotions but rather in the stupefyingly cyni-cal amorality that characterized the Com-munist Party of the Soviet Union.

Minor poet,2 major Stalinist, Chuyev isdevoted to the Leader and his disciple. Heconcluded his funeral oration, “Today webid farewell to Lenin’s last coworker, afighter for communism. . . .” (p. 553) Thathelps confirm this book’s savage authentic-ity; it also renders an outside review of thetapes and transcripts—which we are un-likely to get—all the more desirable.

One may as well speculate about God’smemoirs, several versions of which are be-ing peddled in Moscow in these parloustimes, as to raise the question of Stalin’s.And because what Khrushchev concocted isso often dishonest, Sto sorok besed is prob-ably the best—most accurate and useful tohistory—insider account we will ever have.

Contrast, for example, Khrushchev’slies, disavowals, and silence with Molotov’sunreconstructed defiance:

I have defended Stalin and defend himtoday, including the terror. I believethat, without terror, we wouldn’t havegotten through the prewar period, andafter the war we wouldn’t have had amore or less stable situation in the coun-try (pp. 338, 389-480).

They say Lenin would have carried outcollectivization without so much sacri-fice. But how else could it have beendone? I don’t repudiate anything. Wedid it rather cruelly, but absolutely cor-rectly (p. 227).

But Khrushchev, who remindedMolotov of a “cattle dealer” (p. 347), tried toslither away from responsibility in his ownposthumously published memoirs:

I’ve always stood for complete truthful-ness before the Party, before the LeninLeague of Communist Youth, and be-fore the people—and I stand for truth-fulness all the more now [late 1960s].

Soon [after Kirov’s murder in 1934] thepolitical terror started. I caught only an

(East Germany) to fall under western control, andtrying to bring capitalism to Russia. The plenum servesas an opportunity for the Politburo to justify its accusa-tions against Beria.

During the meetings, the Soviet leadership offersthe following reasons for the charges against Beria:

* that he aspired to control the Soviet governmentby establishing the MVD as an organ free from scrutinyby the Communist Party;

* that he engaged in economic sabotage by stallingthe passage of critical economic decisions of the Cen-tral Committee, especially in the sphere of agriculture;

* that he used his position to encourage“bourgeois-nationalist activities” in the Soviet Repub-lics;

* that he advocated the creation of a unifiedGermany as a “bourgeois, peace-loving nation” (1:162)and the abandonment of East Germany’s status as aseparate, socialist state;

* that he conducted secret communications andmeetings with Tito of Yugoslavia;

* that as early as 1919, during the British occupa-tion of Baku, Beria intrigued with Azerbaijani nation-alists, and in 1920 with the security section of theMenshevik government in Georgia.


BERIA'S DOWNFALL


occasional, accidental glimpse of its in-ner workings.

[After Stalin’s death, f]or three years wewere unable to break with the past, un-able to muster the courage and the deter-mination to lift the curtain and see whathad been hidden from us about the ar-rests, the trials, the arbitrary rule, theexecutions, and everything else that hadhappened during Stalin’s reign . . . Thencame Beria’s arrest and the investiga-tion into his case. There were shockingrevelations about the secret machinerywhich had been hidden from us andwhich had caused the death of so manypeople.3

This from a man who carried out

nant emotion was the anger that fueled hishatred of “imperialism,” the “right devia-tion,” Churchill, Truman, Khrushchev (“inhis time a Trotskyite” [p. 392]), and ulti-mately Brezhnev, whom Molotov accusedin 1986 of having resurrected the“khrushchevshchina” (p. 550).

Searching for a clue to the man’s per-sonality, one may ask what he felt for hiswife, Polina Semyanova, in whose arrest heacquiesced without a whimper. This is whathe tells us:

It was my great good fortune that shewas my wife. She was pretty, intelli-gent, and most important—a real Bol-shevik, a real Soviet person (p. 473).

Stalin came up to me in the Central

Committee and said, “You’ve got todivorce your wife!” And she herselftold me, “If the party needs this, thenwe’ll divorce.” Late in 1948 we did (p.475).

When Stalin decided Polina Semyonovaneeded some jail time, that real Bolshevikwent cheerfully, thanking him all the way.Her husband of course knew the chargeswere false (conspiring with Zionist organi-zations through Golda Meir, seeking to es-tablish a Jewish autonomous region in theCrimea, planning an attempt on Stalin’s life),but what could he do? He was Number Two“only for the press, for public opinion,” andanyway, Polina “should have been more

mass murder in the Ukraine, where he be-came party first secretary in—fateful time!—January 1938.

Molotov was honest enough to defendthe terror in which Khrushchev proved hismettle, but he maintained that it involvedonly clean kills. This exchange took placein October 1983:

Chuyev: I’ve heard that you and Stalinissued a directive to the NKVD [secretpolice] instructing it to use torture.Molotov: Torture?Chuyev: Did that really happen?Molotov: No—no, there wasn’t any ofthat (p. 396).

Chuyev compiles a montage of severalsuch conversations, setting the scene by ask-ing whether it was true, as Suslov charged,that Molotov once intervened to change awoman’s sentence from ten years in theGulag to death:

Molotov : There was such a case. Adecision had been made. I had a list [onwhich the woman’s name appeared], andcorrected it. So I did.Chuyev: Who was this woman, whatwas she?Molotov : That’s not important.Chuyev: Why did the repressions ex-tend to wives and children?Molotov : What do you mean, why?They had to be isolated to some extent.They would have spread all sorts of

complaints, demoralization. That’s afact (p. 415).

Molotov would have found incompre-hensible the charge that Stalin destroyed thecountry in order to save it. For him, thecountry—the nation—was composed ofStalin, his personal staff in the form of theCommunist party, and a segmentally ex-pendable service organization, i.e., everyoneelse.

His own words reveal Molotov to be anamoral, intellectually limited bureaucrat whothought in slogans, a man whose instinctualdevotion to Stalin was that of a robot to itscreator, a robot that could even be pro-grammed to weep at the funeral. His domi-

Molotov on the Marshall Plan

Chuyev: In the West they write that failure to accept the Marshall Plan was a major mistake of Soviet diplomacy.Molotov: It was the other way around—a great success. By the way, at first I agreed [with the Plan] and proposed to the Central

Committee that we participate—not only we but the Czechs and Poles too—in the Paris Conference. But then I came to my senses andsent a second note the same day, saying: Let’s refuse. We’ll go, but suggest [to the Central Committee] that the Czechs and the othersdecline because we still couldn’t rely on them or their experience.

And right away we passed a resolution and sent it around. We advised them not to agree, but they—especially the Czechs—hadalready made preparations. The Czech foreign minister was rather doubtful—I’ve forgotten, I think it was Clementis. Having receivedinstructions from us not to participate, they didn’t go.

Well, such a gang assembled there that you couldn’t expect honorable relations. We clashed, and I gave as good as I got. It was justas well I didn’t take along any aides who might have muddled the issue. Clementis, the Czechoslovak—such a Rightist, dangerous man.That was in 1948, after Benes.

There was a lot of confusion. But if they think we made a mistake in rejecting the Marshall Plan, that means we acted correctly. Noquestion about it—today you can prove it the way you can two times two is four.

They’d have inveigled us into their company, but as a subordinate member. We’d have been dependent on them, but we wouldn’thave gotten anything—we’d have been dependent, that’s for sure. Even more so the Czechs and Poles—they were in a difficult situation.

Sto sorok besed s Molotovym, pp. 88-89


fastidious in picking her acquaintances.”She had been on cordial terms with SolomonMikhoels, for whom the NKVD had ar-ranged a fatal automobile accident on Stalin’sdirect order (pp. 473-75).

Polina’s first words on her release were,“How’s Stalin?” When they told her they’dburied him two days earlier she surely won-dered whether she had committed a mortalpolitical sin, and in Beria’s presence at that.But—outrunning her husband—LavrentiPavlovich merely rushed to embrace her,crying, “You’re a heroine!” (p. 474)

In those few instances when Molotovconcedes that innocent, loyal people—in hisview a handful of obscure individuals—suffered and perished, the bloodshed troubleshis sleep not at all. “There wasn’t time oropportunity,” he insists, “to sort things out”(p. 356). He defends the state murder of themilitary commanders on the ground that noone knew whether they would be loyal in theevent of war—for which, he declares, “noteven the Lord God could have been ready!”(pp. 35, 37, 544)

While Chuyev's conversations shed con-siderable light on the Soviet domestic scene,less than a quarter of the book deals withforeign policy. The 4,300 pages of tran-scripts Chuyev decided not to use must surelycontain much more on that subject; Sto sorokbesed aims chiefly to settle scores withStalin’s Soviet opponents, including post-humously “rehabilitated” victims. It out-raged Molotov, for example, that his prede-cessor as foreign minister, Maxim Litvinov( “turned out to be quite rotten”), was notshot. “Only by accident,” VyacheslavMikhailovich reveals, “did he remain alive.”4

(pp. 95-98) His first spectacular feat afterreplacing the Jewish diplomat was cutting adeal with that erstwhile Nazi wine salesman,German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop: theNazi-Soviet non-aggression pact of August1939. His second was convincing the Westthere was no secret codicil carving up East-ern Europe between Stalin and Hitler. Sosuccessful were his lies that Molotov appar-ently believed them himself: in April 1983he repeated this one (“No, that’s absurd”) toChuyev, who did not question it (p. 20).

Molotov had great misgivings about thewording of the Yalta communique and sayshe told Stalin that the American statementon the liberation of Europe was “too much.”The generalissimo with the disgraceful recordin two wars is said to have remarked, “Never

mind . . . we’ll work on it . . . do it our ownway later.” (p. 76)

Molotov detested Churchill as an “arch-imperialist” and mocked his prayers forStalin’s health (p. 71), but held him in waryrespect. The Americans, whose politicianshe dismissed as “stupid,” rated his contempt(p. 77). He succumbed just a bit toRoosevelt’s charm, accepting a night’s lodg-ing in the White House and an autographedphoto (“To my friend Vyacheslav Molotovfrom Franklin Roosevelt”). He foundEisenhower “good-hearted,” but a more typi-cal assessment is this:

Dulles was such a pettifogger . . . and hisbrother . . . an intelligence officer. Thesebrothers were the sort who would pickyour pockets and cut off your head inone stroke (pp. 69, 75, 77, 101).

This echoes—perhaps not accidently—Westbrook Pegler’s characterization of HarryTruman, who next to Khrushchev wasMolotov’s darkest bete noir:

thin-lipped, a hater, a bad man in anyfight. Malicious and unforgiving andnot above offering you his hand to yankyou off balance and work you over witha chair leg, pool cue, or something out ofhis pocket.5

Molotov had a similarly shrill assess-ment of the term “cold war”:

I think it’s Khrushchevian. It was in theWestern press in Stalin’s day, then cameto us. “The Iron Curtain.” Goebbelsinvented that, and Churchill used it a lot.That’s for sure. But what does “coldwar” mean? Tense relations. They wereresponsible. . .[perhaps because] we wereon the offensive. They were of coursebitter about us, but we had to consoli-date our conquests. Create our own,socialist Germany out of a part of [thecountry]. Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hun-gary, Yugoslavia—they were feeble, wehad to restore order everywhere.Squeeze out capitalist regimes. That’sthe “cold war.” Of course, you have toknow when to stop. In this regard I thinkStalin observed strict limits (p. 86).

The Soviet Union wanted peace, but“according to American plans, 200 of ourcities would be subjected to simultaneous

nuclear attack.” Stalin, he indicates, did notshare Mao’s casual dismissal of The Bombbut had no doubt another war was coming:“The First World War ripped one countryout of the grip of capitalist slavery. TheSecond created a socialist system. The Thirdwill finish off imperialism forever.” (p. 90)

War was always on Molotov’s mind.Like so many desk-bound warriors he didnot know how to use a weapon yet advocatedviolence as a means of settling almost everydispute. When on the eve of the 1972 sign-ing of SALT I Chuyev observed that theSoviet people were fond of saying, “If onlywe can avoid war,” he replied,

That’s a short-sighted Khrushchevianpoint of view. It’s quite dangerous. Wehave to think about preparing for a newwar. It will come to that. Yes, we’ve gotto be ready. Then they’ll be more cau-tious. . . (p. 95)

And four years later, even as the USSRseemed to be surging ahead in the arms race:

Today we’ve dropped our trousers infront of the West. It’s as though themain goal isn’t the struggle against im-perialism but the struggle for peace. Ofcourse it’s necessary to fight for peace,but you won’t get anything with wordsand wishes—you’ve got to have strength(p. 109).

The heart and mentality of a bully laybehind that diminutive, grandfatherly, pince-nez’d exterior. When the Latvian foreignminister came to Moscow in 1939 for whathe hoped would be civilized negotiations,Molotov put him on notice: “You’re notgoing home until you sign the unificationagreement.” (p. 15)

Stalin’s creature reveals little really newabout Soviet foreign policy. We learn a fewdetails of the dreams of regaining Alaska; ofthe demand for joint control of theDardanelles; of Libya and Iran; of expropri-ating some Greek shoreline to bestow on theBulgarians; of Soviet options in the Arab-Israeli dispute; and of “salami-tactics” usedby Moscow to consolidate control over EastEuropean satellites. Every initiative had hisapproval, but he and Stalin knew when tofold (pp. 92-104).

Molotov repeatedly tries to persuade usthat every move was calibrated to precision,


with little left to chance. He revels in thememory of those stunningly accurate post-war calculations which up to 1953 producedmore successes than failures, convinced thatthe wire in his ear was invisible, and that wecan’t see Kim Philby smirking just offstage.

But no Philby lurked behind a predic-tion Molotov made in 1973:

There’ll be a fight in the party yet.Khrushchev was no accident. It’s apeasant country—the right deviation isstrong. Where’s the guarantee theywon’t take power? It’s entirely possiblethat the anti-Stalinists—most likely theBukharinists—will soon come to power(pp. 375, 538).

Molotov and everyone who thoughtlike him rejoiced when Andropov took thetop job; he was one of theirs. They evenwelcomed Gorbachev after Gromyko reas-sured them about those “iron teeth.”

Yet, lacking even the modest visionnecessary to discern that Gorbachev wantedto “reform” the system in order to strengthenit, the Stalinists were soon disappointed.Molotov himself, however, hurrying now tokeep his appointment in Samara, probablydid not realize that his prophecy had cometrue, and that at least for a while Andropovwould be the last to preach the old-time

religion—in public, anyway.The backwoods deacons who cobbled

together the 1991 “vodka putsch” trying toset Soviet communism back on track willlikely be reading the second volume of thesememoirs—if there is one—in prison. They’reprobably already berating themselves for notconsulting the first volume in time:

There wasn’t any unity in our group[Molotov says of the 1957 conspiracyagainst Khrushchev], and we didn’t haveany program. We just agreed to ousthim, but we ourselves weren’t ready toseize power. . .The only thing was todispose him, name him minister of agri-culture. . . We weren’t prepared to offerany [new policies] (pp. 347, 354, 357).

When Chuyev asks whether the peoplewho expelled him from the party after thatfiasco blamed him for the terror, Molotovreplies, “Yes. They claimed that the anti-party group feared exposure. But it wasnamely Khrushchev who had to be afraid.This was a well-played game . . . .”(p. 357)

Through the medium of Sto sorok besed,the ghost of one of Stalin's prime henchmensends this message: “Here I am, outsideevolution, all muscle and fang and venom,with just enough brain to synchronize them.There are many like me.”

Molotov on the Atomic Bomb

Truman decided to surprise us at Potsdam. So far as I recall, after a lunch given by the American delegation, he took Stalin and measide and—looking secretive—informed us they had a unique weapon of a wholly new type, an extraordinary weapon . . . It’s difficult tosay what he was thinking, but it seemed to me he wanted to throw us into consternation.

Stalin, however, reacted to this quite calmly, and Truman decided he hadn’t understood. The words “atomic bomb” hadn’t beenspoken, but we immediately guessed what was meant. We also understood they weren’t in a position to unleash a war. They only had oneor two bombs, and when they blew those up over Hiroshima and Nagasaki they didn’t have any left. Even if they had had some, theywouldn’t have played any special role.

We’d been working on this since 1943. I was ordered to take charge, find someone who could build an atomic bomb. The Chekists[secret police] gave me a list of reliable physicists. I made my choice and summoned [Pytor] Kapista, an Academician.

He indicated we weren’t prepared, that the atomic bomb was a weapon not for this war but for the next. We asked [Abram] Iofe—his position was likewise unclear. To make a long story short, there was the youngest, still quite unknown [Igor] Kurchatov, whom theydidn’t want to promote. I summoned him, we spoke, and he made a good impression. But he said a lot was still unclear to him.

I decided to give him the material from our intelligence service—the agents had done something very important. Kurchatov stayedin my office in the Kremlin several days, working on this material. This was sometime after the Battle of Stalingrad in 1943. I asked him,“Well, what about it?”

I myself didn’t understand anything about the material, but I knew it had been obtained from good, reliable sources.He said, “It’s excellent—it adds exactly what we were missing.”This was a fine operation on the part of our Chekists. They did well in getting what we needed—at precisely the right time, when we

had just begun this project.There was something in my memory, but now I’m afraid I’ve forgotten the details. The Rosenberg couple . . . I tried not to ask any

questions about that, but I think they were connected with [our] intelligence . . . Somebody helped us a great deal with the atomic bomb.The secret service played a very big role. In America, the Rosenbergs paid for this. It’s not excluded that they were involved in helpingus. But we musn’t talk about that. It might be quite useful in the future.

Sto sorok besed s Molotovym, pp. 81-82

Terra publishers mercifully tack Pro-fessor Sergei Kuleshov’s scholarly essay,“He Seeks Laws in Lawlessness” (pp. 554-604), to the back of this herpetorium, notingthat Chuyev “does not share the point ofview of the afterword’s author.” Our gentlepoet prefers the man from Mogilyov Prov-ince.

1. A double entendre in a folk saying that fell out ofusage around the turn of the century. Mogilyov Prov-ince and town are in Byelorussia, but “mogila,” fromwhich adjectival “Mogilyov,” means “grave,” hence“Graves Province” or “Province of Graves.”2. Izbrannoye: Stikhi (A Selection: Verses), (Moscow:Khudohestvennaya Literatura, 1984); Nagrada: Knigastikhotvorenii (The Award: A Book of Verses) (Mos-cow: Sovremenik, 1985).3. Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Little, Brown,1970), 9, 79, 343.4. There was indeed a plan to kill Litvinov a la Mikhoel:Nikita Khrushchev, Vospominaniia: Izbrannye otryyvki,compiled by V. Chalidze (New York: Chalidze Publi-cations, 1982), 195-196.5. Oliver Pilat, Pegler: Angry Man of the Press(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1973), 13; also quotedin Finis Farr, Fair Enough: The Life of WestbrookPegler (New Rochelle, NY: Arlington, House, 1975),180.

Woodford McClellan is a professor of his-tory at the University of Virginia and authorof Russia: A History of the Soviet Period.


times rather trivial ones, pending receipt ofexplicit instructions from Moscow. In oneparticularly vivid example Novikov writesthat by the fall of 1945, he felt the politicalclimate had changed so radically from thatof the war years that he could no longerreport effectively without being recalled toMoscow for consultations and “political re-orientation” from the foreign ministry. Af-ter some months of pressuring Moscow torecall him for such consultations, Novikovfinally received orders to return to Moscowin January 1946. There he was given thenecessary political orientation to the newinternational situation—by Molotov per-sonally. It appears that Novikov felt inca-pable of sending “correct” reports withoutinstruction in the proper assumptions andapproach from Molotov. Even in their inter-nal reports, then, it appears that Soviet dip-lomats were constrained to follow the pre-vailing interpretation of events in Moscow.Such a practice drastically affected not onlythe quality of information that the Sovietleadership received, but also its ability toreact to developments in the outside world.Policy formulated in this sort of environ-ment was not likely to prove flexible.

This conclusion is reinforced byNovikov’s description of the writing of thenow published September 1946 report onAmerican foreign policy. At that time,Novikov was serving as a member of theSoviet delegation to the Paris Peace Confer-ence (July-October 1946). In mid-Septem-ber, Molotov approached Novikov and askedhim to write a report on the tendencies ofU.S. foreign policy in the post-war period.Molotov wanted the report written and sub-mitted by the end of the month. Novikovobjected, asserting that such a report de-manded more time for preparation, and couldonly be written properly in Washington orNew York, where he would have access todocuments from his embassy which wereunavailable in Paris. Molotov, however,insisted that Novikov could write the reportperfectly well during his spare hours awayfrom the conference table, and the underlingset to work.

Within a few days, Molotov requested arough draft of the report, with an outline ofits main conclusions. When Novikov showedhim the draft, Molotov suggested severalchanges, essentially dictating its major con-clusions. Novikov objected that perhaps itwould be better to discuss the report after its

completion, but Molotov insisted and pro-ceeded to prescribe to Novikov the conclu-sions he should reach in the report. Insumming up this episode, Novikov notesthat when he turned in the report on the dayMolotov requested, he could “only symboli-cally consider it my own.”3

Thus the "Novikov letter" might be bet-ter termed the "Molotov letter" if one givescredence to Novikov’s account. ThatMolotov pushed Novikov to write the reportand also served as its anonymous co-authorsuggests that George Kennan is correct whenhe asserts that Molotov needed the reporteither to gain the support of the East Euro-pean countries at the Peace Conference, oras ammunition in an internal Kremlin debateover Soviet American policy.4 The memoirdoes not provide enough evidence to choosebetween these two possibilities, however,and Novikov himself probably did not knowexactly why his boss needed the report. Still,the memoirs place the letter in a clearercontext, making it easier to interpret.

What strikes one as curious, after read-ing this account, is the rift between Novikov’scontemporary analysis and the policies theSoviets were actually following at that time.Novikov, apparently with the support ofMolotov, had already concluded by the fallof 1945 that the United States was pursuingan expansionist and imperialist policy whichmade cooperation between it and the SovietUnion all but impossible. Yet in November1945, in the annual speech on the anniver-sary of the October Revolution, Molotovhimself gave a positive appraisal of the pos-sibilities of future Anglo-Soviet-Americancooperation. Stalin made similar publicstatements in 1946, and throughout that yearSoviet foreign policy remained relativelymoderate. Western communist parties wereencouraged by Moscow to pursue coalitionswith “bourgeois” parties, and coalition gov-ernments led by non-communists continuedto govern Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

What explains this divergence?Molotov, judging from his role in the draft-ing of the September report, had by some-time in 1946 concluded that a more aggres-sive and bellicose policy was necessary tocounter American assertiveness. However,he apparently failed to convince Stalin of thewisdom of this course for some time. Onemay infer, then, that Stalin had not given upall hope of finding some form of accommo-dation with Washington until the June 1947

NOVIKOVContinued from page 16

ship of state would turn.” From that pointforward, in his opinion, U.S. foreign policyaimed to restrict Soviet influence and estab-lish American hegemony.

That Novikov indeed held such aninterpretation of U.S. policy can be con-firmed, not only from the published “let-ter,” but also from unpublished documentsin the archives of the USSR Ministry ofForeign Affairs. When in November 1945,after an Anglo-American summit confer-ence, the Truman administration publiclyannounced its desire to discuss with theUSSR the idea of the international controlof atomic energy, Novikov cabled Mos-cow that this decision

represents a new tactical approach inrelation to the USSR, the substance ofwhich can be reduced to the following:on the one hand, to use the atomic bombas a means of political pressure to obligethe Soviet Union to accept its [Wash-ington's] will and to weaken the positionof the USSR in the U.N., Eastern Eu-rope and so on, but on the other hand, toaccomplish all of this in such a form asto somewhat ameliorate the aggressivecharacter of the Anglo-Saxon allianceof “atomic powers.”2

This cable, which Novikov does not citein his memoirs, confirms that by late 1945 hehad formed an image of the United States asa hostile power, intent on using its power toextort political concessions from the USSR.From this standpoint, even potentially con-ciliatory gestures such as the opening ofdiscussions on controlling atomic energywere automatically interpreted as merelytactical maneuvers in a zero-sum strugglewith the Soviet Union. As he operated undersuch assumptions, one can scarcely imaginethat Novikov sent many cables to Moscowwhich suggested the possibility of anythingmore than limited, short-term cooperationwith Washington.

Novikov offers some interesting insightsinto how the Soviet diplomatic service func-tioned, largely confirming the assumptionthat Molotov wielded tight control over theactions of Soviet diplomatic missions.Novikov several times recounts how he post-poned action on various questions, some-


American announcement of the MarshallPlan, which precipitated a hostile and wide-ranging Soviet reaction. But while the Mar-shall Plan may have precipitated the finalbreak in Soviet-American relations, oneshould not underestimate the role played byNovikov’s reports in preparing the groundfor this event. His earlier pessimistic ap-praisals of American foreign policy pro-vided a ready-made framework for inter-preting the Marshall Plan as the first step inan American plan to gain control over Eu-rope and to isolate the USSR.

In August 1947, again in response to arequest from Molotov, Novikov wrote areport evaluating the Truman Doctrine andthe Marshall Plan. In this case, however, hedoes suggest that its conclusions were dic-tated in advance. In this report, Novikovreached the unsurprising conclusion that theTruman Doctrine and the Marshall Planwere linked together as integral parts of anAmerican strategy to surround and coercethe USSR, economically, politically, andmilitarily. He concluded:

The implementation of these measures[the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan,and U.S. military base construction over-seas] would allow the creation of a stra-tegic encirclement of the Soviet Union,running from the west—through WestGermany and the Western Europeancountries, in the north—through the lineof bases on the northern islands of theAtlantic, and also in Canada and Alaska,in the east—through Japan and China,and in the south—through the MiddleEast and the Mediterranean.5

This report, though unreleased, corre-sponds in its conclusions to later internalSoviet evaluations of the Marshall Plan, andsuggests that the Soviet leadership indeedviewed the Marshall Plan, backed by U.S.capital and economic power, as a significantthreat to its security interests, severe enoughto require immediate counteraction in theform of the Cominform.6

Shortly after he finished this report,Novikov retired from the diplomatic serviceto pursue a career as a writer. He wasrelieved of his post as ambassador in Octo-ber 1947. Novikov himself explains hisretirement as motivated by his longstandingdesire to leave the Foreign Ministry, wherehe never wanted to work in the first place.

However, documents uncovered by Soviethistorians in the Soviet Foreign Ministryarchives suggest that Novikov was regardedas insufficiently “vigilant” in that he per-ceived American foreign policy primarily asa political, and not military, threat to Sovietinterests. By late 1947, internal Soviet re-ports stressed that the United States wasbecoming a direct military threat and waspreparing for eventual war against the SovietUnion.7 We still do not possess sufficientinformation to judge whether Novikov’s res-ignation was related to this supposed failingon his part. But Novikov states that Molotovreleased him from the diplomatic serviceonly grudgingly, and afterwards Novikovwas able to undertake his writing career. Inlight of these facts it seems unlikely that hewas removed because of his unsound analy-sis. During the late Stalin years, those whofailed were not simply retired; they facedmore severe punishments.

There are many interesting questionswhich Novikov does not discuss. Althoughhe lacked access to the highest-level discus-sions of Soviet policy, he could have writtenin more detail about the parts of the processto which he was exposed. It would, forexample, have been quite interesting to hearin more detail about the “political orienta-tion” which Molotov provided duringNovikov’s recall to Moscow for consulta-tions in January 1946. One would also like toknow just which of the conclusions of theSeptember 1946 report were dictated byMolotov, which were drawn independentlyby Novikov, and what their points of dis-agreement were. Novikov omits these de-tails, and leaves much else unexplained.8

Nevertheless, his memoir is still an interest-ing historical document, deserving of con-sideration as yet another small piece of thelarger puzzle of Soviet foreign policy in theearly years of the Cold War.

1. For an English translation of this report and commen-tary on it by several scholars, see “The Novikov Tele-gram,” Diplomatic History 15 (Fall 1991), 523-563, andKenneth M. Jensen, ed., Origins of the Cold War: TheNovikov, Kennan, and Roberts “Long Telegrams” of1946 (Washington: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1991).2. Archive of the Foreign Policy of the USSR (AVPUSSR), f. 048g, op. 28g, p. 19, d. 1, l. 120, citing AVPUSSR, f. 059, op. 15, p. 47, d. 274, ll. 202-203.3. Novikov, Recollections, 352-53.4. See Kennan’s comment on the Novikov letter inDiplomatic History 15 (Winter 1991), 539-543.5. Novikov, Recollections, 394.6. See the Annual political report for 1947 from theSoviet Embassy in the U.S., AVP USSR, f. 0129, op.

31a, p. 241, d. 1.7. See Viktor Mal’kov’s comment on the Novikov letterin Diplomatic History 15 (Fall 1991), 554-58.8. Unfortunately, these details will probably remainunelucidated. While in Moscow in the fall of 1990, thepresent author tried to obtain an interview with Novikov,but learned that the former diplomat was deceased.

A doctoral candidate at the Harriman Insti-tute of Columbia University, Scott Parrishspent 1991-92 at the Brookings Institution .

CWIHP Activities (1991-92)

November 1-2, 1991. Workshop on Chinese Foreign

Policy, Michigan State University.

January 8-9, 1992. Workshop on Soviet Cold War

Archives, Institute of General History, Moscow.

March 18. “Reconsidering Cold War Origins after the

Cold War.” Melvyn P. Leffler, University of Virginia.

April 2 . “The Cold War as Seen from the Other Side.”

Organization of American Historians, Chicago.

Moderator: James G. Hershberg, CWIHP Coordinator.

Panelists: He Di, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences;

Geza Mezei, Budapest University; Vladislav Zubok,

Russian Academy of Sciences.

April 8 . “‘A Terrible, Monstrous Sight’: New

Evidence on the Soviet H-Bomb Program, 1948-55.”

David Holloway, Stanford University. Commentator:

Gregg Herken, National Air and Space Museum.

April 10 . “Russia’s Foreign Policy: Dilemmas and

Choices.” Vladislav Zubok, Senior Researcher,

Russian Academy of Sciences.

April 21 . “Cuban and Soviet Perspectives on the

Cuban Missile Crisis: Assessing the New Evidence.”

Philip J. Brenner, American University, and Raymond

L. Garthoff, Brookings Institution.

May 14. Noon Discussion: “The Role of Threat-Based

Strategies in Soviet-American Relations: New

Evidence from the Cuban Missile Crisis and the 1973

Middle East War.” Richard Ned Lebow, Cornell

University.

June 1. Seminar (3:30-5:30 p.m.): “The Soviet

Suppression of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the

Trials of Imre Nagy: New Evidence from Budapest and

Moscow.” Charles Gati, Union College. Commenta-

tor: Geza Mezei, Budapest University.

June 22. Seminar (3:30-5:30 p.m.): "Warsaw Pact

Politics and the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia in

1968: New Evidence from East-bloc Archives." Mark

Kramer, Russian Research Center, Harvard University.

Commentator: Karen Dawisha, University of

Maryland.

June 30. Seminar (3:30-5:30 p.m.): “A Complicated

War: Mozambique, U.S. Foreign Policy, and the East-

West Conflict in the 1980s.” Chester A. Crocker,

School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University;

William Finnegan, The New Yorker. Commentator:

Kenneth Mokoena, National Security Archive.


SOVIET ARCHIVESContinued from page 15

shed light on policy formulation and deci-sion-making in the Stalin era.27 However,scholars who have reviewed materials suchas Politburo minutes report that they oftencome across references to special dossiers[osobaya papka] that were transferred to thepost-1952 Central Committee archives atStaraya Ploshad’; for the moment those files,which have generally not been declassified,remain under the control of the StorageCenter for Contemporary Documentation,which plans to return them to the formerCentral Party archives while retaining a mi-crofilm duplicate.

Since the coup, some Western and Rus-sian scholars have gained access to the Rus-sian Center and its spacious, well-lit readingroom, where finding aids are readily avail-able (a welcome departure from past Sovietpractice in many archives). When we visitedin January, two U.S. scholars, one on anIREX exchange and one who had been re-ceived with the help of letter of recommen-dation from a Russian friend, were quietlytaking notes. Scholars from the RussianAcademy of Sciences reported that they hadbeen able to gain access to Cominform ma-terials, part of a section on “The Documentsof the International Communist and Work-ing Movement” that the center had opened.28

For foreign scholars, the center recommendsthat interested scholars write letters of appli-cation bearing the sponsorship of their insti-tution and indicating the theme, time span,and date of their proposed research. Somescholars report logistical problems even af-ter gaining access, however, with photo-copies discouraged and xerox paper andpowder in short supply.

Not surprisingly, given the dire eco-nomic situation, the center has actively soughtout commercial relationships with Westernpartners. “Nothing is easy for us,” Kozlovlamented, “because having decided to grantfreedom of access to archives we now faceanother situation: This freedom cannot beimplemented because the situation in thecountry is awful.” At the Central Partyarchives alone, he reported, 48 archivistshad left their jobs in the last two-and-a-halfmonths of 1991.29 On January 21, appar-ently in synch with Roskomarkhiv’s con-tacts with the British firm, the Russian Cen-ter announced an agreement with Chadwyck-Healey for the microfilming and interna-

tional release of major collections.30 Thecenter’s officials also seem eager to reachbilateral agreements with U.S. institutionsto provide research assistance in exchangefor financial support.

3. “Presidential” or “Kremlin” ArchivesWhile the two centers described above

clearly contain much CPSU material of criti-cal interest to Cold War historians, severaladditional crucial collections pertinent tothe decisions of Soviet leaders during thepostwar period remain to be integrated intothe archival system. These include a collec-tion known variously as the Kremlin orPresidential archives, which are said toinclude the most sensitive files of the Com-munist Party leadership, including protocols(though probably not minutes or stenographictranscripts)31 of Politburo meetings, through1991. These materials apparently consti-tuted the “working archive” of the Sovietleadership, and were under the direct controlof Mikhail S. Gorbachev behind the Krem-lin walls until he left office and the complexcame under Russian authority. Despite state-ments by Gorbachev before he left officeindicating a willingness to grant access tothese papers, their disposition remains un-certain. SCCD officials said that their centerwill receive these documents for eventualrelease to scholars, but the details and timingof the transfer remain to be worked out.Asked in mid-March when the documentswere likely to be turned over, one SCCDofficial gave a reply reflective of the prevail-ing uncertainty: “Maybe tomorrow, maybenext year, maybe twenty years.”32

One of the most tantalizing collectionswithin the Presidential archives is Stalin’spersonal papers, whose very existence as acorporate archival entity has long remainedunconfirmed. According to Pikhoia, roughly17,000 files of documents, some with Stalin’shandwritten notation to be placed “in myarchives,” constitute what is known as the“Sixth Section” in the Politburo collection inthe Kremlin or Presidential archives for-merly under Gorbachev’s control. Pikhoiasaid in March that these presidential ar-chives, including the Stalin collection, wereto be divided among two research centers:the recent materials, including post-1985Politburo records and recent files on eco-nomic and strategic matters, will go to a newpresidential archives center created byYeltsin; while older materials, including the

Stalin papers, will go to the two aforemen-tioned centers housing the papers of theCPSU Central Committee for the appropri-ate chronological period (e.g., most of theStalin archive would end up in the RussianCenter for the Preservation and Study ofContemporary Historical Documents).33

Foreign Ministry archives

After the Soviet collapse, control overthe USSR Foreign Ministry and its archivesdevolved to the Russian Ministry of Exter-nal Relations. But the archive’s physicallocation and key officials dealing with archi-val matters have not changed. Interestedscholars may contact the Russian Ministryof External Relations (now in the head-quarters of the former USSR Foreign Minis-try), 121200, Moscow, SmolenskaiaPloshad’, 32/34; or the archive directly:Archives of the Foreign Policy of the USSR[Arkhiv vneshnei politiki SSSR, or AVPSSSR], Plotnikov per., 11; 121200 Moscow,metro: Smolenskaya: director, VladimirVasil’evich Sokolov; telephones: 236-5201;reading room, 241-0296 or 241-0296; askfor Anatoly Alexandrovich Bykov orShirokova Alla Ivanovna).

Prior to last August’s failed coup, se-lected Soviet and foreign researchers hadbeen gaining limited access to Foreign Min-istry files from the early postwar period. Thetrickle of outsiders permitted entry had beenincreasing since August 1990, when the So-viet Government decreed that materials morethan 30 years old could be declassified andthat a committee of retired diplomats wouldbe created to begin reviewing documents forrelease. Though constrained by limited fa-cilities (the reading room seats only eightresearchers at a time), non-availability offinding aids, and prohibitions on photocopy-ing those documents one was grudginglypermitted to see, U.S. researchers were ableto take notes from an internal administrativehistory of U.S.-Soviet relations, 1945-1952,and to use the footnotes to request additionaldocuments.34

Prior to the August 1991 coup, how-ever, few interesting documents on the post-war era escaped the Foreign Ministry ar-chives into the public domain. Declassifica-tion went forward slowly with only a hand-ful of former diplomats hired to review se-cret materials. In 1990-91 the ministry jour-nal Vestnik began featuring selected docu-


ments on Soviet diplomacy during and afterWorld War II, including such topics as theNazi-Soviet pact and Soviet-Japanese ex-changes in the summer of 1945. In 1990, inconnection with Soviet-American confer-ences in Washington and Moscow orga-nized by the U.S. Institute of Peace, theForeign Ministry released the September1946 “Novikov telegram” from the Sovietambassador to Washington analyzing U.S.policy towards Moscow.35 That document,though inspiring much discussion, occa-sioned as much frustration as excitement. Ina survey in the fall 1991 Diplomatic His-tory, Melvyn Leffler called the Novikovdocument “a tease”36 while Steven M. Minercommented that it “raises more questionsthan it answers.

“If we are truly to understand the his-tory of Soviet foreign policy we will needmore than the release of a single memoran-dum each year—or decade—no matter howimportant,” Miner added. “Until we do re-ceive access to more information, we canonly recall Stalin’s insight that all informa-tion is incomplete, and some is even inten-tionally misleading.”37 Soviet scholars whoparticipated in the two 1990 conferenceswere also acutely disappointed with thefailure of Foreign Ministry archivists torelease more materials to them, especiallyafter Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadzehad assured them that they would enjoygreater access to archives while researchingtheir papers.38

Last fall, hopes rose that the ForeignMinistry might take a more open view to-wards releasing materials on important ColdWar events when it released documents tothe official Czech commission studying theKremlin’s crushing of the 1968 PragueSpring, and permitted scholars from theAcademy of Sciences to prepare papersbased on these materials.39 However, morethan a half year after the coup, complaintsfrom Russian and foreign scholars regard-ing the Foreign Ministry persist in regard toboth the quality of materials and the proce-dures required for using them. “To my pointof view the progress is very slow,” AndreiEdemskii of the Institute of Slavic and Bal-kan Studies recently stated. “The tradi-tional psychology of the leadership’s ap-proach to the scholars remains un-changed.”40

Denied access to finding aids, scholarshad been forced to rely on archivists to

produce relevant files; suspicion persistedthat important records were being withheld,either intentionally or due to disorganiza-tion. On the other hand, some scholarsspeculate that the Foreign Ministry records,even if fully opened, may be inherently lessrevealing because in the most vital areas theministry tended to merely implement deci-sions made by the CPSU leadership. Re-searchers also encountered problems in pho-tocopying materials, and were forced to de-pend on handwritten notes.41

Evidence of the cautious attitude of theold guard in the Foreign Ministry archivessurfaced at the CWIHP archives workshop inMoscow in January. Vladimir Sokolov,deputy chief of the ministry’s historical re-search division, sternly proclaimed his oppo-sition to a proposed law on archives ad-vanced by Yuri Afanasiev that would give allcitizens over 16 years of age the right to usethe archives (Sokolov preferred carefulscreening of scholars) and complained thatforeigners might pilfer the national heritageby making hundreds of photocopies of min-istry documents during research visits. An-other senior official Vladimir Shustov, saidhe favored joint projects with foreign schol-ars to work in Foreign Ministry archives, butalso sounded cautious about the notion ofunrestricted access.

Not surprisingly, given the political tur-moil, a shake-up in the old line-up seems tobe in progress within the Foreign Ministry asit shifted from Soviet to Russian hands. Themost important recent change was the re-moval in January of Feliks N. Kovalev ashead of the historical research division andhis replacement by Igor Lebedev, the formerdeputy director of the Foreign Ministry’sUSA/Canada Desk.

More recently, the ministry has madeclear its assent to the principle of declassify-ing archives and its intensified interest inobtaining hard currency support from West-ern partners. That attitude strongly flavoredthe first meeting between ministry officialsand an international advisory panel assembledby the Norwegian Nobel Institute and con-sisting of U.S., British, and German histori-ans. At that meeting, held in March after aplanned January session was postponed, bothsides agreed in principle — the Russianspointing out that they would be bound tocomply with the upcoming Law on Archivesof the Russian Federation — that the minis-try should promote the declassification as

quickly as possible of all materials exceptfor those that might “demonstrably impede”current Russian security or other fundamen-tal state interest or disclose information of apersonal nature that could cause “danger ordistress” to individuals.42 They also agreedthat the international advisory group shouldaid the ministry’s search for Western finan-cial assistance to publish a guide to thearchives, to xerox finding aids (which wouldthen be made available to researchers), toexpand the reading room, and to pay thesalaries of former diplomats who wouldreview secret materials for declassification.43

Roughly $100,000 is sought from Westerndonors to pay for staff to declassify andprocess still-secret foreign ministry files.44

According to Russian scholars who havegained limited access to Foreign Ministryfiles, they are divided into two main catego-ries — a central file and a cable file — andalso include the collections (fonds) of allForeign Ministers and their deputies.45 For-eign scholars interested in gaining access tothe Foreign Ministry archives should send aletter to Sokolov on university or institu-tional stationary, specifying the types ofdocuments and subjects they would like tosee. In addition, a letter of endorsementfrom the researcher’s institution, or from theU.S. Embassy in Moscow, can be helpful.Prospective researchers from the UnitedStates should allow ample time for delays inmail service and for the archive to gatherdocuments before their arrival in Moscow.

KGB Archives

Discredited by the involvement of itschairman, Vladimir A. Kryuchkov, in thefailed August coup, the KomitetGosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (KGB) of-ficially went out of existence last fall andwas replaced by two Russian intelligenceservices, one each for domestic and foreignactivities. The Soviet secret police agency’sfiles ended up in the hands of the Russiangovernment, but by the time Russian au-thorities impounded KGB records in lateAugust, they found signs that massiveamounts of documents had already beendestroyed—not only compromising evidencepertaining to the coup, but other politicallysensitive materials; Vadim Bakatin, whoserved temporarily as KGB chairman lastfall, reported that more than 580 volumes ofAndrei Sakharov’s confiscated diaries had


been destroyed in July 1989,46 and evidenceemerged to show that the KGB had doctoredrecords regarding the case of RaoulWallenberg, the Swedish diplomat who dis-appeared into Soviet custody in Budapest atthe end of World War II.47 While manyRussians called for a rapid release of KGBmaterials, others raised concern that fulldisclosure could fuel the sort of witch-huntfor secret police operatives that has occurredin many Eastern European countries. Filesconcerning agents, Bakatin declared, “wouldbe handed over only his dead body.”48

Yevgeny Primakov, named to head the for-eign intelligence service, promised that theagency would make some information avail-able to scholars outside the government, butfew practical steps are known to have beentaken in this direction.49

Last fall, Russian authorities turned theprickly issue of what should be done with theKGB files over to a parliamentary commis-sion. While the issue was studied by thecommission, which was chaired by Col.Dmitri Volkogonov and included Rudolf G.Pikhoia, reports surfaced that KGB officerswere retailing choice documents for hardcurrency to Western publications and insti-tutions.50 Illustrating the confused situationthat ensued in the constitutional vacuumafter the coup, ABC’s Nightline was firstgranted, and later denied, access to the KGB’sfile on Lee Harvey Oswald. Taking after theenterprising spirit of former agents such asOleg Gordievsky and Boris Kalugin, whowere busy marketing their stories to Westernaudiences,51 the KGB even signed an agree-ment with a Hollywood production com-pany to produce popular entertainments al-legedly based on confidential files.52 Inanother sign of the agency’s desperation fordollars, the KGB opened its doors to West-ern tourists for a time in December andJanuary. For $30 per person, visitors wereushered through an exhibit-filled museum—largely devoted to extolling KGB successstories against counter-revolutionaries, theNazis, and the CIA, and to the virtues ofFeliks Dzerzhinsky, founder of the Bolshe-vist secret police—and escorted to the well-appointed former office of chairman YuriAndropov in KGB headquarters overlook-ing the stump of Dzerzhinsky’s statue inLubyanka Square. During one such tour inJanuary, the author was told by the group’sescort, a rather embittered former counteres-pionage specialist, that the KGB desired to

open its files to rebut smear stories in themedia; but he hedged when asked when,how, and under what procedures this wouldbe done.

Summarizing the situation recently, ajournalist for the newspaper NezavisimayaGazeta [Independent Newspaper] underlinedtwo major problems relating to KGB records:the need for outside, independent staff andhistorians; and the danger of commercial-ization. Citing a roster of cases where evi-dence appeared to have been deliberatelydistorted—“a minimum of authentic docu-ments and a maximum of invention”—Vladimir Abarimov called for the examina-tion of KGB files “by independent, impartialresearchers, not KGB officials and/or thosewho actually committed the crimes.”53 Onesign of willingness to allow outsiders at leastlimited access to KGB records emerged withRussian agreement to allow American histo-rians to investigate charges that the Sovietsecret police interrogated U.S. prisoners-of-war seized during the Vietnam War.54

In February 1992, the parliamentarycommission ruled that KGB records morethan 15 years old must be turned over to statearchives for declassification, unless theyconcern “still effective orders and instruc-tions concerning operation of agents,” “sen-sitive technical details,” and certain othercategories—in which case they can be with-held from the state archives for up to 30years and may require a “special politicaldecision” prior to release to state archives.Nikita Petrov, a representative of the com-mission, said materials related to politicalpersecutions and criminal actions may betransferred to state archives even if they areunder 15 years old.55 Documents impingingon personal privacy may be withheld for upto 75 years, according to Pikhoia, who saidthe Russian Government is likely to create anew center to store KGB archives.56

Yet, while the parliamentarycommission’s report helped clarify the obli-gations of the Russian intelligence servicesto turn over KGB records to state archives, itremains unclear when and to what extentoutside historians will be able to see and usethose records. Even after documents areturned over to state archives, Petrov notes,“researchers won’t be guaranteed access toany such files. An[y] access to the KGBarchives will have to be regulated by specialrules yet to be designed. But this cannot bedone before we have an act on archives and

official secrets.”57

Defense Ministry Archives

For inquiries regarding military docu-ments, contact the History-Archival andMilitary Memorial Center [Istoriko-arkhivnyi i voenno-memorialnyi tsentrGeneral’nogo Shtaba Vooruzhennykh Sil];ul. Znamenko, 19; 103160 Moscow; Tele-phone: 296-53-48 / 203-43-48 / 296-88-46.This center, created in 1991, handles inquir-ies from foreigners to see holdings at mili-tary archives, including the two major knownrepositories for Ministry of Defense hold-ings dealing with the post-World War IIperiod: the Central Archive of the Ministryof Defense (TsAMO) in Podol’sk outsideMoscow58—the largest archive in USSRsecond to the CPSU Central Committee ar-chives—and the main Naval archives centernear St. Petersburg.59

Until 1991, access was rarely given toforeigners to see military materials duringthe Soviet era, and the military archivespolicy was generally regarded as thoroughlyresistant to change. These attitudes surfacedmost prominently in June 1991, when aMoscow newspaper printed a transcript of aconference held a few months earlier toreview the first volume of a projected ten-volume official military history of the Sovietrole in World War II. The Soviet GeneralStaff’s leaders expressed horror and shock atthe draft, which they labelled as derogatoryto the heroic accomplishments of the Sovietmilitary. They vowed never to open upDefense Ministry archives, and accused theproject’s head, military historianVolkogonov, of unpatriotic behavior.

Soviet military top brass “want to con-trol history, as usual, and for them, WorldWar II can only be the victory of socialismand nothing else,” responded Volkogonov,who resigned in protest from his post as headof the Military History Institute. “I don’twant to write a fake history.”60

Since the coup the tone has changeddramatically, but questions of archival ac-cess have been complicated by the fact thatmany assets of the USSR military wereintended to be under the shared control of theCommonwealth of Independent States. Evenwith materials less explosive than nuclearweapons, it is taking some time to sort outnew lines of authority and jurisdiction, andto a society accustomed to extreme secrecy


the notion of declassifying military plan-ning documents still strikes a nerve.

Nevertheless, some steps have beentaken to make Defense Ministry recordsmore accessible to outsiders. At the CWIHParchives workshop in January, a representa-tive of the Historico-Archival and Military-Memorial Center indicated a genial willing-ness, in principle, to share materials withforeign scholars in joint research programsconducted on a basis of strict reciprocity; heexpressed particular interest in collaborat-ing with U.S. military historians.61 Evenbefore the coup the military archives hadbegun to show a new willingness to enterinto commercial relationships with Westernfirms interested in marketing formerly con-fidential Defense Ministry finding aids andjournals. One such enterprise that has madea special effort to publish Soviet militaryand secret police records, as well as othernewly available Soviet journals, records,and finding aids, is the Minneapolis-basedEast View Publications.62 Materials fromDefense Ministry sources on subjects suchas the Cuban Missile Crisis and Afghanistaninvasion also began to seep out in 1990-91through the Military-Historical Journal[Voyenno-Istorichesky Zhurnal].63

* * * * *

The archival situation, in sum, is notaltogether unlike that in the political andeconomic spheres. Just as it will take sometime to convert the rhetoric of “democracy”and “free market” into concrete and stablerealities, the now widely-proclaimed goalof “open access” to the documentary hold-ings of the late Soviet Union will unavoid-ably require traversing a bumpy and zig-zagging path before the destination is fi-nally reached. To belabor the metaphor:many potholes remain—but the roadblocksare fast disappearing.

1. For aid during the research for this report, the authorwould like to thank: Tom Blanton, Mario Corti, JeffreyJ. Gardner, Patricia Grimsted, David Holloway, KentLee, Harry Leich, Vojtech Mastny, Woody McClellan,Priscilla McMillan, Sergei Mironenko, Scott Parrish,Amos Perlmutter, Vlad Petrov, Constantine Pleshakov,Blair Ruble, Chris Smart, William Taubman, MarkTeeter, Mark Von Hagen, Odd Arne Westad, VladZubok, and the participants in the CWIHP workshop inMoscow in January.2. Patricia Kennedy Grimsted, “Beyond Perestroika:Soviet Area Archives After the August Coup,” Interna-tional Research & Exchanges Board, Princeton, NJ,Jan. 1992, prepared for publication in American Archi-vist 55 (Winter 1992); and Grimsted, “Intellectual

Access and Descriptive Standards for Post-Soviet Ar-chives: What Is to Be Done?” IREX preliminary pre-print, March 1992.3. For further information on this conference contactOdd Arne Westad, Research Director, The NorwegianNobel Institute, Drammensveien 19, N-0255, Oslo,Norway; tel. (+472) 443680, fax: (+472) 430168.4. For the most comprehensive reviews of the Sovietarchives situation prior to the coup, see Patricia KennedyGrimsted, A Handbook for Archival Research in theUSSR (International Research and Exchanges Boardand Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies,1989) and a 1991 supplement circulated by IREX,“Major Archives and Manuscript Repositories in Mos-cow and Leningrad”; and Grimsted, “Perestroika in theArchives?: Further Efforts at Soviet Archival Reform,”American Archivist 54 (Winter 1991), 70-95.5. For an informed account of archive-related eventsimmediately following the coup attempt, see Vera Tolz,“New Situation for CPSU and KGB Archives,” Reporton the USSR 3:38 (20 September 1991), 1-4.6. RSFSR Committee on Archival Affairs, ul. Ilyinka[formerly ul. Kuibysheva], 12, 103132 Moscow; metro:Kitai Gorod; telephone: 206-3531/206-2785/240-3075;fax: 200-4205.7. Eleanor Randolph, “On the Soviet Paper Trail,”Washington Post, 5 November 1991; interviews withStephen D. Bryen (American Enterprise Institute) andMario Corti (RFE/RL), November and December 1991.For other Western initiatives, see Grimsted, “BeyondPerestroika,” 35-40.8. Ella Maksimov, interview with Pikhoia, “Krupneishaiaarkhivnaia sdelka s amerikantsami, kotoroi protiviatsianashi istoriki” [The largest archival deal with the Ameri-cans, opposed by our historians], Izvestia, 7 March1992. Further announcements concerning details of theagreement among Hoover, Chadwyck-Healey, andRoskomarkhiv were expected as the Bulletin went topress in late April.9. Grimsted, “Beyond Perestroika,” 11.10. Pikhoia, “Russian Archives and the New Realities,”oral presentation to Norwegian Nobel Institute confer-ence on “The Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, 1945-1989,” 28 February-1 March 1992; Pikhoia commentsat CWIHP workshop on Soviet sources, Institute ofGeneral History, Moscow, 8 January 1992. PatriciaGrimsted quoted Roskomarkhiv officials as estimatingthat the Central Committee had held some 30 millionfiles (over 75 million documents), compared to only 1.5million files in 1991 at the Central Party archives(TsPA). Grimsted, “Beyond Perestroika,” 5.11. Pikhoia, “Russian Archives and the New Realities.”12. Grimsted, “Beyond Perestroika,” 32-35; interviewsin Moscow, January 1992.13. For further information contact Andrei Kortunov,Dmitrii Akhalkatci or Sergei Tikhonov: Russian Scien-tific Foundation, 2/3 Klebny per., suite 407, Moscow121814, Russia, tel.: 202-9635/202-6438; fax: 253-9291; 205-1207.14. Valery Koretskii, its director, has two fax numbers.The first, at the Central Telegraph, is 292-6511; mes-sages must include the notation, “BOX 5769, ZaKoretskogo.” The second, at the office, is said to be lessreliable: 248-30-95.15. Grimsted, “Beyond Perestroika,” 14-16; Vera Tolz,"Access to KGB and CPSU Archives in Russia," RFE/RL Research Report 1:16 (17 April 1992), 1-7; “Draft ofLaw on Archives of the Russian Republic: RSFSR Lawon the Archival Legacy and on Archives,” Nov. 1991draft, trans. Harold Leich, Library of Congress; inter-views with Leich, Nov. 1991 and April 1992; Pikhoia,

comments at CWIHP Moscow workshop, 8 January1992, and in “Russian Archives and the New Realities.”16. V. Bukovsky, “To Oppose the Right Forces, AStrong Left Opposition is Necessary,” Izvestia, 3 April1992, 3; Tolz, "Access to KGB and CPSU Archives inRussia," 3.17. Steven Solnick and Susan Bronson, “The TorontoInitiative,” reprinted in the American Association forthe Advancement of Slavic Studies [AAASS] Newslet-ter, Jan. 1992, 10-11.18. Grimsted, “Intellectual Access,” 132, passim.; Grim-sted, “Beyond Perestroika,” 30-31.19. See Ella Maksimov, interview with Pikhoia,“Krupneishaia arkhivnaia sdelka s amerikantsami,kotoroi protiviatsia nashi istoriki” [The largest archivaldeal with the Americans, opposed by our historians],Izvestia 57 (7 March 1992); Yuri Afanasiev, “Proizvolv obrashchenii s obshchestvennoi pamiat’iunedopustim” [Tyranny in the treatment of our collectivememory is impermissible], Yuri Afanasiev, Izvestia 58(9 March 1992); Rudolf Pikhoia, “Fakty i vymysly o‘rasprodazhe istoricheskoi pamiati’” [“Fact and fictionabout the ‘sale of our historical memory’”], Izvestia, 18March 1992; Tolz, "Access to KGB and CPSU Ar-chives in Russia," 3.20. Clare Pedrick, “Revelations From the CommunistFiles: Letter Alleges Italian’s Role in Soldier’s Deaths,”Washington Post, 8 February 1992; Pikhoia, “RussianArchives & the New Realities.”21. Tim Sebastian, “Dialogue with the Kremlin,” TheSunday Times (London), 2 February 1992.22. Michael Dobbs, “Opening of Soviet Party ArchivesDraws Crowd,” Washington Post, 3 March 1992.23. Pikhoia, “Russian Archives and the New Realities.”24. Mario Corti, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “ABrief Survey of the Archives Visited,” Oct. 1991.25. The higher figure is from the report of AndreiEdemskii, Institute of Slavic and Balkan Studies, “TheSoviet Union in Eastern Europe, 1945-1989: New Ar-chival Possibilities and Present and Ongoing Researchesin Russia—A Survey,” presented to the NorwegianNobel Institute conference; the lower figure was quotedby Mironenko, according to press accounts: “Openingof Soviet Party Archives Draws Crowd,” WashingtonPost, 3 March 1992.26. “Opening of Soviet Party Archives Draws Crowd,”Washington Post, 3 March 1992; on the exhibition alsosee Evgenii Kuz’min, “The secret life of the CentralCommittee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,”Literaturnaya Gazeta, 26 February 1992, 13.27. For an early example of scholarship based on thisarchive, see Sergei Kudryashov, “Soviet IdeologicalInfluence and Control Over Eastern Europe, 1945-1953,” presented to the Norwegian Nobel Instituteconference.28. Comments at CWIHP workshop on Soviet sources,Institute of General History, Moscow, 8-9 January1992; Edemskii, “Soviet Union in Eastern Europe,1945-1989: New Archival Possibilities and Present andOngoing Researches in Russia — A Survey.”29. Comments at CWIHP workshop on Soviet sources,Institute of General History, Moscow, 8 January 1992.30. William E. Schmidt, “Files to Be Opened, FromLenin to Gorbachev,” New York Times, 22 January1992.31. Personal communication from William Taubman,16 April 1992.32. Comment by SCCD official to Prof. WilliamTaubman during a visit to Moscow in mid-March 1992;see also Tolz, "Access to KGB and CPSU Archives inRussia," 1-2.


33. Pikhoia, “Russian Archives and the New Realities.”34. N.P. Pavlova, “Soviet-American Relations, 1945-1952” (1965), fond 048g, opis 24g, p. 19, d. 1 & 2.Official internal administrative histories are said also toexist at the Foreign Ministry on such topics as Anglo-American-Soviet relations, and the German question.35. For the Novikov telegram and analyses of its signifi-cance, see Diplomatic History 15:4 (Fall 1991), 523-63; Kenneth M. Jensen, ed., Origins of the Cold War:The Novikov, Kennan, and Roberts “Long Telegrams”of 1946 (Washington: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1991);and Scott Parrish, "A Diplomat Reports," CWIHP Bul-letin 1 (Spring 1992), 16, 21-22.36. Melvyn P. Leffler, “Commentary on ‘The MolotovTelegram,’” Diplomatic History 15:4 (Fall 1991), 548.37. Steven Merritt Miner, “Commentary on `TheNovikov Telegram,’” Diplomatic History 15:4 (Fall1991), 563.38. Constantine Pleshakov, comments at the WoodrowWilson International Center for Scholars, 24 April1992.39. Two Russian scholars who have made use of thesematerials are Michael Latysh (Institute for Slavic andBalkan Studies) and Maxim Korobochkin (Institute forGeneral History).40. Edemskii, “Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, 1945-1989: New Archival Possibilities and Present and On-going Researches in Russia — A Survey.” See also theletter of researcher Georgy Chernyavsky, who com-plained last fall that the Soviet Foreign Ministry ar-chives remain “virtually inaccessible.” “Foreign Min-istry archives,” Moscow News 41 (3496), 13-20 Octo-ber 1991 [English edition].41. This assessment is based on interviews with Rus-sian scholars during a visit to Moscow in January 1992.42. This language closely follows the formulation usedin the latest U.S. State Department regulations for itsForeign Relations of the United States series.43. “Western Members of the International AdvisoryGroup, Summing Up of the Nakhabino Meeting March14-18, 1992,” Regulations for Declassification.44. Prospective funders are urged to contact Dr. OddArne Westad, Research Director, The Norwegian NobelInstitute, Drammensveien 19, N-0255, Oslo, Norway;tel. (+472) 443680, fax: (+472) 430168, or the membersof the international advisory committee: Prof. JonathanHaslam (Cambridge University); Prof. WilliamTaubman (Amherst College); and Prof. Gerhard Wettig(Bundestinstitut fur Ostwissenschaftliche undInternationale Studien).45 . Personal communication from Vladislav Zubok, 16April 1992.46 . Interview with Vadim Bakatin, LiteraturnaiaGazeta, 18 December 1991, in FBIS-SOV-91-249, 27December 1991; Grimsted, “Beyond Perestroika,” 9.47. Serge Schmemann, “Soviet Files Show K.G.B.Cover-Up In the Disappearance of Wallenberg,” NewYork Times, 28 December 1991.48. Viktor Loshak, interview with Vadim Bakatin,“Nam nuzhno mnogoe drug drugu prostit’,” MoskovskiiNovosti, 9 September 1991; see also Tolz, "Access toKGB and CPSU Archives in Russia," 5-7.49. Michael Dobbs, “KGB Spy War With U.S. FallsVictim to Glasnost,” Washington Post, 3 October 1991.50. “The spies who came in for the gold,” The Guard-ian, 30 October 1991; Boston Globe, 22 December1991; New York Times, 22 January 1992; Grimsted,“Beyond Perestroika,” 27; Tolz, "Access to KGB andCPSU Archives in Russia," 3.51. Of particular interest are purported KGB docu-ments disclosed by Gordievsky, who served as a senior

KGB agent in Copenhagen in London before defectingto the West in 1985. See Christopher Andrew and OlegGordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story of its ForeignOperations from Lenin to Gorbachev (Hodder &Stoughton, 1990); Andrew and Gordievsky, eds., In-structions from the Centre: Top Secret Files on KGBForeign Operations, 1975-1985 (Hodder & Stoughton,1991), and “More ‘Instructions from the Centre’: TopSecret Files on KGB Global Operations, 1975-1985,”special issue, Intelligence and National Security 7:1(Jan. 1992), passim.52. Lloyd Grove, “The KGB Breaks Into The Movies,”Washington Post, 17 January 1992.53. Vladimir Abarimov, “Troubled Waters in K.G.B.Files,” presentation to the Norwegian Nobel Instituteconference.54. “Russian Offers Americans Access to K.G.B. Files,”New York Times, 30 January 1992.55. “The KGB archives will be made more accessible,in theory,” Moscow News 8 (3515), 23 February-1March 1992, 8.56. Pikhoia, “Russian Archives and the New Realities.”57. “The KGB archives will be made more accessible,in theory,” Moscow News 8 (3515), 23 February-1March 1992, 8.58. TsAMO address: Tsentral’nyi arkhiv MinisterstvaOborony SSSR; ul. Kirova, 74; g. Podol’sk; 142117Moscow oblast’.59. The Central Naval Archive of the Ministry ofDefense (TsVMA) in Gatchina: TsVMA: Tsentral’nyivoenno-morskoi arkhiv Ministerstva Oborony;Krasnoarmeiskii prospekt, 2; g. Gatchina; 188350 St.Petersburg oblast’.60. Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 18 June 1991; EleanorRandolph, “Top Kremlin Generals Criticize Revision-ist Account of WW II,” Washington Post, 21 June 1991;Grimsted, “Beyond Perestroika,” 12.61. Comments of Col. Victor Vasilievich Muchin,CWIHP workshop, 8-9 January 1992.62. For further information contact Kent Lee, EastView Publications, 12215 North 28th Place, Minne-apolis, MN 55441, telephone: (612) 550-0961; fax:(612) 559-2931; toll-free (U.S. only): 1-800-477-1005.63. Voyenno-Istorichesky Zhurnal [Military-Histori-cal Journal], Moscow 103160, K-160, tel: 296-4487;296-4495; 296-4501; 296-4535.

James G. Hershberg is the coordinator ofthe Cold War International History Projectand the author of From Harvard toHiroshima: James B. Conant and the Birthof the Nuclear Age to be published in 1993by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.

BERIAContinued from page 17

While the bulk of attacks against Beria focuson his alleged anti-party activities and eaves-dropping on his colleagues in the Politburo, hiserstwhile colleagues also attacked his personallife. Comments were made about how Beria hadnumerous contacts with prostitutes and had con-tracted syphilis from these women.

Malenkov and Khrushchev are the domi-nant figures in the meeting. However, in a mo-ment of tension Malenkov goes out of his way tostate that there is no one who would “pretend toplay the role of Stalin’s successor.” “The succes-sors to Stalin” he continues, “are a strong, unitedgroup of party leaders dedicated to the mother-land, the population of the Union, and united bythe great principles of Marx, Engels, Lenin andStalin.” (2:197) Despite these comments, theU.S. government was correct in its judgement atthe time that the power struggle in Moscow wasnot resolved with the expulsion of Beria and thatthe repeated declarations by Stalin's successorsthat collective leadership was their primary goalmasked continuing internal tensions.

The final evaluation of the case by the U.S.Embassy, described in a secret telegram fromAmbassador Charles Bohlen to the State Depart-ment on Christmas Eve, 1953,1 the day Beria'sexecution was officially announced, coincideswith many of the conclusions of the CentralCommittee plenum. It was of critical importanceto Malenkov and his associates, Bohlen noted, toreduce the role of the internal police if the Partywere to maintain administrative power over theSoviet Union. That job, they evidently believed,was simply impossible as long as Beria stayed atthe MVD's helm.

Moreover, the Bohlen cable states, due tothe “half-hearted” attempt to prove the guilt ofone of their closest colleagues, it was “doubtful ifthe present leadership wished the Soviet popula-tion really to believe most of these charges againstBeria.” As the envoy later recalled in his mem-oirs: “The aim was to take away the power of oneman to look down the throats of his associatesthrough his control of the secret police.”2

An English translation of the July 1953Plenum transcript is scheduled to be issued thissummer by Nova Science Publishers (6080 Jeri-cho Turnpike, Suite 207, Commack, NY 11725;tel.: 516-499-3103; fax: 516-499-3146). Thehardcover edition, roughly 165 pages and pricedat $49, is edited by D. M. Stickle and will bereleased under the title, The Beria Affair (ISBN1-56072-065-4).1 . Bohlen to Department of State, 24 December 1953,U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the UnitedStates, 1952-1954 (Washington: Government PrintingOffice, 1988) 8:1222-23.2. Bohlen, Charles. Witness to History (New York;W.W. Norton & Co., 1973), 357.

--- --- Rachel A. Connell

CWIHP Working Papers:

#1: Chen Jian, “The Sino-Soviet Alliance andChina’s Entry into the Korean War.”#2: P.J. Simmons, “Archival Research on theCold War Era: A Report from Budapest,Prague and Warsaw.”#3: James Richter, “Reexamining Soviet PolicyTowards Germany during the Beria Interreg-num.”Working papers are available upon request from

CWIHP, Woodrow Wilson Center, 1000 Jefferson

Drive, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20560.


The Update section summarizes items in the popularand scholarly press containing new information onCold War history emanating from the former Commu-nist bloc. Readers are invited to alert CWIHP ofrelevant citations.

Former Soviet Union

Updated, post-coup reports on status of Sovietarchives by leading U.S. specialist. (Patricia KennedyGrimsted, “Beyond Perestroika: Soviet Area Archivesafter the August Coup,” available from IREX andforthcoming in American Archivist 55, Winter 1992,and “Intellectual Access and Descriptive Standards forPost-Soviet Archives: What Is to Be Done?” IREXpreliminary preprint, March 1992.) For reviews ofpost-coup developments concerning archives, also seeVera Tolz, “New Situation for CPSU and KGB Ar-chives,” Report on the USSR 3:38 (9/20/91), 1-4; Tolz,"Access to KGB and CPSU Archives in Russia," RFE/RL Research Report 1:16 (4/17/92), 1-7; and IrvinMolotsky, “Russians Get U.S. Help On Baring SovietFiles,” New York Times [NYT], 3/11/92.

Exhibition of formerly secret records is held atthe headquarters of the former CPSU Central Commit-tee. Officials of the Center for the Preservation ofContemporary Documents say roughly one-third of thecenter’s files have been opened. Records alreadyopened include domestic departments of the CentralCommittee, but the release of foreign policy docu-ments has been slowed by a political controversy inBritain stemming from a Sunday Times article usingdiplomatic reports from the Soviet embassy in London“to seek to demonstrate a link between the oppositionLabor Party and the Kremlin.” (Michael Dobbs, “Open-ing of Soviet Party Archives Draws Crowd,” Washing-ton Post [WP], 3/3/92; Tim Sebastian, “Dialogue withthe Kremlin,” Sunday Times (London), 2/2/92.)

Former Institute for Marxism-Leninism, renamedthe Russian Center for the Study of Documents ofModern History, contains well-kept and thoroughrecords of Communist Party Central Committee that itis now making available to scholars. (“Temple to LeninOpens Its Doors to Freethinkers,” NYT, 1/22/92.)

Chadwyck-Healey, British publishing firm, an-nounces agreement with Russian Government to mi-crofilm archives of Soviet Communist Party, begin-ning with personal files of key figures such as Trotsky,Molotov, and Zhdanov. (“Files to Be Opened, FromLenin to Gorbachev,” NYT, 1/22/92; “Microfilmingthe CPSU Archives,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Lib-erty [RFE/RL] Daily Report 15, 1/23/92, 2.)

U.S. Librarian of Congress James H. Billingtonsigned an agreement with Russian archives chiefRudolph Pikhoia to create a “task force of Westernscholars” to advise Moscow on how to organize andopen Soviet archives for research. (“On the SovietPaper Trail,” WP Style Section, 11/5/91.)

Representatives from the American EnterpriseInstitute, Hoover Institution, and Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty meet Russian officials to discuss anagreement to make archival records under Russiancontrol available in the United States. (The Chronicleof Higher Education, 11/23/91.)

Soviet Foreign Ministry archives remain “virtu-ally inaccessible,” researcher complains. (GeorgyChernyavsky letter under heading “Foreign Ministryarchives,” Moscow News 41 (3496), 13-20 October1991.)

Ukraine president Leonid M. Kravchuk prom-ises Ukrainian-American scholars greater access tohistorical archives. (“Ukraine Chief Faces Hurdles In

91; “Top Kremlin Generals Criticize Revisionist Ac-count of World War II,” WP, 6/21/91.)

New evidence from Soviet and East Europeanarchives could illuminate relationship between WorldWar II and the onset of the Cold War. (R.C. Raack,“Clearing Up the History of World War II,” The Societyfor Historians of American Foreign Relations Newslet-ter 23:4 (Dec. 1991), 41-47.)

Documents reveal that the K.G.B. attempted tocover up its involvement in the imprisonment and deathof Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg. (“Soviet FilesShow K.G.B. Cover-Up In the Disappearance ofWallenberg,” NYT, 12/28/91.) See also “New Informa-tion on Raoul Wallenberg Promised,” RFE/RL DailyReport 225, 11/27/91.

Two assessments of Cold War origins: in Novayai Noveyshaya Istoria [New and Newest History] 3(May-June 1991): A.O. Chubaryan, “The Origin of theCold War in Eastern and Western Europe,” 63-67, andA.A. Yazkova, “Eastern Europe in Soviet and Ameri-can Policy (1944-1945),” 68-76.

Retired diplomat focuses on German issue inSoviet foreign policy and its impact on the escalation ofthe Cold War, 1947-1949. (V. Yerofeev, “Ten Years ofSecretaryship in Foreign Commissariat,”Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn [International Life], Sept.1991, 108-116.)

Former atomic project employee recalls Ger-mans’ contribution to the early Soviet nuclear weaponsprogram, condemns silence on this subject. (“Germans’Role in A-Bomb Project Recalled,” JPRS [Joint Pub-lications Research Service]-UMA-91-013, 5/20/91, 68-69, citing Literaturnaya Gazeta 14, 4/10/91, 5.)

Soviet ties with China and Mao Zedong, 1948-1950, analyzed on the basis of recollections and docu-ments of I.V. Kovalev, Stalin’s special envoy to theChinese Communists. (S. Goncharov, interview withKovalev, “Stalin’s Dialogue with Mao Zedong,” partone of two, Problemy Dalnego Vostoka [Problems ofthe Far East] 6 (1991), 83-93; see also S. Goncharov, M.Morozov, “A Secret Adviser to Two Leaders,”Komsomolskaia Pravda, 10/10/91, 3.)

Three-part series by scholar describes Soviet-Yugoslav relations, Tito-Stalin rift, 1948-1953. (L. Ia.[Leonid Iaonovich] Gibianskii, “Otkrytyi arkhiv. Kistorii sovetsko-iugoslavskogo konflikta 1948-1953 gg.”[Open Archive: Toward a History of the Soviet-Yugoslav Conflict, 1948-53], part one: “U nachalakonflikta: balkanskii uzel [At the beginning of theconflict: The Balkan Knot],” Rabochii klass isovremennyi mir [The Working Class and the Contem-porary World] 2 (March-April 1990), 171-85; part two:“Pervye shagi konflikta [First Steps of the Conflict],”Rabochii klass i sovremennyi mir 5 (Sept.-Oct. 1990),152-63; part three: “Vyzov v Moskvu [Summons toMoscow],” Politicheskie Issledovaniya [Political Re-search] 1 (Jan.-Feb. 1991; the journal’s name waschanged beginning with this issue), 195-207. For aroundtable discussion of the Stalin-Tito rift, see “WeAll Stemmed from Stalin’s Overcoat,” LiteraturnayaGazeta 12 (5286), 3/21/90. For an interview withGibianskii on the 1948 Soviet-Yugoslav crisis, see A.Kartzev, “How Josef Quarrelled with Josip,”Komsomoskaia Pravda, 8/7/91.

Stalin’s “main double,” a man resembling theSoviet leader who stood in for him at meetings andbanquets, dies in the southern city of Krasnodar.(“Stalin’s Double Reported Dead,” NYT, 6/16/91, APreport quoting Rabochaya Tribuna, 6/15/91.)

Arrest of Stalin’s secret police chief, described bya participant. ("Beria’s Arrest: From the UnpublishedMemoirs of Marshal Moskalenko," Moscow News 23,

UPDATEQuest for U.S. Recognition,” NYT, 9/30/91.)

A Hollywood production company, Davis Enter-tainment Television, announces that it has concluded anagreement with the KGB to bring out a series of TVmovies and feature films on Cold War espionage casesbased on secret KGB files. (“The KGB Breaks Into TheMovies,” WP Style Section, 1/17/92.)

KGB documents on Cold War mysteries are of-fered for sale to the West. (“The spies who came in forthe gold,” Guardian, 10/30/91; “KGB Sells DocumentsAbroad,” RFE/RL Daily Report 192 (10/9/91).)

Russian parliamentary commission reports guide-lines for transferring KGB files to archives; rules forrelease to public await new laws on secrecy. “The KGBarchives will be made more accessible, in theory,”Moscow News 8 (3515), 23 February-1 March 1992, 8.For further information on the KGB archives, see JonasBernstein, “Secrets of the KGB,” Insight magazine, 11/11/91, 6-9, 34-37; and Oleg Gordievsky, “The KGBArchives,” Intelligence and National Security 6:1 (Jan.1991). Gordievsky and Cambridge historian Christo-pher Andrews, co-authors of KGB: The Inside Story,have also co-edited two collections of purported KGBdocuments: Instructions from the Centre: Top SecretFiles on KGB Foreign Relations, 1975-85 (London:Hodder & Stoughton, 1991) and “More ‘Instructionsfrom the Centre: Top Secret Files on KGB GlobalOperations, 1975-1985,” special issue, Intelligence andNational Security 7:1 (Jan. 1992).

Soviet foreign intelligence head vows his agencywill disclose historical documents to scholars. (“KGBSpy War With U.S. Falls Victim to Glasnost,” WP, 10/3/91.) Outgoing Soviet foreign minister estimates halfof all diplomats posted abroad were KGB agents. (“KGBStaffed Embassies, Top Soviet Diplomat Says,” WP,11/26/91.)

Series based on formerly secret documents fromCPSU Central Committee archives alleges excesses,from secret orders by Lenin that “could be interpreted asincitement to violent actions against sovereign states,”to a perestroika-era scheme to disguise party involve-ment in hard currency money-laundering enterprisesand banks, to hidden support for “fraternal” communistparties. (Pavel Voshchanov in Moscow KomsomolskayaPravda, 10/2,3,4/91, excerpted in FBIS-SOV-91-195,10/8/91; also see “Soviet Papers Show Party Took UpShadow Capitalism,” WP, 10/8/91.)

Secrets of Lenin’s mausoleum disclosed: (A.Fyodorov, “Lenin’s Tomb: from the top down,” Mos-cow News 41 (3496), 13-20 October 1991.)

“Memorial” society, dedicated to preserving thememory of victims of Stalinism, announces plans topublish anthologies of documents and memoirs describ-ing repression in the Soviet Union between 1918 and1958. First volume, Zven’ya [Links], put out jointly byProgress Publishers and Atheneum Press, appeared inlate 1991; for a review, see Literaturnaya Gazeta, 10/30/91. (Vera Tolz, “`Memorial’ Society Launches NewSeries of Historical Anthologies,” Report on the USSR,12/13/91, 8-10.)

Recollections by former foreign minister V.M.Molotov on domestic and foreign policy during theStalin era. (Vitaly Lelchuk, “Meaningful Revelationsby Stalinist Number Two,” Moscow News 18 (3473), 5-12 May 1991, 9.)

The first volume of a projected 10-volume officialhistory of the Soviet role in World War II, whosepreparation was overseen by Dmitri Volkogonov, irksmilitary leaders at a secret March 1991 conference; therevisionist account is blasted by hardliners as “anti-communist,” and Volkogonov resigns in protest fromMilitary History Institute. (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 6/18/


17-24 June 1991, 8-9.)Documents in Soviet archives disclose Foreign

Ministry deliberations leading up to Moscow’s accep-tance of the 1955 Austrian State Treaty providing forthe departure of Soviet troops in return for Vienna’spledge to remain neutral. Writing in an Austrian dailynewspaper, historian Manfried Rauchensteiner con-cludes that Moscow did not wish to use Austrianneutrality as a wedge to divide NATO but merelywanted to assure that the country did not enter theWestern military alliance. (Die Presse, 5/11-12/91.)

Investigation discloses new details of 1957 nucleardisaster in Urals, including figures on amount of radio-activity and number of people affected. (“Chelyabinsk:Nuclear Nightmare,” ABC News Nightline, 1/31/92.)

Soviet Communist Party records disclose pay-ments of $2 million per year to the U.S. CommunistParty, according to Aleksandr A. Drosdov, editor of thenewspaper Rossiya. (“Kremlin Reportedly Gave $2Million a Year to U.S. Communist Party,” NYT, 12/1/91.) Russian prosecutors describes plans to investigatesecret CPSU funding program of U.S. party. (“Revela-tions From the Communist Files: U.S. Party Said FundedBy Kremlin,” WP, 2/8/92.)

Communist archives also reveal large-scale op-eration to counterfeit foreign passports, official govern-ment seals, immigration stamps and documents. (“So-viet Party Made Bogus Documents,” WP, 10/31/91.)

John Cairncross, a former British intelligenceagent, acknowledges being the “fifth man” in the fa-mous Soviet spy ring in Britain along with Kim Philby,Guy Burgess, Donald Maclean, and Anthony Blunt.(“A Briton Admits Spying for Soviets,” NYT, 9/23/91.)

Limited review of KGB files on Lee HarveyOswald during his stay in Soviet Union after defectingfrom the Marines depicts a discontented loner, fail tosubstantiate charge that he worked for Soviet intelli-gence. (ABC News Nightline, 11/22/91.)

First installment of Roy Medvedev’s biographyof Leonid Brezhnev, including his rise to power andhandling of tense Soviet relations with China andCzechoslovakia in the 1960s. (Roy Medvedev, “L.I.Brezhnev: The Individual and the Epoch,” DruzhbaNarodov [Friendship of Peoples] 1 (1991), 169-215.)

Former KGB official Boris Kalugin asserts thatSoviet intelligence agents questioned 3 U.S. prisoners-of-war in Vietnam in 1978, 5 years after all AmericanPOWs were supposedly released, seeking to recruitcandidates for spying against the United States. Viet-nam later confirms one interrogation in 1973; head of aRussian parliamentary commission overseeing the KGBarchives, invites U.S. historians to inspect files. (“Rus-sian Offers Americans Access to K.G.B. Files,” NYT, 1/30/92; “Vietnam Admits K.G.B. Interrogated Ameri-can,” NYT, 1/22/92; “KGB Plan ̀ Flopped,’ Ex-OfficialSays,” WP, 1/22/92; “Soviets Questioned 3 U.S. POWsin Vietnam in ’78, KGB Ex-Officer Says,” WP, 1/3/92.)For a review of reports of U.S. soldiers who allegedlydisappeared on Soviet territory: Vladimir Abarinov,“The Sad Tale of American Captives,” IndependentNewspaper, 4/10/92.

Kalugin is also reported to be involved in startinga new Russian magazine, The Red Archives, that willpublish “political commentary, fiction and previouslysecret government documents.” (“K.G.B. Telltale IsTattling, But Is He Telling U.S. All?” NYT, 1/20/92.)

Soviet diplomat recounts background to 1981incident in which Soviet submarine was discoveredintruding in Swedish waters, triggering internationalincident. (E. Rymko, “Submarine 137,”Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, Nov. 1991, 123-27.)

New details on the 1983 Soviet downing of Ko-

rean Air Lines flight 007, strengthen argument that the747 intruded into Soviet airspace accidentally ratherthan intentionally (as Moscow originally charged);transcripts of conversations with Soviet pilots wereallegedly “doctored” to support the official story. (JohnLepingwell, “New Soviet Revelations about KAL-007,Report on the USSR, 4/26/91, 9-15, citing 10-part seriesby Andrei Illesh published in Izvestia in January 1991and in English translation in FBIS-SOV-91-025, 2/6/91, 3-27, and FBIS-SOV-91-031-S, 2/14/91, 1-4.)

Soviet ambassador recalls unofficial meeting withVice President Bush in Geneva in 1984 at which Bushsuggested that Gorbachev might succeed Chernenko.(V. Izraelyan, “The Meeting That Did Not Happen,”Argumenti i Fakti (558), 7/25/91, 5.

A previously hushed-up 1985 accident on a So-viet nuclear submarine in the Pacific killed 10 personsand created a serious environmental hazard, accordingto Soviet military officials quoted by Greenpeace. (“So-viet A-Sub Blast Killed 10,” WP, 10/25/91.)

Andrei Gromyko’s career as foreign minister isanalyzed. (A. Alexandrov-Agentov, “Foreign AffairsMinister Andrei Gromyko,” Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn,July 1991, 114-25.)

Germany

The German government has published a newguide to German archives that represents the first at-tempt by the German Federal Archive in Koblenz toinclude the archives of the former East Germany. Schol-ars interested in receiving the new directory shouldwrite Prof. Hans Booms or Dr. Tilman Koops, DeutschBundesarchiv, Potsdamerstrasse 1, 5400 Koblenz Ger-many, tel.: (49) 261-5050.

Notes found in the archives of the East GermanSocialist Unity Party (SED) describe a 4 June 1945meeting in Moscow between Soviet leaders and Ger-man communists suggesting that the Kremlin’s plansfor the postwar period were predicated on the belief thattwo rival German states would emerge. Participants inthe meeting included Soviet leaders Stalin, Molotov,and Zdanov, and a German communist delegation in-cluding party head Wilhelm Pieck (who took the notes)and Walter Ulbricht, who later became prime minister.[“` Es wird zwei Deutschlands geben’: Entscheidunguber die Zusammensetzung der Kader” [“`There WillBe Two Germanies’: Decisions over the Future Lead-ership of the Cadre”], Frankfurter Allgemeine, 3/30/91,6; also see “The SED, Stalin, and the Founding of theGDR,” Das Parliament, 2/25/91, “Wart nur ab!,” DerSpiegel, 4/15/91, and the documentary, “Poker umDeutschland” [“Poker for Germany”], a co-productionof Bavarian Broadcasting and the Defa-Studio for Docu-mentary Films aired on the German television show“Report” on 3/2/91.]

Newly available East German documents shedlight on the fusion of SPD and KPD in the Soviet zoneof Germany in 1946; article by Wolfgang Malanowskidetails postwar pressures on East German Social Demo-crats to cooperate with Communists. Includes excerptsfrom Harold Hurwitz’s Fuehrungsanspruch und Isola-tion der Sozialdemokraten and Zwischen Selbsttauschung und Zivilcourage: der Fusionskampf (Co-logne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik). (Der Spiegel,9/24/90, 116, and 10/1/90, 127.)

Former SED Central Committee member’s diarypublished, containing details of maneuvering insideEast Germany party after Stalin's death. (RudolfHerrnstadt, Das Herrnstadt Dokument (Reinbek:Rohwolt Taschenbuch Verlag, 1990); see also DerSpiegel, “Walter, du hast Schuld,” 6/11/90, 126, and

“Sind wir alle Speichellecker?” 6/18/90, 126.)Interview with former 26-year Politburo veteran

discloses information on SED history, Warsaw Pact,and other matters. (Der Spiegel, 5/7/90, 53.)

Warsaw Pact documents seized from the EastGerman government by West German authorities indi-cate that as late as 1990 Soviet-bloc forces plottedoffensive military operations against Western Europein the event of war, even after political leaders an-nounced primarily defensive doctrines. (Lothar Ruhl,“Offensive defence in the Warsaw Pact,” Survival 33:5(Sept./Oct. 1991), 442-450; also Yevgeny Bovkun,“The Danger From the East: What Was It?” Izvestia, 2/5/92, 4, in FBIS-SOV-92-035, 6.)

Text of Gorbachev’s speech to SED members on7 October 1989, the 40th anniversary of the East Ger-man state, in which the Soviet leader urged the GDRleadership to be ready to make courageous decisions forchange. (Der Spiegel, 9/9/91, 107.)

Hundreds of thousands of Germans line up to readfiles of the Stasi, the East German secret police, afterthey are opened for public inspection in early January.The decision followed months of controversy and de-bate over whether to open the Stasi records and whowould be permitted to see them. Revelations from filesspark recriminations, debates. (“Bonn Closing Books,Opening Controversy,” WP, 11/13/91; “East GermansFace Pain of Redefining Pasts,” WP, 1/19/92; “Files ofEast German Secret Police Are Opened but Few SeekAccess,” NYT, 1/3/92; “`Friends’ Revealed as StasiSpies,” Guardian, 1/3/92; “Secret Files Haunting East-ern Europe,” Los Angeles Times, 1/21/92; “Game Is Up,So Informers Inform on Themselves,” NYT, 1/30/92.)

Albania

The Supreme Military Court overturns 22 deathsentences of citizens accused of “treason and terroristacts” in 1951. (Foreign Broadcast Information Service,Eastern Europe Report [FBIS-EER], 8/12/91.)

Angry crowds seize and destroy documents inArchives of Cooperatives and People’s Councils. (FBIS-EER, 8/14/91.)

Bulgaria

The weekly Reporter 7 announces a “Do YouRemember Prague, My Friend?” initiative to collectmemoirs of military officers and soldiers who took partin the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia.(FBIS-EER, 8/5/91.) The chief of the Bulgarian ArmyGeneral Staff declassifies all archives related to the1968 invasion and endorses Reporter 7’s initiative.(FBIS-EER, 8/23/91.)

The government Commission of Inquiry IntoPolice Files is working on a “white paper” on the“wrongful acts” of the state security apparatus prior toNovember 1989. Research continues despite the de-struction of 1,500 of the 1,700 archive units of theformer political police. Newspaper report alleges thatthe Soviet KGB signed an agreement with its Bulgariancounterpart to gain access to all spheres of Bulgarianlife, and includes information on the murder of GeorgiMarkov, the 1981 papal assassination attempt, andother events. (FBIS-EER, 9/5/91.)

Reporter 7 quotes an unidentified ex-colonel ofthe former state security forces as saying that journalistVladimir Kostov and emigre writer Georgi Markovwere “wasted to teach the rest a lesson,” and thatoperations to kill them must have involved the SovietKGB. (FBIS-EER, 9/6/91.)

The “umbrella murder” trial of former intelli-

UPDATE


gence chief Gen. Vladimir Todorov begins. Todorov isaccused of destroying the police file of emigre writerGeorgi Markov, murdered in London in 1978. Chargesagainst former deputy interior minister Stoyan Savovwere dropped after Savov was found shot dead. FormerKGB officer Oleg Kalugin is expected to testify thatten KGB agents carried out the murder. (FBIS-EER, 1/9/92.)

Czech and Slovak Federal Republic

Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier sees Soviet offi-cials to arrange joint investigation of Moscow’s inva-sion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, using CPSU CentralCommittee, Foreign Ministry, and KGB archives.(FBIS-EER, 9/17/91.)

Visiting Soviet foreign and interior ministerspromise Czech officials that Moscow would intensifyefforts to locate documents in Soviet archives relevantto the 1968 invasion. (FBIS-SOV-91-221, 11/15/91).

President Vaclav Havel signs controversialscreening (“lustrace”) law banning former communistofficials, secret police collaborators and former mem-bers of the People’s Militia from top state posts for thenext five years. Federal Assembly chairman AlexanderDubcek refuses to sign the law. (FBIS-EER, 10/22/91.)

In December 1991, the head of the Czech govern-ment commission to analyze the years 1967-1970received archival documents, mainly coded diplomaticmessages, from Aleksandr Lebedev, then the Sovietambassador to Czechoslovakia. (“East Europe Offer-ing Astounding Access to Official Papers,” Chronicleof Higher Education, 2/12/92.) In April 1992, Yeltsinpresented Havel with additional archival documentsfrom the CPSU Central Committee archives relating tothe 1968 invasion. (FBIS-EER, 4/3/92.) For initialfindings see "August 1968 in Staraya Ploschad Files,"Moscow News 17 (3524), 26 April-3 May 1992.

Interior Minster seeks additional information onKGB activities in Czechoslovakia from 1948 onwardsfrom Russian Interior Minister Viktor Yerin. (FBIS-EER, 4/8/92 and 4/10/92, citing Mlada Fronta Dnes, 4/8/92 and 4/8/92.)

Minutes of 9 July 1947 meeting in Moscowbetween Stalin and Czech leaders which led to thePrague reversal of earlier intent to participate in ParisMarshall Plan discussions. Document is one of a seriesto be made available by the Prague Institute of Contem-porary History and published in Bohemia. (“Stalin,Czechoslovakia, and the Marshall Plan: New Docu-mentation from Czecho-Slovak Archives,” intro. byKarel Kaplan, commentary by Vojtech Mastny.Bohemia 32:1 (1991), 133-44.)

Hungary

According to the Soviet weekly Novoe Vremya,669 Soviet officers and soldiers died in the 1956invasion of Hungary. Hungarian radio also stated that1,500 were wounded and 51 reported missing. (RFE/RL Daily Report 232 (12/12/91), 5.)

Poland

Poland’s reaction to the Marshall Plan recounted,using unpublished Polish archival sources. (SheldonAnderson, “Poland and the Marshall Plan, 1947-1949,”Diplomatic History 15:4 (Fall 1991), 473-94.)

In a recently-published memoir, The General’sDossier, Jaruzelski cites a threat by Brezhnev to invadePoland to defend his 1981 imposition of martial law.(“Many Poles Now See ’81 Martial Law as Justified,”

NYT, 12/22/91.) Two Soviet accounts detail the inva-sion plans: Leonid Kornilov, “According to GeneralDubynin, General Jaruzelski prevented the interventionof Soviet troops planned for December 14, 1981,”Izvestia, 3/16/92, 4; Maj.-Gen. (res.) Vladimir Dudnik,“‘Dark Room’ Secrets,” Moskovski Novisti 14 (4/5/92),17; reprinted in Moscow News, English edition, 15(3522), 12-19 April 1992, 13.

Jan Rokita, chairman of the Sejm’s Commissionfor Studying the Activities of the Internal Affairs Min-istry, MSW, 1981-1988, presents a report which ac-cuses the ministry of improperly investigating 98 casesof mysterious deaths and holds the ministry responsiblefor numerous unlawful acts, including murder and falsi-fication of documents. (FBIS-EER, 10/10/91.)

United States

President Bush signs legislation aimed at requir-ing declassification and publication of key State Depart-ment documents no more than 30 years after date ofcreation and giving outside historical advisory panelmore power to ensure integrity of declassification pro-cedures. (“Documents Law: 30 Years and Out,” WP, 10/31/91; Warren F. Kimball, letter, NYT, 10/9/91.)

Chairman of historians’ watchdog panel urgespassage of new law on declassification, explains politi-cal obstacles. (Warren Kimball, “Re: the State Depart-ment Historical Advisory Committee,” The Society forHistorians of American Foreign Relations Newsletter22:3 (Sept. 1991), 38-42.)

CIA panel urges faster declassification of olderdocuments. (“Panel from C.I.A. Urges Curtailing ofAgency Secrecy,” NYT, 1/12/92; “CIA Task ForceUrges Speedier Declassifications,” WP, 1/13/92. "CIAReport on Openness Classified Secret," WP, 4/23/92.)

People’s Republic of China

Chinese Historians: The Journal of Chinese His-torians in the United States devotes issue 5:1 to Chinaand the Cold War. Contact: Prof. Chen Jian, ChineseHistorians, Department of History, SUNY-Geneseo,Geneseo, NY 14454. Subs: $20/yr. (inst.), $12/yr.(individ.). Sino-American relations, 1949-50, and China'saims in the Korean War are among the topics scrutinizedin the inaugural issue (Spring 1992) of The Journal ofAmerican-East Asian Relations (Imprint Publications,Inc., 100 E. Ohio St., Suite 630, Chicago, IL 60611).Subs: $60/yr. (inst.), $30/yr. (individ.), $22/yr. (stud.).

Korean War

Publication of Mao’s cables to Stalin and ZhouEnlai sheds new light on Chinese decision to intervenein Korean War in the fall of 1950. (“Mao’s CableExplains Drive Into Korea,” NYT, 2/26/92.)

Two recent South Korean publications containingSoviet and North Korean accounts are: Korean WarResearch Conference Committee, The Historical Re-Illumination of the Korean War (War Memorial Ser-vice-Korea, 8 Yongsan-dong 1-ga, Yongsan-ku, Seoul,Korea 140-021) and Kim Chullbaum, ed., The TruthAbout the Korean War: Testimony 40 Years Later(Seoul: Eulyoo Publishing Co., Ltd., 46-1 Susoug-dong, Chongno-gu, Seoul 110-603).

Berlin Crisis

New details on construction of Berlin Wall, in-cluding deliberations of Ulbricht and Honecker, emergefrom book by Werner Filmer and Heribert Schwan,

Opfer der Mauer: Die geheimen Protokolle des Todes(Munich: C. Bertelsmann Verlag, 1991); see also DerSpiegel, 8/12/91, 102.

Interviews with Soviet officials indicate October1961 U.S.-Soviet tank standoff in Berlin was moredangerous than previously believed. (Raymond L.Garthoff, “Berlin 1961: The Record Corrected,” For-eign Policy 84 (Fall 1991), 142-56.)

Cuban Missile Crisis

Former KGB agent in Washington AlexanderFeklisov recounts meeting with ABC correspondentJohn Scali during crisis to pass message to U.S. admin-istration. (V.P. Krikunov, “The Unknown Facts Aboutthe Outcome of the Caribbean Crisis,” Voyenno-Istorichesky Zhurnal 10 (1990), 33-38.)

Khrushchev’s correspondence with Castro dur-ing the crisis. (Vestnik MID SSSR 24 (Dec. 1990).)

Ex-Soviet envoy analyzes crisis. (G.M. Kornienko,“New Facts about the Caribbean Crisis,” Novaya iNoveyshaya Istoria 3 (May-June 1991), 77-92.)

State Department releases previously classifiedKennedy-Khrushchev correspondence from Oct.-Dec.1962. (“The Cuba Missile Crisis: Kennedy Left aLoophole,” NYT, 1/7/92.) Columnists report that still-classified documents show that only in 1983 did theState Department close a loophole in the U.S. pledgenot to invade Cuba. (“Secrets of the Cuban MissileCrisis,” WP Op-Ed page, 2/2/92.)

Conference in Havana discloses new informationon missile crisis, including revelation by Soviet mili-tary official that Moscow had deployed tactical nuclearlaunchers on the island with local commanders givenpermission to use the warheads against invading U.S.soldiers. Castro takes an active part in meeting, whichgathered Cuban, American, and former Soviet officialsand scholars. (“In Letter, Khrushchev Tells Of Mock-ery Over Cuba Crisis,” NYT, 1/22/92; “Cuban MissileCrisis More Volatile Than Thought,” WP, 1/14/92; J.Anthony Lukas, “Fidel Castro’s Theater of Now,” NYTOp-Ed page, 1/20/92; Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., “FourDays with Fidel: A Havana Diary,” New York Review ofBooks 39:6 (3/26/92), 22-29.) Former CIA analystasserts U.S. intelligence knew of short-range nuclear-capable Soviet missiles in Cuba during crisis. (Dino A.Brugiono, letter, WP, 2/8/92.)

Afghanistan

Babrak Karmal and other former Communistofficials recount Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and itsaftermath, analyzing the war’s relationship to the largerCold War conflict. (Steve Coll, “Orphan of the ColdWar: The Last Battleground,” WP Magazine, 4/26/92,10-15, 24-28.)

Recently-released documents on political back-ground to 1979 Soviet decision to intervene in Afghani-stan. (D. Muratov, “Afghanistan,” KomsomolskayaPravda, 12/27/90, 3.)

Soviet decision to intervene in Afghanistan isrecounted, along with details of military operationsthere. (“How the Decision Was Being Made,” Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal [Military-Historical Journal] 7(1991), 40-52.)

KGB chief in Kabul describes events leading toinvasion. (Alexander Morozov, "Our Man in Kabul,"Novoe Vremya [New Times] 41 (1991), 32-38.

Information presented about activities of Sovietdelegation at United Nations regarding Soviet invasionof Afghanistan. (N. Ivanov, “Limited Contingent,”Literaturnaya Rossiya 4 (1/25/91), 12-15.)

UPDATE


During Senate confirmation hearings last fall, incom-ing Director of Central Intelligence Robert M. Gatespromised that the Central Intelligence Agency would bemore forthcoming in declassifying and releasing his-torical materials. To this end, Gates appointed a “TaskForce on Greater CIA Openness” to explore ways ofmaking good on this promise. That report was com-pleted in late December 1991 and its major conclusionshave since been made public in the form of a speech byGates to the Oklahoma Press Association on 21 Febru-ary 1992, although the task force report itself wasstamped “secret” and the CIA declassified a sanitizedversion (with the names of consulted individuals blackedout) in late April in response to a request from theHouse Intelligence committee. (George Lardner, “CIAReport On Openness Classified Secret,” WashingtonPost, 23 April 1992) Though the CIA as of late April hadnot formally released the documents, the Bulletin of theCold War International History Project has obtained acopy of the 15-page report as well as Gates’ respondingdirective. Excerpts of particular relevance to scholarsinterested in historical research pertaining to the CIA,as well as from Gates’ speech, appear below.

Excerpts from the task force report, dated 20 December1991

3. Many of those interviewed said the CIA wassufficiently open; all thought the CIA could do more todeclassify and make available portions of its historicalarchives, especially regarding CIA successes and sci-entific/technical accomplishments; some said the CIAwill have to work harder at explaining the need forintelligence in the post-cold war world.

All agreed that an effective public affairs programfor the CIA was necessary and that whatever changeswere made to increase openness, all would expect theCIA to keep the secrets it is charged to protect.

4. In whatever program we pursue, we should:* get our employees on board first* be consistent* be excellent* be credible—admit when we are wrong* personalize the Agency* preserve the mystique

7. We have an important story to tell, a story thatbears repeating. We are the most open intelligenceagency in the world which is proper in our form ofdemocracy. (In fact, several foreign intelligence orga-nizations have sought advice from PAO [Public AffairsOffice—ed.] on how to establish a mechanism fordealing with the public.) That said, many Americans donot understand the intelligence process and the role ofintelligence in national security policymaking. Manystill operate with a romanticized or erroneous view ofintelligence from the movies, TV, books and newspa-pers. These views often damage our reputation andmake it harder for us to fulfill our mission. There aresteps we can take which will benefit us and the Ameri-can people.

8. To increase CIA openness and signal a changein how we do business, we need to take initiatives toshare our history through the declassification of oldrecords, explain our mission and functions in a chang-ing world through an expanded briefing program withinand outside of government, and develop a strategy forexpanding our work with the media as a means ofreaching an even broader audience. Our major recom-mendations address these issues:

A. Declassifying and releasing records that de-scribe CIA’s history and activities would go a long wayto educating the public on the work of intelligence. Our

voluntary Historical Review Program has proceededvery slowly, and recent legislation (H.R. 1415) hasmandated greater access to our records by State Depart-ment historians. Presently, policy and resource con-straints severely limit the amount of historical recordsreleased by the CIA. Therefore, we recommend thatyou:

1) Establish a senior-led, Agency-wide group toreview the Agency’s policy and practices related tothe declassification and release of records under theHistorical Review and FOIA programs, as theyrelate to the changing international environmentand counterintelligence threat, and with a view toaccelerating the process.

_____Approve _______Disapprove2) Initiate in the near-term the declassification of

historical materials on specific events, particularlythose which are repeatedly the subject of falseallegations, such as the 1948 Italian Elections,1953 Iranian Coup, 1954 Guatemalan Coup, 1958Indonesian Coup and the Cuban Missile Crisis in1962. Notify the public of the availability of theresulting materials.

_____Approve _______Disapprove3) Have OTE [Office of Training & Education—

ed.] publish an unclassified version of Studies inIntelligence and make it available to the public forsale through the National Technical InformationService and have it listed in the Social ScienceIndex.

1

_____Approve _______Disapprove4) Publish compendiums of papers delivered at

conferences sponsored or cosponsored by CIA._____Approve _______Disapprove

9. In most of our discussions we defined theaudiences for greater CIA openness as the following:the media, academia, business, the private sector, gov-ernment, and our own employees. We have used thesecategories to describe our current program related toopenness which provides a context for offering ourother recommendations.

B. ACADEMIA2) Recommendations:d. Sponsor either unilaterally or in cooperation

with academic institutions or other governmentagencies conferences on the history and craft ofintelligence. PAO will work with OTE’s Center forthe Study of Intelligence on these programs.4

______Approve ______Disapprovee. Conduct more academic conferences here at

Langley. Take the successful DI [Directorate ofIntelligence—ed.] model of substantive confer-ences with the academic community and explorehow it could be valuable to S&T [Directorate ofScience and Technology—ed.] and DA [Director-ate of Administration—ed.].

______Approve ______Disapprove

[Footnotes:]1 . The Editorial Board of Studies has identified severalhundred unclassified or declassified articles and takensteps to interest scholars and publishers in them. Abouthalf a dozen university presses have expressed interest,but to date none have [sic] actively begun the editorialprocess.4. For example, PAO is currently talking with theTruman Library about a conference in late 1992 or 1993on the origins of the Intelligence Community. A similarconference with the Wilson Center is being consideredto mark the 30th anniversary of the Cuban MissileCrisis next fall. [Editor’s note: Such a proposal wasmade to the Coordinator of the Cold War International

History Project, James G. Hershberg, on 14 February1992 by James A. Barry, Director of the CIA’s Centerfor the Study of Intelligence, who had contacted CWIHPto solicit suggestions. Hershberg suggested that, ratherthan begin with a conference on CIA documentation onthe missile crisis, it might make more sense, both for thepurposes of Cold War historical research and to ad-dress straightforwardly widespread skepticism amongacademics, for the CIA to (1) declassify materials onearlier controversial events following the creation ofthe CIA, such as the Italian elections and the Iranianand Guatemalan coups; (2) declassify and publishNational Intelligence Estimates from 1947 onwards;and (3) systematically review, with a tilt towards de-classification in light of the Cold War's end, materialspreviously deleted by the CIA from volumes of the StateDepartment’s Foreign Relations of the United Statesseries. The Wilson Center did not agree to hold anymeetings sponsored by the CIA.]

Gates’ response, dated 6 January 1992:

5. Reference paragraph 8.A. (1) and (2) of thereport: The Executive Committee should establish asenior-led Agency-wide group to review CIA policyand practices related to declassification and release ofrecords under the historical review and FOIA programswith a view to accelerating the process. Additionally,this senior-level group should examine the initiation ofa program in the near term to declassify historicalmaterials on specific events as suggested by the taskforce report—a suggestion that I am inclined to support.(Further to this issue, see paragraph 18.a.) At the sametime, this group should identify what additional re-sources would be necessary to augment our efforts inboth of these areas.

6. Reference paragraph 8.A.(3): The editorialboard of Studies in Intelligence should intensify itsefforts to find a university prepared to publish unclas-sified or declassified articles from Studies in Intelli-gence. If no university has made a firm commitment bythe end of May, OTE should begin publishing compen-dia of unclassified articles from past Studies. Theseshould be made available in the same way as otherunclassified CIA publications.

7. Reference paragraph 8.A.(4): We should notpublish compendiums of papers delivered at confer-ences sponsored or co-sponsored by CIA. However,when such conferences are unclassified, we shouldindicate to participants that we have no objection totheir publishing their papers—with appropriate dis-claimers—and referencing a CIA conference. The choiceshould be up to the scholar.

11. Reference paragraph 9.B.(2): . . . I supportparticipation of Agency employees in relevant scien-tific and professional societies and approve the recom-mendation for updating procedures for individuals topresent papers in such meetings. I am not persuaded thatCIA should become an institutional member of thesesocieties. I support conducting more academic confer-ences at Langley, examining ways to continue to en-hance the program of disseminating unclassified publi-cations, and encouraging the establishment of intelli-gence studies programs at academic institutions.

12. . . .I endorse the recommendation that theCenter [for the Study of Intelligence] should sponsoreither unilaterally or in cooperation with academicinstitutions conferences on the history and craft ofintelligence.

18. I received a number of useful comments fromseveral of the addresses of this memorandum, as well asa number of others in the Agency . . . I commend you:

DOCUMENTATION


a. [name deleted-ed.] memorandum, particu-larly that part suggesting that the senior group review-ing our policy and practices relating to declassificationand release of records under the historical review andthe FOIA programs consider beyond these programswhat kinds of information, and under what circum-stances exceptions should be made. As [name deleted-ed.] says, "Mere expedience and a perceived need torespond to the Hill or press quickly should not be thedriving factor in whether we declassify information."Above all, [name deleted-ed.] contends we should beconsistent in the way that we release information.

The task force recommendations were incorporatedinto Gates' 21 February 1992 speech to the OklahomaPress Association [“CIA and Openness”; availablefrom the CIA Public Affairs Office, Office of Public andAgency Information, CIA, Washington, DC 20505;703-482-7676]. Excerpts follow.

We are under no illusions that CIA, whatever thelevel of its efforts, will be able to win recognition as an‘open’ institution. What we hope to do is all we can tobe as forthcoming, candid, informative and helpful aspossible to the public, the media and academia consis-tent with our mission and the protection of sources andmethods.

Bearing in mind these considerations, CIA willtake the following initiatives with respect to the publicand the media, the academic community, and thedeclassification of historical documents . . . .

First, the public and media. . .* For decades, CIA has had a high quality classi-

fied internal journal, Studies in Intelligence. Over theyears, many hundreds of articles have been written byintelligence professionals on every aspect of our work.I have directed the open publication of unclassifiedarticles as well as articles that can be declassified fromthis journal. As one example, I will soon release to theSmithsonian Institution such an article dealing withCIA’s role in the early development and operation ofthe SR-71. We are currently discussing with severaluniversity presses their publishing compendia of thesearticles. We also are considering publishing them our-selves and making them available to the public in thesame way as other unclassified CIA publications.

* CIA will develop additional unclassified infor-mation on the agency, its history, mission, function androle, and also will expand its briefing program forschools, civic groups and other organizations.

Second, with respect to academia: . . .* The Center for the Study of Intelligence will

sponsor, both unilaterally and in cooperation with aca-demic institutions, conferences on the history and craftof intelligence. [Ed. note: For further information con-tact: Mr. James A. Barry, Director, Center for the Studyof Intelligence, Office of Training & Education, CentralIntelligence Agency, Washington, DC 20505, tel.: (703)351-2378]

. . . Third, with respect to declassification:* CIA for years has complied with requirements to

review documents for declassification under the Free-dom of Information Act, the Privacy Act and ExecutiveOrders. Congress, in recognition of the special sensitiv-ity of intelligence operations, in 1984 passed the CIAInformation Act exempting certain categories of opera-tions, security and technical files from search and re-view under the Freedom of Information Act. In confor-mity with these laws, last year CIA received over 4,500new requests for document declassification and com-pleted action on some 4,000. Some 5,700 pages of CIAdocuments were declassified. [Ed. note: For furtherinformation or to file FOIA requests, contact JohnWright, Freedom of Information Coordinator, CentralIntelligence Agency, Washington, DC 20505.]

* Separately, CIA has had a voluntary historicalreview program since 1985 to review and declassifyhistorical CIA records. However, apart from a verylimited volume of documents declassified from the filesof CIA’s history staff and turned over to the nationalarchives, we must acknowledge that the results of ourhistorical review program have been quite meager—theconsequences of low priority, few resources, and rigidagency policies and procedures heavily biased towarddenial of declassification.

I have directed a new approach that will changethis situation while still protecting intelligence sourcesand methods and conforming to the 1984 CIA Informa-tion Act.

* I am transferring the unit responsible for histori-cal review for declassification to the Center for theStudy of Intelligence, where there will be a bias towarddeclassification of historical documents. Line compo-nents seeking to appeal a decision by the center staff todeclassify a document can appeal only to the head of thecenter and from there only to the DCI, to me.

* In this time of scarce and diminishing resources,as a measure of the priority I attach to this effort, I amdirecting the allocation of 15 full-time positions to formthe historical review unit.

* Subject to the 1984 CIA Information Act, theunit will review for declassification all documents over30 years old.

* Beyond this, the unit will review for declassifi-cation all national intelligence estimates on the formerSoviet Union ten years old or older.

* In addition to systematic review of 30 year oldand older documents, I have directed that several of thereviewers be assigned to focus on events of particularinterest to historians from the late 1940s to the early1960s so that these materials need not await their turnin the queue. Such events might include the 1954Guatemalan coup, the Bay of Pigs and the CubanMissile Crisis.

* This unit will be responsible for CIA participa-tion in preparation of the State Department’s ForeignRelations of the United States series and compliancewith related statutes governing the review of historicalmaterial.

* CIA will publish on an annual basis an index ofall documents it has declassified under all categories ofreview, including historical review.

* I am transferring custody of all documents CIApossesses relating to the assassination of PresidentKennedy to the Historical Review Program. As I havetold Senator Boren, Congressman McCurdy and Con-gressman Louis Stokes, CIA will cooperate fully andwillingly in any government-wide effort to declassifythese documents. Our ability to act unilaterally is hin-dered by the Privacy Act, sequestration of many docu-ments we have by the House Select Committee onAssassinations, and the fact that many other documentswe hold on this tragedy belong to other agencies. ButCIA will not be found lagging in any broader govern-ment effort to review and declassify these documents.

Cold War International History Project Bulletin Issue 1 (Spring 1992)Woodrow Wilson Center1000 Jefferson Drive, S.W.Washington, D.C. 20560Tel.: (202) 357-2967; fax: (202) 357-4439

Editor: James G. HershbergAssociate Editors: Angela Carter, P.J. SimmonsResearchers: Rachel A. Connell, Stephen Connors, Lena Gavruseva

DOCUMENTATION

Cold War International History ProjectWoodrow Wilson Center1000 Jefferson Drive, SWWashington, DC 20560





