Inter-linkages between Process Safety and APELL for Accident Prevention and Preparedness Inter-linkages between Process Safety and APELL for Accident Prevention.

Inter-linkages between Process Safety Inter-linkages between Process Safety and APELL for Accident Prevention and APELL for Accident Prevention

and Preparednessand Preparedness

Inter-linkages between Process Safety Inter-linkages between Process Safety and APELL for Accident Prevention and APELL for Accident Prevention

and Preparednessand Preparedness

ING. NESTOR SPOSITOING. NESTOR SPOSITO DOW ARGENTINADOW ARGENTINA

Argentina NFPA Chapter PresidentArgentina NFPA Chapter PresidentBAHIA BLANCA APELL PROCESSBAHIA BLANCA APELL PROCESS

Coordinator UNEP/Bs.As. Province. Coordinator UNEP/Bs.As. Province.




Promoting Safer Operations and Promoting Safer Operations and Emergency Preparedness Chemical Sector Emergency Preparedness Chemical Sector

26-27 April-201026-27 April-2010

Zhangjiagang- CHINAZhangjiagang- CHINA

Notwithstanding… They Keep On Notwithstanding… They Keep On HappeningHappening

Notwithstanding the enormous ongoing Notwithstanding the enormous ongoing efforts and the significant progress so far efforts and the significant progress so far attained in the last few years to increase our attained in the last few years to increase our knowledge about the root causes of fires and knowledge about the root causes of fires and explosions in process plants and even in explosions in process plants and even in spite of the remarkable technological spite of the remarkable technological progress accomplished in the field of progress accomplished in the field of materials and the development of safe materials and the development of safe design methodologies, such disastrous design methodologies, such disastrous occurrences keep on happeningoccurrences keep on happening

•BASIC CONCEPTBASIC CONCEPT

• FIRE AND EXPLOSIONS FIRE AND EXPLOSIONS

• Fires. Classification. Effects. Fires. Classification. Effects.

• Explosions. Classification. Effects.Explosions. Classification. Effects.

•Learning experiences about accidents. Learning experiences about accidents.

•PREVENTION AND MITIGATION METHODS. PREVENTION AND MITIGATION METHODS.

•IMPORTANCE OF A SAFE DESIGN AND THE USE OF PROPER IMPORTANCE OF A SAFE DESIGN AND THE USE OF PROPER STANDARDS.STANDARDS.

• ConclusionsConclusions

•BASIC CONCEPTBASIC CONCEPT

• FIRE AND EXPLOSIONS FIRE AND EXPLOSIONS

• Fires. Classification. Effects. Fires. Classification. Effects.

• Explosions. Classification. Effects.Explosions. Classification. Effects.

•Learning experiences about accidents. Learning experiences about accidents.

•PREVENTION AND MITIGATION METHODS. PREVENTION AND MITIGATION METHODS.

•IMPORTANCE OF A SAFE DESIGN AND THE USE OF PROPER IMPORTANCE OF A SAFE DESIGN AND THE USE OF PROPER STANDARDS.STANDARDS.

• ConclusionsConclusions

Inter-linkages Process Safety and APELLInter-linkages Process Safety and APELLTopicsTopics

DOW RESTRICTED - For internal use onlyDOW RESTRICTED - For internal use only

(Upper Flammability Level )(Upper Flammability Level )

(Lower Flammability Level)(Lower Flammability Level)

Lean mixture

Rich mixture

ExplossiveRange

Inter-linkages Process Safety and APELLInter-linkages Process Safety and APELLBasic ConceptsBasic Concepts

DOW RESTRICTED - For internal use onlyDOW RESTRICTED - For internal use only

combCt

tISLISL

2575.01...... º25

Concentration % vol.Concentration % vol.

Tem

pera

ture

ºC

Tem

pera

ture

ºC

L.L.IL.L.I L.S.IL.S.I

400400

00

Flammability - Variation of Temperature LimitsFlammability - Variation of Temperature Limits

combCt

tIILIIL

2575.01...... º25


DOW RESTRICTED - For internal DOW RESTRICTED - For internal use onlyuse only

L.S.I. (p) = L.S.I. (1 atm) + 20.6(log P + 1)

L.I.IL.I.I L.S.IL.S.I

@ atm press.

@ P press.

Slight impact

Big increase

Variation of Flammability-Pressure LimitsVariation of Flammability-Pressure Limits



PropanePropane

L.S.I.L.S.I.L.I.I.L.I.I.

9.5% (air)9.5% (air)

55.0% (oxygen)55.0% (oxygen)

2.1% (air)2.1% (air)

2.3% (oxygen)2.3% (oxygen)

R.I.(air)R.I.(air)

R.I.(Oxygen)R.I.(Oxygen)

Variation of Flammability - O2 Concentration LimitsVariation of Flammability - O2 Concentration Limits



Minimun Ignition Energy (MIE)Minimun Ignition Energy (MIE)

IGNITIONIGNITIONMINIMUM IGNITION

ENERGY (MIE)

MINIMUM IGNITION

ENERGY (MIE)

- Characteristic for every material.

-Varies with environmental conditions, pressure and composition.

- For HC is of about 0.25 mj

- Characteristic for every material.

-Varies with environmental conditions, pressure and composition.

- For HC is of about 0.25 mj



0.50.5

0.20.2

0.020.02

MIE

MIE

Igni

tion

Ene

rgy

(mj)

Igni

tion

Ene

rgy

(mj)

Flammable Gas Concentration (% v/v)Flammable Gas Concentration (% v/v)1010 2020 3030 4040

CH4CH4

H2H2


Minimun Ignition Energy (MIE)Minimun Ignition Energy (MIE)

Pool FirePool Fire Begins with the release of flammable material from process

equipment. Thermal effects depends on:

Type of fuel Geometry of the pool Duration of the fire Location of the radiation receiver .

Localized in their effects Main concern domino effect/ setup employee safety zones.

Inter-linkages Process Safety and APELLInter-linkages Process Safety and APELLFire and ExplosionFire and Explosion

Jet FireJet Fire

Combustion of a material released from a pressurized process unit.

Localized in their effects

Main concern domino effect.


Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE).

““A release of energy that causes a blast” AICheE/CCPS (1994) .

“Blast is a transient change in the gas density, pressure and velocity of the air surrounding an explosion point” NFPA 69.

“A rapid expansion of gases resulting in a rapidly moving pressure or shock wave”. Crowl and Louvar (1990)


Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE).

Material flammable. Suitable conditions P y T.Material flammable. Suitable conditions P y T.

Cloud sufficient size prior to ignition ( Dispersion phase).Cloud sufficient size prior to ignition ( Dispersion phase).

Ignition delays 1 to 5 minutes ( more probable) . Ignition delays 1 to 5 minutes ( more probable) .

Sufficient amount of the cloud must be within the Sufficient amount of the cloud must be within the flammable range flammable range


Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE). Sufficient confinement or turbulent mixing of a portion Sufficient confinement or turbulent mixing of a portion

of the vapor cloud must be presentof the vapor cloud must be present..

Minimum mass of flammable material required:Minimum mass of flammable material required:

1 ton (Wiekema, 1979) to 15 tons (Health &Safety Executive, 1 ton (Wiekema, 1979) to 15 tons (Health &Safety Executive, 1979).1979).

More reactive species such as hydrogen and acetylene More reactive species such as hydrogen and acetylene Gugan(1988) with quantities as low as 100 kg.Gugan(1988) with quantities as low as 100 kg.


A Long and Sad History A Long and Sad History of Fire and Explosion in of Fire and Explosion in

Process IndustryProcess Industry

28 death

104injuries

Total destruction ( 70

MMU$S)

1800 damages

home

Inter-linkages Process Safety and APELLInter-linkages Process Safety and APELLLesson LearnedLesson Learned


•Importance of Management of Change (MOC).Importance of Management of Change (MOC).

•The need to eliminate expansion joints in dangerous The need to eliminate expansion joints in dangerous

services.services.

•Control Room design concept in High Hazards Plants.Control Room design concept in High Hazards Plants.

Structural design to withstand major hazardous Structural design to withstand major hazardous

eventsevents

•Plant Layout. Positioning of occupied buildingsPlant Layout. Positioning of occupied buildings


4000 4000 Death

Death inmediatly

inmediatly

10000 10000 afectted

afectted ClosedClosedPlantPlant


MOC (Management of Change) MOC (Management of Change)

•The change was about the inadequate state of the he change was about the inadequate state of the facilities supporting the safe operation of the MIC facilities supporting the safe operation of the MIC storage.storage.

•Layers of Protection Identified and installed in the Layers of Protection Identified and installed in the design/construction but out of operation.design/construction but out of operation.

There were 5 levels of protection available to There were 5 levels of protection available to minimize the Release to atmosphere, all of which minimize the Release to atmosphere, all of which failed.failed.

Inter-linkages Process Safety and APELLInter-linkages Process Safety and APELLLesson Learned BHOPALLesson Learned BHOPAL

•American Institute of Chemical & Process Safety American Institute of Chemical & Process Safety organization & programs (AIChE –CCPS).organization & programs (AIChE –CCPS).

•UNEP Awareness Preparedness Emergency Local level UNEP Awareness Preparedness Emergency Local level Process ( APELL Process).Process ( APELL Process).

•Chemical Manufacturer’s Association Community Chemical Manufacturer’s Association Community Awareness and Emergency Response (CAER). Awareness and Emergency Response (CAER).

•Local Emergency Planning /Risk communication. Local Emergency Planning /Risk communication.

•Community Engagement.Community Engagement.

Inter-linkages Process Safety and APELLInter-linkages Process Safety and APELLLesson Learned BHOPALLesson Learned BHOPAL


Effective safety culture leadership and oversight to prevent Effective safety culture leadership and oversight to prevent catastrophic accidentcatastrophic accident.

•Focus on process safety besides personal safety.Focus on process safety besides personal safety.

• Personal safety metrics are important to track low-consequence, Personal safety metrics are important to track low-consequence, high-probability incidents, but are not a good indicator of process high-probability incidents, but are not a good indicator of process safety performance .safety performance .

•Create an effective reporting and learning culture.Create an effective reporting and learning culture.

Inter-linkages Process Safety and APELLInter-linkages Process Safety and APELLLesson Learned BPLesson Learned BP

•Provide adequate resources to prevent major accidents; budget cuts Provide adequate resources to prevent major accidents; budget cuts impaired process safety performance at the Texas City refineryimpaired process safety performance at the Texas City refinery.

•Effective vehicle traffic policy to control vehicle traffic into hazardous Effective vehicle traffic policy to control vehicle traffic into hazardous process areas.process areas.

•Nonessential personnel must be removed from areas in and around Nonessential personnel must be removed from areas in and around process units during the hazardous unit startupprocess units during the hazardous unit startup


•Effective mechanical integrity program to maintain instruments and Effective mechanical integrity program to maintain instruments and process equipment .process equipment .

•MOC guidelines that address the safe control of the following: MOC guidelines that address the safe control of the following: •Major organizational changes including mergers, acquisitionsMajor organizational changes including mergers, acquisitions, reorganizations.

•Changes in policies and budgets.Changes in policies and budgets.

•Personal changes. Staffing during processPersonal changes. Staffing during process

Inter-linkages Process Safety and APELLInter-linkages Process Safety and APELL

Lesson LearnedLesson Learned

The occurrence of releases shall be minimized by The occurrence of releases shall be minimized by measures which include:measures which include: Proper operating and design conditionsProper operating and design conditions Material selection Material selection Preventive maintenance, procedures, alarm systemsPreventive maintenance, procedures, alarm systems No flanges shall be installed inside the skirt of a No flanges shall be installed inside the skirt of a

vessel containing flammable materials.vessel containing flammable materials. Welded connections instead of flanged connectionWelded connections instead of flanged connection..

Avoid or minimize releasesAvoid or minimize releases..

Inter-linkages Process Safety and APELLInter-linkages Process Safety and APELLPrevention and MitigationPrevention and Mitigation

The occurrence of releases shall be minimized by The occurrence of releases shall be minimized by measures which include:measures which include: Proper operating and design conditionsProper operating and design conditions Material selection Material selection Preventive maintenance, procedures, alarm systemsPreventive maintenance, procedures, alarm systems No flanges shall be installed inside the skirt of a No flanges shall be installed inside the skirt of a

vessel containing flammable materials.vessel containing flammable materials. Welded connections instead of flanged connectionWelded connections instead of flanged connection..

The amount of released material within flammability The amount of released material within flammability limits shall be minimized by:limits shall be minimized by: Proper atmosphere controlProper atmosphere control Accelerated dispersion through water spray Accelerated dispersion through water spray Proper storage and installation of check valves, Proper storage and installation of check valves,

remotely operated isolation valves and excess flow remotely operated isolation valves and excess flow valvesvalves

other systems where appropriate.other systems where appropriate.


The amount of released material within flammability The amount of released material within flammability limits shall be minimized by:limits shall be minimized by: Proper atmosphere controlProper atmosphere control Accelerated dispersion through water spray Accelerated dispersion through water spray Proper storage and installation of check valves, Proper storage and installation of check valves,

remotely operated isolation valves and excess flow remotely operated isolation valves and excess flow valvesvalves

other systems where appropriate.other systems where appropriate.


Avoid the use of trhreaded connections in critical

hazardous material services.

Avoid the use of trhreaded connections in critical

hazardous material services.

Ignition SourcesIgnition Sources Potential ignition sources should be eliminated. Where Potential ignition sources should be eliminated. Where

they cannot be eliminated protection should be they cannot be eliminated protection should be

provided byprovided by: : Proper spacing. Proper spacing.

Installing equipment which meet the area classification Installing equipment which meet the area classification standard (NFPA 70).standard (NFPA 70).

Installing water curtains to prevent flammable gas mixtures Installing water curtains to prevent flammable gas mixtures from reaching ignition sourcesfrom reaching ignition sources. .


Ignition SourcesIgnition Sources

Static electricity is a potential ignition source. Static electricity is a potential ignition source.

It is crucial to prevent the simultaneous occurrence of a It is crucial to prevent the simultaneous occurrence of a flammable mixture and static spark. flammable mixture and static spark.



Safe Design of Storage TanksSafe Design of Storage Tanks

Containment dikeContainment dike Fire protectionFire protection

Grade:1-2 %

Remote controlled diked area

Sprinkler System


Avoid small connections at the bottom and liquid areas.

Avoid small connections at the bottom and liquid areas.

EBVEBV

BuildingsBuildings Critical buildings (Control Room) shall be designed to Critical buildings (Control Room) shall be designed to

withstand the consequences of explosions. withstand the consequences of explosions. CR cannot meet this requirement shall beCR cannot meet this requirement shall be

Relocation. Relocation.

Strengthening for pressure effects. Strengthening for pressure effects.

Shielding the critical equipment with a blast wall. Shielding the critical equipment with a blast wall.

Shielding the area where a release can occur from possible Shielding the area where a release can occur from possible ignition sources by providing properly grounded water or steam ignition sources by providing properly grounded water or steam

sprayspray..



Adequate BuildingsAdequate BuildingsExplosion proof control roomExplosion proof control room

Explosion resistant door

Demand closing and opening

Awareness raising Awareness raising and dissemination and dissemination Process Safety Process Safety knowledge knowledge

Risk analysis, Risk analysis, Consequence calculations, Consequence calculations, inherently safe design more inherently safe design more

reliable engineering reliable engineering practices and standards practices and standards

Inter-linkages Process Safety and APELLInter-linkages Process Safety and APELLEnhancement PS KnowledgeEnhancement PS Knowledge

How to explain fire and explosion incidents in High-tech How to explain fire and explosion incidents in High-tech plants :plants : Violations to or non compliance with safety regulations Violations to or non compliance with safety regulations Not using supposedly very well known safe procedures.Not using supposedly very well known safe procedures. Layers of Protection disable.Layers of Protection disable. Lacks of compromise with PS.Lacks of compromise with PS. Lack of knowledge or commitment with Safe Design.Lack of knowledge or commitment with Safe Design. Other, other,……Other, other,……

Process Safety knowledge should be open.Process Safety knowledge should be open. Throughout all organizationsThroughout all organizations Control Agencies.Control Agencies. Technical schools and universities.Technical schools and universities. Contractors/EPCM Contractors/EPCM


We must break the paradigmWe must break the paradigm

Good personal safety record is enough to ensure Good personal safety record is enough to ensure that we are sufficiently safe to prevent all types of that we are sufficiently safe to prevent all types of major accidentsmajor accidents. .

““The lost time rate is not a measure of process safety” The lost time rate is not a measure of process safety” (Kletz, 2003).(Kletz, 2003).

““An emphasis on personal safety statistics can lead An emphasis on personal safety statistics can lead companies to lose sight of deteriorating process companies to lose sight of deteriorating process safety performance (Hopkins, 2000)”safety performance (Hopkins, 2000)”


We must break the paradigmWe must break the paradigm

““Nothing bad will ever happen to us” Nothing bad will ever happen to us” or that or that any action made with impunity for some time against any action made with impunity for some time against Safety Process rules could be repeated forever with Safety Process rules could be repeated forever with the same lack of adverse resultsthe same lack of adverse results


Another great challenge is to find a way to expand the Another great challenge is to find a way to expand the knowledge in a worldwide context characterized byknowledge in a worldwide context characterized by

Global economical crisis.Global economical crisis.

A progressive expansion of plant capacities and inventories. A progressive expansion of plant capacities and inventories.

A progressive increase of investments in places where there is A progressive increase of investments in places where there is not enough background and experience about the operation, not enough background and experience about the operation, maintenance, Process safety and loss prevention (Middle East). maintenance, Process safety and loss prevention (Middle East).

High labor turnover.High labor turnover.

More reduced budgets. More reduced budgets.


Our Proposal Our Proposal

Raising awareness.Raising awareness. Companies, local community, local authorities (APELL)Companies, local community, local authorities (APELL)

Commitment. Commitment. Promoted throughout the whole organization, all project Promoted throughout the whole organization, all project

stages and the whole project life span. stages and the whole project life span.

Creativity.Creativity. To improve and expand even more the existing PS To improve and expand even more the existing PS

knowledge and its dissemination, encouraging the universal knowledge and its dissemination, encouraging the universal creation, expansion and application of a Process Safety creation, expansion and application of a Process Safety Culture in a world of continuous change.Culture in a world of continuous change.


The study highlights the need for accident The study highlights the need for accident forecasting, enhancement PS knowledge forecasting, enhancement PS knowledge consequence assessment, and development of up-consequence assessment, and development of up-to-date emergency preparedness and disaster to-date emergency preparedness and disaster management plans in the chemical process management plans in the chemical process industries and raising community awareness industries and raising community awareness trough plan like APELL Process from UNEP trough plan like APELL Process from UNEP

APELL Process must include Process Safety as a APELL Process must include Process Safety as a key deliverable. key deliverable.

Our Proposal


PROCESS SAFETY IS NOT PROCESS SAFETY IS NOT A MEREA MERE

INTELLECTUAL EXCERCISE INTELLECTUAL EXCERCISE BUT THE BUT THE

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DIFFERENCE BETWEEN LIFE AND DEATH LIFE AND DEATH


QUESTIONS?QUESTIONS?

nspó[email protected]ó[email protected]ó[email protected]ó[email protected]




Inter-linkages between Process Safety and APELL for Accident Prevention and Preparedness Inter-linkages between Process Safety and APELL for Accident Prevention.

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