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volume14,no.21 july2014
Insight Knowledge of
No Self in Buddhism:
An Epistemic Analysis
Miri AlbahariUniversity of Western Australia
2014 MiriAlbahari
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.
Prologue
MaryAnalogueisabouttogiveatalkon noself. It
isthemostan-ticipatedtalkattheconferencebecausewordhasitthatshe,likehercousin
the famouscolourscientistMary,knowseverything there
istoknowabouthersubject-matter.1Atleast,sheknowsallthetheory.In
particular, she knows that there is no self of a certain kind
thatmosthumansdeeplybuyinto:apersonalisedandpersistingcentreofagencyandownership,acentrewithelusiveboundaries
thaten-closeathingofutteruniquenessandaxiologicalsaliencethatmustbeprotected.2Itistheselfonbehalfofwhichpeopleseektosatisfytheirdesires,dreamsandambitions:thethingthatfeelsemotionsofpleasure(suchasexcitement,lust,joy)ifthedesiresarefulfilled,anddispleasure(suchasanger,fear,disappointment)iftheyarefrustrat-ed.It
isthethingthatisperceivedtoinitiatesuchactionstosatisfythedesires.3Maryhasclosely
studieda rare sectorof
theBuddhistcommunity(calledarahants)who,throughyearsofmeditationprac-tice,arerumouredtohaveseenthroughandovercomethisillusionofself.Shehasextractedeveryfactfromtherumour:sheknowsalltheintricaciesoftheircognitivetransformationtonibbna(asitscalled)howmeditationchangestheirbrainandeliminatesthosecomplexandpervasivepatternsofdesire-drivenemotionandactionthatstemfromanassumedidentificationasasolid,separateself.Amongstthe
1. Despite the namesake, a complete theoretical knowledge of
their
subject-matterisasfarastheanalogybetweenthetwoMarysissupposedtogo.Atalaterpoint,thetwocasesarecontrasted.Thepaperwillbeassuming,forthesakeofargument,thatthereisnoself.
2.
Ontheelusivenessandaxiologicalsalienceofself,GilbertRylewrites:Healsofeels,veryvaguely,
thatwhatever it is thathis Istandsfor, it
issome-thingveryimportantandquiteunique,uniqueinthesensethatneitherit,noranythinglikeit,belongstoanyoneelse.(1966,31).
3. William Jameswrites: It is thehomeof interestnot thepleasant
or
thepainful,notevenpleasureorpain,assuch,butthatwithinustowhichplea-sureandpain,thepleasantandthepainful,speak.Itisthesourceofeffortandattention,andtheplacefromwhichappeartoemanatethefiatsofthewillbeingmoreincessantlytherethananyothersingleelementofthementallife,theotherelementsendbyseemingtoaccretearounditandtobelongtoit.Itbecomesopposedtothemasthepermanentisopposedtothechangingandinconstant(1890,297298).
ImprintPhilosophers
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mirialbahari Insight Knowledge of No Self in Buddhism
philosophersimprint 2 vol.14,no.21(july2014)
0. Introduction
Nibbnaisthesummon
bonumofBuddhistpractice.4Puttingasidemys-ticaldescriptions,acentraltenetofnibbna,asdescribedinearlyBud-dhisttradition,isthatityieldsacompleteunderstandingofthetruthofno-self.Sometimescalledawakening,therealisationissaidtoper-manentlyfreetheaspirantfromtheaffective,behavioural,andmotiva-tionaldrivesthatstemfromhavingasenseofself.Itissaidtobeastateofutmostcontentmentandequanimity,withnocapacitytomentallysuffer(hencenounpleasantemotionssuchasfearorgloom).Atten-tionissharpandneverlostinthought.Thereisimmensecompassiontowardspeoplessuffering,yetwithoutanyattachmenttooutcomes.Thereisnoidentificationwithelementsofthemindandbody,whichwouldgiverisetosuchthoughtsasthisisme,thisismine,thisismy
action.5Theprocessofunderstandingtherealityofselflessnessisthus
4. My interpretationofBuddhismdrawsprimarilyuponearlyBuddhist
teach-ingsfromthePlisuttas
(discoursesbetweenthehistoricalBuddhaandhisdisciples)andasexpoundedintheworkofleadingBuddhistscholarssuchasBhikkhuBodhi.IthususePlispellinginalltheBuddhistterminology.
5. Elsewhere I introduce a distinction betweenwhat I call
perspectival
andpersonalownership(Albahari2006,2011).Perspectivalownershipisthesortofmine-nessneutrallybornetowardsobjectsthathappentoappearuniquelytoonesperspective
(suchas thoughts,
feelings,perceptionsandbodilyac-tions);personalownership
isanemotionally investedmine-ness that is
re-ciprocallybornefromidentifying,amongstotherthings,withperspectivallyownedelementsofonesbody-mindasmeandwhoIam.InthePlisuttas,theBuddhaalludestoidentification(evidencedbythoughtsof
thisisme)alongwithreciprocalfeelingsofpersonalownership(thisismine)asbeingcentraltothesenseofself.ThusoneencounterssuchpassagesasBhikkhus,therebeingaself,wouldtherebeformewhatbelongstoaself?Yes,ven-erablesir.Or,therebeingwhatbelongstoaself,wouldtherebeformeaself?Yesvenerablesir(MN22,
1995,transl. amoli and
Bodhi).Oneshouldthusaspiretoastatewherenolongeridentifieswithorfeelspersonalownershiptowardsanyfacetoftheirpsychophysicalexistence,hence:Whatisnonselfshouldbeseenasitreallyiswithcorrectwisdomthus:Thisisnotmine,thisIamnot,thisisnotmyself.(MN22andSN35,
1995,transl.
Bo-dhi).Thefollowingpassagestarklyillustratesthecompletelackofemotion-allyinvestedidentificationandpersonalownershipthatshouldeventuallybeharbouredtowardseachelementofpsycho-physicalexistence:
Bhikkhus,whatdoyouthink?Ifpeoplecarriedoffthegrass,sticks,
branches, and leaves in this JetaGrove,orburned
them,wouldyouthink: Peoplearecarryingofforburningusordoingwhat they
like
emotionsstrikinglyabsentinarahantsisfear:forjustasourawaken-ingfromadreamdispersesanyfearofadreamt-oftiger,theirawak-ening
from the illusion of self disperses any fear on behalf of
theformerly-assumedself-entity.
Conversely,Maryknowsthata feelingof fear typically
indicatesasenseof theself,andthatshe,MaryAnalogue,
isafraidofpublicspeaking. Upon mounting the podium and seeing a
packed audi-encerepletewith famousphilosophers, theanxietykicks
in.Struckby stage-fright she stands in the spotlight and
falteringlybegins tospeak.Thiscausessomepeople in theaudience
towonder if
thereisnotsomethinginconsistentaboutMary.Thereshestands,givingapaperonhowthereisnoselfyetasenseofthatveryselfiscausingherwordstotremble.Peoplewonder:IsMaryabitlikeHume,who,afterrecitingphilosophicalargumentsfornoself,returnstohisback-gammonwithbiasontheimagination?Couldhersenseofselfbetrayan
irrational commitment to the selfs existence,which
contradicts(whatwearesupposingis)hercompletetheoreticalknowledgethattheselfdoesnotexist?WouldMarysomehowimproveher(alreadytheoreticallycomplete)knowledgethatthereisnoselfif,likethoseeliteBuddhistpractitioners,
shewere toeliminate
thevastarrayofaffectiveandbehaviouraldispositionsthataccompanythemistakenassumptionthatsheisaself?AndcouldsuchepistemicimprovementcastlightonwhatBuddhistsmeanwhentheytalkaboutthehighlyes-teemedeventofgaininginsightknowledgeofnoself?AsMaryAna-loguefumblesthroughhertalk,amemberoftheaudiencedecidestowriteapaperaddressingtheseepistemologicalquestionswithaviewtoanalysingatopicthathasbeengivenlittleattentioninWesternan-alyticphilosophy.Couldtherebeanythingepistemicallydistinctive,andindeedprofound,aboutthegainingofso-calledinsight
knowledge
intotherealityofnoself?Andcouldanythingaboutsuchanalysisil-luminatetheepistemicstructureofawiderrangeofcases,suchastheovercomingofaphobiaoneknowsisirrational?
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deepandcomprehensiveseeing into thenatureofexis-tencewhich
fathoms the truthofourbeing in
theonlyspherewhereitisdirectlyaccessibletous,namely,inourownexperience.[1994,56]
While the general topic of insight knowledge in Buddhism has
re-ceived littleattention inWesternphilosophy,GalenStrawson
inhisre-releasedbookFreedom and Beliefwrites:
ItisnotimplausibletosupposethatBuddhistmonksandmysticshavesucceededinalteringquiteprofoundlytheirexperienceofthemselvesasacting,thinking,andfeelingbeings.Norisitimplausibletosaythattheyhaveinsodoingachievedwhatisincertainrespectsamorecorrectviewoftheworld[2010,103]
6
Thispaperoffersananalysisofwhatitcouldmean,inepistemicterms,toarriveatamorecorrectviewoftheworldthroughtheprofoundal-terationoflivedexperienceorofwhatistermed,byBuddhists,asin-sight(vipassan),ormorebroadly,wisdom(pa).7WhileBuddhisttraditionsalludetovaryingtargetsanddegreesofinsightknowledge,myanalysiswillfocusonwhatiswidelyagreed,inearlyBuddhism,tobeaninsightofthemostprofoundinnature:thatoffullyapprehend-ingtherealityoftherebeingnoself,throughtheattainmentofnibbna.Myanalysisneednotassumethatthefullpurportedinsight
intonoselfmustoccurall at
oncefromastageinwhichthepractitionerhasa
6. Owen Flanagan has in a recent book described Buddhist wisdom
asabsorb[ing]andinternaliz[ing]acertainmetaphysicofself(2011,131).Histreatmentofthetopic,however,focusesonthepsychologicalandethicaldi-mensionhowwisdommaydiminishsuffering/desireandpromotehappi-ness/compassionratherthanonanepistemicanalysis.
7. While these two terms indicatedifferences inemphasis
(vipassan
ismoreassociatedwiththeactivityofcuttingthroughdelusion,andpawiththeresultingwisdom),
Iwill, for purposes of this paper, use theEnglish terminsight or
insight knowledge to cover both these aspects. I will use
thetermawakeningtorefertotheeventofhavingattainednibbna,andarahant
(sometimeun-italicized)torefertoonewhohasawakened.
said,intheBuddhisttradition,tobenotmerelyintellectual,butdeeplytransformativeintegrallyconnectedtotheexperienceofeliminatingthesenseofselfanditspsychologicalstructures.Suchstructuresaresaidtosustainmentaldefilements,suchaspreferencesandaversions,whichmakeoneattachedtothingsbeingonewayratherthananother,causingus
to sufferwhenourdesiresare frustrated.On the
insightintoselflessness,aleadingscholarmonk,BhikkhuBodhi,writes:
Ofthesecognitivedistortions,themostdeeplygroundedandresistant is
thedelusionofself, the ideathatat
thecoreofourbeingthereexistsatrulyestablishedIwithwhichwe are
essentially identified. This notion of self,theBuddha teaches, is
an error,
amerepresuppositionlackingarealreferent.Yet,thoughamerepresupposition,theideaofselfisnotinconsequential
Becausewemaketheviewofselfthelookoutpointfromwhichwesurveytheworld,
ourmindsdivide everythingup into
thedu-alitiesofIandnotI,whatismineandwhatisnotmine.Then,trappedinthesedichotomies,wefallvictimtothedefilementstheybreed,theurgestograspandde-stroy,andfinallytothesufferingthatinevitablyfollowsTofreeourselvesfromalldefilementsandsuffering,theillusionofselfhoodthatsustainsthemhastobedispelled,explodedbytherealizationofselflessness.Preciselythisisthetasksetforthedevelopmentofwisdomwisdomremoves
the veils of distortion, enablingus to see phe-nomena in their
fundamental mode of being with
thevivacityofdirectperception.Thetraininginwisdomcen-tersonthedevelopmentofinsight(vipassan-bhavana),a
withus?No,venerablesir.Whynot?Becausethatisneitherourselfnorwhatbelongstoourself.
What is it that
isnotyours?Mate-rialformisnotyoursFeelingisnotyoursPerceptionisnotyoursFormations
are not yoursConsciousness is not yoursAbandon
it.Whenyouhaveabandonedit,thatwillleadtoyourwelfareandhappi-nessforalongtime.(MN22).Formoreonhowidentificationcouldcontributetothesenseofself,seenote16.
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coreofmyanalysiswillexpandupontheStrawsonian/Buddhistde-scription
of insight as overcoming a delusion. Delusions, at
leastthenon-clinicalkind,arecommonlythoughttobetypesofstubborn,falsebelief.Buildingonthis
idea,
Ihypothesisethatthegainingofinsightknowledge,throughlosingthesenseofself(ofaparticularnature),wouldinvolvetheuprootingofadeep-seatedandreflexivefalse
belief that one is a self, alongwith the re-alignment and
inte-gration of ones emotional, cognitive and behavioural
dispositionsinaccordancewiththecorrectbeliefthatthereisnosuchself.Ifthecorrectbeliefisalreadyacomponentofthesubjectsexisting(theo-retically-based)propositionalknowledgeasIamassumingisthecasewithMaryAnalogue
andmost Buddhist practitionerstherewill be the loss of a false
action-based belief that contradicts
thedoxasticcomponentofthisknowledge.
Throughsubsequentdoxas-ticintegrationofaction-basedwithreflectivebelief,Icontendthatthesubjectspropositionalknowledge,thatthereisnoself,willhavegreatly
improved inquality.8This
typeofexperientiallybasedepis-temicprogressistobedistinguishedfromthathadbyMarytheco-lourscientist;itismorethansimplycomingtoknow
what it is liketoexperienceamindfreedfromtheillusionofself.
Thesuccessofsuchaproposalwillrelyonthetruthofatleastthreeclaims,namelythat:(1)thesenseofselfisdoxasticallyanchoredinanaction-basedbelief,
(2)
ifdoxastic,onecansimultaneouslyharboursuchanaction-basedbelief(thatoneisaself)withanopposingre-flectivebelief(acomponentofthepropositionalknowledgethatthatthereisnosuchself),and(3)replacingthefalseaction-basedbeliefwithonethatdoxasticallyintegrateswiththecorrectreflectivebeliefwouldimprovethequalityofonesexistingpropositionalknowledgethatthereisnoself.Whiletherewillnotberoomtofullydefendeachof
theseclaims,
Iwilloffersomelinesofargumentthatcanbepur-suedintheirdefence,withthesuggestionthatupsurpingthesense
8. The terms action-based belief and reflective belief will be
properly
ex-plainedinsection3;fornow,itisenoughtonotetheirrespectiveconnectionwithpatternsofaction/emotionversusreflectiveendorsement.
definitivesenseoftheself.Iftheattainmentofnibbnaoccursoveraseriesofsmallerstagesorbreakthroughs,myinquirywillcomparethestagesofwherethepractitionerdefinitivelyhasasenseoftheselfwiththefinalstageatwhichalltracesoftheself-illusionhavevanished.
Myquestion is thus:assuming that there isnoselfand that it
ispossibletolosethesenseofselfinawaythatretainsnormalpsycho-logicalfunctions,howmightwearticulateandexplaintheappearanceofepistemicprogressthatoccurswhenthepractitionerissaidtogainfull
insight into the realityofno self?Buddhist
traditionputsmuchemphasisontheclaimthatinsightknowledgeisnot(ornotmerely)theoreticalknowledge,butisknowledgeofakindthatisgainedviaexperience.Whenapproachingtheissue,itisthusinstructivetocom-pareMaryAnaloguewiththesubjectofFrankJacksons(1986)famousthought-experiment,MarytheColourScientist.Raisedfrombirthinablack-and-whiteroom,Maryacquirescompletephysicalknowledgeaboutthephysicsandphysiologyofcolourandcolourvision.Uponreleasefromhercell,sheseescolourforthefirsttime,promptinginphilosophers
(amongst other conclusions) thewidespread intuitionthat
shemakesepistemicprogress thatgoesbeyondher
theoreticalknowledge.Manywill claim thatMarynowknows, in
someexperi-entialorpracticalsense,what it is
liketoseecolour.IfMaryAnalogueweretobeliberatedfromtheillusionofself,forthefirsttimeexperi-encingamindcompletelyfreedfromtheillusion,wouldanyepistemicprogressbebestdescribedalongthesame
linesasMarythecoloursci-entist(suchthatshenowknowswhat it is
liketobefreedfromtheillu-sionofself),orwouldtherebealsosomethingelsethatisdistinctiveaboutherepistemicimprovement?
While I surmise that there would indeed be parallels with
theepistemic progress ofMary the colour scientist (if such there
be),I will propose that Mary Analogues impression of having a more
correct view of the world typified in reports from Buddhist
tradi-tionswould indicate that there is somethingquitedistinctive,
aswell,aboutherprogress.Iofferananalysisofwhat,atleastinpart,thisdistinctivekindofepistemicimprovementcouldamountto.The
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theproposal rests. Idonotpurport
toprovideacompleteoverviewonthenatureof insightknowledge,nordo
Ipretendtoeventouchuponeverythingthatcouldbeprofoundaboutit.Moreover,offeringsuch
ahypothesis on the gainingof insight knowledge
intono-selfwillrequiremaking,forthesakeofargument,severalprovisionalandcontentiousassumptions.Ofthese,nonearesocontentiousastheas-sumptionthatnibbna
qua losingthesenseofself
(andassociatedaffectiveandbehaviouraldrives)whileretainingorenhancingmentalacuity
and well-beingis psychologically possible. Despite
Straw-sonsoptimismthatsuchasuppositionisnotimplausible,somethingmustbesaidtoallaythelegitimateconcernthatitissoimplausibleastodemotivatetheprojectfromtheoutsetatleastaspartofaseriousinquiryintowhathumancognitioniscapableof(asopposedtoamereexerciseinspeculativelogic,akintoanalysinghowmanyangelscanfitontheheadofapin).
Section1willthusbedevotedtoexpoundinguponandaddressingthismajorconcern,beforeturning,morebriefly,torelativelylesscon-tentiouspresuppositionsthatareassumedforpurposesofmydiscus-sion:thatthereisnoself,andthatwehaveasenseoftheself.Whileaddressingthesepresuppositionswillnot,ofcourse,justifythem,mygoalistoshowthattheyarenotsoobviouslyimplausibleastoarresttheprojectbeforeitcangetstarted.Iaimtoshowthatphilosophicalinquiryintogaininginsightknowledgeofno-self,asdescribedinearlyBuddhistteaching,isofgenuinerelevancetothecontemporaryfieldsofknowledge,mindandcognition.Itishopedthatthisexercisewillalsomakemoreconcretetheoverallcontextofinquiry,suchashowitsitswithcurrentempiricalresearch,aswellaselucidatethediffer-encebetweenthecentralnotionsofselfandsense
of selfastheystandinrelationtothenon-existenceofself.Unlessspeltout
insufficientdetail,subsequentdiscussionabouttheepistemicbenefitsof
losingthesenseofselfwillhavelittletohangon.
Theremainderofthepaperhasalreadybeenforeshadowed.Insec-tion2,Iintroduce,inmoredetail,thecomparisonofMaryAnaloguewithMary
the Colour Scientist, via the question: what distinctive
of self in thisway involves the alteration of a deeply
foundationalframeworkbelief.
The general analysis of knowledge-improvement, if correct,
willnot be confined to the gaining of Buddhist insight knowledge,
butshouldapply toothercasesofwhere there
isdissolutionofconflictbetween (thedoxastic
componentof)propositionalknowledgeandrecalcitrantbeliefs. Iwill
suggest that in suitablydoxastic
instancesof(say)losingaphobia,superstitionorclinicaldelusion,thesubjectspropositional
knowledge (e. g. that feathers are not
dangerous)willsimilarlyhaveimprovedthroughthereplacementofacontradicting,falseaction-basedbelief(e.
g.thatfeathersaredangerous)withacor-rectbeliefthatintegrateswiththedoxasticcomponentofthesubjectsexistingpropositionalknowledge.
Whileextendingtheanalysisofknowledge-improvementtoawid-errangeofcasesmaybeviewedasanadvantageoftheaccount,italsoraisesthequestionofwhetherthereisanythingreallydistinctive,afterall,aboutthegainingofso-calledinsightknowledge.Couldtherebesomethingsubstantivebehindthefactthatthenomenclatureinsight(orwisdom)occurswithinBuddhisttraditions,ratherthaninconnec-tionwiththelossofthephobiasorsuchlike?Indeedtherewouldap-peartobe.Theinsightarisingfromovercomingthedelusionofselfissaidtocarryanauraofprofundity;itisacognitivetransformationthatdeeply,globallyandirrevocablyshiftsonesentireperspectiveontheworldbefittingthealterationofafundamentalframeworkbelief.Iwilloffersomeempiricallybasedspeculationsonwhatcouldaccountforthisprofoundcognitiveshift,
insofaras
itexplainswhythelevelofinsightintotherealityofnoselfmaybedistinguished,atleastindegree,fromthatofthemoremundanecases.
DoingfulljusticetothetopicofBuddhistinsightknowledgewillbeafarlengthierenterprisethanwhatcanbecoveredwithinthescopeofasinglepaper.WhatIhopetoprovideissomephilosophicaltractiontotheideaofgaininginsightknowledgeofno-self:namely,acorepro-posalofitsepistemicstructure,alongwithanindicationofthedirec-tionthatfurtherresearchmaytakeindefendingkeyclaimsonwhich
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regulation is no longer possible in a complex environ-ment.In
fact, left to their own devices,
deathwouldensureinamatterofhoursbecausebodilymaintenancewould
collapse.This,
andcomparableexamples,wouldsuggestthatastateofconsciousnesswhichencompassesasenseofselfasconceptualisedinthisbookisindispens-ableforsurvival.[1999,304305]10
How,inmoredetail,isthisselftobedefined,andhowisittobedis-tinguishedfromthesenseofself?Howmightweunderstandtheclaimthatthesenseofself
isthesortofthingthatexists,whiletheself
isnot?Andhowmightsuchasenseofselfbeseen,onDamasiosview,asessentialtosurvival?
Whiletherearemanynotionsofselfintheliterature,thecoreno-tionof
selfat stake inDamasioswork, inBuddhism,and in
thatofseveralWesternphilosophersisthatofyouasobserverorknowerofthethingsobserved,[]youasownerofthoughtsformedinyourper-spective,youaspotentialagentonthescene(1999,127).11Thisowner/observer/agentisapersonalisedandpersistingentity:aunique,uni-
10.Withregardtothenecessityofthementalconstructionofself,DanielDen-nettalsowrites:Strippedofit,anindividualhumanbeingisasincompleteasabirdwithoutitsfeatures,aturtlewithoutitsshell.(1991,416).Seealsonote18onPanksepp(1998).
11.
Westernphilosopherswhohavealsodeniedtheexistenceofaselfofthisde-scription(orsomethingclose)includeHume(1739/1978),James(1890/1981),Parfit(1984),Dennett(1991),Flanagan(1992),Metzinger(2003),andtheau-thor(2006).ElsewhereIprovidedetailedevidenceandargumentfortheviewthatDamasioandsomeoftheseWesternphilosophersaredealingthesameorverysimilarnotionofselfthatcanbegleanedfromsuttasintheBuddhistPliCanon(Albahari,2006).
Ialsoofferacomparativeanalysisofhow,ac-cordingtoBuddhistandWesterntraditions,theillusionofsuchaselfmaybesaidtoarise.Fromthis,itbecomesapparentthatnoteveryone,evenwithinaparticulartradition,agreesuponhowthesenseofselfgetsconstructed.Den-nett,forinstance,hasamorelinguisticemphasisthanDamasio,seeingtheselfasacentreofnarrativegravity.InalaterbookDamasiowrites:Thereisindeedaself,butitisaprocess,notathing,andtheprocessispresentatalltimeswhenwearepresumedtobeconscious(2012,8).Thisseemsmainlytobea
semantic shift:whathe isdescribing is theneurological
(etc.)pro-cessunderpinningthesenseofself,aprocesshealsoascribestopre-linguistic
epistemicdimensioncouldthegainingofso-called insight-knowledge
addtoalreadyperfecttheoreticalknowledgeofthepropositionthereisnoself?Indevelopingthiscomponentoftheaccount,IintroduceafurtherpassagebyStrawsonfromwhichIdrawoutmyspecificpro-posal.Then,insection3,Iofferpreliminaryargumentsforthethreefurtherclaimsuponwhichthisproposaldepends,whichwouldallowforknowledge-improvementthroughdoxasticintegration.Insection4,
I describehow the account of knowledge-improvement could ex-tend
toothercases, including the lossofphobias,clinicaldelusions,and
superstitions. In section 5, I offer some empirical
speculations,basedupontheaccountofselfinsection1,onwhatcouldmakeMaryAnalogues
knowledge-improvementas opposed to (say) the
lossofaphobiaprofoundlyinsightful.Iconcludebybrieflyconsideringhowtheaccountmightbearuponcaseswhereasubjectlacksinitialknowledgethatthereisnoself.
1. The empirical viability of the nibbnic hypothesis
Letuscalltheproposalthatlosing the sense of self whilst
retaining or en-hancing mental acuity is psychologically
possiblethenibbnichypothesis.Acentral concern for
thenibbnichypothesis lies inevidence
fromscientificquarterstosuggestthatlosingthesenseofbeingaseparate,axiologicallysalientself,alongwithattendantself-regardingemotion-alandbehaviouralpatternseveniftheselfisanillusionissuretoresultinsub-humanratherthansuper-humanstates.Oneofthemostcarefullyworkedoutandinfluentialhypothesesabouttheoriginsandneurologicalunderpinningsoftheself-senseistobefoundintheworkofneurologistAntonioDamasio(1999,2012).9Fromhisstudiesofanumberofsuchcaseswherethesenseofselfhasbeensuspended,in-volvingpathologiessuchasakineticmutismandepilepticautomatism,Damasioconcludes:
Whenthementalaspectofselfissuspended,theadvan-tages of
consciousness soon disappear. Individual life
9.
SimilarideashavebeenproposedbyneurologistJaakPanksepp(1998).
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Now,thosewhodenytheexistenceofsuchaselfdonotusuallydenythatthesenseofselfisreal,anymorethandenyingthatthetwolinesinaMuller-LyerIllusionareofunevenlengthinvolvesdenyingtheappearanceofsuchlines.Whatisheldtolackrealityatleastinits
entiretyis rather thevery thing thatwehavea reflexive
senseofbeing:aself,withalltheenlistedfeatures,thatiswhollyanteced-enttoandunconstructedbythethoughtsandexperiencesthatitap-pearstoownorgenerate.Theideaisthatinsteadofbeinganchoredinathought-antecedentself,astheysubjectivelyappeartobe,atleastsome
features of the thing that we reflexively and unwittingly
takeourselvestobe(viathesenseofself)suchfeaturesasboundedness,persistence,agency,unity,axiologicalsalienceturnouttobewhollyorpartiallygeneratedbytheverythoughtsandexperiencesthattheselfseemstoownorgenerate.Putsimply,theself(withthosefeatures)doesnot,asitpurportsto,thinkthethoughts;instead,thethoughtsthink(thosefeaturesof)theself.Themismatchbetweenappearanceandrealityiswhatmakestheselfanillusion.
Denying theexistenceof selfdoesnotentail, then,denying
therealityofevery
featureascribedtotheself,aconsequencethatsomewould find
implausible. Non-illusory, unconstructed features as-cribed to the
self can survivedissolutionof the self-illusion,hencethe locution
losing the senseof self shouldbe readas losing thesenseof those
illusory features ascribed to the
self.13Now,despitedisagreementovertherangeoffeaturessaidtobementallyconstruct-ed,bothDamasio
and the scholarsof earlyBuddhismare likely
toconvergeonatleastthefollowing.Theywillagreethattheuniquely
personalised boundary that separates self from the rest of
theworld(whichIcallboundedness)thefeaturethatmakesmeseemlikeadistinctlyseparate,unique,axiologicallysalientthinginrelationtotheworldismentally
constructed andhence, illusory (because it
13.
Forinstance,Iargueelsewherethatthefeatureofconscious,unifiedaware-ness(modus
operandiofobserver)cannotbementallyconstructedandhenceillusory(Albahari2006,2011).
fied and bounded locus of agency that underlies and is
somehowgenerativeofourthoughtsandexperiences.Thisselfisdescribedassystematicallyelusivetoitsownobservation.Whileabletoturnitsfo-calawarenessontoitsthoughtsandexperiences,aswellasaspectsofthewiderworld,thesupposedselfcanneverseemtodirectlyobserveitselfinthismanner.Theelusivenessiswhatessentiallydistinguishestheselfasatypeofsubjectratherthanobjectintheworld,aligningitwith
theobserver rather thanwith the
thingsdirectlyobserved.Yettheselfstillseemsreflexivelyandperipherallyawareofitsownpres-ence,suchthatanindividualsexperienceisnotconfinedtoobjectsofawareness,butseemsdividedintotheobservingsubject(quaself)andtheobservedobjects.Thissubtle,reflexivefeelingthatwehaveofourownpresenceas
suchaboundedthought-antecedentself,assomethingdistinctandseparatefromitssurroundingenvironment,iswhatisreferredtoasthesenseofself.12
creatures. It remains the case thatqua
boundedobserver/owner/actor,histheoryimpliesthereisnosuch(unconstructed)thingasaself.
12.
Itisapresuppositionofthispaperthatwedoindeedhaveasenseofbeinganentitywiththeabove-listedfeatures.Still,somethingshouldbesaidabouthow,giventhatwecannotdirectlyintrospectandreadoffthecharacteristicsofoursupposedselves,wecanarriveatthelistoffeaturesthatwesuppos-edlyascribetoourselves.Muchofthecontenthastobeinferredindirectly,throughreflectingonourmodesofinteractionwiththeworld,includingourlikelymotivations,
emotions and behaviours. TakeMaryAnalogues
risingfearattheupcomingtalk.Thisindicates,arguably,thatshedeeplyidentifiesasthepersonwhoisabouttogivethespeech,suchthatsheassumesittobethenumericallysamebeingastheonenowundergoingtheanxiety,implyinganassumptionofpersonalised,uninterruptedpersistenceovertime.Supposethatsheberatesherselfforbeingabruptwithaquestionerintheaudience,thinkingIshouldnothavesaidthat!Thisguiltwouldindicatenotonlyanassumedpersistence,but
the fact that she thinks itpossible,allelsebeingequal, that she
could have actedotherwise.This arguably implies that
shetakesherselftobeanagentwithlibertarianfree-will.InthecurrentsectionIelaborateonhowtheassumptionofboundednesscanbeinferredfrom(andindeedconstructedby)cognitionsthatamplifyanongoingreflexiveconcernforonesownwelfare,althoughIargueelsewherethatboundednesscanbeinferredfromamultitudeoffactors,includingthesenseofagency.Forade-tailedaccountanddefenceofhowtheentirelistoffeaturesgetsascribedtotheself,seeAlbahari2006,2011.
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AccordingtoDamasio,thissubtlesenseofourselvesassomethingpsychologically
bounded, separate, unique, and important is
bothmentallyconstructedandcriticaltothesurvivalofourorganismsbio-logicalboundaries.Toseehowthismaybeso,onemustconsider,atleastinoutline,thecentralrolethatDamasioascribestoemotioninconstructingtheboundedself.17Damasiousesthetermemotiontorefer
specifically to thebodys complexsetof
stereotypedchemical/neuralresponsestotheenvironment;
feelingsreferstothefamiliarsubjective side of these emotions.
Through conditioning, emotionsbecome associatedbothwith objects in
the environment, andwithpatternsofmotorresponsesuchthat:
Memoriesofanobjectthatwasonceactuallyperceivedinclude not only
records of the sensory aspects of theobjectbut also records of
themotor adjustments thatnecessarily accompanied the gathering of
the sensorysignalsandtheobligateemotionalreactionto
theob-ject.Asaconsequence,whenwerecallanobjectwere-trievenotjustsensorydatabutalsoaccompanyingmotorandemotionaldatathepastreactionsoftheorganismtothatobject.[1999,161]
isanon-illusorylocusofperspectivalconsciousnessintoapersonalised,sol-id-seemingme,therebysharpeningandexaggeratingthesenseofboundarybetweenonesassumedexistenceandtheworld.Theemotionalinvestmentinthesemantlesofidentitywould,moreover,reinforcethefeelingofbound-ednessbyfeedingintoanongoingasymmetricalconcernaboutoneswelfare(alludedtobyDamasio),therebypresupposingadistinctandimportantthingonbehalfofwhichoneisconcerned.Theprocessofawakeningcaninviewofthisalsobeunderstoodasonewhichdismantlesthelayersofidentityandaccompanyingself-concern;Isaymoreaboutthissoon,andinPart5.
17.
MypresentationofDamasiospositionhereissimplified,focusingmainlyonhis
accountofhowemotionsand feelingshelp to construct the
featureofboundedness,andignoringothertechnicalitiesabouttheconstructionofself,includinghisaccountofhowtheorganismsrelationtotheenvironmentismappedinthebrain.Damasiothinksthatallfeaturesofselfareconstructed,notjustboundedness.
purportstonotbementallyconstructed).14Thispersonalisedbound-arybetweenselfandtheworldismuchpsychologicallythickerthanthatwhichcomesfrommerelyoccupyinganembodied,first-personperspectiveontheworld.15AsGilbertRyleputsit,Healsofeels,veryvaguely,thatwhateveritisthathisIstandsfor,itissomethingveryimportantandquiteunique,uniqueinthesensethatneitherit,noranythinglikeit,belongstoanyoneelse(1966,31).Thefeelingofim-portanceattachedtobeingthisverythingmaybesummonedbythereactionofhorroraroundtheprospectofbeingreplacedbyapsycho-physicalreplicawhowillgoontoliveyourlife(anideaexploredinParfit,1984,199201).16
14.
WhileIregardsuchboundednessascentraltotheself-illusioninBuddhism,other
authorsmay takeother featuresof the self tobeprimary targets
forBuddhistmeditativepractice.GalenStrawsonholdsregarding[oneself]andothersastrulyself-determiningsourcesofaction(2010,103)viz.,anagentoflibertarianfreewilltobeasuchatarget.WhileIremainneutralonthispoint,ifStrawsoniscorrect,myoverallphilosophicalanalysis(ofwhatitistogaininsightintonoself)willstillapply.
15.
Thepassiveboundarythatcomesfrommerelyoccupyingafirst-personem-bodiedperspectivegoesreciprocallywithwhatIrefertoinnote5asperspec-tivalownership.
Boundednesspertains to theemotionally invested,moreactively (albeit
elusively) sensed boundary that arises with
identification(moreinnote16),reciprocalwithwhatIvecalledpersonalownership.Itisalludedtointhesuttasinnote5andinBhikkhuBodhi:Becausewemaketheviewofselfthelookoutpointfromwhichwesurveytheworld,ourmindsdivideeverythingupintothedualitiesofIandnotI,whatismineandwhatisnotmine.(1994,56).IsurmisethatDamasiospatientswhohavelosttheirsenseoftheboundedselfthroughpathologywouldstillhaveapas-sivefirst-person,embodiedperspectiveontheworld;theydlackanysenseofboundedidentityinrelationtothisperspective.So,forthatmatter,wouldBuddhistarahantsalthoughtheleveloftheircognitionwouldvastlydifferfromthepathologicalcases.
16.
Inmoredetail,howmightidentificationcontributeto(andprovideevidencefor)thesenseofboundednessandaxiologicalsalience?Identificationoccursasoneappropriatesvariousideas(e.
g.thosepertainingtospecificattributessuchasbody,gender,age,race,character
traits,preferences,profession,ortocommonmodesofinteractionsuchasobserver,owneroragent)toonesperspective,sothattheworldisapproachedandthoughtaboutthroughtheirassumed,reflexivefilter.AsJ.DavidVellemanputsit:Ifthereisapartofyourpersonalitywithwhich
younecessarily think about things, then itwill
beyourmentalstandpoint,alwayspresentingareflexiveaspecttoyourthought(2002,114).ThenumerousmantlesofidentificationhelptoreifywhatIthink
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of thoughts, images and felt emotions (attended and
unattended),whosecontentrepresents,aspartofitsnarrative,not only
the objects perceived and acted upon but also the organism
perceiving and acting upon them(1999,93,188192).
Thebiologicalorganismisinotherwordsrepresentedvia the subjective
elusive impressionof
abackgroundagentialself:aprotagonistwhoengageswiththeworldinsuchawaythat
it is driven by an individual concern which permeates all as-pects
of thought-processing, focuses all problem-solving activities,and
inspires theensuing solution (1999, 304). Identifyingas
suchaprotagonistmakestheorganismreflexivelycareaboutwelfare,byfuelinganongoingsenseofurgencyintheserviceofhelpingtheor-ganismtoautomaticallythinkandactinsuchawayastopreserveitsbiologicalboundaries.Thefeelingofbeingathingthatmustbepro-tectedgreatlyexaggeratesthe(assumed)boundarybetweenmindedorganismandenvironment.19
InrelationtoBuddhistthought,DavisandThompsonhavenotedthat
thenotionofvalence (thepurelyaffectivecomponentofwhatDamasio calls
feeling) has a direct analogue in the Buddhist no-tionofvedan:
therawfeelingofpleasure,displeasureorneutralityasmanifestedthroughthesixsensemodalities(includingthemind).Theywrite:
Inthecaseofbothconcepts,valenceandvedan,thefeel-ingtoneofpleasantversusunpleasantiscloselyrelated
ofself(withtheirconnectiontoaffectiveandmotorresponses)wouldprob-ablyinvolvemajordeficitsinhighercerebralfunctions(1998,314).
19. OnDamasios theory(and indeedPanksepps),
themorecomplextheenvi-ronmentalpressures, themoredeveloped
thesenseof selfwillhave tobetocopewith
them.Mostanimalsandhumanshave
thebasicsenseofself(orcoreself)sofardiscussed:anunreflectivesenseofidentityasanagent/owner/observerthatisboundedandseparatefromitsenvironment,abletocogniseitsimmediatefutureandpast.Oncelonger-termplanninganddeci-sion-makingbecomeadvantageous,requiringaconsciousrepresentationofoneselfasthesubjectofrememberedandimaginedoutcomes,thesenseofboundednessandidentityovertimegetsgreatlyenhancedintowhatDama-siocallstheautobiographicalself,withmanyadditionallayersofidentifica-tionsuchasthosementionedinnote16.
While it is evident that variousobjects and situations can
regularlyinduce strongly felt emotional reactionstowhich he gives
the
fa-miliarnamesfear,anger,hope,etc.recentstudieshavesubstanti-atedDamasioscontentionthatevenrelativelyneutralobjectssuchastablesandcoffeecupsproducemeasurablemicro-valences(Lebrechtetal,2012).Thesesubtleaffectivefeelingsofpleasantnessorunpleas-antnessmayliebelowthethresholdofconsciousawareness,buttheynevertheless
prime perception, helping us tomore quickly
identifyandactuponsourcesofperceivedharmandbenefit.Damasioholds,then,thatthefunctionofemotionbothfeltandunconsciousistoreliablydirectattentiontotheenvironmentinwaysthatreadyustoact
so as to avoidharmandprocure advantage.On the
connectionbetweenattentionandemotion,hewrites:
Emotion is critical for the appropriate direction of at-tention
since
itprovidesanautomatedsignalabouttheorganismspastexperiencewithgivenobjectsand
thusprovides a basis for assigning orwithholding
attentionrelativetoagivenobject.[1999,273]
Damasio maintains that the felt, attention-directing emotions
be-comefarmoremotivatingiftheorganismpsychologicallyidentifiesasabounded,axiologically
salient selfon behalfofwhich theemo-tional reactionsare felt.18
Thewordless impressionofbeingsuchaself is synchronically generated,
he claims, by the ongoing stream
18.
Onthecloseconnectionbetweenourbasic,elusivesenseofboundedagen-tial
self and sensory/affective/motor responses, there appears to be
someconcordancebetweenDamasioandPanksepp.LikeDamasio,Panksepp
re-gardsthecoresenseofself,viz.,ourego,thefeelingofwillorI-nesstoberootedindeep,evolutionarilyprimitivestructuresofthebrainthatserveas
thefirstpointof contact for the intermixingof motormaps (i. e.,
bodyschema),sensorymaps(worldschema)andemotionalmaps(valueschema)(1998,300).Theinteractionofthesestructuresinvolvingcircuitsthatlikelyfirstrepresentedthebodyasanintrinsicandcoherentwholeandthroughwhich
a variety of sensory stimuli become hedonically
valencedfeedsintothat ineffable feeling of experiencing oneself as
an active agent in the perceived events of the
world(1998,310,hisitalics).AndlikeDamasio,Pankseppholdsthatabreakdownoftheprimitiveneuralcircuitsthatsubtendthebasicsense
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isfulfilled(inreactiontopleasantvedan)andlesshappywhenitisnot
(unpleasantvedan).Tah isbehind the constantdrive,
con-sciousandunconscious,tobringstatesofaffairsintolinewithonespreferences.While
the resulting thoughts and emotions of
satisfac-tionorfrustrationseemtobeexperiencedonbehalfofapersonalself,andareperpetuatedsolongasonehasthesenseofbeingsuchaself,Buddhismcontends,likeDamasio,thatthereisnoactualsuchself:nothought-antecedent,thought-generating,axiologicallysalientcornerof
theworldanunderlying, separate I thatwill stand to benefitor lose
from the situation at hand.The senseof boundedness
thatseemstoseparatetheselfasasalientthingfromtherestoftheworld(includingonesthoughts)isheldtoimmediatelystem,instead,fromtheverystreamoftah-driventhoughtandemotionthatisassumedtooriginateintheself.20
Yetdespiteconvergenceoverhowtheboundednessofselfispsy-chologically
constructed, Buddhist thought radically diverges
fromDamasio(andPankseppseenote18)overthenecessityofthesenseof
thisself forautonomoushumanexistence. It isnot
thatBuddhisttraditionwould rejectDamasios theoryabout theoriginof
the self-illusion; itmaywell accept that the senseof bounded
self,with
itsaccompanyingdesire-drivenemotions,evolvedasacomplexsurvivalmechanismthatcontinuestoserveits
importantbiological
function.ButaswasevidentinthepassagefromBhikkhuBodhi,Buddhismdoesnotregardawell-functioninghumanmindashavingtobeanimatedbythisdesire-drivensenseofself.ThecoreteachingexpressedinwhatisknownastheNobleEightfoldPath(theFourthNobleTruth)alongwiththedoctrineofDependentOrigination,maintainsthatitispos-sible,viameditativepractice,tobreakdowntheconditioningbetween
20.Note:theideathatthesenseofself(perhapsalsoabeliefthatoneisaself)perpetuatesI-thoughtsshouldnotbeconfusedwiththemistakenideathatitis
theactual thought-antecedentself
thatperpetuatesthosethoughts.Com-pare:Jimiscoweringunderthebedbecausehesensesthataliensarewatch-inghim.Itisentirelythesense(perhapsalsoabelief)thataliensarewatchinghimthatmakesJimcower,ratherthananythingaboutanactualsituationofalienswatchinghimthereisnosuchsituation.
toactiontendenciesofapproachversusavoidance.Fromthe modern
neuroscience perspective, the bodily re-sponses constitutive of an
emotion, including an
emo-tionsvalenceandactiontendency,canbeactivatedevenwhenwedonotreportconsciouslyfeelingtheemotionMoreover,
recentworkhas shown that such implicit
af-fectvalenceisnotlimitedtoemotionalepisodesandin-fluencesdecision-makingoneverythingfromconsumerchoicestomoraljudgementThisunderstandingofthepervasive
role of affect valence in human
psychologyfindsaparallelintheBuddhistsuggestionthatvedanispresentwitheverymentalstate,not
just
thoseWesternpsychologyincludesundertheemotions.[2013,587588]
It is important, nonetheless, not to conflate vedan raw
sensorypleasant, neutral or unpleasant hedonic tonewith the action
ten-dencies of approach and avoidance towards those hedonic
tones(feeling an emotionwould usually involve amixture of
these).Ac-cordingtoearlyBuddhistteaching,thequalityofvedanhelpscondi-tionourmental
reactionsofpreferenceor aversion (tah) to
suchsensorystimuli,whichinfluences(andisinfluencedby)ourpercep-tionofthings(sa)asdesirableorundesirable,aswellasthearis-ingofmentalformations(sakhra)thatincludevolitionaltendencies(cetan)
and object-specific grasping (updna). From these tah-driven mental
formations arise thoughts and feelings of me
andmine:manifestationsofwhatIvedescribed(innotes5,15,and16)as the
emotionally invested personal ownership and identification,central
to theearlyBuddhistnotionof self.The root causeof
suchI-thoughtsliesinboththesenseofselfthattheyperpetuate,andintah.TahcorrespondscloselytoDamasiosnotionofthepermeat-ingindividualconcern.Oftentranslatedascravingorattachment,itisthedispositiontoemotionallyinvestinthesatisfactionofdesire.Itistheunderlyingcurrentofdesiretopreferthattheworldbeonewayratherthananother,suchthatoneismadehappierwhenthedesire
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casesofwheresubjectshavepurportedlylostordiminishedthesenseofselfvia
thesortofmeditativepracticesdetailed inBuddhist
tradi-tions.Perhapstheway
inwhichthesenseofboundedselfiserodediscrucialtoharnessingordevelopingcapacitiesofthemindandbrainthatmaypermitautonomoussurvivalsansthesenseofboundedself.
Asithappens,Buddhistmeditativepracticesandthecognitiveandneuralcorrelatesofhavingpracticedforanythingfromafewminutestoover44,000hourshaveincreasinglybeenstudiedinlaboratorycon-ditions.Whilestillatanearlystage,someofthefindingstoemergearepromising.Forexample,studieshaveindicatedthatincreasesinhoursofmeditationpositivelycorrelateswithdecreasesofactivityinneuralcorrelatesassociatedwithself-narrative(mid-corticalstructures)23andwith
fear, depression, and other self-concerning emotions (e. g.,
theamygdala).24Thereisalsomountingneuropsychologicalevidencetosuggestthat,foradvancedpractitionersofmeditation,thereisasub-stantialincreaseinthelevel,quality,andeaseofattentionthatispaidtoongoingstimuli(ratherthanonlystimulithatisofselectiveinterestto
the self).25Thesefindingsare significant forat least two
reasons.
23. While freely engaging in self-referential thought,
individuals [in
controlgroups]exhibiteddistinctengagementofcorticalmidlinestructuresandposteriorcingulatecortices,regionsassociatedwiththeaffectiveappraisalofeventsasgoodorbad
for
theself.Bycontrast,mindfulnesspractitio-nersengaginginametacognitiveprocessexhibitedapronouncedshiftawayfrommidlinecorticalactivation[andtoward]sensoryrepresentationsintheinsula
and secondary somatosensory cortices.These regionsmay supportmore
detached, objective interoceptive, and somatic awareness that
mayserveastheprimitivesensoryrepresentationsoftheself(Farb,Andersonetal,2010,26).
24.
Inapapersummarisinganumberofstudies,DavidsonandLutzwrite:Ex-pertmeditatorsalsoshowedlessactivationthannovicesintheamygdaladur-ingFA[focusedattention]meditationinresponsetoemotionalsounds.Acti-vationinthisaffectiveregioncorrelatednegativelywithhoursofpracticeinlifeThisfindingmaysupporttheideathatadvancedlevelsofconcentrationareassociatedwithasignificantdecreaseinemotionallyreactivebehavioursthatareincompatiblewithstabilityofconcentration(2008,173).
25.
ArecentstudyusedfMRItointerrogatetheneuralcorrelatesofFA[focusedattention]meditation
in experts andnovices.Whereas
expertmeditatorswithanaverageof19,000practicehoursshowedstrongeractivationintheseareasthanthenovices,expertmeditatorswithanaverageof44,000practice
vedanandtah.21Astahisweakened,onereactswithdecreasingpreferenceoraversiontopleasantandunpleasantvedan.Thisinturnweakenstheillusionofself(withthoughtsofIandmine)thatbothdepends
upon and helps generate these emotionally invested
reac-tions.22Suchpracticeissaidtoculminateintheexultednibbna:thefinalflashofinsightthatburnsouttahandthesenseofselfforgood.
Bycontrast,DamasioandPankseppregardtheemotionally-investedsenseof
self tobeuniversally critical to survival.The contention ismorethan
just theoretical;wehaveseenthatDamasioappeals toanumber of clinical
studies: subjects who, through various
neuropa-thologies,havelostthesenseofboundedself(alongwithallmanifes-tationsofemotion)andareunabletofendforthemselves.
Howseriousaretheseconcernsforthenibbnichypothesis?ItisworthrememberingthatDamasiostheory,whileempiricallysupport-edinmanyofitsdetails,isahypothesisratherthanverifiedfact:andthecaseswherehedocumentsasuspensionoftheself-sensealloccurinthecontextoftraumatothebrain,suchasstroke.Theinabilitytoactautonomouslymaythusbeasmuchtodowiththetraumaaswiththelossofthesenseofself.Moresignificantly,Damasiohasnotstudied
21. TheFourNobleTruths, foundational toBuddhism,arepartof
thefirstdis-courseoftheBuddha(SN56.11,1995,transl.Bodhi)andcanbesummarisedas:(1)Suffering(dukkha)exists,(2)Theoriginofdukkhaistah,(3)Theces-sationofdukkhaliesinthecessationoftah,and(4)Thereisapathtothecessationofdukkha(andtonibbna):theNobleEightfoldPath,involvingthepracticesof
insight-wisdom(pa),meditation(samdhi),andvirtue(sla).ThedoctrineofDependentOrigination(Paiccasamuppda,SN12)identifies12proximallinksinthecycleofbirthanddeath(sasra),expressingthecen-tralBuddhist
ideathateverythingwhicharisesdependsonmultiplecondi-tions.Whilemanylinksareseenaspassivelydetermined(e.
g.,withsixsensebases(sayatana)ascondition,contact(phassa)comestobe;withcontactascondition,feeling(vedan)comestobe),thelinkwithvedanascondition,tahcomestobeisrecognisedasonethatcanbeactivelybroken.
22.Hence, undermining the sense of selfbased on a form of
ignorance,avijj inturndiminishes tah,bothofwhicharepurportedlyat
therootofmentalsufferingforthelivingpractitioner.Asmentalsufferingisfinallyeliminatedthroughinsight,unpleasantvedanwillbeconfinedtoonlyphysi-cal(notmental)suffering.Andasthearahantissaidtonotberebornintothecycleofbirthanddeath(sasra),physicalsufferingeventuallyceases.
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Ihavejustprovidedonesuchoverviewastohowthesenseofbeingsuchabounded,separateentitycouldbeconstructedfrompatternsofthoughtandemotion.Asforhavingasenseofselfofthatdescription,I
have elsewhere offereddetailed arguments thatwedo
commonlyidentifyassuchaself(alludedtoinnote12)aswellassomeevidencehereforthesenseofboundednessinparticular(seealsonote16).Withtheprovisionalassumptionsnowdeemedasnotunreasonable,andwith
a clearer understanding ofwhatwillmeant in ensuing
discus-sionbythetermsselfandsenseofself,wecanturntothequestionofhowlosingthesenseofbeingabounded,axiologicallysalientself,whileretainingmentalacuity,maybeunderstoodinepistemicterms.
2. The Core Proposal: Knowledge-Improvement through Doxastic
Integration
ManywillbefamiliarwithFrankJacksons(1986)fictitiousMary,theomniscient
colour scientist. Raised from birth in a
black-and-whiteroom,Marylearnsallthephysicaltheoreticalfactsthatcanbeknownaboutcolourandcolourvision.Butwhen
the
roofofherenclosureopensforthefirsttimetorevealabrightbluesky,Marysunderstand-ing
of seeing blue seems dramatically
enhanced.AsMartineNida-Rmelinputsit,thereisastrongintuitioninfavourofthethesisthatMarymakesgenuineepistemicprogressafterherrelease(2004,241).Supposingthatthisintuitionisright(andputtingasidedeepermeta-physical
conjectures such as whether this understanding
indicatesnon-physicalfactstheoriginalpurposeofthethoughtexperiment),therearethreemainhypotheseswhichaimtofleshouttheideathatMarynowknowswhatitisliketoseeblue(evenifthelocutionis,intheend,misleading).28
aboutinthiscontextwhoseexistenceisbeingdeniedisbynomeanstheonly
one; asDanZahavi (2011, 6667) and othersmake clear, there
areothernotionsofselfthatmaywellcorrespondtophenomenathatexist.Idohowevermaintain,contraZahavi,thatthecurrentnotionofselfisacentralandimportantone.
28.Forthissummary,IdrawuponNida-Rmelin(2010).
First, themovement from increased todecreased emotional
activity,andfromaselectivetowardsanimpartialpatternofattention,servesas
evidence that the sense of selfcorrelativewith selective
tah-drivenattentionbeingpaidtoobjectsofpersonalsignificancecanbeeroded.Second,inthosecontrastingpathologicalcaseswherethesenseofselfisseverelycompromised,thelevelofattentionisusuallyabnormally
low, something thatDamasio views as indicative of
pa-thology.Perhapstherecomesastagewhereasustained,highlevelofeffortless,unbiasedattentiontoonessurroundingshelpscircumventanypathologytothedegreethatiteventuallysubstitutesthevisceralfeelingofself-concernthat,withourusual(lower)levelsofattention,isneededtokeeptheorganismoutofdanger.Ofcoursethesereflec-tionsonthepossibilityofaltogethereliminatingthesenseofselfviameditativepracticearespeculative,butratherthanbeingbasedmere-lyuponreligiousconvictionanduntestable,theyextrapolatefromsci-entificstudiesandaretestable.26Thenibbnichypothesis,whilestillrequiringfurtherevidence,isnotanunreasonableone.
The other immediate provisional assumptionsthat there is
noselfandthatweneverthelesshaveasenseofbeingsuchaselfarelesscontentious.Therehavebeenanumberofargumentsfromscien-tific,philosophical,andcontemplativequartersfortheviewthatthereisnoself:atleast,nobounded,personalisedandpersistingcentreofagencyandownershipfromwhichthoughtsandexperiencesarise.27
hoursshowedlessactivation.Thisinvertedu-shapedfunctionresemblesthelearningcurveassociatedwithskillacquisitioninotherdomainsofexpertise,suchaslanguageacquisition.Thefindingssupporttheideathat,afterexten-siveFAmeditationtraining,minimaleffortisnecessarytosustainattentionalfocus(DavidsonandLutz2008,173).DavidsonandLutzalsociteevidence(with
reference to the attentional blink phenomenon) that
mindfulness,whichaimstocultivateaclearawarenessofthefieldofcurrentexperienceasitarisesmoment-to-moment,haslastingeffectsonthequalityofattentionoutsidethecontextofformalFAmeditationpractice,suchthatsubjectsarebetterabletoattendmoment-to-momenttothestreamofstimuli(2008,173).
26.
Insection5,Iofferfurtherspeculationontheavenuesalongwhichmedita-tivepracticemightunderminethesenseofself.
27.
Argumentsagainsttheexistenceoftheselfhavebeenofferedbytheauthorsmentioned
note 11. It should be reiterated that the notion of self talked
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abilities(suchasactuallydeliveringapublicspeechwithoutfear)orthroughsimplybeingdirectlyacquaintedwiththestateofhavinglostthesenseofself.
Yetwhilesomeformofknowingwhatitisliketohaveanosenseofself(andindeedasenseofnoself)maywellbeacentralcompo-nenttoMaryAnaloguesimprovedepistemicstatusaccordingwellwithBuddhistinjunctionsthatonemustknowrealitythroughdirectexperiencethereremains,Icontend,animportantsenseinwhichitfailstocapturewhatisdistinctiveaboutMaryAnaloguesepistemicimprovement.
To bring this out, consider the following example.
IhavenevertakenmescalinbutIvereaddescriptionsofwhatitisliketotakeit.SupposeItakeitandIamstruckwiththeconviction:This
is a more correct view of the
world.Isthisthoughtinfactcorrect?Well,itdepends.IfallImeanbymorecorrectviewoftheworldissomethinglocalised
like Inowknowwhat it is like to takemescalin
thenmyconvictionmaywellberightforthesortofreasonsoutlinedabove:Imay,forexample,havegainednewphenomenalconceptsthatbolsterwhatIalreadyknewfromreadingdescriptionsoftakingmescalin.Butsuppose
Imean somethingmoreuniversal like: This experienceoftakingmescalin
is infusedwithnoetic resonance,asense of rightness that
exemplifiesaprofoundlymoreaccurate
frameofmindandout-lookontheworld.30Insuchacase,thereisgoodreasontodoubtthetruthofmystatement:aswithmanysuchdrug-inducedexperiences,Iamprobablydeluded.31
Likewise,
ifpost-revelatoryMaryweretoexclaimthatherexperi-enceofbluenessoffersamorecorrectviewoftheworld,herstatement
30.BysenseofrightnessandnoeticresonanceImeantoconveythefeelingofdirectintuitiveunderstandingthatcomeswithanahamoment,whenthingscoalesceinawaythatappearstomakeperfectsense.
31.
Bythisexample,Idonotintendtoruleoutthepossibilitythatsomedrugex-periences(orneurologicaltraumas)could,infact,instil(intheradicalsense)amorecorrectviewoftheworld,andhencebeawayofacquiringso-calledinsight-knowledge(foradramaticexampleofneurologicaltraumaelicitingapparentboundary-dissolving
insight, see JillBolteTaylors2008TED
talkMyStrokeofInsight).Tomyknowledge,however,nosuchcasesthatfullymatchthedescriptionofnibbnahavebeenreported.
Verybriefly,thefirsthypothesisisthatMarygainsknowledgeofthephenomenalcharacterofblueunderaphenomenal
conceptofblue-nessaconceptwhoseacquisitionrequires,asanecessarycondition,the
direct experience of seeing blue. Once acquired, this
phenom-enalconceptofbluemayleadhertohavephenomenalbeliefsaboutthecolourofvariousthings,suchthatshecan(forexample)cometoknowthat
theskyappearsphenomenallyblue
toothernormalper-ceivers.Anotherhypothesisforherimprovedepistemicstatusisthatshegainsnewabilities:
shecannow imagineor
recallwhatablueskylookslikeandshecanimmediatelyrecognise,withouthelpfromscientificinstruments,thatanobjectisofacertaincolour(defendersoftheviewholdthatknowingwhatbluenessislikeamountstonomorethantheacquisitionof
therelevantabilities).Thisdimensionhassometimesbeentermedknowledge
how.Athirdhypothesisisthatwithoutacquiringnewfacts(suchasthoseassociatedwithphenom-enalconcepts),Marysimplybecomesdirectlyacquaintedwiththeex-perience
of blueness,which is enough to account for her sense
ofknowingwhatbluenessislike.
Itisnotthepurposeofthispapertoarbitrateonwhich,ifany,oftheseaccountsiscorrect.Butifweacceptthatcolour-scientistMaryepistemicallyprogressesalonganyoftheseavenues,thenitisreason-abletosupposethatMaryAnalogue,wereshetoawaken,wouldmakeparallelepistemicprogress.29Beforeawakening,shewouldknowallthetheoryinconnectionwiththepropositionthereisnoself(includ-ingtheneuropsychologyofthoseBuddhistswhohaveovercomethesenseofself).Afterawakening,shewillknowwhatitisliketohavenosenseofself,whetherthisbeaccountedforintermsofhergainingnewphenomenalconcepts(suchthatshenowknowswhatarahantsphenomenallybelieve,whentheyclaimthatthereisnoself),ornew
29.
Ifoccurringoveraseriesofsmallerbreakthroughs,mightMaryAnaloguesfinalrevelationnotbeasdramaticasthatofMarythecolourscientist?TheaccountsIvereadofpurportedarahantsallsuggestthefinalbreakthroughtobedramatic;butevenifthisisnotso,insofarasMaryAnaloguecomestoknowwhatitisliketoexperienceamindcompletelyfreefromthestructuresofself,thecomparisonstillstands.
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ofwhich,theyclaim,istocausethedelusiontodislimn.[2010,101102]
Here iswhere Ipropose thedifference lies.Unlike in
thecoloursci-entistormescalincase,MaryAnaloguestheoreticalunderstandingoftheproposition
there isnoself (andbyimplication,
thatsheisnotsuchaself)isbeingcoupledwiththeovercomingofapowerfulandpervasivedelusionthedelusionthatsheisaself.Overcomingthisdelusionimbuesherwithagenuinelyaccuratefeelingofnoeticreso-nance:ofhavingdispelledacognitiveerroranalogous,
it is
some-timessaid,toawakeningfromadream.Thedepthandpervasivenessof the
errorovercomeexplains andgroundsher feeling that the
in-sightisprofoundandirreversible,resultinginacorrespondinglymoreaccuratemodeofcognition.32Inthemescalinandcolourscientistcase,thereisnoerrortobeovercome,suchasadelusionaboutwhatblue-nesslookslike;Marysimplylearns(orappearstolearn)whatitisliketoexperienceblueness.Whiletothisextentthecolourscientistmaywellhaveamorecorrectviewoftheworld,itisnotthesortofcor-rectnessthataccompaniestheovercomingofacognitiveerror,norisitprofoundinacognitivelypervasivesense.Thatiswhyshewouldnotbewarrantedtomakeanyclaimsaboutharbouringaprofoundlymoreaccuratestateofmind.
From this,wecandistinguish two features that
characteriseepis-temic progress towards insight knowledge of no
self: the overcom-ing of a delusionthat is, the dispelling of a
cognitive errorandthedepthandpervasivenessof thedelusionovercome,
resulting ina correspondinglymore accurate way of viewing the
world. In the
32.
Itisimportanttonotethatjustaswithanyintellectual(suchasmathematical)insight,asenseofrightnessattachingtoanypurportedinsightaroundover-comingthedelusionofselfwillnotalwaysbeveridical.Buddhisttraditioniswellawarethatpractitionerscanbemistakenabouttheirclaimstoinsight,which
iswhy the traditionplaces importanceuponothermembers of
themonasticcommunityespeciallyteacherstohelpverifysuchclaims,suchasthroughmonitoringreactionstodifferentsituationsovertime.Anydisplayoftah(suchasthroughanger,fear,pride,orlust)wouldforinstancebeareliableindicationthatthepractitionerisnotawakened.
wouldbecorrectuptothepointatwhichshenowknowswhatitisliketoexperiencethesensationofblue,suchthatshecanforinstanceapply
therelevantphenomenalconcepts
towhatshealreadyknewaboutblueness.Butifsheweretoinsist
No,Imeanmorethanjustthat:itcarriesasenseofrightness,instillingaprofoundlymoreaccu-rateframeofmindandoutlookontheworldshewould,aswiththemescalincase,begoingbeyondwhatshehaswarranttoclaim.Butthis,precisely,
is thekindofdescription thatBuddhist tradition
im-partstoinsightknowledgeintono-self.Itisnotjustamatterofclaim-ingInowknowwhatitisliketohavenosenseofselfonwhateverreading.Thefeelingofovercomingthesenseofself
issaidtocarryanadditionalnoetic resonanceasenseof rightness
thatpurports,inconnectionwithhavingseenthroughtheillusionofself,toinstilaprofoundlymoreaccurateframeofmindandoutlookontheworld:acognitiveplatform,as
itwere, fromwhichotherchunksof reality,which relatemind to
thewiderworld,areapprehendedandunder-stoodwithfarlessdistortion.
Nowwhatcouldinfusetheexperienceoflosingthesenseofselfwithaveridicalnoeticresonance,makingtheclaimtoincreasedaccu-racymorelegitimatethanthatofthemescalinorcolour-scientistcase?A
central clue canbe foundboth inBuddhist sources (e. g.
BhikkhuBodhi),andinthisfurtherpassagebyStrawson:
Consider certain Buddhist philosopherswho argue, ona variety of
metaphysical grounds, that our natural
no-tionofapersistingindividualself
isanillusion.Havingreachedthisconclusion,theysetthemselvesatask:thatofovercomingthedelusion.Theyrecognize,however,thatonecannotsimplyabolishonessenseofindividual-ity,bysomesortofeffortless,rationallymotivated,self-di-rectedintellectualfiat.Delusionsdelude,afterall;andtheordinary,strongsenseofselfisaparticularlypowerfuldelusion.They
therefore recommend theadoptionof
acertainpracticethatofmeditationtheeventualeffect
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falsity.Contrastthiswithanon-recalcitrantbelief,alsobasedonillu-sion.EncounteringtheMuller-LyerIllusionforthefirsttime,youmayinnocentlyassumethetwoparallel
linestobeofunequal length,
inaccordancewiththewaytheylook.Youhavebothanillusionandadelusion
that the linesareunequal.Someoneplacesa rulernext
tothem(ortellsyouitsanillusion)andyouarenowcorrectlyconvincedthattheyareofthesamelength.Althoughtheopticalillusionpersists,thedoxasticanchorhasbeenpulledup.All
tracesofdelusion,bothinyouractions/affectandinreflectiveendorsement,havevanished;yourinitialbeliefinunequallinesisusurpedbythecorrectintegratedbeliefthattheyareequal.Bycontrast,whiletheintroductionofaratio-nallysupportedbeliefthatthereisnoselfdoesindicateadoxasticshiftatthelevelofreflectiveendorsement,itdoesnotpullupthedeeperaction-baseddelusionthatanchorsthepersistingillusionofself.
Prior toovercomingthedelusion,
therecalcitrantbeliefco-existswith the reflectiveone,whichbringsus
to a third implication fromStrawsonspassage:withinagivensubject
therecanbe
theco-pres-enceofcontradictingbeliefsaninconsistencyofwhichthesubjectcanbeaware.Thereflectivebeliefthatthereisnoselfwillbeacom-ponentofwhatweareassuming
is thepractitionersknowledge
thatthereisnoselfpropositionalknowledgethatcohabitswithafalseaction-basedbeliefthatthereisaself.
A fourth implication suggests that this cognitive state is
notepistemically ideal. By overcoming the delusion of self, the
sub-ject comes toholdamorecorrectviewof theworld,
anepistemicimprovement signalled by a feeling of direct intuitive
understand-ing I have been calling noetic resonance.33 But there is
a further
33.
Thenoeticresonanceseemstoimplytheemergenceofareflectivecompo-nentthatisnotreducibletotheexistingpropositionalknowledgethatthereis
no self (although itwould doxastically integratewith and improve
thatknowledge).Thereflectivecomponentwouldcomefromthedirectintuitiverecognitionthattheselfisadelusion.Thatsaid,priorintellectualreflectiononnoself(alongwithformalmeditation)maystillcontributetotheprocessofundoingtheaction-basedbeliefinaself,andhenceingainingcompleteinsightintotherealityofnoself.Ireturnbrieflytothisissueinnote42andintheconclusion.
remainderofthissection,IexpandStrawsonspassageintoananaly-sisofhowtheBuddhistpractitioner,throughdispellingthedelusionofself,couldendupwithbetterqualityknowledgeofthepropositionthatthereisnoself:ananalysiswhichIthenapplytoothercases(sec-tion4).Inthefinalsection(5),Itrytoaccountforwhywemightexpectthegainingofinsightknowledge,inparticular,toresultinasubstan-tivelymoreaccuratemodeofcognitionthanthatwhichoccursinmostothercasesofknowledge-improvement.
Strawsonspassagecarriesanumberof implications fromwhichwe
canpropose amoredetailed epistemic analysis ofwhat it is
toovercomethedelusionofself.First,
thereisreferencetotheselfasbeingbothan
illusionanddelusionbothofwhich imply that
theselfdoesnotexist.Illusionsoccurwhenanappearancepresentstheworld(toasubject)ashavingx,whentheworlddoesnotinrealityhavex.Whileoftenperceptual,illusionscansometimesbecognitive.Theillusionofselfwillbecognitiveratherthanperceptual:akintoasenseofdanger,wherethedangerdoesnotexist.Itakeitthatbyde-lusionStrawsonmeansatypeoffalseorinaccuratebelief
minimally,awayoneassumestheworldtobe.Inmanydelusions,thesubjectwill
take the content of an illusion to be veridical, thereby
assum-ingtheworldtocarrythatfeature.Justasanillusionofdangermaybeassumed,byitssubject,toindicaterealdanger,sotheillusionorsenseofselfis(reflexively)assumed,bytheunawakenedBuddhist,toindicatearealself.Iwillputthisbysayingthatthesenseofselfacognitiveillusionisanchored
inadelusionofself,abeliefthatthecontentoftheillusionisreal.
A second implication pertains to Strawsons claim that
Buddhistphilosophers (presumably serious practioners)
intellectually arriveat their conclusionof therebeingnoselfbefore
settingout toover-comethedelusionofself.Thissuggests that
thephilosophicalargu-mentandscientificevidencewhichjustifytheirreflectivebeliefthatthereisnoselfhaslittleeffect,byitself,ondislodgingtheirdelusionalcommitment
toaself.Thedelusion thatanchors the illusionof selfis thus
recalcitrant, failing to be shifted by standard evidence for
its
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Muller-LyerIllusion,wheretheillusionwillremainafterthedelusionhasbeendispelled.)ThedoxasticintegrationresultingfromthefinalnibbnicinsightisthusacentralrespectinwhichsomeonewithpriortheoreticalknowledgeofhersubjectmatternowhaswhatStrawsontermsamorecorrectviewoftheworldinrelationtohersubject.Wemightsay
thatawakenedMaryAnaloguenow thoroughly knows
thatthereisnoself.Inmodernidiom,shewalksthewalkaswellasnon-nervouslytalkingthetalk.
3. Defending supporting claims of the core proposal
Theaboveanalysis,whichproposesacoreepistemiccomponentforthegainingofinsightknowledgeintonoself(thatofknowledge-im-provement
throughdoxastic integration), reliesuponthe truthofatleast three
contentious claims. To reiterate, these are: first, that
thesenseofselfisanchoredina(false)action-basedbelief;second,thatthisfalsebeliefthatoneisaselfcanco-existwithacontradictingre-flectivebeliefthatthereisnosuchself(acomponentofthesubjectspropositionalknowledge);andthird,replacementofthefalse,contra-dictingbeliefwithatrue,consistent(action-based)beliefwill,viadox-asticintegration,improvethequalityofthepropositionalknowledgethatthereisnoself.Whatfollowsaresomesuggestionsonhoweachoftheseclaimsmaybedefended.
3.1 The sense of self is doxastically anchored. Despite the self
being commonly called a delusion in Buddhist
lit-erature,manywilldeny that the senseof sucha selfwhether
theselfexistsornotcanbeanchoredinabeliefthatoneissuchaself.Mostcentrally,
thesenseof selfs
reflexiveandelusivemodeofpre-sentationwillmeanthatitscontentisnotimmediatelyaccessibletointrospectionandthereforenotamenable,viathatchannel,toreflec-tiveendorsement.36TobelievethatP,theobjectiongoes,onehasto
36.
IfonedoesreflectivelyendorsethepropositionIamaself,itwillbethere-sultofanexercisewhichobjectivelyreflectsupontheinferredcontentofselfandaffirmsitsexistence.Thisdoesnotmakesenseofselfin
itselfdoxastic.
dimension to the progress, to dowith how this shift in what
Ivebeencallingaction-basedbeliefcomestointegratewiththeexistingpropositional
knowledge. Before transition, the false
action-basedbelieffromwhichstemsavastarrayoftah-drivenemotionsandbehaviourscontradictsthereflectivebeliefthatisacomponentofthepropositionalknowledgethatthereisnoself;aftertransition,theaction-basedbeliefanditsattendantattitudesno
longercontradictbut are in complete conformitywith the
propositional
knowledge.Throughbecomingconsistent,theaction-basedandreflectivebeliefsdoxasticallyintegrateintoonebelief(asmostbeliefsalreadydo).Inthisrespect,Iwanttoclaimthatonesdoxasticallyintegratedknowl-edge
of the proposition there is no self is better quality knowledge
thanthatwhichwashadbeforethetransition.
Because theaction-basedbelief (thatone isaself) is
recalcitrant,themethodforattainingthisepistemicallyimprovedstatewillnotbetheconventionalrouteofgarneringbetterphilosophicalorscientificevidence
for the truereflectivebelief;wecansuppose that
thebestevidenceofthatsortwasrecruitedintheearlierphase.34Therouteinthiscase,asStrawsonhasnoted,isratheroneofdedicatedmeditationpractice,throughwhichthecomplexnetworkoftah-drivenpsycho-logicalstatesthatfeedintotheillusionanddelusionofselfiseventu-allytransformed:themotivations,behaviours,dispositions,affectivedrivesandattitudes.35
(Thattheillusionofselfmustbedestroyedinordertodissolvethedelusionmakesitsignificantlydifferentfromthe
34.Onacoherentistaccountof
justification(andperhapsafoundationalistac-count aswell), thebelief
that one is not a selfmay, after loss of the
falseandcontradictingbeliefoneisaself,becomebetterjustifiedinvirtueofthesetofbeliefshavinggreateroverallcoherence.Itisnotclear,however,thatthisshouldbedescribedasacasewherethesubjecthasbetterevidenceforthebelief,as
theaction-basedbeliefwasrecognisedas false
tobeginwith.Therelatedquestionofwhatsortofevidentialandjustificatoryrolemightbeplayedbyaveridicalexperienceofhavingovercometheillusionofself,is,Ithink,animportantonethatwillhavetobedeferredtoanotheroccasion.Ireturntoitbrieflyintheconclusion.
35.
Althoughthefinalinsightwillitselfhaveareflectivecomponentformoreonthisseenotes33,42,andtheconclusion.
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Assumingtheviabilityofanaction-basedapproachtobeliefascrip-tion(anassumption
thatwouldneed
furtherdefence),havewerea-sontosupposethatthesenseoftheselfcouldactuallybeanchoredinsuchabelief?Here
isan initial reason.Thesenseof theself
canbedescribedasaconsciousimpressionofbeingaself,namely,ofbe-inganelusiveentitywithsuchfeaturesasboundedness,agency,andaxiologicalsalience.Astheself(quasubject)eludesdirectintrospec-tion,thesefeatureswillbeindeedbeascribedlargelyonbasisofbe-haviouralandemotionalpatterns,andIhavealreadyprovidedsomeexamples
(for instance in note 12) of how such featuresmay be
in-ferred.Thatweidentifyasbeingaboundedentityinparticularismostbroadlyevidenced,aswesawinsection1,throughmanifestationsoftah:
the spectrumof desire-driven thoughts, emotions
andbehav-ioursthattacitlyassumeasalient
thingonbehalfofwhichthedesiresandemotionsarefeltandtheactionscarriedout.Nowbarringbeliefswithtautologicalcontent,anecessarycomponentofanybelief,wheth-erjudgement-oraction-based,isthatitcontainstruth-aptcontentthatcanbeinerrorandthisindeedisbeingclaimedaboutthesenseofself.For
if theself (wehaveasenseofbeing) turnsoutnot
toexist,thenoursenseofselfwillbeperpetuatingsomekindofpsychologicalerror,or,asiscommonlysaid,anillusion.Wewillnotinrealitybethesortofthingthatweunwittinglytakeourselvestobe.Fromthis,itmaybe
tempting to infer thatwecommonlydoharboura
(false)action-basedbeliefthatweareaself;theillusionisanchoredinadelusion.
Mattersarenot,however,sostraightforward.Inapaperwhichar-gues
that a subjective senseof libertarian freewilldoesnotentail abelief
in such freewill,RichardDouble (1991) invitesus to consider,
Dennett(1987).While
third-personaloraction-basedapproaches(suchasaninterpretivestance)canallowthedisplayofnot-P-ishbehaviouralandemotionalpatternstotrumpcontrarydisplaysofreflectivelyendorsedbeliefthatP(suchthatSisascribedabeliefthatnot-P),weshouldnotassumethattheyalldo.
Incasesofconflictbetweenwhat is
reflectivelyendorsedandhowoneacts,Smightnotbeascribedanybeliefatall,ormightbeascribedbothabeliefthatPandabeliefthatnot-P.Myanalysisofinsightknowledgedependsontakingthelatterdisjunctiveapproachtobelief-ascription.Moreonthissoon.
bereadilydisposedtoconsciouslyaccessandreflectivelyjudgethatP,where
thedisposition to judge thatP
ispartofabroaderdisposi-tion-basetofollowvariousnormsofrationality.Suchnormsincluderevisingthebeliefinthefaceofchangestoourall-things-consideredevidence,beingpreparedtobethighstakesonPbeingtrue,andbe-lievingpropositionsthatfollowobviouslyfromP.Thesenseofbeingaself(forexample,itspotentialrecalcitranceinfaceofcountervailingevidence)disobeysatleastsomeofthesenorms.Thosedefendingadoxasticaccountof
theself-sensecanrespond that this rationalisticjudgement-based
conception of beliefwhat I have so far alludedtoas
reflectivebeliefisnot
theonlyoneavailable;philosophicaltraditionalsorecogniseswhatIhavebeencallinganaction-basedap-proach,wherebeliefscanbeascribedonthebasisofnon-reflectivecriteriasuchasobservablepatternsofemotionsandbehaviours.Suchcriteria,whichincludethoseexemplifiedinbelief-desireanalysesofbehaviour,37maypermit
theascriptionofbelief
tonon-rationalcrea-turessuchasanimals.Ifthesenseofselfisdoxasticallyanchored,thenitwillbeanchoredinthesortofbeliefthatisascribedalonganaction-basedratherthanjudgement-basedavenue.38
37.
Onthebelief-desireanalysis(characterised,butnotendorsedbyVelleman),abeliefthatPdispose[s]thesubjecttobehaveincertainwaysthatwouldpromotethesatisfactionofhisdesiresifitscontent[P]weretrue(2000,255).The
term action-basedalso includesreference topatternsofemotion,e.
g.,ifSdesiresthatP,thencomingtobelievethatPwillelicitpositiveemotion,andcomingtobelievenot-Pwillelicitnegativeemotion(Zimmerman2007,64).Canthesestandardaction-basedcriteriabeusedtoindicatethesortofreflexive,action-basedbeliefintheselfsexistencethatwouldbeinstantiatedbyharbouringasenseofself?NotbydirectlysubstitutingtheselfexistsforP.WhileIshortlydiscusstheimplicationsofthisin3.2,Iwillfornowsupposethataction-basedcriteriapertainingtomanifestationsoftahapply.
38.Whilethetermsjudgement-basedandaction-basedaremyown(andaregiven
a detailed formulation in Albahari 2014), variants of these two
ap-proaches to belief-ascription have been described under
different
names.Forexample,H.H.Price,asnotedinGendler(2008a,638n),attributeswhathe
calls the traditional (i. e. judgement-based) view to Descartes,
Hume,Spinoza, Cardinal Newman and Cook Wilson. Insofar as they
privilegeevidenceaccessiblefromthethird-personperspective,Zimmerman(2007,71,
7273)attributesversionsof a third-personal
(action-based)positiontoWilliamson(2000),Smith(1994),Stalnaker(1984),Davidson(1984),and
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perceptual senses, suchpressure commonlyexerts itself in the
caseof conscious impressions, particularly if the impression is
powerfulandpersistent.Wewillhaveheardabout theschizophrenicwho,
intheabsenceofknowledgeabouthercondition,thoroughlybuysintothecontentofsuchimpressionsashavingherthoughtsmonitoredbysecretpolice,
etc.we infer it from theparanoid, fearfulbehaviour.The conscious
impressionof being a selfwill not
onlybepowerfulandpersistent,butwilltendtoberegardedasneitherabnormalnorpathologicalnorfalse.Hence,atleastincaseswithnocountervailingevidenceathand,
it seemsat this stage reasonable to infer that
theconsciousimpressionofbeingaself,justlikeoursense-impressions,isanchoredinapowerfuldefaultaction-basedbeliefintheveracityofthatimpression.
3.2 Delusion of self co-exists with knowledge that there is no
selfIfweprovisionallygrant that thesenseofself
isnormallyanchoredina false action-basedbelief thatone is a self,
can
thedelusionbeheldinconjunctionwithanopposingjudgment-basedbeliefindeedknowledgethatoneisnotsuchaself?Herewearefacedwithwhatappears
tobea two-horneddilemma.Thefirsthornpertains to
thesecondpointwithinDoublesobjectionabove.Hewouldcontendthatajudgement-basedconvictionthatoneisnotsuchaself(elicitedbycountervailing
evidence)will, just as in the caseof
theMuller-LyerIllusion,servetoreplaceanyopposing,action-basedbelief
thatoneisaselfwithaconsistentandintegratedaction-and-judgement-basedbeliefthatoneisnotsuchaself.IfDoubleiscorrecthere,thenmypro-posedanalysisofinsightknowledgemustfail,asitdependsuponthedelusionofselfbeingrecalcitrantinthefaceofevidencethatsupportsanopposing,judgment-basedbelief.ButiftheotherhandDoubleisnot
correct and the so-calleddelusionof self persists in the
faceofitsapparentlyopposingconviction,thenwehavereasontosupposethatthesenseofselfisnotactuallyanchoredinabeliefatall,butinsomethingpre-doxastic,suchasanaliefordefaultpsychologicalarchi-tecture.Inaddressingthissecondhornofthedilemma,werevisitthe
amongstotherexamples,theMuller-LyerIllusion.Whilethecontentoftheperceptualillusionmisrepresentsreality,socontainstruth-aptcontentthatallowsittobeinerror,thispre-emptorybelief(ashecalls
it) in noway implies thatwe harbour a genuine belief
abouttheunevenlengthofthelines.Asmyearlierexampleshowed,coun-tervailingevidencecanmakeus
instantlyswitch fromastateofbe-lieving the contentof the illusion
todisbelieving itwhere
beliefisascribedonaction-basedaswellasjudgement-basedcriteria.(Be-haviours
aroundattempting to re-designoneshouseusing Muller-Lyer
technologywill,after initialdisappointment,beshifted).Simi-larly,
theobjectiongoes, thecognitive
illusionofhavinglibertarianfreewillor of being a self which has
itmay beguile the
philo-sophicallynave,butthosewhoknowbetterwillnotbetakeninbyit.Doubles
objection is actually double-barrelled. First, it suggeststhat an
impressionor senseor illusionof xdoesnot
automaticallyguaranteeabelief thatx,sothere
isnopressingreasontosupposethatthesenseofselfisactuallyevidenceofabeliefinaself.Second,itsuggeststhatifthereisanyinitialbeliefintheself(whetheraction-orjudgment-based)thenwillberevisedbycountervailingevidence,leavinguswithnoreasontosupposethatanaction-basedbelief
intheselfwouldpersist
inthecaseofthosewho,onjudgment-basedcriteria,cometobelievethereisnoself.
In response to the first pointwithinDoubles objection,we
cannoteisthatwhileaperceptualorcognitiveimpressionofxdoesnotguaranteeabeliefthatx,itisneverthelesstruethatwithoutcounter-vailingevidence,animpressionofxwillusuallybeunquestioninglyassumedtoindicatearealx,allowingustoascribetothesubjectanaction-basedbeliefthatx.Thedefaultposition,afterall,istobelieveandactuponthedeliverancesofonessenses;asystematicscepticismisnothowwehaveevolvedtoengagewiththeworld.Presentedwithappearancesofgrass,
treesandpeople,wetakeforgrantedtheirve-racity.39Justasthereiscognitivepressuretoacceptdeliverancesofthe
39.WecandrawaconnectionherewithWittgensteinsnotionofa
frameworkbelief,discussedinsection3.2.
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thereflexivecontentof
theselfsystematicallyeludesdirectobserva-tion,andsocannotbetheimmediatetargetofitsownobservationalscrutiny.Revelationofitsillusorystatus(andthesubsequentrevisionofbelief)couldthusneverhappenviathesamesortofdirectobser-vationalchannelsthatoccur,say,withtheMuller-LyerIllusion;theresnoequivalentofplacingarulernexttothelines.Itstandstoreason,then,thatanoverturningofthedefaultaction-basedbeliefthatoneisaselfwillhavetocomeaboutthroughmethods(suchasmeditation)thaterodetheverypsychologicalstructuresthatsubtendthesenseofbeingaself.42Thiswouldaccountforthelackofparallel,mentionedearlier,between
the illusionof self andmostotherperceptual
(andlikely,cognitive)illusions.Whereasinmostcases,theillusioncanordoespersistafterthedelusionhasbeendispelled,thisisnotthecasewiththesenseofself.Beingreflexive,theimpressionthatoneisaselfcannotcomeapart
fromthebeliefthatoneisaself;the tah-driven cognitions that
constitute the sense of self double as the vehicle through which
the self is
assumed.Thecognitiverelationbetweensenseofselfanditsdoxasticanchoristhusaverycloseone.Forthesesortofreasons,weshouldexpectsuchanaction-basedbelieftoremainrecalcitrantinthefaceofopposingtheoretically-basedevidence.
Yettheveryconsiderationsthatspeakinfavourofthebeliefinselfbeingrecalcitrantworkagainstitsbeingdoxasticallyanchored,takingustothesecondhornofthedilemma.Couldthedeeprecalcitrance,alongwith
the lackofparallelwithother illusions, indicate that
thesenseofself(evenwithouttheco-presenceofaconflictingbelief)isnotdoxasticallyanchoredatall,but
is rooted in
somethingentirelymoreprimitiveandpre-doxastic,suchasanalieforbasicpsychologi-calarchitecture?DamasioandPankseppbothregardtheimpressionof
42.
Throughsuchprocesses,therewouldcomeastageatwhichthesenseofselfiserodedenoughtopermitthefinalpurportedburstofinsight,uponwhichthedelusionofselfisseenthroughandcomprehendedinthedirectandin-tuitivewaythatIvebeencallingnoeticresonance.Whilesuchexperiencedoessuggestamodeofdirectobservation,Isurmisethatitwouldtranscendnormalconstraintsofsubjectversusobject,sothatordinarynotionsofelu-siveness(whichpresupposethisdivision)nolongerapply.Thisisatopicforfurtherinvestigation.
assumedviabilityofanaction-basedbeliefasbestexplanationforthedelusionofself.Ifthesenseofselfisnotafterallanchoredinabelief,thenmyanalysismustfail.
Tothefirsthorn:IthinkthatDoublespointabouttheMuller-LyerIllusiondoesnotcarryovertothatoftheself(includingaself
initscapacityofharbouringlibertarianfreewill).Whilediscoveringtherealstatusoftheopticalillusionwouldinvolveadiscernableshiftinourunderlyingemotionalandbehaviouralattitudestowardsthephenom-enon,sothatwenolongertakeitseriously,becomingconvinced(onjudgement-basedcriteria)thatthereisnoselfisnotlikelytoelicitananalogousshiftinmanifestationsoftah,suchthatwetaketheselfless
seriously.40 As Strawson implies, there is little evidence to
sug-gestthatphilosophersandBuddhistpractitionerswhobecomeintel-lectuallyconvincedthatthereisnoselfwillbeanylessemotionallyinvested
inprotecting the imaginedboundariesof their selves
thantheywerebefore. Indeed, there is likely
tobenodiscernablediffer-enceinthelevelsoftahbetweenthosewhoreflectivelyendorsetheexistenceofselfandthosewhodenyit.MaryAnaloguesfearatpublicspeakingisnotmerelythestuffoffiction.
Why might this be so? First, those advocating the reality of
ac-tion-basedbeliefsoftennotetheirconnectionwithdeeplyingrainedmodesofconditionedorinstinctualresponsetotheenvironmentthatareatbestslowtorespondtocontraryevidence,and
insection4,
Iconsiderseveralfurthercandidatesforsuchbelief.41Thebeliefsmaybeespeciallystubbornifthemodeofresponsehasevolvedtoaidsur-vival,asDamasiosupposesinthecaseoftheself.Afurtherreasonforrecalcitranceinthecaseoftheself,Isurmise,liesinthestructureofthesubject/objectdivision.Lyingonthesubjectsideofthedivision,
40.Recall our supposition that emotional and behavioural
manifestations
oftahcomprisetherelevantsortofaction-basedevidenceforbelievingoneisaself.
41.
WhileIshortlyconsideranalternativehypothesisofalief,agooddiscussionofdual-processcognition,whichoffersapsychologicalexplanationfor
therecalcitranceofvariousbeliefsthataretypicallyslowtoformandchange,canbefoundinKeithFrankish(2009).
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motor/affective tendencies that clashwith
judgement-basedbelief(Albahari,2014).Inparticular,aliefdoesnotprimarilyexplainthoseinstancesofdiscordantbehaviourandemotionthatfitstandardcri-teria
for action-based belief; action-based belief explains those.43
Alief offers the primary explanation for cases where
themotor-af-fectivetendenciesarebetterdescribedasmodulatingthedominant,judgement-concordantaffective-behaviouralarcwithopposingten-dencies.44Comparethetypicalbehavioursandemotionsofaheight-phobicandanon-phobicwhofindthemselvesontheglassSkywalk.Whilebothhavevertigoandrationallyjudgetheplatformtobesafe,onlythephobicsbehaviourandemotionfitsstandardaction-basedcriteriaofbelief-ascriptionshefeelsherlifetobeindangerasshedesperatelytriestoleavetheplatform.Shehasa(contradicting)be-lief
that the platform is unsafe.45 The non-phobics butterflies
andhesitancy in stepping, by contrast, are caused by aliefs that
serveto modulate her overarching, action-and-judgement-based
belief(manifestedthroughgut-levelfeelingsofsafetyandsteppingontheplatform)withopposingtendencies.46
43. Forevolutionaryreasonsdiscussed in thatpaper, I
rejectGendlersconten-tionthatbeliefcanonlybeascribedonjudgement-basedcriteria,asguidedbynormsofrationality.
44.
IsayprimaryexplanationasIholdthataliefhassomeexplanatoryroletoplayineverycasewherethereisthattripletofRABassociation,includingthoseofcontradictingbeliefs;itisjustthatintheselattercasesaliefisnotthemaincauseofthediscordantreaction.Isaymoreaboutcomplementaryrolesofaliefandbeliefinnote46.
45. I recognise that the notion of having contradicting beliefs
is contentious;moreonthissoon.
46.
InthatpaperIproposethatthesecriteriafordistinguishingalieffrombelief(inthecapacityofexplainingdiscordanttendencies)areaptlygroundedintheirdifferentandcomplementaryevolutionaryroles.
Iargue that theevo-lutionary role of beliefin keeping with the
common belief-desire plati-tudesis to guide and execute behaviour
(in conjunctionwith
prevailingdesires).Thefunctionofaliefisassociativeratherthanexecutive;itsroleistospeedupreactiontimebyassociatingrepresentationswithaffectiveandmo-torresponses,sothatwhenfeedingintotheaction-guidingbeliefcircuitry,theactionsarecarriedoutmuchfaster.Hencealiefswillalwaysmanifestaspar-tial(neverfullycarriedout)reactionsthatspeedilyassociaterepresentational,
aselftoariseataprimitiveneurologicallevel,involvingcircuitrythatcombinesbasic
sensory-motorwithaffective inputs.Taking
theirac-countsseriously,asIhavedone,seemstofavourapre-doxasticanaly-sis.Inowconsiderthepre-doxastichypothesesthatthesenseofselfisanchoredin(a)analief,andthen,(b)basicpsychologicalarchitecture,suchasamodelthebraincreatestoallowtheorganismtofunctionintheworld.
Tothealiefhypothesis.Aliefs(thetermwasrecentlyinventedbyT.S.
Gendler, 2008a, 2008b) are defined as primitive,
pre-doxastic,pre-rational, clusters of reaction to apparent
stimuli, that associaterepresentationalcontent(e.
g.aprecarious-lookingheight)withaffec-tivereactions(e.
g.feelingsoffear)andbehaviouralproclivities(e.
g.anurgetostepaway).Gendlerintroducesthenotionofalieftoprovideaunifyingexplanation
for
thosepuzzlingphenomenawherebehav-iouralandaffectivetendenciespersistinspiteofrationalbeliefstothecontrary:thinkofthecommonreaction(butterflies,shaking)tostep-pingontheglassSkywalkabovetheGrandCanyonthatwerationallyknowissafe.While
thenormforbelief, shesays, is
toberationallyresponsivetoall-things-consideredevidence,makingitappropriatetocriticiseasirrationalifstubbornlypersisting(suchasabeliefthatoneisabetterdriverthanoneis),aliefisnotgovernedbysuchnormsofrationality(2008b,570).Whilealiefsmaybeseenasundesirable(e.
g.incasesofracism),theirinherentunresponsivenesstoall-things-con-sideredevidencemakesitinappropriatetodeemthemirrational.Anychangestoformationsofaliefmustoccurgradually,throughprocessesofassociationandconditioning.Fromeverythingsaidsofar,itwouldseemthatthedeeplyrecalcitrant,survival-promotingassumptionofbeingaself,whichwouldautomaticallyandreflexivelyassociatethecontentwithfeelingsofemotionalattachmentandbe-haviouralproclivitiestoprotect,isaprimecandidateforalief.
Alief is a controversial cognitive category; some argue, for
in-stance,thatitdeflatesintobelief.Myowntakeonit,thatIdevelopatlengthelsewhere,isthataliefisanindependentcognitivecategorythat
(contraGendler) is not themain unifying explanation for all
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emotionsandbehaviourtoconstituteuniqueaction-basedevidenceforthereflexivebeliefthatoneisaboundedself.Butcouldthisanom-alyintheso-calledaction-basedcriteriabywhichanassumptionofselfispresupposedintheveryhavingofanordinaryaction-basedbe-liefsuggestanotherhypothesis?Couldthesenseofselfbeanchorednotinabeliefthatoneisaself,butinbasic,pre-doxasticpsychologicalarchitectureoraself-modelthatgroundsmuchofourordinarypsy-chologicalpracticesandbehaviours?
Iproposethatsomethinginbetweeniscorrect:thatthesenseofself,while
indeedanchoredinadeeppsychologicalstructureof
thesortdescribedbyDamasioandPanksepp,isneverthelessanchoredinastructurethatisdoxasticatitscore.Thevastedificeofneurological-ly-basedaffectiveandmotorproclivitiesthatcomprisethisstructureservesasthevehiclethatbearstheunifyingdoxasticcontent.Butwhatkindofaction-basedbeliefcoulditbe?Whileafulldefenceisnotpossiblehere,IsuggestthatwhatIvebeencallingtheassumptionofselfcloselyfitstheprofileofaframeworkbelief(orhingeproposition)
along the linesdescribedbyWittgenstein
inOnCertainty(1969)anddevelopedbylaterthinkerssuchasLisaBortol-loti(2010).Frameworkbeliefsareaxiomaticassumptionsthatplayafoundationalroleintheformationofotherbeliefs;theyarecentraltoourworldview.Ratherthanbeingobjectsofovertknowledgeorbeliefwithintheframework,theyareappealedtoorassumedwhenjustify-ingorformingotheritemsofknowledgeandbelief.Frameworkbeliefsaretypicallytakencompletelyforgranted.AsBortolottiputsit:Thecommitmenttoaframeworkpropositionispervasiveandmanifestedinmany
instances of behaviour, although the belief remains in
thebackgroundandmayneverbeexplicitlyreportedorjustified(2010,192).Theyarelikelytobediscovered,ratherthanexplicitlylearnt:
Idonotexplicitlylearnthepropositionsthatstandfastforme.Icandiscoverthemsubsequentlyliketheaxisaroundwhichabodyrotates.Thisaxisisnotfixedinthesense
Ifmyaccountiscorrect,
thenthecaseoftheselfdoesnotfittheprofileofamerealief, for it
resembles thecaseof thephobicmorethan thatof thehesitant
stepper.47Consider the typical self-deniersthought that something
unpleasant is about to befall them.
Theirtah-influencedemotionsandbehaviours(taken,sofar,asthemostlikelyaction-basedcriteriaforaffirmingtheexistenceofself)arenotaptlydescribedasmerelymodulating
adominant action-and-judge-ment-based belief in no self with
self-like tendencies. Tah
drivestheiremotionsoftrepidationandbehavioursofavoidance.Asnotedearlier,theirleveloftahislikelytobenolesspronouncedthaninthosewhoreflectivelyendorsetheselfsexistence.Soifnotanchoredinmerelyanalief,isthesenseofselfanchoredinanaction-basedbe-lief?Herewenowfaceadifferentproblem;thereflexivebeliefintheselfsexistencedoesnotconformtostandardaction-basedcriteria.
Letusrevisit
thecriteriaathand.Onthebelief-desireanalysis,abelief that P
dispose[s] the subject to behave in certainways thatwouldpromote
thesatisfactionofhisdesires if itscontent
[P]weretrue(Velleman,2000,255).Onthepatternsofemotionanalysis:IfSdesiresthatP,thencomingtobelievethatPwillelicitpositiveemo-tion,andcoming
tobelievenot-Pwill elicitnegativeemotion (Zim-merman,2007,64).
Ifwesubstitute theselfexists
forP,wequicklyseethatneitherformulaapplies.Forastart,theexistenceofselfisnotsomethingthatfromanaction-basedperspectivewecometobelieve,whichwould
in turncausevariousemotional reactions. Indeed,
thestandardaction-basedcriteria(bywhichasubject
isdisposedtobe-haveinwaystopromotethesatisfactionofdesirebecominghappierthedesiresaresatisfiedandlesshappyiftheyarenot)presupposethesubjecttobeinthegripoftah.SofarIhavebeentakingtah-driven
motorandaffectivecontentmostnoticeablyinbelief-discordantcases,butalso
in the vitally importantbelief-concordant cases, such
aswhenhastilysteppingawayfromamovingcar(Albahari2014).
47. The examples of phobia, superstition, and clinical delusion,
as I
describetheminthefollowingsection,willalsofittheprofileofbeliefratherthanalief,althoughadoxasticdiagnosiswillnotuniformlyapplytoallsuchphenomenawithinthosecategories(e.
g.clinicaldelusions).
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Viewingtheassumptionofselfasanaction-basedframeworkbe-liefthatcanpossiblyberevisedisilluminating,asitthrowsintorelieftheutterenormityofwhatwouldbeentailedbyitseventualrevision.48
Theinitialassertionofanopposingjudgement-basedbelief
thereisnoselfnowappearsasamerechippingatthetipofaniceberg,atinyshadowofcontradiction.Withthedisintegrationofthevastedificeofcognitions
that express self-assumingpreferences, aversions,
anxiet-ies,identities,etc.,andtheirreplacementbyasetofcognitionsconsis-tentwiththerebeingnoself,wouldcomearadicalalterationofonesentirewayof
thinkingand livingexactlyasdescribed
inBuddhisttexts.49IreturntothisthemeinPa