Intelligence and Ethics: The CIA'S Covert Operations
byDavidCanon DepartmentofPolitical Science,IndianaUniversity This
agency is conducted in a splendid way.As has been said, spying is
spying.. ..Youhaveto make up yourmind that youare going to have
anintelligence agency andprotectitas such, andshut your eyes some
and take whatis coming. John Stennis, November1971' Itwasnaiveto
suppose inthe first place that such an agency could he broughtinto
beingwithoutbecominga Frankenstein.Itisevenmore naive to suppose
that it can go on in its present form without unhinging the
government itwascreated to protect, NormanCousins,July 8,1978' The
world is quite capable ofgoing to hell without the help ofthe CIA.
NormanBirnbaum, January1979' The CIA recentlysuffered through a
periodofCongressional scrutiny and
moraloutragefromapublicstillreelingundertheunsettlingeffectsof
Watergate.This attentionwastotallyforeign t o an agencyaccustomed t
o limitedaccountabilityandvirtualindependenceinmostofitsactivities.
Many claim that the CIA has not been the same since, partly because
of the crisis ofconfidence it has suffered worldwide,partly because
of the all-time low in employee morale, and mostly, as critics from
the rightmaintain, be- cause it has been shackled by unreasonable
limits imposed on it by a reform- mindedadministration. Critics
from the left, while acknowledging the need for
anationalintelligenceagency,believethat the potential for
abusestill exists and that not enough has been done to insure that
the "excesses"of the CIA'S first thirty years do not occur again.
In recent months this opinion has come from a shrinking minority,as
such ethical considerations lose appeal during a periodofheightened
militarismand patriotismbrought on bythe crisesin Iran and
Afghanistan.A definite sentiment exists in Congress t o
simply"unhandcuff'theCIA,hopingthatU.S.interestsmaybebetter
protected.' 198THE JOURNAL OF LIBERTARIAN STUDIESSpring This paper
will examine the CIA'srole in the international power struggle by
briefly outlining the formation and early history of the CIA, then
by dis- cussing the developments of the last twenty years that led
to the crisis,and nextbyexamining the early attempts at control and
reform.Finally Iwill outlineandassessthe various policy
options:from the coldwarriorswho wantto returnto theoldAllenDulles
CIA to the humanistswhobelieve that any covert activity is immoral
and must be outlawed. After evaluating the trade-offs that
inherently exist in such acomplex issue, I will recommend the
alternative thatI believe to be in the best interest of the United
States as a partofthe worldcommunity. I.The EarlyHistoryofthe CIA
The needfor an agency that would centralize intelligence gathering
became obvious after the terrible tragedy ofPearl
Harbor.'Intelligence at the time had some idea that an attack was
possible, but there was no single voice that dictated a loud enough
warning. This lack of a centralized apparatus proved to be
disastrous; shortly afterward, William J. Donovan recommended that
such an organizationbeformed. The Office of
CoordinatorofIntelligence
wasputintoexistence,whichlaterwassplitintotheOfficeofStrategic
Services (OSS), underDonovan,and the Office ofWarInformation.The
patternofcombiningspecialoperationswithinformation-gathering that
wasestablished intheOSS isstillfollowed today.Trumandisbandedthe
OSS on September 20,1945, and formed the Bureau ofIntelligence and
Re- search. Anotherexecutive orderset up the NationalIntelligence
Authority and under it, the Central Intelligence Group. Two
motivating factors led to the formation of the CentralIntelligence
Agency underthe NationalSecu- rity Actof1947: I.the American rise
to worldpowerafter WW 11,the abandonment of our prewar
isolationism, andall the responsibilities thatthis change entailed;
and 2.the perceivedSoviet threat to this newpositionofpower.6
Itappearedthat the CIA wasformed to serve two purposes: I. to
gather information aboutthe capabilities andintentions offriendly
andun- friendly nations (and to discern betweenthe two); and 2.to
evaluate itandpresent it insome usefulform to policy-makers.'
Mostofthe CIA'searly activities were centered on uncovering as much
informationaboutRussia as they could.Because the
earlierconcentrated intelligence efforts hadbeencentered
exclusively on GermanyandJapan, the U.S.really
hadlimitedinformation on its newrival.In the late forties andearly
fifties,hundredsofmenwereemployedandmassiveresources
wereusedinaneffortto amassasmuchinformationaspossible.Illegal
bordercrossings were usedfor everything from obtainingsoil samples,
to testing for radioactive fallout, to interviewing anyone who
would talk. Soon 1980COVERT OPERATIONS AND ETHICS199
itbecameevident thatsimple intelligence gathering
wouldnotsufficeand thatan additional function was needed to fill
the void between normal for-
eignpolicyactionsandarmedintervention.Questionswereimmediately
raisedas to the legitimacy ofthe new branchreferred to as Special
Opera-
tions,covertactivities,orclandestineoperations.PresidentTruman,
amongothers, saw these activities as deviating from the original
intentof the 1947 Act. Fifteen years after the CIA'S inception
Truman said, "Inever hadany thought that whenIset up the CIA thatit
wouldbeinjected into peacetime cloak and
daggeroperation^."^Directors ofOperations have al- waysliberally
usedthe fifth clause ofthe CIAsection ofthe1947 Actto justify its
actions.The clause, which is similar in its ambiguity to the Com-
merce Clause ofthe Constitution, gave the CIA the right "to perform
such other functions and duties related to intelligence activities
affecting national security..
.."9Thismandate,referredtoasthe"otherfunctions"clause,
wasfurtherlegitimizedbyaNationalSecurityCouncilOrderin1948, shortly
after the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, which gave the CIA
responsibility for"political,psychological, economic,
andunconventional warfareoperation^."'^In1949 the CIA gained more
powerfromthe CIA Act,whichexempted
itfromdisclosinginformationaboutitsemployees and allowed itto spend
taxpayers' money "without regard to the provision of law and
regulations relating to the expenditures of government funds.""
These laws gave the CIA unprecedentedspecial status in carrying
outbu- reaucratic activity. The CIA was something new and exciting,
and was held inhigh public esteem in an era ofintense Cold War. A
complete understanding of the expansion of the CIA in the early
fifties mustinclude anawareness ofthe
interestingrelationshipthatexistedbe- tween theState
Departmentandthe CIA because ofthe Dullesbrothers. John Foster
Dulles reflected the American ethic in the Eisenhower adminis-
tration.He spoke ofthe "containment"ofCommunism; butwhen it came to
actual interference in the affairs ofother nations,the State
Department made itclear thatwewouldnot"adoptthe eviltactics
ofsubversion and
secretmanipulationpracticedbytheCommunistenemy."12Meanwhile, John
Foster'sbrother, Allen Welsh Dulles, Director of the CIA, was
carry- ing out covert operations that did everything from fixing
elections to leading military coups. This dualism of US.foreign
policy, openly claiming our be-
liefinself-determinationandcovertlycreatinghavocaroundtheworld,
probablywouldhavedevelopedwithouttherelationshipoftheDulles
brothers,butits magnitude was intensified because of the
reducedfrictions between the State Departmentand the CIA that would
naturally arise with such conflicting policies."The system of
checks and balances was reduced and the CIA virtually hada free
handin all ofits operations. The CIA rapidly took advantage of its
new extensive powers and started making its presence known around
the world.In the first ten years, major covert operationswere
carried outinBogota,Burma,Costa Rica,Korea, 200THE JOURNAL OF
LIBERTARIAN STUDIESSpring Laos, Guatamala, Indonesia, Iran, China,
and Taiwan. Many of these were seenashugesuccesses,especially
coupssuchasthe"bananarevolt"in Guatemala-essentiallyaBayofPigs that
worked."Manyofthese cases have recently come under fire for causing
death and destruction that byfar
outweighanygainsforthe"freeworld."Forexample,inIndonesiathe
CIA-inspired coup that removed President Sukarno from power led to
the death ofat least 500,000 people and the imprisonment ofhundreds
of thou-
sandsmoreinconcentrationcamps."TherecentcrisisinIrancertainly
castsdoubtonthedecisiontoputtheShahandhisCIA-createdsecret police
force into power in1953. The operations ofthe CIA in the early
years reflected the national senti- ments at the time. The cold war
was at its peak with anticommunist feelings running high. With the
present Watergate-aroused moralism and awareness ofpublic
opinion,itisdifficult to comprehend the"nationalsecurity iiber
alles"mind-set that dictated the apathetic attitudes toward human
rights in situationsof"containingcommunism."Typical
ofthis"endsjustifythe means"approachwas the testimony ofa DullesCIA
agent in theChurch Committee investigations of1975:
Wenevergaveanythoughttothislineofreasoning[objections to violations
of human rights], because we were justnaturally pragmatists. The
one thing we were concerned about was this:Will this course ofac-
tionwork; will we reach the objective that we desire to reach?
Asfar as legality isconcerned, morals or ethics, it
wasneverraisedbymyselfor
anyoneelse.Ithinkthissuggestsreallythatingovernmentwe are amoral.
l6 Though perhaps amoral, the CIA was perceived bythe policy-makers
as working in the nation'sbest interests, and so no objections were
raised. This viewofthe CIAdictated the administration'sdualistic
policyas discussed earlier. Forexample,concerning
Indonesia,Eisenhower maintained,"Our
policyisoneofcarefulneutralityandproperdeportmentalltheway
throughso as notto be takingsides where itisnoneofourbusiness."At
thatverymoment dozens ofCIA B-26's were flyingfromManila to aid in
therevolt."The CIA wasinits heyday. 11.The Fall From Grace The CIA
was operating under the principle, "Dowhat you have to but don't
get caught," realizing that despite national security priorities
the public may notsympathize if some ofthemore extreme activities
were revealed. The integrity of the government had to be protected
bycutting a line be-
tweenthesponsorsandtheactorsofcovertactivities.Withtheembar-
rassmentoftheU-2 planeoverRussiain1960,thepublic wasno longer
accepting all thedenials. Therefore,theconcept of"plausibledenial"
was developed todetermine whentheadministrationwouldbeable to
deceive 1980COVERT OPERATIONS AND ETHICS201 the American public. If
it was felt the public would buy the line, the action wouldbe
carried out. Much work went into the formation ofcover stories,
butin the1961 BayofPigs debacle the denial was implausible even to
the most naive. The shabbily handled invasion and explanation were
so comical (ortragic)thatCastrocommented,
"EvenHollywoodwouldnottryand film such a story."lB This incident
marked the beginning of the end of public confidence in the CIA.In
general the Bay ofPigs was not viewed as immoral but as a failure
because it was not successful. If we had used more air support it
might have beenanotherfeather inthe CIA'scap.
Tokenoversightwasconductedbytheexecutive branchandCongress
throughthe ForeignIntelligence Advisory Board and the Intelligence
Sub- committee ofthe ArmedServices committee.Little
restraintwasactually imposed, as isrevealedbycommittee chairman
John Stennis' commentin November1971: This agency [the CIA] is
conducted in a splendid way.Ashas been said, spying is spying.. .
.You have to make up your mind that youare going to have an
intelligence agency and protect it as such, and shut your eyes some
and take whatiscoming." Senator Stuart Symington complained,
"Iwishhis[Stennis']interest in the subject haddeveloped to
thepointwhere heheld justone meetingofthe CIA subcommittee this
year, justone meeting!"20 Despite occasional leaks and minor
problems, the CIA's covert operations were running in high gear,
accounting for over halfof the CIA's total budget.
TherooffinallycavedinonDecember 22,1974, whentheNewYork Times
rananarticle bySeymour Hershrevealing theCIA's"dirtytricks" that
are now so well known: bribing politicians, undermining
governments, spreading lies,conducting experiments
withmind-altering drugs,building stocks ofpoison,contaminating food
supplies, arming secret armies to re- voltagainst national leaders,
and above all, plotting to assassinate foreign leaders.Director
WilliamColby confirmed most ofthe allegations in a re- portsent to
Henry Kissinger. Top men resigned and the crisis that virtually
paralyzed the CIA wasunderway.The House underOtisPike, theSenate
underFrankChurch, and theJustice Department all conducted
investiga- tions that confirmed many ofthe public'sworst
suspicions. The Justice De- partment's 683-page report
of"questionable activities" and the multivolume Congressional
reports left the public screaming for the reform ofan agency that
had seemingly lost touch with reality and had adopted the methods
and accepted thevaluesystem ofthe "enemy."" Even more unsettling
were the facts revealed byformer CIA agents who hadquitandwere
"tellingitall."ItwasrevealedthatRichard Helms bla- tantly lied to
the Senate about the CIA'sinvolvement in Chile on February 7,
1973.2William ColbyperjuredhimselfbeforetheChurchcommittee in
202THE JOURNAL OF LIBERTARIAN STUDIESSpring 1975 whenhe tried to
deny U.S.involvement in Angola. Both of these men
wereintheunenviable positionofhaving to choose betweentwo "ethical
imperatives," either honoring the oath ofsecrecy for the CIA or
telling the truthunderoath.Itisatoughdilemma
andbothofthemenoptedfor former,Colby saying, I found myself ina
position ofconflict. I had sworn myoath to protect certain secrets.
I didn'twant to lie. I didn'twant to mislead the Senate. I
wassimply trying to findmywaythrough a verydifficult situati~n.~'
Judge Parker did not see it that way and convicted Colby of
perjury,giving himthemaximum$2,000 fineandsaying,
"Publicofficialsateverylevel, whatever their position,like any
other person,mustrespectand honor the Constitutionandthe laws ofthe
Unitedstate^."'^ Itiseasytosympathize withthese men'sdilemma.They
bothbelieved
theywereactinginthenation'sbestinterestandsaidtheywoulddo the same
thing againifthey hadto.Itis much harderto justifythe action of
Henry Kissingerbefore the same Church committee.JohnStockwell, who
at the timewasOperations DirectorinAngolaandwasamemberofthe
NationalSecurityCouncil,revealedthatKissingerpresidedoverthe
meetingoftheNSCthatapprovedofaprogramtoorganizeandsupply mercenary
armies and then subsequently went in front of Congress and de- nied
any involvement in Angola.'>The secrecy (and the deception that
goes withit)oftheCIAcanbejustifiedas beingindispensable forthe
organ- ization,butwhenitoverflows into the policy-making
arena,serious ques- tionsofthe subversion ofthe whole democratic
process can be raised. This, then, brings the problem to the point
where the American public no longerhasanyconfidence
intheCIA,andtheCIAhasbeendeemedin- competent and unable to serve
our interests. The crisis of confidence and in- effectivenessof the
CIA are merely symptoms of the problem which critics from the right
say will besolved ifthe CIA is given backits oldpowerto
protectAmericaninterests.ManyfeeltheCIA'S problemscontributeto
America's apparent inability to deal with international crises, as
in Iran and Afghanistan. Others insist there are inherent problems
in covert operations thathavebeencausingtheincompetence
andthattrade-offswithhuman
rightsaretooseveretojustifycovertoperationseveniftheydowork. The
main questions are then: to what extent is the CIA compatible with
the American system, or necessary to preserve it;andhowcan wehave
an ef- fective intelligence agency, which is essential for survival
in today's complex world,butyetdoes nottramplehumanrights?In
otherwords,are ethics and intelligence contradictory terms, and if
they are which must we choose? 111.Reform ofthe CIA-Whatis Needed?
Reformofany bureaucracy is difficult, buttackling the CIA has
proven to beataskofmonumentalproportionsastheinertiaandresistanceto
1980COVERT OPERATIONS AND ETHICS203 change, generally observable in
government, isslowed even further bythe
"sacredcow"statusofnationalsecurity. Two aspects oftheCIAare the
targets ofmost reform discussions: the controversial covert
political opera-
tionsandthecovertmeansofobtaininginformation.Athirdfunction,
counter-intelligence, is usually regarded as immune to the reforms
because
ofitsuniversallyrecognizedimportance.Reformproposalshavetaken
dozens ofdifferentapproaches.I willexamine fourpossibilities
(actually, three alternatives and the status quo), bearing in mind
both historical prece- denceandfuture implications inassessing
theirrespective meritsandlia- bilities. The "Minimal Decision:"
StatusQuo.WhenAdmiral Stansfield Turner recently tookover
thestruggling CIA,itappearedhehadthe rightinten-
tions,butmostofhiseffortsbackfired.Inordertorestorepubliccon-
fidence,hecutbackcovert operationsandfired400clandestine officials.
Tad Szulc viewed this act as having a worse effect on employee
morale than all the investigations andrevelation^.^^Turner'snext
move was to attempt totakecontrolofthewholeintelligence
apparatus,making theDefense Department the CIA'smainantagonist for
this period. It became obvious to President Carter that action was
needed to improve theaccountability,integrity andeffectiveness
oftheCIA.Accountability
wasprovidedforintheHughes-Ryanamendmentof1974 withrequire- ments
for Senate briefingsandPresidential approval ofcovert operations.
With Colby and Kissinger proving that non-accountability through
perjury was still possible, Carter established the Intelligence
Oversight Board, com-
prisedofformerGovernorofPennsylvaniaWilliamScranton,former
SenatorofTennessee AlbertGore,andWashington attorneyThomasL.
Turner. They are responsible for reviewing intelligence activities
and report- ing any problems to the President.2' In addition,Carter
issued Executive Order #I2036 on January 24,1978, showing a
commitment to more openness in intelligence functions and more
protectionfor individual rights. Its main points outlawed all
covert opera- tionsintheUnitedStates(exceptwithexecutive
approval),outlawedas-
sassinations,restrictedCIAcontractswiththeacademic worldandnon-
governmentinstitutions,restrictedthesurveillanceof"U.S.persons"to
overseas (except with approval of the President and Attorney
General), and put counter-intelligence under the direction ofa new
committee.The effec- tiveness of the CIA was to be bolstered by the
National Intelligence Tasking Center, which centralized activities,
and by the Policy Review Committee of
theNSC,which"definesandestablishes prioritiesforintelligencecon-
sumers."In addition, Stansfield Turner was given more power
inpreparing the CIA'sbudgetandin otherareas.2' Criticism flew
frombothsides, as isusually the case withminimal deci- sions such
as this.Opinions ofthose who thinknothing concrete came of 204THE
JOURNAL OF LIBERTARIAN STUDIESSpring
theorderaresummedupbytheDirectorfortheCenterforNational Security
Studies: It isa sad commentarv that a Presidential directive
instructine the intel- -ligence agencies to respect the
Constitution and to act in a lawful man- ner is hailed as reform.
Given vast conduct. enforcine the Constitution. -wouldindeedbea
reform, butitisnota reformwhichtakes one very far, since the
meaning of these phrases is not spelled out and they mean far
differentthings whenputinto practice." Acloser lookat the executive
orderreveals that,whileitreasserts consti- tutional,ethical
behavior,itis also riddledwithmanyloopholesthatwill allow continued
abuses and basically ignores the issue of covert political ac-
tivity.The attempts to reorganize the agency seem to have backfired
as well. Although the order concentrates on protectingthe rights
ofAmericans, substantial guarantees still do not exist. Electronic
surveillance and physical searches are authorizedundervague
"nationalsecurity" guidelines andthe
AttorneyGeneralisgivenexcessive powerinauthorizingdomesticcovert
actions.Itshouldbeobvious inthe light oftwo recent convictions
ofAt- torneys General thattoo much power should notbe placedin one
person's hands.)O Theheaviestcriticism
camefrompersonsintheacademiccommunity who claimed that academic
institutions would still be used as a cover for in- telligence.
Morton Baratz, general secretary of the American Association of
University Professors, warned, "The order will leave the door open
to unac- ceptable intrusionsbythe intelligence agencies incolleges
anduniversities
throughoutAmerica.")'Specifically,thestatusquoallowsprofessorson
sabbatical to be usedfor covert activities and allows other
purchases ofin- formation "iftheappropriate seniorofficialsare
informed."Inaddition, professors will be allowed to secretly
workfor the CIA if no remunerations are i nvol ~ed. ' ~
Otherconcerns have beenraised about the status quo'sprotectionofthe
covert leadership and the maintenanceof thatpowerful branchdespite
at- tempted reorganization.The main effect of the Stansfield Turner
reductions ofclandestine operations was to fill the highest
executive positions ofother branches withthe fired personnel.The
newleadership didnotspend much timeonlimiting
activities;insteaditcompartmeiltalized the more suspect activities
so fewer people would be responsible. E. Drexel Godfrey laments:
Thus,apictureemergesof ahighlycompartmentalizedbureaucracy
whosedirection hasbeenlargelycontrolled byofficialswithlongex-
perienceinthe seduction of other humanbeingsandsocieties.''
Thecriticisms expressedare serious ones;theyshowabasic doubtinthe
government'sabilitytocontrolwrongdoingsandtoprotecttheConsti-
tutional rights ofU.S.citizens. It also shows an unwillingness to
accept de- cisions made bythe Attorney General and the President
regarding national 1980COVERT OPERATIONS AND ETHICS205 securityas
anendinitselfwhilesubverting constitutionalrightsinthe process.34
Criticisms from the right were equally severe but in a different
vein.With an "1told you so"attitude, they scoffat the critics from
the left who com- plainoftheintelligence failures in Iran and
Nicaragua. The reformists are viewed as responsible for the
problems by crippling the CIA with "foolish,
inflexible,andunrealisticrestrictions,"andyetwantinganeffective
agency.15 Specific problems inthestatus quo aretheextension
ofConstitutional rights toforeigners residing intheUnitedStates and
excessivecontrolby Congress andotheroversight committees. The first
isviewedas impeding effectivecounter-intelligence by giving
potential KGB agents the same rights to warrants from the Attorney
General that U.S.citizens possess. Account- ability can be damaging
by providing a source for possible leaks and by cut-
tingdownontheefficiencyoftheCIAthroughforcing continuouscon-
sultation when speedier action maybeneeded. Furtherdisgust is
expressed in the status quo'slack ofcensorship exerted over the
breaking ofthe oath
ofsecrecyandtherevealingofclassifiedinformationbyloose-tongued
agents who have blown covers and who, in at least one case (Richard
Welch in Athens), may have led to the death of the exposed agent.36
William Evans sees the CIA as being weakenedfurther byexisting
laws. Thecombinedeffect of these provisions isto make our already
palsied intelligence agenciesfeeblerstill,
andtomakeitextremelylikelythat any data obtained despite the
restrictions wouldbe leaked to the outside worldthrough one or
another of the hundreds ofcrevices." Attempts at reform seem to
have fallen short of everyone'sexpectations. Stansfield Turner and
President Carter both have exhibited interest in reor- ganizing the
CIA to respectability, and some benefits can be observed, such as
the CIA'S apparent transitionfrom a "military-intelligence
mentality" to one thatencompasses theeconomic, political,
andsociological factors af- fecting this complex world.While
intentions were good,the minimal deci- sion in the form ofExecutive
Order #I2036 is unacceptable: reformists cry about loopholes, and
hardliners fume over handcuffing restrictions. Some- thing needs t
o be done: the United States' image is at a low ebb right now,
andatthispointtheCIAhasdone nothingtoalterthat,andindeed,its
activities may go a long way in explaining hostile,
anti4J.S.feelings world- wide. AlternativeProposal# I .
Inconsideringpolicyalternatives,willcovert operations inherently
end in abuse and lead to the undermining ofeffective intelligence,
orare presentproblems due to structuralandoperationalde- fects? A
strong case can be made for the latter. William Colby blames past
"excesses"on the CIA charter that gave the agency too much latitude
in op- erations.He quipped,"Ifyou had given the Fish and Wildlife
Service that 206THE JOURNAL OF LIBERTARIAN STUDIESSpring kindof
charteritwouldhavegot introuble."3B Othercurable defectsal-
readyraisedarerestrictivereportingrequirementsanddamagingintelli-
gence leaks.
Anothersurmountableproblemassociatedwithcovertoperationsisits
apparent responsibilityfor intelligence failures. One source of
failure is the
existenceofvestedinterests;forexample,inIrantheoperationists'
overriding interest in protecting listening posts on the Soviet
border deluded
themintobelievingthattheShah'sopponentswere"numerically
insignificantand potentiallyimpotent."39 Asecond causeoffailure
liesin preconceived ideas,as withthe CIA'S tendencyto viewthe Third
World as weak and unable to affect worldpolitics.This gross
distortion ofreality led tofailurest o predicttheYomKippurWar,the
Araboilembargo,and subsequentpricehikes.'O To solve these problems
and to strengthen covert operations, the follow- ing policy
alternative is proposed. 1.Divorce overt andcovert operations into
two separate, independent branches.
2.Formanew,trulysecretintelligence branchfor
covertoperations.Itwillbe
composedofafeweliteagentswhohaveproventhemselves intheclandestine
service. They willlive privately and beaccountable to a small
office that willre- port to the CIA Director. There will be no
production requirements, no leaks, no bureaucracy, andnolarge
system to service.+' 3.CIA willcontinue to operate, but only inthe
overt collection ofinformation to provide the President withupdates
on current issues. 4.Setupacommission
comprisedofCongressionalleaders,businessmen,labor leaders, media
personnel, and academicians, that willprovide a public statement.
oflong-term foreign policy goals and objectives. This will serve as
a guideline for covert andovertoperations." 5.Outlaw all publishing
ofclassified material byformer CIA agents. The rationale for this
planis summed up byKenneth Adelman, "Whatthe nation requires is
national intelligence that is so tough, shrewd, and ruthless that
no trend or fashion will ever again screen data or warp
per~eption."' ~ Obvioustrade-offsexistwithhumanitariananddemocratic
ideals,but giventhepresentconservatismand
recentlossofAmericanprestige,this proposal is likely t o be
metwithwidespreadapprovalfrom large segments of the population.As
time drags on, memories of the CIA'S abuses dim;a gradualloss
ofpublic conscience,agrowingfeeling ofnationalism,and a needt o
reassertourpowercanbeobserved.The publicistiredofbeing pushedaround
by countries such as Iran, and astrongerCIA should help. These
attitudes are expressed by A. L.Jacobs, a former CIA clandestine
of- ficer withnineteenyearsexperience: Wemaybededicated to the
moralideals ofpeace,self-determination, andhumanwelfare-butinthe
attainmentofthose ideals there isthe overriding ethic of all
nation-states, namely survival." This policy alternative recognizes
the needfor intelligence and secrecy. It 1980COVERT OPERATIONS AND
ETHICS207 would eliminate detailed oversight, and the new status of
covert operations would assure professionalism. Agents would be
protected by eliminating in- formation leaks, a point being widely
supported in Congress, where several bills to achieve that
protection have been proposed.The policy commission wouldsee
thatnationalprioritiesweresetandfollowed. The outstanding point is
the separation of overt and covert operations to assure that
conflict- ing interests will not affect information and to enhance
the integrity and ef- fectiveness ofbothbranches.
Oppositionforthisplanwillcomefromthosewhothinkasecretin- telligence
branchwillopen the doorfor more abuses.Jacobsanswers this argument
saying thatsecrecy is an indispensable attribute, and is initself a
nationalethic, "justas the secrecy of the ballotbox and of grand
jurypro- ceedings are accepted precepts of our nationalmorality."45
To compare the
vote,theveryfoundationofdemocraticsociety,withsubversive"dirty
tricks," and then justify both in the name of secrecy is absurd;
serious ques- tionsaboutthe desirability ofsecrecy can be raised.
The oppositionto thisplan can be crystalized into two arguments:
a.given the current climate of worldwide political activism and
nationalism, covert activities cannot bekeptsecret;. and,
b.evenifsecrecycouldbeassured, covertactsare
notthewaythatourforeign policyshould hecarried out, or as Herbert
Scoville puts it, "We cannot adopt the reprehensible tactics
ofthosewe are ~pposing."'~ This second argument is a value judgment
stating the humanitarian point of viewand can be discarded ifone
putshigherpriority on nationalsecurity. Butthe firstargumentstrikes
attheheartofthe proposaland,if proven valid,wouldseriously
undermine the arguments for its adoption. The American public
hasbeenprotectedfrom knowledge ofCIA activ- ities by the practice
of"plausibledenial" and the dualism ofaction policy;
buttheexistenceofthis"hearnoevil,see no evil"atmospheredoesnot mean
the rest of the world has been equally ignorant.What was revealed
to theAmericanpublicintheCIAinvestigationswaswell-knowntothe
countries involved.John Stockwell maintains,"TheUnited States has
been
responsibleformoreactsofviolenceandterrorismforpoliticalreasons
than have all ofthe other countries and liberation movements ofthe
world putt~gether."~' The people ofChile knew where those $13.4
million came from to subvert the Allende ~ampaign. ' ~Nicaraguan
citizens knew who was still supporting their oppressive leader,
Somoza. It was no secret to the Iran- ians who was responsible for
the powerofthe Shah and Savak. For these reasons covert political
activity cannot beacceptable; infernational secrecy isimpossible
intoday'sworld.Theendresult,ifsuchactivities are con-
tinued,willbethefurtherdecayofAmericancredibilityandprestige
abroad.Everyone wonders why America is hated so much, but, while
some of it can be attributed to scapegoating, the scapegoat was not
singled out at random.Tom Wickeragrees with thisassessment
ofanti-U.S.feeling and 208THE JOURNAL OF LIBERTARIAN STUDIESSpring
abhors a return to covert operations; "Indeed,with 'CIA'a knee-jerk
phrase evokinganti-Americanism around the worldwiththe CIA's
realrecord of bloodshed,blunder, and ineptitude from Chile to Iran,
a return t o that kind of intervention makes little more sense than
re-running the Bay of Pigs."44 Additional opposition would be
voiced by the free-speech advocates who would abhor the censorship
of former agents. Moralistic arguments against covertoperations
willberaisedlater;theycenteraround the premise that
nationalsecurityisnotanendinitselfand thatabusesofhumanrights
cannot beallowedto continue underits guise. Alternative Proposal
#2. An alternative t o unrestrictedcovert operations would be t o
revamp the status quo so as t o protect human rights t o a greater
degreeand providefor more opennessand control.This proposalwillat-
tempt to maintain the balance between flexibility and
accountability,while recognizing the needfor national securityand
democratic control.Heavier weight will be placedon the latter to
avoid the "minimaldecision" status of the
presentsystem.Thisplanwouldcontain the following points.
1.Outlawallpoliticalcovert activity exceptincases uhere: a)
thePresidenthas determined a rreatncedto ~rotectourinterfit, and
-"national security;"
b)thisneedispresentedtoselectedcommitteesofCongressanditis shown
that overt operations willnot suffice;and, c)the authorization for
any covert activity is approvedin writing at sev- eral points
before actual implementation, culminating withPresiden- tial
approval. 2.Covert activity involving the gathering of information
willbeconfined to infor- mation that has immediate and direct
relation to the violation of a law or is neces- sary for the
administration ofa law.so 3.The budgetfor the CIA'scovert and
overtoperations willbemadepublic. 4.Allelectronic surveillance and
physical searches ofUS. citizens must be author- izedbya court
order. 5.Congress will beauthorized to make public more information
regarding the CIA that does nothave "topsecret" classification.
This proposal takessignificant steps to assure that the
democraticprocess will be preserved.Governmentactivities are
supposed t o have the "consent of the governed,"but in the past
there could be no consent because the pub- lic did not know to what
it was consenting. This goes along with the Jeffer- sonian idealof
informing the public.He once said: I know no safe depository of the
ultimate powers ofthe society but the peo-
plethemselvesandifwethinkthemnotenlightenedenoughtoexercise their
control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it
from them,but to inform their discretion." All the same arguments
usedagainst the restrictivenessofthe status quo are applicable
here, and to a greater degree. One additional objection could be
raised:the jeopardizingof national security by making the CIA's
budget 1980COVERT OPERATIONS AND ETHICS209 public. Critics maintain
that too much valuable information would be given out to theRussian
as well as the American public. In actuality, publishing the CIA'S
budget wouldno more jeopardize national security than does the
publicnatureofthedefensebudget.Inaddition,covertspendingsare
"riddledwithwaste,"andinan eraoffiscalrestraintitwouldbein the
nation'sinterest to control this multibillion-dollar operation.s2
Anobjective analysis would showthatthe only activities controlled
by this plan are those that are not really essential to national
security and that are notresponsible for most ofthe abuses. It
appears this proposal would
achieveadesirablebalance,giventhepresentadministrationandCIA
leadership, butthere are no inherent protections when leadership
changes. In setting guidelines for covert operations,the national
security loopholes leaveoneinextricably tiedtohuman
judgmentandvalues.Personally,I tend to cringe at the thought ofwhat
powers the CIA might begiven were Ronald Reagan to beelected this
nextfall. Another fact that prevents inherent controls over the CIA
is the nature of theoversight process.There isan inevitable "Catch
22"involved-weare dependent on the integrity ofthe CIA. Who gives
the information desired? Who decides how much information will be
given? The same agency that is being monitored."Inviewof the recent
perjury oftwo CIA directors be- fore the Senate this seems like a
very thin guarantee ofdemocratic control. Alternative Proposal
#3.What then is the solution to restoring the CIA'S effectiveness
and integrity? Perhaps the answer can be gained byreturning to the
original goalsexpressedin the1947 NSAct:the collection anddis-
semination ofinformation. When these goals became distorted,
trouble was sure to arise. NormanBirnbaum mused,"Whyshould
aproblemofpoli- tical technique, dealt withreasonably well byother
nations,prove so diffi- cult?"s4
Theobviousanswerliesinthevocalandprincipledopposition
voicedinouropensocietywhenthegovernmentdeviatesfromwhatis viewed as
acceptable. In theSoviet Union the KGB can operate at willbe- cause
there isno voicedopposition.In the UnitedStates this cannothap-
pen;wemustreturnto thedemocratic ideals uponwhichthis countryis
based.The Soviet Union'sviewing of the Third World as a playground
for its covert operations does not mean that we can do the same.
Attimes we seem to fulfill the prophecy of George Williams, the
famous Harvard theo- logian who said, "Becautious when choosing
your enemy, for you will grow more like him."s5 We must break away
from this patternand recognize the realities ofa
newinternationalpoliticalenvironment. The ThirdWorldis no longer
taking its cues from the superpowers; blocs ofnonalignedstates are
being formed and nationalistic feelings are running high. This is
not the time for imperialistic interventions in the name of our
national security. The integrity
andeffectivenessoftheCIAandpositiveimageoftheUnited States can be
revived only ifthis fact is recognized and ifour priorities are
revised. 210THE JOURNAL OF LIBERTARIAN STUDIESSpring
Intelligenceisneededmorethaneverinthisinterdependentworld;we needt
oknowtheeconomicandpoliticalintentionsand motivesofevery
nation.This must be done through an understanding of their
cultures, atti- tudes and feelings,not by intervention in their
internalaffair^.'^ This can he accomplishedby the following
proposal. 1.Abolish all covert operations, except those involving
counter-intelligence, which mustbepurelydefensive innature. 2.Set
up a commission, as in point #4 ofthe first alternative, to develop
long-range goals foroven operations. 3.Strengthen overt
intelliaence aatherina bvmakine better use of foreian embassies and
putting more empiasis ; n tecbnolo&almeansof getting
information. 4.Recruit foreien CIA aeents who are more svmoathetic
toward and knowledaeable -aboutthe co&yto whichthey
willbeakgned. 5.Make the operating budgetofthe CIA public. The
benefitsof the planare obvious:the integrityofthe agencywillhe
restoredwithabove-boardoperations,democratic controlwillhe assured,
andinformationgatheringwillbecomeprofessionalandaccurateonce again.
National security will be protected by aggressive
counter-intelligence that willmonitorand reportactivities by the
KGB and other hostile spies. Acareful analysis and assessmentofthe
costs and risksassociated with
thisproposalmustbecarriedoutbeforeafinalrecommendationcanbe
made.The arguments against the planwouldfall under three points:
a.overt intelligence gathering will not supply crucial information
which can only be obtained byspies andcontrolled sources; b.weneed
covert activities for our survival and to further our interests
abroad; and furthermore, sinceothercountries
carryoutcovertoperations, ourmoralistic stand would put us at a
disastrous disadvantage because the Russians would react to an
announcement of the termination ofCIA covert operations bystepping
up theirownoperations all over the world;l'and,
c.wehavearesponsibility toprotectourallies,andifcovertsupport
weretobe discontinued theywouldsuffer harms underCommunist
oppression that are far greater than any costs associated
withcovert operations. The first point can be easily refuted.People
who make this assertion point t o the highly
compartmentalizednature of the Kremlin and other controlled
societies and maintain that any really valuable information can he
obtained onlythroughsubversiveme a n~.
~8Tothecontrary,covertinformation sources rarely provide any new
information; even when contacts are made, suchas inthe
celebratedPenkovskycaseofthe earlysixties,theyusually serve t o
substantiate existingdata.The questionablevalidityofthe covert
source rendersittotallyuselessin time of crisis,as itmust always be
con- firmed by some technical system anyway.59 One can imagine the
reaction in the U.N.ifAdlaiStevenson
hadpresentedevidencesuppliedbyaCastro defector as proof ofRussian
missiles,rather than photos from a U-2plane. Conceivablyit could
bearguedthat covert informationsources are useful for their support
function,but this is also doubtful whenthe phenomenon I980COVERT
OPERATIONS AND ETHICS21 1 of "disinformation"is considered. Covert
human sources are extremely dif- ficultto come bysinceRussianspies
are well-trained. Whenacontactis made one can never be sure ifhe is
a bona fide defector or someone planted bythe KGB.In the
lattercase,once a KGB agent is accepted as aninfor-
mant,lieswillbetakenforrealintelligence.Sometimes the effect canbe
disastrous as in the case of dissident Anatoly Shcharansky who
wasturned in bysuch a " c ~nt a c t . " ~~Covert sources are even
less significant whenone considers thatnonrecruiteddefectors,who
make upa large percentage of all sources, can still be
utilizedbyovert intelligence operations. The latter two points
involve national security questions and a view of the Soviet threat
as being of utmost concern. These arguments were summed up
verywellbySidney Hook: Those who on a priori grounds condemn an
action without regard for its consequencesinpreservingthestructure
ofdemocraticfreedomare guilty atthe veryleastofblatanthypocrisy.. .
.We mustrecognize the evil we do even whenit is the lesser evil.
Butifit is truly the lesser evil,
thenthosewhocondemnitorwouldhaveusdonothingatallare morally
responsible for the greater evil that mayen~ue. ~'Two
implicitassumptions are made in this statement: that covert opera-
tions are in fact the lesser evil and that covert operations
support the "struc-
tureofdemocraticfreedom."Bothoftheseassumptionscanberefuted, thus
destroying the justification for covert operations.If covert
operations do upholdthe "structureof democratic freedom,"then itis
merely a value judgmentin determining the relative costs ofletting
a nationfall to com-
munismandpreventingsuchanincident.Ifcommunistexpansion inthe Third
World is perceived as a threat to our nationalsecurity, then
anything to stop itcould be justified.The fact is, the CIA'S covert
operationsoften subvertdemocraticideals.Inaddition,JohnStockwell
maintains,"Very fewofthose[covert] operationshavehadanythingto
dowithnational
securityinterestsoftheUnitedstate^."^^InmanycasestheCIAhas
supportedorputintopowerregimes thatare atleastas repressive as the
communistoneswearetryingtosubvert.Brazil,Iran,BritishGuiana,
Indonesia, Guatemala,and Ecuador are all cases in point.Perhaps the
best exampleisthetragedyofVietnam,whichwouldhavebeencompletely
avoided had the CIA allowed the immensely popular Ho Chi Minh to
take power.Instead, the CIA supported the anticommunist Diem, and
the rest is history. It is almost absurd to consider the tremendous
loss of human life as being anything butwasted,and wouldhe so even
ifthe United States and the CIA hadbeen"victorious"over the
expanding Communists. 1V. Conclusion In arriving at a final policy
recommendation,all ofthe trade-offs and risks ofeach
alternativehave to be carefully weighed.The communist threatis
realandcannotbeignored.Itisnaiveto assume thattheSoviet Union
212THE JOURNAL OF LIBERTARIAN STUDIESSpring would follow our
example and stop intervening in the activities of other sov- ereign
nations.It is equally naive, though, to assume that the United
States
cancontinuetooperateunderthedualistic,hypocriticalforeignpolicy
which it has pursued for the last thirty years, and yet maintain
any degree of internationalcredibility. It has been shown that
covert operations are unac-
ceptablebecause:a)theirintentionofpreservingdemocracyisfarout-
weighed bythe repressive regimes that we put into power; b)they
intensify anti4J.S.feelings worldwide because covert operations do
not remain secret in the nations concerned (just as Americans would
be outraged if the Demo- cratic Party received most ofits campaign
contributions from the KGB,or ifCBS and NBCwere supportedby secret
funds);61 c)they subvert demo- cratic ideals at home in that
democratic consent is impossible because of the secret nature of
covert operations (oversight and secrecy are inherently con-
tradictory terms); and d) they force usto adopt the immoral tactics
ofthe "enemy." TheSovietthreatwillbecontrolledpartiallybythesame
phenomenon thathasbeena thorn in the side ofthe
UnitedStates-therise ofnation- alism in the Third World.When this
does notholdtrue, the United States will still be able to intervene
in international emergencies; but under the sug-
gestedpolicyitwillactovertlyfromapositionofmoralleadership.Ina case
such as in Portugalrecently, where a vocal,Soviet-led, minoritywas
swaying an election, it was determined to be in our national
interest to inter- veneandcounterbalancetheSoviet
influence.IfittrulywasinPortugal's interest, and therefore also in
ours, an overt act ofaid would be justifiable. JohnStockwell
supports this view: Isubmit that true inhence over worldaffairs is
nevergained bycovert operations.Itisrather theforce ofthe
relationships among the coun- tries that produces positive
influence. Wewould befurther ahead inthe worldifwe haddirect
andopen and honest relations with c~untries.~' The CIA would still
operate to gather information essential to the carrying
outofforeignpolicy,butnolongerwouldwebeshackledbycynicism,
"plausibledenial,"andacontradictorydualism.Wewouldbethemoral
leaders of the world,with the worldas our judge. NOTES 1.Brian
O'Cannell,"Doing Away With Covert Activities,"America,March 13,
1976,p. 205. 2.NormanCousins,"Whatisan Americanto ThinkAboutthe
CIA?," Saturday Review, July 8.1978.p. 40.
3.NormanBirnbaum."Failure ofintellieence.". Nalion.Januanr.20..
1979..
.D.42.-4.CharlesMore,"CIACharterAgreementisExpected,"LouisvilleCourierJournal,
JanuaryIS,1980, p.2. 5.Roberta Wohlstetter,"Cuba and Pearl Harbor:
Hindsight and Foresight." Foreign Anairs 44(October 1965):695-696.
1980COVERT OPERATIONS AND ETHICS213 6.David Wise and Thomas B.Ross,
Thelnvisible Government (New York: Random House, I W) ,p.4.
7.William J.Barnds, "lntelligence and Foreign Policy: Dilemmas of a
Democracy," Foreign Affairs 47(January1969): 282. 8.Wise,The
InvisibleGovernment, p.96. 9.O'Connell. "CovertActivities." . o..
204. 10.Harry~o' sitrke,
"America'sSecretOperations:Aperspective,"ForeignAffairs53
(January1975): 340. 11.Wise,The InvisibleGovernment, p.%.
12.Ibid..pp.98-99. 13.Ibid., p.99. 14.Stockwell's comment would be
chronologically accurate ifhe had called the Bay of Pigs a
"BananaRevolt" that did not work.The comment was made in
JohnStockwell, "ACIA
Trip-FromBelief,toDoubt,toDespair,"TheCenterMagazine(September-October
1979): 27. IS.Peter Singer, "Foreswearing Secrecy,"Notion(May
5,1979), p.490. 16.E.Drexel Godfrey,Jr.,
"EthicsandIntelligence,"Foreign Affoirs 56 (April1978): 628.
17.Wise,The hvisibleGovernment, p.137. 18.Ibid.,p.62. 19.O'Connell,
"CovertActivities,"p.205. 20.Wise,The InvisibleGovernment, p.xi.
21.Frank Church, "Covert Action: Swampland of American Foreign
Policy," The Bulletin of the AtomicScientists (February1976), p.9.
22.Godfrey,"EthicsandIntelligence," p.625. 23.ThomasPowers, "Inside
the DepartmentofDirty Tricks,"Atlantic (August 1979), p.62.
24.Ibid., p.63. 25.Stockwell, "ACIA Trip,"p.26. 26.Tad
Srulc,"Shaking Up the CIA,"NewYork Times Magazine,July29,1979,
p.13. 27.Ibid.,p.IS. 28.David Binder, "lntelligence Service
Reorganized with Tighter Rules on Surveillance,"New YorkTimes,
January 23,1978, p.I .29.George Lardner,"Congress Overlooks
Oversight: Missinglntelligence Charters,"Notion (September 2,1978).
p.170.
30."IntelligenceNeedsReform,ReformNeedsIntelligence,"NewRepublic(FebruaryI
I, 1978). o.5. 31.R. J. ' ~ki t h, "Clash in Congress Over the
Honorable Schoolboy:Hearing on the National lntelligence
Act,"Science(September 1,1978), p.7%. 32.Ibid.
33.Godfrey,"Ethicsand Intelligence,"p.632. 34."Carter vs. the
Constitution:The FrankSnepp Case," NewRepublic (March 4,1978), p.
13. 35.Binder, "lntelligence Service Reorganized,"p.1. 36.Singer,
"Foreswearing Secrecy,"p.488. 37.William
Evans,"ANewandBetterCIA,"NationalReview(July 6,1979). p.863.
38.Stansfield Turner,William E. Colby, Mitchell Rogovin, Thomas I.
Emerson, and Morton Halperin, "Freedom and the lntelligence
Function: A Symposium," The Center Magazine (March1979). p.59.
39.Kenneth Adelman and Robert F. Ellsworth,
"Foolishlntelligence,"Foreign Policy, (Fall, 1979), p.154.
40.Ibid., p.156. 41.Rositzke, "AmericanSecret Operations,"p.346.
42.Ibid.,pp.350-51. 43.Adelman, "FoolishIntelligence."p.159. 44.A.
L. Jacobs,Reply to Godfrey, "Ethics and Intelligence,"Foreign
Affairs 56 (July1978): 868. 45.Ibid., p.869. 214THE JOURNAL OF
LIBERTARIAN STUDIESSpring
46.HerbertScoville,Jr.,"IsEspionageNecessaryforOurSecurity?"ForeignAffairs54
(April,1976): 483. 47.Stockwell, "ACIA Trip,"p.58.
48.O'Connell,"CovertActivities."o.204...
49.Tomwicker,"ItmakeslittlesensetoletCIAresumecovertoperations,"Louisville
Courier Journol, January16,1980, p.11. 50.William
E.Rogovin,inTurner,"Intelligence Symposium,"p.46. 51.Wise,The
Invisible Covernmenl, p.7. 52.Lardner,"Congress Overlooks
~vmsight,"p.169.
53.MortonHalperin'spointprettywellestablishesthatoversightandsecrecyarecontra-
dictory terms.If one takes an absolutist stand on preserving
democratic control, this point
alonewoulddestroythesecondproposal.Thisabsolutismisfairlyextreme,thoughin
dealingwithpoliticalrealities this
policyoptionisaboutthebestthatliberalreformists could hope for, and
therefore, althoughit was cast aside fairly abruptly, it is not a
"straw man"~ r o ~ o s a l .. .(Senate liberals. such as
BirchBavh.have been oushine for bills similar to Ihbspi n. ; This
oplion ;auld be ionsidered a mmimaldccls~oninthat;tdoc,notentirely
plcasecilhcrside ofthe ,,we,buti t is one lhal*odd rwrwe
xide\preadsupportfrom the non-absolulcr ~ l o r m~ r l ~ .
C\puundinglhcmorer.xrrr.mr. w w *as.MortonHalperin,in Turner,
"Intelligence Symposium,"p.58.
54.Birnbaum,"FailureofIntelligence,"p.42,
55.Church."CovertAction,"p.10. 56.Turner,"Intelligence
Symposium,"p.48. 57.O'Connell."CovertActivities."o.205...
58.Jacobs.InCiodfrrs. "Ethicsandln~clligensr,"p.814.
59.Epstein."WarWlthmtheCIA,"p37. M) . "HumanRlphls fur Spies,"
NewXepubltr(Oitober14,1978), p. 9-10 61.Scoville, "IsEspionage
Necessary?"p.485 62.Stockwell, "ACIA Trip,"p.27.
63.O'Connell,"CovertActivities," p.205. 64.Stockwell, "ACIA
Trip,"p.28.