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INSIDE MEDITATION
Interiority, Reflexivity and Genre in Descartes Meditations.
by
Juan Carlos Donado
September 2012
Submitted to the New School for Social Research of the New
School in partial fullfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy. Dissertation Committee: Dr. Dmitri Nikulin
Dr. Richard J. Bernstein Dr. Zed Adams Dr. Miran Bozovic
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2012 Juan Carlos Donado
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Caveat pseudophilosophorum lectione & consortio, nihil enim
quamlibet scientiam addiscenti periculosius est, qum imperiti aut
dolosi ingenii commercium, quo falsa pro veris principia
inculcantur, quibus bon fide mala doctrin imbuitur candidus animus.
Arcanum hermeticae Philosophiae Opus. Canon VIII. 1623.
(Take heed of reading and keeping company with
pseudo-philosophers; nothing, in fact, is more dangerous for the
learner of any science than commerce with an ignorant and deceitful
spirit, by means of whom false principles are inculcated for truth,
whereby a spotless soul of good faith is imbued with false
doctrine.)
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In memoriam I.
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vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
I. PRELIMINARY NOTE 1
II. INTRODUCTION. 3
III. ABOUT THIS TRANSLATION. 13
Inside Meditation.
A. THE CONFESSIONAL. 15
0. Section Overview. 16
1. The Logic of Confession. 16
2. The Spiritual Manual. 25
3. The Confessional in the Meditations: Already now some years
ago 44
B. THE LITERARY 77
0. Section Overview. 78
1. I Withdraw Alone. 79
2. Sitting by the Fire. 85
3. The Fiction of Dreams. 92
4. Reading Derrida Reading Foucault Reading Descartes. 98
5. Reading Foucault Reading Derrida Reading Foucault Reading
106
6. The Impossible Fiction of Madness? 115
7.On the Way to the Evil Genius: Concerning Opinions. 122 8. On
the Way to the Evil Genius: Some Would Prefer to Declare It a
Fiction. 128
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vii
9. The Fiction of the Evil Genius and the Cogito. 137
C. THE METAPHYSICAL 146
0. Section Overview (or Metaphysics In Titulus). 147
1. Descartes Video System. 151
2. Naturally Natural Light. 157
3. Clarity and Distinction. 170
4. Image and Reality of Error. 179
5. Tension and Contention of the Imagination. 195
Appendix: Reading Coincidence or Concerning the Search for The
Search for Truth by means of Natural Light. 208 Bibliography.
219
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1
I. Preliminary Note.
Although in what follows we borrow the term self-writing from
the works of
Michel Foucault, two main reasons compel us to keep our distance
from the general
thrust of his analyses. The first consists in Pierre Hadots
criticisms of the
Foucauldian notion of criture de soi or self-writing as a
traditional technique for
constituting the self.1 Summarily, Hadot believes one writes not
to forge oneself a
spiritual identity by writing, but rather to liberate oneself
from ones individuality, in
order to raise oneself up to universality (Hadot, p. 210). Hadot
makes an important
point about Foucaults interpretation of the relation between
time and writing, arguing
that Foucaults take on the role of self-writing as essentially
interested in capturing
the past and inflecting the soul toward meditation on the past
is simply a mistaken
interpretation (Hadot, p. 209). For Hadot, the ancients were
concerned with
possesing not the past, but the present (ibid.). Hadot further
states: Writing, like
other spiritual exercises, changes the level of the self, and
universalizes it. The
miracle of this exercise, carried out in solitude, is that it
allows its practitioner to
accede to the universality of reason within the confines of
space and time (ibid., p.
211).
The second reason for keeping our distance from Foucault has to
do with his
interpretation of the evolution of confession in the History of
Sexuality v. I: An
Introduction. Foucault interprets it as follows: By integrating
it into the beginnings
of a scientific discourse, the nineteenth century altered the
scope of confession; it no
1 For the whole of Hadots discussion, see: Pierre Hadot, pp.
206-213.
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2
longer concerned itself solely with what the subject wished to
hide, but with what was
hidden from himself (Foucault 1990, p. 66). Even though
Foucaults analysis are
to be considered only an introduction, for eventually he would
grapple with
confession in the last and unpublished- volume of The History of
Sexuality entitled
Confessions of the Flesh, it is still highly inaccurate, in our
view, to assert that at
some point in the history of confession the subject has not been
concerned with what
was hidden from himself. This is as manifest in Judaism as it is
in Christianity.
Augustine, for instance, while opening up his Confessions (Book
I. 5. 6), articulates
his project by precisely quoting Psalm 19:12: Who can understand
[his] errors?
Cleanse thou me from secret [faults] (Ab occultis meis munda me,
domine). The
quote clearly establishes that, at its core, the confessional
ideal also involves, in
Foucaults words, that which is hidden from the subject
himself.
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II. Introduction: Making a Reading.
To begin by asking what it means to make a reading is not at all
alien to the
Cartesian spirit. Indeed, in a much celebrated passage at the
beginning of Meditation
I, the analysis whereof will be a constant point of return for
us, Descartes depicts the
actitivity of meditation his own retreat as a meditating
subject- as essentially
involving writing. Being essential to meditation, writing
arguably demands that
reading be essential too. Thus, a more careful examination of
the Meditations
composition yields enough material to launch an enquiry into the
author/ reader
relation for, to our knowledge, there is no other volume in the
Western philosophical
canon that, picking up on the tradition of the scholastic
Summae, reaches the public
from its very first edition as a work that has been explicitly
read and objected to, not
by an anonymous collectivity, but by identifiable others.2
Radically innovating within the tradition of the Summae, the
Meditations
effect an alteration in the presentation of same and other as
such principles relate to
the notions of an authorial I and a reader. In terms of the
principle of sameness, the
author is made reader of the readers objections who, in terms of
the principle of
otherness, having reacted to the author as readers, become
authors themselves. This
becoming of author into reader and reader into author places
same and other in a
2 Amlie Oksenberg Rorty holds a similar view when she states:
The Objections and Replies are themselves transformations of a
tradition Descartes invites his opponents to speak for themselves,
in their own words, for as long as they like: not a constructed
dialogue but a genuine correspondence. Nor does he edit his
interlocutors not a Thommistic snippet Sed Contra followed quickly
by a Responsio. Nor does he present a showy dialectical Disputatio,
with a defendens and impugnans. Rather he asks respected fellow
scholars to present him with their criticisms. Their objections and
his replies are published together; readers can weigh and consider
the merits of the arguments in privacy and at their leisure rather
than immediately, at a public event (Rorty, p. 19).
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rather peculiar poietic relation, which does not lack
reflexivity: Descartes readers are
made authors by making a reading of the Meditations, and
Descartes himself is made
author once more by making a reading of the readings that have
been presented as
objections.
The Meditations, therefore, open up the bibliographic space,
from the Greek for
book () and writing (), where this poiesis historically takes
place. As
our essential task will be to show here, we will advance the
claim that the author/
reader relation within the six Meditationes also involves a
similar poiesis a poiesis
we will address in terms of a conceptual transition. We must
straightforwardly say
that, in our own mind, there is no doubt that Descartes himself
picks up on this
intensification and almost redoubling of the notion of reading,
as he demands from
us, in his Preface to the Reader, that we become the readers of
the readers. Asking us
to withold judging the entire project of the Meditations until
reading what others have
put forth in the Objections, such readings are considered now to
be a part of the
whole:
But because I yet do not promise to satisfy straightforwardly on
everything from the beginning; nor do I confer upon myself so much
confidence so as to believe that I am capable of foreseeing which
difficulties may anyone observe, first of all, in the Meditations,
I will set forth those thoughts by means of which I have, in my
view, arrived at a certain and evident knowledge of the truth, so
that I can experience if the same arguments, which have convinced
me, will perhaps allow me to convince others. Afterwards, however,
I will reply to the objections of various men of excellent
intellect and scholarship to whom these Meditations were sent for
examination before they were submitted to print. For what they
objected was so much and so varied that I would dare to hope that
it will not be easy for anything other to come to mind for anyone
else, at least of any importance, which they have not touched on.
And therefore I likewise ask the readers not to pass judgement on
the
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Meditations, until they have been kind enough to read through
all these objections and their replies (AT VII, 10-11).
(Quia ver nequidem etiam aliis spondeo me in omnibus prim fronte
satisfacturum, nec tantum mihi arrogo ut confidam me omnia posse
praevidere quae alicui difficilia videbuntur, prim quidem in
Meditationibus illas ipsas cogitationes exponam, quarum opem ad
certam et evidentem cognitionem veritatis mihi videor pervenisse,
ut experiar an fort iisdem rationibus, quibus ego persuasus sum,
alios etiam possim persuadere. Postea vero respondebo ad
objectiones virorum aliquot ingenio et doctrin excellentium, ad
quos haec Meditationibus, antequam typis mandarentur, examinandae
missae sunt. Satis enim multa et varia ab illis fuerunt objecta, ut
ausim sperare non facile quicquam aliis, saltem alicujus momenti,
venturum in mentem, quod ii nondum attigerint. Ideoque rogo etiam
Lectores, ut non prius de Meditationibus judicium ferant, qum
objectiones istas earumque solutiones omnes perlegere dignati
sint.)
We will attempt to sketch the contours of our hermeneutical
horizon by explicitly
taking a poietical stance that will result in yielding a
depiction. By this we mean that
our attempt consists in making a reading that eventually offers
a depiction of the
writing involved in the Meditations. This making demands the
making of the
elemental building blocks out of which we aspire to understand
the relationship
between author and reader a relationship that will be thought in
terms of a transition
between two sets of equivalencies. What will characterize the
reflexivity of our own
project can be said to consist in that, making a reading to
depict writing, this
depiction of writing will only be completed as we understand the
role of reading
itself. Ultimately, such reflexivity will only be achieved once
we unfold the immanent
relations existing between reading, writing, and the exercise of
meditation.
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What type of writing, and with it, what type of reading does a
project like the
Meditations involve? From the very start we would like to push
an analogy: if the
Meditations are thought to involve a type of writing that, using
Michel Foucaults
expression, we could call self-writing, the reading they summon
could also be
considered a self-reading. Already in the Preliminary Note, we
have mentioned that
Foucault essentially conceived self-writing as a technique for
what he called
constituting the self. We also noted that Pierre Hadot replied
to Foucaults
interpretation of self-writing by critically changing the terms
of what is at stake,
claiming that self-writing aspires, rather than to constitute
the self, to universalize it
by changing the level of the self.
For our own purposes here, we would like to take a different
stance from both
Foucault and Pierre Hadot, only to say that, in what regards the
Meditations, a
dialectical sublation or Aufhebung could well be what fits the
case. By this we mean
that, while constituting the self through writing, the
Meditations self-writing would
be aspiring to constitute an essentially universalizable self.
This constitution of the
universal would occur through the reading of the self-writing we
are trying to
describe, which eventually would result in the selfs
constitution through reading or
through what we have called self-reading.
Within the interrelatedness of self-writing and self-reading,
two moments
would be clearly distinguishable: one belonging to the
constitution of a self whose
architectural parameters consist in universalizability. This
moment can be said to be
essentially but not exclusively related to the self-writing of
the Meditations. A second
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moment, nevertheless, where such universalizability actually
becomes universal or, if
you will, where such universalizability passes from the
potentiality latent in the selfs
construction to a universal actuality, would be essentially
related to self-reading. The
non-exclusion of both moments can be understood by grasping that
the telos of the
entire written construction is the actualization of the
universal in self-reading. In his
own terms, we take Descartes himself to be conceiving a similar
state of affairs, when
straightforwardly affirming: Rather, I am not an author to those
who read, except
only to those who are willing to seriously meditate with me
(Quin etiam nullis
author sum ut haec legant, nisi tantm iis qui seri mecum
meditari) (AT VII, 9).
In order for the concept of self-reading to gain the robustness
we aspire, we
will have to further determine its conceptual boundaries.
Consequently, we would
like to address the notions of self-writing and self-reading by
attempting to describe
the summoning between both as technically consisting in a
conceptual transition from
one series of first person singular equivalencies (or I
equivalencies) to another. The
first series of I equivalencies pertains to the author, just
like the second pertains to
the reader. The dynamic we have in mind consists in
transitioning from the
equivalencies: author = meditator = character, into the set of
equivalencies: reader =
meditator = character. Transitioning from one set of I
equivalencies to the other will
be made possible by means of certain modifications exercised on
the interiority of the
first person singular. Availability and access to the Is
interiority will therefore be
the condition of possibility for the entire project of the
Meditations. The operations
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performed on the subjects inner space will clear the path for
constructing the space
of the I in such a way that such space can be literally
in-habited by the reader.
Correlating to the terms contained in the I equivalencies, our
analysis of
interiority will center on three of its avatars. These are the
elemental building blocks
for making our reading: the first is the confessional, the
second the literary, and the
third is the metaphysical. Although individually identifiable,
these various avatars are
not conceived as excluding each other. On the contrary, we will
at some points walk
the extra mile to spot the essential points of contact between
them. As if dealing with
three Cartesian planes that we would translucently want to place
on top of each other,
characterized by the operations performed within their
respective inner spaces, each
avatar of interiority will allow us to plot certain inner
coordinates.
We could offer a brief sketch of what we intend to do by saying
that the
authorial aspect of the I closely relates to the confessional
avatar of interiority, just
as the character relates to the literary and the meditator to
the metaphysical. But even
as we begin to make such one-to-one correlations, the conceptual
plasticity of the
Meditations rather Cartesianly overwhelms us, and the organicity
in which these
notions and avatars appear almost immediately makes us abandon
such an inflexible
starting point.
Having said this, we would rather begin again and state that, at
a first moment,
the confessional avatar relates especially to the subjects
auto-biographical history, as
it pertains to an author who confesses his or her personal
experience. At the same
time, nevertheless, immanent limits are drawn to the
confessional in the Meditations,
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when Descartes own confession of a vital crisis that leads to
the search for truth
halts, only because a more detailed self-narrative would create
a character that, being
too particularly determined, would risk obstructing the reader
from further occupying
the authors place and, therefore, would obstruct the meditators
meditation.
We could speak similarly about the literary, where an entire
literary mise en
scne will depict the character while in his or her meditative
retreat. Simultaneously,
nevertheless, the character will employ this same literary mise
en scne to deploy
certain fictional devices, such as the fiction of dreams and the
fiction of the evil
genius, that allow radical doubt to extend itself, corroding
previous certainties and
driving the meditator to discover various metaphysical
truths.
Grasping how these equivalencies relate to each other will put
us in a position
to provide a better understanding of Descartes employment of the
first person
singular as a placeholder for every reader (Hatfield, p. 50). It
is in tandem with the
author/ reader relation, therefore, essentially related to the
notion of placeholder, that
we would like to think of universal subjectivity generating
itself in the Meditations.
From the authors perspective, one could risk saying, the gamble
involved in the
Meditations ultimately consists in failing to produce the
conceptual transition
sketched above.
Such transition, nevertheless, does not necessarily demand
symmetrical terms.
On the contrary, the assymetricity involved in this conceptual
movement hinges on
requiring the readers willful acceptance and, therefore, hinges
on the fact that such
transition cannot do away with the notion of the gift. Simply
put, the reader ultimately
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allows him or herself to step into the space the author has
prepared. Berel Lang puts it
clearly enough when he states: Rather, if the reader chooses to
reenact what the
author has done, if he follows the procedure indicated by the
latter, he may establish
for himself what the writer has established; it is that personal
and individual
construction, a constitution of the philosophical self, which is
the prospect offered by
the writer (Lang, p. 55). This, of course, does not mean that
the author will not
employ every weapon in his or her arsenal to magnetically draw
the reader in. The
analysis of such arsenal lies at the core of our interests in
this text.
While speaking about self-writing, we will limit ourselves to
merely opening a
question that oversteps the boundaries of this inquiry. The
question concerns Plato
and his famous remarks about writing in the Pheadrus (274b ff).
It is well known that
Plato divides writing roughly into two: on one hand, he presents
us with the writing
that occurs physically, as it were, words that have been written
down in ink
(275d, 276c). On the other, he presents us with the writing that
is written in the soul
of the listener (276a). The first type of writing is famously
compared to a mute
offspring that, as a text passes from reader to reader reaching
indiscriminately those
with understanding no less than those that have no business with
it (275e), is left to
roam the earth without the aid of the father or author. The
second type of writing is
compared to the experience of dialectic exchange, where
knowledge is bestowed from
master to disciple in an oral manner that vitally transforms the
soul and produces a
seed from which more discourse grows in the character of others
(277a).
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Leaving aside the complex interrogations Platos distinctions
generate within
his own written corpus, the question we want to pose has to do
with the place of self-
writing as it relates to the Pheadrus framework: doesnt
self-writing represent the
finest perspective to think through the Phaedrus conception of
writing? Two
positions, at least in our mind, could be taken to tackle such
question. The first would
consider Plato as not being a self-writer a position that could
be argued for based on
his Letter VI (341c-d), which we will shortly quote in full. In
such an interpretation,
given the immanent need self-writing carries of both
transforming the self and
producing a written text, it would precisely be the type of
writing that locates itself on
the seams of the Phaedrus distinctions.
The second position, on the other hand, would consist in
thinking of Plato
himself as the self-writer par excellence, attempting to explain
his choice of genre
(dialogue) precisely as the genre that allows the making visible
line by line- of the
transformations of a self engaged in the exercise of dialogue
and dialectic. Naturally,
were this the case, yet another example of Socratic irony would
be in store, given that
by offering the examples of writing he does in the Phaedrus,
Plato would be precisely
excluding his own writing or self-writing from the analysis.
This exclusion, in the
end, would become an eliptic inclusion, for Platos dialogues
would precisely stand at
a middle point between writing in ink and writing in the
soul.
Finally, as a gesture to the reader, we would like to frame the
reflexivity of
our project yet again, this time by quoting Guillaume de
Saint-Thierry, who stated
concerning reading and meditation that reading arouses a
meditation that resembles
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it (Saint-Thierry, p. 257).3 As we have already emphazised, our
reading is a reading
of the writing involved in the exercise of meditation. We would
consequently want to
leave it up to the readers mind to consider what type of
meditation should ressemble
this reading.
3 Lectionis quippe modum similis meditatio sequi solet (Latin
text quoted in Belin, p. 71).
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III. About this Translation.
Our analysis will focus on the original 1641-1642 Latin editions
of Descartes
Meditationes de Prima Philosophia. Due to the terminological
accuracy needed for
our reading, we will provide our own translations of the
passages quoted from the
Meditations, offering beside them the original Latin text as
warrantor of our choices.
John Cottinghams English translation of the Meditations, which
has become the
standard for Cartesian scholars, though accurate and elegant, is
certainly liberal. To
illustrate our point using an example that will be crucial for
us, Cottingham decides to
render the notion of admission (from the Latin admitto) as
accepted (Descartes 2005,
v.ii., p. 12). Although not technically wrong, we do not deem it
necessary to distance
ourselves from Descartes original linguistic universe, putting
into play a different set
of verbal roots and prefixes as in ac-cipio, instead of focusing
on the precise
dynamics of ad-mitto.4
In what concerns alternate translations, at the other extreme of
Cartesian
scholarship, George Heffernans bilingual edition of the
Meditations has also been
invaluable for our own renditions. Due to its explicit
literality, nevertheless,
Heffernan oftentimes sacrifices readability, making the
popularity and elegance of the
Meditations as a philosophical pocket book (an important part of
the Cartesian
project, one might claim) difficult to understand for a
non-Latin English reader.
4 Whereas the ad in ad-mitto is a single preposition meaning
towards, the ac in ac-cipio is a contraction of atque or ad + que,
meaning and even or and also. The difference between mitto and
capio is perhaps even starker, given that capio means to take or
seize, whereas mitto means to let go or send off. For a fuller
analysis of admitto, see Chapter One, section three below.
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This having been acknowledged, there are also particular
differences in
terminology with Heffernan that make our own translation a
necessity. For instance,
early on in Meditation I (AT, VII 17), when Descartes expresses
the urgency of his
meditative retreat, Heffernan renders the sentence as: I would
be at fault if by
deliberating I were to consume that time which remains for what
is to be done
(Descartes 1990, p. 87). Descartes original expression for what
Heffernan translates
as at fault is in culpa, which literally involves the notion of
guilt or culpa. The
importance of these nuances will be made clear in what
follows.
Our ideal for translation, therefore, has been to strike a
harmonious chord
between elegance and rigour that, alongside our interpretation
of the text, delivers the
intensity of Descartes writing. To accompany the present essay
with a bilingual
translation of the Meditations still remains a desideratum and
constitutes, perhaps,
our horizon of full projective completeness.
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A. The Confessional.
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0. Section Overview.
Scholars have suggested that Descartes Meditations begin as
an
epistemological confession.5 Indeed, the tone of the project
(its mood6) is quite
radically set by the voice of a meditating subject who seems to
be disclosing intimate
circumstances. It is precisely this confessional aspect,
simultaneously disclosing a
history of interiority and showing that the meditator himself
has a life that runs
alongside the present meditative retreat, that gives the project
of the Meditations its
astoundingly personal character. To examine the particularity of
the confessional
space of the Meditations, nevertheless, we will first need to
philosophically examine
two closely related subjects. The first is the structure of
traditional confession, having
Augustines Confessions in mind as a paradigm of written
confession; the second is
the genre of the spiritual manual, focusing on Ignatius of
Loyolas paradigmatic
Spiritual Exercises. The link between both and their relation to
Descartes
Meditations will hopefully be made clear in the last section of
this chapter.
1. The Logic of Confession.
It would certainly take more space than the one allotted here to
trace the
Judaic roots of the practice of confession as they permeate the
whole Pentateuch,
5 Nikulin 2006, p. 130. 6 Cfr. Wilson, p. 10.
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clearly back to the book of Leviticus.7 Even a full examination
of the practice of
confession in Christianity oversteps the boundaries of this
text. For our purposes,
instead, purposes in no way historically exhaustive but
logically structural, it will be
necessary to take a step back both from the institutional
establishment of the practice
of penance in the Fourth Lateran Council early in the 13th
century,8 and from
interpretations concerning practices of penance in the Early
Church, such as the
exmologesis considered paradigmatic by Foucault as it is
described by Tertullian in
his On Repentance.9
The reason behind such conceptual focus consists in the fact
that, as many
scholars have noted, the political context of the
institutionalization of penance is not
always irrelevant.10 In the second case, as Foucault himself
highlights, exmologesis
has more to do with the dramatic aspect of the revival of
confessed sins than with the
transformation of the practice of confession into a written
one.11 Even though a line
7 See: Lev 5:5: And it shall be, when he shall be guilty in one
of these things, that he shall confess that he hath sinned in that
thing (emphasis ours). All quotations from Scripture in English,
unless otherwise stated, come from the King James Version. 8 In
1215, canon 21 of the Fourth Lateran Council made it an obligation
of every Christian to confess at least once a year to his own
priest (Lacoste, p. 1219). 9 See: Tertullian On Repentance, chaps.
9-12. 10 Penance could be administered as a judicial penalty by
Church and Emperor acting together against a common enemy. For by
c. 1000 penance had a long history as a political punishment
administered by rulers as well as bishops (Hamilton, p. 1). 11
Another point of contention against the Foucauldian interpretation
of exmologesis might be based on his conceptual neglect of the fact
that Tertullians radicality has much to do with the relation
between paenitentia and paenitentia secunda, which already
represents a purification after baptism. More clearly, paenitentia
secunda or exmologesis consists in the possibility of purification
after the primordial purification brought about by conversion and
its corresponding sacrament: baptism. Sin after baptism is, for
Tertullian, a particularly dramatic situation within the Church,
for a Christian
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might be drawn from the public aspect of the exteriorization
involved in exmologesis
to the publication involved in confessional writing, the fact
that exmologesis itself is
a reenactment or representation that takes place in front of an
audience, makes it
radically different from the presentation or representation of
sins that takes place at
the face of the reader.
The line of thought we will be attempting to examine here,
therefore, intends
to nuclearly focus on the tradition that Augustine himself was
drawing from,
inquiring into the interrelation between the two verbs employed
in the Greek New
Testament to signify the activity of confession.12
There are two Greek verbs used in the New Testament, rendered
into English
as to confess: homologe (),13 generally employed to signify a
confession of
faith, and exomologe (),14 generally used as confession of sins.
Even at
first sight the proximity between both verbs can be
linguistically grasped, for it is
plain that exomologe consists of the verb homologe plus the
prefix ek. Found in
when baptized should have already turned away from sin: Penance
is often described as a second baptism, a renewal of the original
initiation in the Church (Rapp, p. 127). Guy Stroumsa is clear to
draw these relationships when he states that baptism was identified
with an act of metanoia. The act of re-integration into the
community, therefore, would be a a second metanoia, a paenitentia
secunda (Stroumsa, p. 173). 12 All Latin and Greek etymologies
using both the Lewis and Short and LSJ lexicons were consulted
on-line at:
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/morph?redirect=true&lang=la
13 For the passages where is used cfr. Mat 7:23, Mat 10:32 (2x),
Mat 14:7, Luk 12:8 (2x), Jhn 1:20 (2x) Jhn 9:22, Jhn 12:42, Act
7:17, Act 23:8, Act 24:14, Rom 10:9, Rom 10:10, 1Ti 6:13, Heb
11:13, Heb 13:15, 1Jo 1:9, 1Jo 2:23, 1Jo 4:3, 1Jo 4:15, 2Jo 1:7,
Rev 3:5. 14 For cfr: Mat 3:6, Mat 11:25, Mar 1:5, Luk 10:21, Luk
22:6, Act 19:18, Rom 14:11, Rom 15:9, Phl 2:11, Jam 5:16.
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19
twenty six verses throughout the New Testament, homologe
literally means to say
the same, for which reason among its meanings one also finds to
agree, to
acknowledge, and to promise.
Although still present in the meaning of confession as exomologe
(found
only in ten New Testament verses), this latter verb carries with
it the important
connotation of also meaning to praise.15 Thus one finds
exomologe being used either
with a direct, accusative object in the sense of confessing
sins: And [they] were
baptized in the Jordan, confessing their sins ( ) (Matt
3:6); with an indirect, dative object in the sense of praise: I
thank/ praise thee
( , ) (Matt 11:25, Luk 10:21); or by itself in the sense of
giving consent: He consented/promised () and watched for an
opportunity... (Luk 22:6). What interests us here is that, even
though a certain
constancy might be said to exist within the four gospels in the
use of homologe as a
confession of faith and exomologe as confession of sins, already
by the time of the
writing of the first Johannine epistle, homologe is also being
used in the sense of a
confession of sins.16
About three hundred years later, by the time Augustine is
writing his
Confessions, contemporaneous with Jeromes translation of the
Vulgata Latina, a
semantic unification has already occurred: not only has the
meaning of both
15 This captures in Greek the spirit of the Hebrew verb
Le-hodot, both to thank and to confess. 16 1Jhn 1:9: If we confess
our sins ( ).
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20
exomologe and homologe collapsed into the Latin verb
confiteor,17 but even the
various meanings of exomologe as to confess and to praise (with
the sole exception
of Luk 22:6, where Jerome translates exomologe for spondeo) are
rendered by
Jerome with the same Latin verb.18
It is not surprising that this phenomenon eventually took place,
for such
linguistic interchangeability is ultimately based on the
conceptual proximity of the
two branches of confession. That is: a confession of sins
(exomologe) does not occur
without an implicit confession of faith in a normative standard
to which the
confessant aspires and in relation to which he or she has fallen
short. In turn, the
explicit belief in the existence of this standard is what is
actually verbalized in the
case of a confession of faith (homologe).
Both branches of confession can also be said to touch in what
regards the
notion of witnessing or , for both types of confession demand
the bearing of
a witness in front of self and other, either against oneself or,
as it were, for the faith.
And even though it is not accurate to assert that all
testimonies are confessional, for
our purposes here we will consider all confessions pertaining to
the tradition of Latin
confessio to be testimonial. In the case, for instance, of a
confession of faith
(homologe), the confessant bears witness of his or her faith in
front of God and
another who simultaneously witnesses such a bearing of witness.
It is in this dynamic
that we encounter the first instance of confessional reflexivity
as it relates to 17 The only place where Jerome does not translate
for confiteor is Matt 14:7 where, in the sense of to promise, he
uses the phrasing: cum iuramento pollicitus est. 18 See summarily
in the Vulgata Latina Matt 3:6, 11:25, and 1Jhn 1:9.
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21
witnessing: the other who witnesses a confession immediately,
and inevitably,
becomes a witness of the bearing of witness.
Its history of martyrs aside, the word martyr actually deriving
from the Greek
for witness or , in Christianity there are two paradigmatic
instances of the
witness. As a couple of passages already cited clearly state,19
the foremost witness is
Christ, who in the book of Revelation, for instance, is
described precisely as the
faithful witness or (Rev 1:5). It is not necessary or even
possible
to examine this topic in more detail here (for the topic of
witnessing traverses almost
the whole Gospel of John), but rather exhibit the second
paradigmatic instance of the
witness in Christianity: that of John the Baptist, who in the
opening verses of the
same Gospel of John is described precisely as one who came to
bear witness of the
light ( ) (Jhn 1:7).
It is worthwhile to note how the notion of the witness and the
two notions of
confession relate to the figure of John the Baptist, for it is
concerning him that the
first use of occurs in the New Testament. 20 The other branch
of
confession (homologe) is also clearly associated to his figure
in the following
context: while the people confess their sins to John the Baptist
(), John
the Baptist himself confesses in front of the people that he is
not the Christ: And he
confessed () and denied not (); but confessed (), I
19 See: Mat 10:32. 20 See: Mat 3:6.
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22
am not the Christ (Jhn 1:20). Both in this passage and in the
verse succeeding the
aforementioned Matt 10:32, the verb homologe is explicitly,
almost rhetorically,
opposed to the verb (to deny, refuse or negate), clearly
establishing the
positivity implied in the activity of confession as
homologe.
Taking a step towards the general analysis of confession, we
would like to
conceptualize the stance represented by John the Baptist so as
to summarize what is
philosophically at stake in the tradition that Latin confessio
eventually inherits. We
will claim that the Baptists witness epitomizes the link between
the two stances of
confession and its relationship to light, for every confession
that places itself within
this tradition will have to involve a personal witness of the
determinations of light
(). This means: every confession that entails a witness will
demand both a
positive affirmation of what light is and a negative
determination of what light is not.
It might be objected that a determination of the metaphor of
light is always
involved, from the Platonic dialogues onwards, in the activity
of philosophizing. In
Platos case, nevertheless, we must say that what distinguishes
the determinations of
light attempted in his work (under the guise of the idea of the
good) from the tradition
that leads to Latin confessio is the personal aspect of his
presentation: Socrates, of
course, is not Plato. Precisely, the interest generated by the
famous Letter VII,
considered by some the first political confession (Nikulin 2006,
p. 130), consists
in such text being the only instance we know where Plato himself
uses the first person
singular to state, among other things, that there has never been
or will there ever be a
written doctrine ascribable to Plato about certain problems with
which I [Plato] am
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23
concerned There is no writing of mine about these matters, or
will there ever be
one. For this knowledge is not something that can be put into
words (Letter VII,
341c-d).
What we intend to examine here is that from the New Testament to
various
Early Church Fathers, the practice of confession has always been
immanently linked
to a personal determination of light. It is not coincidental
that two of the closest, most
probable antecedents of Augustines Confessions, Justin Martyr
(ca. 100-165 CE) and
Cyprian (ca. 200-258 CE), articulate the confession of their own
conversions using
precisely the metaphor of light. As told in the Dialogue with
Trypho, right before his
own conversion, Justin Martyr has an encounter with a
respectable old man who tells
him: Above all, beseech God to open to you the gates of light
(Saint Justin Martyr,
p. 160). Right after this encounter, Justin experiences his own
conversion, which he
describes using another image of light: But my spirit was
immediately set on fire I
discovered that his was the only useful philosophy (ibid.).
Cyprian of Carthage, on the other hand, in the beautiful epistle
Ad Donatus,21
describes his state before and after conversion as a lying in
darkness and gloomy
night (in tenebris atque in nocte caeca iacerem), wavering
hither and thither, tossed
about on the foam of this boastful age, and uncertain of my
wandering steps, knowing
nothing of my real life, and remote from truth and light
(veritatis ac lucis alienus).
But after that a light from above, serene and pure, had been
infused (lumen infundit)
into my reconciled heart (Ad Donatus, 3-4). 21 In The
Ante-Nicene Fathers v.5, pp. 275-280, edited by A. Roberts and J.
Donaldson. Grand Rapids, MI: W. M. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.
1986.
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24
But one must look no further than Augustine himself who, after
hearing a
boys voice or a girls voice that tells him to open the
Scriptures and read, describes
his own conversion as follows: For in that instant, with the
very ending of the
sentence, it was as though a light of utter confidence shone in
all my heart, and all the
darkness of uncertainty vanished away (quasi luce securitatis
infusa cordi meo omnes
dubitationis tenebrae diffugerunt) (Confessions, X. VIII.
29).
To consider this tradition as positing two truths, one external
(God) and one
internal (the self) (Taylor, p. 17) is to greatly misinterpret
the issue. Although it is
not pertinent to deploy a full theological discussion on such
matter, to correctly
understand the tradition of confessio it must be said that, in
Christianity, the
phenomenon of logos is related both to interiority as
archetypical immanence and to
transcendence as a cosmological aspect of the trinitarian
structure of the divine.
Relevant to our discussion concerning interiority is how this
inner abiding of the
logos creates a necessary link between witnessing and
interiority, for such logical
abiding brings to the fore the second reflexive instance of the
confessional practice:
whoever confesses bears witness of the inner abiding of the
primordial witness, that
is, of the logos.
This is a strong point made in the first Johannine epistle: He
that believeth
hath the witness in himself ( ) (1Jhn 5:10; emphasis
ours). For this same reason, Augustines project in the
Confessions will demand both
a deepening of the examination of subjective structures of
interiority and,
simultaneously, an ascent towards the transcendental structures
of cosmological
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25
logos. We take it then to be the case that, in confessio, there
is much more at stake
than just an understanding of illumination as a disclosure of
the self (Foucault
1997a v. 1, p. 243). What is confessed in confession is also a
personal experience of
the determinations of light and in traditional confessio such
light is necessarily linked
to the notion of the inner, determined both as logos and as
witness. Closing the full
circle of witnessing, we may say that the witness involved in
confessio consists of a
multiple reflexivity. By definition, the witness bears witness
of the logos witness.
Let us keep this in mind when analyzing the reflexivity that
Descartes appropriates in
his own confessional dynamic.
2. The Tradition of the Spiritual Manual.
As we have said, the reason behind our focus on Augustines
Confessions has
to do with the paradigmatic place he occupies in the evolution
of the confessional
practice into a written one. Our intention here is not to
problematize the psychological
aspects entailed in the author of written confession,22 but
rather to depict the
22Although we must notice that the guilt present in the
Meditations first paragraph will be reminiscent, for instance, of
Berggrens psychological analysis of confession: During confession,
and because of it, an assimilation takes place, a reassociation of
a previously dissociated mental life He [the confessant] is
burdened with a sense of guilt because of certain actions, or he
feels himself to be generally inadequate and worthless (Berggren,
p. 144).
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26
communicative structure of a text that, understood as a
sacrifice for Augustine,23 is
supposed to capture the essence of a practice that was
originally oral.24
By turning to Augustines famous passage in The City of God (X.,
5.), which
deals with the notion of sacrifice, we will attempt to better
picture how writing might
fit into the equation of confession. Augustine states: A
sacrifice, therefore, is the
visible sacrament or sacred sign of an invisible sacrifice
(Sacrificium ergo visibile
invisibilis sacrificii sacramentum, id est sacrum signum est)
(Augustine 2000, p.
308). Augustine defines the sacrifice as a sign because of its
capacity to render visible
another sacrifice that essentially occurs within the believer:
He [God] does not
desire the sacrifice of a slaughtered beast, but He desires the
sacrifice of a contrite
heart the true sacrifice of ourselves (X., 5-6).
The relation between sacrifice and visibility seems to befit the
practice of writing
within the tradition of Latin confessio. In a well known passage
of the Vita Antonii
that Foucault rather insightfully highlights, Athanasius
describes how Antony used to
recommend to his fellow monks the written notation of actions
and thoughts:
Let this observation be a safeguard against sinning ( ): let us
each note and write down our actions and impulses of the soul as if
we were about to report them to each other ( ); and you may rest
assured that from utter shame of becoming known we shall stop
sinning and entertaining sinful thoughts altogether. Who, having
sinned, would not choose to lie, hoping to escape detection? Just
as we
23 Cfr. Confessions, IV. 1. 1; V. 1. 1; VIII. 1.1; IX. 1.1; XI.
2.3; XII. 24. 33. All quotations from the Confessions are taken
from the translation by F. J. Sheed and are quoted according to the
standard form of book, chapter, and paragraph. 24 For a radical
stance on the immanent orality of confession, see Nikulin: For this
reason, confession can only be oral. As such it can only be
imitated in the written, which, however, is a narcissistic betrayal
of its orality (Nikulin 2006, p. 130).
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27
would not give ourselves to lust within sight of each other, so
if we were to write down our thoughts as if telling them to each
other ( ), we shall so much the more guard ourselves against foul
thoughts for shame of being known. Now, then, let the written
account stand for the eyes of our fellow ascetics, so that blushing
at writing the same as if we were actually seen, we may never
ponder evil. Molding ourselves in this way, we shall be able to
bring our body into subjection, to please the Lord and to trample
under foot the machinations of the Enemy (Athanasius, p. 73
[translation modified]).25
The passage leaves no doubt that Antony is not referring to a
proper written
confession, for his self-examination is very similar to the
Stoic practices of daily
meditation described by Seneca and Marcus Aurelius, among
others, which include
both the writing and reading of right and wrong actions and
thoughts.26 What interests
us, nevertheless, is the way in which Antony relates writing to
the gaze. As Foucault
puts it, writing offers what one has done or thought to a
possible gaze what others
are to the ascetic, the notebook is to the recluse (Foucault
1997a, v 1., pp. 207-208).
Insightful as Foucaults remarks are, Antonys conceptions seem to
demand a
more detailed elaboration. It is not that the notebook totally
replaces the other in the
ascetic community, but rather that the notebook or writing is
the locus of what we
would like to consider a powerful fiction that includes the
other, for Antonys
prescription centers around an as if. Antony does not prescribe
that the monk actually
25 We relied heavily on Robert T. Meyers translation provided in
Foucault 1997a, v 1., p. 207. Greek text is available at:
http://www.documentacatholicaomnia.eu. 26 Senecas famous remarks on
reading and writing in his Epistle 84 to Lucilius: We should not
limit ourselves to either writing or reading; the former will
depress ones powers and exhaust them, the other will relax and
weaken them (Seneca, p. 155). In the very first page of his
Meditations, Marcus Aurelius recalls his painting master Diognetus
advice, stating: To hear the lectures first of Baccheius, then of
Tandasis and Marcian, in boyhood to write essays and to aspire to
the camp-bed and skin coverlet and the other things which are part
of the Greek training (Marcus Aurelius, p. 1).
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28
writes to submit his writings to possible readers, but that he
writes as if others were
reading what is being written. It is enough to immerse writing
within this as if for
writing to have actual implications on the monks ethical
behaviour. The effects of
fiction on the monks inner states are, therefore, real, and this
real effect produced by
fiction is something we must have in mind when turning to
Descartes own fictions in
the Meditations.
Aside from its effectuality, Antonys fiction also serves an
important role in
terms of temporality, especially in what concerns the present.
Because writing
manifestly pretends to make the self visible to the other, but
not to the other only as
reader, but to the other as reader at the time of writing,
writing is an essential tool in
achieving the intensification of the present. We consequently
highlight the present
participles employed by Athanasius in the original Greek: or
about to report and, especially, or as if reporting. It is
the
possibility of writing as if being simultaneously read by
another, that is: it is the
coincidence between the time of writing and the time of reading
that stirs up the
emotions of shame and guilt which, within the monastic
community, help transform
the self by means of refraining the monk from sinning.
Concerning the Vita Antonii, it is worthwhile to note that in
the same 55, just
before the passage quoted above, Antony is indeed referring to
Gods capacity of
seeing all things. Writing as a means to make the self visible
would thus function,
within the frame of an omniscient deity, as an extension of Gods
gaze and, in a way
that we must be careful not to exaggerate but never to
underestimate when turning to
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29
written confession, would be granting the reader access to the
privileged position held
only by God, in private confession, or by the confessor in an
oral one.
This access, we stress again, does not in any way imply that
written confessio
does not have its limits. Its limits are made manifest by
Augustine himself who, in an
enigmatic passage of his Confessions, decides to pass over some
of his past sins in
silence. Augustine merely states: For I dared so far one day
within the walls of Your
church and during the very celebration of Your mysteries to
desire and carry out an
act worthy of the fruits of death (Confessions III. III. 5). We
do not know, and can
only imagine, what Augustine was confessing. We do know,
nevertheless, regardless
of the lack of details, that Augustine is confessing. The
setting of limits clearly
distinguishes the tradition of Latin confessio from our
contemporary media spectacle
where written or, especially, televised confession does not have
any whatsoever.
Returning to Antony, it is also crucial to keep in mind the
employment of
writing as a safeguard or . The Greek term literally means a
security against stumbling or falling, in a way that can be
applied, as Sophocles does
for instance, to a city or state.27 Quite literally, then, the
notion chosen by Antony to
describe the role of writing belongs to the metaphor of
architecture. In the conext of a
written confession, writing would be serving the role of making
the self visible to
itself and to the other as reader. At the same time,
nevertheless, writing provides the
27 Raise up our city, so that it stands fast ( ) (Sophocles, p.
12; translation modified).
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30
possibility of stabilizing confessed utterances in such a way
that the whole of
confessional receptivity is radically transformed. We will turn
to this briefly.
In the context of visibility, Augustine brings up a passage
belonging to the
Epistle to the Hebrews: But to do good and to communicate forget
not: for with such
sacrifices God is well pleased (Hbr 13: 16).28 It is not
difficult to see the connection,
even through brief linguistic analogies, between communicatio as
sacrifice and
confession as the most intimate of all communications.29 But
what does this intimacy
consist of? To answer such question, we will have to return to
the closeness between
the two branches of confession, for it is here that a possible
interpretation of
confessional intimacy could be attempted in temporal terms.
We find the need to supplement Foucaults definition of
confession as to
declare aloud and intelligibly the truth of oneself (Foucault
1997b, p. 173) with an
understanding of the temporal aspects of this self-truth that is
confessed.
Apprehended within the dynamic of exomologe and homologe,
confessional truth
will be essentially linked to both the past (in the sense of a
confession of sins) and to
the present (in the sense of a confession of faith). As a
primordial break which has its
important nuances, confession is linked to the past in terms of
a past history that the
subject him or herself rejects.
But this rejection, or what the confession of sins has of
rejection, cannot occur
unless the subject has gone through the essential transformative
experience of 28 In Augustines Latin, using the Vetus Latina
translation: Bene facere, inquit, et communicatores esse nolite
oblivisci; talibus enim sacrificiis placetur Deo (Augustine 2000,
p. 309). 29 The other is most intimately met in confession (Nikulin
2006, p. 128).
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31
conversion or . This literal turning or twisting marks the
subjective split
between a was and an is. Simultaneous with a confession of his
or her past, therefore,
the subject confesses his or her conversion. It is in this
communication of the
phenomenon of conversion that the subject reveals his or her
present. Completing the
full temporality involved in the tradition of Latin confessio,
nevertheless, the future of
the converted subject will also come to the scene as a future
reality in which the
converted confessant professes to believe. It is the presence of
both past, present and
future this temporal wholeness- that makes confession utterly
intimate.
It can be plainly seen how Augustine builds up the narrative of
his
Confessions up to the point where he communicates his conversion
in Book VIII. We
will claim that the move made in Book X actually consists in the
thematization of this
latent temporal present of confession. As was the case in
Antonys conception of
writing, Augustine himself will radicalize the intensification
of the present by not
only employing the literary tools to stir up the heart
(Confessions X. 3. 4) of the
reader in present, but by actually taking the stance of
confessing what he is at the
present time of writing his Confessions. Augustine himself marks
the shift as follows:
But again, O Lord my God, to whom daily my conscience makes
confession, relying
more in the hope of Your mercy than in its own innocence, with
what profit, I
beseech You, do I confess unto men in Your sight by this book,
not what I once was,
but what I now am? (Confiteor per has litteras adhuc quis ego
sim, non quis
fuerim?) (Confessions X, 1.3; emphasis ours).
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32
Confession, we have said, only makes sense from the vantage
point of a
present where the subject has experienced conversion. This means
that at the moment
of confession, the confessant must have already experienced a
subjective split that
creates a chasm between past and present, eventually endowing
the future with
unforseen possibilities. This subjective split, nevertheless, is
more complex than just a
simple break with the past, for although the confessant can no
longer be said to be
what he or she was (identification with his or her past no
longer stands30), from the
perspective of conversion all past events contained in this
personal history are re-
interpreted as leading to the present subjective circumstances
that have made
conversion possible.
From the perspective of narrating such a personal history,
conversion is also
responsible for granting subjective access to the meaning of an
auto-biographical
narrative that would otherwise be disjointed or non-sensical.
Fritz Stolz puts it even
more radically: Life cannot really be understood without the
turning point of
conversion so conversion has to happen, even if it seems not to
be necessary (Stolz,
p. 11). We could frame what we are attempting to say by
articulating the phenomenon
of conversion in terms of the discovery of a teleology
previously hidden from the
subject. Once the subject has converted, this teleology is made
manifest as presently
involving the subject him or herself. This discovery and
acknowledgement of
teleology is an important aspect of what makes confession
partake of the essence of
praise or laudatio (confession as exomologe), implying that the
subject that has 30 Facing such a personal history of past mistakes
entails emotions such as guilt and shame: so that I am ashamed of
what I am and renounce myself and choose You (Confessions, X. 2.
2).
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33
experienced such teleology will, in the act of an
autobiographical confession, recount
the steps that have led him or her to such a discovery. In the
Pauline terminology
Augustine employs, such a narration will recount the steps that
have led him back to
grace through grace: For when I am wicked, confession to You
simply means being
displeased at myself; when I am good, confession to You means
simply not
attributing my goodness to myself: for You, O Lord, bless the
just man, but first You
turn him from ungodliness to justice (Sed prius eum iustificas
impium) (Confessions,
X. 2. 2).
By the same token, conversion can also be interpreted as the
pivotal spatio-
temporal moment where the personal determinations of light fully
constitute
themselves, for it is only after experiencing conversion that,
alongside the negative
determinations of what light is not, the subject can establish
the positivity of what
light is. In a nuclear manner, conversion contains in itself the
specificity that produces
the witness. It is in conversion that the witness testimony is
produced, for the witness
must necessarily bear his or her witness. The essential bearing
of witness can
therefore be said to consist in bearing subjective conversion.
It is from this bearing or
undergoing conversion that the witness subjectivity as
sub-iectum can be inferred,
from the Latin infero, a close relative of Descartes future
refero, which we will later
grapple with in Chapter Three.
It is clear that for Augustine writing has an important place
within the
structure of confessional testimony. Here, one could go into the
influence of Pauls
writings in the course of Augustines conversion and, as Pierre
Courcelle well makes
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34
the point, consider Paul as the subject of the first known
Christian autobiography,
recounted in Acts 22: 6-16 and 26: 4-18.31 Even though
Augustine, as Paul, hears a
voice in the famous garden scene in Milan (the famous tolle,
lege of Confessions
VIII, 12.29), the great difference between both is that the
voice Augustine hears bids
him to read. When confessing his conversion in writing,
therefore, Augustine is
writing about hearing a voice that leads to reading. The
interconnection of reading
and writing cannot but stand out.
Although the most relevant of all, Augustines is not the only
case where reading
and conversion go hand in hand in the Confessions. Moreover, in
her outstanding
Augustines Confessions: Communicative Purpose and Audience,
Annemar Kotz
devotes an important portion of her analysis to arguing that, of
the six conversions
narrated in Book VIII of the Confessions, all of them have to do
(including Antonys)
either with reading or hearing:
Victorinus converted through reading but also through talking to
Simplicianus. Of Ponticianus colleagues we learn that one needs
nothing more than reading a conversion story (that of the monk
Antony in this instance) to come to an immediate conversion All we
learn about Antonys conversion at this stage is that it is brought
about by hearing Scripture Alypius conversion is presented, like
that of the second agent at Trier, with very little detail, except
for the information that the final catalyst is the reading of
Scripture Antony had heard a reading from Scripture and applied
what he read to his own life (Kotz, pp. 174, 175, 177).
It has already been emphasized that both exomologe and homologe
coincide in
the fact that they are structured around the externalization of
a personal witness by 31 The first Christian auto-biography is
Saint Pauls narrative, which we read in Acts (Courcelle, p. 119;
translation ours). In these passages of the book of Acts, Paul
himself speaks about the great light that shone from heaven and the
same time a voice called him to repentance.
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35
means of verbalizing. Both significations, therefore, involve an
inter-subjective space
in which a once personal witness is made public through the
speaking voice. If
written confession is not to lose any of its sacrificial value
(and for Augustine it does
not), writing must be able to capture the total truth value of
the confessional dynamic.
But what happens to the structure of confessional receptivity
when put into writing?
When criticizing the traditional attachments of what he calls
the metaphysics
of presence, Jacques Derrida emphazises the priority given to
that which is never
primarily reading, but rather listening (Derrida 1978, p. 34).
His analyses are far too
intricate and complex to be tackled here in detail, but various
of his claims in Of
Grammatology concerning the status of writing in the Western
philosophical tradition
might be relevant for our discussion:
The epoch of the logos thus debases writing considered as
mediation of mediation and as a fall into the exteriority of
meaning The difference between signified and signifier belongs in a
profound and implicit way to the totality of the great epoch
covered by the history of metaphysics, and in a more explicit and
more systematically articulated way to the narrower epoch of
Christian creationism and infinitism when these appropriate the
resources of Greek conceptuality Thus, within this epoch, reading
and writing, the production or interpretation of signs, the text in
general as fabric of signs, allow themselves to be confined within
secondariness (Derrida 1997, pp. 12-13, 14-15).
One wonders if such debasing of writing in the epoch of the
logos can
stand a confrontation with Augustines Confessions. In this, and
perhaps in this only,
both Foucault and Derrida remain at a close distance: one looks
for a conclusive
confrontation with the figure of Augustine in each of their
works, but that search
yields little fruit. It has been mentioned already that
Foucaults last work, Confessions
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36
of the Flesh, was meant to deal with Augustine, and Derridas
Typewriter Ribbon, a
conference turned essay addressing the genre of confession, is
disproportionately
devoted to Rousseaus Confessions which, in a dramatic and
palpable way, differ
from Augustines project in his own Confessions.
In any case, the question here seems to be appropriately
addressed in
Derridas terms, for there might not be any other type of writing
that intends to
capture the original, speaking, present voice as much as
confessional writing. From
this confessional phoneticism, nevertheless, it does not seem to
follow that writing is
debased in any way. On the contrary, the importance of this
phonetization is
manifested in the fact that reading, as much as listening, is
henceforth credited as an
effective agent in the production of arguably the most crucial
of all religious
experiences: conversion. It is in this way that the notion of
the text is raised to its
highest possible spiritual position.
What does follow from the writing of confession is a radical
alteration in the
structure of confessional reception, especially in what concerns
the place of the other
as its recipient. The circulation of oral confession was
certainly restricted,
circumscribed by the spatio-temporal limits of an oral
transmission intended for a
chosen audience either of trusted spiritual brethren or of
authoritative Church elders.32
The act of confession itself had a performative immediacy, which
meant that once
performed, confession came to silence. The notion of privacy was
therefore crucial in
32 In the 4th Century monastic context of Basil of Cesarea, for
instance, the only criterion put forward by Basil is that sins
ought to be confessed in the presence of those who are able to help
the sinner (Bitton-Ashkelony, p. 183).
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37
oral confession, up to the point that scholars still debate the
limits and contours of
public and private penance.33
All this, of course, changes considerably once confession is put
into writing.
For once, the place of the other as recipient of confession
bursts open in a way
reminiscent of Platos discussion of writing in the Phaedrus:
henceforth, confession
roams the earth passing from one reader to another and everyone,
even those that
have no business with understanding (275e) have access to the
written confession.
This unthematized subtext of the universal receptivity of
written confession is
probably behind Augustines attempt to restore the exclusivity of
his audience as his
Confessions turn towards the present in Book X. Augustine puts
it rather symbolically,
stating that his present confession is intended for the mind of
my brethren not the
mind of strangers nor the children of strangers, whose mouth has
spoken vanity, and
whose right hand is the right hand of iniquity (Confessions X.
4. 5).
As a consequence of the universalization of confessional
reception, written
confession also universalizes the possibility of witnessing such
a confession. Every
reader therefore becomes a witness, partaking in the dynamic of
witnessing already
described. As reading becomes coextensive with witnessing, the
performative
dimension of the practice is also transformed. Therefore, every
time the confession is
read, the act of confession is re-enacted. But this re-enactment
has a specific meaning,
for written confession severs the essential, performative tie
between the particular
33It is, however, much easier to simplify penance into a
bipartite practice of either secret or public penance in the
abstract than it is in reality They were interchangeable parts of a
single process (Hamilton, p. 8).
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38
confessant and confession itself, placing the reader as witness
in a particularly active
position: the confessant might pass, but his confession, as long
as it is read, remains.
What existed only in the recipients memory after the silence of
oral confession, now
permanently exists in writing a writing that serves both as a
confessional memory
bank and as the condition of possibility of a universal
confessional availability:
confession, as it were, is now zuhanden, that is:
ready-at-the-readers-hand.
As it has been emphasized already, one of the most problematic
issues of a
written confession an issue to which Augustine returns time and
time again- is that
of the reader as interlocutor. Augustine himself acknowledges
that his own
confessional interlocution reaches out towards the reader in
order to stir up the
heart (Confessions, X. 3. 4). This stirring of the heart has
much to do with a
production in the reader of mimesis. That is: using the
technical terms of classical
rhetoric, the written confession is essentially a protreptic or
,
understanding with Mark Jordan that: The unity of the protreptic
genre could be
provided, then, by the recurring situation of trying to produce
a certain volitional or
cognitive state in the hearer at the moment of decision about a
way-of-life (Jordan,
p. 331). As a protreptic, therefore, the state which written
confession aspires to
produce is precisely that of conversion.
When describing the intensity of his own conversion, in a way
that will
already bring Descartes to mind, Augustine explicitly attaches
the value of confidence
to light (luce securitatis), in direct opposition to darkness as
doubt (dubitationis
tenebrae). The relation between both light and darkness is
articulated in terms of a
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39
shining or an infusion on the side of light (from the Latin
infundo), which produces
the vanishment of all darkness in the heart. We have to note
that Augustine is moving
within a tradition where mind and heart are intimately
connected. As an example of
this intimacy, suffices for us to quote one of the many passages
where mental
processes are described in terms of the heart: Why do you reason
in your hearts?
( ) (Luke 5:22). The Greek term employed,
dialogismos, can also be translated as calculation, argument or
discussion.
It will be important for us to remember how the metaphor of
light relates to
the inner landscape of the subject. For now, it is only
appropriate to mention that,
among the many differences between Descartes and Augustine, a
crucial one will
have to do with a conspicuous and almost obligatory rethinking
of the heart in the
Meditations. We will limit ourselves therefore to opening a
series of questions: can
this radical redetermination of the heart in the Meditations be
accountable for making
it so akin to the mind that it is ultimately absorbed by it?
Does this absorption remove
an anatomical correlative that stands for the mental in the
body? Can the most
notorious problem of Cartesian philosophy, namely: the
relationship between mind
and body, be related to these cardiac tensions?
Having addressed what we might call the protreptic mimesis
latent in
confessional discourse, we will now have a better perspective in
order to grasp the
close relationship between confession and the spiritual manual.
Taking Ignatius of
Loyolas Spiritual Exercises as a paradigm of such genre, a text
Descartes was quite
surely acquainted with having been brought up at the famous
Jesuit college of La
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40
Flche, we will focus on what might now seem a foreseeable
connection: the spiritual
manual is structured around the mimesis that, in confession,
still remains as one
discoursive possibility among others. Loyola himself highlights
a two-fold
relationship of antecedence and consequence between confession
and the spiritual
manual when recommending weekly confession to one who is on the
path of
spiritual instruction, but also considering the spiritual
exercises as a preparation for
confession (Loyola, p. 8).
Intersubjective mimesis between spiritual director and
exercitant, therefore, has
now become the center of the genre of the spiritual manual, for
in the manuals
mimetical experience lies its use. In a way that radically
transcends the realm of mere
theoretical speculation, in the spritual manual the notion of
order relates to that of use
through the effects that are to be produced on the reader/ user
who undergoes the
exercises prescribed in the manual. It is impossible to miss
Loyolas remarks
concerning the right order in which the spiritual exercises
should be given:
It should be observed that when the exercitant is engaged in the
Exercises of the First Week, if he is a person unskilled in
spiritual things, and if he is tempted grossly and openly, for
example, by bringing before his mind obstacles to his advance in
the service of God our Lord, such as labors, shame, fear for his
good name in the eyes of the world, etc., the one who is giving the
Exercises should not explain to him the rules about different
spirits that refer to the Second Week. For while the rules of the
First Week will be very helpful to him (le aprovecharn), those of
the Second Week will be harmful (le daarn), since they deal with a
matter that is too subtle and advanced for him to understand
(Loyola, p. 4).
The order of the exercises clearly has to do with the well-being
of whom we could
call, from the undergoing or pathos involved in the concept of
the exercitant, the
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41
patient. The spiritual manual, therefore, can be said to have an
essential medical
dimension to it a medical dimension that someone like Kotz will
argue is also
present in the language in which the protreptic intent of the
Confessions is
articulated.34 For it to be succesfully used, therefore, the
spiritual manual must, by all
means, conserve and augment the patients health.35 Salus in
Latin famously means
both health and salvation, and health can only be enhanced by
the right dosification
of the spiritual exercises. The spiritual director is therefore
advised to check for
certain symptoms in the exercitant, described by Loyola as
desolations (desolaciones)
and consolations (consolaciones) (Loyola, p. 3, 5).
In this manner, the spiritual manual might be thought to be
functioning within
the logic of the pharmakon. As is well known, pharmakon in Greek
both signifies
medicine and poison. And we can well say that what determines
the pharmakon either
as medicine or poison is precisely the notion of a dose or ,
literally: a giving.
The appropriate dose of the appropriate pharmakon will enhance
the patients health,
but the excess thereof will produce a state of infirmity or
intoxication. A lack in the
pharmakons dose, on the other hand, will be responsible for not
bringing about the
patients health by means of a cure. It is this capacity of
discriminating and
determining the exact dose for the right patient that
distinguishes and we could even
say makes- the physician.
34 See: Kotz, pp. 117-196. 35 Definitely reminiscent of the
Platonic tradition is Berggrens description of the confessor as
physician of the soul (Berggren, p. 40).
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42
A particular element of the medical dimension of the spiritual
manual is its
relationship to time. We are dealing here with the measure of a
dose and this
dosification is essentially tied to following an orderly
unfolding in time. For Loyola,
duration is of critical importance, recommending rather an
excess of time spent on
each exercise than to cut the devoted hour of meditation or
contemplation short: Let
him rather exceed an hour than not use the full time (Loyola, p.
5). As the translation
nicely brings up, the use implied in the spiritual manual is
rather crucially a use of
time. But Loyola is not unflexible concerning the overall
duration of the Spiritual
Exercises, acknowledging the many differences in possible
exercitants, knowing that
some are slower in attaining what is sought others more diligent
than others, some
more disturbed and tried by different spirits (Loyola, p. 2). At
stake, nevertheless, is
the way in which time affects a subject who is undergoing
radical modifications in his
or her own subjectivity. Loyolas prescriptions seem to suggest
that too much time
spent in the whole of the spiritual project is not profitable.
The Spiritual Exercises are
intended to be finished in approximately thirty days (Loyola, p.
3), but too little
time spent in each one of the spiritual exercises is the enemys
victory.
As the spiritual evolution of the exercises becomes gradually
more intense, an
adjustment of the appropriate dose is demanded from the
spiritual director in order to
bring forth the best possible results in the exercitant. Loyolas
main concern in his
Introductory Observations is to clarify how the exercitants
subjectivity should be
exposed to the later, more advanced spiritual exercises, only
after it has been affected
by the performance of the former ones. Loyola, nevertheless,
reserves this task for the
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43
spiritual father. In a way that summarizes the structure of the
manual, Loyola states:
To one who is more disengaged, and desirous of making as much
progress as
possible, all the Spiritual Exercises should be given in the
same order in which they
follow below (Loyola, p. 9). We emphasize the words as much
progress as possible
as they can only be conveyed with authority by an author who has
experienced and
undergone the spiritual exercises him or herself, and who
structures the work
according to the knowledge that such an undergoing has
provided.
In the ascetic chain that leads from the first exercises to the
last, the notion of
order as a methodical following is intertwined not only with the
meaning that these
latter spiritual exercises may have, but also with the medical
concern for the
exercitants salus. Loyola himself describes the exercises of the
First Week using
organic terminology. He calls them the purgative way or via
purgativa (Loyola, p.
4). From the Latin purgare, Loyolas first exercises intend to
cleanse, purify or clear
the exercitants self before subjecting him or her, in the Second
Week, to what he calls
the illuminative way or via iluminativa (ibid.).
The removal of certain elements lodged within the exercitants
self must be
accomplished before subjecting him or her to the experience of
light. And the first
step to be taken in this purge is a daily Examination of
Conscience whose purpose is
to purify the soul and to aid us to improve our confessions
(Loyola, p. 18). This
same concern is at the base of another important category
without which an analysis
of the spiritual manual would not be complete: that of
obedience. Just as the author
had to submit to his or her previous experience as patient, the
reader/ exercitant must
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44
submit at least temporarily- to the authority of the author or,
in Loyolas case, to the
authority of the spiritual director.
3. The Confessional in the Meditations: Already now some years
ago...
We will turn to the confessional operations exhibited in the
first lines of
Meditation I by focusing on Descartes crucial notion of
admission:
Already now some years ago, I noticed how many a large number of
falsehoods I had admitted for truths in my first years, and the
highly doubtful nature of whatever I had afterwards built upon
them, and that everything in life was to be fundamentally
overturned and, once and for all, begun from its very first
foundations were something firm and lasting ever desired to be
established in the sciences. But the work seemed immense and I
waited for an age so mature that none more apt to grasp the
discipline would ensue. And for that reason, having hesitated so
long, I would hereafter be guilty if the remaining time for action
were consumed in deliberating. Therefore, having now opportunely
rid the mind of all cares and provided myself with a secure
leisure, I withdraw alone, in earnest at last and unrestrictedly,
to apply myself to this general overturning of my opinions (AT VII,
17-18). (Animadverti jam ante aliquot annos qum multa, ineuente
aetate, falsa pro veris admiserim, & qum dubia sint quaecunque
istis postea superextruxi, ac proinde funditus omnia semel in vit
esse evertenda, atque a primis fundamentis denuo inchoandum, si
quid aliquando firmum & mansurum cupiam in scientiis stabilire;
sed ingens opus esse videbatur, eamque aetatem expectabam, quae
foret tam matura, ut capessendis disciplinis aptior nulla
sequeretur. Quare tamdiu cunctatus sum ut deinceps essem in culp,
si quod temporis superest ad agendum, deliberando consumerem.
Opportune igitur hodie mentem curis omnibus exsolvi, securum mihi
otium procuravi, solus secedo, seri tandem & libere generali
huic mearum opinionum eversioni vacabo.)
We have suggested above that the notion of admission or admitto
cannot be fully
grasped without inquiring into the dynamic of interiority it
implies. Composed of the
preposition ad (to or towards) plus the verb mitto (to send out,
to put forth, to emit),
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45
ad-mitto seems to have originally signified the act of sending
out or dispatching. In a
diplomatic mission, for instance, a king would send out a
messenger or envoy to
reach another hierarchs court. Even though our understanding of
the term focuses on
the movement from outer to inner (and we will take this to be
its main signification),
in a way that we will attempt to relate both to the practice of
confession and later to
the metaphysics of Meditation III, admission etymologically
signifies movements
both from outer to inner and from inner to outer.36
But let us focus now on Descartes employment of the notion of
admission,
for it is in the analysis of gestures such as these that, in our
opinion, the complexity of
the Meditations relation to tradition most truthfully shines
forth. We will depict the
initial confessional gesture of the Meditations in a reflexive
way: not only does
Descartes admit, but he admits he has admitted. For our
purposes, this is as important
a philosophical gesture as we can get from Descartes at such an
early stage. A
connection already might be intuited between the reflexivity of
traditional confessio,
which we have described above in terms of the witness of the
witness, but
appropriated as the conceptual reflexivity of the admission of
admission. Such
appropriation would occur by means of the notion of interiority,
due to the fact that
both reflexive dynamics necessitate and imply an essential
connection to the subjects
inside.
36 It is also thought provoking that, in Latin medical
literature, mitto can also have the purgative meaning of letting
blood out.
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46
That every confession demands an admission is something that can
be
reasonably argued, making such a case even in linguistic terms.
For instance, in the
Latin lexicon that will serve as the basis for most of our
etymological inquiries, Lewis
and Short list definition C. 2. of the verb credo or to believe
precisely as: to admit as
true. Such terminology can be easily applied to the definition
of homologe (or a
confession of faith) to state that, as a profession of belief, a
confession of faith is
essentially an act of admitting as true. We could also draw a
line between admisssion
and witnessing by the same means: if conversion is the act that
constitutes the witness
and no conversion is devoid of a profession of belief, then no
witnessing is devoid of
an admission of truth.
What mostly interests us here, nevertheless, is the way in which
Descartes
carefully operates on the subjects inner landscape by employing
a concept so close to
the traditional confessional dynamic, but yet liable of being
constructed in such a way
that it affects the interiority of a universal subject. What we
observe early in the
Meditations, therefore, is the purgative movement from inner to
outer of what
Descartes calls falsehoods or falsum, and the subsequent
movement from outer to
inner, which will be played out after the Cogito from Meditation
III onwards, of what
he calls truth or verum. This last movement, nevertheless, will
only complete itself by
Meditation VI. We will theref