Intellectual Roots of Turkish Islam

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Journal of Muslim Minority A ffairs^ V ol. 24y No. 2, October 2004 mmCarfax Publishing^ m ^ Taylor 6. Francis Grou p

Intellectual Roots of ^Turkish Islam' and Approachesto the 'Turkish Model'

ETGA U6UR

Abstract

This paper examines the notions of 'Turkish model' and 'Turkish Islam' which have caughtsignificant interest among the political circles in Turkey and the West but which failed toreceive adequate a ttention from the academia. This paper argues that there are three main

outlooks that conceptualize and idealize the Turkish modelvis-a-vis its relation to Islam:nationalist, orientalist, and liberal. These perspectives depart from a set of assumptions andpractical objectives in order to make their proposal appealing. After examining their premises,it is evident that the intellectual roots of Turkish Islam do not receive adequate attention inthese three models. Thus, it would be more accurate to name the Turkish model as the'Kemalist model' of modernization since the historical evolution and intellectual roots ofTurkish Islam rem ain undervalued. The paper concludes that rather than presenting modemTurkey as a role model to the Greater Middle East or the Muslim world, a more comprehensiveand nuanced analysis of social, historical and intellectual roots of Turkish Muslimness is

necessary. This attitude can make the discussion on Turkish model well founded and bettersuited for the ongoing debates regarding the future ofthe Muslim world in terms of its economic,political and social transformation.

In troduction

A wide range of Western intellectuals and policy-makers have talked about the idea ofa 'Turkish model' . The most recent examples can be found among the speechesdelivered by some senior officials of the Bush administration, including the Presidenthimself,' or on the agendas of various intemational platforms such as the G-8 SeaIsland Summit and NATO Istanbul Summit 2004. With the increase in academic andpolitical interest, the idea has become more tangled and even more vague. What exactlydoes the Turkish model involve? Why is it a model and for whom? Who promotes thismodel and for what purpose? And as the central question of this article, what is theplace of Islam in the formulation of this model? Without adequately addressing thesequestions, one cannot provide a lucid analysis of the different framing efiforts revolvingaround the 'Turkish model ' .

An important aspect ofthe discussion about the 'Turkish model' is its relationship toIslam and its particular way of interpretation and practice in Turkey. In most cases, theTurkish model is about the form of modernization that republican Turkey has gone


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and democracy, we still need to consider the question of whether Islam or the Turkisway of understanding and practice of Islam for that purpose has any significanrelevance to the Turkish model, especially in the Middle Eastern context. Although thpromoters of the Turkish model are not primarily interested in Islam, the credibility the propositions is closely related to the cultural ethos of the nations in the Muslimworld.

Islam is the m ost infiuential cultural factor in most of these countries and this makIslam, or a particular form of it, an integral part of the model. In that sense, attempare made to alleviate the objections to secular and modernist propositions by reference to the Islamic character of Turkey. My argument in this paper is that therare significant aspects of Turkish experience with Islam that can teach lessons and offsolutions to some chronic problems and dilemmas in the Muslim world. Yet, thTurkish practice of Islam during the republican era attracts the mere interest on thsubject and blurs other dimensions of deep historical understanding. In that sense, thnotion of Turkish Islam does not go beyond a symbol of restructuring the so-calleincompatible parts of Islam with the modem world. Consequently, its intellectual rooare deemed to be trivial in the model. A possible contribution of the study ointellectual tradition of Turkish Islam can be to broaden the outlook firom narrowlfocusing on the republican era (1923-2004), which is I also believe to be versignificant, to a broader historical analysis.

The intellectual roots of Turkish Islam are historically shaped by social factorHowever, there are certain essential elements which are crucial to understand ththeory and practice of Islam by the Turkis h peoples and states. In this regard, I will loo

at three dimensions of Islam in the Turkish practice. First, the theological schooMaturidi, which shaped the Turkish Muslim outlook and worldview, in terms of issueregarding firee will and destiny, epistemological u nde rpinn ings , an d logical reasoninThe particular responses given to these controversies have had implications on thTurkish psyche through their impact on the mentality and approach to religio-socimatters. Second, I will analyze the Islamic legal school that the majority of TurkisMuslims adhere to, namely, the Hanafi schoolof fiqh.Hanafi jurisprudence formed themain source of legislation and interpretation of law in Muslim Empires including thAbbasid, Seljuk and the Ottoman. The Hanafi methodology and its scope of openne

and accommodation of customary law is an important factor to examine the fiexibiliand applicability of Muslim law in diverse contexts.^ Third, I take the Sufi dimensioof Turkish Islam (with specific reference to Ahmet Yesevi, Yunus Emre, MevlanJelaleddin Rum i and Haci B ektas-i Veli) as the cen tral pillar of historical und ersta nd inand practice of Islam among the Turks. These three factors should be studied in thlight of social status and organizational dimensions: the historical differentiation btween ulema and popular levels and the modem Islamic movements that arguablserved as a bridge between theulema and the Sufis. Through networks reminiscent oftraditional Sufi lodges and professional associations, Islamic movements aimed answer the questions the modem age raised about religion, science and politics. In thendeavor, the intellectual roots of Turkish Islam have played a formative role witvarying degrees of success. Thus, it is essential to bear in mind these three intellectu


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'Turkish Islam' and Approaches to the 'Turkish Model' 329

ship between the theoretical sources and the historical practices. At the, Turk s are not the only Hanafi, Maturidi and Sufi-oriented M uslims, b uthistorical outcomes can be studied under the frame of essentials and theeraction between various aspects of Turkish society and culture,alysis of its roots, I will discuss the ways in which Turkish Islam relates

model. I will identify several starting points to support such a model.groups that emphasize:

experience with secularism and the possibility of coexistence betweenidentity and modernity;ltion of Islamism in Turkey toward a moderate liberal directionvis-d-visemocratic institutions; androots of Turkish Islamic synthesis as part of a nationalist project.

These starting points and mindsets will help to explain the desired final outcomes

otion of the model by the respective political actors of each position.he ultimate question arises whether the Islamic identity of Turkey is a

relevant phenomenon factoring into the designation(s) of the model, or whether it isreally the secular experience of Turkey that matters most.

Intellectual Roots

Hanafi Jurisprudence

The Hanafi school of law was widely accepted among the Turks both at individual andcollective (political) levels.' Hanafi interpretation was developed under the socialconditions of urban(izing) life in Kufa by its founder Numan bin Thabit (known as AbuHanifa), and his chief disciples Abu Yusuf and Muhammad ibn-al-Hasan al-Shaybani.During the Abbasid Empire, the students of Hanafi school were appointed to officialposts of the judiciary, including the chief attorney andqadi positions. The naturalconsequence of this was the dominance of Hanafi jurisprudence over any other lawschools. Together with city-based social background, the cosmopolitan nature of theIslamic Empire necessitated the Hanafi scholars to take different cultures, traditionsand circumstances into consideration across the vast territories of the empire. As a

result, the place of local custom s and p ractices, which do not co ntradict w ith the centralprinciples of the Islamic message, were seen as potential contributors to the idea ofuniversal applicability of Islam. This was done by attributing an auxiliary status tocustomary law in generating the body of the Muslim law. According to FethullahGulen, this philosophy was employed through a number of means in Hanafi jurispru-dence:

Islam, with all its light and dimensions, went to Central Asia. Those of itsaspects open to interpretation were interpreted there. The foundation forijtihad (independent judgment reached through reasoning based on the

Qur'an and Sunnah) was evaluated there. It is no coincidence that the Hanafischool of jurisprudence found its most prominent representatives in that


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Turkish sultanates and empires were attracted by this fiexible and nuanced methoological approach of the Hanafi school. Seljuk and Ottoman sultans depended heavion Hanafi scholars to incorporate some old Turkish political institutions into thshariah, as it was applied during their times. The scope and limitations of the authoriof the sultan, the millet system, iqta or timar (fief) system, the court system, andapplication of punitive systemof shariah were primarily Ottoman or Seljuk in characteras well as being Islamic. Theshariah and qanun, the Islamic law and the (secular)imperial law, coexisted in the Ottoman legal system.'Qanun was largely shaped byTurkish tore (tradition) from early Central Asian Turkic culture. Additionally, thOttoman legal system was infiuenced by the imperial legacy of the Byzantium EmpirThe prominent figure who tried to bring these two sources of law in conformity durithe Ottoman Empire was Ebu's-Su'ud Efendi.*

For our purposes here we can argue that the appropriation of the Hanafi jurisprudence among the Turkish population and especially the polity made a cosmopolitaand pluralist legal culture an d a unique state tradition fiourish from Tu rkish experienwith Islam. Transition from nomadic to sedentary lifestyle and from rural to urbasettlement could have been accommodated and Islamic culture was embraced by tpublic without totally denying the old aspects of culture and civilization. Turkiinterpretation did not believe in achieving universality of Islam by confining it to strand unchangeable principles, but emphasized its ability to address problems of a broarange and across ages and cultures.'

The Maturidi Approach to Theology

The responses given to some philosophical questions in the Muslim history played important role in the development of Muslim intellectual traditions. The place non-religious sciencesvis-d-visreligious disciplines, multiple ways of approachin g Go dand human responsibility and free will in worldly affairs were the matters that havconsciously or unconsciously, framed the cognitive map s of M uslim s. Philosophy in tearly Muslim society developed in relation to some social issues and political controvsies. For example, the status of the sinners in the community and caliphate was linkewith the theological question of the relation of faith and deeds (whether or not deewere a necessary part of faith). The consequence ofthese discussions was significant order to recognize the later 'settled' dominant Muslim mentality and orthodoxy, whicat least partially, played a key role for the accomplishments or failures of Muslisocieties in different historical periods.^ This collective consciousness or mentality win part shaped by the unique Islamic discipline calledkalam (dialectical theology), andthe discussions revolving around its subject matter.'

Discussions in kalam ended up generating four main schools: Muta'zila, AshariMaturidi, and Hanbali. These schools are formed around the perspectives they prvided to key issues of Islamic theology and philosophy. The most prominent puzzlinclude the relationships between reason and revelation, free will and destiny, attribu tand essence of God, faith and deeds, and lastly the eternal or created nature of th


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Hanafi school favors the Maturidi interpretation. Thus, the majority of Turks follow theMaturidi teachings on kalam.

For our purposes here, the significance of the Maturidi position on the various issuesabove was threefold. First, by adopting a closer position to Muta'zila's rational claims,

Maturidi disturbed the balance between determinism and free willhuman responsi-bility and independence of his actstoward the latter, as well as giving more indepen-dent role to human reason in terms of acquiring knowledge. Passivism and determinismwere closely related to each other and these two were declared as noteworthy reasonsbehinds the backwardness of Muslims today. Although this position did not play anim porta nt role historically, some of th e m od em (ist) movem ents and intellectuals foundthe necessary base for their arguments regarding the rationality and centrality of humanfree will. For example, Jamaladdin al-Afghani, who became infiuential in Ottomanlandscape, openly talks about the negative role of this (mis)understanding on the levelofMuslim development and civilization."

Secondly, by refusing disassociation of the attribu tes, such as knowledge, and essenceof God, Maturidi opened the way to legitimize the famous mystic theory of oneness ofexistence (wahdat al-wujud).^^Turkish Sufi understanding of love and tolerance werebased on the idea of unity in the universe, inspired by thewahdat al-wujud outlook. Thisidea was digested, diluted and embedded in the famous motto of Yunus Emre,'yaratilani sevdik yaratandan oturu' (we loved the creatures because of their relation tothe Creator), yet without necessarily leading to pantheism. In addition, this secondposition rejected the idea of inherent superiority of religious sciences over natural ones,since knowledge as an attribute of God was not separate from His Essence. Thirdly, byleaving the ultimate say to God in the Day of Judgment and distinguishing betweenbelief and practice, faith and deeds, yet without necessarily disassociating the two,Maturidi presented a less strict view on practice regarding apostasy and membership tothe Muslim community. This made it possible for a plural understanding of the waysand philosophies to approach God, and was complementary to the Sufi practices inCentral Asia and Anatolia and the functioning of the Ottomanmillet system.

One can argue that the first two positions of Maturidi school, and their respectiveimplications, became less apparent among the Ottoman scholars, especially after thefifteenth century. The Asharite mentality predominated the Ottoman institutions, inspite of the continuation of the M aturidi adherence in theory. Two imp ortant develop-ments contributed to this shift. First was the Ottoman-Safavid rivalry and the 'shi'amenace' which halted the historical Persian cultural infiuence on Turkish Islam. Thishad further implications on the Ottomanulema, replacing the Persian infiuence by Arabproximity and transformation of an Iranian-Seljuk pattem of society to a highly statecontrolled one.'^ The end result of this shift in orientation was the serious differen-tiation of ulema from 'civil Islam'. This was due to the fact that the basic role of Islamin the Ottoman Empire was legal, as a constitutional reference, andulema were giventhe supervisor's role over the Ottoman polity, which resulted in confining theulema to

'legalistic Islam'. Consequently, theulema became less connected to the Sufi traditionofthe common people, which by and large constituted the 'civil Islam'. Second was the


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century became the end of progress and beginning of intellectual, scientific, and latemilitary and political inertia on the part of the Ottoman Empire.

Sufism

The outstanding figures in the history of Turkish Sufism are Ahmed Yesevi, YunuEmre, Mevlana Jelaleddin Rumi, and Haci Bektas-i Veli. These Sufis had their ownmystic ways and programs, nevertheless one can find common ideas and practices thacan be generalized to represent Turkish Sufism. Turkish Sufi tradition corresponds tthe second phase of Sufism in general. The first phase dates back to the early years othe Ummayad Empire, one can even argue to the period of third caliph UthmanSufism was bom as a reaction to the struggles for power, and enhanced life standardand welfare after the death of the Prophet. This was a very individualist trend whicpromoted a simple life(zuhd). In the coming centuries this nascent idea was developedinto orders organized aroundshaikhs.^* The legalistic and rational attitudes toward threligion can also be argued to have a distancing impact on the people who are leseducated and interested in religious disciplines. Sufi orders were built in order tunderstand the spirit of Islam through personal experience with God.'' The sociacondition during its birth made Sufis isolated from the society.

The second phase was initiated by Kalenderi and Melami ideas, which stemmemainly in Persia, and reached to peoples in Central Asia and Anatolia. The centraplace of zuhd and isolation was replaced by love and tolerance-oriented social integration . Th e Sufi orders in this period, by acting as civil society organization s, provid e

social services and promoted good manners and morals within the society. Poetry anverse became important tools to transmit the message to the masses. Among the foumain Sufi figures only Rumi was highly educated in religious disciplines and literaturwho used merely Persian in his poems. Rumi was one of the first to exert an effort treduce the gap between 'ulema Islam' and popular Islam. He was able to communicatethrough the power of literature what he leamed from themadrasah to the hearts of thepeople around him, as well as the religious and political elite. Yesevi, Yunus and HacBektas were closer to the popular culture and utilized the elements of this culture tteach the spirit of Islam, which they perceived to be morality, love and tolerance.'Koprulu argues that even the Nakshbandi Sufi order, which has been the most populbranch among the Turks up to date, was influenced by Yesevism.'^

Since the people of Turkic origin first accepted Islam, they perceived and practiceit under the infiuence of Sufi ideas. Sufi-oriented Islamic movements kept a certaidistance from the politics of their times in contrast to other Islamic movements. Foexample, the Shiites or Kharijis defined themselves according to an imagined 'othe(those who do not support the truth) and became associated with specific politicstances over the proper nature of the state and who should hold power. Sufi traditiohowever, has described itself as being based on the philosophy that all creatures shoulbe loved as God's physical refiection and objects of the Creator's own love. The placfor enemies or 'others' in this system was highly restricted.

Historically the Turkish public has understood and practiced Islam under the Su


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'Turkish Islam' and Approaches to the 'Turkish Mod el' 333

Turkish political system in 30 years, was a Sufisheikh, Mehmed Zahit Kotku. Salafiideas hardly found supporters in Turkey. For instance, the largest Islamic movement inTurkey, the Nur movement, was shaped by the Turkish Sufi tradition more thananything else. Said Nursi and Fethullah Gulen put the individual at the center of theirteachings and formulated their philosophies around love and tolerance, as well as astrong emphasis on faith. Nursi perceived his mission in his 'Risale-i Nur' (Epistles ofLight) collection as being identical to that of Rumi in the twelfth century.^" He playeda bridge-builder role betweenulema Islam and popular Islam, by responding to modemquestions regarding the authenticity and rationality of aspects of the Islamic faith. Indoing this, he tried to overcome the 'superstitious beliefs', as construed by the positivistintellectuals at the popular level, and 'dry' and formal language of legalistic Islam at thescholarly level. Accordingly, rationality ofthe mind and spirituality ofthe heart did notcontradict each other, and indeed they were two indispensable and complementarydimensions of faith.

Layers of Turkish Islam

It is possible to categorize the understanding and practice of Islam in Turkey in twodimensions. On one dimension is the dichotomy between popular Islam inspired bySufism and formal-legal-based ulema Islam. On the other dimension, which is notdistinct from the first, lies the continuum between orthodox and heterodox Islam.Orthodox Islam usually refers to the mainstream traditional practice of Islam, as it was

shaped and passed on to generations by the state in Seljuk and Ottoman periods.Tj^jically, an average orthodox Muslim is Sunni-oriented and lives in the city center.He/she follows Hanafifiqh and prefers Maturidi in theological issues without going toomuch in depth about the exact nature and terms of substantive or philosophical issues.The heterodoxy to the other facet of Islam comes from pre-Islamic culture and beliefs.The nomadic Turks, when they were introduced to Islam, retained some of their oldcentral symbols and rituals. Most of these people were not literate and hardly hadaccess to Islamic scholars. The Sufi brotherhoods of Hace Yusuf Hamedani, ArslanBaba and Ahmad Yesevi constituted the main conduits of Islam to these people. In a

nutshell, Yasar Ocak refers to three main characteristics of heterodox Islam in Turkey:syncretism, mysticism and messianic prospect.^'There is no such thing as pure orthodox Islam and heterodoxy is true for Turkish

Islam in general in varying degrees. The orthodoxy in Turkish Islam does not comeclose to Puritanism or fundamentalism, as in the case of Salafiya or Wahhabism.Although one can find marginal groups which are infiuenced by the Islamist trends ofthe 1970s and 1980s, it would be correct to argue that Turkish understanding andpractice of Islam is largely shaped by tradition and history.^^ Nevertheless, it is mostlythe Tu rkish Alevi Islam th at is referred to when one talks about th e heterodox y of Islamin Anatolia. Today's Alevi Islam was shaped not only by pre-Islamic Turkic nomadicculture and beliefs, but also by the spread of the elements of Shii doctrine by theSafavid Empire in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The rituals incemevis (the


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his disciples in the sixteenth century, including figures such as Musa Kazim and BaliSultan.23

The historical dichotomy between popular andulema understandings has beenmostly replaced by urban and rural demarcation. Typically, the people living in citi

are more educated and aware of intellectual discussions around certain Islamic issueOn the other h and , the people living in the coun tryside retain th e features of folk Islalargely shaped by saint(evliya) cult. Stories of miracles and extraordinary events, of thspiritual power of saints to heal certain diseases and to release calamities, form taspects of religion that become appealing to these people. It is the authenticity of thmessage and respect to the carriers of this message that matters most for an averaMuslim living in a village. The sacredness of the Qur'an, the penetrating nature of verses into the hearts ofthe listeners or readers comes before the content ofthe messaitself, which is taught to them by respected saints orimams in the mosque.

In Turkey and central Asia, the most conspicuous aspect of the religious practice the culture of respectrespect to the Holy Qur'an, religious books, senior scholahistorical figures and the like. The Qur'an has to be placed higher and above the levof the ground. In that sense, most Turkish Muslims become upset and disappointeduring their pilgrimage when they see some pilgrims using the Qur'an as a pillowSimilarly, one has to say specific salutations when God, the prophets, companionsaints or scholars are mentioned. In the Turkish collective psyche communal evenassume significance more than individual practice. In that sense, people who do npray regularly feel a social obligation and motivation to attend the funeral services, ago to congregational prayers on Fridays, in Ramadan(teravi) and during feasts(bayram

namazi). Visiting elders, relatives and neighbors becomes significant social obligatiomolded with religious and cultural factors. These factors are common to Turkish Islain general, but are less visible and central among the urban population.^^

Certain Islamic groups promoted the traditional folk understanding of Islam Turkey by trying to preserve the tradition of sacred and respected saints and theextraordinary stories in the collective memory. Examples for this effort can be found the early years of the first private Islamic TV channel in Turkey, TGRT, which airesaint's stories, and openly criticized the puritanism of Salafiya and Wahhabi doctrineThese programs had a high approval rating among the pious Muslims who saw the

as representing a religious and cultural treasure.The modem forces of rational and scientific reasoning are infiuential on reinterpret

tion or rethinking of certain practices and beliefs. Especially the Alevi rituals atraditions be cam e issues of discontent b etween generations in cities. Th e difficustems from the very nature of the Alevi system, which has been historically shaped nomadic oral culture and lived by people in the countryside.^' As the Alevi youbecame more educated, the modem forces of rationality and scientific reasoning startto hold a central place, which questioned the central position ofdede (respected eldersin Alevi traditon) in cemevi in regards to religious and social issues.^* Expectinarbitration for certain disputes or solutions to complex problems from a person, wdoes not usually have m ode m education, became problem atic for the new generationSunni Islam faced the same type of problems, yet the institutional and written traditi


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The historical position of the classicalulema in Turkey was transformed as a resultof republican reforms. After the caliphate was abolished, a new bureaucratic institutionunder the name of Directorate of Religious Affairs was created. Consequently, theulema fell under the control of the state even more so than during the Ottoman timesand lost their legitimacy-giver status to the state. Secularism was understood asconfining religion to private life and removing any of its social or political manifesta-tions from the public sphere. The role of the new religious bureaucracy would be toensure this control over religion and the people. The central ideas of enlightenmentstructured the premises of the Kemalist reform. Positivism, rationality, secularism andnationalism constituted the main pillars of the new Republican order. As a result, thestate banned Sufi lodges, which were seen as promoting superficial beliefs and consti-tuting alternative sources of loyalty. Republican Turkey would be based on reason andscience, and the only loyalty would be to the Turkish nation.

As a result of these contemporary transformations of the layers of Islam, talkingabout a boundary between m odernist and traditionalist groups as a global p heno m enonhas become more meaningful in the Turkish case, as it is for others in the Muslimworld. Although one can see the legacy of the above distinctions between rural-urbanand /ema-popular-heterodox versions of Islamic practice, the idea of modemizationbridged the gap between these realms. Compatibility of reason and revelation andharmonious aspects of religion and modernity dominated the city. The traditional cultof sacredness and culture of respect remained at the center of the countryside. TheKemalist reform and other Islamic movements, especially the Nur movement, con-tributed to the erosion of the chasm between the different layers of Islam in Turkey.

Keeping in mind the above characteristics of Islam in Turkish experience, we nowtum to our discussion about the 'Turkish model' .

Turkish Model: Whose Project?

There are several groups that can be identified as carriers and promoters of the idea ofa (distinct) Turkish (experience of) Islam. These groups can be categorized under threemajor projects: nationalist, orientalist and liberal. The nationalist project stems fromthe idea of a Turkish Islamic synthesis and emphasizes the unique and superiorunderstanding of Islam by the Turks. The second approach shares intellectual proxim-ity with the orientalist academic thought and underlines the Turkish experience withsecularism as a model for other Muslim societies, being a necessary condition fordevelopment and modemization. The liberal project highlights the evolution of Is-lamism in Turkey and points to its capacity of creating a constructive approach to thetensions between Islam and the modem world.

Nationalist Design

The nationalist project dates back to the late Ottoman era, which was infiuenced byEuropean ideas of nationalism and primacy of national symbols, i.e. language, culture,religion. The Ottom an intellectuals who were educated in Europ e, called Young Tu rks


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by the masses. The other version of nationalist argument was less radical and morconciliatory. Accordingly, the old Turkish religions and Islam were not significantlincom patible, and even one could find astonishing degree of similarity between the twConception of God, universe, society and order were said to be well suited, if noidentical. In fact the historical decision of Turkish tribes to convert to Islam was onnatural. Moreover, the protagonists of this approach underscored the historical missioof Turks to serve Islam by defending, preserving and spreading its message via thstates they established throughout the centuries. Turks not only contributed to thhistorical survival and fiourishing of Islam, but also interpreted its message more deepand suitably to its spirit than any other nation, including the Arabs. The key intellectuals of this creed were Ziya Gokalp (1 876 -192 4), Sem settin Gu naltay (1 883-1 961) anOsman Turan (1914-1978).^ The founders ofthe Republican Turkey utilized some othe scholarly works and discussions to formulate an ideological project with the aim omolding nationalism, religion and modernity together and creating the new Turkis

identity. Mehmet S. Aydin argues that there really was a need to reinterpret Islamnationalism and modernity in relation to each other, but the elite were more interestein engineering a secular society and the efforts to structure a 'Turkish' (and modem the same time) understanding of Islam remained superficial. The issue was reduced reciting the Qur'an and the call to prayer in Turkish and ignoring or abrogatinpractical ordinances of the religion, known asmuamalat. According to Aydin, withouta new understanding of Islamic philosophy and jurisprudence methodology that woube able to tackle the modem issues in front of Muslim societies, it was only impossibfor these transformation attempts to go beyond an ideological project.^'

An other interesting framing effort a roun d T urkish Islam took place in the late 1990Especially after the 28 February 1997 intervention of the Kemalist guardians of thregime, a new discussion about Turkish Islam was noticeable. Some of the Kemaliintellectuals and politicians utilized the annual Alevi festivals and memorials of earliAlevi saintsespecially Pir Sultan Abdal and Haci Bektasto promote the idea thAlevi Islam was the genuine Turkish Islam. This was argued du e to the Turkish culturelemen ts present in Alevi Islam, as com pared to Sun ni Islam w hich was refiected as tproduct of Arab and Persian cultures. The assessment ofthe accuracy of this argumeis up to historical investigation,^^ yet one can easily see the motivations of the figurwho articulate this idea. The promise of Alevi Islam stems from its less politicized anpublicity demanding character. The social and political demands framed arounreligious goals and symbols are quite worrisome for the Kemalist establishmenEventually, the danger of dividing the society on sectarian boundaries made the ideless feasible as a way of discrediting political Sunn i un ders tand ing and lost its p opu laity after 1998-1999.

The nationalist project, naturally, has been mostly confined to the domestic realmyet it also had extemal ambitions. Pan-Turanist aspects to promote the idea ofthe uniand integration of the Turks all over the world, from Adriatic Sea to the great ChinesWall, became the central ambition for this inspiration. In essence, the idea ofa Turkishmodel first came to the forefront and was taken seriously after the dissolution of thUSSR and subsequent process of proclamation of the independence of the Turki


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and economic relations within these countries, contributed to the idea of a moderateTurkish Islamic model, as opposed to the radical Shii or Wahhabi patterns. This ideawas also welcomed by the US, for whom this offered leverage in Central Asia overTurkey.

Orientalist Outlook Modernist Aspiration

The notion of orientalism represents the arrogant attitude (nowadays) of a smallportion of Western scholarship in their study of the East. As Edward Said eloquentlyputs it, orientalism '... can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution fordealing with the Orientdealing with it by making statements about it, authorizingviews of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short. Orientalismas a westem style of dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient'.' ' 'This type of an outlook was solidified through the modemization theory, whichproposed the Westem model of development and social change to be imitated in otherparts of the world. This includes adoption of technical skills and advancements, andmost significantly, elimination of certain core cultural and political values for the sakeof replicating the same sorts of processes and outcomes. There are more nuanced andless value-laden forms of mo dernization theory tha n its more positivist and linear forms,yet the core idea of the Orient against the Occident is still infiuential.

How does the Turkish experience become a role model from orientalist perspective?Daniel Lemer's well-known study on Turkish modemization.The Passing of the Tra-ditional Society,represents the mentality of transplanting the forms of institutions and

methods from the Westem world to the Eastern. Traces of a similar approach can befound in Bernard Lewis' or Feroz Ahmad's dichotomy of modem and reactionary, thetop down Kemalist reforms and the societal resentment or reluctance for it.' ' Thestruggle of modern and reactionary forces is also the struggle of development andresistance to change in the Muslim world. For policy purposes, the Turkish experiencewith secularism and modemization under the guidance of Kemalism is meant to set anexample for the third world countries in general and the Muslim world in particular. Itshould be noted here that Turkey was able to progress in terms of social, economic andpolitical development to meet the modem standards of the world, yet it was far frombeing problem-free. The Kemalist project succeeded in cracking the infiuence ofreligion over politics, and structuring a nation-state from the residue of the OttomanEmpire. However, it failed quite miserably in assuring religious freedom and integratingthe peripheral regions to the center. The two chronic problems of Kurdish issue andpolitical Islam are the products of this failure."^ Therefore, the idea of promoting amodel which has its deficiencies (first for itself) became the handicap of marketing toa wider au dience. Especially the p roblem s related with the pu blic visibility of Islam andIslamic symbols were quite unacceptable to the Muslims in the Middle East.

With its advantages and disadvantages, the idea of establishing secular states forMuslims was tempting for an array of constituents and social engineering purposes. Aswe discussed in the previous section, the central Asian Tu rkic R epublics becam e the ap tground for the idea of a secular state and, crucially, society. After 9/11, the idea of


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project to democratize the Middle East. In that sense, establishing friendly regimes acracking down on the menace of Islamic fundamentalism and radicalism would be thultimate result of the 'war on terrorism'. The lack of a Turkish version of Islamradicalism makes the Turkish model defendable in terms of its experience wit

democracy and secularism, as well as veiling the outsider character of the project. Tcrucial point at this stage is the interventionist attitude of the US in the eyes of thMuslim world, carrying the imprint of the orientanlist outlook.

We can see examples of studies to find ways to implement a treatment to the Islamworld, inspired by the Turkish Kemalist experience. In a policy paper prepared for thBrookings Institution in Washington, DC, Omer Taspinar identifies three importalessons from the Turkish model for the Arab world. After delineating the uniqucharacteristics of the Turkish model and its problematic aspects, Taspinar first cautioAmerican policy-makers about the possible fiaws of the model and its application. Thhe puts forward his recommendations for a safe transformation in the Middle East. Tfirst priority for the A rab world should be to establish a 'positivist edu cati on '. H e arguthis would have several impacts. Education would increase the literacy rate and develhuman capital, which in tum would contribute to economic growth and increase livinstandards. Also, educated people would be less inclined to preserve traditional valuand less likely to be infiuenced and manipulated by traditional leaders. The seconlesson from the Turkish experience is a guided and controlled relationship betweestate and religion. Religion should be controlled by the state to avoid its misuse by threligious groups to rally support against the modemization process and an Islamitake-over. Thirdly, Taspinar argues that gradualism is key for minimizing risks in th

path to democratization. Strengthening civil society, legal framework and constitutionliberties should come first and gradually democracy can be introduced, as opposed shock therapy.'*

Taspinar's analysis about the mindset of the Kemalist elite, their objectives anmeans to achieve them in the specific context of Turkey are well informed and fair. Othe other hand, his policy recommendations are quite close to the terms of orientalioutlook and modernist aspiration we discussed above. These proposals speak to thambitious groups which have the idea of restructuring the Middle East and establishifriendly democratic secular regimes. The author's position might be singling out

feasible project informed by the Turkish experience, if it is to become a model, yet tparticular policy proposals refiect the modernist mentality educated with positivism aorientalism. Brookings Institution is one of the conservative think tanks that stuissues regarding the Islamic world and make policy recommendations to the Uadministrations. One can find similar examples indicative of the orientalist outlook amodernist aspiration in other institutes and organizations in the US and the West.

Liberal Model

The evolution of political Islam in Turkey inspired many liberal projects to moderathe terms and means of Islamic search for power and change. Modernization-friendform and liberal interpretation of Islam and politics would be an antidote for fund


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'Turkish Islam' andApproaches to the 'Turkish Model' 339

liberalist approach suggests transformation and reconstruction of Islamic ideas andclaims in the light of modem conditions. Rather than the imposition of 'objective'measures of modernity, liberals put forward a mutually constitutive relationship be-tween Islam and modernity." This constructivist fiexible attitude, as compared to a

positivist dogmatic mindset, unleashes the possibility of the existence of multiplemodernities, including Islamic or Islamist ones.^"The 'timely' developments in Turkish politics in November 2002, the electoral

victory of the last edition Islamist Party, the AKP (Justice and Development Party),struck some neo-conservatives more than liberals as an opportunity to promotethe policy of restructuring the Muslim world."" Interestingly enough Paul Wolfowitz,one of the key mentors of the Bush administration and its foreign policy, sent warmmessages to the new govemment formed by the AKP last year. The Turkish involve-ment in the Iraqi operation gained a symbolic meaning, more than a strategic ortactical, in the eyes of the US administration. Even after the democratic tackle of theTurkish parliament, Wolfowitz criticized mostly the military's reluctance to support thegovemment bill that would open Turkish bases for US operation and send Turkishtroops to Iraq together with the coalition forces.' '^ The idea was not alienating the newgovernment for the future. The second US dem and from Turkey, or Turkish expressedwillingness, to send troops to Iraq can also be seen from its symbolic meaning. Theinvolvement of Muslim countries in the Iraqi reconstruction was thought to legitimizethe coalition forces' presence there in the eyes of the Iraqi people. There are otherhistorical and geographic dynamics that also play a significant role for Turkish involve-me nt; nonetheless, the intemational context makes the Turkish dom estic context highly

relevant for such a mission. One of the constitutional advisors to the US authority inIraq, Noah Feldman, openly talked about the significance and impact of an Islamicdemocracy, with all its vagueness, in Turkey, which can sway a liberal-democraticmodel over the whole region via the trusted channels of political Islam to the Muslimmasses and movements.*'

Similar arguments to this demonstration effect are made by other liberals. GrahamFuller, in his recent b ookThe Euture o fPolitical Islam, argued that the AKP governmentis the first Islamist regime that came to power by democratic means, and it will be aserious test for compatibility of Islam and democracy, and credibility of its liberal

advocates.' ' ' ' In the end, the Westem stereotype and prejudice against peaceful coexis-tence of modem-liberal principles and Islamic identity, nourished by the undemocraticexperiences of Iran, Sudan and Afghanistan, now got the chance to be revised with thehelp of the Turkish case.

The intellectual discussion about the relationship between Islam, politics andmodernity is not near a settlement by any means. There are objections to a synthesisor eclectic approaches from both Islamic and liberal camps. In essence, social transfor-mations do not always follow the theory, but often the theory is inspired and modifiedby practice. Many Islamist or other radical ideas were moderated when they came tothe position to take responsibility and govern. The evolution of political Islam inTurkey is a good example of this change. On the other hand, one can find examples tothe contrary, where moderates in principle became radicals in practice. Sudan's Hasan


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340 Etga Ugur

Viability and Feasibility of a Turkish Model in the Islamic World

The credibility of the Turkish model depends on three main factors. First, the modhas to prove its merit in term s of achieving social peace, econo mic progress and politicdevelopment in its own habitat, namely, Turkey. Hence, Turkey needs to solve thKurdish issue and its 'political Islam' (or sometimes public Islam) problem by maturinits democratic institutions. The enduring problem of tension between full democratiztion and a homogenous nation idea has to be eased by opening legitimate channels fthe articulation of Kurdish cultural identity and political demands. The AKP govemment steadily passed the necessary legislation to meet the Copenhagen criteria, whicassures the cultural and political rights of minorities. The issue is not primarily legal nature, but political, so the practice of these reforms is more important and at the samtime more difficult than legislation. The European Union offers a great deal omotivation and pressure for realization of these changes in Turkey. It is also the caswith 'political Islam'. Restrictions on democratization for the sake of radical applicatiof the two pillars of Kemalism, i.e. secularism and nationalism, will undermine tsincerity ofclaims to help other countries in benefiting from the Turkish experience anpractice in order to solve their problems.

Turkey's image in the Arab world is not very positive due to its experience witWesternization through militant secularism and cultural reform, its relations with tUS and Israel, and the Ottoman heritage. Most of the Arabs perceive Turkish modemization as de-Islamization and Westernization, the top down cultural reform, anrestrictions on Islamic symbols and identity in the public sphere. The nationali

policies of Young Turks during the early twentieth century and Arab rebellions inspireby Britain have also affected the collective psyche in the Arab world and in Turkey.'These mutual negative feelings were fortified further by Kemalism's efforts to associaTurkey with the Western world, which was perceived as, if not actually was, tuming iback to the Muslim world. Abolition of the Caliphate, replacing the Arabic alphabwith th at of Latin , closing of Sufi orde rs an dmadrasahs,, changes in the dress codes andlegal 'reforms' that cleansed the constitution from Islamic principles were unacceptabto the Arabs. There were reformist agendas in the Arab and the Muslim world as weyet never at the same level of radicalism as that of Turkey.

In order to propose a Turkish model that can be appealing to the wider masses in thMiddle East, Turkey needs to demonstrate that democracy and secularism in thMuslim world are not mutually exclusive, or have to grow only at the expense of thother. The 80-year Turkish experience exactly alludes to this problem. Secularismunderstood in a fashion close to French laicism and control of religion by the statunlike the Anglo-Saxon way of separation of state and church, has always assumepriority over liberalization and democracy. The idea was that people were not matuenough to be given full democratic rights, and after they were educated with positivipremises and became enlightened then it would be more desirable and less risky

open the political system to equal participation. From the Kemalist point of view athe expected ultimate social transformation, this was a quite realist and pragmatcalculation The top down process of transforming the society was far from winning t


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foreign imposition.''^ American policy-makers are also aware ofthis setback and lookingfor credible and trustworthy channels to communicate with the Islamic world. Thevalue of the semi-Islamist party govemment in Turkey stems from this quest forapproaching the moderate Islamist groups and conservative Muslim population to

deliver the message of viability of an Islamic democracy, whatever that means. Septem-ber 11 , 2001 m ade A merican policy-makers seriously question their long-lasting sup-port for the friendly authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. A significant part ofanti-Americanism and radicalism was attributed to the lack of democracy and politicalrights, which was in essence preserved by the US support to the autocrats. Even if theUS wanted to introduce democratization in the Middle East countries, the dilemmawould be the desirability ofthe most likely outcome, i.e. the Islamist take-over in mostof these countries. In that respect, a middle way was thought to be the creation ofIslamist democracies that are friendly to the US. That is where we see the potentialvalue of the Islamist roots of the AKP. However, the AKP is in a dilemma, too. On theone hand, it tries to renounce its Islamist background to gain legitimacy in the eyes ofthe secular establishment. On the other hand, the leaders of the party see the opportu-nities of utilizing Islamism outside. So far, the govemment has tried to be cautious indealing with sensitive issues in Turkey, at the same time has sought for buildingcoalitions outside, which would strengthen their positionsvis-d-vis the seculars athom e. The go vem m ent's enthusiasm about accession to the EU and w illingness to keepUS-Turkish relations at a high level are significantly affected by this idea of balancing.In brief, the idea of a Turkish model is appealing to both the US and AKP, though itsadmission by the target audiences and the Turkish military-bureaucratic establishment

is highly questionable.''^The major problem of the Turkish model in the eyes of the Arabs and Muslims is its

history of militant secularism. The Turkish modemization project has been perceivedas being Westernization-oriented and against the cultural heritage of Islam. In thatsense, democratization with a similar secular orientation would not be welcomed. TheAKP offers a way out of this impasse, if the secular establishment and the AKP canmanage to coexist peacefully. The AKP, as an ex-Islamist party that went through aserious transformation and came u p with a claim to represent 'conservative d em ocratic'philosophy, can communicate with the Islamist groups, conveying moderation and

pragmatism in the short term. However, the long-term intemalization of liberal-politicalvalues is not certain. The infiuence of this message depends on the independence of theTurkish voice. Ifwe put aside other consequences ofthe Turkish Parliament's rejectionof participating in the war o n Iraq with the coalition forces, it was positively interprete din the Arab world as retuming of Turkey back to ' its Arab Muslim brothers' . Thisimage was reinforced after Turkish nominee Ekmelettin Ihsanoglu's election as thesecretary general ofthe Islamic Conference Organization (ICO).*'

For the Central Asian Turkic Republics, by the help of cultural and geographic ties,the Turk ish experience has been m ade to offer a mo del of developm ent. Th is includes

integration with the global market and economic growth by establishing a marketeconomy. Turkey becomes a gateway for Turkic republics by which they gain access tooutside markets especially the European market Regional cooperation and common


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342 Etga Ugur

Uzbekistan was quite uncomfortable with the relationship between the oppositioleader, Muhammad Salih, and Turkey.'" This led to deterioration of the relationbetween the two countries. A similar process occurred with Azerbaijan, when demcratically elected Ebulfez Elcibey was ousted from power by a coup reinstating th

previous President and a former KGB bureaucrat, Haydar Aliyev, to power. Turkegave mixed signals to thefait accompli and had to act pragmatically and consent to thbanishment of a pro-Turkey president." Turkey's nationalist discourse 'from Adriatto the Great China Wall' also made some of these countries unsure and suspicious oTurkish intentions and the possibility of a pan-Turkist agenda.'^

Conclus ion

In the first section, we analyzed the intellectual roots of Turkish Islam. The questiois how much of a role the apt features of the Hanafi school of law, the Maturiddialectical theology, and the Yesevi-Mevlevi-Bektasi Sufi tradition that we havidentified play in the formulation ofthe 'Turkish model'. It is hard to find a straightfoward answer to this question. One can argue that the popularity of the idea is mostdue to the Turk ish practice of Islam during the republican era rather than the endurinhistorical understanding . For the m ost part, the flexible and accom mo dating m ethod oogy of the Hanafi school, the appreciation of natural sciences by Maturidi theology anits less determinist more rationalist approach, and the civil organization of Sufismatter less, if any, than the fact that the role of religion in the society was someho

limited by secularism, rationalism and the nationalism of Kemalist ideology. Very littattention is paid to the set of Islamic movem ents and their accomplishments in TurkeIn essence, if the Kemalist model of society can be transplanted to other countries, tdetails of Turkish understanding would be trivial as a result of the diminished role religion in their respective societies. The section on the viability and feasibility of tTurkish model demonstrated that limiting the Turkishness of the model to the repulican practice would prove little effectiveness in the Muslim world, especially among tArabs. On the other hand, discussing the promises of the three pillars of Turkisunderstanding of, and experience with, Islam, without necessarily referring to iTurkishness, seems more hopeful for some of the acute problems in the Muslim worl

N O T E S

1. For the relevant statements of US President Bush and National Security Advisor, CondoleezRice, see 'The Pentagon Talks Turkey',The American Prospect, Vol. 13, No. 16, 9 September 20and for Paul Wolfowitz, CNN Turk interview, 6 May 2003 and < http://www.washingtonfile.ne2002/March/Marchl4/EUR405.HTM>, cited in Omer Taspinar, 'An Uneven Fit? "TurkisModel" and the Arab World', The Brookings Project on the US Policy Towards the IslamWorld, Analysis Paper, No. 5, August2003, p. 4.

2. Wanafi iqh should be understood with its origin and later evolution as a result of emerging neeand circumstances. Abu Hanifa's methodology can be said to entrust a significant place toijtihad(interpretation) and ra'y (personal opinion) by employingqiyas (analogical reasoning) methodol

d b k d d d k h l l d l


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Muslim landscape after the suppon ofthe Seijuks and Ottomans. William Montgomery Watt,TheFormative Period of Islamic Thought, Oxford: O neworld, 200 2, p. 313.

4. See online < http://www.mfethullahgulen.com/life/article.php-id = 761&pageno = 7.htm > .5. The coexistence was not always harmonious; depending on the Sultan,ulema and the circum-

stances, these two sources of law interacted with each other. On the terms of this coexistence with

specific issues and anecdotes, see Richard C. Repp, 'Qanun and Shari'a in the Ottoman Context',in ed. Aziz Al-Azmeh, Islamic Law: Social and Historical Contexts, London and New York:Routledge, 1988, pp. 124-145.

6. For an analysis of Ebu's-Suud Efendi andhh fatwas in Ottoman legal tradition, see Colin Imber,Ebu's-Su'ud: TheIslamic Legal Tradition, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997.

7. Fethullah Gu len's critique of Salafi interpretation in Ali Unal and Alphonse Williams,FethuUahGulen: Advocate of Dialogue, Fairfax: Fountain, 2000, p. 54.

8. By the end of tenth century these philosophical debates ceased to attract the utmost interest inMuslim societies. Especially after Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazzali, Islamic philosophy wasdiscredited by the Sunni orthodoxy (Mutazila arguments to be defeated by Asharite reasoning),leaving the ground to legal studies and mystic formations. A quest for rule and order after centuries

of intemal struggle combined with a sense of mental fatigue and the reality of social stratificationbetween the elite and the masses led to consolidation of Sunni orthodoxy. Also, the feeling ofcompleteness in Islamic civilization and thought after this 'closed' the door ofijtihad. For ananalysis of this eclipse of thought and dominant mentality, see, for example, Mehmet S. Aydin,'Degisme Surecinde Islam' ('Islam in a Process of Transforma tion') in hisIslamin Fvrenselligi (TheUniversality of Islam),Istanbul: Ufuk Kitaplari, 2000, pp. 23-36.

9. For a historical survey of the social context of the theological discussions in the early years of theIslamic community, see W. Montgomery Watt,Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Edinburgh:Edinburgh University Press, 1964, pp. 1-35.

10. For a detailed comparison ofthesekalam schools, see, for example, W. Montgomery Watt,IslamicPhilosophy and Theology: An Extended Survey,Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1985.

11. Hayreddin Karaman, Gercek Islam'da Birlik (Unity in the RealIslam), Istanbul: Nesil Yayinlari,1980, p. 34.12. Ozkan Acikgoz, 'Fikih, Kelam ve Tasawuf Alaninda Hanefilik, Maturidilik ve Yeseviligin "Turk

Muslumanligi" Zaviyesinden Tahlili' ('Analysis of Hanefi Fiqh, Maturidi Kalam, and YeseviSufism from the Perspective of Turkish Muslimness'),Bilig, Vol. 20, 2002, p. 36.

13. Ira Lapidus,A History of Islamic Societies, op . cit., p. 303.14. For an analysis of approaches to Sufism in general and Turkish Sufi practice in particular, see

Ahmet Yasar Ocak, Turkler, Turkiye ve Islam: Yaklasim, Yontem ve Yorum Denemeleri (Turks, Turkand Islam: Approach, Method an d Commentary Attempts),Istanbul: Iletisim, 2000.

15. This idea of personal experience is articulated and practiced in many ways. For a question-basedsurvey on Sufi beliefs and practices in Turkey, see Mehmet Demirci,Sorularla Tasawuf ve

Tarikatler (Sufism and Sufi Orders in Q&A), Istanbul: Damla Yayinevi, 2001.16. Fuad Koprulu, Turk Edebiyatin'da Ilk Mutasavvifiar (Earlier Sufis in the Turkish Literature), AnkaraAnkara Universitesi Basimevi, 1966, pp. 151,257-261, 300-304.

17. IHd., pp. 92-93.18. For a sample detailed historical study on the place of Sufism in Ottoman era, see Necdet Yilmaz,

Osmanli Toplumunda Tasawuf: Sufiler, Devlet ve Ulema (Sufism in the Ottoman Society: Sufis, Sand Ulema), Istanbul: OSAV, 2001, esp. pp.429-461.

19. M. Hakan Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey, New York: Oxford University Press,2003,p. 274.

20. See Nursi's introduction for hisMesnevi-i Nuriye, whose name is an allusion to Rumi's masterworkMesnevi.

21. Ahmet Yasar Ocak, Turk Sufiligine Bakislar(Thoughts on Turkish Sufism),Istanbul: IletisimYayinlari, 2000, pp. 18-19.22. Islam in Turkey is less politicized than most other Muslim countries. For a survey-based study on


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344 Etga Ugur

Erzurum and its Surrounding Villages), Istanbul: Erzururm Kitapligi, 1999on religious life acustoms in Erzurum, as a 'crucial case study', supports the argument here. According to Gunayfindings, the percentage of people who pray five times regularly in the rural areas and u rban areare 44.5 % and 28% , respectively (p. 96). W hen it comes to feast prayers(bayram namazi), theseratios rise to 75% in cities and 95% in villages (p. 110).

25. After the Ottomans tied Bektasi Order to Janissary Corps and tried to adjust the sedentary lifestyof early Alevis to urban life, two different forms of Alevi Islam emerged, namely, Kizilbas anBektasi. Later on due to the negative connotation that the name Kizilbas carries historically, thebecame known as Alevis. For details of this historical evolution, see IreneMelikoff, 'Bektashi/Kizil-bas: Historical Bipartition and its Consequences', in eds T. Olsson, E. Ozdalga and C. RaudvereAlevi Identity: Cultural, Religious an d Social Perspectives, Istanbul: Swedish Research InstituIstanbul, 1998, pp. 1-8.

26. For a sociological investigation of the urban Alevi population profile and their attitude toward thtraditional structure, see Ali Aktas, 'Kent Ortaminda Alevilerin Kendilerini Tanimlama Bicimleve Inane Rituellerini Uygulama Sikliklarinin Sosyolojik Acidan Degerlendirilmesi' ('SociologicAnalysis of the Urban Alevi Identification Patterns and Frequency of Religious Ritual Practice

paper presented at Gunumuzde Alevilik Konferansi (AleviIslam Today Conference), 27 May 200Th e paper is available online at: < http://www.alevibektasi.org/tkent.htm > .27 . Harun Odabasi, 'Aleviler Dedeligi Tartisiyor' ('Alevis DiscussDede Tradition'),Aksiyon,No. 460,

29 September 2003.28 . Faruk Bilici, 'The Function of Alevi-Bektashi Theology in Modem Turkey', in T. Olssonet al., op .

cit., p. 58.29. For a close examination of the ideology of Nihal Atsiz, see Umut Uzer, 'Racism in Turkey: Th

Case of Huseyin Nihal Atsiz',Journal ofMuslimMinority Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2002, pp. 119130.

30 . For pieces that can represent the views of these intellectuals on Turks, Turkey and Islam, see ZiyGokalp, Turklesmek, Islamlasmak, Muasirlasmak (Turkification, Islamization and Modemiza

Istanbul: Devlet Kitaplari, 1976; M. Sem settin Gunaltay,Maziden Atiye (From Past to the Future)Istanbul: 1923; Osman Turan,Turk Cihan Hakimiyeti Mefkuresi Tarihi: Turk D unya NizaminiMilli, Islami ve Insani Esaslari (The History of Turkish World Hegemonic Order: National, IslamHumanistic Essentials of Turkish World Order), Istanbul: Turan Nesriyat Yurdu, 1969.

31. Mehmet S. Aydin, 'Turk Muslumanligi' ('Turkish Islam'),Islamin Evrenselligi, op . cit., pp. 67-7432 . For a competent academic presentation on this issue, see Ahmet Yasar Ocak, 'Tu rk Muslumanli

Tartismalari, Resmi Ideoloji, Alevilik, Sosyoloji ve Tarihsel Gercek' ('Debates on Turkish IslamOfficial Ideology, Alevi Islam, Sociology and H istorical Fac t') , inTurkler, Turkiye ve Islam, op. citpp. 147-156.

33. For an analysis ofthis model of development, see Idris Bal,Turkey's Relations with the West and thTurkic Republics: TheRise and Fall of the 'Turkish Model', Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2000.

34. Edward Said, Orientalism, London : Penguin, 1995, p. 3.35 . Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modem Turkey, London: Oxford University Press, 1968; Fer

Ahmad, The Making ofModem Turkey, London and New York: Routledge, 1993.36. For an analysis of this failure, see M. Hakan Yavuz, 'Turkey's Fault Lines and the Crisis o

Kemalism', Current History, Vol. 99, 2000, pp. 33-3 9.37 . Omer Taspinar, 'An Uneven Fit?',op. cit., p. 5.38 . Ibid.39. For a collection of case studies investigating the modernizing role of religion in Europe and th

Middle East, see, for example, John L. Esposito and Francois Burgat,Modernizing Islam: Religionin the Public Sphere in Europe an d the Middle East, New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press,20

40 . For a selection of intellectual discussions on the possibility of multiple modernities including a

Islamic one, see the special issueoi Daedalus, Vol. 129, No. 1, 2000.41. See Note 1.42 Paul Wolfowitz CNN Turk interview 6 May2003


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National Collective Psyche Since the Proclamation of the Republic of Turkey'), paper presentedat The Future of Arab-Turkish Relations Colloquium, 15-18 October 1993, Beirut, Lebanon(conference proceedings were published by Timas Yayinlari, Istanbul, 1994).

47 . 'A Year After Iraq', The Pew Global Attitudes Survey, 16 March 2004.48 . This uneasiness can be seen in Turkey's President Sezer's waming to US President Bush regarding

the Islamic character ofTurkey. Sezer clarifies that Turkey is a secular country and not an Islamicstate. Therefore the idea of Turkey being a model for other Muslim countries is not a soundproposition. For an analysis of this news story, see Fikret Bila, 'Sezer'den Bush'a: Turkiye IslamDevleti Degil' ('From Sezer to Bush: Turkey Is Not an Islamic State'),Milliyet, 28 June 2004.

49. Ali Al-Safdi, 'Turkiye'nin IKO Genei Sekreterligi Desteklenmeli' ('Turkey's Nomination for theICO Secretary General Should be Supported'),Zaman, 16 June 2004.

50. 'A New Chapter in Turco-Uzbek Relations',Turkish Daily News,8 October 2000.51. Thomas Goltz,Azerbaijan Diary, New York: M. E. Sharp, 1998, pp. 366-383, 449-452.52. M. Laumulin, 'Turkey as a New Geopolitical Actor in Eurasia',Central Asia's Affairs,Vol. 1,

No. 3, pp. 1-6.


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Intellectual Roots of Turkish Islam

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