Bart Van Hoe / Institutionalization of the Strategy-Focused Organization I UNIVERSITEIT GENT FACULTEIT ECONOMIE EN BEDRIJFSKUNDE ACADEMIEJAAR 2007 – 2008 Institutionalization of the Strategy-Focused Organization Masterproef voorgedragen tot het bekomen van de graad van Master in de Toegepaste Economische Wetenschappen Bart Van Hoe onder leiding van Prof. Dr. W. Bruggeman
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Bart Van Hoe / Institutionalization of the Strategy-Focused OrganizationI
UNIVERSITEIT GENT
FACULTEIT ECONOMIE EN BEDRIJFSKUNDEACADEMIEJAAR 2007 – 2008
Institutionalization of the Strategy-FocusedOrganization
Masterproef voorgedragen tot het bekomen van de graad van
Bart Van Hoe / Institutionalization of the Strategy-Focused Organization2
II. INTRODUCTION
In the field of management control, performance measurement has received a lot of attention
the last fifteen years (Otley, 1999; Bruggeman et al., 2001; Niven, 2006). Measurement was
mainly focused on financial objectives, which often lead to dysfunctional behaviour.
Furthermore, there is little research on the change an organization goes through when altering
their performance measurement system or even becoming a strategy-focused organization.
This paper will integrate two, relatively recent, fields of study. First, the evolution of the
Balanced Scorecard (BSC) framework, and in a broader sense the Strategy-Focused
Organization (SFO), will be discussed (Kaplan and Norton, 2001). Second, Institutional
Theory [based on the Burns and Scapens (2000) framework] with its roots in Old Institutional
Economics and the Barley and Tolbert (1997) framework, will be expounded in the light of
Management Accounting (MA) change. This paper puts the change project (BSC and SFO)
of two organizations in the perspective of institutional theory and investigates whether any
differences arise.
How does an organization introduce Management Accounting change? Do they succeed?
Why (not)? And how does Institutional Theory contribute to this?
III. PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT
III.1 Theoretical Evolution
“The goal of performance management is to motivate members of an organization to align
their activities with the organizational strategy, with the purpose of achieving its goals and
doing so in an effective and efficient manner; thus creating a ‘mental allegiance’ between the
employee and the company ideas. Control systems are to be organized so management
behaviour is consistent with the ‘intended strategy1’. Traditional ‘diagnostic’ control systems
will only measure performance of managers and compare it with company objectives”
(Bruggeman et al., 2001, p. 15).
1 Different from ‘realized strategy’, through ‘deliberate’ and ‘emergent’ strategies; Mintzberg, H., 1994. TheRise and Fall of Strategic Planning. New York: Prentice Hall
Bart Van Hoe / Institutionalization of the Strategy-Focused Organization7
Norreklit (2000)4 has some critical reflections on the BSC-model. “Causality is the
suggestion that certain events (effects, consequences) will only occur because certain other
events, which predate the first events, have occurred (causes)”5.
According to Norreklit this is not the case in the ‘cause-effect’ relationships between
measures in the strategy map Kaplan and Norton suggest. At most there is an interdependent
relationship between the measures of the four perspectives (e.g. ‘circular reasoning’ in
relationship customer value and company image). Also, not all stakeholders (government,
networks) are included and in this way the scorecard is ‘unbalanced’ (cfr. Otley). Another
flaw is the lack of continuous observation of competitors, technology advances,… (targets are
set only one time) which leads to a rigid and static model in which strategic uncertainty
becomes greater than it already is. Furthermore, it is argued that the BSC must create internal
commitment (motivation, responsibility), rather than just external commitment (rewards).
Top-down communication doesn’t stimulate this kind of commitment with the employees.
There has to be a process of interactivity (mgt. and employees must speak the same language),
in order to avoid dysfunctional behaviour (focus on rewards) and suboptimal performance
(short-term focus). Resistance to change is also partly rooted in top-down, imperative
guidance.
Lipe and Salterio (2000) studied the limitations of the characteristic of the BSC to create
strategic alignment throughout the company by linking compensation and bonus systems to
the scorecard measures. They found that cognitive limitations of managerial decisions
prevent the company to fully exploit the information generated by BSC usage. After the
cascading of corporate scorecards through the different BU’s of the company, top
management (both corporate and BU) will have reached consensus about common measures
and measures that are unique for each BU. Previous research, however, showed that decision
makers, who are confronted with unique and common measures, will place more weight on
common measures (comparability). The experiment Lipe and Salterio (2000) executed shows
that for the evaluation of managers there will be a focus on common measures. This may
cause dysfunctional behaviour among employees, who will disregard the unique measures.
4 Norreklit, H., 2000, The Balance on the Balanced Scorecard – a critical analysis of some of its assumptions,Management Accounting Review, 11, p. 65 – 885 System Theory; Source: De Neve, J., guest lecturer at Strategic Management course (Heene, A.)
Bart Van Hoe / Institutionalization of the Strategy-Focused Organization8
Although the experiment was performed in the context of performance evaluation, when
compensation is linked with this evaluation, the BSC system will achieve only suboptimal
results, because of ‘unbalanced’ focus on common, usually more financial oriented or
‘lagging’, measures. If, however, the cognitive limitations of managers were to be
desintermediated and compensation directly linked with the common and unique measures,
this problem could be avoided. Kaplan and Norton give little explanation on this matter,
except to postpone the linkage of compensation to performance on measures until the
causality is tested and if so, link rewards to output measures.
Wong-On-Wing et al. (2007) performed a similar experiment to test another cognitive bias6 of
performance evaluators (top management). Previous research showed that differences in
evaluation style between supervisors (raters) and subordinates (ratees) could cause conflicts
and disagreements. BSC should be able to solve this problem due to the strategic alignment
and linkage between performance measures. Kaplan and Norton state that through evaluating
performance (on basis of measures) ‘strategic learning’ can be achieved, by testing the causal
linkages between measures. However, in a case of poor performance and potential conflict
between raters and ratees, raters may overlook the plausible ineffectiveness of strategy and
focus their attention on the ability and effort of the ratee, thus, compromising strategic
learning. The experiment shows that when top management is required to make an
assessment of the importance of strategy quality, the bias can be significantly reduced.
III.2 Empirical Implementation Research
Davis and Albright (2004) performed a quasi-experimental study in a US banking
organization to find out if “branches who have implemented BSC outperform similar
branches without BSC”. Within one organization they monitored four BSC-branches and five
non-BSC-branches and measured their performance on the basis of a composite financial
indicator (loan volume, loan yield,…). A significant increase in financial performance was
noticed in the BSC-branches and, more important, a significant positive difference between
BSC-branches and non-BSC-branches. However, some potential limitations have to be
clarified.
First, the study wasn’t able to test the causal linkages between the financial and non-financial
scorecard measures, which is important to prove the goodness-of-fit of the BSC as a system.
6 Actor-observer bias: “actors tend to view their behaviour as determined by situational factors, observers, onthe other hand, will attribute the same behaviour to actor’s disposition” (Wong-On-Wing, 2007, p. 367)
Bart Van Hoe / Institutionalization of the Strategy-Focused Organization11
IV. INSTITUTIONAL THEORY
IV.1 Theoretical Evolution
In this section a framework will be described that conceptualizes Management Accounting
change, more precisely the switch to a Strategy-Focused Organization or the usage of the
Balanced Scorecard as a performance measurement system. The model this paper draws upon
is that of Burns and Scapens (2000), which is based on Barley and Tolbert (1997).
In recent years, both the environment in which MA systems are practised (competitive
markets, IT) and MA practises themselves (ABC, BSC) have changed. There is little research
on MA change as a process and Neo-Classical Theory8 is more concerned with outcomes and
rational techniques, than change processes. Barley and Tolbert (1997), originally, generated
their framework on some basic ideas of Old Institutional Economics9. They conceptualize
change as a process (see Exhibit_4) and develop a model based on some notions of Giddens’
Structuration Theory10. They define ‘scripts’ as “recurrent, observable activities/patterns of
behaviour in a particular setting” (Barley and Tolbert, 1997, p. 98). These are enacted (they
can be replicated or revised) in the Realm of Action (e.g. human activities). Over time, these
scripts can become institutionalized (“they become just the way things are”) in the
Institutional Realm. Institutions are defined as “shared taken-for-granted assumptions which
identify categories of human actors and their activities/relationships”(Burns and Scapens,
2000, p.8).
Scapens (1994) links the notion of institutions to that of “habits”. “Habits are more or less
self-actualizing dispositions or tendencies to engage in previously adopted or acquired forms
of action” (Scapens, 1994, pp. 306). In this paper, the impulse was given to look at
management accounting practices from institutional theory and to develop an institutional
framework to conceptualize management accounting change in organizations.
Burns and Scapens (2000) use the Barley and Tolbert (1997) model to develop their
institutional framework (see Figure_2).
8 Supply and Demand equilibrium, Theory of the Firm9 dissertations.ub.rug.nl/FILES/faculties/management/2006/m.p.van.der.steen/c2.pdf“Institutions are key elements of an economy, the economy is an open, evolving system (subject to technologicaladvances), individuals are affected by institutions and cultural environment10 Agency/structure in social systems
Bart Van Hoe / Institutionalization of the Strategy-Focused Organization12
Scripts are replaced by Rules and Routines; rules are formalized procedures (e.g. MA
practises and techniques such as BSC) and needed to coordinate the actions of groups of
individuals. Routines are behaviour based on “tacit knowledge” (both rules as routines can be
first to emerge). This framework is based, essentially, on a duality between Actions and
Institutions; social structures (institutions) define and make possible the
interactions/relationships between actors (human activity), and because of these actions,
institutions are bound to change (cfr. Language/Speech metaphor11).
Figure 2: Framework Burns and Scapens (2000)
The first process involves existing institutions shaping/influencing rules and routines. The
second one entails the enactment of rules and routines (may be subject to resistance if they
challenge existing values, institutions) by actors. During the third process, human actors (e.g.
employees in an organization) will reproduce routines (with (un)conscious change). Finally,
the generally accepted rules and routines may become institutionalized.
11 For effective communication, speech (actions) must conform the structures of language (institutions); languageevolves through time through speech by actors
Bart Van Hoe / Institutionalization of the Strategy-Focused Organization13
So, eventually, institutions will represent “the way things are being done” and they will shape
or constrain upcoming rules and routines. What we see here is a ‘path dependent’12 process.
An example may clarify this conceptual model. Say, a multinational company (A), working
according to the principles of the SFO, acquires a smaller SME (B), which still uses
traditional budget and planning methods (existing institutions). Company A will require the
SME to adopt a BU BSC and new information flows (new, imposing rules), which will lead to
new accounting practises (new routines) in company B. These will be influenced by the
existing traditional culture (institutions) of the SME. Resistance to this MA change could
arise when the perceived contradictions between the new management system and the existing
rules and routines (and institutions) are too high. This may lead to reluctance to conform,
which in turn can infer failure of the change project.
Thus, introducing MA change is much more than just selecting the most rational/optimal
technique or practise. It’s a path-dependent process and requires a thorough understanding of
the existing rules, routines and institutions of an organization. This means; knowledge about
the formal systems, but also about the habits, the taken-for-granted assumptions in day-to-day
activities. Further, Burns and Scapens (2000) provide some dichotomies, prominent in Old
Institutional Economics literature. First of all, they distinguished formal and informal change.
Informal change occurs at a more tacit level, while formal change is an intervention in the
formalized accounting procedures. It is suggested that top-down MA change will have a
direct impact on the formal systems, but only an indirect influence on the informal routines,
who underpin the accounting practises. A bottom-up approach is more likely to have
influence on the informal systems. The difference between instrumental and ceremonial
behaviour is also discerned; the latter emerges from a hierarchical value system, where
existing power structures want to be preserved and can only allow regressive change13. The
former exists in a ‘best-in-class culture’, where only the best available knowledge and
technology survives and stimulates progressive change.
Finally, possible circumstances for resistance to change are identified. Competing interests
can be source of implementation barriers. Also, a lack of knowledge or experience
(capabilities) or a “mental allegiance” with current organizational practices can prevent
institutionalization of new ways of thinking and doing.
12 “The notion that a firm’s future capability development will be constrained to follow a trajectory that islargely determined by its past capability development”Source: Sanchez, R. and Heene, A., 2004, The New Strategic Management, p. 4213 Dominant power structures (e.g. group of powerful people) restrict institutional change to maintain theirinfluence
Bart Van Hoe / Institutionalization of the Strategy-Focused Organization14
IV.2 Empirical Implementation Research
In Busco et al. (2006) the case of the General Electric – Nuovo Pignone (GE – NP) take-over
is discussed and used to develop a model for organizational change (and individual
(un)learning). They argue that when MA systems are embedded in the “trusted rationales”14,
they provide a sense of safety during times of crisis. When they are only used as “ad hoc
measures”, they become a source of conflict during the crisis.
Members of an organization have to reflect critically on experiences15 and classify events
(new routines and rules) as disconfirming (challenging the taken-for-granted assumptions).
The next step is raising sufficient “survival anxiety”16. After overcoming this anxiety,
cognitive redefinition and sedimentation of new experiences follows and new MA systems
can be adopted. This process is also referred to as “cultural unfreezing and refreezing”17. In
the GE-NP case, NP was transformed from a bureaucratic, state-owned company with no
measurement culture at all, to a competitive oriented, (non) financial measurement focused
business. Financial reporting systems were restructured and the Six Sigma18 quality
improvement programme was implemented.
The authors conclude that organizational change can be facilitated by the implementation of a
MA system (e.g. performance measurement with BSC) and “Accounting for Trust” and
“Trust for Accounting” must be created. The first refers to MA systems as a source of trust
(MA system for dealing with business reality). The latter is referring to MA systems as an
object of trust (to be trusted, need to prove their ability to facilitate change processes).
Lukka (2007) studied a Finland based, multinational group. The global company suffered
from a lack of coordination and standardisation; multiple BU’s using multiple reporting
systems. There was also a sense of goal ambiguity; goals were an endogenous element in the
decision making process. Over time, employees started developing systems (routines) that
were decoupled from the official accounting rules. Rising problems were solved on an ad hoc
basis. This ‘coexistence of change and stability’ is also mentioned in the Burns and Scapens
(2000) framework.
14 “way of doing things” (cfr. Institutions)15 Experiential Learning16 ‘knowing the environment is changing and realizing personal lack of knowledge, but willing to learn’17 Lewin’s change management model (model for institutionalisation of new MA system)18 “The word is a statistical term that measures how far a given process deviates from perfection. The centralidea behind Six Sigma is that if you can measure how many "defects" you have in a process, you cansystematically figure out how to eliminate them and get as close to "zero defects" as possible. Six Sigma haschanged the DNA of GE — it is now the way we work — in everything we do and in every product we design.” –Source: www.ge.com/sixsigma
Bart Van Hoe / Institutionalization of the Strategy-Focused Organization15
Rules remain stable, as the routines cope with daily problems and exhibit an inherent
flexibility. Of course, this formal stability, through informal flexibility, was a good short-
term solution but may cause problems, for in the long run the company will keep postponing
functional adaptations.
The paper concludes with the observation that, in order to thoroughly understand MA change
in organizations, researchers must be familiar with the formal (rules) and informal (routines)
systems and their interplay within the company.
Burns et al. (2003) summarize, in their report, some of the case studies they have conducted
and draw upon Burns and Scapens (2000) to indicate that MA change is not just a rational
choice of the optimal reporting system. Some cultural and behavioural issues must be
addressed in this context. They highlight some difficulties inherent with MA change and
discuss some successful19 and unsuccessful20 implementation projects. The report also
contributes to the theoretical development of the conceptual framework by defining three
important characteristics of rules, routines and institutions; first of all they help members of a
company cope with the organizational complexity (task specification, understanding).
Second, they comprise a large part of the organizational know-how (that is not coupled to
individual knowledge). And third, if rules, routines and institutions are widely spread and
accepted in the organization, this reduces the potential for conflicts.
Finally, Burns et al. (2003) give some suggestions of how to cope with and manage MA
change. First, the taken-for-granted assumptions (institutions), existing within the
organization, can have a direct and important impact on the success or failure of a change
project. Compatibility of the new system with the existing institutions is helpful (but not
necessary), and sometimes “bursting the bubble”21 is necessary.
Secondly, good communication, education and both extensive (everyone) and intensive (in-
depth) training are needed. It is also important to emphasize that MA change deals with the
“ways of thinking” about new systems, and not just their mechanical implementation.
19 ‘Ferac Plastics’; language of accounting was accepted, ‘Polymer Case’; culture change through mgt. support,communication, involvement and training, ‘GE – NP’; cfr. Busco et al. (2006)20 ‘Omega Plc.’; resistance because of incompatible business perceptions, ‘RetailCo’; introduction of EVArevealed contradictory assumptions between sales and accounting staff21 Challenging the existing assumptions before implementation of a new MA system
Bart Van Hoe / Institutionalization of the Strategy-Focused OrganizationVIII
REFERENCES
BARLEY, S.R. and TOLBERT, P.S., 1997, Institutionalization and Structuration: Studyingthe Links between Action and Institution, Organization Studies, vol. 18/1, pp. 93-117.
BRUGGEMAN, W., AMEELS, A. and SCHEIPERS, G., 2007, Strategisch besturen met deBalanced Scorecard, Antwerpen – Apeldoorn: Maklu.
BRUGGEMAN, W. and SLAGMULDER, R., 2001, Beheerscontrole, leidraad voor hetdoelgericht management van organisaties, Tielt: Lannoo.
BURNS, J., EZZAMEL, M. and SCAPENS, R., 2003, The Challenge of ManagementAccounting Change; Behavioural and Cultural Aspects of Change Management, Oxford:Elsevier Ltd.
BURNS, J. and SCAPENS, R.W., 2000, Conceptualizing Management Accounting Change:an Institutional Framework, Management Accounting Research, vol. 11, pp. 3-25.
BUSCO, C., RICCABONI, A. and SCAPENS, R.W., 2006, Trust for Accounting andAccounting for Trust, Management Accounting Research, vol. 17, pp. 11-41.
DAVIS, S. and ALBRIGHT, T., 2004, An investigation of the effect of Balanced Scorecardimplementation on financial performance, Management Accounting Research, vol. 15, pp.135-153.
KAPLAN, R.S. and NORTON, D.P., 1992, The Balanced Scorecard – Measures that drivePerformance, Harvard Business Review, January-February, pp. 71-79.
KAPLAN, R.S. and NORTON, D.P., 1993, Putting the Balanced Scorecard to work, HarvardBusiness Review, September-October, pp. 134-147.
KAPLAN, R.S. and NORTON, D.P., 1996, Using the Balanced Scorecard as a StrategicManagement System, Harvard Business Review, January-February, pp.75-85.
KAPLAN, R.S. and NORTON, D.P., 2000, Having Trouble with Your Strategy? Then Mapit, Harvard Business Review, September-October, pp. 167-176.
KAPLAN, R.S. and NORTON, D.P., 2001, The Strategy-Focused Organization – Howbalanced scorecard companies thrive in the new business environment, Boston: HarvardBusiness School Press.
KAPLAN, R.S. and NORTON, D.P., 2001a, Transforming the Balanced Scorecard fromPerformance measurement to Strategic Management: Part I, Accounting Horizons, March,vol.15, No 1, pp. 87-104.
Bart Van Hoe / Institutionalization of the Strategy-Focused OrganizationIX
KAPLAN, R.S. and NORTON, D.P., 2001b, Transforming the Balanced Scorecard fromPerformance measurement to Strategic Management: Part II, Accounting Horizons, June,vol.15, No 2, pp. 147-160.
KASURINEN, T., 2002, Exploring Management Accounting Change: The Case of BalancedScorecard Implementation, Management Accounting Research, vol. 13, pp. 323-343.
LIPE, M.G. and SALTERIO, S.E., 2000, The Balanced Scorecard: Judgemental Effects ofCommon and Unique Performance Measures, The Accounting Review, vol. 75, No.3, pp. 283-298
LUKKA, K., 2007, Management Accounting Change and Stability: Loosely Coupled Rulesand Routines in Action, Management Accounting Research, 18, pp. 76-101.
NIVEN, P.R., 2006, Balanced Scorecard; Step-by-Step: maximizing Performance andmaintaining Results, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., Hoboken, New Jersey
NORTON, D.P. and RUSSELL, R.H., 2004, Align the organization to the strategy, BalancedScorecard Report, Sep/Oct, pp. 1-5
NORTON, D.P. and RUSSELL, R.H., 2004, Motivate to make strategy everyone’s job,Balanced Scorecard Report, Nov/Dec, pp. 1-5
NORTON, D.P. and RUSSELL, R.H., 2005, Govern to make strategy a continual process,Balanced Scorecard Report, Jan/Feb, pp. 1-5
NORTON, D.P. and RUSSELL, R.H., 2005, Mobilize change through executive leadership,Balanced Scorecard Report, Mar/Apr, pp. 1-5
NORTON, D.P. and RUSSELL, R.H., 2005, Translate strategy into operational terms,Balanced Scorecard Report, May/Jun, pp. 1-5
OTLEY, D., 1999, Performance Management: a framework for management control systemsresearch, Management Accounting Research, vol. 10, pp. 363-382
SCAPENS, R.W., 1990, Researching Management Accounting Practise: The Role of CaseStudy Methods, The British Accounting Review, vol. 22, pp. 259-281
SCAPENS, R.W., 1994, Never mind the gap: Towards an institutional perspective onmanagement accounting practice, Management Accounting Research, vol. 5, pp. 301-321
SCAPENS, R.W., 2006, Understanding Management Accounting Practices: a PersonalJourney, The British Accounting Review, vol. 38, pp. 1-30.
SOIN, K., SEAL, W. and CULLEN, J., 2002, Activity-based Costing and OrganizationalChange: an Institutional Perspective, Management Accounting Research, vol. 13, pp. 249-271
WONG-ON-WING, B., GUO, L., LI, W. and YANG, D., 2007, Reducing Conflict inBalanced Scorecard Evaluations, Accounting, Organizations and Society, vol. 32, pp. 363-377
Bart Van Hoe / Institutionalization of the Strategy-Focused OrganizationXV
Exhibit_6Interviewing Guides BSC and SFO Case
BSC Case (Alpro NV):
• Started with Goals, Vision, Strategy defining in Strategy Map?• Quantifiable measures in BSC? 4 perspectives? How many measures?• Targets attached? How are targets defined (benchmarking, …)?• Actions / initiatives linked with measures?• Accountabilities determined? (Who is responsible for what measure and is there
evaluation / remuneration on this basis?)
• What are the company’s taken-for-granted assumptions, institutions,organizational culture? (Burns et al., 2003)
• What are the roots of these assumptions? Dominant coalition? (Burns et al., 2003)• What is being changed / left unchanged? (measurement of performance,
remuneration, new rules, new routines, new behaviour, …) (Soin et al., 2002)• One off change in inputs or process of change? (How did management introduce
change?) (Soin et al., 2002)• Description of the change process. (resistance to change, satisficing behaviour, …)
(Soin et al., 2002)• Classification of change; (Soin et al., 2002)
Ø (In)FormalFormal rules, procedures that were changed or informal routines, habits?
Ø (R)EvolutionaryBased on former values, beliefs or ‘culture shock’?
Ø (Re)(Pro)gressiveNew power structures, changes in dominant coalition?
• BSC reporting (measures) and evaluation meetings? Strategy review meetings(adapting, modifying strategy)? Planning, budgeting linked with strategy?
• What are the company’s taken-for-granted assumptions, institutions,organizational culture? (Burns et al., 2003)
• What are the roots of these assumptions? Dominant coalition? (Burns et al., 2003)• What is being changed / left unchanged? (measurement of performance,
remuneration, new rules, new routines, new behaviour, …) (Soin et al., 2002)• One off change in inputs or process of change? (How did management introduce
change?) (Soin et al., 2002)• Description of the change process. (resistance to change, satisficing behaviour, …)
(Soin et al., 2002)• Classification of change; (Soin et al., 2002)
Ø (In)FormalFormal rules, procedures that were changed or informal routines, habits?
Ø (R)EvolutionaryBased on former values, beliefs or ‘culture shock’?
Ø (Re)(Pro)gressiveNew power structures, changes in dominant coalition?
Bart Van Hoe / Institutionalization of the Strategy-Focused OrganizationXVII
Exhibit_7Jansen Afwerkingsbedrijf Charter
Source: Jansen Charter (24.01.2008)
Jansen Afwerkingsbedrijf Charter:
Mission;• To take care of a professional project execution with the best
quality and service, for a correct price, as a reliable partner for ourcustomers in the finishing of buildings and constructions, withmaximal involvement
• To create a safe and pleasant working environment, whereemployees can develop optimally and be appreciated for thereperformance, as a reliable, respectful and correct employer with aclear vision
• A professional, reliable and respectful partner for oursubcontractors and suppliers
• Ensure an excellent return for our shareholders
Ambition;• We want to be the most transparent, progressive and professional
organisation with high added value and strong image• We want to be the reference and most important leader with a
progressive approach in the construction sector• We want to be the best employer, with the best people
Values;Reliability, involvement, loyalty, correctness, respect and pleasure