Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and ...unctad.org/sections/wcmu/docs/c2clp_ige9_respart2_en.pdfCOMPILATION OF THE RESPONSES TO THE UNCTAD QUESTIONNAIRE Part II:

CONFÉRENCE DES NATIONS UNIES SUR LE COMMERCE ET LE DÉVELOPPEMENT

UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT

Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy

Geneva, 16-18 July 2008

COMPILATION OF THE RESPONSES TO THE UNCTAD QUESTIONNAIRE

Part II: Interface between Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Rights

COMPILATION OF THE RESPONSES TO THE UNCTAD QUESTIONNAIRE

Part II: Interface between Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Rights

Albania...................................................................................................................3 Andean Community ...............................................................................................5 Barbados ................................................................................................................7 Bhutan ..................................................................................................................11 Bosnia and Herzegovina ......................................................................................14 Brazil....................................................................................................................16 Bulgaria................................................................................................................23 Burkina Faso ........................................................................................................28 Colombia..............................................................................................................31 Costa Rica ............................................................................................................34 Croatia..................................................................................................................40 Czech Republic ....................................................................................................45 Denmark...............................................................................................................49 European Commission .........................................................................................54 France...................................................................................................................60 India .....................................................................................................................67 Indonesia ..............................................................................................................71 Italy ......................................................................................................................73 Jamaica.................................................................................................................78 Japan ....................................................................................................................79 Latvia ...................................................................................................................84 Pakistan ................................................................................................................88 Panama.................................................................................................................91 Peru ......................................................................................................................95 Romania ...............................................................................................................98 Russia.................................................................................................................102 Singapore ...........................................................................................................106 Slovakia..............................................................................................................111 Switzerland ........................................................................................................113 Tunisia................................................................................................................117 Turkey ................................................................................................................120 Turkey ................................................................................................................120 Uruguay..............................................................................................................128 Venezuela...........................................................................................................130 Viet Nam............................................................................................................133 Zambia ...............................................................................................................136 Zimbabwe ..........................................................................................................139

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Albania

(Kindly liaise with the National Patent Office or other relevant institution in your country if necessary) 1. How does your intellectual property rights and competition rules complement each other in enhancing dynamic efficiency and consumer welfare? 2. How is the tying and bundling of intellectual property rights examined under your competition law? Was the per se approach or the rule of reason approach applied? 3. Does your national patent office consult the competition authority when granting intellectual property rights? If yes, please elaborate. 4. Have you dealt with cases involving intellectual property rights under the abuse of dominance rules? Is dominance a criteria in the assessment of these practices? Are there any other typical business practices related to intellectual property rights that have been found to be anti-competitive in your jurisdiction? Please cite three cases including the parties, facts, legal provisions that have been violated and findings. 5. Have any of the following practices of combining several intellectual property rights resulted in anti-competitive effects in your country? Please elaborate. a. "package patents" (whereby several patents of one company are necessary for the production of a product) b. "patent thickets" (patent rights of multiple patent holders overlap) c. "cross licensing" (patent holders license their products reciprocally) d. "patent pools" (whereby patents held by various patent holders are pooled and access is granted to the pool instead of to an individual patent) 6. Is there concurrent jurisdiction between the competition authority and the patent office with regard to the enforcement of intellectual property rights? Please elaborate. 7. Has the competition authority issued or envisages issuing guidelines on the relationship of intellectual property rights and competition law? Please provide details. 8. Have there been cases in your jurisdiction where access to an essential facility has been refused on account of an intellectual property right? Please provide specific information relating to the individual cases. 9. Under what circumstances a competition law allegation against a refusal to license would be found to be valid in your jurisdiction? What remedies are possible? Can the patent holder be forced by the competition authority to grant a license? 10. Have common industrial standards that are intended to ensure interoperability created anti-competitive effects? Please elaborate.

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11. To which bilateral or international agreements concerning intellectual property rights is your country a party? 12. How has your country made use of the flexibilities provided for in TRIPS, particularly in Art. 8, 31 and 40? Please provide details.

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Andean Community (Kindly liaise with the National Patent Office or other relevant institution in your country if necessary) 1. How does your intellectual property rights and competition rules complement each other in enhancing dynamic efficiency and consumer welfare? 2. How is the tying and bundling of intellectual property rights examined under your competition law? Was the per se approach or the rule of reason approach applied? 3. Does your national patent office consult the competition authority when granting intellectual property rights? If yes, please elaborate. 4. Have you dealt with cases involving intellectual property rights under the abuse of dominance rules? Is dominance a criteria in the assessment of these practices? Are there any other typical business practices related to intellectual property rights that have been found to be anti-competitive in your jurisdiction? Please cite three cases including the parties, facts, legal provisions that have been violated and findings. 5. Have any of the following practices of combining several intellectual property rights resulted in anti-competitive effects in your country? Please elaborate. e. "package patents" (whereby several patents of one company are necessary for the production of a product) f. "patent thickets" (patent rights of multiple patent holders overlap) g. "cross licensing" (patent holders license their products reciprocally) h. "patent pools" (whereby patents held by various patent holders are pooled and access is granted to the pool instead of to an individual patent) 6. Is there concurrent jurisdiction between the competition authority and the patent office with regard to the enforcement of intellectual property rights? Please elaborate. 7. Has the competition authority issued or envisages issuing guidelines on the relationship of intellectual property rights and competition law? Please provide details. 8. Have there been cases in your jurisdiction where access to an essential facility has been refused on account of an intellectual property right? Please provide specific information relating to the individual cases. 9. Under what circumstances a competition law allegation against a refusal to license would be found to be valid in your jurisdiction? What remedies are possible? Can the patent holder be forced by the competition authority to grant a license? 10. Have common industrial standards that are intended to ensure interoperability created anti-competitive effects? Please elaborate.

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11. To which bilateral or international agreements concerning intellectual property rights is your country a party? 12. How has your country made use of the flexibilities provided for in TRIPS, particularly in Art. 8, 31 and 40? Please provide details.

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Barbados

(Kindly liaise with the National Patent Office or other relevant institution in your country necessary)

1. How does your intellectual property rights and competition rules complement each other in enhancing dynamic efficiency and consumer welfare?

Section 16 (4) of the Competition Act explains how our intellectual property rights and competition rules complement each other in enhancing dynamic efficiency and consumer welfare.

(4) An enterprise shall not be treated as abusing a dominant position (a) if it is shown that its behaviour was exclusively directed to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress and consumers were allowed a fair share of the resulting benefit;

(b) the effect or likely effect of its behaviour in the market is the result of its superior competitive performance; or (c) by reason only that the enterprise enforces or seeks to enforce any right under or existing by virtue of any copyright, patent, registered design or trademark except where the Commission is satisfied that the exercise of those rights

(i) has the effect of lessening competition substantially in a market; and (ii) impedes the transfer and dissemination of technology.

2. How is the tying and bundling of intellectual property rights examined under your competition law? Was the per se approach or the rule of reason approach applied?

It would be examined using a rule of reason approach. In such cases it would have to be demonstrated that the owner of the intellectual property right has abused its power not for the purpose of improving the production or distribution or promoting technical progress and consumers are allowed a fare share of the resulting benefit.

3. Does your national patent office consult the competition authority when granting intellectual property rights? If yes, please elaborate.

No, our national patent office does not consult the competition authority when granting intellectual property rights.

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4. Have you dealt with cases involving intellectual property rights under

the abuse of dominance rules? Is dominance a criteria in the assessment of these practices? Are there any other typical business practices related to intellectual property rights that have been found to be anti-competitive in your jurisdiction? Please cite three cases including the parties, facts, legal provisions that have been violated and findings.

The Fair Trading Commission has not dealt with cases involving intellectual property rights under the abuse of dominance rules and there are no other typical business practices that are related to intellectual property rights that have been found to be anti-competitive in our jurisdiction.

5. Have any of the following practices of combining several intellectual

property rights resulted in anti-competitive effects in your country? Please elaborate.

a) “package patents (whereby several patents of one company are

necessary for the production of a product) b) “patent thickets” (patent rights of multiple patent holders

overlap) c) “cross licensing” (patent holders license their products

reciprocally) d) “patent pools” (whereby patents held by various patent holders

are pooled and access is granted to the pool instead of to an individual patent)

No, the following practices of combining several intellectual property rights have not resulted in anti-competitive effects in our country.

6. Is there concurrent jurisdiction between the competition authority and the patent office with regard to the enforcement of intellectual property rights? Please elaborate.

No, there are no concurrent jurisdiction between the competition authority and the patent office with regards to the enforcement of intellectual property rights.

7. Has the competition authority issued or envisages issuing guidelines on the relationship of intellectual property rights and competition law? Please provide details.

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No, the competition authority has not issued or envisages issuing guidelines on the relationship of intellectual property rights and competition law.

8. Have there been cases in your jurisdiction where access to an essential facility has been refused on account of an intellectual property right? Please provide specific information relating to the individual cases.

No, there have not been any cases in our jurisdiction where access to an essential facility has been refused on account of an intellectual property right.

9. Under what circumstances a competition law allegation against a

refusal to license would be found to be valid in your jurisdiction? What remedies are possible? Can the patent holder be forced by the competition authority to grant a license? Yes, in circumstances where the patent right had to do with the provision of an essential facility good or service. Remedies include provision of access to the essential facility good or service. Yes, the patent holder can be forced by the competition authority to grant a license.

10. Have common industrial standards that are intended to ensure

interoperability created anti-competitive effects? Please elaborate.

No, there has not been any instances where common industrial standards that are intended to ensure interoperability create anti-competitive effects.

11. To which bilateral or international agreements concerning intellectual property rights is your country a party?

- Convention Establishing the World Intellectual

Property Organization - Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial

Property, 1883 as revised in 1967 - The Nairobi Treaty for the Protection of the Olympic

Symbol - The Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), 1970 - The Nice Agreement concerning the International

Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of Registration of Marks, 1967

- The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 1986

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- The Rome Convention for the Protection of Performances, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, 1961.

- The Geneva Convention for the Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication

- The Hague Convention Abolishing the Requirement of Legalisation For Foreign Public Documents, 1961

- The WTO/TRIPS Agreement on the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property.

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Bhutan (Kindly liaise with the National Patent Office or other relevant institution in your country if necessary) 1. How does your intellectual property rights and competition rules complement each other in enhancing dynamic efficiency and consumer welfare? Ans. Under the present intellectual property rights act there is no provision which deals with competition as such. However, our Industrial Property Act 2001 contains provisions on unfair competition. 2. How is the tying and bundling of intellectual property rights examined under your competition law? Was the per se approach or the rule of reason approach applied? Ans. As mentioned above there is no law on competition a yet therefore no legal provisions dealing with tying and bundling of intellectual property rights. 3. Does your national patent office consult the competition authority when granting intellectual property rights? If yes, please elaborate. Ans. At the moment we do not have competition law. 4. Have you dealt with cases involving intellectual property rights under the abuse of dominance rules? Is dominance a criteria in the assessment of these practices? Are there any other typical business practices related to intellectual property rights that have been found to be anti-competitive in your jurisdiction? Please cite three cases including the parties, facts, legal provisions that have been violated and findings. Ans. No. 5. Have any of the following practices of combining several intellectual property rights resulted in anti-competitive effects in your country? Please elaborate. i. "package patents" (whereby several patents of one company are necessary for the production of a product) j. "patent thickets" (patent rights of multiple patent holders overlap) k. "cross licensing" (patent holders license their products reciprocally) l. "patent pools" (whereby patents held by various patent holders are pooled and access is granted to the pool instead of to an individual patent) Ans. Not applicable

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6. Is there concurrent jurisdiction between the competition authority and the patent office with regard to the enforcement of intellectual property rights? Please elaborate. Ans. There is no competition authority. 7. Has the competition authority issued or envisages issuing guidelines on the relationship of intellectual property rights and competition law? Please provide details. Ans. There is no competition authority. 8. Have there been cases in your jurisdiction where access to an essential facility has been refused on account of an intellectual property right? Please provide specific information relating to the individual cases. Ans. No. 9. Under what circumstances a competition law allegation against a refusal to license would be found to be valid in your jurisdiction? What remedies are possible? Can the patent holder be forced by the competition authority to grant a license? Ans. Not applicable 10. Have common industrial standards that are intended to ensure interoperability created anti-competitive effects? Please elaborate. Ans. The issue of anti-competitive effects is moot, as we do not yet have competition law. However, the Standards and Quality Authority of Bhutan if laying down certain product standards and the issue of anti-competitive effects may arise in future when our competition law is promulgated. 11. To which bilateral or international agreements concerning intellectual property rights is your country a party? Ans. 1. WIPO convention 2. Paris Convention 3. Bern Convention 4. Madrid Agreement for International Registration of Trademarks 5. Madrid Protocal for International Registration of Trademarks

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12. How has your country made use of the flexibilities provided for in TRIPS, particularly in Art? 8, 31 and 40? Please provide details. Ans. Bhutan is not yet a member of WTO. We are now in the process of negotiating accession to WTO. We will be taking advantage of all the flexibilities under TRIPS available to least developed countries including flexibities undr Articles 8, 31 and 40.

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Bosnia and Herzegovina NOTE: Council of Competition and Intellectual Property Rights Institute of Bosnia and Herzegovina are both founded 3 years ago. Both institutions, first of all, had to work on relevant laws in order to align them with EU legislation, than to work on by-laws, etc. Till this moment, Council of Competition did not had any cases or practice related to Intellectual Property Rights, and for that reasons we can not give you answers to questions in this section. (Kindly liaise with the National Patent Office or other relevant institution in your country if necessary) 1. How does your intellectual property rights and competition rules complement each other in enhancing dynamic efficiency and consumer welfare? 2. How is the tying and bundling of intellectual property rights examined under your competition law? Was the per se approach or the rule of reason approach applied? 3. Does your national patent office consult the competition authority when granting intellectual property rights? If yes, please elaborate. 4. Have you dealt with cases involving intellectual property rights under the abuse of dominance rules? Is dominance a criteria in the assessment of these practices? Are there any other typical business practices related to intellectual property rights that have been found to be anti-competitive in your jurisdiction? Please cite three cases including the parties, facts, legal provisions that have been violated and findings. 5. Have any of the following practices of combining several intellectual property rights resulted in anti-competitive effects in your country? Please elaborate. m. "package patents" (whereby several patents of one company are necessary for the production of a product) n. "patent thickets" (patent rights of multiple patent holders overlap) o. "cross licensing" (patent holders license their products reciprocally) p. "patent pools" (whereby patents held by various patent holders are pooled and access is granted to the pool instead of to an individual patent) 6. Is there concurrent jurisdiction between the competition authority and the patent office with regard to the enforcement of intellectual property rights? Please elaborate. 7. Has the competition authority issued or envisages issuing guidelines on the relationship of intellectual property rights and competition law? Please provide details. 8. Have there been cases in your jurisdiction where access to an essential facility has been refused on account of an intellectual property right? Please provide specific information relating to the individual cases.

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9. Under what circumstances a competition law allegation against a refusal to license would be found to be valid in your jurisdiction? What remedies are possible? Can the patent holder be forced by the competition authority to grant a license? 10. Have common industrial standards that are intended to ensure interoperability created anti-competitive effects? Please elaborate. 11. To which bilateral or international agreements concerning intellectual property rights is your country a party? 12. How has your country made use of the flexibilities provided for in TRIPS, particularly in Art. 8, 31 and 40? Please provide details.

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Brazil (Kindly liaise with the National Patent Office or other relevant institution in your country if necessary)


Three laws regulate the intellectual property rights in Brazil: Law No. 9,279/96

(Industrial Property Law, also known as Patents Law); Law No. 9,456/97 (Lei de Cultivares – Patent Law for Agricultural products); and Law No. 9,610/98 (Copyright Law). These laws have as main objective, by granting property protection, to allow the due appropriation of the investments made in innovation.

There is a provision of the Competition Law that allows CADE to order the

compulsory license of a patent in case of abuse of such rights with negative effects on competition. Firms may abuse its intellectual property rights for instance by extending the rights that were granted to one product to others that do not enjoy such protection.

While intellectual property rights assure monopoly for the innovating firms, the

competition law combats its abuse. The intellectual property law aims to promote dynamic efficiency and innovation and, consequently better products to consumers that otherwise would not be reached without investments in research and development.


The tying and bundling of intellectual property rights are examined under the

rule of reason approach, since the law does not make any special reference to IP cases. The only analyzed issue is whether there is damage or the possibility of damage to the Brazilian competition environment. In this sense Competition Law, Article 20 states:

Article20.Regardless of culpability, any act in any way intended or otherwise able to produce the effects listed below, even if any such effects are not achieved, shall be deemed a violation of the economic order: I - to limit, restrain or in any way injure open competition or free enterprise; II - to dominate a relevant market of a certain product or service; III - to increase profits on a discretionary basis; and IV - to abuse one's market dominance.

3. Does your national patent office consult the competition authority when

granting intellectual property rights? If yes, please elaborate.

No.

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4. Have you dealt with cases involving intellectual property rights under the abuse of dominance rules? Is dominance a criteria in the assessment of these practices? Are there any other typical business practices related to intellectual property rights that have been found to be anti-competitive in your jurisdiction? Please cite three cases including the parties, facts, legal provisions that have been violated and findings.

Yes, CADE has already dealt with cases involving intellectual property rights. Please see the cases description below. Irrespective of whether the case involves or not intellectual property rights, dominance is always a criterion when analyzing conduct cases. Pursuant to the Brazilian Competition Law, market dominance is “presumed” when a company or group of companies holds a 20 per cent share (CADE has the authority to change the 20 per cent presumption with respect to specific sectors of the economy). Apart from the cases listed below, there are a number of ongoing investigations involving IP rights, primarily claims for sham litigation in the pharmaceutical industry.

I) The Monsanto-Cargill case1

In 1998, Monsanto decided to buy all assets related to the development of hybrid seeds (corn, sorghum, soy, wealth and sunflower) of Cargill.

Monsanto has the patent of transgenic seed production technology, which grants the monopoly – and consequently market power - of the development and commercialization of seeds resistant to glyphosate herbicides (Round-up), which is also produced by the company. Such monopoly, according to the CADE reporting-commissioner of the case, results in better conditions for the imposition of unilateral anticompetitive practices by Monsanto on the market of glyphosate-based herbicides. Starting from this premise, CADE analyzed the possibility of Monsanto to impose restrictive measures, not on the glyphosate resistant seeds market, on which Monsanto has the exclusivity of product development granted by patent, but on the sale of glyphosate-based herbicides, where competition could exist, as Monsanto patent had already been expired.

On May 2004, CADE approved the transaction, concluding that the acquisition could result in economic benefits since it allowed Monsanto to improve technology and resulted in economy of scope by joining the two researches – development of seeds and herbicides. With respect to glyphosate herbicides commercialization, CADE observed that although the concentration arising from the transaction was high, it was not enough to Monsanto to conquer - and abuse – market power, since Monsanto, in fact, had lost market share, due to the entrance of companies that offer generic versions of the glyphosate herbicide, what reduced prices.

CADE imposed a restriction on the approval of the case, prohibiting Monsanto of restricting the guarantee on the productivity of company’s seeds only for

1 Merger Case No. 08012.005135/98-01

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the farmers that used the Monsanto’s glyphosate-herbicides on the crops, in order to avoid future tying sale agreements. That is, the restrictions were supposed to avoid the time-extension of market-power granted for the herbicide patent, that had already been expired, through the control on herbicide-resistant seeds protected by patents. As a strategy already denounced in other jurisdictions, CADE could avoid the same result in Brazil explicitly restricting this strategy.

II) The Technology Licensing Agreements’ cases2

Monsanto executed many technology licensing agreements by which it licenses the use of modified genes in order to allow research institutes and seed producer companies to carry on researches on seed genes to make them resistant to herbicides. The licensed companies were the largest seed developers that owned germoplasm banks of adapted Brazilian varieties.

CADE concluded that all transactions that involve technology licensing for development, production and/or commercialization of seeds were pro-competitive since it make a ‘key-technology’ available to other market agents, which would not be otherwise possible considering the existence of the patent over the technology.

However, most of these agreements contained an exclusivity clause, under which licensees were obliged to use Monsanto’s herbicide on its test only, being forbidden, sometimes with the imposition of penalties, to use glyphosate-based herbicide offered by any other producer.

BCPS considered this clause anti-competitive, since it could provide conditions for market foreclosure and other exclusionary practices. Considering the complementarity between the transgenic seeds and the glyphosate-based herbicide, competition authorities identified a possibility of transference of Monsanto’s market power, granted by the patents it holds on the seed market, to the glyphosate-based herbicide market. Under CADE’s view, such exclusivity could restrict the development of glyphosate-based herbicides since it does not permit the tests necessary for the certification of the herbicide, what blocks the entrance/development of any agent in the market.

Another element considered by BCPS on the last processes that were analyzed refers to the fact that Monsanto was contracting with different researcher institutes and seed producers. Such institutions hold specific germoplasm banks, adapted to certain regions, climes, soils and seed varieties that are different from one institution to another. In this sense, exclusivity with one of most of the mentioned organizations, taken the cases jointly considered, would result in much worse block restrictions to the market, since some varieties and characteristics would be 100% under Monsanto control, or even all of germoplasm of the country, precluding any new entrant in the transgenic glyphosate resistant-seeds market to get the adapted variety to Brazilian market.

It is interesting to note that in the first two cases, CADE approved the transaction with the obligation for Monsanto to banish such exclusivity; on a third

2Merger Cases No. 08012.004808/2000-01 (Embrapa - Brazilian Agriculture Research Corporation), 08012.008359/2005-11 (Agroeste), 08012.003997/2003-83 (Coodetec); and 08012.009265/2005-69 (Agromen).

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case analyzed (Monsanto-Embrapa), after the release of SDE’s opinion recommending the restriction of the exclusivity clause, Monsanto decided to exclude such clause before the final decision by CADE (and then the transaction was approved without restrictions); and in the last case (Monsanto-Agromen, dated October 2005, judged on May 2006), the agreement did not contain any clause in this sense anymore. The most recent technology license agreement case, judged on June 2006, referred to the acquisition by DuPont of the intellectual property rights of a fungicide developed by Syngenta, does not also contain any exclusivity on its terms.

III) The SIM Cards case3

The only merger operation that does not involve the agriculture sector was recently approved with restrictions by CADE (Ordinary Session of October 04, 2006). The case was a merger between two European companies, Axalto Holding and Gemplus International, which produce plastic security cards and commercialize software, hardware and related services.

The analysis was mainly based on the impact of the control of key technological resources on the competition. As per the Reporting-Commissioner description “the companies that act in this market can be divided in two strategic groups: (i) the companies, as Axalto and Gemplus, that hold technological resources to compete by innovation and receive revenues not only from the sale of cards but also from technology licensing; and (ii) companies that compete on the cards sales, which are based not on innovation but on costs reduction”.

The case was also analyzed by the European Commission, which verified that the companies hold a big portfolio of patents in Europe. Based on this fact, the Commission decided to approve the merger but only under the commitment from the companies to license its intellectual property rights, since the control of such essential asset could block access to the cards market. The decision, however, is valid only on the European territory.

In Brazil, CADE found out that the use of patent is not so relevant to the Brazilian market, considering the low number of patents granted (approximately 1/100 of the European patent protection). On the other hand, the control of Axalto and Gemplus over the valid patents and the ones which can be potentially protected in Brazil due to international intellectual right treaties summed could sustain a dominant position to the parties. Based on this, CADE imposed a commitment to the companies under which they are obliged to license their patents deposited in Brazil, related to SIM cards to any interested parties that operate in the Brazilian market by any form, under fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory basis.



q. "package patents" (whereby several patents of one company are necessary for the production of a product) 3 Merger Case No.. 08012.011178/2005-71.

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r. "patent thickets" (patent rights of multiple patent holders overlap) s. "cross licensing" (patent holders license their products reciprocally) t. "patent pools" (whereby patents held by various patent holders are

pooled and access is granted to the pool instead of to an individual patent)

Please find case descriptions on question 4.


No, the National Patent Office is the only public agency in the Executive branch

responsible for enforcing IP rights. The only common point is the reference, in the Competition Law, to compulsory license of patents when demonstrated that the parties are abusing their rights and thus creating negative effects on competition.


There are no guidelines issued by the Brazilian competition authorities

concerning intellectual property rights.


No.

9. Under what circumstances a competition law allegation against a refusal

to license would be found to be valid in your jurisdiction? What remedies are possible? Can the patent holder be forced by the competition authority to grant a license?

The law provides for that a breach of competition law can be penalized by

CADE imposing a mandatory licence, along with other penalties (fines, publication of the decision in a major newspaper, prohibition to contract with the Administration, spin-offs, etc.). Such provision would particularly be appropriate in the case of an anticompetitive refusal to licence, which is also mentioned in the exemplificative list of art. 21 of the Competition Law (item XVI). However, this provision has not been applied by CADE yet. Such analysis, when required, will be done under the rule of reason approach, on a case-by-case basis.

10. Have common industrial standards that are intended to ensure interoperability created anti-competitive effects? Please elaborate.

In principle, no. Since there are no exceptions under the Brazilian Competition

Law, any strategy or behaviour from a firm may be considered anticompetitive if it can produce such negative effects.

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Brazil is a party to several multilateral agreements on Intellectual property. However, Brazil has not signed any bilateral agreements whose main subject is intellectual property. On the bilateral level, the subject only emerges as an ancillary topic in a wide range of bilateral agreements on Science, Technology and Innovation, Energy, Health, etc., as listed below:

WIPO – World Intellectual Property Organization WTO/TRIPS – Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights UPOV – International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants WHO – World Health Organization MERCOSUR European Union & MERCOSUR (bi-regional process of integration) Comunidad Andina de Naciones (CAN) – Brazil is an associated member

and accepts the CAN normative related to intellectual property. Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) – Negociation Group about

Intellectual Property Rights for the FTAA. Convention d’Union de Paris pour la Protection de la Proprieté Industrielle Bern Convention : International convention for the protection of literary and

artistic works Strasbourg Agreement Concerning the International Patent Classification Universal Copyright Convention Treaty on the International Registration of Audiovisual Works

12. How has your country made use of the flexibilities provided for in TRIPS, particularly in Art. 8, 31 and 40? Please provide details.

Brazil is of the view that the protection accorded to intellectual property rights in the TRIPS Agreement should never be taken in disregard of Articles 7 and 8, which set the objectives and principles that shall guide its interpretation. Since the entry into force of TRIPS, Brazil has enacted legislation which takes into account these flexibilities, especially, those related to the prevention of abuses of intellectual property rights by right holder as well as to the prevention of practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technology. Law No. 9,279/96 (Industrial Property Law) has a section of provisions on compulsory licenses (Section III of Chapter VIII). According to Article 68 of this law, the titleholder of a patent may be subject to having it licensed on a compulsory basis if he exercises his rights derived therefrom in an abusive manner, or by means thereof, engages in abuse of economic power, proven pursuant to law in an administrative or judicial decision. Under this article, a compulsory license may be granted in the case of: (a) non-exploitation of the object of the patent within the Brazilian territory for failure to manufacture or incomplete manufacture of the product, or also failure to make full use of the patented process, except cases where this is not economically feasible, when importation shall be permitted; or (b) commercialization that does not satisfy the needs of the market. Additionally, in cases of national emergency or of public interest, as declared in an act of the Federal Executive Power, and provided the patent holder or his licensee does not fulfill such need, a temporary and non-exclusive

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compulsory license for exploiting the patent may be granted, ex officio, without prejudice to the rights of the respective titleholder.

Finally, according to Article 21 of Law No. 8,884/94, which provides for antitrust measures, the act of taking possession of or barring the use of industrial or intellectual property rights or technology is deemed a violation of the economic order.

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Bulgaria


The Bulgarian Law on Protection of Competition “aims at ensuring protection and conditions for the promotion of competition and free initiative in the economy”, providing “protection against agreements, decisions and concerted practices, abuse of monopolistic and dominant position on the market, concentration of economic activities, unfair competition and other actions that may result in prevention, restriction or distortion of competition.” (Art. 1, (1) and (2)). There is a special provision in the LPC, stating that “This Law shall not apply to the relations falling within the scope of the legislation relating to the protection of industrial property, copyright and related rights, in so far as they are not used to restrict or distort competition” (Art.2, (2), p.1).

Violations of the LPC, involving intellectual property rights, are covered by Chapter VII of the LPC (Unfair Competition).

The provisions in this chapter lay down a general prohibition of unfair competition practices, which “contravene the good trade practice and impairs or may impair the interests of competitors in their mutual relations or in their relations with consumers” (Art.30). Therefore, the main focus of competition rules in the LPC in relation to intellectual property rights is to preserve the fair competition between competitors on the market and thus to protect consumers’ interests.

The unfair competition practices, covered by the LPC, are the following:

a. Harming the good reputation of the competitors or of their goods or services (Art. 31 LPC);

b. Misleading information or advertisement of goods or services (Art.32 LPC);

c. Counterfeit of competitors’ goods or services to the prejudice of consumers (Art. 33 LPC);

d. Unfair attraction of clients (Art.34 LPC);

e. Disclosure of industrial or trade secrets (Art. 35 LPC).

The most frequent violations in field of unfair competition, established by the CPC in 2006 and 2007, are the imitations of competitors’ goods or services (Art. 33 LPC). This article prohibits:

• “the offering or advertisement of goods or services with an appearance, packaging, marking, name or other characteristics which mislead or may mislead as to the origin, producer, seller, the way and place of production, the source and way of acquisition or utilisation, the quantity, quality, nature, consumer characteristics and other essential features of the good or service”;

• “the use of a trade names, marks or distinctive symbols identical or similar to those of other persons in a way that may result in impairing the interests of competitors and/or consumers”.

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When investigating cases under Art. 33 LPC, the CPC cooperates with the Patent Office of Republic of Bulgaria, requiring information on the holders or owners of trade names, marks, distinctive symbols, but the Commission does not involve itself with disputes on intellectual property rights.

2. How is the tying and bundling of intellectual property rights examined under

your competition law? Was the per se approach or the rule of reason approach applied?

The tying and bundling of intellectual property rights is not specifically addressed by the Bulgarian competition law.

In principle, not each violation of Bulgarian national legislation, related to the protection of intellectual property rights, automatically leads to the infringement of provisions of Art.33 LPC. An investigation under the competition law seeks to establish possible or real harmful effect on the competitors or on the consumers as a result of the violation of intellectual property rights.

3. Does your national patent office consult the competition authority when granting intellectual property rights?

The national Patent office does not have the obligation to consult the CPC when granting intellectual property rights.

The legal or natural persons, seeking a registration of trade name, mark, etc., apply for this before the Patent Office, using the legal advice of lawyers, specializing in intellectual and industrial property rights protection.


CPC Decision No 331/28.12.2006

Parties

Plaintiffs- 3 Bulgarian Cable TV operators

Against – Associations for collective management of copyrights and related rights – MUSICAUTHOR, FILMAUTHOR, THEATREAUTHOR, AGICOA, EBU CC, VPRT

Substance of the complaint: The plaintiffs claimed that the above-mentioned associations for collective management of r copyrights and related rights ights have abused their dominant position through:

-imposing directly or indirectly purchase or sale prices or other unfair trading conditions (Art. 18, p.1 LPC) – complaint from two of the three plaintiffs;

- refusal to conclude a contract when the possibilities for production or supply are available (Art.18, p.5 LPC)-complaint by the third plaintiff. Facts of the case

24

The three Bulgarian Associations for collective management of copyrights and related rights-MUSICAUTHOR, FILMAUTHOR, THEATREAUTHOR, AGICOA, EBU CC and VPRT have concluded a Memorandum for settlement of copyrights and related rights for cable transmission of TV programs. Contract for general licensing was attached to the Memorandum. This Contract grants non-exclusive licence to all willing Bulgarian cable TV operator to transmit to their clients the programs of 37 foreign TV companies, represented by EBU CC and VPRT. At the same time, under Art. 9, p.4 of the Contract for general licensing, before the conclusion of contracts for non-exclusive licence with Bulgarian cable TV operators, they should submit to MUSICAUTHOR in written Report card with detailed data on the activities, subscribers, etc. of the cable TV operator. The Report card had 6 sections to be filled with the relevant data and to be submitted on quarterly basis to MUSICAUTHOR after the conclusion of the contract.

In addition to the Memorandum, a Servicing Agreement was concluded, under which MUSICAUTHOR took the responsibility, for certain payment,

i. to conclude Contracts for general licensing with individual cable TV operators in Bulgaria,

ii. to collect the payments due by the operators under these contracts,

iii. to manage these payments on behalf of the holders of copyrights and to allocate the payments between them.

Art.6, p. 2 of the Servicing Agreement set the exact percentage of the collected payments, that was due to the different groups of copyrights holders.

Violation

CPC has ruled that MUSICAUTHOR, FILMAUTHOR, THEATREAUTHOR, AGICOA, EBU CC and VPRT are undertakings under the Law on Protection of Competition and that they hold collective dominant position as “rights holders”. In abusing this dominant position, these undertakings have imposed unfair prices for retransmission by the cable TV operators of the TV programs, covered by the Contract for general licensing. Thus, they have infringed Art. 18, p.1 LPC.

In addition, the Report Cards, required from MUSICAUTHOR, included business secrets and confidential data for the cable TV operators, without this data to be related to the subject of the contract. Thus, MUSICAUTHOR has violated also the second part of Art. 18, p.1 (“imposing of other unfair trading conditions”).

MUSICAUTHOR has also violated Art.18, p.5 LPC, refusing to conclude a contract with the third plaintiff, because the name of the company included a word, referring to the name of another undertaking, with which MUSICAUTHOR had still pending civil law case before Sofia City Court.

With its decision the CPC imposed pecuniary sanction for collective abuse of dominant position on MUSICAUTHOR, FILMAUTHOR, THEATREAUTHOR, AGICOA, EBU CC and VPRT, ordered termination of the violation with an obligation to report to the CPC in 3 months period for the steps taken to implement the CPC decision.

5. Have any of the following practices of combining several intellectual property rights resulted in anti-competitive effects in your country?

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u. "package patents" (whereby several patents of one company are necessary for the production of a product)

n.a.

v. "patent thickets" (patent rights of multiple patent holders overlap)

n.a.

w. "cross licensing" (patent holders license their products reciprocally)

n.a.

x. "patent pools" (whereby patents held by various patent holders are pooled and access is granted to the pool instead of to an individual patent)

n.a.


As already stated under p.1, on the grounds of Art.2, (2), p.1 LPC, there is no concurrent jurisdiction between the competition authority and the patent office with regard to the enforcement of intellectual property rights.

Each patent holder, for example, has the right to protect himself against violations of his rights, related to the use of the patent, submitting a complaint before the Patent office, based on the relevant provisions of the intellectual property rights legislation. The Commission on Protection of Competition is competent to open a case only when, as a result of illegal use of patent, there is potential or real negative impact on the interests of competitors or consumers.


The CPC has adopted two decisions for block exemptions of certain categories of horizontal agreements:

• Decision 118/08.07.2003 for Block exemption of certain categories of specialization agreements;

• Decision 119/08.07.2003 for Block exemption of certain categories of research and developments agreements.

These decisions cover some issues, related to the interconnection between protection of intellectual property rights and competition rules (restrictive agreements). The CPC decisions were adopted during the negotiation process for accession of Bulgaria to EU and they fully comply with EU competition rules (Council Regulation (EC) No 2658/2000 of 29 November 2000 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of specialisation agreements and Commission Regulation (EC) No 2659/2000 of 29 November 2000 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of research and development agreements).


26

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32000R2659:EN:NOT

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32000R2659:EN:NOT

There are no CPC cases where access to an essential facility has been refused on account of an intellectual property rights.

9. Under what circumstances a competition law allegation against a refusal to license would be found to be valid in your jurisdiction? What remedies are possible? Can the patent holder be forced by the competition authority to grant a license?

See p.4

10. Have common industrial standards that are intended to ensure interoperability created anti-competitive effects?

n.a.


Bulgaria is a party to the Paris convention and TRIPS.

• Marks – Under the Madrid Agreement and the annexed Protocol, a mark can be registered by the International bureau of WIPO. An international registration of a mark, for which Bulgaria was included, has the same effect as if this mark was directly registered in Bulgaria;

• Appellation of origin – international registration of appellations of origin stands for registration, made in the International bureau under the Lisbon Agreement;

• Community mark – stands for a mark, registered in the Office of Harmonization of the Internal Market under Regulation 40/90/EC. The Community mark is valid on the territory of Bulgaria.

12. How has your country made use of the flexibilities provided for in TRIPS, particularly in Art. 8, 31 and 40?

n.a.

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Burkina Faso

1. Dans quelle mesure les droits de propriété intellectuelle et la politique de concurrence se complètent-ils mutuellement pour améliorer l’efficience dynamique et le bien être des consommateurs dans votre pays ?

Les droits de propriété intellectuelle et la politique de concurrence sont des notions voisines qui se ressemblent et donc se complètent mutuellement. Dans certains cas, les interdictions contenues dans le droit de la propriété intellectuelles se retrouvent dans le droit de la concurrence et constituent parfois des pratiques anticoncurrentielles ; ce que combattent les autorités compétentes. Toute fois, elles sont admises si elles ont un caractère ouvert,

2. Comment la vente liée et le groupage des droits de propriété intellectuelle

sont-ils examinés par votre législation sur la concurrence ? Les approches d’interdiction perse ou basées sur la règle de la raison ont-elle été appliquée ?

Les ventes liées peuvent être considérées comme des abus de position dominante, donc des pratiques anticoncurrentielles dans la mesure ou la législation de la concurrence burkinabé (loi n° 15) stipule que les abus de position dominante peuvent notamment consister en des refus de vente, en des ventes liées… Toute fois, il existe une exemption (article 8 ) où ces pratiques ne doivent imposer des restrictions à la concurrence que dans la mesure où elles sont indispensables pour atteindre l’objectif de progrès.

3. L’autorité nationale chargée des brevets consulte-t-elle l’autorité chargée de la

concurrence lorsqu’elle accorde des droits de propriété intellectuelle ? dans l’affirmation, prière de développer votre réponse. Comment évaluez-vous la position dominante et quels sont les critères que vous utilisez à cet effet ?

Aucune consultation n’a été faite jusqu’à présent par l’autorité chargée des

brevets.

4. Avez-vous traité des cas impliquant les droits de propriété intellectuelle dans le cadre des règles qui régissent l’abus de position dominante ? La domination est-il un critère dans l’examen de ces pratiques ? Existe-t-il d’autres pratiques typiques des affaires relatives à la propriété intellectuelle qui ont été qualifiées d’anticoncurrentielles dans votre juridiction ? Prière de citer ces cas en indiquant les parties, les dispositions pertinentes de la loi qui ont été violées et les conclusions qui ont résulté de leurs examens.

Non. La domination n’est pas un critère suffisant dans l’examen. Il faut qu’il ait abus. Le cas d’autres affaires ne s’est pas encore présenté.

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5. Les pratiques suivantes qui impliquent la combinaison de plusieurs aspects du droit de la propriété intellectuelle ont-elles eu des effets anticoncurrentiels dans votre pays ? Prière de développer votre réponse.

a) Package patents (mécanisme par lequel plusieurs brevets

d’une société sont nécessairement à la fabrication (rentrant dans la fabrication) d’un produit-) ;

b) Patent thicks (les droits de plusieurs titulaires (détenteur) de

brevets se chevauchant ;

c) Cross licensing le croisement des licences (détenteurs de brevet s’accordent des droits réciproques sur leur produit) ;

d) Patent pools Le pool des brevets (mécanisme qui permet à

plusieurs titulaires de brevets de mettre en commun leur brevet, de manière à les licencier conjointement plutôt qu’individuellement).

Cas ignorés.

6. Existe –t-il une juridiction concurrente entre l’autorité de concurrence et l’office de brevet dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre des droits de la propriété intellectuelle ? Prière de développer votre réponse.

Non

7. L’autorité de concurrence a-t-elle (ou envisage-t-elle) publié des directives sur

les relations entre la politique de la concurrence et les droits propriétés intellectuelle ? Prière de donner des détails. informations spécifiques sur ces cas.

Non

8. Votre juridiction a-t-elle eu à connaître des affaires où l’accès à une facilité

essentielle a été refusé en invoquant les droits de propriété intellectuelle ? Prière de donner des informations spécifiques sur ces cas.

Ce cas ne s’est pas réalisé

9. Dans quelle circonstance, en vertu de la législation sur la concurrence, une

allégation sur le refus de licence peut être considérée comme recevable dans votre juridiction ? Quelles mesures correctives proposez-vous dans cette perspective ? Un détenteur de brevet peut-il être forcé d’accorder une licence par l’autorité de concurrence ?

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Ce problème n’est pas connu au niveau de l’autorité de la concurrence du Burkina Faso ; mais au niveau des tribunaux.

10. Votre juridiction a-t-elle eu à traiter des affaires où les mesures industrielles

communes dont l’objectif est d’assurer l’interopérabilité ont eu des effets anticoncurrentiels.

Non

11. Quels sont les accords bilatéraux, régionaux ou multilatéraux dont votre pays est parte ?

Il s’agit de l’OAPI, OMAPI

12. Quel usage votre pays a-t-il fait de la flexibilité contenue dans les ADPIC en particulier les articles 8, 38 et 40 de cet accord ? Prière de donner plus de détails.

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Colombia First, it is important to mention that the Superintendencia is not in charge of the Copyright System.

1. How do your intellectual property rights and competition rules complement each other in enhancing dynamic efficiency and consumer welfare?

A//. Article 49 of Law Decree number 2153 of 1992 establishes that conducts whose purpose is cooperation in R&D and development of new technology will not be considered an illegal restriction of competition. 2. How is the tying and bundling of intellectual property rights examined under


A//. There is no special legal treatment of such issues. Besides, there is no strictly per se rule or rule of reason analysis in our system. We have a system that analyzes facts, agent participation, and the purpose and effects of the conduct when the activity falls under articles 47 to 50 of the above mentioned rule 2153.


granting intellectual property rights? If yes, please elaborate. A//. Our national patent office does not consult with the competition authority before granting intellectual property rights

4. Have you dealt with cases involving intellectual property rights under the

abuse of dominance rules? Is dominance a criterion in the assessment of these practices? Are there any other typical business practices related to intellectual property rights that have been found to be anti-competitive in your jurisdiction? Please cite three cases including the parties, facts, legal provisions that have been violated and findings.

A//. The answer is no to the first and third part of the questions. We have not dealt with such cases. Regarding the second part of the question, it must be indicated that abuse of dominance could be the criterion for assessment of such practices if its conditions are met. 5. Have any of the following practices of combining several intellectual property

rights resulted in anti-competitive effects in your country? Please elaborate.

31

y. "package patents" (whereby several patents of one company are necessary for the production of a product)

z. "patent thickets" (patent rights of multiple patent holders overlap) aa. "cross licensing" (patent holders license their products reciprocally) bb. "patent pools" (whereby patents held by various patent holders are


A//. No. It has never happened.


A//. There is no such concurrent jurisdiction.


A//. No, the agency has not issued guidelines regarding the relationship between intellectual property rights and competition law, and is not envisaging issuing it. 8. Have there been cases in your jurisdiction where access to an essential facility

has been refused on account of an intellectual property right? Please provide specific information relating to the individual cases.

A//. No.


A//. We have no precedents in such matter.

10. Have common industrial standards that are intended to ensure interoperability

created anti-competitive effects? Please elaborate. A//. There is a legal rule in Article 49 of Law Decree 2153 of 1992 that establishes that agreements regarding voluntary common standards are deemed to be legal as long as they do not prevent new entry into a market.

11. To which bilateral or international agreements concerning intellectual property

rights is your country a party? A//. - Andean Community.

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-WTO –> TRIPS. - WIPO. - Patent Cooperation Treatment. PCT.

- Washington Convention, 1929. - Convention on Industrial Property with France, 1901. -Free Trade Agreement among the governments of Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela, 1994. Paris Convention, 1883.

12. How has your country made use of the flexibilities provided for in TRIPS,

particularly in Art. 8, 31 and 40? A//. The country has issued the legal framework to use these flexibilities, but there have not been particular cases under these regards.

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Costa Rica (Kindly liaise with the National Patent Office or other relevant institution in your country if necessary)


Nuestro país se encuentra dentro de aquellos orientados hacia la conciliación entre

protección de la propiedad intelectual y aplicación de las normas antimonopolio

en busca del bienestar del consumidor.

En los últimos años se han diseminado normas que regulan los DPI a nivel

doméstico como mundial, fenómeno que ha sido impulsado por la importancia de

la tecnología como factor productivo, además del empleo de marcas como signo

distintivo de un producto dentro de un mercado, estimulado por los procesos de

integración económica y el comercio internacional.

Siguiendo esa línea de razonamiento, y en desarrollo del artículo 47 constitucional

existen leyes en nuestro país tales como: la Ley Nº 7978 del 06/01/2000, Ley de

Marcas y Otros Signos Distintivos, Ley Nº 6683 del 14/10/1982, Ley sobre

Derechos de Autor y Derechos Conexos y la Ley Nº 6867 del 25/04/1983, Ley

sobre Patentes de Invención, Dibujos y Modelos Industriales y Modelos de

Utilidad, entre otras.

La Ley Nº 7979 del 06/01/2000, “Reforma a Ley sobre Derechos de Autor y

Derechos Conexos y a la Ley de Patentes de Invención, Dibujos y Modelos

Industriales”, establece en su artículo 2 lo siguiente:

“ARTÍCULO 2.- Reformase la Ley de patentes de invención, dibujos y modelos industriales y modelos de utilidad, No. 6867, de 25 de abril de 1983 y sus reformas, en las siguientes disposiciones: a) b) (...) f) Los artículos 19 y 20, cuyos textos dirán: Artículo 19.- Licencias obligatorias de patentes dependientes y licencias obligatorias por prácticas anticompetitivas.

34

A. (...) B.- Licencias obligatorias por prácticas anticompetitivas 1.- Serán otorgadas licencias obligatorias cuando la Comisión para Promover la Competencia determine que el titular de la patente ha incurrido en prácticas anticompetitivas. En estos casos, sin perjuicio de los recursos y audiencias que le competan al titular de la patente, la concesión se efectuará sin necesidad de que: a) El potencial licenciatario haya intentado obtener la autorización del titular según el párrafo 6) del artículo 18 de la presente ley. b) Sea para abastecer el mercado interno. 2.- No obstante lo dispuesto en el inciso a) del párrafo 1 de este artículo, el titular de la patente objeto de la licencia deberá ser notificado cuando sea razonablemente posible. 3.- Para los fines de la presente ley, se considerarán prácticas anticompetitivas, entre otras, las siguientes: a) La fijación de precios excesivos o discriminatorios de los productos patentados. b) La falta de abastecimiento del mercado en condiciones comerciales razonables. c) El entorpecimiento de actividades comerciales o productivas.

Los derechos que se otorgan de manera temporal a los creadores e inventores, se

consideran excepciones a la aplicación de normas antimonopolio. No obstante,

esta atribución de exclusividad jurídica, le confiere a sus titulares el poder de

ocupar una posición de dominio sobre el mercado relevante. Posición que puede

verse fortificada si hay ausencia de tecnologías y productos análogos que

establezcan límites viables en ese mercado.

El abuso de esa posición de dominio puede a la larga derivar en insuficiencias en

materia de distribución, amén de que todos los beneficios generados por los

derechos de propiedad intelectual están conectados directamente con la duración

del alcance de esos derechos.

En otras palabras, si los DPI tienen un amplio plazo de agotamiento, el abuso de

esa posición dominante se va a proyectar con mayores daños a la competencia

durante un tiempo considerable tiempo. Y acá es donde es oportuno, por lo menos

insinuar por ahora, que el determinar la duración y el alcance de los DPI, no es

una función de una agencia u organismo de competencia, baste por ahora indicar

eso si, que una política de competencia sustentada en un marco legal eficaz,

contribuye a limitar la extensión del dominio sobre los DPI, evitando que ese

dominio no sea excesivamente amplio, ni que tampoco vaya a ser manejado como

un vehículo que sirva de abuso y se haga extensivo a otros mercados no conexos.

35

El reconocimiento de la aportación de la protección de la propiedad intelectual al

fomento del crecimiento económico es uno de los principales objetivos del

Acuerdo sobre los aspectos de los derechos de propiedad intelectual relacionados

con el comercio que se negoció en la Ronda Uruguay.

En ese Acuerdo se establecieron normas mínimas comunes de protección y

aplicación de los derechos de propiedad intelectual en el sistema internacional de

comercio que son obligatorias para todos los países miembros. Se dispone

expresamente que la protección y la aplicación de los derechos de propiedad

intelectual deben contribuir a la promoción de la innovación tecnológica y a la

transferencia y difusión de la tecnología (arts. 7 y 8).

Los derechos de propiedad intelectual deben ejercerse en beneficio mutuo de los

productores y los usuarios de conocimientos tecnológicos y de una manera que

favorezca el bienestar social y económico y establezca un equilibrio entre los

derechos y las obligaciones. Amén de que en el Acuerdo se enuncia expresamente

la función de la política de la competencia para conseguir que los derechos de

propiedad intelectual fomenten el crecimiento económico y la innovación:

"Ninguna disposición del presente Acuerdo impedirá que los miembros

especifiquen en su legislación las prácticas o condiciones relativas a la concesión

de licencias que puedan constituir en determinados casos un abuso de los derechos

de propiedad intelectual que tenga un efecto negativo sobre la competencia en el

mercado correspondiente" (art. 40.2).

Se reconoce a los países miembros la posibilidad de "adoptar, de forma

compatible con las restantes disposiciones del presente Acuerdo, medidas

apropiadas para impedir o controlar dichas prácticas... a la luz de las leyes y

reglamentos pertinentes de ese miembro".

2. How is the tying and bundling of intellectual property rights examined

under your competition law? Was the per se approach or the rule of reason approach applied?

36

La Ley que norma el tema relacionado con competencia no tipifica de manera especial las conductas relacionadas con los derechos de propiedad. De tal manera que el análisis de estas conductas anticompetitivas relacionadas con estas derechos se analizarán bajo la regla per se si puede considerarse un acuerdo horizontal y bajo la regla de la razón si se consideran restricciones verticales. Sobre el control de las fusiones se podría decir que el enfoque dado es cuando la adquisición de una empresa por otra supone la concesión de licencias de derechos de propiedad industrial, estas licencias se considerarán accesorias de la transacción principal si no son excluyentes y su concesión no se limita a un territorio determinado. Ahora, específicamente en el tema de derechos de autor se analiza que: 1. Que los derechos exclusivos sean agotados en un plazo razonable. 2. Que exista la posibilidad de una regulación de abusos de derechos de propiedad intelectual asociados la existencia de una posición dominante u otras distorsiones de la competencia, como por ejemplo, la limitación o caducidad de títulos ejercitados de manera abusiva; y 3. Lo anterior es importante de considerar ya que por su propia naturaleza, los derechos de propiedad intelectual otorgan derechos exclusivos, de carácter temporal, que mientras están en vigor aseguran un monopolio o cuasi-monopolio al titular y frustran, por tanto la libre competencia. El ejercicio de esos derechos, si no se efectúa dentro de límites razonables, pueden conducir a una fragmentación de los mercados con la consecuente discriminación en el acceso a los productos patentados y en la fijación de precios.



No, la Oficina Nacional de Patentes no tiene que consultar a la autoridad de competencia cuando otorga derechos de propiedad intelectual.


abuse of dominance rules? Is dominance a criteria in the assessment of these practices? Are there any other typical business practices related to intellectual property rights that have been found to be anti-competitive in your jurisdiction? Please cite three cases including the parties, facts, legal provisions that have been violated and findings.

37

En relación con temas de propiedad intelectual, la Comisión para Promover la Competencia no ha resuelto ningún caso. En la actualidad se encuentra en estudio el primer caso relacionado con este tema.



cc. "package patents" (whereby several patents of one company are necessary for the production of a product)

dd. "patent thickets" (patent rights of multiple patent holders overlap) ee. "cross licensing" (patent holders license their products

reciprocally) ff. "patent pools" (whereby patents held by various patent holders

are pooled and access is granted to the pool instead of to an individual patent)

En los temas de propiedad intelectual, la agencia de competencia ha analizado pocos casos, de hecho en este momento se está en formación en el análisis de este tipo de casos, en ese sentido de los casos planteados no se cuenta con estudios similares.

6. Is there concurrent jurisdiction between the competition authority and

the patent office with regard to the enforcement of intellectual property rights? Please elaborate. Existe un control cruzado entre el Registro Público, ente encargado de la regulación de los temas de propiedad intelectual y la Comisión para Promover al Competencia, en el caso específico de licencias obligatorias.


No en este momento se trata de tener un acercamiento con las autoridades del Registro de Propiedad Intelectual, con el fin de tener una comunicación estrecha y una mayor coordinación con esa entidad, que permita una participación oportuna de esta agencia en aquellos casos en que pueda estarse dando abusos.


38

En el tema de acceso a facilidades esenciales solamente tenemos casos en el campo de telecomunicaciones, específicamente de televisión por cable e Internet.

9. Under what circumstances a competition law allegation against a refusal

to license would be found to be valid in your jurisdiction? What remedies are possible? Can the patent holder be forced by the competition authority to grant a license?

La única regulación que tenemos en esta material es la señalada en la pregunta No. 6, en el campo de patentes.

10. Have common industrial standards that are intended to ensure

interoperability created anti-competitive effects? Please elaborate.

No se cuenta con estas herramientas e información. 11. To which bilateral or international agreements concerning intellectual

property rights is your country a party?

El acuerdo comercial con Estados Unidos, México, Chile, OMC, CARICOM y Panamá.


particularly in Art. 8, 31 and 40? Please provide details.

Este aspecto ha sido reflejado en los textos de los tratados de libre comercio, específicamente, en el Cafta. En lo que respecta en materia de competencia no se ha aplicado, pero existe una provisión en la legislación que ya fue citada.

39

Croatia (Kindly liaise with the National Patent Office or other relevant institution in your country if necessary)


There is no direct reference to intellectual property rights in the Competition Act. However, in the bylaws regulating competition there are several provisions related to intellectual property rights. For example, Regulation on block exemption granted to certain categories of horizontal agreements(between undertakings operating on the same level of production or distribution chain) envisages in Article 3, Paragraph 5 the application of block exemption to the provisions contained in specialization agreements, which do not constitute the primary object of such agreements, but are directly related and necessary for their implementation, such as those concerning the assignment or use of intellectual property rights. The Article 11, Paragraph 1, point b) provides that the block exemption shall not apply to research and development agreements which, directly or indirectly, in isolation or in combination with other factors under the control of the parties, have as their object the prohibition to challenge after completion of the research and development the validity of intellectual property rights which are relevant to the research and development or, after the expiry of the research and development agreement, the validity of intellectual property rights which protect the results of the research and development, without prejudice to the possibility to provide for termination of the research and development agreement in the event of one of the parties challenging the validity of such intellectual property rights. The Regulation on block exemption granted to certain categories of technology transfer agreements is applicable to patent licensing agreement, a know-how licensing agreement, a software copyright licensing agreement or a mixed patent, know-how or software copyright licensing agreement, including any such agreement containing provisions which relate to the sale and purchase of products or which relate to the licensing of other intellectual property rights or the assignment of intellectual property rights, provided that those provisions do not constitute the primary object of the agreement and are directly related to the production of the contract products. For certain issues which are not included in the relevant Croatian legislation, EC Guidelines on technology transfer agreements is also taken into account.



The tying and bundling of intellectual property rights is not included in the competition law.

40



No. It has not been practice so far.


The Competition Agency has dealt so far only with one abuse of dominance case which involved intellectual property rights. This was not the typical case in the sense that there was no formal proceeding initiated but there was the commitment signed by the company Microsoft upon the request of the Competition Agency. In the mentioned commitment, the undertaking Microsoft committed itself to respect the competition rules in the territory of the Republic of Croatia, in compliance with the conditions and obligations imposed by the European Commission in its decision 2007/53 EC of 24 March 2004 which was upheld by the judgement of the Court of First Instance of 17 September 2007. The undertaking Microsoft, thus, is obliged to ensure: - the disclosure of the relevant Windows Server Protocol specifications to all undertakings in the market within the territory of the Republic of Croatia on the basis of non-discriminatory use and on equal terms applicable on the undertakings within the EU; - obtaining the existing Windows XP and Windows Vista operating systems without Windows Media Player in all languages obtainable in the EU in a non-discriminatory manner by offering 2 versions of Windows at the same price, - availability in Croatian of a new version of Windows XP and Windows Vista operating systems without Windows Media Player. In addition, there were few expert opinions issued by the Competition Agency, on the topic of the use of trademark and parallel import of the branded products. The undertakings protect their products with trademarks and thus, protect their national territory from the imports. From the competition point of view, the prohibition of active and passive sale is considered as hard core restriction of competition because it can lead to the absolute territorial protection of certain distributors. The absolute territorial protection of distributors can as a consequence create a dominant position and the possiblity for those distributors to raise prices. However, if there is a parallel import of products by passive sale on the same geographical market where, for the same type of products, exclusive distributor is already active, then such parallel import would be compatible with competition rules. Hence, the business practice of protecting national territory with products with trademarks represents the only possible conflict between the competition law and

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intellectual property rights encountered so far in the practice of the Competition Agency. 5. Have any of the following practices of combining several intellectual property


gg. "package patents" (whereby several patents of one company are necessary for the production of a product)

hh. "patent thickets" (patent rights of multiple patent holders overlap) ii. "cross licensing" (patent holders license their products reciprocally) jj. "patent pools" (whereby patents held by various patent holders are


No. The above mentioned practices have not been subject of any competition case dealt with by the Competition Agency.


The enforcement of intellectual property rights is exclusively in the competence of the Patent Office (State Intellectual Property Office of the Republic of Croatia).


So far, considering a small amount of cases in this area, the drafting and issuing of such guidance has not been planned in the Competition Agency.

8. Have there been cases in your jurisdiction where access to an essential facility


None of the competition cases related to access to an essential facility dealt with by the Competition Agency were connected to the intellectual property rights.


The Regulation on block exemption granted to certain categories of technology transfer agreements which is fully in line with relevant EU legislation, regulates to a certain extent licensing agreements. In order for this Regulation to apply, the licence from the agreement has to deal with production of the products. If the agreement refers to other forms of know-how (for instance, distribution know-know), then other competition Regulation on horizontal or vertical agreements would apply.

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Furthermore, the Regulation on technology transfer agreements determines hard core restrictions of competition which licensing agreements should not contain. Among those prohibited restrictions is the restriction of the licensee's ability to exploit its own technology or the restriction of the ability of any of the parties to the agreement to carry out research and development, unless such latter restriction is indispensable to prevent the disclosure of the licensed know-how to third parties. In case, this restriction would be determined in the proceeding by the Competition Agency, the general sanctions for the breach of Competition Act would apply as a remedy. The damages could be also sought by the claim to the Commercial Court. It should be also noted that the Regulation on technology transfer agreements sets the method of calculating market shares of the parties relevant for determining block or individual exemptions of licensing agreement. In the case of the relevant product market, the licensee's market share is to be calculated on the basis of the licensee's sales of products incorporating the licensor's technology and the sales of their substitutes on the relevant market. Where the licensor is also a supplier of products on the relevant product market, the licensor's sales on the product market in question must also be taken into account in the calculation of his market share. Finally, the patent holder could be forced by the decision of the Competition Agency to grant a licence only if a patent holder is an undertaking in a dominant position and the refusal to grant the licence would amount in preventing the licensee to access the market applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other undertakings, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage which is a prohibited abuse of a dominant position. In order to prevent such a possible abuse, the Competition Agency initiated the commitment of undertaking Microsoft as described in answer to the question No.4. in this part of the questionnaire.


created anti-competitive effects? Please elaborate.

In order to ensure interoperability without anti-competitive effect, the Competition Agency initiated Microsoft’s commitment which included the reference to the interoperability (please see, the explanation under Question 4 of this part of the Questionnaire).


Croatia is a member to all relevant international agreements concerning intellectual property rights:

f. Paris Convention for the protection of Industrial Property g. WIPO Convention h. Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks i. Washington Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated

Circuits j. European Patent Convention k. Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of

Microorganisms for the Purposes of Patent Procedure

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l. Strasbourg Agreement Concerning the International Patent Classification

m. Trademark Law Treaty n. Treaty on Commercial aspects of the Intellectual Property Rights

(TRIPS) o. Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods

and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks p. Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the

International Registration of Marks q. Vienna Agreement Establishing an International Classification of the

Figurative Elements of Marks r. Nairobi Treaty on the Protection of the Olympic Symbol s. Hague Agreement Concerning the International Registration of

Industrial Designs t. Patent Law Treaty u. Locarno Agreement Establishing an International Classification for

Industrial Designs. 12. How has your country made use of the flexibilities provided for in TRIPS,

particularly in Articles 8, 31 and 40? Please provide details. The details of TRIPS are in sole competence of the Ministry of Economy and State Intellectual Property Rights Office. Here we would refer to the official web site of the State Intellectual property rights Office- http://www.dziv.hr/en/

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http://www.dziv.hr/en/

Czech Republic

(Kindly liaise with the National Patent Office or other relevant institution in your country if necessary)


In general, innovation is regarded as pro-competitive. The existence of rights guaranteed to a holder of intellectual property rights is not vulnerable by the act on protection of competition. The important moment in the Office’s acting is to correctly define the boundaries between what the very existence of the patents is and what the administration of law is in a particular case. In case the use of industrial rights becomes the subject, means or result of certain actions, e.g. agreements infringing the competition, the IPR holder may be prohibited from acting in this way.

In April 2006 the European Parliament and EU Council Directive No. 2004/48/EC from April 29, 2004 on enforcement of intellectual property rights was implemented into the Czech legal system. One aim of the new legal regulation is, among others, to unify the means of industrial rights protection for all subjects of intellectual property rights without affecting the rules of competition.



The Office’s experience with intellectual property rights protection and possible impact of this protection on competition are above all from merger assessment cases. When assessing a merger of undertakings the Office, in accordance with Council Regulation No. 139/2003, on merger control, takes into account all reasoned and possible benefits the assessed merger should bring (so-called efficiencies). One benefit of the planned merger may also be the so-called dynamic efficiency, i.e. the achievement of an optimal level of innovation, development and creation of new products, all of which increase consumers´ welfare. The fact that the Office, when assessing a merger, takes into account research and development, is embodied in the Czech Act on the protection of competition. An explicitly specified fact is here “research and development which results in the consumer welfare and do not restrict an effective competition”.


No.


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According to the Czech competition act one of the forms of abusing a dominant position is among others a refusal of access to intellectual property rights. It is possible to apply to this area the so-called Essential facilities doctrine where the access to these rights is necessary for other competitors’ participation in the market. The Office has not conducted any case of abuse of dominant position relating to intellectual property rights issue so far.

5. Have any of the following practices of combining several intellectual property


kk. "package patents" (whereby several patents of one company are necessary for the production of a product)

ll. "patent thickets" (patent rights of multiple patent holders overlap) mm. "cross licensing" (patent holders license their products

reciprocally) nn. "patent pools" (whereby patents held by various patent holders are


The Office has not come across these practices so far.


The central body of the Czech Republic state administration for protection of industrial property is the Office for Industrial Property which fulfils above all a function of patent and trademark office. The protection of competition is performed exclusively by the Office for the Protection of Competition. The scopes of activity of both the institutions are clearly defined and the competences do not collide.


No. 8. Have there been cases in your jurisdiction where access to an essential facility


No.


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Provided the refusal to license is connected with the violation of competition act (e.g. abuse of dominant position in the form of constraint of access to research or refusal of access to the so-called Essential facilities), the Office may intervene. When the violation of the competition act takes place, the Office may in addition to the fine impose also remedial measures. This remedial measure can be the duty to grant a licence.



Provided those standards lead in their results to an increase of consumers’ welfare and not to elimination of competition from the market or were not connected to other circumstances such as fixing of product prices, they will not in general lead to constraint of competition.


rights is your country a party?

The Czech Republic is member of World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) which is an important international organization in intellectual property protection field and contractor of many multilateral international treaties on protection of industrial property administrated by this organization. Furthermore, the Czech Republic is member of European Patent Organization (EPO) and contractor of European Patent Convention which is administered by EPO. It is also contractor of Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) administered by World Trade Organization. Regarding the most important agreements relating to intellectual property where the Czech Republic is contractor of treaty it is possible to mention the following:

Treaty on establishment of World Intellectual Property Organization signed in Stockholm on June 7, 1967, changed on October 2, 1979 (edict No. 69/1975 Coll., as amended by edict No. 80/1985 Coll.).

Paris treaty on industrial property protection (Paris Union Treaty) from March 20, 1883, revised in Brussels on December 14; 1900, in Washington on June 2, 1911; in Haag on November 6, 1923; in London on June 2, 1934; in Lisbon on October 31, 1958 and in Stockholm on July 14, 1967 and changed on October 2, 1979 (edict No. 64/1967 Coll., as amended by edict No. 81/1985 Coll.).

Patent Cooperation Treaty approved in Washington on June 19, 1970, changed on September 28, 1979, on February 3, 1984 and on October 3, 2001 (announcement No. 296/1991 Coll. as amended by subsequent acts).


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The Office for Industrial Property (UPV) safeguarded fulfilling of tasks resulting from the TRIPS Agreement, particularly in part dealing with the protection of industrial property. All notification obligations were fulfilled according to this agreement. UPV representatives participated on the review of the trade policy of the Czech Republic in WTO in Geneva in March 1996, as well as on review of the Czech legislative in the field of industrial patterns, trademarks and geographical marking which was held in TRIPS Council in November 1996. UPV representatives took part in the TRIPS Council review of the Czech legislative in the field of patents, topographies, non-publicized information and anti-competitive practices inspections in trade licenses and on review of the Czech legislative in the field of enforcement of intellectual property rights. Compulsory licensing is dealt with in Article 20 of the Act No. 527/1990 Coll., on Inventions and Rationalization Proposals (Patent Act). Article 20 of the quoted act is in accordance with Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement. Other valid regulation is Regulation (EC) No. 816/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of May 17, 2006 on compulsory licensing of patents relating to manufacture of pharmaceutical products for export to countries with public health problems.

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Denmark (Kindly liaise with the National Patent Office or other relevant institution in your country if necessary)


Answer: Section 1 of the Danish Competition Act specifically mentions consumer interests. Section one reads as follows: “The purpose of this Act is to promote efficient resource allocation in society through workable competition for the benefits of undertakings and consumers.”

In order to promote growth and innovation companies may acquire exclusive rights to new knowledge through patents, trademarks and copyright. All such rights are well protected by the Danish legislation on intellectual property rights etc. At a first glance such exclusive rights appear to be in conflict with the principles of the competition act. However, that is not the case. Exclusive rights may encourage inventions as such as well as the dissemination of inventions which could otherwise be kept secret - all to the benefits of consumer interests.

As mentioned under the answer to Question 12 (Part I) The Danish Competition Act is aligned with the EU Competition Rules. The two prohibitions in the Danish Competition Act - section 6 (the prohibition against anti-competitive agreements) and section 11 (the prohibition against abuse of a dominant position) - are similar to Article 81 and Article 82 of the EC Treaty, and the Danish provisions are applied in conformity with EU-legislation including EU-case-law of the European Commission, the European Court of First Instance and the European Court of Justice - also when is comes to matters which include questions regarding competition and intellectual property rights.



Answer: The approach to tying and bundling of intellectual property rights under the Danish Competition Act is the same as the approach under Article 81 and Article 82 of the EC Treaty, cf. Question 1 above. In line with this the wording of section 11 of The Danish Competition Act (abuse of dominant position) is similar to the wording of Article 82. Please note that Article 82 (2) (d) and section 11 (3) (iv) of The Danish Competition Act deal specifically with tying (se also the answer to Question 1(Part III)).


Answer: No.

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Answer: No.



oo. "package patents" (whereby several patents of one company are necessary for the production of a product)

pp. "patent thickets" (patent rights of multiple patent holders overlap) qq. "cross licensing" (patent holders license their products reciprocally) rr. "patent pools" (whereby patents held by various patent holders are


Answer: Not to our knowledge.


Answer: Se the answer to question 1 (Part II).


Answer: No.



Answer: No.

9. Under what circumstances a competition law allegation against a refusal to

license would be found to be valid in your jurisdiction? What remedies are possible? Can the patent holder be forced by the competition authority to grant a license?

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Answer: A patent holder can only be forced to grant a licence by the Danish Competition Authority, if the patent holders conduct is found to be contrary to section 6 or section 11 of the Danish Competition Act (or Article 81 or 82 of the EC Treaty). The Competition Authority may issues orders according to section 16 of The Danish Competition Act to bring infringements of the pro-hibitions in section 6 or 11 (or Article 81 and 82) to an end. The orders the Competition Authority may issue according to section 16 to eliminate the adverse effects of anti-competitive activity may include:

v. …. w. …. x. An obligation for one or more of the undertakings concerned to sell to

specified buyers on the conditions usually applied by the undertaking to corresponding sales. The undertaking is, however, always entitled to demand cash payment or adequate security;

y. An order to grant access to an infrastructure facility which is necessary for the marketing of a product or service.



Answer: NA 11. To which bilateral or international agreements concerning intellectual property


Answer:

z. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, of March 20, 1883 as revised and amended

aa. Patent Law Treaty of June 1, 2000 bb. Patent Cooperation Treaty of June 19, 1970 as revised and amended cc. Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of

Microorganisms for the Purpose of Patent Procedure of April 28, 1977

dd. Strasbourg Agreement Concerning the International Patent Classification of March 24, 1971

ee. Trademark Law Treaty of October 27, 1994 ff. Protocol relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the

International Registration of Marks of June 27, 1989 and amended on October 3, 2006

gg. Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purpose of Registration of Marks of June 15, 1957 as revised and amended

hh. Locarno Agreement Establishing an International Classification for Industrial Designs of October 8, 1968

ii. TRIPS Agreement and the Protocol amending the TRIPS Agreement

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jj. European Patent Convention of October 5, 1973 as revised and amended

kk. Agreement on the Establishing of Nordic Patent Institute between the Governments of Denmark, Iceland and Norway of July 5, 2006



Answer: The Chapter 6 of the Danish Patent Act contains a number of flexibilities pertaining to the possibilities of compulsory licensing of which several are based upon the flexibilities provided for in TRIPS. The provisions relevant in this respect are as follows:

Section 46 (1) The proprietor of a patent for an invention, the use of which is dependent on a patent or a registered utility model which belongs to another person may obtain compulsory license for use of the protected invention of the latter patent or the protected model on utility model registration if the former invention makes up an essential technical progress of substantial economic importance. [Comment: This provision has been added based upon TRIPS Article 31(l),(1) and (2)]

(2) The proprietor of the patent of the invention or of the registered utility model for which use compulsory license has been granted pursuant to the provision in (1) shall on reasonable terms be able to obtain compulsory license for use of the other invention.

Section 46 a (1) An owner of a variety who cannot obtain or exploit a plant variety right without infringing a prior patent may apply for a compulsory license for use of the invention, where the compulsory license for the exploitation of the plant variety to be protected, against payment of an appropriate royalty. Compulsory license will only be granted provided that the owner of the variety proves that the variety constitutes essential technical progress of substantial economic importance in relation to the invention.

(2) Where, under the Danish Plant Variety Protection Act, a proprietor of a patent has obtained a compulsory license to exploit a protected plant variety, the owner of the plant variety has the right, on reasonable terms, to obtain cross-license for use of the invention. Section 47 When required by important public interests, any person who wishes to exploit an invention commercially for which another person holds a patent may obtain a compulsory license to do so.

Section 48 (1) Any person who, in this country, at the time when a patent application was made available to the public, was commercially exploiting the invention for which a patent is applied for, may, if the application results in a patent, obtain

52

a compulsory license to exploit the invention, if very special circumstances make it desirable, and he had no knowledge and could not reasonably have obtained any knowledge of the application. Such a right shall also, under similar conditions, be enjoyed by any person who had made substantial preparations for commercial exploitation of the invention in this country.

(2) Such a compulsory license may include the time preceding the grant of the patent.

(3) The Minister for Economic and Business Affairs may direct that for the purposes of subsection 1 hereof exploitation of the invention in another country shall be equivalent to exploitation in this country. Such a provision may be made subject to reciprocity.

Section 49 (1) Compulsory license shall only be granted to persons who by agreement have not been able to obtain license on reasonable terms and who may be regarded as being able to make use of the invention in a reasonable and proper manner and in compliance with the license. [Comment: This provision has been added based upon TRIPS article 31(b)]

(2) A compulsory license shall not prevent the proprietor of the patent from exploiting the invention himself or from granting licenses to others.

(3) Compulsory license can only be transferred to others together with the establishment in which it is used or in which the utilisation was intended. For compulsory license filed in accordance with Section 46(1) it shall moreover be applicable that transfer of compulsory license shall take place together with the patent the use of which is dependent on a patent or a registered utility model which belongs to another person. [Comment: This provision has been added based upon TRIPS article 31(l)(3)]

(4) Compulsory license concerning semiconductor technology can only be filed for public, non-commercial use or for terminating an anti- competitive practice, which has been established by decree or administrative decision. [Comment: This provision has been added based upon TRIPS article 31(c)]

Section 50 (1) The Copenhagen Maritime and Commercial Court shall decide as the court of first instance whether a compulsory license shall be granted and shall also determine the extent to which the invention may be exploited, fix the compensation and lay down the other terms of the compulsory license. If circumstances should change considerably, the Court may, at the request of either party, cancel the license or lay down new terms of the license.

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European Commission (Kindly liaise with the National Patent Office or other relevant institution in your country if necessary)


IP and competition law are complementary because they both aim at promoting consumer welfare. Competition policy aims at promoting consumer welfare by protecting competition as the driving force of efficient and dynamic markets, providing at all times the best quality products at the lowest prices. The objective of IP laws is to promote technical progress to the ultimate benefit of consumers. This is done by striking a balance between over- and under-protection of innovators’ efforts. The aim is not to promote the individual innovator’s welfare. (Section 2.3 on Competition law and IP law, p. 6 of "Competition policy and the exercise of intellectual property rights", EC submission of July 2007 to IGE.) For the issue of the relationship between IPR and dynamic efficiency, see paragraphs 3-7, section 2.1. "Competition and Innovation", p. 3 of "Competition policy and the exercise of intellectual property rights", EC submission of July 2007 to IGE. Please find this paper attached.


This problem is mainly addressed in the context of technology licensing agreements, and our approach to the problem is spelled out in our Commission Regulation (EC) No 772/2004 of 27 April 2004 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of technology transfer agreements4, the so-called Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation (TTBER). According to this regulation, tying occurs when the licensor makes the licensing of one technology (the tying product) conditional upon the licensee taking a licence for another technology or purchasing a product from the licensor or someone designated by him (the tied product). Bundling occurs where two technologies or a technology and a product are only sold together as a bundle. In both cases, however, it is a condition that the products and technologies involved are distinct in the sense that there is distinct demand for each of the products and technologies forming part of the tie or the bundle. This is normally not the case where the technologies or products are by necessity linked in such a way that the licensed technology cannot be exploited without the tied product or both parts of the bundle cannot be exploited without the other. In the following the term "tying" refers to both tying and bundling.

4 OJ L 123/11

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Article 3 of the TTBER, which limits the application of the block exemption by market share thresholds, ensures that tying and bundling are not block exempted above the market share thresholds of 20 % in the case of agreements between competitors and 30 % in the case of agreements between non-competitors. The market share thresholds apply to any relevant technology or product market affected by the licence agreement, including the market for the tied product. Above the market share thresholds it is necessary to balance the anti-competitive and pro-competitive effects of tying, so our approach is not per se, but a rule of reason. The main anticompetitive effect of tying in this context is foreclosure of competing suppliers of the tied product. Tying may also allow the licensor to maintain market power in the market for the tying product by raising barriers to entry since it may force new entrants to enter both the tying and the tied product markets. Moreover, tying may allow the licensor to increase royalties, in particular when the tying product and the tied product are partly substitutable and the two products are not used in fixed proportion. Tying prevents the licensee from switching to substitute inputs in the face of increased royalties for the tying product. These competition concerns are independent of whether or not the parties to the agreement are competitors. For tying to produce likely anti-competitive effects the licensor must have a significant degree of market power in the tying product so as to restrict competition in the tied product. In the absence of market power in the tying product the licensor cannot use his technology for the anti-competitive purpose of foreclosing suppliers of the tied product. Furthermore, the tie must cover a certain proportion of the market for the tied product for appreciable foreclosure effects to occur. Tying can also give rise to efficiency gains. The Guidelines to the TTBER give two examples of such efficiencies. First, the tied product is necessary for a technically satisfactory exploitation of the licensed technology or for ensuring that production under the licence conforms to quality standards respected by the licensor and other licensees. Second, tying is likely to be pro-competitive where the tied product allows the licensee to exploit the licensed technology significantly more efficiently.


granting intellectual property rights? If yes, please elaborate. Non Applicable.

4. Have you dealt with cases involving intellectual property rights under the abuse of dominance rules? Is dominance a criterion in the assessment of these practices? Are there any other typical business practices related to intellectual property rights that have been found to be anti-competitive in your jurisdiction? Please cite three cases including the parties, facts, legal provisions that have been violated and findings.

EC law an IPR does not automatically confer upon its holder a dominant position. Furthermore, there is no obligation for the dominant holder of an IPR to license it to other companiesi. That said, a refusal by the dominant company to license IPR may be seen as problematic under certain circumstances, e.g. if it prevents the development

55

of a market for which the license is an indispensable input, to the detriment of consumersii.

In the Commission's view, there are five conditions which must be examined in an evaluation of a refusal to start supplying an input. These are the following: (i) the behaviour can be characterized as refusal to supply; ii) the company is dominant; iii) the input is indispensable iv) the refusal is likely to have a negative effect on competition; v) the absence of an objective justification. In order for a refusal to license an IPR to be abusive one additional condition has to be fulfilled: the refusal must prevent the development of the market for which the license is an indispensable input, to the detriment of consumers. The European Court of Justice in its judgment in Case C-418/01 IMS Healthiii has stated that this may only be the case if the undertaking requesting the license does not intend to only duplicate the goods or services offered by the IPR holder but intends to really produce new goods or services for which there is potential consumer demand (par. 49 of the judgement).

The Commission had to address a scenario of this kind in the Microsoft caseiv. In its 2004 Decision, the Commission, after having found that Microsoft had infringed Article 82 EC by leveraging its dominant position verging on monopoly in a primary market (PC operating system market) into a secondary market (work group server operating system market), ordered Microsoft to disclose to other software developers certain information necessary to ensure the interoperability of their products (work group server operating systems) within Microsoft’s dominant platform. Although the case is not only a compulsory licensing case, it does have intellectual property implications insofar as Microsoft holds IPRs relative to the interoperability information. And as the ECJ has held, a refusal to license intellectual property is under certain exceptional circumstances not immune to antitrust enforcement.

Although intellectual property rights were raised as a justification by Microsoft, the gist of the case concerned a refusal to disclose secret information, the innovative character of which was unclearv. The information at stake was indispensable to compete viably against Microsoft in the relevant market and Microsoft’s refusal had already allowed it to achieve a dominant position, and risked eliminating competition in that market. Competitors were prevented from bringing to customers new and improved products that interoperate with Windows, in contradiction with Article 82 (b).

The 2004 Decision did not order the compulsory licensing of Microsoft IP, but the disclosure of certain interoperability information. In doing so, the Commission carefully established that the conditions judged to be sufficient by the ECJ in its compulsory licensing IMS Health ruling (indispensability of the refused right, risk of elimination of all competition, preventing the emergence of new products and services for which there is a potential consumer demand) were met in the Microsoft case.

The Commission, when taking its decision, considered not only Microsoft’s incentives to innovate but the incentives of the whole market to innovate. It concluded that Microsoft’s refusal to disclose the interoperability information was itself reducing the incentives of rivals to bring innovative products to the market because without the interoperability information they will not be in a position to compete on the merits. The objective of the remedy is to induce rivals to innovate along with the dominant company.

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As it was shown in the Microsoft case, the Commission always takes an extremely cautious approach in this area. In applying the so-called IMS conditions, the Commission will always examine carefully the impact of the refusal to supply on incentives to innovate. (section 3.1.4. "Microsoft" , p. 10 of EC submission of July 2007)

In its judgment of 19 September of 2007, the Court of First Instance dismissed Microsoft's appeal of the 2004 Commission Decision and affirmed the Commission's decision in reiterating the finding that the exercise of the exclusive right by the owner of the intellectual property right may give rise to an abuse of a dominant position only in exceptional circumstances5. …The CFI goes on confirming the Commission's view in its statement referring to the circumstances which "must be considered to be exceptional:

1) in the first place, the refusal relates to a product or service indispensable to the exercise of a particular activity on a neighbouring market;

2) in the second place, the refusal is such a kind as to exclude any effective competition on that neighbouring market;

3) in the third place, the refusal prevents the appearance of a new product for which there is potential consumer demand[.]

… unless the refusal is objectively justified."

There is another case which is of high relevance for innovative markets: the Commission’s decision in Astra/Zeneca of 15 June 2005vi.

In this case (currently under appeal before the European Court of First Instance, CFI) the Commission found that the company, dominant in the market for proton pump inhibitors (PPIs) with its product “Losec” had infringed Article 82 EC by misusing public procedures in a number of EEA States only with the objective to exclude competition from generic rivals. AZ was fined 60 million Euro.

AZ’s first abuse involved misuse of an EC Regulation creating supplementary protection certificates which allow extension of basic patent protection for pharmaceuticals. The concrete abuse consisted in misleading representations made by AZ before patent offices. Due to these misleading representations AZ managed to delay the entry of cheaper generic versions of Losec (with costs for health systems and consumers). The Commission’s intervention under these circumstances was very important given that the authorities applying the patent procedures have little or no discretion. Although there are other legal rules which could have been used by the generic producers as remedies, the Commission found that there is no reason to limit the applicability of competition law (rules on abusive conduct).

The second abuse consisted of AZ’s requests for the deregistration of its market authorisation for Losec capsules in several Nordic countries, thus removing the reference market authorisation on which generic firms and parallel traders arguably needed to rely at the time to enter or remain on the marketvii. Again, this second exclusionary abuse took place in a regulatory context characterised by little or no

5 Para 331, Judgment of the CFI of 17.09.2007 in case T-201/04, Microsoft v. Commission,

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discretion on the part of the authorities concerned. The Commission found that dominant companies have a special responsibility to use specific entitlements (including IPRs) in a reasonable way in respect of market access for other parties. The types of abuse are both novel and represent the Commission’s first decision in relation to patent “evergreening” (the practice of extending the period over which a patentee of a pharmaceutical product may enjoy monopoly rights beyond the period of basic patent protection). (Section 3.1.3. "Astra/Zeneca", p. 9 of EC submission of July 2007)



ss. "package patents" (whereby several patents of one company are necessary for the production of a product)

tt. "patent thickets" (patent rights of multiple patent holders overlap) uu. "cross licensing" (patent holders license their products reciprocally) vv. "patent pools" (whereby patents held by various patent holders are


No closed cases on these issues.


No.


The TTBER guidelines6.



The IMS Health7: In this case, a copyright blocked access to an industry standard.

In this case, the European Court of Justice held that the refusal by an undertaking which holds a dominant position and owns an intellectual property right in a brick structure indispensable to the presentation of regional sales data on pharmaceutical 6 Guidelines on the application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to technology transfer agreements, OJ C 101/2, 27.4.2004, p. 2. 7 IMS Health GmbH & Co v NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG (2004) ECR I-5039.

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products in a Member State to grant a licence to use that structure to another undertaking, which also wishes to provide such data in the same Member State, constitutes an abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of Article 82 EC where the following conditions are fulfilled:

- the undertaking which requested the licence intends to offer, on the market for the supply of the data in question, new products or services not offered by the owner of the intellectual property right and for which there is a potential consumer demand;

- the refusal is not justified by objective considerations;

- the refusal is such as to reserve to the owner of the intellectual property right the market for the supply of data on sales of pharmaceutical products in the Member State concerned by eliminating all competition on that market.

9. Under what circumstances a competition law allegation against a refusal to


For this, please see response to question 4.


created anti-competitive effects? Please elaborate. No cases.


WTO TRIPS and intends to ratify WCT and WPPT in the near future.


particularly in Art. 8, 31 and 40? Please provide details. Not relevant.

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France (Dans la mesure du possible, prière de collaborer avec l'Autorité nationale chargée des brevets ou de la propriété intellectuelle ou toute autre structure gouvernementale chargée de ces questions). 1 Dans quelle mesure les droits de propriété intellectuelle et la politique de concurrence se complètent-ils mutuellement pour améliorer l'efficience dynamique et le bien être des consommateurs dans votre pays? Comme le Conseil de la concurrence l’a indiqué dans son rapport d’activité de 2004, si les droits de propriété intellectuelle protègent avant tout l’intérêt individuel d’une personne en garantissant que l’inventeur ou le créateur pourra retirer un profit légitime de son invention ou de sa création, ils encouragent également ainsi l’innovation qui est un des moteurs de la concurrence. Les droits de propriété intellectuelle sont donc aussi édictés dans l’intérêt général pour favoriser le progrès et la diffusion des connaissances dans le public. Ils peuvent, dès lors, concourirà la réalisation de l’objectif du droit de la concurrence qui est de favoriser la mise à disposition d’une offre diversifiée à des prix concurrentiels. 2. Comment la vente liée et le groupage des droits de propriété intellectuelle sont-ils examinés par votre législation sur la concurrence? Les approches d'interdiction per se ou basées sur la règle de la raison ont-elles été appliquées? Le Conseil de la concurrence ne suit pas une approche per se mais une approche au cas par cas puisqu’il estime que ces pratiques ne sont pas condamnables en soi mais examine les circonstances propres à chaque cas. • En ce qui concerne le groupage des droits de propriété intellectuelle, on peut

citer la décision du 26 avril 2005 relative à des pratiques mises en œuvre par la société des auteurs et compositeurs dramatiques (SACD). Cette décision porte sur la gestion collective des droits d’auteurs audiovisuels. La SACD imposait à ses adhérents un couplage obligatoire de la gestion de leurs droits de représentation dramatique et de leurs droits audiovisuels, par l'intermédiaire d'une clause statutaire. Les auteurs étaient donc contraints de confier à la SACD la totalité de la gestion de leurs droits, sans fractionnement possible. Cette clause de prestations liées permettait en définitive à la SACD « d'utiliser sa position de monopole sur le marché non contestable et incontournable de la gestion des droits audiovisuels pour consolider et maintenir sa position de monopole sur le marché, potentiellement contestable et ouvert, de la gestion des droits de représentation publique des œuvres dramatiques ». En d'autres termes, les auteurs, captifs pour les droits audiovisuels, étaient contraints d'apporter également la gestion de leurs droits de représentation théâtrale à la SACD alors qu'il ne s'agit pas du même marché et qu'ils auraient eu la possibilité de les faire gérer par une autre société de gestion collective ou d'adopter un mode de gestion individuelle.

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Au regard des préoccupations de concurrence exprimées par le Conseil de la concurrence, la SACD s'est engagée à modifier ses statuts de façon à permettre aux auteurs de fractionner leurs apports par catégorie d'œuvres, en distinguant trois catégories: les œuvres dramatiques, les œuvres audiovisuelles et les images. Le Conseil de la concurrence a accepté ces engagements et les a rendus obligatoires, mettant ainsi fin à la procédure.

• En ce qui concerne les pratiques de vente liée, le Conseil de la concurrence a condamné dans sa décision 03-D-35 du 24 juillet 2003 le laboratoire Sandoz pour avoir mis en place un système de remises liées. La pratique abusive a consisté à accorder des remises sur l'achat d’un médicament incontournable protégé par un brevet, à condition que les hôpitaux achètent aussi d'autres spécialités Sandoz, même si ces spécialités avaient des concurrents meilleur marché. Cette pratique qui a duré trois ans a eu pour effet d’évincer des concurrents, parmi lesquels des producteurs de médicaments génériques significativement moins chers, à vingt-quatre reprises, à l’occasion d’appels d’offres passés par huit hôpitaux.

3. L'Autorité nationale chargée des brevets consulte-t-elle l'Autorité chargée de la concurrence lorsqu'elle accorde des droits de propriété intellectuelle? Dans l'affirmative, prière de développer votre réponse. Non, il n’existe pas d’obligation à la charge de l’Institut national de la propriété intellectuelle de consulter les autorités de concurrence lorsqu’il accorde des droits de propriété intellectuelle. 4. Avez-vous traité des cas impliquant les droits de propriété intellectuelle dans le cadre des règles qui régissent l'abus de position dominante? La domination est-il un critère dans l'examen de ces pratiques? Existe-t-il d'autres pratiques typiques des affaires relatives à la propriété intellectuelle qui ont été qualifiées d'anticoncurrentielles dans votre juridiction? Prière de citer ces cas en indiquant les parties, les faits, les dispositions pertinentes de la loi qui ont été violées et les conclusions qui ont résulté de leurs examens. Le Conseil de la concurrence a en effet eu à connaître de cas d’abus de position dominante impliquant l’exercice de droits de propriété intellectuelle. La détention d’un titre de propriété intellectuelle ne créé pas nécessairement une position dominante au profit de son titulaire. Toutefois, un tel titre peut contribuer à la création ou au renforcement de la position dominante d’une entreprise, notamment parce qu’un titre de propriété intellectuelle a une force économique en soi (rapport 2004 du Conseil de la concurrence). Le Conseil veille par conséquent à ce que le détenteur d’un tel pouvoir de marché n’abuse pas de sa position privilégiée par rapport à celle de ses concurrents. Ainsi, dans sa décision n°05-D-25 relative à des pratiques mises en œuvre sur le marché des catalogues de cotation des timbres-poste, le Conseil de la concurrence a estimé que la société Yvert & Tellier, qui détenait 83% du marché des catalogues et qui était l’opérateur le plus ancien et le plus renommé auprès des collectionneurs de timbres, détenait une position dominante. Il convient de relever que la cour d’appel de Paris avait reconnu la protection de propriété intellectuelle, au titre du droit d’auteur

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et du droit sui generis des bases de données couvrant la numérotation des timbres dans les catalogues Yvert & Tellier. Le Conseil a constaté qu’en refusant aux autres éditeurs l’accès à sa numérotation qui faisait référence et revêtait, de ce fait, un caractère normatif pour les collectionneurs, la société Yvert entravait l’accès au marché de ses concurrents. Dès lors, se référant à la jurisprudence IMS Health (CJCE, 29 avr. 2004, aff. C-418/01), il a estimé que le refus d’Yvert de permettre l’usage de sa numérotation était susceptible de constituer un abus de position dominante, en infraction à l’article L.420-2 du code de commerce, « dès lors qu’il interdit la production de tables de concordance entre les différentes numérotations, produit nouveau pour lequel il peut exister une demande ». Au regard des préoccupations de concurrence exprimées par le rapporteur en séance de mesures conservatoires, la société Yvert a proposé d’octroyer à ses concurrents des licences pour l’utilisation de sa numérotation dans la mesure où un tel usage se limite à la confection de tables de concordance et ne porte pas sur son utilisation directe. 5. Les pratiques suivantes qui impliquent la combinaison de plusieurs aspects du droit de la propriété intellectuelle ont-elles eu des effets anticoncurrentiels dans votre pays? Prière de développer votre réponse.

a. "Package patents" (mécanisme par lequel plusieurs brevets d’une société sont nécessaires à la fabrication (rentrent dans la fabrication) d’un produit- );

b. "patent thickets" (les droits de plusieurs titulaires (détenteurs) de brevets se chevauchent; c. "cross licensing"-"le croisement des licences" (les détenteurs de brevet s'accordent des droits réciproques sur leur produit)

d."patent pools"-"Le pool des brevets" (mécanisme qui permet à plusieurs titulaires de brevets de mettre en commun leur brevet, de manière à les licencier conjointement plutôt qu’individuellement).

Aucune décision n’a pour l’instant été rendue sur ces pratiques. Si des pratiques de ce type étaient relevées, les autorités françaises pourraient utiliser comme guide d’analyse le Règlement communautaire n°772/2004 du 7 avril 2004 relatif aux accords de transfert de technologies et les lignes directrices afférentes. 6. Existe-t-il une juridiction concurrente entre l'Autorité de concurrence et l'Office de brevet dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre des droits de la propriété intellectuelle? Prière de développer votre réponse. Non, il n’existe pas de juridiction concurrente entre le Conseil et l’Office de brevets. Le Conseil de la concurrence a indiqué notamment dans sa décision n°02-MC-06 du 30 avril 2002 qu’il ne lui appartient pas de se prononcer sur l’existence des droits de propriété intellectuelle, qui est du ressort de l’Office des brevets. Il lui appartient en revanche de contrôler le respect du droit de la concurrence par les opérateurs sur les marchés dans le cadre l’exercice de leurs droits de propriété intellectuelle. Une pratique de dépôts de brevets peut en outre être considérée comme abusive s’il est

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avéré qu’elle a pour unique objet d’empêcher des concurrents de pénétrer le marché (décision 01-D-57). 7. L'Autorité de concurrence a-t-elle (ou envisage-t-elle) publié des directives sur les relations entre la politique de la concurrence et les droits de propriété intellectuelle? Prière de donner plus de détails. Si les autorités de concurrence françaises n’ont pas publié à proprement parler de directives sur les relations entre la politique de la concurrence et les droits de propriété intellectuelle, ce sujet retient toute leur attention. Ainsi, dans son rapport d’activité pour 2004, le Conseil de la concurrence a consacré une de ses études thématiques aux relations entre les droits de propriété intellectuelle et le droit de la concurrence. Par ailleurs, la DGCCRF a organisé en décembre 2003 un atelier de la concurrence sur le thème de la propriété intellectuelle et, en novembre 2006, une conférence sur les approches juridiques et économiques des droits de propriété intellectuelle s’est tenue à la Cour de cassation. 8. Votre juridiction a-t-elle eu à connaitre des affaires où l'accès à une facilité essentielle a été refusé en invoquant les droits de propriété intellectuelle? Prière de donner des informations spécifiques sur ces cas. Le Conseil de la concurrence a eu à se prononcer sur plusieurs affaires dans lesquelles les entreprises plaignantes s’étaient vues refuser l’accès à des produits protégés par des droits de propriété qu’elles considéraient comme des facilités essentielles. Le Conseil de la concurrence a examiné au cas par cas si cette qualification de facilité essentielle était recevable. Dans son avis n°01-A-18 du 28 décembre 2001, le Conseil de la concurrence a estimé que le répertoire établi par l’Institut national de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques (INSEE) SIRENE, seul répertoire officiel exhaustif de toutes les entreprises immatriculées en France et de leurs établissements, pouvait effectivement être considéré comme une facilité essentielle pour les opérateurs actifs sur le marché aval de la cession de fichiers de grande taille comportant au minimum plusieurs centaines de milliers d’adresses. En effet, ce répertoire est indispensable pour les producteurs de fichiers de prospection de grande taille. En conséquence, l’INSEE, qui était aussi présente sur ce marché secondaire des fichiers de prospection de grande taille, devait prévoir des conditions d’accès non discriminatoires et éviter en particulier tout effet de ciseau tarifaire. Dans sa décision n°04-D-54 du 9 novembre 2004, le Conseil de la concurrence a eu à se prononcer sur le refus d’Apple d’accorder à VirginMega une licence sur son dispositif de gestion des droits numériques (Digital Rights Manager ou DRM) Fair Play. Dans cette affaire, l’autorité de concurrence a été saisie d’une plainte de VirginMega, filiale à 100% du groupe Lagardère concernant l’incompatibilité du dispositif de gestion des droits numériques (digital rights managers ou DRM) Microsoft utilisé par sa plate-forme de musique en ligne, avec le DRM FairPlay utilisé pour l’iPod distribué par Apple Computer France pour le compte de sa maison mère Apple Computer, Inc., unique détentrice des droits d’accès sur le DRM FairPlay. Les consommateurs qui téléchargent des titres musicaux sur la plate-forme VirginMega ne pouvaient les transférer directement sur les baladeurs numériques

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iPod, fabriqués et commercialisés par Apple. Cette impossibilité de transfert direct provenait de l'incompatibilité entre les dispositifs de gestion des droits numériques (Digital Rights Manager ou DRM) utilisés par la plate-forme VirginMega et les baladeurs iPod. VirginMega utilisait en effet le DRM de Microsoft alors que l'iPod n'est compatible qu'avec le DRM propriétaire d'Apple, FairPlay. Mais le Conseil a constaté que l'accès au DRM Fairplay n'était pas indispensable pour le développement des plateformes légales de téléchargement de musique en ligne. En particulier, il a rappelé que, pour qu'un abus de domination puisse être caractérisé sur le fondement d'un refus d'accès à une ressource essentielle, il faut notamment que l'accès à celle-ci soit indispensable. Or, en l'espèce, le caractère indispensable de l'accès au DRM d'Apple n'apparaissait pas établi pour trois raisons: le transfert sur baladeur ne constitue qu'un usage minoritaire parmi les usages actuels de la musique téléchargée, il existait une solution de contournement simple, peu coûteuse et très courante, en cas d'incompatibilité des DRM (la gravure sur CD) et enfin de nombreux baladeurs numériques sécurisés avec le DRM de Microsoft et compatibles avec la plate-forme VirginMega étaient apparus récemment en France. De plus, le risque d'élimination de la concurrence paraissait, lorsque la décision du Conseil a été rendue, extrêmement réduit étant donné le fort dynamisme du marché. Le Conseil de la concurrence a donc considéré qu’il n’existait pas d’éléments suffisamment probants de nature à caractériser, en l’état actuel du marché, un comportement anticoncurrentiel. Il a rendu une décision de rejet de la demande de mesures conservatoires et de la saisine au fond, précisant, toutefois, que ce rejet ne fait pas obstacle à une saisine future dans le cas où les entreprises du secteur feraient état d’éléments nouveaux provenant de l’observation ultérieure du marché. 9. Dans quelle circonstance, en vertu de la législation sur la concurrence, une allégation sur le refus de licence peut être considérée comme recevable dans votre juridiction? Quelles mesures correctives proposez-vous dans cette perspective? Un détenteur de brevet peut-il être forcé d'accorder une licence par l'Autorité de concurrence? La position du Conseil de la concurrence concernant les licences obligatoires rejoint celle exprimée par la Cour de justice des communautés européennes dans son arrêt Magill selon laquelle seules des circonstances exceptionnelles doivent justifier l’octroi de licences obligatoires. Dans la décision n°05-D-25 précitée, le Conseil de la concurrence a effectivement admis une allégation sur le refus de licence, dans la mesure où ce refus de licence empêchait l’introduction sur le marché de produits nouveaux, n’était pas justifié par des considérations objectives et où ce refus excluait la concurrence sur un marché dérivé. Dans cette affaire, la prise d’engagements de la part de l’entreprise titulaire de propriété intellectuelle pouvait se révéler plus efficace et moins intrusive que l’imposition d’une sanction, puisqu’elle se fait sur une base volontaire, et que les entreprises contribuent à identifier les difficultés relatives à la partie des engagements qui ressort de leur expertise. Ces dernières sont donc au premier plan du processus de négociation.

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Par ailleurs, le test de marché consistant à permettre au tiers intéressés de soumettre des observations sur l’offre d’engagements de l’entreprise concernée ainsi que les débats en séance qui suivent cette période de consultation, permettent de mieux appréhender les enjeux en présence et de délimiter le périmètre d’application des engagements de façon définitive. Les contours de l’intervention de l’autorité de concurrence sont donc plus précisément définis. Ce résultat est en ce sens plus satisfaisant que l’application unilatérale des critères jurisprudentiels, considérée comme une source d’insécurité pour les acteurs sur les marchés. Ainsi, dans l’affaire Yvert, l’entreprise en cause a-t-elle limité l’octroi de la licence à l’utilisation de la numérotation pour la confection de tables de concordance avec la numérotation de ses concurrents et non à l’utilisation directe de sa numérotation. S’agissant des conditions d’octroi d’une telle licence, les paramètres de fixation du taux de redevance proposé par Yvert au sein de ses engagements soulevaient également certaines préoccupations de concurrence. En effet, cette société proposait le paiement « d’une redevance annuelle d’un montant permettant l’offre effective de tables de correspondance dans des conditions économiques raisonnables ». Bien qu’il n’appartienne pas au Conseil de fixer ce montant, il apparaissait, à la lumière du test de marché et des différents éléments d’information collectés lors de l’instruction, que la proposition initiale de la société mise en cause faite à titre indicatif, à savoir « une redevance de 2,5 % du prix de vente HT des catalogues, avec un minimum de 1 000 ?, et versement d’une avance récupérable mais non remboursable de 1 000 ? », pouvait « ne pas satisfaire à ces critères ». Le Conseil a en outre estimé qu’une redevance proportionnelle basée sur le nombre et le prix de détail des produits vendus aurait obligé les futurs licenciés à communiquer de façon unilatérale, à « l’acteur dominant du marché », de l’information potentiellement couverte par le secret des affaires, laquelle était susceptible de donner à Yvert « un avantage indu de nature à renforcer sa dominance ». Dans le but de remédier à ces diverses préoccupations, le Conseil a pris acte, d’une part, de la fixation envisagée par la société des Éditions Yvert d’un montant de redevance raisonnable et conforme aux critères de transparence, de non-discrimination et d’objectivité et, d’autre part, de l’octroi de la licence moyennant un montant forfaitaire. Prenant acte, au surplus, de la réfection du montant indiqué à titre indicatif ; le Conseil a recherché un niveau optimal d’efficacité dans le traitement des préoccupations de concurrence liées à la fixation du montant de redevance en l’espèce. 10. Votre juridiction a-t-elle eu à traiter des affaires où les normes industrielles communes dont l'objectif est d'assurer l'interopérabilité ont eu des effets anticoncurrentiels.

En France, l’objectif d’interopérabilité a été récemment affirmé par la loi n° 2006-961 du 1er août 2006 relative au droit d'auteur et aux droits voisins dans la société de l'information qui porte transposition de la directive 2001/29/CE du 22 mai 2001.

Cette loi dite "DAVDSI" prévoit qu’une autorité de régulation des mesures techniques a désormais pour rôle de maintenir un équilibre conciliant droit d’auteur, copie privée et interopérabilité. L’autorité compte six membres nommés pour six ans. Un décret datant du 4 avril 2007 précise son fonctionnement et dispose qu’elle pourra être saisie

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par les consommateurs par simple lettre recommandée avec avis de réception, voire par courriel. La loi DAVDSI dispose que les mesures techniques ne doivent pas avoir pour effet d'empêcher la mise en œuvre effective de l'interopérabilité, dans le respect du droit d'auteur. Les fournisseurs de mesures techniques doivent donner l'accès aux informations essentielles à l'interopérabilité. Tout éditeur de logiciel, tout fabricant de système technique et tout exploitant de service peut, en cas de refus d'accès aux informations essentielles à l'interopérabilité, demander à l'Autorité de régulation des mesures techniques de garantir l'interopérabilité des systèmes et des services existants, dans le respect des droits des parties, et d'obtenir du titulaire des droits sur la mesure technique les informations essentielles à cette interopérabilité. Le président de l'Autorité de régulation des mesures techniques saisit le Conseil de la concurrence des abus de position dominante et des pratiques entravant le libre exercice de la concurrence dont il pourrait avoir connaissance dans le secteur des mesures techniques. Cette saisine peut être introduite dans le cadre d'une procédure d'urgence, dans les conditions prévues à l'article L. 464-1 du code de commerce. Le président de l'autorité peut également saisir le Conseil, pour avis, de toute autre question relevant de sa compétence. De même, le Conseil de la concurrence communique à l'autorité toute saisine entrant dans le champ de compétence de celle-ci et recueille son avis sur les pratiques dont il est saisi dans le secteur des mesures techniques. L’édiction de normes d’interopérabilité est donc garantie par le contrôle d’une autorité indépendante en relation avec le Conseil de la concurrence, ce qui minimise les risques d’effets anticoncurrentiels surtout les effets d’éviction du marché de concurrents. 11. Quels sont les accords bilatéraux, régionaux ou multilatéraux dont votre pays est partie? Les autorités de concurrence françaises sont membres du réseau européen de concurrence et elles appliquent le droit communautaire de la concurrence dans le respect des principes du Règlement n°1/2003. 12. Quel usage votre pays a-t-il fait de la flexibilité contenue dans les ADPIC en particulier les articles 8, 38 et 40 de cet accord? Prière de donner plus de détails. En 2006, la France a soutenu la proposition de création d’une facilité internationale d’achat de médicaments qui a pour objectif d’adosser des recettes pérennes au financement de l’approvisionnement en médicaments et d’offrir une visibilité à moyen et long terme pour renforcer l’accès à des médicaments de qualité à un prix abordable.

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India Question 1. How do your intellectual property rights and competition rules complement each other in enhancing dynamic efficiency and consumer welfare? Answer 1. Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) provide exclusive rights to the owners to protect them as an innovation and permitting them to be exploited for commercial activity on certain terms and conditions.

In the Indian competition law, protection is given to the IPRs from provisions of section 3 of the Competition Act, 2002(the Act) relating to anti-competitive agreements subject to imposition of reasonable conditions. Under the Act , the following 6 types of IPRs are recognized and are exempted from the preview of the Act subject to the rule of reasonableness of the conditions that the owners of these IPRs may impose on their licensees:-

1. Copyright and Related Rights 2. Trade Marks 3. Geographical Indications 4. Industrial Designs 5. Patents 6. Semiconductor Layout-designs of the Integrated Circuits

Sub section (5) of section 3 of the Act by an express provision provides that “reasonable conditions” as may be necessary for protecting the above IPRs during their exercise would not constitute anti competitive practice. Therefore, in so far as the characteristics of any of the above mentioned IPRs in enhancing efficiency and thereby promoting consumer welfare is concerned, the same is protected under the Act. Question 2. How is the tying and bundling of intellectual property rights examined under your competition law? Was the per se approach or the rule of reason approach applied? Answer 2. As stated in answer 1 above, the protection of any one of the 6 IPRs mentioned in sub section (5) of section 3 of the Act is provided in the Act. However, the Act does not follow a “per-se” approach while dealing with the anti competitive agreements including IPRs and follows a “rule of reason” approach in as much as only conditions that are reasonable and considered necessary for the protection of such rights, may be imposed. Conditions which go beyond mere protection and are not considered “reasonable” can not be imposed in protection of the IPRs. The Act provides a clear distinction between the existence of the IPRs, which is recognized and the manner of their exercise. It is in the latter, i.e. the manner of exercise of the IPRs, that the Act follows “rule of reason” approach, as stated above. Question 3. Does your national patent office consult the competition authority when granting intellectual property rights? If yes, please elaborate. Answer 3. No. There is no specific institutionalized arrangement of consultation between the Competition Commission of India and the National Patent Office.

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However, the Patent Office, as a statutory authority, can refer any issue on competition law, if raised by any party before it, or suo motu, to the Commission for opinion under section 21 of the Act. Similarly, the Commission may also make a reference to the Patent Office for its opinion under section 21A of the Act. Question 4. Have you dealt with cases involving intellectual property rights under the abuse of dominance rules? Is dominance a criteria in the assessment of these practices? Are there any other typical business practices related to intellectual property rights that have been found to be anti-competitive in your jurisdiction? Please cite three cases including the parties, facts, legal provisions that have been violated and findings. Answer 4. Since the enforcement provision of the Act have not been notified so far, no cases involving IPRs under the provisions relating to abuse of dominant position i.e. section 4 of the Act have been handled by the Commission. However, the relevant provisions relating to abuse of dominant position under section 4 of the Act will certainly apply to cases involving IPR if the behavior of the holder leads to any one of the five “abuses” prohibited under section 4 of the Act. Question 5. Have any of the following practices of combining several intellectual property rights resulted in anti-competitive effects in your country? Please elaborate.

a. ‘package patents’ (whereby several patents of one company are necessary for the production of a product)

b. ‘patent thickets’ (patent rights of multiple patent holders overlap) c. ‘cross licensing’ (patent holders license their products reciprocally) d. ‘patent pools’ (whereby patents held by various patent holders are


Answer 5. As stated in answer 4 above, since enforcement provisions have not yet been notified, no such cases involving several IPRs resulting into anti competitive effects have been handled by the Commission. Question 6. Is there concurrent jurisdiction between the competition authority and the patent office with regard to the enforcement of intellectual property rights? Please elaborate. Answer 6. No. There is no concurrent jurisdiction between the competition authority and the Patent office in India with regard to enforcement of IPRs. __________________________________________________________ Question 7. Has the competition authority issued or envisages issuing guidelines on the relationship of intellectual property rights and competition law? Please provide details. Answer 7. No. The Competition Commission of India has not issued any such specific guidelines. However, the Commission has published an advocacy booklet in the form of a quick guide of Intellectual Property Rights and their treatment under the

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Act. This advocacy book-let on IPRs lists out, inter alia, as many as 16 trade practices or conditions such as patent pooling, tying-in etc which are likely to be struck down as anti competitive, for the guidelines of the general public. Question 8. Have there been cases in your jurisdiction where access to an essential facility has been refused on account of an intellectual property right? Please provide specific information relating to the individual cases. Answer 8. As stated above, in the absence of notification of the enforcement provision of the Act, no case of denial of access to an essential facility has come before the Commission. Question 9. Under what circumstances a competition law allegation against a refusal to license would be found to be valid in your jurisdiction? What remedies are possible? Can the patent holder be forced by the competition authority to grant a license? Answer 9. The Advocacy Booklet of the Commission on IPRs, referred to in answer 7, gives an illustrative lists of the following circumstances or possible allegations against a refusal to grant license by a patent holder ,which may be treated as an anti competitive practice under the Act:-

1. If the patent holder puts a condition which restricts competition in Research and Development (R&D) on the licensee or prohibits the licensee to use rival technology.

2. If licensee is subjected to a condition not to challenge the validity of the patent under question.

3. If licensee is required to “grant back” to the licensor (Patent holder) any know how or the patent acquired and not to grant licenses to any one else except the patent holder.

4. If the patent holder fixes the price at which the licensee should sell. 5. If the patent holder restricts the licensee territorially or according to

categories of customers.

6. If a licensee is coerced by the licensor (patent holder) to take several licenses for the patent even though the former may not need all of them (package licensing).

7. A condition imposing quality control on the licensed patented product beyond those necessary for guaranteeing the effectiveness of the licensed patent.

8. If the licensor imposes undue restrictions on the licensor’s business. 9. If the licensor limits the maximum amount of use the licensee may make

of the patented invention. 10. If the licensor imposed condition on the licensee to employ or use staff

nominated by the licensor. __________________________________________________________ Question 10. Have common industrial standards that are intended to ensure interoperability created anti-competitive effects? Please elaborate

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Answer 10. No such case has come to the knowledge of the Competition Commission of India in view of the fact that enforcement provisions are yet to be notified. Question 11. To which bilateral or international agreements concerning intellectual property rights is your country a party? Answer 11. India is a party to the following multilateral, international agreements, which concern Intellectual Property Rights:-

(i) World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreements. (ii) General Agreements on Trade and Services (GATS). (iii) WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).

__________________________________________________________ Question 12. How has your country made use of the flexibilities provided for in TRIPS, particularly in Art. 8, 31 and 40? Please provide details. Answer 12. Article 40 of TRIPS deals with the recognition by member states with certain licensing practice or conditions relating to IPRs that restrain competition which have adverse effect on trade and may impede the transfer and dissemination of technology. It further states that members are free to bring in legislation specifying what licensing practices or conditions may in particular cases constitute an abuse of IPRs having an adverse effect on competition in the relevant market. Section 3 of sub section (5) of the Act is in accordance with the spirit of Article 40 since only the conditions which are reasonable and necessary, to protect the IPRs may be imposed by the owners of the IPRs in exercise of their rights under an agreement.

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Indonesia (Kindly liaise with the National Patent Office or other relevant institution in your country if necessary)


These two laws can be complementing each other. Law No. 19 year 2002 Article 47 (1) stated that every agreement on IP Rights shall not accommodate any provisions that might produce unhealthy business competition, as regulated by existing laws and regulations. On the other hand, in business competition law, Law No. 5 year 1999 Article 50 (b) treats agreements on IP Rights such as licenses, patent, trademarks, copyrights, industrial product design, integrated electronic circuit and undisclosed information as well as agreement on franchise, as exceptions. The facts above basically show that these two laws may be implemented parallels. IP Rights Law still put a high regard on healthy competition on every IP Rights application, and Business Competition Law shows a great respect on Exclusive Rights in IP Laws, as an appreciation on invention and intellectual products.


No, we do not have authority to examine cases in regard to Intellectual Property Rights. However, we do have specific article for exclusive dealing that include tying and bundling cases. This article used rule of reason approach.


No. there was no consultation from National Patent office to us because in our law, IPRs is exempted.


The law of business competition is relatively new in Indonesia. Thus, it still requires socialization in order to improve people awareness on the importance of competition. In Indonesia, competition authority, KPPU, has been dealing with hundreds of cases, yet, none of the cases have a direct relation to IP Rights application.

5. Have any of the following practices of combining several intellectual property rights resulted in anti-competitive effects in your country? Please elaborate.

ww. “package patents” (whereby several patents of one company are necessary for the production of a product) xx. “patent thickets” (patent rights of multiple patent holders overlap)

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yy. “cross licensing” (patent holders license their products reciprocally) zz. “patent pools” (whereby patents held by various patent holders are pooled and access is granted to the pool instead of to an individual patent) No, we have not any. We had a case close to IPRs issue that still in the area of competition law.


No, there is not concurrent jurisdiction between the competition authority and the patent office with regard to the enforcement of intellectual property rights


KPPU views that the distributed non-licensed products of IP Rights holder is actually unhealthy business competition practice. However, KPPU also views IP Rights application may cause unhealthy business competition. So that, KPPU is still on doing research to elaborate IPRs


One of the cases closest to IPRs that handled by KPPU was the plan from TV paid- provider program, ESPN & Starsport, to terminate transmission programs permit (6 channels) for some paid-TV stations in Indonesia and offer exclusive transmission permit to one particular station. KPPU in the opinion of that if this keeps going, then, this policy is against the Law No. 5 year 1999, since in the related market, there are already several qualified competitors who are ready to sell those programs in the spirit of competition. ESPN & Starsport were finally agreed to cancel the so-called exclusive license plan.


No. 10. Have common industrial standards that are intended to ensure interoperability

created anti-competitive effects? Please elaborate. Never have experience on this matter.


Never have experience on this matter.


Never.

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Italy (Kindly liaise with the National Patent Office or other relevant institution in your country if necessary)


Intellectual property rights and competition rules contribute to enhance dynamic efficiency and consumer welfare promoting innovation and stimulating technical and economic progress. In terms of general principles to be applied intellectual and physical properties are the same. There is no need for special antitrust provisions with respect to intellectual property. However there are important differences between physical and intellectual properties that affect the way antitrust laws are actually enforced with respect to IP. First of all, contrary to physical property, without legal protection it is impossible to exclude others from appropriating the economic benefits originating from it or simply from using it. This implies, for example, that an access regime imposed on intellectual property cannot ignore that, while access to physical property is objectively limited by existing capacity, access to intellectual property is limited only by market demand. Furthermore, while physical property is easily defined, the extent of intellectual property protection may be quite uncertain, even to its owners.

Like with physical property, the right to exclude others from the free use of intellectual property does not imply market power. Indeed in most cases. substitutes are available for products that are protected by intellectual property rights. In such circumstances intellectual property rights do not give rise to significant market power and the mere existence of intellectual property rights should not be seen as a matter that raises antitrust concerns. Nevertheless, intellectual property rights can give rise to significant market power in particular cases and the exercise of such rights can conflict with the content and/or the objectives of competition law in a variety of ways. Problems with competition law are most likely to arise in regard to five main categories of practices: (i) the acquisition of intellectual property rights, for example through mergers, (ii) technology licensing arrangements; (iii) cooperative arrangements among innovating firms, including patent pools; (iv) refusals to license; and (v) exhaustion concerns. A further aspect of tension between intellectual property and competition policy is that efforts by patent and copyright owners to enforce their

intellectual property rights are often met by antitrust counterclaims pursuant to which it is argued that the rights of the intellectual property owner should be curtailed on the basis that it is illegally protecting or expanding its market position 2. How is the tying and bundling of intellectual property rights examined under


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A tie-in is the sale of one product (the tying good) on condition that the buyer purchase another product (the tied good). Bundling refers to situations where a package of two or more of products is offered. If only the bundle is offered and not its individual components then bundling is called “pure”, otherwise it is “mixed”. With tying the quantity of the tied good is not predefined, while with bundling the “package” cannot generally be customized and the number of units of the bundled goods is fixed. Furthermore while tying is based on a contract, bundling may also originate from technological integration so that unbundling may not be that simple.

Mixed bundling, a situation where a bundle is discounted with respect to the price of its individual components, is abusive only in so far as an equally efficient competitor, offering only some of the components, could compete only at a loss against the discounted bundle. The analysis to be performed in order to identify an abuse is the same as that suggested for discounts and rebates.

Tying and bundling should not be considered abusive if the firm lacks market power in the tying good. Even when the firm has market power, establishing that a tie-in or a bundle is in fact abusive requires detailed analysis of its purpose and the market context. Sometimes two products are vertically related, with one being an input to the production of the other. In such circumstances, tying/bundling can reduce the overall net price paid by consumers (i.e. eliminating inefficiencies originating from double marginalization). Tying may be motivated by the firm's desire to maintain or increase its reputation for quality or reliability. This should not be considered abusive since it increases efficiency and market demand. A rule of reason approach should be applied.


NO, it does not. 4. Have you dealt with cases involving intellectual property rights under the abuse of dominance rules? Is dominance a criteria in the assessment of these practices? Are there any other typical business practices related to intellectual property rights that have been found to be anti-competitive in your jurisdiction? Please cite three cases including the parties, facts, legal provisions that have been violated and findings. Yes. Italian Competition Authority has recently dealt with one case involving intellectual property rights under the abuse of dominant position rules: the case Glaxo/Active Ingredients. In general, the existence of a patent, trade mark, or copyright is not sufficient to establish a dominant position. Nevertheless, when it is established that the existence of such rights confers a dominant position, the refusal to license intellectual property rights may in exceptional circumstances constitute an abuse of the dominant position. The case law of the European Court of Justice requires the Italian Authority to ascertain that (i) there must be no actual or potential substitute for the IP-protected product in the relevant market; (ii) there can be no

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business justification for the exclusion; and, perhaps most importantly, (iii) a new product must be denied to consumers because of the refusal. GLAXO-ACTIVE INGREDIENTS In February 2006 an investigation into the pharmaceutical group Glaxo concluded with the finding of abusive practices in violation of Article 82 of the EC Treaty. Glaxo refused to grant Fabbrica Sintetici Italiana (FIS), a chemical-pharmaceutical undertaking, a licence to produce an active drug ingredient known as Sumatriptan Succinato, covered in Italy by a supplementary protection certificate, for use in other Member States (in which Glaxo no longer held any patent-rights) in the production of generic drugs known as triptans for the treatment of migraines. This supplementary protection for pharmaceuticals originated from an Italian 1991 law which allowed 18 years of supplementary protection. Subsequently in 1993 the law was amended and only 5 years of supplementary protection was allowed for then on. As a result, there were a number of pharmaceutical products that between 1991 and 1993 benefited from this extra protection. Sumatriptan Succinato was one of them. In 2002 the Italian Parliament intervened again and advocated that these extra protected patent holders licence their patents to domestic producers for export in EC market where the patent was expired. In the case of disagreement between the licensor and the potential licensee, law n 112/2002 asked the Italian Competition Authority to decide on the matter, introducing a much stronger requirement to license for these extra protected patent holders than otherwise. The Authority found that Glaxo, in addition to holding a quasi-monopoly on the production of Sumatriptan Succinato worldwide, occupied a dominant position in the Spanish and Italian markets for the production and marketing of triptans sold through hospitals. In these markets Glaxo held a particularly high market-share, equal to about 96% in Italy and 58% in Spain. As for the possibility of access for potential competitors, all the products sold in the markets concerned were found to be covered by industrial patent-rights, which were due to lapse between 2008 and 2012, with the exception of Sumatriptan Succinato which was not covered by any patent in the Spanish market. Based on the investigation’s findings, the Authority deemed that Glaxo’s refusal to grant the requested licence constituted an abuse of dominant position in violation of Article 82 of the EC Treaty, since its refusal hindered the production of an active ingredient needed by producers of generic drugs, potential competitors of Glaxo, to access national markets where Glaxo did not have any exclusive rights. Because of law n 112/2002, the standard under which the Authority had to decide whether the refusal to license was an abuse, was not the requirement that a new product be denied to consumers, but the requirement that the refusal not be objectively justified. Well before the end of the investigation, Glaxo had not only granted the licences originally requested by FIS but had also set conditions allowing that company to save the time required to research and test an efficient production process for obtaining Sumatriptan Succinato. As a result, well before the conclusion of the

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proceedings, a producer of generic drugs based on this active ingredient had succeeded in entering the Spanish market. 5. Have any of the following practices of combining several intellectual property rights resulted in anti-competitive effects in your country? Please elaborate. a. "package patents" (whereby several patents of one company are necessary for the production of a product) b. "patent thickets" (patent rights of multiple patent holders overlap) c. "cross licensing" (patent holders license their products reciprocally) d. "patent pools" (whereby patents held by various patent holders are pooled and access is granted to the pool instead of to an individual patent) NO, they haven’t 6. Is there concurrent jurisdiction between the competition authority and the patent office with regard to the enforcement of intellectual property rights? Please elaborate. NO, there isn’t. 7. Has the competition authority issued or envisages issuing guidelines on the relationship of intellectual property rights and competition law? Please provide details. No, it has not. 8. Have there been cases in your jurisdiction where access to an essential facility has been refused on account of an intellectual property right? Please provide specific information relating to the individual cases. NO. 9. Under what circumstances a competition law allegation against a refusal to license would be found to be valid in your jurisdiction? What remedies are possible? Can the patent holder be forced by the competition authority to grant a license? See answer 1. 10. Have common industrial standards that are intended to ensure interoperability created anti-competitive effects? Please elaborate. The Italian Competition Authority has never dealt with these kind of cases.

11. To which bilateral or international agreements concerning intellectual property rights is your country a party? This is a short list of some international agreements of which Italy is a party:

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a) Paris Convention for the protection of industrial property - 1883; b) Arrangement de Madrid concernant l'enregistrement international des marques - 1891 c) Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks d) Trademark Law Treaty - Genève -1994 e) Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) Agreement - Marrakesh - 1994 f) Convention on the Grant of European Patent - Monaco - 1973 i) Locarno Agreement Establishing an International Classification for Industrial Designs 1968 l) Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistich Works - 1886 m) Universal Convention Copyright, Genève - 1952; n) International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organization, Rome -1961; o) WIPO Copyright Treaty and WIPO Performances and Phonograms, Genève, 1996. 12. How has your country made use of the flexibilities provided for in TRIPS, particularly in Art. 8, 31 and 40? Please provide details.

NA

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Jamaica

1. The Act does not apply to any agreement that contains a provision relating to the “use, licence or assignment of rights under any copyright, patent or trade mark”. Further, conduct in pursuance of enforcing or seeking to enforce any intellectual property right affords a dominant firm a complete defence to a charge of abuse of its dominant position. 2. See #1 above. 3. No; in the circumstances there is no reason for the Patent Office to consult with the Commission when granting IP rights 4. See #1 2 5. See #1 6. See #1 7. See #1 8. See #1 9. See #1 10. See #1 11. Jamaica is signatory to several multi lateral and bilateral Agreements and Treaties for the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, including:- - Agreement on Trade Related aspects of Intellectual Property, TRIPS (administered by the World Trade Organization, WTO). Several multi-lateral treaties administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO. - Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic works (1971) (WIPO). - Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of phonograms and Broadcasting organizations (1961) (WIPO). - Geneva Convention for the Protection of Phonograms against Unauthorized Duplication (1971) (WIPO). - Paris Convention on the Protection of Industrial Property (WIPO). - Brussels Satellite Signals (WIPO). - WIPO “Internet Treaties” – WCT & WPPT - Governments of Jamaica and United States of America Bilateral Agreement on the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights. 12. There is currently a draft Patent Bill which contains provisions relating to the flexibilities under articles 8 & 31 of the TRIPS. Since this is Bill in draft form we cannot elaborate at this stage.

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Japan (Kindly liaise with the National Patent Office or other relevant institution in your country if necessary)


The legal frameworks to protect intellectual property may encourage firms to

conduct research and development and serve as a driving force for creating new technologies and products based on the technologies. They can be seen as having pro-competitive effects. And enabling technology transactions, which lead to combinations of different technologies, increased efficiency in the use of technology, the formation of markets for technologies and their associated products and an increase of competing entities, also assists in promoting competition. In a free market economy, intellectual property systems motivate firms to realize their creative efforts and contribute to the development of the national economy. It is important to ensure that their basic purposes are respected and that technologies are smoothly traded.

Under intellectual property systems, however, competition in technologies and products may suffer negative effects if any right holder refuses to permit other firms to use its technology or grants other firms a license to use the technology on the condition that their research and development, production, sales or any other business activities are restricted depending on how such refusal or restrictions takes place and on what conduct specifically is involved in the restrictions.

Consequently, applying the AMA, it is important for competition policy to insulate competition in technologies and products from any negative effect caused by any restrictions deviating from the purposes of the intellectual property systems, with fully activating the effect of promoting competition.

Regarding this point, Article 10 of the Basic Law on Intellectual Property provides that, “In promoting measures for the creation, protection and exploitation of intellectual property, attention shall be paid to secure the fair use of intellectual property and public interests and to promote fair and free competition, ”stating the needs to consider promoting competition.



Regarding an obligation imposed by a licensor on licensees to obtain a

bundled license covering a technology other than they wish to use, whether it falls under an unfair trade practice in the AMA is examined in the following terms. Bundle licensing is provided for instance that it is essential to obtain the effect of the technology sought by licensees or is otherwise recognized as reasonable to some extent. However, if such an obligation is not essential for ensuring that the licensed technology exerts its effect or its licenses are obliged to obtain a technology license beyond the necessary extent, licensees may be

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restrained from freely choosing technology and competing technology may ultimately be excluded. In this case, whether the bundle licensing tends to impede fair competition or not is examined on a case-by-case basis.



No, the Japan Patent Office (“JPO”) does not consult the JFTC.


In general, the AMA prohibits unilateral conduct that substantially restrains

competition as “private monopolization” and coordinated conduct that substantially restrains competition as “unreasonable restraint of trade.” In addition, it prohibits particular practices, most of which are unilateral ones, that do not substantially restrain competition but tend to impede fair competition as “unfair trade practices.” (Regarding the relationship between private monopolization and unfair trade practices, see answers to questions 2-4 in Part II.)

The example cases of those three types of conduct involving IPR issues are as follows.

• Private Monopolization

Company X and nine other firms engaging in the manufacture of pachinko game machines and Association Y had patent and other rights relating to manufacturing of pachinko machines. It was difficult to manufacture any such machines without receiving licenses from them. Then ten firms commissioned Association Y to manage these rights and made it difficult for any other entity to enter the market by refusing to grant licenses. This was found to be in violation of the AMA as private monopolization. (Recommendation Decision on August 6, 1997)

• Unreasonable restraint of trade

With regard to iron covers for public sewerage systems to be purchased by a local public entity, specifications that incorporate Company X’s utility model were adopted on the condition that the utility model would be licensed to other firms. Company X granted the license to six other firms. However, it prescribed that the price estimate for iron covers submitted by the six companies to the local government should be equivalent to or higher than that of Company X, that the price at which the covers are supplied by Company X and the six firms to builders and the margin for builders should be fixed and the Company X should secure a 20 % share of the sales volume with the remainder equally divided among Company X and the six companies. These and other

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conducts were found to be in violation of the AMA as unreasonable restraint of trade. (Hearing Decision on September 10, 1993)

• Unfair Trade Practices

Company X imposed on manufacturers and venders of personal computers (PCs) in trading relations with company an obligation to (i) additionally pre-install or bundle word processing software unduly under the license to ship PCs pre-installed or bundled with spreadsheet software and to (ii) pre-install or bundle unjustifiably scheduling management software under the license to ship PCs pre-installed or bundled with spreadsheet software and word processing software. Company X was found to be in violation of the AMA as “Tie-in Sales, etc” in unfair trade practices. (Recommendation Decision on December 14, 1998)


aaa. "package patents" (whereby several patents of one company are necessary for the production of a product) bbb. "patent thickets" (patent rights of multiple patent holders overlap) ccc. "cross licensing" (patent holders license their products reciprocally) ddd. "patent pools" (whereby patents held by various patent holders are pooled and access is granted to the pool instead of to an individual patent)

The above case of private monopolization (Recommendation Decision on

August 6, 1997) involves patent pool issues.


The JFTC makes a decision on competition issues in the use of IPRs, and the

JPO does not engage in this decision.


The JFTC established the “Guidelines for the Use of Intellectual Property

under the Antimonopoly Act” (published in September 2007) showing the principles for the application of the AMA to restrictions in relation to the use of intellectual properties.

The Guidelines have application to all intellectual properties that are concerned with technology. They also describe basic principles for competition analysis by market and by anticompetitive effect. In addition, they illustrate example cases where restrictions may have major impacts on competition and where restrictions are deemed to have negligible effects of lessening competition.

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Moreover, from the viewpoints of private monopolization and unfair trade practices, the Guidelines provide the views on inhibiting the use of technology, limiting the scope the use of technology and imposing conditions on the use of technology. From the viewpoint of unreasonable restraint of trade, they show the views on restrictive practices in a patent pool, multiple licensing and cross licensing.



There are no private monopolization cases where the JFTC made a decision

based on the so-called EF doctrine.


Restrictions by a right holder of a technology such as not to grant a license for use of the technology to a firm is seen as an exercise of rights and normally constitutes no problem. However, if any such restriction is found to deviate from or run counter to the purposes of the intellectual property system, it is not recognizable as an exercise of rights. And if such restriction is investigated in terms of the AMA and then found to be violation of the Act, the company could be ordered to refrain from refusing to grant a license. For example, suppose a case where a firm participating in a patent pool refuses to grant a license to any new entrant or any particular existing firm without any justifiable grounds, to hinder it from using the technology. If this restriction corresponds to the exclusion of other firm’s business activities, it could fall under private monopolization or an unfair trade practice based on its competitive impacts.


If technical standards are established, benefits from the products can increase,

companies can compete given the standards, and consumer interests can increase through the competition. Thus, competition policy does not see technical standards themselves as problems.

However, it is thought that competition policy should cope with potential unjust conduct in the process of formation of technical standards, or anticompetitive practices to use the sole possession of technical standards established.



The agreements concerning intellectual property right to which Japan is a party are as follows:

ll. WIPO Convention mm. UPOV Convention

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nn. Berne Convention oo. Madrid Agreement (Indications of Source) pp. Paris Convention qq. Phonograms Convention rr. Rome Convention ss. Trademark Law Treaty tt. WCT uu. WPPT vv. Budapest Treaty ww. Madrid Protocol xx. PCT yy. Nice Agreement zz. Strasbourg Agreement aaa. TRIPS Agreement bbb. EPA (Singapore, Mexico, Malaysia, Thailand, Chile)



(Article 31 (Compulsory License))

Securing a compulsory license is described under Articles 83(2), 92(3)(4) and 93(2) of the Japanese Patent Law.

A person who intends to work the patented invention may request the Commissioner of the Patent Office (Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry in the case of Compulsory License stipulated under Article 93) for an arbitration decision and then the Commissioner of the Patent Office (Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry) shall render an arbitration decision after hearing the views of the Council and the like stipulated under Article 85. If the request is approved, the person receives the compulsory license.

(Articles 8 and 40.2 (Abuse of Rights))

In Japan, the abuse of right doctrine was established by stipulating in Japanese Civil Code, Article 1(3), that "No abuse of rights is permitted."

This abuse of right doctrine represents general clauses that do not specify an applicable requirement. Therefore, in the case that the enforcement of an intellectual property right is considered to be the abuse of a right, the said doctrine is applied and prevents the right holder from excluding others' infringement acts.

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Latvia


The system of competition law in Latvia is created so, that it does not have any impact on national intellectual property regulation. Although the Competition rights does not have impact on enforcement of intellectual property rights, it does not mean that these rights can be misused, i.e. applied contrary to provisions of the Competition Law. Answer provided by the Competition Council.


Such cases have never been occurred in practice of the Competition Council. If questions concerning intellectual property rights could be examined, the Competition Council could follow the legislature of the European Court of Justice. Answer provided by the Competition Council.


The National Patent Office, when granting intellectual property rights, has never provided consultations with the Competition Council. Answer provided by the Competition Council. The National Patent Office of the Republic of Latvia during its performance of industrial property object registration does not have necessity to ask for consultations of the Competition Council. Answer provided by the Patent Office.


The Competition Council has never examined such cases. In common with situation when performance of dominant enterprise expressed as abuse of its dominant position does not have any exemptions, the same principle can be applied regarding the intellectual property of such enterprise if it is connected with abuse of its position – i.e., exemptions cannot been applied. Answer provided by the Competition Council.

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eee. "package patents" (whereby several patents of one company are necessary for the production of a product) fff. "patent thickets" (patent rights of multiple patent holders overlap) ggg. "cross licensing" (patent holders license their products reciprocally) hhh. "patent pools" (whereby patents held by various patent holders are pooled and access is granted to the pool instead of to an individual patent) Such practices had never been carried out in Latvia and presumably will not been practised in the foreseeable future. Answer provided by the Patent Office.


There is no such jurisdiction in Latvia. Answer provided by the Competition Council. Such concurrent jurisdiction between the competition authority and the patent office does not exist. Answer provided by the Patent Office.


The Competition Council does not have issued such guidelines. Answer provided by the Competition Council.


No answer given.


No answer given.

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No answer given.


1) The Republic of Latvia has concluded agreement with USA on trade relations and protection of intellectual property (in force since 20 January 1995); 2) The Republic of Latvia is a member state in following international agreements and conventions: - Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) (since February 10, 1999) – Annex 1C of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization; - The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (since September 7, 1993); - The Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) (since January 1, 1993); - The Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks (since January 1,1995); - The Protocol Related to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks (since January 5, 2000); - Common Regulations under the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks and the Protocol Relating to that Agreement; - The Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks (since January 1, 1995); - Nice Classification (8th edition); - Trademark Law Treaty (since December 28, 1999); - Regulations under the Trademark Law Treaty; - Locarno Agreement Establishing an International Classification for Industrial Designs (since April 14, 2005); - International Classification for Industrial Designs (Locarno Classification); - The Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) (since September 7, 1993); - Regulations under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT); - The Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of Micro organisms for the Purposes of Patent Procedures (since December 29,1994); - Regulations under the Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of Micro organisms for the Purposes of Patent Procedure; - Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Latvia and the European Patent Organization on the Cooperation in the Field of Patents (Cooperation Agreement) (Latvia becomes the associated member of the European Patent Organization) (signed January 25, 1994; entered into force March 1, 1994); - International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) (since August 30, 2002). Answer provided by the Patent Office.

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http://www.wto.int/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf

http://www.wto.int/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf

http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo020en.htm



http://www.wipo.int/madrid/en/legal_texts/pdf/madrid_agreement.pdf

http://www.wipo.int/madrid/en/legal_texts/pdf/madrid_protocol.pdf

http://www.wipo.int/madrid/en/legal_texts/pdf/madrid_protocol.pdf

http://www.wipo.int/madrid/en/legal_texts/pdf/common_regulations.pdf

http://www.wipo.int/madrid/en/legal_texts/pdf/common_regulations.pdf



http://www.wipo.int/classifications/fulltext/nice8/enmain.htm


http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs_new/pdf/en/wo/wo028en.pdf

http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/classification/locarno/pdf/trtdocs_wo014.pdf

http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/classification/locarno/pdf/trtdocs_wo014.pdf

http://www.wipo.int/classifications/fulltext/locarno8/enmn01.htm

http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/texts/pdf/pct.pdf

http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/texts/pdf/pct_regs.pdf



http://www.wipo.org/about-ip/en/budapest/guide/pdf/budapest_regulations.pdf

http://www.wipo.org/about-ip/en/budapest/guide/pdf/budapest_regulations.pdf

http://www.lrpv.lv/dl/pdf/LR_EPO_nol_en.pdf



http://www.upov.int/en/publications/conventions/1991/pdf/act1991.pdf


Such practices had never been carried out in Latvia and presumably will not been practised in the foreseeable future. Answer provided by the Patent Office.

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Pakistan (Kindly liaise with the National Patent Office or other relevant institution in your country if necessary)


Competition Ordinance, 2007 (the Ordinance) broadly covers all the aspects of competition including agreements and practices arising after the grant of intellectual property rights, patents, trade marks, company name etc, thus enhancing dynamic efficiency and consumer welfare. Under Section 4(2) (d) of the Ordinance, such agreements are prohibited for any undertaking or associations of undertakings that could result in “limiting technical development or investment with regard to the production, distribution or sale of any goods or the provision of any service”. The Ordinance also provides for exemptions from the application of this provision under Section 5, if a request to this effect is made by the concerned party. The exemption criteria are described in Section 9 which cover situations that lead to:- • Improving production or distribution • Promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit. • The benefits of that clearly outweigh adverse effect of absence or lessening of competition. Section 10 (d) of the Ordinance prohibits the fraudulent use of another’s trademark, firm name or product labelling or packaging. Section 3 (3)(c) categorize the practice of tie ins, where the sale of goods or services is made conditional on the purchase of other goods or services as a restrictive trade practice.


Tying and bundling of goods and services is examined under Section 3(3)(c) of the Ordinance as mentioned above. This is considered as a restrictive trade practice that leads to the abuse of dominance position; however, no case has yet been examined as the Ordinance is very recently promulgated.


No

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Recently, a case of abuse of dominant position under intellectual property rights has been taken up in the telecommunication sector but it is yet to be finalised.


iii. "package patents" (whereby several patents of one company are necessary for the production of a product) jjj. "patent thickets" (patent rights of multiple patent holders overlap) kkk. "cross licensing" (patent holders license their products reciprocally) lll. "patent pools" (whereby patents held by various patent holders are pooled and access is granted to the pool instead of to an individual patent) The law has been promulgated very recently, therefore no example is available to quote.


Concurrent jurisdiction is observed in case of fraudulent use of another’s trade mark, firm name or product labelling or packaging, where the Intellectual Property Ordinance and Competition Ordinance both provide protection and regulation for the holder of intellectual property rights.


The newly formed Competition Commission has not yet issued such guidelines, however, it could be considered at a later stage.


No


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A Competition Law allegation may be found valid against a refusal to licence, if it can be proved that licence holder has abused its dominant position. The Competition Commission in such a case may require the undertaking concerned to take such actions specified in the ‘order’ as may be necessary to restore competition and not to repeat the prohibitions specified in the Ordinance or to engage in any other practices with similar effect and in case of prohibited agreements, may annul the agreement or require the undertaking concerned to amend the agreement or related practice and not to repeat the prohibition specified in the Ordinance or to enter into any other agreement or engage in any other practice with a similar object or effect.


No such standards have been identified by the Commission as yet.


Pakistan has no bilateral agreement with any other country regarding the Intellectual Property Rights, however, following is the detail of international agreements:- ccc. Pakistan is a signatory to TRIPS being the member of WTO. ddd. Pakistan is also signatory to Paris Convention for the protection of Industrial Property Rights, 1883. eee. Pakistan is signatory to Bern Convention for the protection of Literary and Artistic Work, 1886. fff. Pakistan is a member of WIPO Convention.


The flexibilities provided for in TRIPS have been utilized by Pakistan by promulgating following laws:- • Copy Rights Ordinance, 2000. • Trade Marks Ordiance, 2001. • Patent Ordinance, 2000. • Registered Designs Ordinance, 2000. • Layout Design of Integrated Circuits Ordinance,2000

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Panama (Amablemente comuníquese con la Oficina de patentes Nacional u otra institución relevante en su país si fuera necesario) 1. ¿Cómo se complementan los derechos de propiedad intelectual y reglas de competencia para la mejora de la eficacia dinámica y el bienestar de consumidor?

R: Los temas de propiedad intelectual, los temas de competencia y los del consumidor son juzgados por la misma entidad jurisdiccional, es decir, los tribunales especiales. La Ley exceptúa el ejercicio de los derechos de propiedad intelectual de la aplicación de la Ley de competencia. Las reglas de competencia mejoran la eficiencia económica y el bienestar del consumidor, ya que se obtienen mayor variedad de productos a mejores precios. No encontramos evidencias claras que esto suceda con los derechos de propiedad intelectual. Sin embargo, están exceptuadas. 2. ¿Cómo son vistos los derechos de propiedad intelectual conforme a su ley de competencia? ¿Se aplica la regla per se o la regla de la razón?

R: El artículo 4 de la Ley 45 del 2007 establece entre las exclusiones, que no se

considerarán prácticas monopolísticas “El ejercicio de los derechos de propiedad intelectual e industrial que la ley reconozca a sus titulares, los que conceda durante un tiempo determinado a los titulares de los Derechos de Autor y Derechos Conexos para el ejercicio de sus derechos y los que otorgue a inventores para el uso exclusivo de sus inventos.”

La Ley 29 de 1996 incluía originalmente este último párrafo: “Sin perjuicio de lo anterior, los titulares de tales derechos de propiedad intelectual, no podrán llevar a cabo ningún acto, contrato o práctica que esta Ley defina como monopolísticos.” Sin embargo, este párrafo no está en la nueva Ley 45 de 2007. Por lo tanto, no se aplica la regla per se ni la regla de la razón, porque están excluidas de un análisis de competencia.

3. ¿Consulta la oficina de patentes nacional a la autoridad de competencia cuando concede derechos de propiedad intelectual? Por favor explíquese.

R: No. 4. ¿Ha tratado usted con casos que implican derechos de propiedad intelectual bajo las reglas de abuso de posición de dominio? ¿Es el abuso de posición de dominio un criterio en la evaluación de estas prácticas? ¿Hay cualquier otra práctica típica de negocio relacionada con los derechos de propiedad intelectual que han sido encontradas por ser anticompetitivos en su jurisdicción? Por favor cite tres casos incluyendo las partes, hechos, las provisiones legales que han sido violadas y conclusiones.

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R: En Panamá no hemos tenido ningún precedente al respecto, dada las razones explicadas en la respuesta 2 de este Capítulo. 5. ¿Cualquiera de las prácticas siguientes de combinación de varios derechos de propiedad intelectual causaron efectos anticompetitivos en su país? Por favor explíquese.

R: No tenemos precedente. No hemos visto ningún caso de propiedad intelectual en la agencia de competencia. 6. ¿Es la jurisdicción concurrente entre la autoridad de competencia y la oficina de patentes con respeto a la ejecución de derechos de propiedad intelectual? Por favor explíquese.

R: La jurisdicción ordinaria para ver ambos temas es la misma: Juzgados Civiles especiales. 7. ¿Ha publicado la autoridad de competencia o piensa publicar directrices sobre la relación de derechos de propiedad intelectual y la ley de competencia? Por favor proporcione detalles.

R: Los derechos de propiedad intelectual o industrial están excluidos de la aplicación de la Ley, por lo que no se estima necesaria hacer una publicación de ese tipo. 8. ¿Hubo casos en su jurisdicción donde el acceso a una facilidad esencial ha sido rechazada debido a un derecho de propiedad intelectual? Por favor proporcione la información específica que se relaciona con los casos individuales.

R: No tenemos precedente al respecto. 9. ¿Bajo qué circunstancias una alegación de ley de competencia contra un rechazo de licenciar sería encontrada para ser válida en su jurisdicción? ¿Qué remedios son posibles?

R: No tenemos conocimiento de que se haya dado una situación de este tipo en nuestro país. A nivel de la entidad de competencia nunca hemos tenido un caso de este tipo, ni ningún caso relacionado con propiedad intelectual. 10. ¿Las normas industriales estándares que son requeridas para asegurar la interoperabilidad han creado efectos anticompetitivos? Por favor explíquese.

R: No tenemos conocimiento que una situación como la descrita se haya dado. 11. ¿A cuáles acuerdos bilaterales o internacionales que conciernen a derechos de propiedad intelectual su país es una Parte?

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R: a.-.Multilaterales

• Convención General Interamericana de Protección Marcaria y Comercial.

Ley No. 64 de 1934. • Convenio de Estocolmo que establece la Organización Mundial de la

propiedad Intelectual. Ley No. 3 de 1982. • Convenio de París para la protección de la Propiedad Industrial.

Ley No. 41 de 13 de Julio de 1995. Publicada en la Gaceta Oficial No. 22,827 de 17 de julio de 1995. Se depositó ante el Director General de la Organización Mundial de la Propiedad Intelectual el día 19 de julio de 1996.

• Acuerdos de Marrakech, constitutivo de la Organización Mundial del

Comercio. Ley No. 23 de 15 de julio de 1997, que incluye entre otros el Acuerdo Relativo a los Derechos de Propiedad Intelectual Relacionados con el Comercio (ADPIC).

• Unión Internacional para la Protección de las Obtenciones Vegetales (UPOV). Ley No. 12 de 3 de mayo de 1999, órgano rector de las Obtenciones Vegetales a nivel mundial.

b.- Bilaterales • Brasil: Convenio para intercambio de información sobre marcas y patentes. • Corea: Memorándum para el otorgamiento recíproco de información de

marcas y patentes. • España: Convenio de intercambio de información. • Perú: Asistencia técnica e intercambio de información.

12. Cómo su país aprovechó la flexibilidad prevista en los Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), en particular en los Artículos 8, 31 y 40. Por favor proporcione detalles.

R. 1. Panamá se adhirió a la OMC, miembro número (132), a través de la ley 23 de

1997, específicamente el 7 de septiembre de 1997. En lo que concierne a los derechos y obligaciones del acuerdo de los ADPIC, Panamá no se acogió a la cláusula de transición establecida en el artículo 65 numeral 2. Es decir, Panamá cumplió todos sus compromisos antes de ese periodo.

2. El artículo 8 desarrolla los principios para proteger la salud pública y la nutrición de la población y la posibilidad de aplicar medidas para prevenir abusos de propiedad intelectual (monopolio) y sobre los aspectos que frene la transferencia de tecnología. Estos aspectos son claras flexibilidades que da el acuerdo pero a la fecha, desde nuestra adhesión a la OMC, no se ha dado ninguna acción del Gobierno o Estado, según sea el caso, para utilizar estos remedios y/o flexibilidades de estos principios. Por ejemplo, el artículo 6 sobre agotamiento de derechos de importaciones paralelas que son permitidas.

3. El artículo 31 de igual manera plantea flexibilidades relacionadas a las licencias obligatorias de medicamentos, por ejemplo. Sin embargo, en

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PANAMA ni siquiera se reglamentó ese artículo, por lo que tampoco se ha utilizado ese esquema y/o flexibilidades aún cuando está allí. Se espera que con el Tratado de Promoción Comercial (TPC) con estados Unidos de América se haga una reforma de la legislación y se reglamente dicha flexibilidad conforme a las flexibilidades de OMC-Doha SOBRE SALUD PUBLICA Y PROPIEDA INTELECTUAL.

4. De igual manera, el artículo 40 sobre el CONTROL DE LAS PRACTICAS ANTICOMPETITIVAS EN LAS LICENCIAS CONTRACTUALES, con relación a la transferencia y a la divulgación de la tecnología y a los a los caso de licencias abusivas, son flexibilidades que no las hemos utilizado POR AHORA, no se sabe a futuro por necesidades, por ejemplo, de medicamentos.

Les adjuntamos archivo con Informe hecho por el Ministerio de Comercio e Industrias sobre la SITUACION DE LA PROPIEDAD INTELECTUAL EN PANAMÁ.

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Peru (Kindly liaise with the National Patent Office or other relevant institution in your country if necessary)


Patent rights limit economic competition but they promote technological innovation, however, under Peruvian law, competition rules may be used if a practice is found to be anti-competitive and damaging to the market.


The Peruvian intellectual property law (Legislative Decree No. 823) clearly states: Artículo 5.- El ejercicio regular de los derechos de propiedad industrial no puede ser sancionado como práctica monopólica ni como acto restrictivo de la competencia. Therefore, the use of intellectual property rights is not going to be penalized as an anti-competitive practice, unless it is found to be irregular. There is no specific rule that establishes that a certain business practice related to the tying and bundling of intellectual property rights is considered illegal per se. However, if a practice is found to be anti-competitive under the peruvian competition law, the rule of reason would be applied and the mentioned practice would be stopped and penalized.


No.


The Peruvian competition authority have not been involved in the assessment of anti-competitive practices that involve patent rights. Nevertheless, in the case N° 001-2004-CLC (Ambev case), related to anti-competitive practices that involve trademark rights, the final administrative ruling mentioned as an example of a strategic barrier designed to increase the access costs or the operation costs the following: “b.4) Acumulación de patentes 82. La adquisición de patentes tanto de procesos como de productos constituye una forma de impedir o desalentar el ingreso de nuevos competidores. La idea detrás de adjudicarse una patente por parte de la empresa establecida es restringir el uso o elaboración de determinados productos o procesos, con lo cual se restringen las posibilidades de ingreso al mercado.

83. Los efectos sobre la competencia son diversos dependiendo de la necesidad de uso del producto o proceso en cuestión. Así por ejemplo, si lo patentado es el producto sobre el cual se quiere competir, la competencia es eliminada toda vez que la empresa

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entrante no podrá producir el producto; similar efecto se da cuando el producto o proceso en cuestión constituye un insumo indispensable sin sustitutos para la elaboración del producto final. Por otro lado, si el producto o proceso patentado posee sustitutos, el efecto de la barrera a la entrada dependerá del grado de cercanía y de los costos de los mismos, lo cual determinará la decisión de ingreso al mercado”


rights resulted in anti-competitive effects in your country? Please elaborate. mmm. "package patents" (whereby several patents of one company are necessary for the production of a product) nnn. "patent thickets" (patent rights of multiple patent holders overlap) ooo. "cross licensing" (patent holders license their products reciprocally) ppp. "patent pools" (whereby patents held by various patent holders are pooled and access is granted to the pool instead of to an individual patent) We do not know if any of the above mentioned practices occurred in the Peruvian market. The competition authority have not issued any ruling or study in which those practices are addressed.


There is no concurrent jurisdiction between the competition authority and the patent office with regard to the enforcement of intellectual property rights. However, regarding the enforcement of rights of those who applied for a patent which is not issued yet, it is important to mention the Directive No. 001-96-TRI. The mentioned Directive addresses the issue of who is competent to enforce a pending patent or an issued patent. When the patent is still pending, the competition authority is competent because the case will be analysed as a possible unfair competition practice. On the other side, when the patent has been issued, the patent office is competent to enforce that intellectual property right.


No guidelines on the relationship of patent rights and competition law have been issued by the competition authority and we do not know if they plan to prepare guidelines related to that topic.


There have been no such cases regarding patent rights.


The Peruvian competition law (Legislative Decree No. 701) states on its third article that “any acts or conduct related to economic activities constituting an abuse of a dominant position in the market or limiting, restricting or distorting the free

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competition, in such a way that damages to the general economic interest in the national territory are caused, are forbidden and will be punished”. Therefore, a competition law allegation against a refusal to license would be found to be valid if it constitutes an abuse of a dominant position in the market or if it limits, restricts or distorts the free competition, in such a way that it is damaging to the general economic interest. The competition authority can fine those who are found guilty and, if a party is adversely affected by any anti-competitive practices, it has the right to bring a civil action for damages and losses. According to article 66 of the Decisión 486, the patent office may issue a compulsory license if the competition authority has found a certain practice to be anti-competitive, specially when they constitute an abuse of a dominant position in the market by the patent right holder.



rights is your country a party? Regarding patent rights, Peru is a party of the following treaties: ggg. Paris Convention (international) hhh. TRIPS (international) iii. Chapter 16 of the Trade Promotion Agreement (TPA) signed with the United States (bilateral) The TPA forces Peru to become a party of this treaties: PCT, Budapest Treaty, UPOV, Peru is a member of the Andean Community, therefore it has to comply with the following common regimes regarding intellectual property rights jjj. Decisión 24 from the Andean Community (regional): related to trademarks, patents, licences. kkk. Decisión 486 from the Andean Community (regional): related to patents, utility models, industrial designs and other intellectual property rights lll. Decisión 632 from the Andean Community (regional): related to test data mmm. Decisión 345 from the Andean Community (regional): related to plant breeder rights nnn. Decisión 391 from the Andean Community (regional): related to genetic resources


The flexibilities provided for in TRIPS have not been used in Peru.

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Romania (Kindly liaise with the National Patent Office or other relevant institution in your country if necessary)


IPR and the antitrust laws share a common central economic goal in the long-run and complement each other: to maximize wealth by producing what consumers need at the lowest cost. In serving this common goal, reconciliation between patent and antitrust law involves serious problems of assessing effects, but not conflicting purposes. Quite properly, competition law permits monopoly when monopoly makes for greater output than would the alternative of an inefficient or fragmented industry. The patent monopoly fits directly into this scheme insofar as its central aim is achieved. It is designed to provide something which consumers value and which they could not have at all or have as abundantly in the absence of patent protection. IPR-s promote dynamic competition by encouraging undertakings to invest in developing new or improved products and processes. So does competition by putting pressure on undertakings to innovate. Therefore, both intellectual property rights and competition are policy tools necessary to promote innovation and ensure dynamic efficiency and consumer welfare thereof. IPR laws should ideally encourage innovation up to the optimal level, but no further, because overly strong IPR laws unduly interfere with competition and therefore reduce welfare unnecessarily. The same is true in reverse: overly aggressive competition law sometimes privileges static efficiency over innovation and therefore reduces long-term welfare.


According to the RCC’s guidelines of 23 of June, 2005 on the application of art. 5 of Competition Law to technologies transfer arrangements which are similar to the EC Guidelines on the application of art.81 of the EC Treaty to technology transfer arrangements, tying and bundling are not block exempted above the market share thresholds of 20 % in the case of agreements between competitors and 30 % in the case of agreements between non-competitors. The market share thresholds apply to any relevant technology or product market affected by the licence agreement, including the market for the tied product. Therefore, above the market share threshold mentioned above, tying and bundling of IPR is an area calling for sensitive application of competition law under a rule of reason standard which confers an adequate distinction between pro and

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anticompetitive tying in cases where the requisite market power is conferred through IPR. However, yet, RCC did not cope with cases whereas its actions would have been necessary to stop patent holders from bundling the sale of two technologies or linking the sale of patented products to the purchase of other patented goods or goods whose patent protection had lapsed.


No. The State Office for Inventions and Trademarks - OSIM is the national administration in charge of granting protection for inventions, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial designs and others, in the territory of Romania, under the law and the provisions of international conventions and treaties to which the Romanian State is party. An invention may be protected in Romania by the grant of a patent by OSIM, according to the national legislation, or by the grant of a European patent with effect in Romania, according to the European Patent Convention.


Insofar, the national competition authority did not pronounce itself on cases of abuse of dominance facilitated by possession of IPR. However, we believe that the competitive impact of intellectual property rights on the market depends on the nature and actual strength of the intellectual property right held by the allegedly dominant undertaking. That means that we recognise that the mere possession of an intellectual property right does not necessarily guarantee the possibility to exercise market power and that there is a need for an in-depth assessment of the individual case-by-case circumstances. Even if intellectual property rights, under certain circumstances, may preclude expansion and entry, they do not as such confer dominance on the holder. To conclude, the assessment of market power stemming from the possession of an intellectual property right in our jurisdiction is not different from that applied in other contexts.


qqq. "package patents" (whereby several patents of one company are

necessary for the production of a product) rrr. "patent thickets" (patent rights of multiple patent holders overlap)

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sss. "cross licensing" (patent holders license their products reciprocally) ttt. "patent pools" (whereby patents held by various patent holders are


The Romanian Competition Authority has no experience in this issue so far.


NO. As long as the intellectual property rights owners reasonably exercise their rights in accordance with the Copyright Law, the Trademark Law, or the Patent Law, the competition law provisions are not applicable.


The secondary competition legislation in Romania provides for exemptions or exceptions designed to ensure that competition law do not negate the exclusive rights explicitly granted by patent, know-how and copyright laws in its “Regulation on granting block exemptions to research and development agreements from the prohibition of art. 5(1) of the Competition law nr. 21/1996” which is similar to the EC Regulation no.773/2004 on the application of art.81(3) of the Treaty to categories of technology transfer agreements . Furthermore, RCC’s guidelines of 23 of June 2005 provides for extensive rules on the application of the Block Exemptions Regulation as well on the application of art. 5 of Competition Law to technologies transfer arrangements that fall outside the scope of the Block Exemptions Regulation.

20. Have there been cases in your jurisdiction where access to an essential

facility has been refused on account of an intellectual property right? Please provide specific information relating to the individual cases.



A competition allegation against a refusal to license is found valid where a patentee’s refusal to license, or its excessively high royalties for a term exceeding the life of patent, is very likely to restrict the development of competition and could lead thus to an abuse of dominance case.

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Romania is one of the countries, which signed and ratified the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO. One of the agreements, signed as part of the Marrakesh Agreement, was the Trade- Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (hereinafter referred to as TRIPS). As it is clearly known that developed countries had a one-year transition period for adoption of national legislation to make them compatible to TRIPS Agreement, developing countries including Romania had been granted 4 more years for reflecting the provisions of TRIPS to their national legislation. This period ended in January 1, 2000.

So, the TRIPS Agreement is already applicable in Romania. Also, Romania is signatory to other main international conventions in the intellectual property field, such as the Paris Convention and the Berne Convention.

To brief, the domestic legislation for all intellectual property objects is fully harmonized with the Community regulations and the international treaties and conventions.


Yet, we did not cope with cases that required the applicability of the TRIPS provisions stipulated in art. 8, 31 and 40.

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Russia 1. According to the part 3 of the Article 1484 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation (hereinafter referred to as CC RF) nobody has the right to use without the permission of the right holder notations that are similar to his trade mark with regard to commodities for the individualization of which the trade mark is registered, or to homogeneous commodities, if as a result of such a use an overlap may occur. According to the part 1 of the Article 1515 of the CC RF commodities, labels, commodities’ packing, on which trade mark or notation similar to it to the extent of the overlap is placed illegally, are infringing. According to the part 1 of the Article 1225 of the CC RF the results of the intellectual activity and equated to them means of individualization of legal persons, commodities, operations, services and entities, which are provided by the legal protection (intellectual property) include:

1) works of science, literature and art; 2) programs for computers; 3) data base; 4) performances; 5) phonograms; 6) online radio and TV broadcasting; 7) inventions; 8) utility models; 9) industrial designs; 10) achievements in selection; 11) integrated-circuit layouts; 12) industrial secrets (know-how); 13) business names; 14) trade marks and service marks; 15) appellation of commodities’ origin; 16) commercial names. According to the point 4 of the part 1 of the Article 14 of the Federal Law

№135-FL “On Protection of Competition” (hereinafter referred to as the Law) unfair competition in the form of selling, exchange or other introduction of the commodity is not permitted if at the same time the results of the intellectual activity and equated to them means of individualization of the legal person, of products, operations and services were illegally used.

According to the part 2 of the Article 14.33 of the Code of the Russian Federation on the Administrative Violations unfair competition in the form of introduction of the commodity with illegal use of the results of the intellectual activity and equated to them means of the individualization of the legal person, products, operations, services leads o the imposition of the administrative fine on legal persons – from 1% to 15% of the proceeds of the infringer gained from the realization of the commodity (operation, service) on the market where the infringement was committed, however, not less than 100 000 roubles.

Hence, the antimonopoly agency prevents spreading of the infringing goods by means of considering of the actions of economic entities on distribution of such goods as an act of unfair competition and by means of giving directions on termination of such actions and by means of imposing administrative penalties.

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Thus, consumers get the opportunity to purchase high-quality products that has legal trade mark and are not afraid to buy infringing goods by mistake. 2. The FAS Russia while exercising its authorities follows the per se approach. The Law doesn’t consider tying and bundling of intellectual property rights as an act of unfair competition. The restriction of intellectual property rights is realized using the following legislative regulations: Part 2 of the Article 14 of the Law bars unfair competition related to purchasing and using of the exclusive right on the means of individualization of the legal person, products, operations and services. Part 3 of the Article 14 of the Law allows interested parties to bring the decision of the federal antimonopoly agency on infringement of the part 2 of the Article 14 with regard to purchasing and using of the exclusive right on the trade mark into the federal executive body on intellectual property to nullify provision of the trade mark’s legal protection. According to the point 6 of the part 2 of the Article 1512 of the CC RF provision of the legal protection to trade mark may be challenged and fully or partially nullified during the whole period of legal protection, provided the actions of the right holder related to the national registration of the trade mark are recognized as abuse of the right or unfair competition. Thus, following the regulations the FAS Russia possesses an opportunity to constrain usage of exclusive rights on the means of individualization of the legal person, operations or services that are purchased for the purpose of unfair competition. In this case the antimonopoly body deals with the actions that are contrary to mental and ethical norms, i.e. when trade mark registration application is formally done according to the law, however is contrary to the principles of respectability, rationality and fairness. At the same time it should be taken into consideration that one of the major principles laid in the Russian legislation on trade marks is an entitlement of the trade mark to the person who applied for protection provision earlier than others. In case of unfair competition related to purchasing and using of exclusive rights on trade mark, the antimonopoly body issues a decision basing on which patent authority deprives the trade mark of legal protection according to the point 6 of the part 2 of the Article 1512 of the CC RF. 3. When granting intellectual property rights the national patent authority doesn’t hold consultations with the FAS Russia. 4. 1) In September 1996 the non-commercial partnership “Centre of scientific and technical support of the “AVTOMIR” vehicle business” was registered. Presently, this partnership consolidates 30 economic entities, acting under the “Avtomir” trade mark. The main sorts of activity of these economic entities are vehicle trade, spare parts and utility trade, operations and service center. The trade marks of the licenses №№ 131453, 156036 under the classes 35, 36, 42 of the International Classification of Goods and Services (ICGS) were registered as partnership members in 1995, 1997. Starting from 1995 economic entities, members of the partnership, render on the Russian market services, dealing with vehicle sale and the subsequent technical service under the “Avtomir” trade mark due to the license agreements.

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In June 2000 “Trade house “Avtomir” Ltd applied for and registered in September 2002 word trademark “AVTOMIR” (license №220938) including under the class 37 of ICGS, i.e. vehicle repair and technical service. In 2004 “Trade house “Avtomir” Ltd offered Non-commercial partnership “Centre of scientific and technical support of the “AVTOMIR” vehicle business” to purchase this trade mark on the license №220938 for 700 000 US dollars. Furthermore, there was put an application to the FAS Russia Moscow Regional Office to call applicant to account for unfair competition. On October 3, 2005 Commission of the FAS Russia issued a decision to recognize actions of the “Trade house “Avtomir” Ltd, related to the registration of the trade mark on the license №220938 under the class 37 of ICGS, namely obtaining and using of exclusive rights for the mentioned trade mark for a competitor’s exclusion from the relevant market, as an act of unfair competition. After accepting of this decision the patent office terminated before the appointed time the legal protection of the trade mark №220938 under class 37 of ICGS. 2) CJSC “Rust Incorporated” realizes from January 3, 2002 “Russian standard PLATINUM” vodka. Sale of vodka was preceded by the number of preparatory events – registration of vodka formula, advertisements in special editions, “Russian standard PLATINUM” vodka presentation, etc. On May 28, 2002 CJSC “GB Holding of Vines” gave an application for the registering of the trade mark “Platinum” and on February 13, 203 received a license, including under class 33 of ICGS (vodka). According to the Articles 25 and 26 of the Law on trade marks CJSC “GB Holding of Vines” on May 11, 2004 proposed to consider an issue of cession of trade mark or to conclude an agreement on usage of this trade mark on the basis of 0,25 US dollars, including VAT, for one liter of an alcohol product. Pursuant to the point 1 of the Article 4 of the Law on trade marks, owner of the trade mark has an exclusive right to use and dispose of the trade mark, as well as to ban its use by other persons. In May 2004, CJSC “GB Holding of Vines” brought a claim to the Moscow Arbitrary court on CJSC “Rust Incorporated” infringing the exclusive right for the trade mark “PLATINUM”, that belongs to CJSC “GB Holding of Vines” according to the law of property under license №238373 requiring to ban “Rust Incorporated” from using this trade mark, to produce, to store, to offer for sale or to introduce it to the circulation on the territory of Russia by any other means and to oblige it to remove at its own expense the illegally used trade mark from commodities, labels, packages. The damages amounted to 17 532 763 roubles, whereas the “Platinum” vine sales volume made 62 400 roubles, including VAT. On October 26, 2004 the actions of CJSC “GB Holding of Vines” (obtaining and using of the exclusive rights for the trade mark under the license № 238373) were adjudicated by the FAS Russia Commission an infringement of the point 2 of the Article 10 of the Law.

After accepting of this decision the patent office terminated before the appointed time the legal protection of the trade mark № 238373. 5. Currently we don’t have such examples. 6. There is no concurrent jurisdiction between the competition authority and the patent authority with regard to the enforcement of intellectual property rights.

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7. Such guidelines were not issued. 8. FAS Russia hasn’t investigated such cases. 9. Such circumstances were not a subject for consideration by the FAS Russia and are not provided in the Law. 10. This question is out of the competence of the FAS Russia. 11. International cooperation in the sphere of intellectual property rights in Russia is mainly realized by Rospatent (Federal Service for Intellectual Property, Patents and Trademarks of the Russian Federation). According to the available information on the web-site of Rospatent the Russian Federation is a party to the following international conventions and agreements in relation to WIPO: Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property; Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks; Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks; Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks; Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization; Locarno Agreement Establishing an International Classification for Industrial Designs; Patent Cooperation Treaty; Strasbourg Agreement Concerning the International Patent Classification; Nairobi Treaty on the Protection of the Olympic Symbol; Trademark Law Treaty; Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works; Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms; Convention Relating to the Distribution of Programme–Carrying Signals Transmitted by Satellite; Singapore Treaty on the Law of Trademarks (have yet to come to effect) and many other. Cooperation between the European patent authority and Rospatent is realized on the basis of Memorandum on mutual understanding on bilateral cooperation between the Federal Service on Intellectual Property, patents and trade marks and European patent office, which was signed on April 17, 2007 in Munich, Germany. Bilateral cooperation between Rospatent and other national patent offices is realized on the basis of different intergovernmental agreements, accords between authorities. In 2006 the Memorandum on establishing a dialog on intellectual property rights between the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation and Directorate General on Trade of the European Union was signed. There are bilateral agreements with China, France, Indonesia, Slovakia, Brazil, Viet Nam, etc. The Russian Federation has a status of an observer in the WTO, including on the issues of intellectual property rights. The Russian Federation has bilateral agreements with the CIS member-states (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, Uzbekistan, Ukraine) on protection of industrial property. 12. TRIPS is a part of WTO and has binding force for all the WTO members. The Russian Federation is currently not a WTO member.

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Singapore (Kindly liaise with the National Patent Office or other relevant institution in your country if necessary)


The CCS has published Guidelines on the Treatment of Intellectual Property Rights which can be found on its website. Both intellectual property (“IP”) and competition laws share the same basic objective of promoting economic efficiency and innovation. IP law does this through the provision of incentives for innovation and its dissemination and commercialisation, by establishing enforceable property rights for the creators of new and improved products and processes. Competition law does this by helping to promote competitive markets, thereby spurring firms to be more efficient and innovative. For competition law purposes, the CCS will regard IP rights (“IPR”) as being essentially comparable to any other form of property. The right to exclude is the basis of private property rights. An IPR bestows on the IP owner certain rights to exclude others, and the CCS recognises that these rights are necessary in order to allow IP owners to recover the costs of their investments and profit from the use of their property. However, as with other forms of private property, certain types of agreements or conduct with respect to IP may have anti-competitive effects which come under the purview of competition law.


As a new competition authority, we have not had any experience dealing with cases on tying and bundling. Generally, under the Act, an agreement, merger or conduct will only be found to be an infringement of the Act where there is an appreciable adverse effect on competition in Singapore. Under section 34 and section 47 of the Act, agreements, decisions or concerted practices which make the conclusion of contract subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of the contracts, i.e. tying, are deemed in particular to have the effect of preventing, restricting or distorting competition within Singapore. An illustration of a possible infringement under section 34 of the Act is where licensors with a sufficient degree of market power pool together various parts of a technology and license them together as a package when only part of the package is

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essential to produce a certain product. However, the CCS will consider if an agreement that falls within the scope of the section 34 prohibition will have a net economic benefit. Such an agreement will be excluded by virtue of section 35 of the Act, no prior decision of the CCS to that effect will be required. An illustration of a possible infringement under section 47 of the Act is where, an undertaking who is dominant in the market might impose a condition that he will grant a licence to his IPR only if the potential licensee agrees to buy an additional product or set of products, which is not covered by the IPR. However, the conduct of an dominant undertaking may be deemed to be an objectively justified and proportionate response, if it can show that such provisions are necessary for a satisfactory exploitation of the IPR, such as for ensuring that the licensee conforms to quality standards or for technical interoperability.


At present, when dealing with the grant of patent rights, the intellectual property registration office does not consult the CCS.


The CCS has not dealt with such cases.


uuu. "package patents" (whereby several patents of one company are necessary for the production of a product) vvv. "patent thickets" (patent rights of multiple patent holders overlap) www. "cross licensing" (patent holders license their products reciprocally) xxx. "patent pools" (whereby patents held by various patent holders are pooled and access is granted to the pool instead of to an individual patent) The CCS is not aware of such cases.


Under section 55 of the Patents Act, the Courts of Singapore may order the grant of a licence under a patent on the ground that the grant of the licence is necessary to remedy an anti-competitive practice. Presently, section 55 of the Patents Act does not

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expressly require a court to consult the CCS when reaching a determination on this issue but a court when hearing such an application has the discretion to consult the CCS on such matters.


The CCS has published Guidelines on the Treatment of Intellectual Property Rights. This can be found on our website.8


Such cases have not arisen before the CCS.


The basis of property rights is the right to exclude. Ownership of an IPR does not normally impose on the IP owner an obligation to license the use of that IP to others, even where the IPR confers market power on the IP owner. Therefore, a refusal to supply a licence, even by a dominant undertaking, is not normally an abuse. However, in limited circumstances, a dominant undertaking’s refusal to supply a licence may constitute an infringement under the section 47 prohibition. For example, this may occur if the refusal concerns an IPR which relates to an essential facility9, with the effect of (likely) substantial harm to competition. The CCS may consider if the dominant undertaking is able to objectively justify its conduct, and whether the dominant undertaking has behaved in a proportionate way in defending its legitimate commercial interest. In determining whether a refusal to supply a licence constitutes an abuse under the section 47 prohibition, the impact on the technology and innovation markets will be considered in order not to undermine the incentives for undertakings to make future investments and innovations. Under section 69 of the Act, the CCS may give directions as it considers appropriate to bring infringements to an end.


8 http://www.ccs.gov.sg/NR/rdonlyres/A67B68FC-DB6F-415B-9DF1-5A97FC6855A9/17200/IPR_Jul07FINAL.pdf 9 A facility will be viewed as essential only if there are no potential substitutes (through duplication or otherwise), and if the facility is indispensable to the exercise of the activity in question. Essential facilities are rare in practice; IPRs by themselves are generally unlikely to create essential facilities.

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Such cases have not arisen before the CCS.


Singapore is a party to these international agreements on IP:

Berne Convention for the protection of literary and artistic works Brussels Convention Relating to the Distribution of Programme-Carrying Signals Transmitted by Satellite Hague Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Industrial Designs Madrid Protocol - Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property Patent Cooperation Treaty TRIPS – Agreement on the Trade Related aspects of Intellectual Property rightS Singapore Treaty on the Law of Trademarks UPOV Convention WIPO Copyright Treaty WIPO Performers and Phonograms Treaty

In addition to the international agreements listed above, Singapore is a party to a number of bilateral trade agreements that have chapters containing substantive IP provisions. These include the United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (USSFTA) and the Singapore-Australia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA).


Singapore has given effect to parts of the above-mentioned articles in various provisions of our domestic IP laws. The following table gives some examples of how Singapore has made use of these TRIPS articles.

TRIPS Provision Singapore Article 8 Principles

Singapore has provisions in the Patents Act and the Plant Varieties Protection Act that provide for compulsory licences to be given for public non-commercial purposes or for the public interest.

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Article 31 Other Use Without Authorization of the Right Holder

The spirit of Article 31 has been enacted in Section 56 of the Patents Act.

Article 40 Control of anti-competitive practices In contractual licences

Singapore has a system of Competition law in place to prohibit anti-competitive agreements.

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Slovakia (Kindly liaise with the National Patent Office or other relevant institution in your country if necessary)


We have a very few experiences in this field.


We have a very few experiences in this field.


No, it does not.


The Office has not dealt with cases involving intellectual property rights, yet. So, we can not respond to this question.


yyy. "package patents" (whereby several patents of one company are necessary for the production of a product) zzz. "patent thickets" (patent rights of multiple patent holders overlap) aaaa. "cross licensing" (patent holders license their products reciprocally) bbbb. "patent pools" (whereby patents held by various patent holders are pooled and access is granted to the pool instead of to an individual patent)

The Office has not found this type of anti-competitive effects, yet. So, they have not.


No, it is not.

The purpose of the Act No. 136/2001 Coll. on Protection of Competition is to protect competition in the market for products, performance, work and services (hereinafter referred to as "goods") from any restriction and to create conditions for its further development with a view to promoting economic development to the benefit of

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consumers and regulating the powers and scope of activities of the Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic.

The Industrial Property Office of the Slovak Republic is a central state administration body operating, in accordance with the Act No. 575/2001 Coll. on Activities of the Government and central state administration bodies, in the field of industrial property protection, i.e. patents, utility models, designs, topographies of semiconductor products, trademarks and designations of origin /geographical indications. The Office further maintains the patent and trademark documentation and makes it available to public and acts as special patent information centre in Slovakia. In the field of international relations the Office administers international treaties concerning industrial property protection which the Slovak Republic is bound with. The Office fosters and encourages the development of technical creativity, education and popularization of intellectual property.


No, the Office has not.


The Office has not dealt with cases involving intellectual property rights, yet. So, the Office has not solved any type of such cases, yet.


We have very few experiences in this field.


The Office has not found this type of anti-competitive effects, yet. So, we can not respond to this question.


The Industrial Property Office of the Slovak Republic (www.upv.sk) should answer this question.


The Industrial Property Office of the Slovak Republic (www.upv.sk) should answer this question.

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http://www.upv.sk/

Switzerland (Dans la mesure du possible, prière de collaborer avec l'Autorité nationale chargée des brevets ou de la propriété intellectuelle ou toute autre structure gouvernementale chargée de ces questions). 1. Dans quelle mesure les droits de propriété intellectuelle et la politique de concurrence se complètent-ils mutuellement pour améliorer l'efficience dynamique et le bien être des consommateurs dans votre pays?

La LCart règle les rapport entre le droit des cartel et le droit de la propriété intellectuelle à l’article 3 alinéa 2. Aux termes de cet article, la LCart n’est pas applicable aux effets sur la concurrence qui découlent exclusivement de la législation sur la propriété intellectuelle. En revanche, les restrictions aux importations fondées sur des droits de propriété intellectuelle sont soumises à la LCart. L'Institut Fédéral de la Propriété Intellectuelle est l’autorité compétente en matière de propriété intellectuelle en Suisse. Il a obtenu le statut d'établissement de droit public indépendant le 1er janvier 1996. Autonome dans la gestion de ses affaires, l'Institut a une personnalité juridique propre et est inscrit au registre du commerce. 2. Comment la vente liée et le groupage des droits de propriété intellectuelle sont-ils examinés par votre législation sur la concurrence? Les approches d'interdiction per se ou basées sur la règle de la raison ont-elles été appliquées?

La portée de l’article 3 alinéa 2 LCart n’a pas encore été décidée dans la législation. Cependant, cet article ne nous restreint pas d’appliquer les articles 5 et 7 si nécessaire. 3. L'Autorité nationale chargée des brevets consulte-t-elle l'Autorité chargée de la concurrence lorsqu'elle accorde des droits de propriété intellectuelle? Dans l'affirmative, prière de développer votre réponse.

L'Institut fédéral de la propriété intellectuelle examine les demandes relatives à la délivrance de droits de propriété intellectuelle en application des lois pertinentes en matière de propriété intellectuelle. Une consultation préalable des autorités de concurrence n'a pas lieu au cours de la procédure d'examen. 4. Avez-vous traité des cas impliquant les droits de propriété intellectuelle dans le cadre des règles qui régissent l'abus de position dominante? La domination est-il un critère dans l'examen de ces pratiques? Existe-t-il d'autres pratiques typiques des affaires relatives à la propriété intellectuelle qui ont été qualifiées d'anticoncurrentielles dans votre juridiction? Prière de citer ces cas en indiquant les parties, les faits, les dispositions pertinentes de la loi qui ont été violées et les conclusions qui ont résulté de leurs examens.

Droit des brevets : le cas Kodak (épuisement national)

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La société Kodak (Suisse) SA était la détentrice du brevet suisse correspondant à un brevet européen, qui appartenait à sa société mère. A ce titre, elle possédait un droit exclusif de vente pour toute la Suisse des produits Kodak. Kodak avait commercialisé des films protégés par un brevet sur de nombreux marchés européens. Or, une partie de la marchandise de la société Jumbo Markt AG provenait de Kodak (Suisse) SA, mais Jumbo Markt AG vendait aussi des pellicules couleur et des appareils photo jetables importés directement d'Angleterre, où ils avaient été mis en circulation avec l'autorisation de Kodak Grande-Bretagne. La chaîne de grande distribution Jumbo avait ainsi acheté ces films en Grande-Bretagne, où Kodak les avait mis sur le marché nettement moins cher, afin de les réimporter en Suisse et de les y commercialiser à bas prix. La société Kodak (Suisse) SA avait ouvert action pour violation du droit des brevets. Le 23 novembre 1998, le Tribunal de commerce de Zurich s’était prononcé en faveur de l’épuisement international des droits. Kodak a fait valoir son brevet pour interdire à Jumbo cette importation parallèle et le Tribunal fédéral lui a donné raison, confirmant que l’épuisement du droit des brevets est national et que la loi sur les cartels peut au plus en corriger les excès. Cet arrêt a été critiqué pour son imprécision et la révision de la LCart a introduit en conséquence une disposition un peu plus précise allant dans ce sens (Art. 3 al. 2, 2ème phrase LCart). ATF 126 III 129. 5. Les pratiques suivantes qui impliquent la combinaison de plusieurs aspects du droit de la propriété intellectuelle ont-elles eu des effets anticoncurrentiels dans votre pays? Prière de développer votre réponse.

a. "Package patents" (mécanisme par lequel plusieurs brevets d’une société sont nécessaires à la fabrication (rentrent dans la fabrication) d’un produit- ); b. "patent thickets" (les droits de plusieurs titulaires (détenteurs) de brevets se chevauchent; c. "cross licensing"-"le croisement des licences" (les détenteurs de brevet s'accordent des droits réciproques sur leur produit ; d."patent pools"-"Le pool des brevets" (mécanisme qui permet à plusieurs titulaires de brevets de mettre en commun leur brevet, de manière à les licencier conjointement plutôt qu’individuellement). Nous n’avons pas eu de tels cas à traiter. 6. Existe-t-il une juridiction concurrente entre l'Autorité de concurrence et l'Office de brevet dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre des droits de la propriété intellectuelle? Prière de développer votre réponse.

Non. Dans la procédure de délivrance, l'Institut fédéral de la propriété intellectuelle décide sans consulter l'autorité de concurrence si un droit de propriété industrielle (brevet, marque, design ou topographie) peut être inscrit au Registre (voir réponse à la question 3). Les décisions de l'Institut peuvent faire l'objet d'un recours au Tribunal administratif fédéral et au Tribunal fédéral. Après l'inscription au Registre, ce n'est plus l'Institut, mais les tribunaux civils compétents qui décident en ce qui concerne l'existence et la portée des droits inscrits.

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7. L'Autorité de concurrence a-t-elle (ou envisage-t-elle) publié des directives sur les relations entre la politique de la concurrence et les droits de propriété intellectuelle? Prière de donner plus de détails.

La Comco a émis une recommandation selon l’article 45 alinéa 2 LCart concernant les importations parallèles et le droit des brevets :

http://www.weko.admin.ch/publikationen/00212/rpw03-1.pdf?lang=fr La Commission de la concurrence (Comco) a, dans un communiqué de presse, recommandé de modifier le système actuel d’épuisement afin de faciliter les importations parallèles : http://www.weko.admin.ch/publikationen/pressemitteilungen/00286/PM_f_Patentrecht_260607.pdf?lang=fr Cependant, on peut noter que le Conseil fédéral a adopté le 21 décembre 2007 le Message relatif à la révision de la Loi sur les brevets, confirmant le principe de l'épuisement national en droit des brevets. 8. Votre juridiction a-t-elle eu à connaitre des affaires où l'accès à une facilité essentielle a été refusé en invoquant les droits de propriété intellectuelle? Prière de donner des informations des informations spécifiques sur ces cas.

Nous n'avons pas connaissance en Suisse d'un cas comparable à l'affaire "Magill" (Radio Telefis Eireann [RTE] and Independent Television Publications Ltd [ITP] v Commission of the European Communities) . 9. Dans quelle circonstance, en vertu de la législation sur la concurrence, une allégation sur le refus de licence peut être considérée comme recevable dans votre juridiction? Quelles mesures correctives proposez-vous dans cette perspective? Un détenteur de brevet peut-il être forcé d'accorder une licence par l'Autorité de concurrence?

Les restrictions aux importations fondées sur des droits de propriété intellectuelle sont soumises à la LCart; Art. 3 al.2. 10. Votre juridiction a-t-elle eu à traiter des affaires où les normes industrielles communes dont l'objectif est d'assurer l'interopérabilité ont eu des effets anticoncurrentiels.

Nous n'avons pas connaissance d'un tel cas.

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http://www.weko.admin.ch/publikationen/00212/rpw03-1.pdf?lang=fr

http://www.weko.admin.ch/publikationen/pressemitteilungen/00286/PM_f_Patentrecht_260607.pdf?lang=fr

http://www.weko.admin.ch/publikationen/pressemitteilungen/00286/PM_f_Patentrecht_260607.pdf?lang=fr

11. Quels sont les accords bilatéraux, régionaux ou multilatéraux dont votre pays est partie?

La Suisse a beaucoup de connexions au niveau international et elle est membre de nombreux accords bilatéraux, régionaux et multilatéraux. Nous renonçons à exposer ici dans le détail les domaines concernés par ces accords. Le Recueil Systématique offre une vue d'ensemble de tous les traités internationaux applicables à la Suisse: http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/iindex.html. 12. Quel usage votre pays a-t-il fait de la flexibilité contenue dans les ADPIC en particulier les articles 8, 38 et 40 de cet accord? Prière de donner plus de détails.

La Suisse n'a à ce jour pas fait usage de la "flexibilité contenue dans les ADPIC" mentionnée à la question 12, et n'en ressent pas le besoin. La protection des topographies de circuits intégrés a été mise en oeuvre en Suisse conformément à l'art. 38 para 1 de l'Accord sur les ADPIC. Concernant le contrôle des pratiques anticoncurrentielles dans les licences contractuelles selon l'art. 40 de l'Accord sur les ADPIC, tandis que les mesures restreignant la concurrence résultant exclusivement de la législation en matière de propriété intellectuelle sont, en règle générale, exemptées du champ d'application de la loi suisse sur les cartels (art. 3 LCart), les mesures basées sur des droits de propriété intellectuelle qui constituent des restrictions à l'importation peuvent quant à elles être examinées à la lumière de la loi sur les cartels (art. 3 al. 2 LCart). En Suisse, une législation a été adoptée, et est actuellement en cours de révision, concernant les notices d'avertissement relatives à la santé sur les produits de tabac. Bien que l'on puisse dire que ces notices affectent indirectement également la marque utilisée sur le produit de tabac, la législation n'empêche pas l'usage de la marque en tant que tel et ne semble ainsi pas constituer une mesure envisagée à l'art. 8 para. 1 de l'Accord sur les ADPIC. Toutefois, si tel était le cas, cette mesure serait, comme expliqué, conforme aux dispositions de la Partie II, section 2 de l'Accord sur les ADPIC.

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Tunisia 1 – Dans quelle mesure les droits de propriété intellectuelle et la politique de concurrence se complètent –ils mutuellement pour améliorer l’efficience dynamique et le bien être des consommateurs dans votre pays ? La réglementation des droits de propriété intellectuelle garantit un certain nombre de droits pour les propriétaires et notamment l’exploitation exclusive de ces droits, toutefois la jouissance de ce droit n’autorise pas les pratiques anticoncurrentielles qui sont qualifiées par l’autorité de concurrence. Il est établi que la protection de la propriété permet de développer l’innovation, la recherche et l’efficience qui est de nature à promouvoir la concurrence inter marque et inter entreprises. Un tel environnement de concurrence permet de réaliser le bien-être du consommateur par l’amélioration de la qualité et des prix et la compétitivité des entreprises. L’absence de protection de ces droits décourage l’entreprise d’investir ou innover et favorise le commerce déloyal et la contrefaçon, un fléau qui compromet l’activité des entreprises. 2- comment la vente liée et le groupage des droits de propriété intellectuelle sont-ils examinés par votre législation sur la concurrence ? les approches d’interdiction perse ou basées sur la règle de la raison ont-elles été appliqués ? Un même produit peut renfermer plusieurs aspects de droits de PI protégés (marque, brevet, design, logiciel…) et par conséquent l’atteinte à un, ou plusieurs droits de PI est examinée conformément à la législation correspondante. Quelque soit la forme d’exploitation des droits de propriété intellectuelle elle est examinée par les autorités de concurrence en vertu des atteintes à l’accès au marché et sur la base des règles de la raison et de l’atteinte aux intérêts du consommateur. 3- l’autorité nationale chargée des brevets consulte-t-elle l’autorité chargée de la concurrence lorsqu’elle accorde des droits de propriété intellectuelle ? Dans l’affirmative prière de développer votre réponse. L’entreprise octroi des droits de propriété intellectuelle selon une procédure fixée par la loi qui assure la transparence et la publicité qui n’est pas de nature à porter atteinte à la concurrence, par ailleurs le texte qui régit a été examiné par l’autorité de concurrence avant sa promulgation pour éviter des dispositions contraires à la concurrence. 4- avez-vous traité des cas impliquant les droits de propriété intellectuelle dans le cadre des règles qui régissent l’abus position ? la domination est –il un critère dans l’examen de ces pratiques ? existe-il d’autres pratiques typiques des affaires relatives à la propriété intellectuelle qui ont été qualifiées d’anticoncurrentielles dans votre juridiction ? prière de citer ces cas en indiquant les parties, les faits, les dispositions pertinentes de la loi qui ont été violées et les conclusions qui ont résulté de leurs examens. Pas de cas de cette nature 5- les pratiques suivantes qui impliquent la combinaison de plusieurs aspects du droit de la propriété intellectuelle ont –elles eu des effets anticoncurrentiels dans votre pays ? Prière de développer votre réponse

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La loi tunisienne sur les brevets s’applique de la même façon sur un produit ou un procédé breveté par un ou plusieurs brevets. De même en ce qui concerne plusieurs titulaires d’un brevet ou si le produit fait l’objet d’une ou plusieurs licences d’exploitation. 6- existe-t-il une juridiction concurrente entre l’autorité de concurrence et l’Office de brevet dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre des droits de la propriété intellectuelle ? Prière de développer votre réponse Le contentieux du droit de la concurrence et du droit de propriété intellectuelle relèvent de la compétence de deux juridictions différentes l’une du conseil de la concurrence et l’autre des tribunaux du droit de commun. 1- L’autorité de concurrence a t –elle publié des directives sur les relations entre la politique de concurrence et les droits de propriété intellectuelle ? L’autorité de concurrence tunisienne n’a pas publié des directives sur les relations entre la politique de concurrence et les droits de propriété intellectuelle mais dans son action de promotion de la culture de la concurrence elle participe dans plusieurs séminaires pour expliquer la relation entre les droits de propriété intellectuelle et la politique de la concurrence, et le rôle joué par l’autorité de concurrence pour vérifier que les droits de propriété intellectuelle ne soient pas exercés en contrariété avec l’impératif de concurrence. 8- votre juridiction a –t –elle eu à connaître des affaires où l’accès à une facilité essentielle a été refusé en invoquant les droits de propriété intellectuelle ? Prière de donner des informations spécifiques sur ces cas ? Ce cas a été vécu lors de la diffusion de la coupe du monde de football, le propriétaire du droit de diffusion a demandé une redevance très élevée qui n’est pas à la portée de la chaîne nationale. L’autorité de concurrence est intervenue pour trouver un compromis entre le propriétaire du droit et la chaîne nationale. 9/ dans quelle circonstance en vertu de la législation sur la concurrence, une allégation sur le refus de licence peut être considérée comme recevable dans votre juridiction ? quelles mesures correctives proposez-vous dans cette perspective ? Le problème de refus de licence est régi par la réglementation relative au droit de propriété intellectuelle et non pas par le droit de la concurrence. Cette législation a prévu le cas où le propriétaire est obligé d’octroyer une licence dans le cas d’urgence ou d’intérêt public. 10-Votre juridiction a –t-elle eu à traiter des affaires où les normes industrielles communes dont l’objectif est d’assurer l’interopérabilité ont eu des effets anticoncurrentiels ? Non, pas de cas traités 11 –Quels sont les accords bilatéraux/régionaux ou multilatéraux dont votre pays est partie ? En matière de propriété intellectuelle la Tunisie est membre :

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- convention de Berne pour la protection des œuvres littéraires et artistiques - arrangement de Madrid concernant la répression des indications de provenance fausses ou fallacieuses sur les produits - traité de Nairobi concernant la protection du symbole olympique - convention de Paris pour la protection de la propriété industrielle - traité de Budapest sur la reconnaissance internationale du dépôt des micro-organismes aux fins de la procédure en matière de brevets - arrangement de la Haye concernant l’enregistrement international des dessins et modèles industriels - arrangement de Lisbonne concernant la protection des appellations d’origine et leur enregistrement international - Traité de coopération en matière de brevets PCT - Arrangement de Nice concernant la classification internationale des produits et services aux fins de l’enregistrement des marques - Arrangement de Vienne instituant une classification internationale des éléments figuratifs des marques. 12- quel usage votre pays a-t-il fait de la flexibilité contenue dans les ADPIC en particulier les articles 8, 38 et 40 de cet accord ? prière de donner plus de détail La loi sur les brevets prévoit de telles mesures Il y a deux types de licence obligatoires : a) les licences obligatoires (chapitre X de la loi sur les brevets) - Lorsque l’invention objet du brevet n’a pas commencé à être exploitée industriellement ou n’a pas fait l’objet de préparatifs effectifs et sérieux en vue de cette exploitation en Tunisie dans un délai de quatre ans à compter du dépôt de la demande ou de trois ans à compter de la délivrance du brevet en tenant compte du délai le plus long dans tous les cas. - lorsque le produit objet de l’invention n’a pas été commercialisé en quantité suffisante pour satisfaire aux besoins du marché tunisien - lorsque l’exploitation industrielle

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Turkey (Kindly liaise with the National Patent Office or other relevant institution in your country if necessary) Some of the answers to this section of the questionnaire answered in liaise with the Turkish Patent Institute.


The purpose of the Competition Act is to protect competition. According to the reasoning of the Competition Act,

ooo. competition is a very important process that directs the undertakings to be more efficient and to offer quality and more products and services with less cost; ppp. undertakings in a competitive market economy make their decisions independently so that limited resources of the country are used efficiently leading to rising consumer welfare level; and qqq. competition contributes to the development of the economy as a whole by causing new inventions and technological developments.

Therefore, it could be said that competition brings pressure on undertakings to find ways to improve their performance continuously. Similarly, intellectual property rights such as patents enable positive developments by encouraging emergence of new inventions that surpass the existing technologic level. For instance, Decree-law No 551 pertaining to the Protection of Patent Rights cites its purpose as promoting the inventive activity and contributing to technical, economic and social development by implementing the inventions in industry. Therefore, it is not wrong to say that competition and IPRs rules share a common approach in the sense that both set of rules encourage the undertakings to operate more efficiently via new products and new methods of production in the goods and services markets that will enable them to ensure a lead in the competitive process. As a result, both set of rules are complementary.



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According to Article 410 of the Competition Act entitled “Agreements, Concerted Practices and Decisions Limiting Competition”, tying11 is prohibited if it is contrary to the nature of the agreement or commercial practice. However, such clauses in licence agreements may not necessarily violate this provision. For instance, in an exclusive licence involving trademark and know-how, obligation on the licensee to purchase certain ingredients from the licensor or resources designated by the licensor was not regarded as a restrictive clause because such an obligation was necessary to ensure the quality of the product and its similarity with the original product and protection of the elements of the recipe within the scope of the know how (see Miller case, 14.11.2002; 02-70/843-347).12 Therefore, it may be said that tying is not regarded as a per se violation of Article 4 in case of licence agreements. Therefore, depending on the circumstances surrounding the licence agreement, tying may not violate Article 4 or if it violates Article 4, exemption may be granted if the relevant agreement satisfies the conditions for exemption cited in Article 513 of the Competition Act.

10 Relevant part of Article 4 is as follows: Article 4- Agreements and concerted practices between undertakings, and decisions and practices of associations of undertakings which have as their object or effect or likely effect the prevention, distortion or restriction of competition directly or indirectly in a particular market for goods or services are illegal and prohibited.

Such cases are, in particular, as follows: a) Fixing the purchase or sale price of goods or services, elements such as cost and profit which

form the price, and any terms of purchase or sale, b) Partitioning markets for goods or services, and sharing or controlling all kinds of market

resources or elements, c) Controlling the amount of supply or demand in relation to goods or services, or determining

them outside the market, d) Complicating and restricting the activities of competing undertakings, or excluding firms

operating in the market by boycotts or other behaviour, or preventing potential new entrants to the market,

e) Except exclusive dealing, applying different terms to persons with equal status for equal rights, obligations and acts,

f) Contrary to the nature of the agreement or commercial usages, obliging to purchase other goods or services together with a good or service, or tying a good or service demanded by purchasers acting as intermediary undertakings to the condition of displaying another good or service by the purchaser, or putting forward terms as to the resupply of a good or service supplied. …

11 Article 4 (2) (f) prohibits tying. See footnote 2 above for details. 12 It should be mentioned that according to the licence in question, if the ingredients were to be purchased from resources designated by the licensor, the cost for the licensee had to be the same with the cost for the licensor. Moreover, the licensee was free to purchase one of the ingredients from other sellers in case there were more favourable conditions. 13 Relevant part of Article 5 entitled “Exemption” is as follows: Article 5 - The Competition Board, in case all the terms listed below exist, may decide to exempt agreements, concerted practices between undertakings, and decisions of associations of undertakings from the application of the provisions of article 4:

a) Ensuring new developments and improvements, or economic or technical development in the production or distribution of goods and in the provision of services,

b) Benefiting the consumer from the above-mentioned, c) Not eliminating competition in a significant part of the relevant market, d) Not limiting competition more than what is compulsory for achieving the goals set out in sub-

paragraphs (a) and (b). …

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As a matter of fact, according to the recent Block Exemption Communiqué on Technology Transfer Agreements (licence agreements)14, tying is not blacklisted and therefore block exempted up to the market share thresholds. Where market shares are exceeded, individual assessment is required. Same explanations are valid for bundling as well. Moreover, Article 6 of the Competition Act entitled “Abuse of Dominant Position” prohibits tying as an abuse.15 However, no case under Article 6 of the Competition Act involving tying in the context of intellectual property rights has been handled so far.


No


The Turkish Competition Authority does not have much experience regarding intellectual property rights and abuse of dominant position. Therefore, it would be premature to answer the first part of the question. Regarding typical business practices related to intellectual property found to be anti-competitive, following explanations may be taken into account: Exclusivity In various cases exclusivity clauses in licences were regarded as violating Article 4 of the Turkish Competition Act. For instance, in Miller case (14.11.2002; 02-70/843-347), exclusivity clause in a licence involving trademark and know-how enabled only one undertaking to produce and sell beer under the trademark “Miller Genuine Draft” in Turkey. Exclusive nature of the licence was regarded as violating Article 4 of the Turkish Competition Act. The parties were Anadolu Efes Biracılık ve Malt Sanayii A.Ş. (the licensee) and Miller Brewing Company (the licensor). The licence agreement was granted exemption for five years. Non-compete

14 Communiqué No 2008/2, Official Gazette dated 23.1.2008 and numbered 26765. 15 “Purchasing another good or service together with a good or service, or tying a good or service demanded by purchasers acting as intermediary undertakings to the condition of displaying another good or service by the purchaser, or imposing limitations with regard to the terms of purchase and sale in case of resale, such as not selling a purchased good below a particular price” is prohibited according to Article 6(2)(c) of the Competition Act.

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In licence agreements, non-compete clauses prohibiting the licensee to produce and distribute competing products have been regarded as anti-competitive and violated Article 4 of the Turkish Competition Act. For instance, in Beck’s case (12.6.2003; 03-42/463-202) concerning a licence involving know-how and trademark to produce and distribute beer under the trademark “Beck’s”, such a clause prohibited the licensee to produce, import or distribute a competing beer and this was regarded as a restrictive clause. The parties were Anadolu Efes Biracılık ve Malt Sanayii A.Ş. (the licensee) and Brauerei Beck Gmbh & Co (the licensor). The agreement was granted exemption for five years. Right of first refusal In Foster’s case (31.3.2005; 05-20/234-69) concerning a licence involving know-how and trademark to produce and distribute beer under the trademark “Foster’s”, it is agreed that the licensor (Foster’s Group Limited and Carlton and United Beverages Limited) would first offer the business to the licensee (Anadolu Efes Biracılık ve Malt Sanayii A.Ş.) if the licensor would think to sell another type of beer apart from Foster’s beer. In case parties could not reach agreement, then the licensor would be free to offer the business to another undertaking. However, the offer should not be more advantageous than the one offered to the licensee. This part of the right of first refusal clause was regarded as preventing the licensor substantially from selling beer other than Foster’s beer through a channel other than the licensee and therefore violating Article 4 of the Competition Act. During assessments made in order to decide whether the agreement satisfied exemption conditions, it was ruled that part of the right of first refusal clause prohibiting the licensor to offer business of selling beer other than Foster’s beer to a third undertaking with more advantageous conditions did not satisfy the final condition of exemption and the parties were asked to remove it from the licence in order for the licence be granted exemption. The final condition of exemption states that competition should not be limited more than what is necessary for achieving the goals of ensuring new developments and improvements, or economic or technical development in the production or distribution of goods and in the provision of services, and consumers’ benefiting from these positive developments and improvements.



cccc. "package patents" (whereby several patents of one company are necessary for the production of a product) dddd. "patent thickets" (patent rights of multiple patent holders overlap) eeee. "cross licensing" (patent holders license their products reciprocally) ffff. "patent pools" (whereby patents held by various patent holders are pooled and access is granted to the pool instead of to an individual patent)

--

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NO.

7. Has the competition authority issued or envisages issuing guidelines on the

relationship of intellectual property rights and competition law? Please provide details.

The TCA has issued a Block Exemption Communiqué on Technology Transfer Agreements recently. To give a brief account of the Communiqué, technology transfer agreements cover licensing of various intellectual property rights such as but not limited to patent licensing, software copyright licensing, and know-how licensing. As a general condition for block exemption, the Communiqué provides different market share thresholds for agreements between competitors and those between non-competitors. Agreements between competitors are block exempted provided that combined market share of the parties does not exceed 30% whereas agreements between non-competitors are block exempted provided that market share of each party does not exceed 40% in the relevant affected technology and product markets. Moreover, the Communiqué provides two different lists of blacklisted clauses depending on whether the parties are competing undertakings or not. In case the agreement contains any one of the blacklisted clauses, then the entire agreement can not benefit from the block exemption. For instance, a clause limiting the right of any of the party to determine the price brings the entire agreement out of the benefit of the Communiqué. The Communiqué also cites some clauses such as certain grant back clauses which can not benefit from block exemption if they are severable from the rest of the agreement enabling the remaining of the agreement to benefit from the block exemption. Finally, the benefit of block exemption may be withdrawn for a certain technology transfer agreement especially where third party technologies are foreclosed from the market. Moreover, block exemption may also be withdrawn for agreements including certain restraints if parallel networks composed of similar technology transfer agreements cover more than 50% of the relevant market. Apart from the Communiqué, the TCA intends to publish guidelines to provide guidance on application of the Communiqué as well as Articles 4 and 5 of the Turkish Competition Act within the context of technology transfer agreements.



-- 9. Under what circumstances a competition law allegation against a refusal to


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The TCA does not have much experience regarding refusal to licence cases. Therefore, it is premature to answer such a question.


created anti-competitive effects? Please elaborate. -- 11. To which bilateral or international agreements concerning intellectual property

rights is your country a party? Turkey is party to the following international agreements concerning intellectual property rights;

Paris Convention on the Protection of Industrial Property (1883) Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works

(1886) Convention establishing WIPO (1967) Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of

Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations (1961) Nice Agreement concerning the International Classification of Goods

and Services for the purpose of Registration of Marks (1957) Patent Co-operation Treaty (1970) Vienna Agreement Establishing an International Classification of the

Figurative Elements of Marks (1973) Strasbourg Agreement Concerning the International Patent

Classification (1971) Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of

Micro-Organisms for the Purpose of Patent Procedure (1977) Protocol relating to Madrid Agreement (1996) Locarno Agreement Establishing an International Classification for

Industrial Designs (1968) European Patent Convention (1973) Hague Agreement (International Deposit of Industrial Designs) Trademark Law Treaty Singapore Treaty on the Law of Trademarks


particularly in Art. 8, 31 and 40? Please provide details. Following explanations may be taken into account in the context of especially Article 31 of the TRIPS agreement which covers compulsory licences.

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Article 99 of the Decree-law No 551 pertaining to the Protection of Patent Rights16 provides that compulsory licenses may be granted in case one of the following conditions exists;

1. Failure to put to use/work the patented invention17 2. Dependency of subject matter of patents18 3. On grounds of public interest (i.e. public health and national defence)

19 Moreover, Article 93 of the Decree-law No 551 entitled “Abuse of Competition” provides that where a patentee commits an act in violation of the general provisions on unfair competition while putting his patent to use, the court may condemn the patentee to offer his patent for licensing. Furthermore, according to Law No 5147 on the Protection of Integrated Circuit Topographies20, Council of Ministers may decide grant of compulsory licences if one of the following conditions exists;

1. There is need to use for non-commercial purposes a protected integrated circuit topography due to reasons such as public interest, national security, general health or development of other vital sectors of the national economy, 2. Judicial or administrative authorities determine that use by a right owner or a licensee of protected integrated circuit topography eliminates competition and there is need to remove such a negative situation.

Regarding both Article 8 and Article 40 of the TRIPS agreement, for instance Article 80 of the Decree-law 551 entitled “Restrictions on the Use of a Patent” provides that “A patented invention shall not be put into use, in any way, contrary to the laws, or

16 For further details see especially part seven of the Decree-law No 551 entitled “Compulsory Licence” covering articles 99-120. An English version of the Decree-law No 551 is available on the website of the Turkish Patent Institute (http://www.turkpatent.gov.tr/portal/default.jsp). 17 According to Article 96 of the Decree-law No 551, “The patentee or the person authorized by him is under obligation to put to use/work, the invention under patent protection. The obligation to put to use/work must be realized within three years as from the date of publication in the relevant bulletin of the announcement related to the issue of the patent. …” 18 According to Article 79 of the Decree-law No 551, “The fact that a patented invention can not be worked without using an invention, protected under a prior patent shall not be an obstacle to its validity. In such cases, neither the right holder of the prior patent, nor the right holder of the latter patent may use, the patent of the other party, without his consent, during the term of validity of his patent. However, the right holder of the latter patent may use, also, the prior patent where he has been authorized by the right holder of the prior patent to use same or has been granted compulsory license to use said prior patent.” 19 According to Article 103 of the Decree-law No551, “The Council of Ministers may decide that the invention that is the subject matter a patent or an application for patent be put to use on grounds of public interest by means of compulsory license where putting the invention to use, increasing its or, generally spreading, its usage or improving same for a useful end are of great importance for public health or national defense purposes, public interest shall be deemed to be involved. Situations where the non use of the invention or its insufficient use in terms of quality and quantity, causes serious damage to the country’s economic or technical development shall be deemed to also involve public interest. …” 20 See especially chapter 8 of the Law No 5147 on the Protection of Integrated Circuit Topographies covering Articles 37 and 38.

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morality, or public order or public health, and its working shall be subject to the prohibitions and restrictions, whether temporary or permanent, established or to be established by law.” Moreover, the TCA issued recently a Block Exemption Communiqué on Technology Transfer Agreements specifying licensing practices restraining competition (see answer to Question 7). Although the Communiqué announces how the technology transfer agreements (license agreements) between non-dominant undertakings are assessed in the context of Article 4 of the Competition Act entitled “Agreements, Concerted Practices and Decisions Limiting Competition” and Article 5 of the Competition Act entitled “Exemption”, it is also overtly mentioned in the Communiqué that exemption granted by the Communiqué does not prevent application of Article 6 of the Competition Act entitled “Abuse of Dominant Position”. An English version of Block Exemption Communiqué on Technology Transfer Agreements will soon be available on the website of the TCA (www.rekabet.gov.tr).

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http://www.rekabet.gov.tr/

Uruguay (Kindly liaise with the National Patent Office or other relevant institution in your country if necessary) 1. How does your intellectual property rights and competition rules complement each other in enhancing dynamic efficiency and consumer welfare? Both agencies have neither collaborated, nor conflict over antitrust issues at this time. 2. How is the tying and bundling of intellectual property rights examined under your competition law? Was the per se approach or the rule of reason approach applied? There has not been cases of these nature yet. 3. Does your national patent office consult the competition authority when granting intellectual property rights? If yes, please elaborate. No. 4. Have you dealt with cases involving intellectual property rights under the abuse of dominance rules? Is dominance a criteria in the assessment of these practices? Are there any other typical business practices related to intellectual property rights that have been found to be anti-competitive in your jurisdiction? Please cite three cases including the parties, facts, legal provisions that have been violated and findings. No we have not yet. 5. Have any of the following practices of combining several intellectual property rights resulted in anti-competitive effects in your country? Please elaborate. a. "package patents" (whereby several patents of one company are necessary for the production of a product) b. "patent thickets" (patent rights of multiple patent holders overlap) c. "cross licensing" (patent holders license their products reciprocally) d. "patent pools" (whereby patents held by various patent holders are pooled and access is granted to the pool instead of to an individual patent) The have not been cases of any of this sort. 6. Is there concurrent jurisdiction between the competition authority and the patent office with regard to the enforcement of intellectual property rights? Please elaborate. 7. Has the competition authority issued or envisages issuing guidelines on the relationship of intellectual property rights and competition law? Please provide details. No. 8. Have there been cases in your jurisdiction where access to an essential facility has been refused on account of an intellectual property right? Please provide specific information relating to the individual cases. No.

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9. Under what circumstances a competition law allegation against a refusal to license would be found to be valid in your jurisdiction? What remedies are possible? Can the patent holder be forced by the competition authority to grant a license? 10. Have common industrial standards that are intended to ensure interoperability created anti-competitive effects? Please elaborate. No. 11. To which bilateral or international agreements concerning intellectual property rights is your country a party? 12. How has your country made use of the flexibilities provided for in TRIPS, particularly in Art. 8, 31 and 40? Please provide details.

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Venezuela

1. ¿Cómo los derechos de propiedad intelectual y las normas de competencia se complementan entre sí en el aumento de la eficiencia dinámica y el bienestar de los consumidores?

En Venezuela, existen dos organismos adscritos al Ministerio del Poder Popular para las Industrias Ligeras y el Comercio competentes para la materia de propiedad intelectual y libre competencia.

El ente competente en materia de propiedad intelectual es el Servicio Autónomo de la Propiedad Intelectual y la Superintendencia para la Promoción y Protección de la Libre Competencia es el organismo competente en materia de libre competencia.

En cuanto a como se complementan ambas para el aumento de la eficiencia y el bienestar de los consumidores, se considera que el reconocimiento de los derechos de propiedad promueven la competencia, ya que cada oferente explota sus factores productivos, asimismo busca diferenciar sus productos del resto, lo cual conlleva a beneficios para los consumidores, ya que se amplia no solo el abanico de opciones, sino la calidad y los precios.

2. ¿Cómo es la vinculación y el agrupamiento de los derechos de propiedad intelectual examinadas en virtud de su derecho de la competencia? A través del enfoque per se o la regla de la razón.

La agencia de competencia de Venezuela en los casos investigados por presuntas prácticas restrictivas en donde se discuta derechos de propiedad intelectual aplica la regla de la razón, debido a que una vez demostrados los extremos de la conducta, su ilicitud está sometida a posteriores análisis en cuanto a su razonabilidad, propósitos y efectos sobre la competencia, es decir, las eficiencias que se produzcan.

En las conductas donde se involucre un abuso al derecho de propiedad intelectual, siempre existirá la posibilidad de que la conducta imputada, pese al efecto anticompetitivo, pueda alcanzar un mayor beneficio en términos de incentivos, por ejemplo en el desarrollo tecnológico.

3. ¿Tiende su oficina nacional de patentes consultar a la autoridad de competencia al conceder derechos de propiedad intelectual? En caso afirmativo, indique los detalles.

No.

4. ¿Ha tratado casos de los derechos de propiedad intelectual en el marco de las reglas de abuso posición de dominio? ¿Es un criterio dominante en la evaluación de estas prácticas? ¿Ha habido otras prácticas comerciales relacionadas con los derechos de propiedad intelectual que se han considerado contrarias a la competencia en el ámbito de su jurisdicción? Por favor, citar tres casos, incluyendo las partes, los hechos, las disposiciones jurídicas que han sido violados y las conclusiones.

No.

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5. Tiene alguna de las siguientes prácticas la combinación de varios derechos de propiedad intelectual como resultado efectos contrarios a la competencia en su país? Por favor relacione.

A.- “Paquete de patentes” (según el cual varias patentes de una empresa son necesarios para la producción de un producto).

B.- “Patentes Cruzadas” (derechos de patente de varios titulares de patentes se solapan).

C.-“Licencias cruzadas” (licencia de los titulares de las patentes de sus productos recíprocamente).

D.-“Patentes Varias” (el que las patentes en poder de varios titulares de patentes que se reparte y se concede el acceso al conjunto en vez de una patente de un individuo).

Tradicionalmente la autoridad de competencia de Venezuela no ha tenido ninguna experiencia en la investigación de las mencionadas prácticas.

6. ¿Hay competencia concurrente entre la autoridad de competencia y de la oficina de patentes en relación con la ejecución de los derechos de propiedad intelectual? Por favor relacione.

No.

7. La autoridad de competencia ha emitido directrices sobre la relación de los derechos de propiedad intelectual y el derecho de la competencia? Sírvase proporcionar detalles.

No.

8. ¿Ha habido casos en el ámbito de su jurisdicción, donde el acceso a un esencial facilitación o ha sido denegada en razón de un derecho de propiedad intelectual? Sírvase proporcionar información específica relativa a los casos individuales.

No.

9. ¿Cuáles son las circunstancias de que la legislación de competencia pueda ser contraria o aprobada una licencia de acuerdo al ámbito de su jurisdicción? ¿Qué soluciones son posibles? El titular de la patente puede ser obligado por la autoridad de la competencia para otorgar una licencia.

Ninguna.

10. Tiene normas industriales comunes que están destinadas a garantizar la Inter. Operabilidad creando efectos contrarios a la competencia? Por favor relacione.

No.

11. Cuales son los acuerdos bilaterales o internacionales relativos a los derechos de propiedad intelectual donde su país es parte?

Los acuerdos que ha suscrito y ha ratificado Venezuela en esta materia son:

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a. Tratado de propiedad intelectual de la Organización Mundial del Comercio (OMPI),

b. Acuerdo sobre los aspectos de los derechos de propiedad intelectual relacionados con el Comercio. (ADPIC),

c. Convenio de la Organización Mundial de la Propiedad Intelectual,

d. Convenio de París para la protección de la propiedad industrial,

e. Convenio de Berna para la Propiedad de Obras Literarias y Artísticas,

f. Acuerdo de Marrakech,

g. Convención Interamericana sobre la protección de los artistas, intérpretes y ejecutantes, los productores de fonograma y los organismos de radiodifusión,

h. Convenio para la protección de los productores de fonogramas contra la reproducción no autorizada de sus fonogramas,

i. Tratado de la Organización Mundial de la Propiedad Industrial sobre Derecho de autor, y sobre interpretación o ejecución de fonogramas.

12. ¿Cómo su país ha hecho uso de las flexibilidades previstas en los ADPIC, en particular en el artículo 8, 31 y 40? Sírvase proporcionar detalles.

La agencia de competencia en Venezuela ha hecho uso de las flexibilidades contempladas en el artículo 8 del ADPIC, más no ha hecho uso de las previstas en los artículos 31 y 40.

Los casos en los cuales la Superintendencia para la Promoción y Protección de la Libre Competencia, hizo uso de las flexibilidades previstas en el artículo 8 del ADPIC, lo cual sirvió de base para no sancionar, son los siguientes:

a. Aventhis Pharma S.A vs. Farma S.A y Megat Parmaceutical, S.A. Resolución N° SPPLC/0016-2003 del 23 de julio 2003.

b. Aventis Pharma, S.A. v Sinergium S.A. y Representaciones Nolver C.A. Resolución N° SPPLC/0018-2003 del 11 de agosto de 2003.

c. Laboratorios Substantia, C.A. v Meyer Productos Terapeúticos, S.A. Resolución N° SPPLC/0020-2003 del 8 de septiembre de 2003

d. Pharmacia Corporation Venezuela C.A. v Farma S.A. y Genéricos Venezolanos S.A. Resolución N° SPPLC/0024-2003 del 15 de octubre de 2003.

Para consultar dichas resoluciones:

http://www.procompetencia.gov.ve/Resoluciones.html

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http://www.procompetencia.gov.ve/Resoluciones.html

Viet Nam

1. How do your intellectual property rights and competition rules complement each other in enhancing dynamic efficiency and consumer welfare?

IP law 2005 and Competition law 2005 of Vietnam complements each other by interferential provisions. In Competition law, there are provisions on “misleading indications” and “infringement upon business secrets”. In Intellectual property law, there are provisions on unfair competition acts and it is also prescribed that the breaches on competition mentioned in IP law will be handled pursuant to competition procedure.


In our competition law, there are provisions on tying and bundling of intellectual property rights…


National Office of Intellectual Property of Vietnam doesn’t need to consult competition authority when granting intellectual property rights.

4. Have you dealt with cases involving intellectual property rights under the abuse of dominance rules? Is dominance a criterion in the assessment of these practices? Are there any other typical business practices related to intellectual property rights that have been found to be anti-competitive in your jurisdiction? Please cite three cases including the parties, facts, legal provisions that have been violated and findings.

IP law 2005 prescribes unfair competition acts only. It means that dominance is not a criterion in the assessment of violated acts.


gggg. "package patents" (whereby several patents of one company are necessary for the production of a product)

hhhh. "patent thickets" (patent rights of multiple patent holders overlap)

iiii. "cross licensing" (patent holders license their products reciprocally)

jjjj. "patent pools" (whereby patents held by various patent holders are pooled and access is granted to the pool instead of to an individual patent)

Competition law 2005 of Vietnam don’t have regulations on combination of intellectual property rights. But the owners or users didn’t allow doing these acts with the purpose of unfair competition or competition restrictions.


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National Office of Intellectual Property grants intellectual property rights. Violations with regard to IP rights will be regulated by several state agencies such as competition authority, competition council, police, customs,..

Paragraph 3, Article 211, IP law 2005:

“Organizations and individuals that have committed acts of unfair competition shall be liable to the administrative remedies provided for in the competition legislation”.


VCAD hasn’t issued any guidelines on the relationship of intellectual property rights and competition law yet. But hopefully, in the future, VCAD will issue some.


VCAD hasn’t dealt any cases related to this issue yet.


The competition law doesn’t have provisions on this issue. But in some cases, these violations can be regarded as prohibited competition restriction agreements.

Article 28 – Decree No. 116 (Decree providing detailed regulations and guidelines for implementation of a number of articles of Competition Law:

“Impeding technical or technological development [thereby] causing loss to customers means the practices of:

(a) Purchasing an invention, patent, utility solution or industrial design in order to destroy it or keep it from being used.

(b) Threatening or pressurizing a person who is conducting research on technical or technological development to suspend or abandon such research”.

A fine of up to 10 percent of the total revenue in the financial year prior to the year in which the breaches was committed by enterprise or group of enterprises can be apply for above violations.

Note: above provisions are applied to enterprises which have combined market share of over 30% on relevant market.


Competition law 2005 and IP law 2005 of Vietnam don’t have provisions which prescribe that common industrial standards which are intended to ensure interoperability can create anti-competitive effects or not.


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- TRIPs 1994

- Berne convention 1971

- Paris convention 1883

- Rome Convention 1961.

- Madrid Agreement 1891

- Geneva Agreement 1994 on Trademark

- Lague Agreement 1925

- Geneva Convention 1961 on protection of new plants and breeding animals

- Washington Agreement on intellectual property with regard to integrated circuit.

- Budapest Agreement 1977

- The Vietnam – US Trade Agreement – Chapter II


Vietnam has a relatively sufficient system of legal documents on intellectual property such as IP law 2005 and some decrees on providing detailed regulations and guidelines or handling breaches…IP law 2005 has provisions on patents, licensing practices.. But up to now, IP law 2005 doesn’t have any regulations in which the violations on patents and licensing practices are regarded as unfair competition acts or competition restriction acts..

Otherwise, Competition law 2005 has some regulations related to intellectual property right but they aren’t on patents or licensing practices.

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Zambia 1. How does your intellectual property rights and competition rules complement each other in enhancing dynamic efficiency and consumer welfare? Intellectual property rights (IPRs) enjoy limited exemptions under Zimbabwe’s Competition Act [Chapter 14:28]. The Act provides in terms of its application provisions of section 3(1) that while the Act applies to all economic activities within or having an effect within Zimbabwe, it shall not be construed so as to limit any right acquired under the country’s Plant Breeders Rights Act, the Copyright Act, the Industrial Designs Act, the Patents Act or the Trade Marks Act “except to the extent that such a right is used for the purpose of enhancing or maintaining prices or any other consideration in a manner contemplated in the definition of ‘restrictive practice’”. Zimbabwe’s competition rules therefore recognise the need and role of IPRs in promoting innovation by allowing the holders of the property rights to prevent others from free-riding and unfairly benefitting from their inventions. Such protection gives the necessary incentives for further innovation, which only benefits consumers in the long run. The competition rules also recognise the danger of wholly exempting IPRs from their application since the rights can be abused, particularly if the consumer does not have alternative choices. In the above sense therefore, IPRs and competition rules in Zimbabwe are complementary because they are both aimed at enhancing dynamic efficiency and consumer welfare. The protection of IPRs under competition rules encourages innovation and promotes technical advancement to the ultimate benefit of the consumer. At the same time, the country’s competition rules reserve the right to protect the consumer against abuse of IPRs. 2. How is the tying and bundling of intellectual property rights examined under your competition law? Was the per se approach or the rule of reason approach applied? Like all other forms of tying and bundling of goods and services that are defined as ‘restrictive practices’ under Zimbabwe’s competition law, the tying and bundling of intellectual property rights in Zimbabwe would be examined as abuse of dominant position using the rule of reason approach. 3. Does your national patent office consult the competition authority when granting intellectual property rights? If yes, please elaborate. Zimbabwe does have a Patents Office, which is situated in the Office of the Registrar of Companies. The Patents Office however does not consult the competition authority when granting intellectual property rights, and does not have legal requirements to do so. 4. Have you dealt with cases involving intellectual property rights under the abuse of dominance rules? Is dominance a criteria in the assessment of these

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practices? Are there any other typical business practices related to intellectual property rights that have been found to be anti-competitive in your jurisdiction? Please cite three cases including the parties, facts, legal provisions that have been violated and findings. No IPR case has been referred to the competition authority of Zimbabwe for investigation since the authority effectively commenced its operations in 1998. Should that happen however, complaints against abuse of IPRs would be assessed using the dominance criteria since such abuses, by their nature, constitute monopolisation. 5. Have any of the following practices of combining several intellectual property rights resulted in anti-competitive effects in your country? Please elaborate. a. “package patents” (whereby several patents of one country are necessary for the production of a product) b. “patent thickets” (patent rights of multiple patent holders overlap) c. “cross licensing” (patent holders license their products reciprocally) d. “patent pools” (whereby patents held by various patent holders are pooled and access is granted to the pool instead of to an individual patent). As explained in 4 above, no specific cases involving IPRs have been referred to the competition authority for investigation as anti-competitive practices. 6. Is there concurrent jurisdiction between the competition authority and the patent office with regard to the enforcement of intellectual property rights? Please elaborate. Save for protecting intellectual property rights, like any other commercial rights, against anti-competitive practices, the competition authority of Zimbabwe does not have specific jurisdiction in enforcing IPRs, that is the specific mandate of the Patents Office and the courts. 7. Has the competition authority issued or envisages issuing guidelines on the relationship of intellectual property rights and competition law? Please provide details. The competition authority of Zimbabwe has not issued any guidelines on the relationship of IPR and competition law. However, serious consideration is being given to do so following intense discussions on the subject at the 8th Session of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts (IGE) on Competition Law and Policy held last year. 8. Have there been cases in your jurisdiction where access to an essential facility has been refused on account of an intellectual property right? Please provide specific information relating to the individual cases. No such cases have yet been referred to the competition authority for investigation. This however does not mean that some enterprises in Zimbabwe are being denied access to essential facilities on account of intellectual property rights.

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9. Under what circumstances a competition law allegation against a refusal to license would be found to be valid in your jurisdiction? What remedies are possible? Can the patent holder be forced by the competition authority to grant a license? A competition law allegation against a refusal to license would be found to be valid in Zimbabwe if the refusal is aimed at enhancing or maintaining a restrictive business practice, particularly those linked to abuse of dominant position. In terms of section 31(1) of the Competition Act, the competition authority can issue the following orders against any restrictive practice: “(a) prohibiting any person named in the order, or any class of persons, from engaging in the restrictive practice or from pursuing any other course of conduct which is specified in the order and which, in the Commission’s opinion, is similar in form and effect to the restrictive practice;

- requiring any party to the restrictive practice to terminate the restrictive practice, either wholly or to such extent as may be specified in the order, within such time as is specified therein;

- requiring any person named in the order, or any class of persons, to notify prices to the Commission, with or without such further information as may be specified in the order: Provided that the Commission shall not make any such order unless it is satisfied that the price being charged by the person concerned is essential to the maintenance of the restrictive practice to which the order relates;

- prohibiting any person named in the order, or any class of persons, from notifying persons supplying any commodity or service of a price recommended or suggested as appropriate to be charged by those persons;

- generally, making such provision as, in the opinion of the Commission, is reasonably necessary to terminate the restrictive practice or alleviate its effects”.

10. Have common industrial standards that are intended to ensure interoperability created anti-competitive effects? Please elaborate. The competition authority has still not come across any such competition complaints. 11. To which bilateral or international agreements concerning intellectual property rights is your country a party? As a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), Zimbabwe is a signatory to the TRIPS Agreement. It is also a member of AIPPA.

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Zimbabwe


Intellectual property rights (IPRs) enjoy limited exemptions under Zimbabwe’s Competition Act [Chapter 14:28]. The Act provides in terms of its application provisions of section 3(1) that while the Act applies to all economic activities within or having an effect within Zimbabwe, it shall not be construed so as to limit any right acquired under the country’s Plant Breeders Rights Act, the Copyright Act, the Industrial Designs Act, the Patents Act or the Trade Marks Act “except to the extent that such a right is used for the purpose of enhancing or maintaining prices or any other consideration in a manner contemplated in the definition of ‘restrictive practice’”. Zimbabwe’s competition rules therefore recognise the need and role of IPRs in promoting innovation by allowing the holders of the property rights to prevent others from free-riding and unfairly benefitting from their inventions. Such protection gives the necessary incentives for further innovation, which only benefits consumers in the long run. The competition rules also recognise the danger of wholly exempting IPRs from their application since the rights can be abused, particularly if the consumer does not have alternative choices. In the above sense therefore, IPRs and competition rules in Zimbabwe are complementary because they are both aimed at enhancing dynamic efficiency and consumer welfare. The protection of IPRs under competition rules encourages innovation and promotes technical advancement to the ultimate benefit of the consumer. At the same time, the country’s competition rules reserve the right to protect the consumer against abuse of IPRs. 2. How is the tying and bundling of intellectual property rights examined under your competition law? Was the per se approach or the rule of reason approach applied? Like all other forms of tying and bundling of goods and services that are defined as ‘restrictive practices’ under Zimbabwe’s competition law, the tying and bundling of intellectual property rights in Zimbabwe would be examined as abuse of dominant position using the rule of reason approach. 3. Does your national patent office consult the competition authority when granting intellectual property rights? If yes, please elaborate. Zimbabwe does have a Patents Office, which is situated in the Office of the Registrar of Companies. The Patents Office however does not consult the competition authority when granting intellectual property rights, and does not have legal requirements to do so. 4. Have you dealt with cases involving intellectual property rights under the abuse of dominance rules? Is dominance a criteria in the assessment of these practices? Are there any other typical business practices related to intellectual property rights that

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have been found to be anti-competitive in your jurisdiction? Please cite three cases including the parties, facts, legal provisions that have been violated and findings. No IPR case has been referred to the competition authority of Zimbabwe for investigation since the authority effectively commenced its operations in 1998. Should that happen however, complaints against abuse of IPRs would be assessed using the dominance criteria since such abuses, by their nature, constitute monopolisation. 5. Have any of the following practices of combining several intellectual property rights resulted in anti-competitive effects in your country? Please elaborate. e. “package patents” (whereby several patents of one country are necessary for the production of a product) f. “patent thickets” (patent rights of multiple patent holders overlap) g. “cross licensing” (patent holders license their products reciprocally) h. “patent pools” (whereby patents held by various patent holders are pooled and access is granted to the pool instead of to an individual patent). As explained in 4 above, no specific cases involving IPRs have been referred to the competition authority for investigation as anti-competitive practices. 6. Is there concurrent jurisdiction between the competition authority and the patent office with regard to the enforcement of intellectual property rights? Please elaborate. Save for protecting intellectual property rights, like any other commercial rights, against anti-competitive practices, the competition authority of Zimbabwe does not have specific jurisdiction in enforcing IPRs, that is the specific mandate of the Patents Office and the courts. 7. Has the competition authority issued or envisages issuing guidelines on the relationship of intellectual property rights and competition law? Please provide details. The competition authority of Zimbabwe has not issued any guidelines on the relationship of IPR and competition law. However, serious consideration is being given to do so following intense discussions on the subject at the 8th Session of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts (IGE) on Competition Law and Policy held last year. 8. Have there been cases in your jurisdiction where access to an essential facility has been refused on account of an intellectual property right? Please provide specific information relating to the individual cases. No such cases have yet been referred to the competition authority for investigation. This however does not mean that some enterprises in Zimbabwe are being denied access to essential facilities on account of intellectual property rights.

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9. Under what circumstances a competition law allegation against a refusal to license would be found to be valid in your jurisdiction? What remedies are possible? Can the patent holder be forced by the competition authority to grant a license? A competition law allegation against a refusal to license would be found to be valid in Zimbabwe if the refusal is aimed at enhancing or maintaining a restrictive business practice, particularly those linked to abuse of dominant position. In terms of section 31(1) of the Competition Act, the competition authority can issue the following orders against any restrictive practice: “(a) prohibiting any person named in the order, or any class of persons, from engaging in the restrictive practice or from pursuing any other course of conduct which is specified in the order and which, in the Commission’s opinion, is similar in form and effect to the restrictive practice;

requiring any party to the restrictive practice to terminate the restrictive practice, either wholly or to such extent as may be specified in the order, within such time as is specified therein;

requiring any person named in the order, or any class of persons, to notify prices to the Commission, with or without such further information as may be specified in the order: Provided that the Commission shall not make any such order unless it is satisfied that the price being charged by the person concerned is essential to the maintenance of the restrictive practice to which the order relates;

prohibiting any person named in the order, or any class of persons, from notifying persons supplying any commodity or service of a price recommended or suggested as appropriate to be charged by those persons;

generally, making such provision as, in the opinion of the Commission, is reasonably necessary to terminate the restrictive practice or alleviate its effects”.

10. Have common industrial standards that are intended to ensure interoperability created anti-competitive effects? Please elaborate. The competition authority has still not come across any such competition complaints. 11. To which bilateral or international agreements concerning intellectual property rights is your country a party? As a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), Zimbabwe is a signatory to the TRIPS Agreement. It is also a member of AIPPA.

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i E.g. Case 238/87 AB Volvo v Erik Veng (UK); ECR 6211; ii DG Competition Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 83 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses; par. 239; http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/others/discpaper2005.pdf iii IMS Health GmbH & Co v NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG (2004) ECR I-5039 iv Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft of 24 March 2004 v Note that the Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of computer programs (OJ L 122, 17.5.1991, p. 42–46 ) explicitly recognises the value of interoperability in software markets, and allows companies to access the interface information necessary, to the extent feasible. vi Case COP/A.37.507/F3-Astra Zeneca; decision of 15 June 2006 vii Note that EC legislation has recently been modified to address this problem: As of 30 October 2005 it will no longer be possible to prevent generic entry by withdrawing a European reference product.

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http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/others/discpaper2005.pdf