Insurgency as an instrument for strategic offence:A century of Pashtun history

7/27/2019 Insurgency as an instrument for strategic offence:A century of Pashtun history

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1

MichaelHesselholtClemmesen,BGen(DA,ret.),M.A.(history)

CentreofMilitaryHistoryattheRoyalDanishDefenceCollege

15.1.2010

Insurgencyas

an

instrument

for

strategic

offence:

AcenturyofPashtunhistory.1

Waziritribesmanthemid1930. (http://www.beikey.net)

1DevelopedfromtheXXXVICIHMAmsterdamcongresspaper:TheDevelopmentandEmploymentofaCradleof

Insurgency:FromacenturyofPashtunrebellions.


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2

ThestudiespreparingforthewritingofthearticleledtotheclearconclusionthattheeffortsinAfghanistan

from2001onwardshavebeenhamperedbystrategictunnelvisiondrivenbyacombinationof

opportunism,expediencyandunrealistichopes. Ontheotherhandtheoppositiontotheinternational

campaignisnourishedbybasicallyfaultyperceptionsoftherootsofthelocalresistance.

Firstaquotationtohighlightthattherootproblemoftheborderlandwasforeseenandunderstood

longtimeago.ABritish1932studyoftheIndoAfghanborderinsurgenciesquotedaletterfromtheAfghan

EmirAbdurrahmanKhanfrom1892wherehewarnedthegovernmentofBritishIndiaofthelikelynegative

influenceoftheborder theDurandLine thatwouldcomeintoplacethefollowingyear:Inyour

cuttingawayfrommethesefrontiertribes,whoarepeopleofmynationalityandmyreligion,youwillinjure

myprestigeintheeyesofmysubjects,andwillmakemeweakandmyweaknessisinjurioustoyour

Government.2

In2006therealityhadstartedtodawnamongthemoreopenmindedobserversinWashington.Ina

presentation

on

12

th

December

after

a

visit

to

the

region,

the

well

informed

analyst

Anthony

H.

Cordesman

noted:

LittledoubtPakistanigovernmentnowtoleratesAlQaida,Taliban,andotherinsurgentoperations. PeaceagreementwithtriballeadersonSeptember5thinNorthWaziristanappearstobedefacto

surrender.

India,Kashmir,Baluchiseparatism,Pashtunquestion,supportofnativeIslamistshavehigherPakistanigovernmentprioritythanwaronterrorism.

TalibanandotherfactionsactasdefactogovernmentsinpartsofEasternPakistan. SomeMadrassasareTalibanandAlQaidabases,somevirtuallyonborderwithAfghanistan. PartsofArmydoseemcommittedtoopposingAlQa'idaandTaliban. PakistaniISIisdividedbutsomeelementsappeartoaidinsurgents.3

ThenewObamaadministrationappointedthetoughspeakingdiplomatRichardHolbrookeofBalkans

fameasitsSpecialRepresentativeforAfghanistanandPakistan,butotherwisetherealisationdidnot

influencethenarrowAfghanistanstrategyfocusoftheU.S.andtheallies.Holbrookediedlate2010,only

weeksbeforethedemonstrationinearly2011ofWesternfailuretostabiliseandusePakistan.

Thearticlewillgiveaquickwalkthroughthehistoryofmorethanahundredyearsofinsurgenciesand

counterinsurgencyeffortsintheIndoAfghan/PakistaniAfghanborderlandtoillustratewhythe

insurgenciesinAfghanistanandPakistanshouldnotberegardedandtreatedasseparate.Instead,they

mustbehandledasone forevershifting Pashtunborderlanduprisingthathasbeenavailablefor

employmentasaratherbluntandindependentlyactingstrategicinstrumentfromtheothersideofthe

border.Thetroublefromtheareahasnearlyalwaysbeencatalysed,usedandsupportedbyinterested

powersfrominsideandoutsideSouthCentralAsia.

Tounderstandthisfactisessentialforanycounterinsurgencythatisnottoremainavaindriveto

containsymptoms.However,thenecessarycombinationofmilitary,economicandpoliticalstepsrequired

tosucceedisgoingtomeethardresistanceinaninternationalframeworkwherethebordersand

2Op.Cit.C.CollinDavies:TheProblemoftheNorthWestFrontier18901908.Withasurveyofpolicysince1849.

London1932,p.160f3IntheCenterforStrategicandInternationalStudiesbriefingWinninginAfghanistan:HowtoFacetheRisingThreat

Slide35:PakistansDangerousRole.


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3

sovereigntyofpresentstatesareconsideredsacrosanct.Thatisonemorereasonwhythepresent

combinedeffortismostlikelytofail.

Thisfocusalsoimpliesadeliberateshiftofthenarrativeawayfromwhatdirectlyorsubconsciously

nourishestheoppositiontotheinternationalcampaignagainstthepresentPashtunledinsurgencyin

Afghanistan.To

illustrate

the

common

understanding

of

the

roots

of

the

problem

one

only

needs

to

pick

a

randomsampleofthelatestbooksabouttheconflictinanAmazonliteraturesearch:

AnOrdinarySoldier:Afghanistan:AFerociousEnemy.ABloodyConflict.OneMan'sImpossibleMission.4 WarsInvolvingAfghanistan:AfghanCivilWar,AngloAfghanWars,SovietWarinAfghanistan,

AfghanCivilWar,AngloAfghanWars.5

Afghanistan:LandofConflictandBeauty:AHistoryofConflict.6 Afghanistan:AMilitaryHistoryfromAlexandertheGreattotheWaragainsttheTaliban.7 IntheGraveyardofEmpires:America'sWarinAfghanistan.8 TheWarsofAfghanistan:MessianicTerrorism,TribalConflicts,andtheFailuresofGreatPowers.9

Theunderstandingoftheproblempresentedbythesetitlesnotnecessarilybythenarrativesand

conclusionsofthelistedbooks isfirstlythealmostcompletefocusonAfghanistanwithinitsinternational

bordersandsecondly,implicitly,thatanyattempttociviliseandpacifytheAfghansisdoomedtofailure.

Pacificationhasbeentriedinvainbeforebysomanyempires.

Withoutmakingthisclear,thereasonforfailureisunderstoodtobethecharacteroftheaverage

Pashtunman.Heispresentedandrespectedasthesupreme,incorrigible,noblesavage:anunalterably

wild,primitive,independentminded,automaticallyxenophobic,conservative,fanaticallyreligiouswarrior

somebodyfundamentallydifferentfromus,analien.Thedifferencemakesanycivilisingprojectbothfutile

andarrogant.

Theonly

problem

with

this

picture

is

that

it

contradicts

both

the

historical

evidence

from

British

administratorsinvolvedinthedevelopmentofthetribalareasintheInterwarPeriod,thecurrentevidence

ofsoldiersandreconstructionsworkersontheground,andthescrutinyandconclusionsofthebest

contemporaryanalysts:outsiderslikeDavidLoyn10

andaswellasinsiderslikeAhmedRashid11

andImtiaz

Gul.12

4DougBeattie,2009.

52010.

6JohnC.Griffiths,2009.

7StephenTanner,2009.

8SethG.Jones,2009.

9PeterTomsen,2011.

10DavidLoyn:Butcher&Bolt.TwoHundredYearsofForeignEngagementinAfghanistan.RioVista,Texas2009.

11AhmedRashid:DescentintoChaos.TheWorldsmostUnstableRegionandtheThreattoGlobalSecurity.London

200812

ImtiazGul:TheMostDangerousPlace.PakistansLawlessFrontier.London2009.GulislesscriticalofPakistans

presenteffortthanRashidandtriestojustifyhiscountryspresentdoublestrategy,whichhisdoesnotacknowledge,

withgeostrategicarguments.However,inhisanalysisofthelocalsocialeconomicroots,heagreeswithRashid.


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Theborderzone

ThemaininsurgencyzonecirclingeastpartofPashtunmajorityareas.(temi.repubblica.it)

Forclosetotwocenturieswarandinsurgencieshasbeenthefateofeverygenerationinthisborderarea,

thefightingpulsingfrombeinglocalisedandsporadictoregionalandperiodicallyintensivewar.Mostthe

troublehaditscentreinthetribalmountainareasonbothsidesofthepresentinternationalborderline.

However,thefightinghasalsobeennourished,supportedandinspiredlocallyfromthemoresettled

Pashtunareasonbothsidesofthisborderzone.Regionalpowersandtheoutsideworldwereinvolvedfor

morethanhalfthattime,projectingideologies,ambitions,threatperceptionsandgeneralconflictsintothe

areaof

the

Pashtuns.

Inordertobetterunderstandtherootsofthepresentsituationitisimportanttokeepinmindthatthis

extendedborderzoneonlydiffersinonerespectfromothersimilarwild,multiethnictribalzonesbetween

empiressuchastheCaucasus,theBalkans,CentralAsianorthofAfghanistanandnativeAmericantribal

landbetweentheBritish,SpanishandFrenchpartsofNorthAmerica:ThelandsofthePashtunswasnever

broughtunderfullcontrolbyanyoftheforwardmovinggreatpowers.WhentheoverextendedBritish

EmpirehalfheartedlyexpandeditssecuritypresencenorthwestwardinIndiatoavoidaRussiancontrolled

Afghanistan,ithadchosenacheaplayeredapproachadjustedtothelocalconditions:Theinner,eastern

layerconsistedofthemoresettledPashtunmajorityareasintheplainbetweentheIndusRiverandthe

hills.Theycouldbecontrolledbymobilemilitaryforcesandweretoremainadministereddirectly.The


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NorthWestFrontierProvinceestablishedforthatpurposein1901withitscentreinPeshawarwasalsoto

monitorandindirectcontrolofthenextlayer:thewildhillylikewisemainlyPashtunpopulatedareasupto

theinternationalborder,namedafterSirMortimerDurand,whoforcedtheAfghanEmirtoagreetothe

borderlinein1893.Thatlinewasnotguidedbyaconsistentmilitarygeographicallogic,itdividedseveral

ofthe

dominating

border

tribes,

and

the

British

tacitly

accepted

that

the

Emir

maintained

some

role

in

relationtothebordertribesontheeasternsideofthelinebyeconomicsponsorshipofhisfavouredtribal

leaders.

ThePashtunmajorityareasinthenorthernpartofBaluchistan,thethinlypopulatedareabetween

BritishIndiaandPersia,wereleftoutofthetwolayeredNorthWestFrontierProvincearrangement.

However,thePashtunsdominatedthedistrictwhereQuetta,thenewgarrisontown,wasbuilttocontrol

themainwesternroutebetweenAfghanistanandBritishIndia.

TheEmiralsomaintainedalevelofinfluenceintheautonomoustribalbelteastoftheLinebecausehe

wastheleadingMuslimprinceofthearea.HehadbeenforcedtoacceptBritishcontrolovertheforeign

policy

of

his

country,

and

he

used

all

his

remaining

influence

over

the

border

tribes

to

weaken

that

control

wheneverpossible.HeencouragedfundamentalistMuslimleadersandclergytounderminetheauthority

ofBritishsponsoredtribalheads.

TheEmirsfirstsuchdiscreetefforttoinspireproblemsfollowedjustfouryearslater,in1897.Another

effortcamein1908,whenthedevelopingcooperationbetweenthetwoborderingempiresundermined

hispossibilitytousethethreatofRussiatoreinforcehishandinhisdealingswithBritishIndia.13

ItisimportanttonoticethatastrategicGreatGamehadcreatedopportunitiesandsourcesofincome

forthePashtunsastheoutsiderscompetedinbuyinginfluence.Withoutastrategicmotiveinvestmentin

infrastructureandtheeconomyofthetribalareashasconsistentlybeenverylow,andthroughoutthe20th

Centurytheconstantpopulationgrowthcombinedwiththelackofdevelopmentcreatedaconstant

migrationof

Pashtun

tribesmen

to

large

regional

cities

like

Karachi.

The

diaspora

has

maintained

close

contactstotheirfamiliesandtribesanddevelopmentsintheborderzone.14

Asearlyasinthe19th

CenturythebadeconomicconditionshadledtoaPashtundiasporatocornersof

theEmpireasfarawayasAustralia,andfromthe1970sonwardsthenowquicklygrowingpopulationin

boththeNorthwestFrontierProvinceandtheTribalAreascreatedamassiveemigrationofmalePashtuns.

MostfailedtofindworkinsidePakistan.Hundredsofthousandssoughtanincomeascontractworkers,

especiallyintheGulfStates.LargegroupsofPashtunssettledinEuropeandNorthAmerica.Intheearly

1980sthousandsofrefugeesfromthewarinAfghanistanwereaddedtothePashtuncommunitiesinthe

largePakistanicities.15

ThelargePashtuninternalemigranturbancommunitieslatermadeitimpossibleforthePakistani

governmenttocontainthetroubleandterrorismintheborderareas.Ithaslocalsupportingexpatriate

groupsinallsignificantpopulationcentresofthecountryandwillgetfinanceandcarryoutsupport

13Forastillvaliddescriptionofthecomplexityofthesituationandmotivesbehindthedevelopment:C.CollinDavies:

TheProblemoftheNorthWestFrontier18901908.Withasurveyofpolicysince1849.London1932.14

SeethediscussioninFerozAhmedsdatedMarxistLeninistanalysisin:FocusontheBaluchistanandPushtoon

Question.Lahore1975.15

SeeRobertNichols:AHistoryofPashtunMigration17752006,Oxford2008,pp.111134,140172.


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operationsboththereandelsewhereintheworld.TheroleofWahhabismaswellasSufismamongPashtun

tribesunderminesthepotentialofmoderateMuslimauthorities,evenifthattoolweretobeemployed.16

UsingJohnMackinlaysacuteinsightabouttheInsurgentArchipelago17

ofpopularrebellions

employingauniversalistideologyinourglobalisedworld,itbecomesclearthatthearchipelagiccharacter

ofthe

migration

coupled

with

the

character

and

role

of

Islamist

revival

means

that

all

the

world

is

going

to

remaindirectlyinfluencedbythePashtunborderzoneinsurgency.TheWesterngovernmentswillhave

seriousdifficultiesdevelopingandsustainingthenecessarycomplexarchitectureofthecounterinsurgency

responses,giventhecombinationofsimplifyingroleofmediaandimpatienceofhomepublicopinion. The

problemsbecomeacutebecausetheinsurgencynotonlymotivatesandinspirestheyoungfrustrated

PashtunsandotherPakistaniexpatriatesintheWest.LargenumberofyoungMuslimsecondorthird

generationimmigrantsfromotherpartsoftheworld suchasIndonesia,China,formerSovietRepublics

andtheMiddleEast havebecomepassive,activeormilitantsupportersoftheborderinsurgency.

On19October2009PakistanipolicepresentsomeofweaponsfoundinacacheamongMashudPashtunTaliban

supportersinKarachi.(islamizationwatch.blogspot.com)

WiththepresentfightingonbothsidesoftheDurandLine,itbecomesessentialtoconfronttheideathat

thelocalconditionsandthecharacterofthePashtuntribesarereallysospecial,soconservativeand

impossibletoinfluencewithcivilisationandanachronisticallywarriorlikethattraditionalcounter

insurgencyeffortsaremeaningless.Ifthiswerereallythecaseandthemainroottoourcounterinsurgency

problems,anyefforttopacifyanddeveloptheregionwouldfundamentallyfutile.Thenawithdrawalfrom

16SanaHaroon:FrontierofFaith.IslamintheIndoAfghanBorderland.London2007,givesanexcellentmodern

adjustmentbyaddinganindepthanalysisoftheimpactofIslamicrevivalismandSufismintribalbehaviourofthe

NorthWestFrontierProvinceofBritishIndiaandearlyPakistan.17

TheInsurgentArchipelago.FromMaotobinLaden,London2009.


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theareawouldbesoundandlogical,especiallyifthetribescouldandwouldblockfurtheruseoftheirarea

asabasefortheinternationalinsurgency.

If,ontheotherhand,thestereotypeisasflawedandanachronisticasallothersuchattemptsof

simplifications,wehaveotheroptions.IfitisthelackofdevelopmentinthePashtuntribalareasthat

remainsthe

core

of

the

problem

the

situation

that

drove

so

many

to

migration

our

actions

should

be

differentandcouldachievepositiveresultforboththePashtunsandourselves.Thealreadymentioned

1932vintageanalysisofconflictsintheregionmustbereadassupportingthislatterview.Fromaclose

studyofthetribesthatanalysisconcludedthattherewasnofundamentaldifferencebetweenthesetribes

andtherestofhumanity: Perhapsthemostimportantlessonofall,andonethatshouldprofoundlyaffect

ourfuturefrontierpolicy,isthatsavageandbloodthirstytribesbecomelessbarbarousandmorereconciled

topeacefulpursuitsunderasettledadministration.18

OneofmanyschoolsdestroyedbytheTalibanintheSwatvalley.(www.bloggernews.net)

Insearchforadeeperunderstandingoftherootsofpresenteventsitisrelevanttofocusonfourperiodsof

thelasthundredyears.Thefirstcoversfrom1919to1939andstartswiththeThirdAfghanwar.Thesecond

isthe1970swiththecombinedpoliticalcrisesinPakistanandAfghanistanthatledtoradicalisationandthe

openconflictsofthefollowingdecade.Thethirdisthe1980s.Thefinalperiodcoveredisthelasttwo

decadeson

both

sides

of

the

Durand

Line

starting

with

the

withdrawal

of

the

Soviet

forces

from

Afghanistan.ThereafterthecurrentdevelopmentofWesterncounterinsurgencydoctrinewillbeoutlined

andusedasaprismforthediscussionofthepresentsituationonbothsidesoftheLine.

18TheProblemoftheNorthWestFrontier18901908,Quotedfromp.70. Theargumentismadeinatotally

convincingwaybyAhmedRashid:DescentintoChaos.


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WhenButcherandBoltwasstillbutonlyjustacceptableto

homepublicopinion

BritishIndiantroopsinWaziristan1935(http://www.beikey.net)

Asalreadyoutlined,theAfghanEmirhadchallengedtheDurandLineinboth1897and1908bybreeding

rebellioninthetribalareas.AsaconsequencehehadbeenforcedtoacceptnotonlytheLine,buta

humiliating

limitation

of

Afghani

sovereignty

by

committing

his

country

to

following

British

advice

in

his

countrysforeignrelations.Inthewinterof1919anewEmir,whoaccededtothecrownafterthemurder

ofhispredecessor,gambledthattheBritishpostWorldWarImilitaryweaknesswouldallowAfghanistanto

gainadvantagesbywarthatincludedatleastfullindependenceandpossiblytheunderminingoftheBritish

willtosupporttheDurandLineborder.InMaythatyeartheAfghanregulararmycrossedtheLinein

offensivesagainstPeshawarfromthenorthwestandwest,intoWaziristanfromKhost,andagainstQuetta

fromthenorth.19

Theinvasionwastobecomereinforcedbyageneraluprisingofthediversetribesacross

theLine.TheBritish,however,mobilised350.000menand158.000transportanimalstomeetthe

combinedexternalandinternalthreat,andwithinacoupleofmonthsBritishIndianforceshadentered

Afghanistaninseveralplacesincounteroffensives.Theeffectiveresponsealsoincludedasymbolic

strategicair

bombardment

of

an

un

defended

Kabul

and

led

to

apeace

agreement

in

August.

TheBritishhadbeenforcedtofocustheireffortsoncontainingtheuprisinginseveralborderdistricts

andthereforeacceptedafullyindependentAfghanforeignpolicy.TheAfghansideformallyrepeatedits

acceptanceoftheDurandLine,buttribalrebellionscontinuedfromnorthernBaluchistanallthewayto

Chitralinthefarnorth.RegainingaminimumlevelofcontroloftheverydifficultmountainousWaziristan

requiredtheemploymentduringthewinterandspringof1920of83.000troopsandsupportingcivilians,

modernartilleryplusasignificantairforceoflightbomberaircraft.Morelimitedpunishmentoperationsin

19FortheofficialBritishhistoryofthewarsee:GeneralStaffBranch,ArmyHeadquarters,India:TheThirdAfghanWar

1919.OfficialAccount.Calcutta1926.


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Waziristan,mainlyusingaircraft,continueduntil1925.TheyoungRoyalAirForcewantedtosecureits

continuedindependencefromtheBritishArmybyreplacing,substituting,slowandexpensivearmy

operationswithpromptlyappliedandlesscostlyandriskyairbornefirepower.20

Theconceptofdisciplining

rebellioustribesbybutcheringtheircamels,cattle,sheepandgoatsanddestroyingtheircropsand

villagesduring

an

army

raid

followed

by

the

units

quick

bolt

back

to

settled

areas

should

be

replaced

by

thequick,safeandcheapoptionofdoingthesamewithaircraftinaircontrol.21

Themirageofcounter

insurgencybyairpowerunfortunatelysurvivedintothe21stCentury.

Duringthenext10yearsuntilthemid1930spacificationoftherebellioustribaldistrictsonlysucceeded

byabalancedcombinationofmilitary,economicandmilitarymeans.Themaincentreoftribaltrouble

movednorthtotheareaclosertotheKhyberPass.

Inthemeantimethelocalmilitiaswerethoroughlyreorganisedtomakeitpossibletowithdrawthe

regularbrigadesdeployedduringthemaininsurgencyinWaziristantogarrisonsnowbuiltadjacenttonew

roads.Thenewinfrastructuresupportedeconomicdevelopmentanditcouldfacilitateamilitary

redeployment

if

necessary.

The

British

administration

of

the

districts

was

reinforced

and

improved

to

allow

directedapplicationofjusticeratherthancollectivepunishmentofseriouscrime.Thenewsystem

remainedbackedupbythethreatofairpower.

However,thispoliticomilitarysystemstartedtocollapseinthemid1930s,whenitbecameevidentthat

theBritishwerebeginningtotakestepstoleaveIndia.Theapproachingdepartureoftheforeignrulers

encouragedlocalpoliticalpreparationsandmanoeuvringforthepowerstruggleahead.Thegrowing

politicalresistanceagainstthewaningBritishruleintheareathereaftercentredonPeshawar:the

administrativecapitalofthefrontierprovince.Atthesametimethethreatofpunishmentfromtheairwas

losingcredibilityandtroublereturnedtoWaziristan.Thetribeswerelearningcountermeasuresagainstthe

aircraftatthesametimewhenthetraditionalapplicationofcollectivepunishmentinsuppressionof

rebellionsby

butchering

and

burning

became

unacceptable

to

the

increasingly

well

informed,

liberal

and

pacificBritishhomepublicopinion.22

20ForashortcleardescriptionoftheInterwarRAFlogicsee:JohnRobertFerris:TheEvolutionofBritishStrategic

Policy,1919

1926.

London

1989,

pp.

88ff,

169ff.

James

S.

Corum

&

Wray

R.

Johnson:

Airpower

in

Small

Wars.

Fighting

InsurgentsandTerrorists,Lawrence,Kansas,2003,pp.5166,8186,givesageneralevaluationoftheeffectivenessof

theconcept.21

FortheofficialBritishhistoryoftheWaziristanoperationssee:GeneralStaff,ArmyHeadquarters:Operationsin

Waziristan19191920.SecondEdition,Delhi1923.22

ThebestmodernaccountifthepostWW1warandinsurgencyis:BrianRobson:CrisisontheFrontier.TheThird

AfghanWarandtheCampaigninWaziristan191920.StroudinGloucestershire2004.Thecollapseofthe1920system

isdescribedbyC.E.Brucein:Waziristan19361937:theProblemsoftheNorthWestFrontiersofIndiaandTheir

Solutions.Aldershot,probablyin1937.BruceunderlineinhisargumentthateventhemostwarriorlikePashto

respondtogoodstronggovernment,justiceandeconomicopportunitiesinthesamewayaseverybodyelse.The

ImperialWarMuseumhasrecentlyreprintedtheofficialhistoryfortheinterwaroperationsin:N.W.FrontierofIndia

192035.OfficialHistoryofOperations.PartI,IIandIII.London2004.


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Troublenorthandsouthoftheborder

PrsidentMohammedDaoudKhan(www.embassyofafghanistan.org)ogGeneralMuhammadZiaulHaq

(obitmag.com)

InPakistanthebreakawayofBangladeshin1971ledtoautonomymovementsinbothSind,Baluchistan

andamongthePashtuns,andalongperiodofseriouscivilunrestbroughtMohammedZiaulHaqsmilitary

takeoverin1977.Thereafterthemilitaryandsecurityservicesconsolidatedtheircontroloverthestateby

allyingthemselves

to

the

fundamentalist

Islamic

forces

in

the

country,

moving

it

from

being

the

home

and

sanctuaryforSouthAsiasMuslimsthatthefoundingfatherMuhammadAliJinnahhadcreatedto

becomingasemiIslamicstate,ignoringthewishesofthepopularmajority.FromthenonwardstheMuslim

leadersofthecountrywereallowedtoconductacampaignofhatredagainsttheWestandespeciallythe

U.S.thathaspoisonedpublicopinionbothinPakistanitselfandamongPakistaniexpatriatecommunitiesin

EuropeandNorthAmerica.Thisbecameoneofthesignificantsourcesofourpresenttroubles.

InAfghanistanthedevelopmenthadmovedintheoppositedirection.TheKabulWesternorSoviet

educatedintellectualelitepressedforacentralisationofpowertoacceleratesocialandeconomicreforms.

ThefirststepwastheousteroftheslowlyreformingAfghankingMohammedZahirShahbyhiscousin

MohammedDaoudKhanin1973.Thecoupremovedthelegitimaterulerofthecountry.Daoudsoughtto

enhancehis

popularity

by

intensifying

Afghan

support

for

the

Pakistani

Pashtun

and

Balochi

independence

claims.23

However,Daoudsinternalpositionremainedweak,andtoconsolidatepowerhesoughtthe

supportofthetwoCommunistPartyfractions:theKhalg(Masses)andtheParcham(Banner).Withthe

communistsbehindhimhemovedagainstthestillweakfundamentalistleaders,includingthelater

MujahidinleadersGulbuddinHikmatyarandAhmadShahMassoud.Theyfledandwerereceivedwithopen

armsbyboththeunstablePakistaniBhuttogovernmentthattaskedtheFrontierCorpstogivesupport.The

refugeesalsofoundsympathyandhelpfromPakistansIslamicpoliticians.ThePakistanileadersrepaid

23FrontierofFaith,pp.185194coversAfghanrejectioninprincipleoftheDurandLineduringthefirstfifteenyearsof

Pakistani.FocusontheBaluchistanandPushtoonQuestionanalysisthequestionatthetimeofDaoudscampaign.


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11

DaoudssupportfortheBalochiandPashtunseparatistsbygivingsupporttoanunsuccessfulrebellionin

Afghanistan.24

Inspring1978DaoudwaskilledinacoupandreplacedbytheKhalgleaderNurMuhammedTarakiwho

inhisplacewasmurderedinSeptember1979ontheinitiativeofhisrivalandPrimeMinister,Hafizullah

Amin.The

local

rebellion

against

Daoud

in

summer

1975

had

been

smashed

quickly;

however

the

full

communisttakeoverinspring1978provokedageneraluprisinginAfghanistanoutsideKabulinMay,the

monthafterthecoup.Fromthebeginningtherebellionwascontrolledfromapoliticalandmilitary

headquartersinPeshawarinPakistananditsmainbasebecamethecampsaroundthatcitywhere

hundredsofthousandsofrefugeesfromthefightingweresettlingintocamps. Inearly1979theAfghan

governmenthadlostcontrolandrepeatedlyaskedforadirectSovietmilitaryinterventionwithinthe

frameworkofthecooperationtreatysignedinDecember1978.Sovietmilitaryadvisoryandmaterial

assistancehadincreasedinstagessince1972,25

andlimitedSovietforceswerealreadyinplace.Aftersome

monthsofhesitationtheSovietPolitburodecidedtostabilisethesituationwithanoperationmodelledon

the

1968

intervention

into

Czechoslovakia.

The

air

landing

and

over

land

operations

took

place

without

problemsoveracoupleofdaysinlateDecember1979.AminwaskilledbyhisSovietSpecialForcesguards

andreplacedbyBabrakKamal,theleaderofthelesshardlineParchamAfghanCommunistPartyfraction.

EarlythatmonthZiaulHaqhadmadeapublicdeclarationoftheintentiontomovePakistantowards

Islamisation.26

ThereafterthescenewassetforanewGreatGameovertheDurandLine,thistimewiththeRussians

overextendedintoAfghanistanandwiththeactiveoperationsfromthemountainousanddesertcore

PashtotribalareasinanorthwesterndirectionratherthanintotheIndusplain.

24ImtiazGulgivesagoodsketchoftheinitialPakistaniresponseinthemid1970sinhis:TheMostDangerousPlace,

Chapter1:PakistansDangerousGame.25

WhentheauthorstayedinHotelKabulinmidMarch1976intransithomefromPakistan,hehadbeenoneofonly

twoWesternguests.TherestwereSovietmilitaryinuniform.26ThedescriptionofthedevelopmentsinAfghanistanandPakistanistoahighextendbasedon:AhmedRashid:

DescentintoChaos.FortheSovietoperationshereandlater:LesterW.Grau&MichaelA.Gress(eds):TheRussian

GeneralStaff:TheSovietAfghanWar:HowaSuperpowerFoughtandLost.Lawrence(Kansas)2002,andGregory

Feifer:TheGreatGamble:TheSovietWarinAfghanistan.NewYork2009.


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12

PashtuncoreareasasantiSovietbases

SovietairbornesoldiersinAfghanistan(englishrussia.com)

Thekeyroleoftheborderarea,theunderdevelopedPashtundistrictsonbothsidesofthePakistani

AfghanborderbecameclearshortlyaftertheSovietforcesthatenteredAfghanistaninlate1979.The

invadingarmywasfundamentallyunsuitedtoconductanythingbutmassiveoffensivemechanised

operationsinWesternEuropeorManchuria.Successfulcounterinsurgencyeitherrequiresacombination

ofmassive

force

and

the

extreme

brutality

required

to

commit

semi

genocide

or

the

combination

of

extremepatience,selfdiscipline,politicalsensitivity,minimumuseofforce,lowlevelinitiative,alllevel

flexibilityandabilitytosubordinatethemilitarytootheragencieswasdescribedabove.TheSovietArmy

wastoothinonthegroundandtooweaklysupportedbytheSovietleadershipandpeopletodothe

former,andtheydidnothavetheresources,leadershipandmoraletodothelatter.TheAfghanArmythat

theycametosupporthadtoalargeextentdesertedduringtheTarakiandAminregimes,sotheSoviet

unitshadtolearntodothejobthemselves.Withheavyuseofspecialforcesandothereliteunitsthey

graduallydevelopedanabilitytocarryoutdeliberatetacticalcordonandsearch(calledblockand

sweep),raiding,ambushandconvoyoperationscombinedwithpunishmentbydestructionofproperty

and

terror

attacks

on

civilians

actually

BucheringandBolting

as

the

British

Indian

operations

from

1897

to1937,butatafarlargerscaleanddestructivelevelandfarlessaccuratelydirectedthantheBritish

operationsthen. Thecombinationofverylimitedforcestrength,lowmoraleanddisciplineandbrutalin

indiscriminateuseoffirepowermadearoundfivemillionAfghansfleetoPakistanandIranandturnedthe

restofthepopulationawayfromtheCommunistgovernmentinKabul.

TherefugeesinthePakistaniandIraniancampssuppliedrecruitsfortheinsurgentMujahidinforcesthat

operatedasmobileunitsfromtrainingareasandbasesbeyondtheDurandLine,enteringAfghanistanto

conductmajorattackstosupplementlocalresistanceforcesandthereafteragainseekingrefugeabroadto

avoiddestructioninablockandsweepresponseoperation.TheunofficialSovietGeneralStaffanalysis

developedtwodecadesafterthewithdrawaldoesnotseemtorecognisethatthedefactorecognitionofa

safehaven

in

the

Pashtun

core

areas

of

Pakistan

(as

well

as

in

Iran)

for

the

forces

of

counter

revolution


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13

probablydoomedtheirlimitedeffortfromthestart,inspiteoftherathernarrowpopularbaseofthe

resistanceallowedbythePakistanileaders.

ZiaulHaqsmilitarycoupandhispoliciesofdeliberateIslamisationtopropuphispoliticalpositionhad

madehiscountryaninternationaloutcastwhentheSovietmoved.However,theSovietinvasionquickly

temptedthe

West

to

move

in

to

exploit

the

Soviet

over

extension,

and

the

Saudis

arrived

to

support

and

recruitanddevelopfellowIslamists.ZiawasevenallowedtoblockdirectWesternsponsorshipofanypart

oftheAfghanresistancenotsuitablymotivatedbyradicalIslam.Supportwaschannelledthroughthenow

vastlyexpandedPakistaniInterServiceIntelligenceAgency(ISI)thatdecidedwhotoassistwithwhat:seven

Islamicresistancegroupingswereselectedasworthy;secularnationalisticanddemocraticwereleftout,

themoreradicallyIslamic,thebetter.Averysignificantpartwenttotheorganisationofthebrutal

extremistGulbuddinHikmatyar. TherebyZiaindirectlyconsolidatedthepowerofthefundamentalist

Islamicforcesinhisowncountrythathehadchosentolegitimisehiscontinuedrule.Thesubstantial

training,militaryandsubversivestructurerequiredtosupportPakistanswarbeyondtheDurandLineby

selected

Afghani

proxies

had

to

be

established

in

the

Pashtun

majority

core

areas

in

FATA

and

northern

Balochistantobecomeeffective.

Afterasurgeinforceleveltoachieveaquickmilitaryvictoryin1986bythesametypeofineffective

counterinsurgencyoperationsasthoseconductedpreviously,theSovietstrategychangedduringthenext

twoyearstooneoftransferringoperationstotheAfghanforcesandnationalreconciliation,whereanew

AfghangovernmentunderMohammedNajibullahdecentralisedthearmedforcesbygivingagreaterrole

tostructuresdevelopedfromlocalmilitias,byopeningthepoliticalsystemtothemoderatepartofthe

IslamicoppositionandbytryingtosavepartofthemodernisationreformswithinamoreIslamic

constitution. Inwinter19881989theSovietforcesleft.27

27Asnote12.


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14

PakistanigeostrategicuseofthePashtocoreareas

KabulwhencapturedbytheTalibanwithPakistanisupportin1996(www.dailykos.com)

MuchwouldhavebeendifferentlaterhadtheU.S.ledandorchestratedfullinternationalsupporttothe

UNsponsoredefforttocreateandmanageastabletransitiongovernmentinAfghanistanthatfollowedthe

Soviet

withdrawal.

It

would

only

have

required

something

similar

to

the

effort

that

led

to

the

Bonn

AgreementinDecember2001.Insteadaseriouseffortwasdeemedfutileandbureaucraticinertialedtoa

shortperiodofcontinuedAmericansupportviaISItoPakistansGreatGaming. Itwasanunfortunate

mistakethatwouldberepeatedadecadelaterwhenanotherBushAdministrationshifteditsfocusfullyto

SaddamHusseinandlostanyinterestinthepostwarreconstructionofAfghanistan.

ISIuseditsspecialistsandbasesintheFATAsupportedbythePashtomannedparamilitaryFrontier

CorpsinadoubleoffensivetoimprovePakistansgeostrategicpositioninitsconfrontationwithIndia.

GuerrillastrainedhereinfiltratedintoKashmirtoinitiateandfueltheopeninsurgencythathadlastedfrom

1989uptotheopenlimitedwarin1999closetotheLehroadbetweenthethennucleararmedPakistan

andIndia.TheoriginalPakistaniinvasionofKashmirinautumn1947hadalsobeenconductedbyPashtun

tribalirregular

militias.

Thedirectoffensiveinspring1989toreplaceNajibullahsgovernmentwithaPakistanifriendlyand

fundamentalistoneunderHikmatyarfailedinitially:EvenifPakistaniartilleryandcommunication

specialistswereemployedindirectsupportoftheoffensiveviaJalalabadtowardsKabul,theattempt

endedindefeat,andittookthreeyearsbeforethecollapseoftheSovietUnionandaworseningeconomic

crisisledtoNajibullahsfall.TogetherwiththelackofAmericaninterestthecompetitionbetweenthe

formergovernmentandresistancemilitaryleaders,nowdefactowarlords,meantthatnostable

governmentcouldbecreated.

InJanuary1993thefullscalecivilwarstartedwithHikmatyarsbombardmentofKabul.Nearlyall

modernization,nationalcohesionandinfrastructuredevelopedduringthepreviouscenturywasdestroyed

inthefightingthatfollowedandledtotheformationoftheyoungpuritanPashtunTalibanmovementin


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15

therefugeereligiousschoolsintheQuettaareainnorthernBaluchistan.Withitssuccessinbattleand

supportfromawarwearyAfghanpopulationithadachievedcontrolofnearlyallofthecountryfiveyears

later.Attheendofthe1990sthePakistanmilitaryleadershipunderPervezMusharrafandISIhadshifted

theirdirectsupportandcooperationfromHikmatyartotheTaliban.IndirectlytheISIsupportedthe

sophisticatedleaders

of

Al

Qaida

that

had

moved

to

Afghanistan

and

increasingly

defined

and

dominated

theforeignpolicyviewsandactionsofthenaveTaliban.WithcontactsandlocalknowledgefromtheFATA

andborderingAfghanareasfromtheircooperationwiththeMujahidininthe1980s,AlQaidaquickly

tookoverandrantheformerlydirectlyISImanagedfundamentalisttrainingfacilitiesforlocaland

internationalMuslimmilitantsintheborderarea.ThesecondClintonadministrationsawthegrowing

threat,butitcouldonlyreactinasymbolicwaywithlongrangeairweapons.Therewasnowillingnessto

moveeventoairbutcherandboltstrikesuntilaftertheeventsof11September2001.28

28Rashid,DescentintoChaos,andDavidLoyn:Butcher&Bolt.Forananalysisofthedevelopmenttowardswar

lordism:AntonioGiustozzi:EmpiresofMud.WarsandwarlordsinAfghanistan.London2009.


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16

Togetthemonstergeniebackintothebottle

USMarinesfrom24thMEUonpatrolinHelmandProvince(www.captainsjournal.com)

ThewarinIraqdrainedresourcesfromAfghanistanbeforethingswereundercontrol,andwenever

recovered.Weneverlookedback.29

Neitherthe

British

in

the

two

invasions

in

the

19

th

Century

nor

the

Soviet

in

their

intervention

into

the

Afghancivilwarin1979hadexpectedtoendupindemandingandprotractedcounterinsurgency

operations.HoweverOperationEnduringFreedom,theU.S.invasionthatstartedinNovember2001,

differedfromboththeBritishandSovietinvasionsofcentralAfghanistanwentfurtherinitsnarrowmilitary

navetybynotconsideringanysignificantpostinvasiondeploymentessentialorevenrelevantforthe

regularAmericanmilitaryforces.Theverynameoftheoperationhighlightingtheshallowrootsanddepth

ofthepreinvasionstrategicanalysis.Alightfootprintwouldbesufficient.

ItwasseveralyearsbeforethecrisisinIraqbroughtthesuccessfulbureaucraticrebellionofsenior

officersofthearmyandmarinelightinfantryagainsttherulingmilitaryparadigmandtheintroductionofa

newcounterinsurgencydoctrine.AccordingtothethenPentagonunderstanding,itsarmedforcesshould

smashthe

enemy

military

quickly

with

overwhelming,

scientifically

distributed,

accurate

firepower

and

thereafterredeploytobasesreadyforthenextoperationleavinglesserqualifiedalliesandcivilianagencies

topickupthepiecesandmaybeleavingsomespecialforceelementsforatimetotrainthelocals.30

The

economicallyattractivefootprintwasmadedependentonauseofairpowerverysimilarinconceptand

motivetotheBritishRoyalAirForceaircontrolpolicyfortheborderzoneintheinterwarperiod.

29RichardArmitage,U.S.DeputySecretaryofState20012005inOctober2007.SethG.Jones:IntheGraveyardof

Empires.AmericasWarinAfghanistan.NewYork2009,p.127.30

Ucko:TheNewCounterinsurgencyEra,andRichardDuncanDownie:LearningfromConflict.TheU.S.Militaryin

Vietnam,ElSalvador,andtheDrugWar.Westport(Connecticut)1998.


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17

DuetothefailuretocaptureOsamabinLadenandcontinuedlowlevelproblemsontheborder,

especiallyoppositeFATA,alightarmydivisionsizeforceremained,howevermostofthelargecountrywas

cynicallylefttothereemergingwarlordsandalliesnotcapableoftheAmericanWayofmodernwarfare.

NoAmericanexampleorpressurewasappliedontheworldcommunitytoliveuptoandrealisethe

Americanpresidents

spring

2002

promise

of

aMarshall

Plan

for

Afghanistan

to

support

reconstruction

ofthedemolishedcountry.

TheMusharrafchairedPakistanigeneralsusedtheU.S.dependenceonPakistanibasestoextricateand

bringbothTalibanfightersandPakistanivolunteersandISIagentsbacktosafetyfollowedbyreorganisation

andretraininginFATAandnorthernBaluchistan.ThenewAfghanpresident,HamidKarzais,returntothe

oldEmirtraditionpayingstipendsforpeacetothelocaltriballeadersinFATAfailedtohaveeffect,31

probablybecausehiseffortswereunderminedpoliticallyfromIslamabad,becausehismoneywasmore

thanbalancedbyotherdonations,andbecausetheU.S.hadshiftedtoIraq,whereshehadbecomefully

committedinaratherclumsylearningprocessthatindirectlyinstructedIslamicmilitantseverywherehow

the

West

should

be

resisted.

All

saw

how

to

fight

modern

Western

forces

with

minimum

own

risks.

With

no

significantU.S.leadershipinAfghanistan,theinferiorWesternmilitariesonlycommittedverylimitedforces

andotherassistancetoimprovesecurityandacceleratereconstruction.

In2005,aftertheISIsupportedexpansionandretraining, thedifferentmainlyPashtunmilitants

steppedupoperationsintosouthernandeasternAfghanistanfromtheirPakistanibases,however,the

worseningsecuritysituationhadalreadyledtotheMdecinssansFrontiretowithdrawfromthecountry

insummer2004.AcoupleoftheinsurgentorganisationsnowemployedtodestabiliseAfghanistanhad

actuallybeencreatedintheearly1990stofightagainsttheIndiansinKashmir.

TheU.S.respondedbysendingarmeddronesintoFATAairspaceoncadreassassinationmissions,a

superiorsuccessortomorebluntaircontrolbutcherandboltoperations,butISIcontinuedits

combinationof

direct

support

to

the

Taliban,

including

the

bombing

of

the

Indian

Kabul

embassy

in

July

2008,andtheratherlimitedsupportforU.S.andotherwesternoperations.Westernforcesnowexpanded

intosouthernAfghanistantocontainandrollbackthesocallednewTalibanoffensive.

Theincreasinglyandunderstandablyselfconfidentmilitantsintheborderprovinceswhocouldget

supportfromtribalmembersinthelargePakistanicitiesnowstartedaterroroffensivetodestabilisethe

politicalsysteminPakistanitselfaswellasthetrainingofdiscontentedmembersofthevastPakistaniand

otherMuslimexpatriatecommunitiesintheWest.TheproblemhadworsenedbecausePunjabimilitants

hadjoinedthePashtunsintheborderzoneandforoperationselsewhere.32

Themurderoftheopposition

leaderBenazirBhuttoinlate2007didnotchangethesituationandneitherdidtheterrorattacksin

Mombaioneyearlater.AnadjustmentofpolicyonlycamewhenmilitantstargetedPakistanimilitaryand

ISIinstallations,andafternewgovernmentshadtakenoverinbothIslamabadandWashingtonthe

destabilisationcampaigndirectedagainstbothcountriesfromtheborderzonemayfinallybeseenasthe

indivisibleproblemithasbeenformorethanacenturyafterthePashtunsweredividedbytheDurandLine

andlefttotheirownsponsoredchiefsandpoverty.33

31ImtiazGul:TheMostDangerousPlace.PakistansLawlessFrontier.London2009,pp.24f.

32Ibid.,pp.1820.

33MainlybuiltonRashid,DescentintoChaos,which,however,issupportedbyCordesmansDecember2006

presentation(seenote2).TheperiodiswellcoveredfromaU.S.AfghaniperspectivebySethG.Jones:Inthe

GraveyardofEmpires.AmericasWarinAfghanistan.NewYork2009.


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18

SofarthelimitedPakistanicounterinsurgencyeffortshavebeenconcentratedagainstfirstSwatand

thenWaziristan,andtheyhavebeengiventheformofoffensivesunlikelytohaveanylastingeffect.The

sanctuariesinthewesthavebeenleftfullyoperational,makingNATOandAfghanioperationsinHelmand,

KandaharandUruzganbothdifficultandveryrisky.TheonlychangehastakenplaceinSwatand

Waziristan,where

the

Al

Qaida

leaders

are

hiding,

the

base

area

for

attacks

against

the

U.S.

forces

across

theborder,becauseitwasfromherethattheinsurgentsstartedanoffensiveslidetowardsIslamabad.

EventhefactthatU.S.hasnowtakentheleadingroleinthecounterinsurgencyinSouthAfghanistanhas

stillnotledtoanyPakistaniefforttoclosetheTalibanbasesinnorthernBaluchistan.

Thestilluntouchedsanctuary.ProTalibanprotestinQuettaagainstthemilitaryoffensiveagainsttheTalibanin

FATA.(www.guardian.co.uk)

OnereasonforthelackofaneffectiveeffortinWesternPakistancouldbethatthebestregularinfantry

unitsofthePakistaniArmyaretheBalochiandFrontierForceRegimentswiththelatterrecruitedamong

thePashto.Anothercausecouldbethelackofcounterinsurgencytrainingintheregulararmywhichis

explainedandreinforcedbyafundamentalunwillingnessofthearmytotransfermoreforcesfromthe

borderswithIndiaandpreparethemforanew,inmostgeneralsmind,secondarytask.

Thereareonlyfew,ifany,indicationsthatcanchallengethesuspicionthatthemainmotivebehind

crossborderoperationsagainstNATOandtheAfghangovernmentstructuresinSouthAfghanistanremains

thewishofelementsinISIandthePakistaniarmedforcestodestabiliseAfghanistanandremovetheriskof

any

continued

Western

and

possibly

Indian

influence

here.

Thus

they

hope

to

succeed

in

their

geo

strategic

GreatGamingbytheresilienceoftheirtrainees.Theinsurgentsretrainingandreequippingaround

QuettaandthendispatchedintoAfghanistanaredifferentfromthosefurthernortheastbybeing

overwhelminglylocalAfghansandPakistanis.TheyarenotAlQaidaforeigners.TheU.S.hassofarnot

donemuchtoempowerthePakistanicivilianpoliticalleaderstoforcethePakistanisecurityforcesto

throttlethewaragainstitselfanditsalliesinSouthernAfghanistan.34

34Forarecent,balancedanalysis,aftertheleakofthePentagondocuments,see:Afghanistanwarlogs:whosesideis

Pakistanon?WikileaksreportshavegalvanizedopinionsofsomeAmericanswhoviewthePakistanimilitarywith

suspicion.guardian.co.uk,Monday26July2010.


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19

NowthePakistanigovernmenthasbeenweakenedbythedisastrousMonsoonfloods.Asthe

InternationalInstituteforStrategicStudiesobservedon20th

September2010: IfPakistanis'

disappointmentwiththeirgoverninginstitutionsweretobecomeevenmoreactiveandwidespread,itis

possiblethatrelationshipsbetweenPashtunsonbothsidesoftheDurandLinecoulddevelopevenfurther,

leadingto

the

revival

of

amovement

towards

'Pashtunistan'.35

35IntheStrategicComments,Volume16,Comment29:Pakistan'sfloods:broaderimplications.


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20

TheframeworkofcurrentWesterndoctrineofcounterinsurgency

DavidGalula1956(coincentral.wordpress.com) andDavidPetraeus2007(upload.wikimedia.org)

Thecounterinsurgentforcemustseparatetheinsurgentfromtherestofthepopulace.Thisisbest

accomplishedthroughtheeffectiveuseofpopulaceandresourcescontrol.Caremustbetaken

toensurethatciviliansarenotinjuredormistreatedasaresultofcounterinsurgentoperations36

Everycountryisdividedforadministrativeandmilitarypurposesintoprovinces,counties,districts,zones,

etc.Theborderareasareapermanentsourceofweaknessforthecounterinsurgentwhateverhis

administrativestructures,andthisadvantageisusuallyexploitedbytheinsurgent,especiallyintheinitial

violentstagesoftheinsurgency.Bymovingfromonesideofthebordertotheother,theinsurgentisoften

abletoescapepressureor,atleast,tocomplicateoperationsforhisopponent.37

Anarmy,beitSoviet,American,PakistaniorevencolonialBritish,willprimarilyorganise,equipandtrain

forconventionaloperationsagainstotherregulararmies,andtheemphasisintacticalbehaviourwill

normallybeondestroyingtheenemyforcesinacombinationofoffensivemanoeuvreanduseof

overwhelmingfirepower.Whereairforcesareinvolved,theywillfocusontheabilitytodestroytheenemy

command,forcesandsupportinginfrastructurebybombardment hopefullyaccurate.

WhenarmedforceshavebeenemployedincounterinsurgenciesduringthePostWorldWarIIperiod,

thefocushasinvariablybeenonlargescaleoffensivesweepoperationswhereanyresistancewas

overwhelmedbyartilleryandairbombardmentfollowedbymeasuringthenumberofkilledbythe

36FM324.2(FM908,FM798)TACTICSINCOUNTERINSURGENCY, 21.April2009,2118,Table21.Insurgent

strengthsandcountermeasures.37

DavidGalula:CounterinsurgencyWarfare.TheoryandPractice.Westport,Connecticut1964,Chapter2:The

PrerequisitesforaSuccessfulInsurgency:TheBorderDoctrine.ContrarytoGalula,SirRobertThompson:Defeating

CommunistInsurgency:ExperiencesinMalayaandVietnam.London1966,didnotconsiderearlybordercontrol

essentialforthesuccessofthecounterinsurgencycampaign(seechapter13JungleandFrontiers).


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21

explosivesorcaughtinthesweep.Thatthepositiveperceptionoftheresultofsuchoperationswas

fundamentallyflawedbecameclearwhentheinsurgencyworsened.TheU.S.ArmyandMarineCorpsonly

startedtorelearnthattheprofessionalgutfeelingwasnonsensewhenthesituationinIraqwentfrombad

todesperatein20042005.

ThereafterU.S.

Army

and

U.S.

Marine

Corps

used

the

classical

counter

insurgency

learning

developed

onthebasisofFrenchunderstandingoftheir1954Indochinadefeat38

andBritishpromotionoftheir

Malayasuccess.39

Theycombinedthoseideaswithboththeirown,deliberatelysuppressedlessonsfrom

thesecondpartoftheVietnamWarandtheactualpainfulexperiencefromIraq.40

Thestudiesand

discussionsofthetwolandcombatservicesquicklyledtoamodernCounterinsurgencyFieldManualand

duetothecriticalsituationinIraqtheysucceededinhavingitapprovedinmidDecember2006inspiteof

Pentagons,halfthearmys,theairforcesandnavyscontinuedfrustrationsandbureaucraticresistance.41

Thefundamentalchangeinoperationalparadigmthatthenewmanualmeantcanbestbeillustratedbya

slidetextfromthepresentationbyDoctorConradC.CranefromtheU.S.ArmyWarCollegeStrategic

Studies

Institute

from

October

2006.

Crane

does

this

clearly

by

highlighting

the

COIN

Paradoxes:

Themoreyouprotectyourforce,thelesssecureyouare

Themoreforceyouuse,thelesseffectiveyouare

Themoresuccessfulyouare,thelessforceyoucanuseandthemoreriskyoumustaccept

Sometimesdoingnothingisthebestreaction

ThebestweaponsforCOINdonotshoot

Thehostnationdoingsomethingtolerablyissometimesbetterthanusdoingitwell

Ifatacticworksthisweek,itmightnotworknextweek.Ifitworksinthisprovince,itmightnotworkin

thenext

Tacticalsuccessguaranteesnothing

Most

important

decisions

are

not

made

by

generals

42

However,theIraqicontextofthenewmanualwasclearintheverysuperficialandhalfheartedwayit

coveredtheborderproblemunderlinedbyGalulaasquotedabove. Itonlymentionedthataninsurgency

couldbetransnational,butillustratedthisbytheexampleAlQaida,anditunderlinedoptimisticallythat

theinsurgentsdependenceonsupportfromsanctuariesacrossaborderwasaweaknessthatcouldbe

exploited,ashecouldnotcontroltheborderarea,andbecausemodernprecisionweaponsmadehim

vulnerableevenacrosstheborder.43

However,whentheU.S.ArmyhadcompletedthedevelopmentofaFieldManualforCounterinsurgency

Tacticsinspring2009,theborderproblemwastakenfarmoreseriously,probablybecauseoftherealityin

Afghanistan.It

noted

that

Ethnic

or

religious

communities

in

other

states

may

also

provide

aform

of

externalsupportandsanctuary,particularlyfortransnationalinsurgencies.Accesstoexternalsupport

influencestheeffectivenessofinsurgenciesandthatinsurgenttrainingcentrescouldbeinanother

38Galula:CounterinsurgencyWarfare.

39 Thompson:DefeatingCommunistInsurgency.

40DouglasS.Blaufarb:TheCounterInsurgencyEra.U.S.DoctrineandPerformance1950tothePresent.NewYork

1977andDavidH.Ucko:TheNewCounterinsurgencyEra.TransformingtheU.S.MilitaryforModernWars.

Washington(DC)200941

FM324/MCWP333.5COUNTERINSURGENCY, 15.December201042

TheEvolutionofAmericanCounterinsurgencyDoctrine.Dr.ConradCrane.10October200643

FM324,177,187and199.


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22

country.44

InthefirstparagraphofasectiondedicatedtoborderareaissuesthemanualunderlinedthatIn

additiontothetypicalexternalsupport,usuallysuppliesthataninsurgentgroupmayreceivefromacrossa

border,insurgentsmayalsoestablishsanctuarybasecampsandconductcrossborder

operationsfromadjacentcountries.Thismeantthatthebordercontrolwasunlikelytotakeplaceinan

effectiveway

without

significant

U.S.

involvement.

Physically

sealing

the

border

may

be

impossible,

sincedoingsocouldincreasetherequirementforforcesandmaterielbeyondavailableresources.Placing

forcesorbarriersateverycrossingandentrysitemayalsobeimpossible.The2006optimismhad

vanished.Bythesuggestion:Establishorconveneavillageortribalcouncilfrombothsidesoftheborderto

identifyandsolveissuesthemanualactuallyrecognisedtherealityofcounterinsurgencydividedbythe

DurandLine.45

FromtheKunarborderdistrictinlateautumn2009.Scoutsfrom2ndBattalion,503rdInfantryRegiment(Airborne)

providessecurityduringasearchoperation(politifront.files.wordpress.com)

However,evenifthemanualhasnowbeenamendedtoincludeabetterunderstandingofthetransborder

problems,thisdoesnotreallyimprovethesituationverymuch.Onecannotrealisticallyhopetoprevail

witheventheidealtacticalmanualaslongasarealisticstrategythatcoversbothAfghanistanandPakistan

ismissing,withinteragencyandinteralliedeffortsthatremainfundamentallyunbalancedand

uncoordinated,andwithaPakistanieffortsouthofthebordercontrolledbyacontradictorystrategicand

anachronistictactical

logic.

44FM324.2,253and279

45Ibid.,BorderAreas,369to383


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23

Fromoptimismtowardscollapse.

Abelatedandlimitedeffortnowabouttoend:PakistanisoldiersincontinuingsanitizingoperationsinSouth

Waziristanthissummer(2010). (southwaziristannews.newslib.com)

Timeaffectseverythingandinfluencesalldecisions.46

Theborderisouralbatross.47

Time.Thefinal

dimensionissoobviousthisitinvitesneglectbytheoriststimeisundoubtedlytheleastforgivingof

erroramongstrategysdimensions.48

CrucialtimehasbeenwastedbytheinternationalcommunityinbothAfghanistanandPakistan.Inthebest

caseitstillremainsanopenquestioniftheinsurgencyinbothAfghanistanandthecentralpartsofPakistan

linkedtothewildPashtunborderareacanstillbecontained.UsingGilMeromsanalysisinHow

DemocraciesLoseSmallWars.State,Society,andtheFailuresofFranceinAlgeria,IsraelinLebanon,and

theUnitedStatesinVietnam49

asthebasis,thereisnotmuchhope.AccordingtoMerommodernliberal

democraciesarenearlycertaintofailinprotracted,limitedwars.FirsttheSouthKoreansandnowthe

DutchwithdrewfromAfghanistanafterthecollapseofpoliticalwill.Thedifficultiesofthegovernmentsof

Germany,France,Australia,Canada,UnitedKingdomandtheU.Stosustainpublicsupportfortheir

deploymentmeanthatonlyafewmoreyearsareavailabletomakeAfghanistanstableandstrongenough

todefend

itself.

Theconstantlyused,buttotallyflawedargument,thatwehavetriedandfailedsince2001(ratherthan

2006)reinforcethepressureforearlywithdrawalasdoestheconstantuseofthewordvictoryasan

46FM324.2(FM908,FM798)TACTICSINCOUNTERINSURGENCY, 129.

47SeniorofficerfromtheU.S.82

ndAirborneDivisioninMarch2008:Seth:IntheGraveyardofEmpires,p.258.

48ColinGray:ModernStrategy.Oxford1999,pp.4243.

49Cambridge2003


24/26

24

objective.However,theconstantintensificationofthefighting,especiallyinsouthwesternAfghanistan,

withincreasedNATOlossesdrivestheperceptionthattheeffortishopeless.50

Late2010,therestillseemedtobeasmallwindowofopportunityleft.Firstly,asmentionedinitially,

thereisnothingthatindicatesthatthetribalPashtuninAfghanistanandPakistanarefundamentally

differentfrom

the

majority

of

other

humans.

They

too

seek

improved

opportunities

for

their

children,

betterhealthcare,improvedinfrastructure,betteropportunitiesforemploymentandfairandjust

treatmentfromthelocalrepresentativesoftherulersatthesametimeastheycombinetheiraspirations

withasound,sceptical,conservativeattitudetochangeandwithanaturalwishtobeabletoinfluence

localdevelopment.TheonlylikelydifferenceisthatPashtunexperiencewithlocalandcentralrulerswill

tendtomakethembothjustlyextrascepticalandgratefulforevensmallconvincingandstable

improvements.Thechallengeistobeabletosupplythatlittleextrabettergovernmentandthepeaceto

achieveprogress.ItshouldnotbeimpossibletocompetewiththeTalibanandothergroupsthathave

nothingmoretoofferthanastrictapplicationoftheSharialawandregressiontoautopianpast.Theinitial

reactions

of

the

people

of

Waziristan

liberated

by

the

Pakistani

Army

did

confirm

again

that

Pashtuns

are

likeeverybodyelse.51

TheotherpositivedevelopmentthenweretheindicationsoftheincreasingwillingnessoftheU.S.from

2008onwardstouseitsleveragetoconvinceallsidesandespeciallyPakistanisecurityagenciestostop

GreatGamingandthereaftertoseeandtreattheinsurgencyaswellasthecounterinsurgencycampaign

asone. Itwasnoteasy,becauseitwouldrequirethetotalterminationofmorethanthreedecadesofnave

supportofthePakistaniarmedforcesthathadonlybeenendedgraduallysince2004.Akeyobstacleto

progressevenifthishappened,however,wasthatthecoordinatedandcombinedeffortcouldnotbring

realprogressifitremainedlimitedtoasecurity(military,intelligenceandpolice)effort.Tohavealasting

effectitmustextendtopoliticalreforms,goodlocalgovernmentandsomeeconomicdevelopmentinthe

Pashtuntribal

areas

on

both

sides

of

the

line.

The

daily

news

from

summer

2010

underlined

that

we

were

stillfarfromthatstage,evenintheareawherethePakistanisecurityforcesthenmadeavisibleeffortdue

totherebellionsproximitytoPeshawarandIslamabad.52

Now,inearly2011,thecontinuationofeffectivePakistanisecurityoperationsagainstradicalIslamistsin

theBorderlandseemshighlyunlikely.TheassassinationofthePunjabiGovernorSalmanTaseerearly2011

andtheopenpublicsupportforhismurdererintheyoungerpartofthePakistanielitehascastratedthe

PPPgovernmentanddemonstratedthattherebellionisgainingcontrolofthecorepartsofthecountry.It

isadevelopmentthatevenanothermilitarytakeoverisunlikelytocontrol,consideringthe35yearslong

alliancebetweenthearmyandtheradicalclergy. ThesourceofthemainsecurityproblemfortheWest

andtheAfghangovernmentisnolongerthePashtunBorderland.ItisthechaosandlikelyMilitantIslamic

controlofanucleararmedPakistanstillalliedtoChina.

50CharlesA,Miller:EndgamefortheWestinAfghanistan?ExplainingtheDeclineinSupportfortheWarin

AfghanistanintheUnitedStates,GreatBritain,Canada,Australia,FranceandGermany.51

BriefingWaziristan:Thelastfrontier.TheEconomist,January2nd2010.52

E.g.thenewsitemsaboutAmericandronestrikesandPakistanioffensivesbySyedShoaibHasaninBBCNews,

Karachion24.6.2010,in NEWKERALA.COMon30.6.2010andDAWN.COMon11.7.2010.


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25

Finalremarks

SalmanTaseersassassinMalikMumtazHussainQadriarrivestotheRawalpindicourthousewithrose

petalsfromhissupporters(http://www.heraldsun.com.au/)

Toconcludethearticlesshortsketch:formorethanahundredyearswehavewitnessedtheemployment

oftribesfromtheIndoAfghanBorderlandasrebelauxiliaries,deliberatelykeepingtheareabackwardin

thedevelopmentofgoodgovernmentandthelocaleconomy:

1) BytheEmiragainsttheBritish,employingreligiousactivismthenaslater.2) BytheBritishasapotentialguerrillaagainstaRussianforwardmove.3) BytheGermanswithoutsuccessinWorldWarI.4) ThereafteragainbyfirsttheEmirandthereaftertheIndianCongressPartyagainstBritishcontrol.5) ThenbythePakistanisinafailedcoupattempttogainfullcontrolofKashmir.6) ThenagainbytheleaderofthenewrepublicanAfghanistanagainstaweakenedPakistan.7) ThereafterbythePakistanimilitaryleaderswithmassiveU.S.andSaudisupportagainsttheSoviet

invadersconsolidatingtheirdomesticholdonpowerbyadeliberatealliancewiththeradicalIslamic

forcesinPakistanandamongthePashtunsonbothsidesoftheborder.


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8) AfterthewithdrawalofSovietsthePakistanisecurityeliteemployedthenowavailableresourcestoseekasubservientregimeinKabulfortheGreatGameagainstIndia,aneffortthatsucceededwith

theTalibanvictoryof1996andtheuseofthetrainingbasesinthePashtunBorderlandinthe

insurgencyin

Kashmir

that

culminated

in

the

open

war

of

1999.

9) ThispolicyofthePakistanisecurityelitecontinuedafter2001inparallelwiththeofficialsupportforU.S.andotherWesternoperationstopacifyandrebuildAfghanistan,nowwithanadditional

insurgencycentreintheTalibancoreareaaroundQuetta.Nothingreallychangeduntilacoupleof

yearsbackwhentheIslamicinsurgencyturnedagainstitsPakistanielitesupportersandWestern

interestsinthelargecities,whereterroristcellscouldoperatefromtheiremigrantlabourPashtun

communities.WiththeassassinationofSalmanTaseerandtheclearandeffectivepublicsupportforhis

assassin,theproblemisnolongerlimitedtotheborderland.

Lookingbackonthepastcentury,theonlynoveltyistheregionalandevenglobalambitionsandreachas

wellasthepoweroftheinsurgencyfromthecradlesinthePashtunareas.

Insurgency as an instrument for strategic offence:A century of Pashtun history

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