Integrated Risk and Knowledge Management for Exploration David M. Lengyel Risk and Knowledge Management Officer Exploration Systems Mission Directorate NASA Headquarters
Integrated Risk and Knowledge Management for Exploration David M. Lengyel Risk and Knowledge Management Officer Exploration Systems Mission Directorate.
Mar 27, 2015
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Integrated Risk and Knowledge Management for ExplorationIntegrated Risk and Knowledge Management for Exploration
David M. LengyelRisk and Knowledge Management OfficerExploration Systems Mission DirectorateNASA Headquarters
David M. LengyelRisk and Knowledge Management OfficerExploration Systems Mission DirectorateNASA Headquarters
Introduction
Objective: Introduce and discuss real work process improvements that utilize organizational management innovations and leverage existing ESMD information technology resources
Customer: The ESMD civil servants and contractor work force
Goal: No nonsense, straight-up, “Real Deal” approaches to make your job more fun and make you more effective
- Work more effectively and efficiently
- Make better – more risk informed decisions
- Manage risks in a proactive fashion
Not another burdensome management / administrative demandon your time …….. This stuff will save you time !
Why Integrate Risk and Knowledge Management?
Practice 1: Establish Pause and Learn Processes
Practice 2: Generate and Infuse Knowledge-Based Risks (KBRs)
Practice 3: Establish Communities of Practice (CoP)
Practice 4: Provide Knowledge Sharing Forums
Practice 5: Promote Experienced-Based Training
Designing a complex architecture of hardware, software, ground and space-based assets to return to the Moon and then go on to Mars will require:
1) an effective strategy to learn from past lessons, and2) a set of inter-related practices to generate and share knowledge for reuse
as we progress forward. ESMD risk and knowledge management communities have embarked on an effort to integrate risk and knowledge management (KM) over the lifecycle of the Constellation and Advanced Capabilities Programs using a set of inter-related strategies, which include:
ESMD and Stealth KM
“Knowledge-enabling processes (i.e. process improvement) will lay a solid KM foundation for future organizational evolution and help align KM with business-based goals and objectives
Improving processes also provides an opportunity to deploy supporting KM tools and techniques such as collaboration orCRM software and processes – this can give important momentumto knowledge workers, and can help them to work in a moreholistic and community-based way
Bottom-line: Process evolution equals culture evolution”
Niall SinclairAuthor of Stealth KM
Practice 1: Pause and Learn
“The Need to Pause, Reflect, and Learn” PaL is modeled after the Army After Action Review (AAR) system by Dr. Ed Rogers KM Architect at the GSFC.
The idea is to create a learning eventat the end of selected critical events in the life of a project. End of project reflections are good but are too infrequent for the organization to learn in a timely manner.
PaL meetings are intended to be integrated into the project life cycle at key points as a natural part of the process. PaL meetings are structured and facilitated by specialists who are not project members
Attributes of a PaL
Informal, facilitated roundtable discussion (1/2 hour to full day)– Includes moderator and rapporteur– Focuses on tasks and goals that were to be accomplished
Not for attribution– Does not judge success or failure (not a critique)– Encourage employees to surface lessons
Focused on particular area of project life (phase and function)– Management PaL, Technical PaL, Conceptual PaL, et. al.– Team participation may vary, depending on PaL focus and objective
Maximizes participation– Primary benefactors are the participants themselves– More project activity can be recalled and more lessons shared
Must be conducted inside a project’s schedule, not outside or later– Recall of key details more likely and insights can be immediately
applied– Affirms learning as integral part of project life cycle
PaL as a Process
Step 1– Identify when PaLs will occur– Determine who will attend PaLs– Select Moderators, Rapporteurs– Select potential PAL sites– Review the PAL plan
Step 2– Review what was supposed to happen– Establish what happened (esp. dissenting points of view)– Determine what was right or wrong with what happened– Determine how the task should be done differently next time
Step 3– Review objectives, tasks, and common procedures– Identify key events– Rapporteurs collect ALL observations – Organize observations (identify key discussion or teaching points)
1 Adapted from United States Army Manual: A Leader’s Guide To After Action Reviews
Practice 2: Knowledge-Based Risks
Knowledge-Based Risk n. 1. A risk based on lessons learned from previous experience. 2. A closed risk with documented lessons learned appended. 3. A means of transferring knowledge in a risk context.
Definition
• Start Early
• Need to Capture, Learn From and Repeat Successes--Need to Learn from and Prevent Failures, Mishaps, Near Misses
• There was a limited number of useful lessons learned in the NASA Lessons Learned Information System database. The good ones are masked by the hundreds of poor ones, so that extensive effort is required to sort them out.
• Lesson Learned – Well-understood mechanisms for “transfer of knowledge” during Program development are crucial to a successful long-term Program.
• Flow all applicable Lessons Learned into Requirements, Processes, and Plans. Institutionalize the Use of Lessons Learned.
• Provide Sufficient Resources, Planning, and Management Support to Analyze and Incorporate Lessons Learned. NASA and Contractor Must Work Together
• The best lessons learned for running a major program should be captured in a living handbook of best practices. New lessons learned should be screened for applicability, and included in the handbook.
Lessons Learned on Lessons Learned
ESMD Is Taking a New Approach to Lessons Learned…..ESMD Is Taking a New Approach to Lessons Learned…..
Knowledge-Based Risks Strategy
The ESMD KBR strategy is intended to convey risk-related lessons learned and best practices to ESMD personnel. This strategy integrates the existing Continuous Risk Management (CRM) paradigm used at NASA with knowledge management--with the primary focus on integrating transfer of knowledge through existing work processes and not adding an additional burden to the workforce to incorporate new KM tools and concepts.
5
4
3
2
1
1 2 3 4 5CONSEQUENCE
LIKELIHOOD
KBR Process Flow Chart
IDENTIFYIdentify risk issues and
concerns
ControlMake risk decisions
TRACKMonitor risk metrics and verify/validate mitigation
actions
PLANDecide what, if anything,
should be done about risks
ANALYZEEvaluate impact/severity,
probability, timeframe, classify and prioritize risks
Candidate KBR?
Replan Mitigation
Program/project data(Metrics Information)
Close or Accept RisksInvoke Contingency Plans
Continue to Track
Risk Status Reports on: Risks Risk Mitigation Plans
Statement of Risk
Risk Classification: Likelihood Consequence TimeframeRisk Prioritization
Risk Source Checklists, Lessons Learned, Review of WBS and Requirements, Hazard Analysis, FMEA, FTA, KBRs, etc.
Risk Data, Test Data, Expert Opinion, Lessons Learned, Review of WBS and Requirements, Hazard Analysis, FMEA, FTA, Technical Analysis, KBRs, etc.
Resources
No
No ActionResearchWatchAcceptance RationaleMitigation Plans
Yes
Notify Cognizant RMO
Brief to ESMD RMWG
Accepted?NoNo Action
Yes
Upon Closure:ESMD RMO coordinate
documenting lessons learned, video nugget(s), and associated
documentation
KBR documenbted in Risk Database and KBR Portal
Pushed to Subscribers
• KBRs are documented as a requirement in ESMD Risk Management Plan – this flows down to Levels 2 and 3 (Program and Project) Risk Management Plans
• Leverages Standard Continuous Risk Management (CRM) paradigm
• Adds filtering process for identifying significant risks as KBR candidates
• Captures “What worked – OR – Didn’t work in terms of mitigation strategies
• Provides Infusion Process for KBRs Back Into Risk Management and other processes Which current NASA Lessons Learned System lacks
KBR Criteria
Risks that are "Candidate KBRs" should meet several of the following criteria (listed in order of importance):
(1) Were mitigated (not accepted or watched)
(2) Will likely appear again in other programs / projects
(3) Included a particularly effective mitigation approach / implementation, or an error in mitigation planning or implementation could have been avoided
(4) Was on the performing organization's Top Risk List at some point during the life cycle
(5) Was owned (and/or worked on) by a particularly knowledgeable person who could serve as a "expert" on the risk topic
Application of Risk Management Assurance Mapping
Multiple KBR Capture Points – Multiple Delivery Points
Internal and External to ESMD
HR
P P
CB
ET
DP
P
CB
HR
P P
CB
MO ProjectEVA Project
GO ProjectELP Project
1st S
tage
E
CB
/ER
BU
p S
tage
E
CB
/ER
BU
pStg
Eng
EC
B/E
RB
AR
ES
-VE
CB
/ER
BF
ligh
t T&
IE
CB
/ER
B
Orion Project
SM
RB
LAS
RB
PP
&C
RB
T&
V R
BS
&M
A R
BV
IO R
BC
M R
B
Constellation Program
ESMD Level 1
Field Centers
Mission Support Offices
Mission Support Offices
SSC CDGilbrech
SSC Risk Management
MSFC CDKing
MSFC Risk Management
LaRC CDRoe
LaRC Risk Management
KSC CDKennedy
KSC Risk Management
JPL CDElachi
JPL Risk Management
JSC CDCoats
JSC Risk Management
GSFC CDWeiler
GSFC Risk Management
GRC CDWhitlow
GRC Risk Management
DFRC CDPetersen
DFRC Risk Management
Tools
Tech. Dev.R. Boyle
SuitCupples
VehicleB. Moses
S&MACarrington
PP&CB. Johnson
SE&IJ. Davis
TV&VJ. Patrick
EVA RMOMulligan
Project Controls
SE&L Level III
CEV MgmtOps & Int.Kunz
Business Mgmt
Staff Office
LV Mgmt
Ground Systems
CC&C
Risk Manager
Risk ManagerAnderson
Risk Manager
Risk Manager
Risk Manager
Risk Manager
Risk Manager
C3PO Program
Flight Test & IntTaylor
ARES-VCook
Vehicle IntegrationReuter
First StageBurt
Upper StageDavis
Upper Stage EngineKynard
NASA AdministratorM. Griffin
Deputy AdministratorS. Dale
Associate AdministratorR. Geveden
Office of Safety and Mission Assurance
B. O’Connor
Office of Chief Engineer
C. Scolese
Space Operations Mission DirectorateW. Gerstenmaier
Science Mission DirectorateC. Hartman
Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate
L. Porter
PA&ES. Pace
Cx PMJ. Hanley
NASA HQ
Adv. Cap. C. Walz
JSC
PP&C B. Waddell
T&VW. Arceneaux
Ops Integration R. Castle
SE&IC. Hardcastle
SR&QAL. Hansen
MSFC
NASA Centers Board/Panel Inline Report
NASA Exploration Systems Mission DirectorateRisk Integration Critical Process Map
LE
GE
ND
Orion Project ManagerR. Hanson
ARES-IProject Manager
S. Cook
Ground Operations T. Talone
Mission OperationsD. Webb
DION. Woodward
Orion ContractorLockheed Martin
Orion VIOGahring
Orion CMPiatel
Orion SMFree
Orion PP&CFloyd
Orion LASStover
Orion T&VHurlber
Orion S&MAThiessel
OrionChief Engineer
Prime Contractor
GSFC
SI&M M. Allen
OCEH. Lyles
First Stage ContractorATK
Upper Stage ContractorPWR
EVALutz
JPL
GRCKSC
LaRC ARC
TransitionJ. Olsen
SOMD TransitionJ. Kearn
RMOPerera
Information FlowProject
Risk ManagerCuriel
Risk ManagerSchwarz
Risk ManagerHolsomback
Risk ManagerNise
Risk ManagerPacera
Risk ManagerSee
Risk ManagerWood
Risk ManagerManuel
Risk ManagerPeterson
Risk ManagerSchubert
Risk ManagerWood/Cole
Risk Agent
Chief Engineer
SE&I
LV RMO
Risk ManagerMabry
Risk ManagerOgle
Risk ManagerColeman
Risk ManagerCole/Wood
Risk ManagerKulpa/Coleman
Risk ManagerKulpa/Wood
Program ManagerBrasfield
Risk ManagerSanofsky
Program Manager
Risk ManagerBurkevics
Logistics Mgmt
Project MgmtReq &
Prj Int – Lvl IVProj.
Support
Risk Manager
Risk Manager
Risk Manager
Lvl5 FITO RMKline
MORM
Smith
OSPP
CMOR. Williams
OSPPRisk Management
CMORisk Management
Liskowsky
ARC CDWordon
ARC Risk Management
SCaN Program
ISS Program
Space Shuttle Program
JICB
ESMDQPMR
ESMD “HQ Only”
RMWG
CxCB
Cx RMWG
PR
CB
PR
CB
Mission Operations Risk Review Board
EVA Risk Review Board
ELP Project Control Board
ELP Risk Management
Panel
Vehicle Integration
CB/RB
Ground Operations Risk Review Panel
Ground Operation Project Control
Board
Orion/CEV Project Control
Board
CT
N P
CB
Program ManagerOndrus
Risk ManagerNaves
Program ManagerHale
Risk ManagerTurner
Program ManagerSuffedin
Risk ManagerLurtomski
C3P
O
PC
B
I&A RRB
CFOG Sykes
OCIOJ. Pettus
General CounselM. Wholley
Integrate Ent. Mgmt Program
B. German
Innovative Partnership Prog.
D. Comstock
Strategic Communications
R. Hopkins
TCB
Inspector GeneralR. Cobb
OI&MT. Luedtke
Communication Planning
R. Hopkins
EducationJ. Winterton
Legislative and Intergovmnt Affairs
J. Winterton
Public AffairsD. Mould
Diversity and Equal OpportunityB. Manuel
Human Capital ManagementT. Dawsey
Internal Controls and Mgmt Systems
J. Henn
ProcurementS. Goddard
Small Business Programs
G. DelgadoSecurity and
Program ProtectionD. Saleeba
NSSCR. Arbuthnot
Infrastructure and AdministrationO. Dominguez
OI&A RMHoyt
ETD Program
ETD Program Manager
Risk Manager
HR Program
HR Program Manager
Risk Manager
LPR Program
LPR Program Manager
Risk Manager
LROProject Manager
LCROSSProject Manager
CxSD
Risk ManagerD. Lengyel
Risk Manager Risk Manager
Risk Manager Risk Manager Risk ManagerN. Saiyeed
SMC
PMC OMC
Risk ManagerTurner
Config.Mgmt.
Risk
Resrc Sch
IT
LM R
B
Lvl5 FITO RMCagle
Risk Mgr
Risk Mgr
Risk Mgr
SR&QA Chair
Chair
Advanced Proj.
Risk Manager
DIO RM Chair
DIO RM Chair
Chair
Program ManagerLindenmoyer
Risk ManagerEminger
ChairChairChair
Program ManagerC. Lacefield
Risk ManagerL. Piccola
AdvisorAdvisor
Chair
R
R R
R
ChairChair
R
R
R
ESMD DRWG
AA Chair
Program and Institutional IntegrationR. Keegan
Chief of StaffP. Morell
Exploration Systems Mission Directorate
S. Horowitz
Deputy AAD. Cooke
Tri-Chair Tri-Chair
Tri-Chair
Administrator, Chair
Co-Chair
Co-Chair
Activity Vector
RRisk Review Board
Knowledge-Based Risks (Continued)
20
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20
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20
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20
09
20
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20
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20
13
20
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20
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12
20
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20
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20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
13
20
12
Ground Ops
Orion
Ares-1
Num
ber
of
Do
cum
en
ted
Ris
ksN
umb
er o
f D
ocu
me
nte
d R
isks
Num
ber
of
Do
cum
en
ted
Ris
ks
KBRs
Standalone Program Risksin ARM
Integrated Program Risksin ARM
Integrated and Knowledge-Based Risks in ARM
More access to risk information is required to close “knowledge gaps”
KBRs will become a living reference over time as risks are identified, mitigated and closed
Ground Ops
Orion
Ares-1
Ground Ops
Ares-1
Orion
Knowledge-Based Risks (Continued)
NASA Standard WBSNASA Standard WBS
ARM allows automated delivery of new KBRsARM allows automated delivery of new KBRs
Knowledge-Based Risks (Continued)
• Embedded 3-8 min Video Nugget with Transcript
• Related Knowledge Bundles
• Related Content – reports, documents, etc.
• Threaded discussion (blog) feature to be added to comment on each KBR
• Hosted on ESMD R&KM portal
• The design of the LRO propulsion tanks was influenced by a number of factors including launch vehicle characteristics. The Delta II Expendable Launch Vehicle’s (ELV) spin stabilized upper stage made the Nutation Time Constant (NTC) a key parameter in assessing the stability of the spacecraft. The uncertainty in predicting the effects of liquid propellant motions and the relatively large propellant load and mass fraction for the LRO tank resulted in the identification of a potential risk. Close coordination and communication with all levels of management early in the design trade study process allowed for the effective mitigation of the risk and provided additional lunar exploration opportunity.
LRO Spacecraft Atlas V BoosterDelta II Booster LCROSSSpacecraft
First Closed Risk KBR – Lunar Recon Orbiter
Practice 3: Communities of Practice
Knowledge resides with people and is often lost via actions like:
• Downsizing
• Retirements
• Shuttle Transition
• People Movement
Participation in a CoP should be considered part of any professional’s career growth
Communities of Practice (Continued)
“Communities of Practice (CoP) are groups of people who share a concern, a set of problems, or a passion about a topic, and who deepen their knowledge and expertise in this area by interacting on an ongoing basis”
“CoPs share information, insight and advice. They help each othersolve problems.”
“They may create tools, standards, generic designs, manuals, andother documents—”
“Cultivating CoP in strategic areas is a practical way to manageknowledge as an asset, just as systematically as companies manage other critical assets.”
Communities of Practice. Wenger, et al
IT Enabling ESMD CoPs in a Secure Environment
The PBMA toolkit provides NASA CoPs with a secure environment to share documents, conduct threaded discussions, polls, manage calendars, locate expertise, collaborate and learn. Over 30 ESMD CoPs are serviced by PBMA.
The Confluence Wiki provides secure collaborative functionality within the ESMD Integrated Collaborative Environment (ICE). ESMD Wiki spaces now number over 130
Practice 4: Knowledge Sharing Forums
ESMD Alumni Sharing Events: • These events bring in alumni from Apollo, Space Shuttle, and other
programs to discuss their experiences and lessons learned• This is an extensive, under-utilized knowledge base• ESMD has invited selected alumni to brown bag lunches and other
lessons learned forums
Knowledge Sharing Workshops and Seminars: • At Knowledge Sharing Workshops, senior project leaders share their
insights, what they learned and what they might have done differently based on a recent project experience.
• These workshops are attended by emerging project leaders who want to understand the wisdom of successful project managers
APPEL Master’s Forums: • Conducted twice annually• ESMD has and will continue to participate in these events
Practice 5: Experienced-Based Training
Project Management and Engineering Training • Already conducted by APPEL and NESC Academy • ESMD will focus its efforts in training on leveraging the existing
infrastructure of training courses throughout NASA• ESMD will help shape existing courses by providing ESMD-related
experiences, gleaned from case studies, KBRs, and other sources of lessons
Case Studies• ESMD will facilitate the development of case studies that will help
transfer the context of program/project decisions to the workforce and emerging leaders
• Senior ESMD managers would help shape the content based on their experiences and leadership
• Case studies will make existing training programs more relevant and useful to upcoming ESMD leaders who participate
KM Practices and Tool Integration
Portals
Engineering / Management Training
Knowledge-Sharing Forums
Wikis/CoPs
Rich Integration and Linkages
Rich Integration and Linkages
ESMD Risk & KM Teaming
ESMD is teamed with:
• Space Operations Mission Directorate• Office of Safety & Mission Assurance• NASA HQ Institutions & Administration• Academy of Program / Project & Engineering Leadership• NASA Engineering & Safety Center (NESC) Academy• JSC Chief Knowledge Officer• GSFC Chief Knowledge Officer• MSFC / Ares Chief Knowledge Officer• Constellation Program• ISS Program• SSP Program• Pratt-Whitney-Rocketdyne Chief Knowledge Officer• Lockheed-Martin • ATK-Thiokal • United Space Alliance, Office of the Chief Engineer• The Aerospace Corporation• NASA Alumni Association• Defense Acquisition University – Best Practices Clearinghouse
Summary
“ESMD faces exciting opportunities and formidable challenges. To reduce risk and apply knowledge more effectively, ESMD should integrate its KM, RM and OL initiatives into a comprehensive plan that will accomplish more with less bureaucracy. The goal is not compliance with detailed processes and procedures but compliance with intent: the intent to learn, to share and probe every possible angle so ESMD’s missions have the highest possible chance of success. ESMD must take risks with ‘eyes wide open’ and ‘minds fully engaged’ at every decision, every trade and with every residual risk.”
From: Strategy for Exploration Systems Mission Directorate Integrated Risk Management, Knowledge Management
and Organizational Learning WhitepaperDave Lengyel & Dr. Ed Rogers
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