Application No.: A.16-09- Exhibit No.: SCE-04, Vol. 2 Witnesses: D. Bauder D. Bernaudo T. Boucher J. Castleberry T. Condit G. Haddox T. Inlander P. Joseph J. Kelly D. Kempf J. Lim S. Nagoshi D. Pierce M. Provenzano J.P. Shotwell J. Tran (U 338-E) 2018 General Rate Case Information Technology (IT) Volume 2 – Capitalized Software Before the Public Utilities Commission of the State of California Rosemead, California September 1, 2016
227
Embed
Information Technology (IT) Volume 2 – Capitalized Software...SUMMARY • This Volume presents SCE’s request for $809.1 million in capitalized software expenditures for the 2016-2020
This document is posted to help you gain knowledge. Please leave a comment to let me know what you think about it! Share it to your friends and learn new things together.
d) Recorded and Forecast Expenditures ...........................71
5. Customer Service Projects Less than $3M ..............................72 D. Kempf, ...................................................................................................... D. Bernaudo ...................................................................................................... S. Nagoshi
B. Transmission & Distribution Software Projects ..................................72
1. Work Management Solutions ..................................................72 P. Joseph
a) Project Description .....................................................192
b) Need for Project and Scope ........................................193
c) Cost Forecast ..............................................................198
(1) Alternatives Considered .................................199
2. Electronic Document Management / Records Management (eDMRM) .........................................................200
a) Project Description .....................................................200
b) Need for Project .........................................................201
c) Scope and Cost Forecast ............................................201
(1) Alternatives Considered .................................202
E. Finance Capital Projects ....................................................................203 D. Pierce
1. Plant Ledger Upgrade and Tax Module Installation ..............203
a) Project Description .....................................................203
b) Need for Project .........................................................204
c) Scope and Cost Forecast ............................................205
(1) Alternatives Considered .................................206
2. Corporate Projects less than $3 Million .................................207 J. Castleberry
SCE-04: Information Technology Volume 2 – Capitalized Software
Table Of Contents (Continued)
Section Page Witness
-xiv-
F. Operational Services Capital Projects ................................................207
1. C-CURE 9000 ........................................................................207 D. Bauder
a) Project Description .....................................................207
b) Need for Project .........................................................208
c) Scope and Cost Forecast ............................................208
(1) Alternatives Considered .................................209
2. Operational Services Projects less than $3 Million ...............210 J. Castleberry
1
I. 1
INTRODUCTION 2
A. Summary of SCE’s Capitalized Software Request 3
SCE is requesting $809.1 million from 2016 – 2020 to implement needed capitalized software to 4
support the business capabilities of SCE Operating Units and enterprise-level systems for SCE.2 5
Table I-1 Capitalized Software Forecast3
(Nominal $Millions)
B. Compliance Requirements 6
In D.12-11-051, SCE was directed to “establish that proposed capital projects are necessary and 7
that SCE has prudently examined alternatives for cost-effectiveness before seeking Commission 8
approval.”4 SCE has considered alternatives to projects and has detailed those evaluations in this 9
testimony. 10
In D.15-11-021, the CPUC required that SCE “include its own forecast and the Commission’s 11
adopted forecast from the previous GRC alongside historical costs, and brief explanations detailing any 12
changes in the scope of a category.”5 The capitalized software projects requested address this 13
requirement within their respective testimonies. 14
2 This does not include the $208.8 million in capitalized software requested in SCE-04, Vol. 3 for the Customer
Service Re-Platform. 3 SCE expects to avoid capitalized software expenditures of $5.46 million in 2020 related to avoided
development for legacy software, as a result of the implementation of the Customer Service Re-Platform (CSR). Consequently, we do not include these costs in our capitalized software forecast. These cost avoidances are contingent upon approval of the CSR project costs as defined in SCE-04, Vol. 3. Should the Commission not adopt the proposed CS Re-Platform costs, the corresponding legacy software development expenditures should be added to SCE’s capitalized software forecast. Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol 3 pp. 169-171 for details on these costs avoidances.
4 D.12-11-051; Conclusion of Law #4. 5 D.15-11-021; pp. 224.
Testimony Volume Year 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2016-20 Forecast
SCE-04, Volume 2 Total 151.662 213.382 202.868 135.965 105.230 809.108
2
C. 2015 Authorized versus Recorded 1
Figure I-16 2015 Requested, Authorized and Recorded
(Constant 2015 $000)
As shown in Figure I-1, SCE’s overall capital expenditures were approximately $8 million below 2
the Commission’s 2015 authorized level. SCE manages our portfolio of capitalized software work in 3
consideration of available resources, competing business priorities, and technology deployment 4
strategies. In 2015, SCE invested more in enterprise and operating system software to make needed 5
upgrades to our server, storage, and desktop operating systems environments prior to vendor-published 6
end-of-life support for Microsoft, Cisco, and VMware Enterprise License Agreements, and in 7
preparation for our migration to Microsoft Office 365. Additionally, SCE underspent its authorized 8
levels for OU capitalized software. This was largely due to the deferral of the Customer Data Warehouse 9
workforce with “anywhere access,” reduce long term investment and operational costs, and supports 18
more mobile technology capabilities. 19
11 For example, the Microsoft Support Lifecycle policy provides consistent and predictable guidelines for
product support availability when a product releases and throughout that product’s life: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/lifecycle.
12 An endpoint device is an Internet-capable computer hardware device on a TCP/IP network. The term can refer to desktop computers, laptops, smart phones, tablets, thin clients, printers or other specialized hardware.
13 Windows 10 Simplification and Modernization the desktop experience: Windows 10 will simplify the desktop experience by providing a consistent experience across phones, tablets, and PCs; it will provide current enterprise-grade security to help protect against modern threats; and simplify the management of both corporate and personal devices.
14 Enhance Cybersecurity: Windows 10 offers key architectural changes such as Enterprise Data Protection (EDP) which provides a strong foundation for some of the key data loss prevention capabilities that SCE needs. Its capabilities will be extended with the Rights Management Services (RMS) that comes with Office 365. By using both EDP and RMS, SCE will be able to strengthen protection by limiting basic copy-and-paste when appropriate and prevent printing and forwarding of documents without authorization.
10
In addition, upgrading these operating systems to Windows 10 will avoid future 1
costs related to hardware refresh, software licenses, and maintenance upgrade costs by simplifying the 2
environment and avoiding expensive custom support agreements typically required for software that is 3
no longer supported under standard agreements. 4
Database platform updates will update the database software and perform related 5
application testing and remediation. Regular updates are required to address software compatibility 6
issues, to scale the installation of the database platform in consideration of data growth and usage 7
growth, and to comply with the vendor support life cycle for that product. This must maintain acceptable 8
performance according to product vendor requirements, which specify their supported operating system 9
versions and minimum server hardware capabilities. This will provide product stability, reduce costs by 10
avoiding the need for custom support agreements for software used beyond its supported life cycle, and 11
avoid technology obsolescence. 12
The Business Intelligence (BI) Tools Upgrade will update infrastructure and tool 13
software as required to continue operating our BI capabilities. Regular upgrades are required to address 14
software issues and scale the installation of the BI applications based on data growth and usage. This 15
will allow for optimal performance of the BI applications used across the organization. 16
As the BI software products and services continue to evolve, existing capabilities, 17
such as cloud, mobile, data discovery, data visualization, and predictive capabilities, are enhanced to 18
provide new and improved functionalities. As new functionalities are introduced, SCE must keep the 19
existing products current to meet the demands required for business decision support and analysis. 20
Failure to maintain the products with upgrades puts the organization at risk of technological 21
obsolescence, unsupported software versions and increased custom maintenance support agreements. 22
As integration tools are used by more applications, the size of the environments15 23
and product versions must be reviewed regularly to verify we have the right capacity. SCE needs to keep 24
the environment current to maintain acceptable performance, comply with vendor support life cycle 25
(avoiding higher maintenance costs), provide reliability and stability of the tools, avoid technology 26
obsolescence, and facilitate new innovations and capabilities to drive better decision making. 27
15 An “environment” refers to where computer users run application software.
11
In the Enterprise Platform Core Refresh we will conduct a periodic major version 1
update (also referred to as “refresh”), pursuant to our software license contract with SAP. The last 2
version update of the software was during 2012 and 2013. This refresh is planned for 2017 and 2018. 3
The Enterprise Platform Core Refresh will require system analysis, modifications to eight existing SCE 4
SAP related custom software packages, over 500 interfaces to other SCE systems, testing, and 5
implementation. 6
As with most COTS, SAP periodically updates its software by releasing support 7
packs and enhancement packs. SAP releases support packs and enhancement packs every year. Support 8
packs deliver fixes for problems in the software reported by SAP product customers and specialized 9
computational changes (e.g., legal-related updates needed to align with changes in the federal tax laws). 10
SAP recommends that customers apply support packs upon release to keep the installed software 11
current. Enhancement packs change the software system’s functions such as restructuring the system 12
software modules for technical efficiency (e.g., moving the employee succession planning function from 13
the recruiting application to the main application for human capital), adding functions to meet regulatory 14
demands (e.g., adding the international accounting standards required for U.S. businesses), and adding 15
new business functions based on client demand. The general software industry practice advises staying 16
within two versions of the currently-available product version to maintain support from the vendor, and 17
to mitigate risks due to security problems and failure because of vendor obsolescence and technology 18
obsolescence. 19
SCE has been implementing SAP support and enhancement packs together every 20
other year since completing our SAP installation in 2008. Although SAP releases new versions of its 21
software every year, SCE has implemented a support and enhancement pack update every other year for 22
minor enhancements and software fixes, and a major core refresh to a new version of the software every 23
four years. This strategy results in our not installing the newest versions, which may contain software 24
bugs (common with new software products) that will be fixed in later releases of these versions. This 25
also minimizes our risk of technology obsolescence and is a cost effective way to minimize labor 26
installation costs. 27
3. Scope and Cost Forecast 28
a) Recorded Expenditures 29
Figure II-2 shows our 2015 request, authorized and recorded amounts for 30
operating software. 31
12
Figure II-2 2015 Request, Authorized and Recorded Expenditures
Operating System Software (Nominal $Millions)
In 2015, SCE spent more than authorized on Operating System Software as a 1
result of needing to upgrade our database software to Hana. Procurement of Hana was needed to avoid 2
extending the life of Teradata beyond end of 2017, which would have resulted in increased O&M and 3
hardware expenses. These costs were in addition to our normal server, storage and desktop operating 4
systems environments prior to vendor published end-of-life support for the Microsoft, Cisco, and 5
VMware Enterprise License Agreements and in preparation for our migration to Microsoft Office 365. 6
b) Forecast Expenditures 7
Total forecast expenditures are $82.6 million for operating software updates in the 8
2016 – 2020 period. This forecast includes the cost to update the software, update the underlying 9
operating system software where required, and conduct application testing and remediation. This five-10
year forecast represents a substantial reduction from the previous five years (2011 – 2015) expenditure 11
level of $177 million. This results from a concerted effort to use more virtualization technologies,16 and 12
16 Using virtualization allows several operating systems running in parallel on a single central processing unit
(CPU). This parallelism tends to reduce overhead costs.
$15.67 $15.67 $15.67
$29.93
$14.27
2015 Request 2015 Authorized Variance 2015 Recorded
13
attempts to lower our overall cost structure by leveraging cloud and software-as-a-service subscriptions. 1
An example of this is the implementation of the Microsoft productivity software Office 365,17 which 2
replaced software previously running in our data centers. 3
The capital forecast for this refresh program was developed using SCE’s internal 4
cost estimation model. This model utilizes industry best practices and SCE subject matter expertise to 5
estimate project cost components. SCE’s forecast for this project includes costs for software, hardware, 6
licenses, vendor labor, and SCE IT labor. See this project’s workpaper for the cost breakdown 7
information. 8
For Operating System (OS) software, we forecast $5.6 million to update Windows 9
Server 2003 and software management tools in 2016. In 2017 we forecast $6.1 million to update server 10
operating system software, including Guardium and other Microsoft server products. In 2018 we 11
forecast $7.8 million to update server operating system software and $5 million to complete Windows 12
10 application remediation. In 2019 we forecast $10.9 million to update server operating system 13
software and $10 million for Windows 10 deployment. In 2020 we forecast $6.6 million to update server 14
operating system software and $5 million to complete Windows 10 deployment. 15
For database system software, we forecast $2.5 million in 2016 to update our 16
Oracle Exadata environment, and $2.0 million in 2020 to replace the System D data warehouse. 17
For business intelligence, we forecast $0.3 million in 2017 and $0.5 million to 18
update SAP BusinessObjects suite, IBM Data Stage, and Extract Transfer and Load tools used in SCE 19
analytics platforms for data ingestion and transformations. We forecast $1.0 million in 2019 to update 20
SAP Hana Geospatial Analytics and Predictive Analytics software. 21
For integration tools software, we forecast $0.3 million in 2017, $1.0 million in 22
2018, and $1.0 million in 2019 to update Managed File Transfer (MFT) software used for Business-to-23
Business (B2B) integration; IBM WebSphere Enterprise Service Bus used in SCE.com; update IBM 24
WebSphere Application server; and update IBM SAP Process integration software used for application-25
to-application integration. In 2020 we forecast $0.3 million to update IBM Data Power software used as 26
a security gateway for business-to-business integration. 27
17 Office 365 is the brand name used by Microsoft for a group of software and services subscriptions providing
productivity software and related services running in the Cloud.
14
For the SAP Enterprise Platform Core Refresh, SCE expects to perform analysis 1
in late 2016 and complete the installation of the major refresh over a 15-month period in 2017 and 2018. 2
We forecast $16.70 million to complete this update. 3
15
III. 1
CYBERSECURITY & IT COMPLIANCE 2
The importance of cybersecurity to the utility industry and SCE has expanded as systems and 3
data have become more integral to business operations and as the electric infrastructure has become 4
more essential to national commerce and communications capabilities. Cyber-attacks are continually 5
growing in number and sophistication, and the availability of cyber weapons is on the rise as well. 6
Therefore, maintaining a strong defense against cyber-attack requires a continually evolving set of 7
strategies. Recent examples of cyber-attacks are well documented in the news media and the intelligence 8
community, which include but are not limited to: 9
• Anthem data breach resulting in losing 80,000,000 sensitive personally identifiable 10
information (PII)18 data records (February 2015).19 11
• Sony Pictures America resulting in loss of systems, data, and services with remediation costs 12
estimated in the tens of millions (December 2014).20 13
• EBay loss of a large database of user credentials (March 2015).21 14
• US Office of Personnel and Management resulting in losing sensitive data related to security 15
clearance holders (June 2015). 16
• JP Morgan Chase loss of 76,000,000 personal information records (July 2014).22 17
• Disruption of Ukraine power grid causing over 225,000 customers to lose power. (March 18
2016)23 19
Cyber-attacks are being mounted against an array of organizations resulting in significant impact 20
to customer data privacy and system availability. To protect the data privacy of our five million 21
customers, and the integrity of our critical grid infrastructure, it is imperative that SCE implement strong 22
cybersecurity controls to mitigate risk. 23
18 Personally Identifiable Information (PII), as used in US privacy law and information security,
is information that can be used on its own or with other information to identify, contact, or locate a single person, or to identify an individual in context.
19 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk A pp. 44-46. 20 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk A pp. 47-50. 21 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk A pp. 51-53. 22 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk A pp. 54-57. 23 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk A pp. 58-63.
16
Figure III-3 SCE Detected Intrusion Attempts
Figure III-3 illustrates the number of intrusion attempts24 on the SCE network over the past five 1
years. As these threats significantly increase year over year, the SCE must develop stronger defense 2
strategies. SCE employs a defense-in-depth cybersecurity strategy,25 which uses multiple layers of 3
protection to prevent unauthorized access to its systems. SCE invests in several Cybersecurity capital 4
programs. These projects fall into three primary categories: Perimeter Defense, Interior Defense, and 5
Data Protection. 6
• Perimeter Defense: Perimeter Defense includes the processes, procedures, personnel, 7
hardware and software designed to protect SCE’s information and systems from external 8
attacks. Like security defense in a home, one can think of Perimeter defense as the locks on 9
doors and windows. Basic technologies include firewalls and intrusion detection systems. 10
24 An intrusion attempt is defined as an unauthorized attempt to access a system, network or endpoint. 25 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk A pp. 64-108.
17
The perimeter defense technology prevents, protects, and detects attacks reducing the risk to 1
critical back-end systems. Perimeter Defense is especially critical to systems that are 2
accessible via the Internet. 3
• Interior Defense: The goal of the Interior Defense program is to secure SCE’s internal 4
business systems from unauthorized users, devices, and software. Interior defense is like a 5
video surveillance system in a home, to know where people are and what they are doing in 6
case we need to respond to an emergency. Advanced and integrated real-time monitoring of 7
SCE’s internal business network makes it more difficult for unauthorized users to gain access 8
to our systems and for rogue devices or software to cause business disruption. 9
• Data Protection: The objective of the Data Protection program is to protect SCE customers, 10
employees, contractors, and other personnel from identity theft. The program also protects 11
confidential SCE information residing on all computing devices from unauthorized use, 12
distribution, reproduction, alteration, or destruction. 13
• SCADA Cybersecurity: SCE must enhance cybersecurity infrastructure services to address 14
emerging advanced cybersecurity threats against Industrial Control Systems.26 The objective 15
of this effort is to implement enhanced cybersecurity controls for SCADA systems and their 16
infrastructure to address modern cybersecurity threats targeting grid control systems. 17
Although in previous filings this section was titled “NERC CIP,” SCE implemented 18
additional SCADA protections with a portion of the approved NERC CIP funding. 19
26 Industrial Control System (ICS) is a general term that encompasses several types of control systems used to
automate industrial processes, including supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, distributed control systems (DCS), and other smaller control system configurations such as programmable logic controllers (PLC). These systems are used in a variety of critical applications and industries including energy and utilities, transportation, health, manufacturing, food and water.
18
Figure III-4 Perimeter Defense, Interior Defense & Data Protection
Authorized vs Recorded27 (Nominal $Millions)
As shown in Figure III-4, the Commission authorized SCE to invest $26 million in these 1
cybersecurity programs. SCE recorded $28 million, $2 million above authorized levels, to implement 2
needed cybersecurity tools and controls. This advanced technology purchase replaced a less effective 3
incident response tool to help SCE analysts and Incident Response teams better detect campaigns or 4
attacks on SCE computing endpoints. 5
27 Totals include authorized expenditures for Solutions for Emerging Legislative Mandates program.
$2 $26 $26
$28
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
2015 Request 2015 Authorized Variance 2015 Recorded
19
A. Perimeter Defense 1
Table III-3 Perimeter Defense28
Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) Authorized, Recorded, & Forecast Capital Expenditures (Nominal $Millions)
1. Program Description 2
Perimeter Defense is the first line of defense against cyber-attacks. It is the outer layer of 3
protection for our Defense in Depth approach to cybersecurity, which includes the processes, 4
procedures, hardware, and software to protect critical systems such as SAP, customer data, and 5
ultimately our grid. Today, perimeter security is used to protect our back-end systems from unauthorized 6
access. When properly configured, the perimeter defenses should only permit those activities required to 7
conduct business. Using a perimeter defense security model, the perimeter technology prevents, absorbs, 8
or detects attacks reducing the risk to critical back-end systems. Cybersecurity perimeter defenses 9
include technologies such as firewalls, intrusion detection systems (IDS), application proxies and virtual 10
private network (VPN) servers. Therefore the best network security based on best practice is a layered 11
Defense in Depth approach. This approach includes implementing security in layers with each layer 12
providing an increasing level of restrictive controls. Perimeter Defense is especially critical to systems 13
that are accessible via the Internet. 14
2. Need for Program 15
The energy sector is under continuous cyber-attack,29 and the attack methods, exploits, 16
and capabilities are constantly evolving as new types of attacks are discovered. As referenced in Figure 17
III-3, intrusion attempts against SCE continue to increase. Such attacks include computer viruses, 18
worms, phishing, spyware, and advanced persistent threats, any of which could cause significant damage 19
to SCE’s information systems, if successful. Security Magazine writes, “The modern enterprise network 20
has become expansive, porous, and completely blurred due to the large number of Internet-facing 21
28 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk A pp. 109-120. 29 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk A pp. 115-116.
applications that have been deployed and adopted. The number of potential entry points into the 1
enterprise network has proliferated uncontrollably.”30 As SCE’s enterprise network expands and 2
integrates with more and sophisticated technologies, SCE must deploy advanced perimeter defense 3
technology to keep pace. Without these defenses, systems could be vulnerable to a wide variety of zero-4
day infections (which are previously unknown malware for which an antivirus mitigation is not yet 5
available) and could be accessed by anyone on the internet with malicious intent. 6
3. Scope and Cost Forecast 7
This project will increase the security of our controls that prevent unauthorized access to 8
the business systems and data within our internal business network. This project will implement tools 9
that increase remote access security on SCE and employee-owned devices, such as cell phones, laptops, 10
etc. In addition, SCE will continue to implement next generation intrusion protection (such as firewalls), 11
and intrusion detection systems (such as advanced data analytics capabilities), to improve detection of 12
nefarious activity. This project will also integrate these new tools and controls into our existing 13
perimeter defense layer to create a common, unified monitoring platform that allows for rapid response 14
to security events. 15
SCE is requesting $66.3 million for the 2016 – 2020 period to enable this scope of 16
work.31 The capital forecast for this project was developed using SCE’s internal cost estimation model. 17
This model utilizes industry best practices and SCE subject matter expertise to estimate project cost 18
components. SCE’s forecast for this project includes costs for software, hardware, licenses, vendor 19
labor, and SCE IT labor. 20
30 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk A pp. 117-120. 31 SCE’s cybersecurity’s efforts are focused on the protection of critical infrastructure, therefore a secure
process for disclosing detailed tactics, techniques, and procedures is necessary to help ensure its protection. In an effort to provide the Commission access to the information needed to answer specific questions regarding the cybersecurity testimony, cost forecasts, and justification, SCE can provide an in-person briefing in a closed setting, and an optional electronic reading room to review documents, if needed.
21
B. Interior Defense 1
Table III-4 Interior Defense32
Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) Authorized, Recorded, & Forecast Capital Expenditures (Nominal $Millions)
1. Program Description 2
Whereas Perimeter Defense acts as a home’s gates, alarm systems, and locks, Interior 3
Defense acts as a video surveillance system that is focused on where people are and what they are doing 4
in the home. Interior Defense is a set of protection controls that are necessary to secure SCE’s internal 5
business systems from unauthorized users, devices, and software attempting to access SCE’s business 6
systems, and to utilize analytics to prevent attacks from happening before they start. These efforts are 7
also focused on identifying and blocking security breaches from personnel with authorized access to the 8
systems. Users of SCE’s business systems can propagate and/or launch malware33 knowingly or 9
unknowingly. Without these controls, SCE could not identify or react to an infected or malicious 10
computer attempting to infect others on the network. Early identification of suspicious activity will 11
allow us to take quicker action to minimize any potential damage that may result from interior attacks. 12
2. Need for Program 13
There are several significant changes in the business environment that create new 14
cybersecurity risks that we must defend against. 34 These changes include: 15
• Growth in mobile technologies, which provides more entry points for vulnerabilities 16
to enter our environment. 17
• Growth in cloud computing, which expands our network to environments we do not 18
directly control and which could be hosted on someone else’s network. 19
32 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk A pp. 121-126. 33 Malware is software that is intended to damage or disable computers and computer systems. 34 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk A pp. 127-131.
• Use of business and personal social media platforms, which if not monitored could 1
prevent us from seeing insider threat behaviors, or from identifying and preventing 2
employees from providing information to potential adversaries who would use the 3
information to attack our network. 4
• Growth in the number of internet-connected devices (Internet of Things), which 5
increase the potential attack paths/exposures to our network. 6
• Integration of software platforms and modular applications, which can create new 7
gateways for malicious activities to infect devices. 8
• Growth of insider threats, which is an ever increasing risk and popular attack path 9
that requires SCE to expand our technology to assess user behaviors. 10
3. Scope and Cost Forecast 11
This program will enable advanced and integrated real-time monitoring of SCE’s internal 12
business network, which will make it difficult for unauthorized users to gain access to our systems, and 13
for authorized users to knowingly or unknowingly propagate cybersecurity attacks. It will also make it 14
more difficult for rogue devices or software to access SCE systems and confidential data or cause 15
business disruption. This program will also address Advanced Persistent Threats (APT)35 by using 16
advanced data collection and analysis technologies that can provide early detection of potential 17
questionable activity. 18
To accomplish this, the Interior Defense program will perform the following activities: 19
• Extend SCE’s Identity and Access Management system to newer generation security 20
technology; 21
• Enhance and expand SCE’s data collection capabilities to mine and potentially 22
connect disparate pieces of data to form a clear picture; 23
• Implement technology to allow SCE to analyze collected information for security 24
threats in a more automated and effective manner; 25
• Initiate automated alerts when questionable activity is detected to enable us to stay 26
ahead of possible threats and help prevent attacks from happening. 27
35 Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) are a network attack in which an unauthorized person gains access to a
network and stays there undetected for a long period of time. The intention of an APT attack is to steal data rather than to cause damage to the network or organization.
23
SCE is requesting $43.0 million for the 2016 – 2020 period to enable this scope of 1
work.36 The capital forecast for this project was developed using SCE’s internal cost estimation model. 2
This model utilizes industry best practices and SCE subject matter expertise to estimate project cost 3
components. SCE’s forecast for this project includes costs for software, hardware, licenses, vendor 4
labor, and SCE IT labor. 5
C. Data Protection 6
Table III-5 Data Protection37
Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) Authorized, Recorded, & Forecast Capital Expenditures (Nominal $Millions)
1. Program Description 7
The Data Protection Program safeguards SCE’s core information computing 8
environment38 by introducing controls to protect critical business information. This program will protect 9
SCE customers, employees, contractors, and other personnel from identity theft, and protect confidential 10
SCE information residing on all computing devices from unauthorized use, distribution, reproduction, 11
alteration, or destruction. This program will improve the security of information stored within various 12
databases both within and outside of SCE’s computing environment. 13
The Data Protection Program will add specialized technology that will: 14
• Increase protection and encryption of data fields within files; 15
• Protect business information on mobile devices; 16
• Enhance access controls to protect sensitive business information; 17
36 SCE’s cybersecurity’s efforts are focused on the protection of critical infrastructure, therefore a secure
process for disclosing detailed tactics, techniques, and procedures is necessary to help ensure its protection. In an effort to provide the Commission access to the information needed to answer specific questions regarding the cybersecurity testimony, cost forecasts, and justification, SCE can provide an in-person briefing in a closed setting, and an optional electronic reading room to review documents, if needed.
37 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk A pp. 132-137. 38 SCE’s core information computing environment includes customer data in Customer Service databases, back-
end systems for SCE.com, and SAP, which contains employee data.
• Control the replication of business information to personal removable storage media; 1
and 2
• Protect business information stored at external sites hosting SCE business systems. 3
2. Need for Program 4
As discussed at the start of Chapter III, several large scale data breaches impacted large 5
and established companies in 2014, including Sony, JP Morgan Chase, Target, and eBay. These data 6
breaches resulted in significant financial, reputational and proprietary impacts to these companies. These 7
companies will be forced to spend hefty funds on improved security measures by way of consultants, 8
security vendors, and test runs—not to mention the fees for lawyers, pending lawsuits, and paying fines 9
from data protection authorities. Given the magnitude of these threats, it is imperative for SCE to 10
implement ongoing cybersecurity improvements to data protection. 11
3. Scope and Cost Forecast 12
This program will perform the following activities to achieve the objectives described in 13
the Project Description section: 14
• Implement enhanced controls for granular data protection by deploying Data Loss, 15
Categorization, and Identification tools; 16
• Automate data classification by tying together the different systems that contain data 17
and the ability to classify them; 18
• Monitor and alert unauthorized access to business information by leveraging the 19
monitoring and data analysis environment with new toolsets; 20
• Manage business information saved on personal devices through implementation of 21
more robust endpoint and mobile device tools; and 22
• Control the copying of business information to removable devices such as memory 23
sticks and DVDs. 24
SCE forecasts $27.5 million for the 2016 – 2020 period to enable this scope of work.39 25
The capital forecast for this project was developed using SCE’s internal cost estimation model. This 26
39 SCE’s cybersecurity’s efforts are focused on the protection of critical infrastructure, therefore a secure
process for disclosing detailed tactics, techniques, and procedures is necessary to help ensure its protection. In an effort to provide the Commission access to the information needed to answer specific questions regarding
(Continued)
25
model utilizes industry best practices and SCE subject matter expertise to estimate project cost 1
components. SCE’s forecast for this project includes costs for software, hardware, licenses, vendor 2
labor, and SCE IT labor. 3
D. SCADA Cybersecurity 4
Table III-6 SCADA Cybersecurity40
Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) Authorized, Recorded, & Forecast Capital Expenditures (Nominal $Millions)
1. Program Description 5
This project extends security measures beyond the NERC CIP requirements governing 6
the bulk electric system by implementing additional risk-reduction methods specifically for SCE’s 7
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. SCE’s SCADA systems provide remote 8
control and monitoring capabilities of the electric grid. While NERC CIP requirements establish a 9
security-control baseline, SCE believes that the rise of electric grid threats and a strong understanding of 10
SCE’s specific environment warrants implementing further security control measures. 11
SCADA Cybersecurity should not be confused with SCE’s Grid Modernization 12
Cybersecurity project presented later in this testimony. SCADA Cybersecurity involves protections for 13
legacy industrial control systems that are currently connected via routable networks. Improved visibility, 14
detection, and protection controls are needed to secure these environments from the evolving threats that 15
continue to propagate against the utility industry. Grid Modernization Cybersecurity efforts are centered 16
on implementing security controls for systems that are interconnected to each other or to external 17
devices such as distributed energy resources (DERs). 18
Continued from the previous page the cybersecurity testimony, cost forecasts, and justification, SCE can provide an in-person briefing in a closed setting, and an optional electronic reading room to review documents, if needed.
SCE has invested in visibility tools and firewalls designed for grid segmentation to create 1
choke points that enable us to close off certain areas of the network in the event of an attack. It also 2
allows us greater visibility. These firewalls act like a watch post at a guarded facility checking 3
identification to validate that you are who you say you are. The goal of this current effort is to focus on 4
additional SCADA protection needs, taking a programmatic approach to reduce the risk. The approach 5
includes performing an assessment of current state cybersecurity controls, establishing desired target 6
states based on advanced cybersecurity risks, and implementing enhanced controls commensurate with 7
system risk. Changes to these systems will be used to update and enhance cybersecurity incident 8
response and investigation capabilities by improving and maturing controls or adding new ones. In some 9
cases, military grade technology will be needed to defend against nation-state attacks, which may 10
require additional implementation costs. 11
2. Need for Program 12
The energy sector has become a major focus for targeted attacks and is now among the 13
top five most targeted sectors worldwide.41 SCADA systems are increasingly becoming the target of 14
sophisticated cybersecurity attacks as evidenced by recent Black Energy attacks on Ukrainian power 15
grids.42 These systems are more vulnerable to cyber-attack as they have longer refresh cycles, fewer 16
security updates, 100% expectation of reliability to our customers, and require significant coordination 17
to test and implement security upgrades. 18
In the last three years SCE has seen a ten-fold rise in attempted cybersecurity intrusions. 19
Coupled with warnings from James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, that advanced attacks 20
against the electric grid are an imminent threat, SCE believes that its customers are best served by 21
implementing additional SCADA security controls. Beginning in 2011, while implementing NERC CIP 22
controls, SCE began enhancing SCADA security controls as SCADA concerns arose, and resources 23
permitted. 24
The threats and challenges against the grid underscore the need to further enhance 25
cybersecurity for SCE’s SCADA systems. Below are infrastructure services that SCE believes the 26
SCADA systems should leverage to garner more robust security controls. 27
41 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk A pp. 141-170. 42 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk A pp. 171-173.
27
3. Scope and Cost Forecast 1
The SCADA cyber security project scope includes the following: 2
• Build a secure network to protect the administrative interfaces of critical tools; 3
• Develop device access controls to secure how operators interact with control systems; 4
• Develop user access controls to secure role-based access to least-required 5
privileges,43 which is a more secure profile for user access; 6
• Implement next generation malware protections to identify malware in an 7
environment; 8
• Deploy vulnerability management tools to scan the environment looking for known 9
vulnerabilities; 10
• Provide data encryption services to encrypt data at transit and at rest; 11
• Develop system monitoring services to provide greater visibility to the network; 12
• Implement threat intelligence integration tools that can automatically ingest 13
intelligence to monitor and analyze the environment; and 14
• Procure government-sponsored secure technology to defend against advanced attacks. 15
SCE is requesting $22.6 million for the 2016 – 2020 period to enable this scope of 16
work.44 The capital forecast for this project was developed using SCE’s internal cost estimation model. 17
This model utilizes industry best practices and SCE subject matter expertise to estimate project cost 18
components. SCE’s forecast for this project includes costs for software, hardware, licenses, vendor 19
labor, and SCE IT labor. 20
43 The Principle of Least Privilege is the idea that only the most minimum number of people should have access
to information and resources that are necessary for its legitimate purpose. 44 SCE’s cybersecurity’s efforts are focused on the protection of critical infrastructure, therefore a secure
process for disclosing detailed tactics, techniques, and procedures is necessary to help ensure its protection. In an effort to provide the Commission access to the information needed to answer specific questions regarding the cybersecurity testimony, cost forecasts, and justification, SCE can provide an in-person briefing in a closed setting, and an optional electronic reading room to review documents, if needed.
28
E. Common Cybersecurity Services for Generator Interconnections 1
Table III-7 CCS for Generator Interconnections45
Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) Authorized, Recorded, & Forecast Capital Expenditures (Nominal $Millions)
1. Project Description 2
In SCE’s 2015 GRC, the Commission adopted the Common Cybersecurity Services 3
(CCS) for Generator Interconnections project.46 This project enables the design and enforcement of 4
policies that can be configured for a type of SCADA system in the electric grid. Each device on the 5
electric grid secured by CCS will have a unique key to enable secure communications with its control 6
system. This approach mitigates the risk that an attacker can seize control of the electric grid from an 7
individual device, such as a relay or capacitor bank controller, and provides the ability to rapidly 8
respond to a cybersecurity event. 9
This project will deploy a Central Security Services engine47 and Edge Security Services 10
systems48 to protect critical electricity generator interconnections. The Central Security Services engine 11
consists of two services that are physically located at SCE’s grid control centers. These include: 12
• Central Security Configuration Services, which manages secure encrypted 13
connections and system health checks on CCS member systems. 14
• Automated Security Services are control actions defined in the configuration that 15
execute when a given set of events occur. 16
45 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk A pp. 174-179. 46 This project was titled “Common Cybersecurity Services (CCS)” in SCE’s 2015 GRC. 47 A Central Security Services engine is the central system used to manage the secure connections created by
CCS. 48 Edge Security Services systems are located at the edge of grid networks that provide measurement or control
data back to central SCADA systems.
Various WBS IDs 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 TotalRecorded / Forecast - 6.86 8.15 9.78 7.36 1.00 3.40 5.90 - - 42.46 2015 GRC Authorized/Request* - 6.86 8.15 5.34 8.23 8.46 8.68 45.72 2015 GRC - Original Request - 6.86 9.90 5.34 8.23 8.46 8.68 47.47 * In D.15-11-021, the Commission adopted 2013 recorded costs and authorized 2014 and 2015 levels. 2016 and 2017 reflect forecast amounts from SCE's 2015 GRC.
Multiple CITs: CIT-00-DM-DM-000141, CIT-00-SD-PM-000103, and CIT-00-SD-PM-000175
Recorded Forecast
29
The Edge Security Services systems consist of services that provide distributed 1
enforcement of cybersecurity on devices at or near the perimeter of a SCADA system. This protects 2
edge configurations from being altered in a manner that introduces cybersecurity risk to central control 3
SCADA systems. These systems are also supported by the Automated Security Services engine to take 4
automated responses when configuration events are triggered that are deemed a risk to the overall 5
system. 6
2. Need for Project 7
The Common Cybersecurity Services (CCS) project will provide enhanced cybersecurity 8
protections for critical generator interconnections. The applications on these interconnection paths 9
require low latency49 to transmit data to back-office systems. It is critical to maintain assurance over 10
these network paths as these systems make automated control decisions on the electric grid. The CCS 11
system is specially designed to provide cybersecurity assurance over these paths while maintaining the 12
minimum performance requirements to enable the functionality of low latency control systems. This 13
system provides controls to meet critical NERC CIP compliance requirements as it relates to electronic 14
security perimeters. 15
3. Scope and Cost Forecast 16
CCS for SCE’s Phasor system was implemented in 2015. This implementation used a 17
proprietary vendor solution. After conducting an assessment on the cost effectiveness of the current 18
version of CCS on the Phasor system, SCE decided that due to the high device integration costs, CCS is 19
too cost prohibitive to scale in its current form. Consequently, SCE will invest in a non-proprietary, 20
standards-based version of CCS that can scale to meet the security needs of the bulk electric system. 21
SCE believes that this revised approach is in the best interests of our customers and the security of the 22
electric grid. 23
SCE’s original, adopted forecast for this project was $47.5 million. Our revised total 24
project forecast through the end of 2017 is $42.5 million, of which $33 million has been incurred 25
through the end of 2015. This total project cost reduction results from scope modifications that include: 26
49 Low latency refers to systems that require having a very low time interval between when a message is sent
and when it is received.
30
• CCS security for EMS and SCADA will be scheduled separately as part of the 1
network upgrades and cybersecurity implementations associated with SCE’s Grid 2
Modernization program;50 and 3
• The refresh of CCS central services servers that can be deferred until 2021. 4
SCE is requesting $10.3 million for the 2016 – 2020 period to complete this project.51 5
The capital forecast for this project was developed using SCE’s internal cost estimation model. This 6
model utilizes industry best practices and SCE subject matter expertise to estimate project cost 7
components. SCE’s forecast for this project includes costs for software, hardware, licenses, vendor 8
labor, and SCE IT labor. 9
F. Grid Modernization – Cybersecurity 10
Table III-8 Grid Modernization Cybersecurity52
Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) Authorized, Recorded, & Forecast Capital Expenditures (Nominal $Millions)
1. Project Description 11
Grid Modernization enables new capabilities to support the evolving use of the 12
distribution system. This will require many new applications that extend grid networks in a two-way 13
50 Refer to SCE-02, Vol. 10 for more information on SCE’s Grid Modernization program. Cybersecurity related
efforts during the 2016-2020 period will be addressed in the Grid Modernization Cybersecurity program within this testimony.
51 SCE’s cybersecurity’s efforts are focused on the protection of critical infrastructure, therefore a secure process for disclosing detailed tactics, techniques, and procedures is necessary to help ensure its protection. In an effort to provide the Commission access to the information needed to answer specific questions regarding the cybersecurity testimony, cost forecasts, and justification, SCE can provide an in-person briefing in a closed setting, and an optional electronic reading room to review documents, if needed.
relationship with customers and third parties. The distributed intelligence53 from grid modernization 1
presents new cybersecurity challenges to the grid of the future: 2
• Two-way communications with edge devices open new avenues of attack as edge 3
computing devices will communicate with control centers over routable connections 4
in near real-time. 5
• Implementation of secure network segmentation and survivability strategies must 6
protect grid reliability if a cyber-attack occurs. 7
• Integration of new technologies with cybersecurity infrastructure. 8
• Significant upscaling of cybersecurity service layers to automate controls, 9
monitoring, and management for new grid operations. 10
• Protection of legacy systems that do not support modern security protocols. 11
• Enhanced security for system monitoring and management networks with privileged 12
access to control systems. 13
Addressing these cybersecurity challenges requires a combination of infrastructure, 14
application, and threat intelligence initiatives. Infrastructure service layers54 are needed to extend strong 15
cybersecurity controls to edge networks. New grid applications must be designed with cybersecurity 16
controls throughout their lifecycle by integrating strong access controls, secure communications, and 17
secure programming code. Integration of cybersecurity operations with external threat intelligence 18
sharing organizations55 will enable more robust incident response and investigation capabilities. 19
Cybersecurity needs to be integrated into each grid modernization component throughout its lifecycle to 20
provide a strong framework against a cyber-attack. Therefore, this project will implement the requisite 21
cybersecurity controls for the various Grid Modernization related hardware and software applications 22
discussed in SCE-02, Volume 10 – Grid Modernization.56 23
53 Distributed intelligence refers to gathering distributed energy resource data points to make power control
decisions on the electric grid. 54 Infrastructure service layers are the systems used to provide cybersecurity device access management, user
access controls, malware protection, vulnerability management, system monitoring, incident investigation and response, and data protection.
55 These organizations include government law enforcement and intelligence, private sector intelligence feeds, and electric industry specific cybersecurity intelligence sharing organizations.
56 See SCE-02, Vol. 10 – Grid Modernization for detailed descriptions of these hardware and software applications.
32
This Grid Modernization Cybersecurity project is distinct from the SCADA 1
Cybersecurity project requested in preceding testimony. Grid Modernization Cybersecurity focuses on 2
extending cybersecurity controls to distribution system substations as they join a routable wide area 3
network.57 SCADA cybersecurity is focused on enhancing cybersecurity controls for critical control 4
center systems performing central management of the bulk electric system. 5
The Grid modernization project is also distinct from the Substation Automation 3 project. 6
The SA3 project leverages existing cybersecurity services to provide enhanced security to managing 7
intelligent electronic devices. SA3 is specifically focused on secure access and management of 8
Intelligent Electronic Devices (IED). It leverages a central cybersecurity service layer to provide 9
enhanced protection to IED access controls and management. 10
2. Need for Project 11
New grid capabilities with additional communication channels increase the potential for 12
cyber-attacks. Enabling a distributed intelligence system requires real-time communications from edge 13
distribution systems to central control centers. This upstream data flow will be used to make automated 14
control system decisions that can significantly impact reliability on the electric grid. These systems can 15
be used as a foothold by an attacker to attempt to compromise various layers of the grid network. 16
However, the new communication paths provided by the wide area network will enable a centrally 17
managed cybersecurity controls designed in a more preventative and automated architecture. This 18
architecture will be designed to provide layered defense-in-depth cybersecurity controls while enabling 19
distributed intelligence systems. 20
Despite the implementation of strong preventative controls, cybersecurity design must 21
account for the possibility that a compromise of a system on the distribution network will occur. A 22
compromised system on the grid enables an avenue of attack to escalate privilege, launch malware 23
attacks, or render a grid system inoperable. Preventative controls alone will not adequately mitigate the 24
potential cybersecurity risk of a malicious insider or sophisticated attacker. The cybersecurity 25
protections must be able to identify when a compromised system behaves anomalously and execute an 26
automated response to isolate the system to minimize its potential impact to the grid operations. 27
57 A routable wide area network is a geographically dispersed telecommunications structure that allows
communications between a series of local networks. I.E. network connectivity between substations and control centers that can be routed per the needs of the grid modernization applications.
33
Implementation of these types of controls requires advanced monitoring and behavior analysis to 1
identify and prevent system exploitation. A concerted initiative is required, so cybersecurity technology 2
and best practices are implemented throughout our grid modernization effort. New two-way 3
communication paths and grid management applications must operate on secure cybersecurity 4
infrastructure and be designed with cybersecurity capabilities and requirements throughout their 5
lifecycle. 6
3. Scope and Cost Forecast 7
SCE forecasts $99.9 million for the 2016 – 2020 period to complete this project. The 8
capital forecast for this project was developed using SCE’s internal cost estimation model. This model 9
utilizes industry best practices and SCE subject matter expertise to estimate project cost components. 10
SCE’s forecast for this project includes costs for software, hardware, licenses, vendor labor, and SCE IT 11
labor. See this project’s workpaper for the cost breakdown information. This forecast will support the 12
implementation of the functions and technologies discussed below.58 13
Cybersecurity for the power grid must be carefully engineered not to interfere with 14
energy delivery functions. For instance, our power grid has legacy devices that are decades old, with 15
limited computational resources and communications bandwidth to support cybersecurity protections. 16
Control and protection devices are widely distributed; some are in unmanned, remote substations or on 17
top of poles in publicly accessible areas. Cybersecurity controls are important and have the potential to 18
disable critical grid systems if configured in an overly strict manner without proper reduction of system 19
false positives.59 Operation of cybersecurity controls must not jeopardize normal operations or 20
emergency responses. Thus, cybersecurity controls must be designed to provide the appropriate response 21
to an alert without disabling critical energy delivery systems. Grid modernization will require significant 22
redesign of cybersecurity architecture, concept of operations, and operationalization planning to 23
facilitate the organizational change management to operations technology and information technology. 24
58 SCE’s cybersecurity’s efforts are focused on the protection of critical infrastructure, therefore a secure
process for disclosing detailed tactics, techniques, and procedures is necessary to help ensure its protection. In an effort to provide the Commission access to the information needed to answer specific questions regarding the cybersecurity testimony, cost forecasts, and justification, SCE can provide an in-person briefing in a closed setting, and an optional electronic reading room to review documents, if needed.
59 System false positives are a test result which incorrectly indicates that a particular condition or attribute is present.
34
New Grid Modernization applications will enable integration with distributed energy 1
resources and communication relationships with third parties. These new interactions necessitate that 2
development efforts perform specialized secure application coding reviews throughout the development 3
lifecycle to minimize the possibility of introducing new vulnerabilities to grid. This project will 4
thoroughly vet application code through a multitude of secure code review services to identify and 5
remediate vulnerabilities in the architectures, system inputs, cryptographic implementations, access 6
controls, database security, memory management, communication sessions, and system configurations. 7
Secure coding is more challenging as it introduces limitations to application functions that could 8
otherwise be used for malicious purposes. This process will be conducted for the Grid Modernization 9
software applications mentioned above. 10
Grid Modernization also necessitates changes to the distribution grid cybersecurity 11
service infrastructure. This project will provide enhanced segmentation and inspection between 12
distributed energy resources and third parties must be implemented to enforce system separation 13
engineering principles. This must provide maximum isolation of critical service layers and systems from 14
new avenues of communication originating from untrusted systems and networks. 15
Cybersecurity control sensors placed throughout the system will need to work in concert 16
to limit any potential attack. The ability to identify the origin of a breach and segment these systems 17
from the network is paramount to limiting the impact of any given attack. Network segmentation of the 18
system must be implemented in a manner that provides segmentation between control center and bulk 19
systems communications while enabling the new communication paths required for grid modernization. 20
Systems must enforce non-repudiation60 of all user activity to deter insider threat and 21
track system usage. Access controls must be strong enough to uniquely identify each user of a system 22
without preventing access to the system in the event of connectivity loss to central authentication 23
systems. This requires implementation of distributed privileged access management systems to enable 24
auditing of shared control system credentials. This data must all be integrated into centralized security 25
operations monitoring to perform cybersecurity analytics and facilitate incident response. Upon 26
detection of suspicious access behavior the system must notify incident response teams to mobilize a 27
response to potential system access loss. This requires baselining access behavior and alerting upon 28
60 Non-repudiation refers to the concept that a user of a system is unable to deny that they performed a specific
action on that system, i.e., a log attributable to a person’s name is generated for all system activity.
35
unauthorized or irregular use of privileged system access. The system will then be able to create alerts 1
based upon unauthorized user activity. Balancing the benefits of central access control with the needs for 2
local support of systems in the event of network loss is a critical control required to protect the 3
cybersecurity of the system without compromising its reliable operation. 4
This project will also tune monitoring systems to detect anomalous and suspicious 5
activities while permitting new and existing grid applications. Electric grid controls systems operate in 6
predictable communication patterns using a limited number of communications protocols. This project 7
will implement systems that are able to aggregate logs and communication data to detect when a system 8
or systems begin communicating in an anomalous way to detect potential attackers. For example, if a 9
compromised system attempts to launch a denial-of-service attack on the grid it would generate 10
significantly more network traffic than is typical during normal operation. Maintaining an automated 11
baseline of system configurations and communication behavior will enable an immediate and 12
accelerated response to such an attack upon detection of anomalous traffic. It would isolate the origin of 13
the attack, enable automated blocking of denial of service traffic, and segment this portion of the grid 14
from critical systems until remediation is complete. This would significantly impede the effect of this 15
attack and prevent the compromise from spreading to other portions of the grid network. 16
Detection and management of authorized and unauthorized systems and software must be 17
strengthened. Advanced malware detection systems must be tuned to whitelist61 permitted applications 18
and autonomously detect known bad malware and the behavior of unknown malware. Electric grid 19
systems typically do not require frequent software changes. This simplifies the implementation of 20
whitelisting technology to prevent unknown malicious or unauthorized software from executing on the 21
system. This would require an attacker to first circumvent the whitelisting protection prior to executing 22
any malicious code on the system. This significantly increases the difficulty of an attack on a critical 23
system as protection software is integrated into central monitoring systems to detect tampering. 24
Additionally, in the event that malicious code does execute on a system despite whitelisting controls, 25
advanced malware detection systems will be implemented as part of this project to detect malicious 26
behavior and remove the malware from compromised systems. This project will also implement 27
61 Whitelisting involves controls within software that permit known good applications and code to run while
denying all other applications and code from running on a system.
36
malware protection into network security devices to prevent the spread of malware through the network 1
upon detection. 2
The infrastructure changes require tight integration with operations teams to support 3
system availability and coordinated incident response. This project will enable the convergence of 4
operations technology with IT cybersecurity controls for awareness and coordination between system 5
stakeholders to protect the grid from cyber-attack. System behavior data and alerts will be shared with 6
correct stakeholders to enable operational awareness and response. These protections will ingest system 7
configuration and log data into usable analytics dashboards tuned to alert on potential incidents in a 8
timely and accurate manner. These response procedures must be regularly tested with incident exercises 9
and penetration tests to verify the effectiveness of cybersecurity operations. 10
This project will implement secure communication protocols between grid systems by 11
using secure encryption technologies protecting the integrity of control system data. Grid modernization 12
systems will enable automated actions to be taken on the grid based on data from distributed intelligence 13
systems, so cybersecurity infrastructure services will be implemented to provide the services needed to 14
facilitate strong authenticated encryption and key management to enable these new protection 15
mechanisms. The lack of integrity protections on this control data could result in man-in-the-middle 16
attacks where systems take actions based on forged messages lacking cryptographic protection. If the 17
system is responsible for managing power it could be exploited to disable power delivery. This type of 18
protection will also apply to sensitive data leaving the grid. Protections must be put in place to verify 19
that meter and measurement data sent to outside parties has not been tampered with so it may be trusted 20
as it is passed to system stakeholders. This is a critical function to protect power delivery and 21
information sharing of grid data. Grid modernization aims to change the way power is managed and 22
delivered, necessitating adapting robust cybersecurity controls to the changes in grid modernization’s 23
electricity management model. 24
a) Alternatives Considered 25
Grid modernization systems are highly customized and adapted to specific 26
applications using communications protocols that are not traditionally employed in IT environments. 27
Due to this complexity, development of a custom-built cybersecurity control suite was considered to 28
provide a central management and monitoring for all cybersecurity controls. This approach was deemed 29
difficult to scale as no single vendor or software suite was able to provide all of the necessary controls to 30
address the risks. While custom cybersecurity solutions will need to be developed for special purpose 31
37
cases, cybersecurity controls will primarily adapt commercial off the shelf technology to support grid 1
modernization applications. 2
G. IT Support for NERC CIP Compliance 3
Table III-9 NERC CIP Compliance62
Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) Authorized, Recorded, & Forecast Capital Expenditures (Nominal $Millions)
1. Project Description 4
This project will continue the on-going implementation of systems and processes that will 5
help SCE maintain compliance with the evolving cybersecurity-related NERC Critical Infrastructure 6
Protection (CIP) requirements. These systems and processes will improve facility access management, 7
asset change control maintenance, and physical access control. In addition, this project anticipates future 8
expenditures associated with emerging mandatory requirements. This project includes cost forecasts for 9
work important to complying with the following FERC-approved requirements: 10
Previous GRC Request* 6.18 1.00 4.80 14.09 11.00 4.80 5.10 *The Commission adopted SCE's request for 2014 and 2015 expenditures for this program in D.15-11-021.
and incident response plans; and CIP-010-2, which requires for transient cyber assets 27
63 See SCE-08, Vol. 1, Chapter IV, Section C, O&M for a discussion on applicable fines. 64 See FERC Order No. 822, issued on January 21, 2016, 154 FERC 61,037, Docket No. RM15-14-000. 65 See FERC Order No. 822, issued on January 21, 2016, 154 FERC 61,037, Docket No. RM15-14-000.
39
and removable media, implementing a plan or plans to include controls over software 1
vulnerabilities mitigation, introduction of malicious code mitigation, removable 2
media authorization, and unauthorized use of transient cyber assets. 3
• FERC ordered NERC CIP modifications that have yet to be drafted and approved.66 4
These modifications include: 5
o Protection of transient electronic devices used at Low Impact BES Cyber System; 6
o Protections for communication network components and data communicated 7
between BES Control Centers tailored to be commensurate with the risk posed to 8
the bulk electric system; and 9
o Modifications to the definition for Low Impact External Routable Connectivity. 10
• FERC created a new CIP, CIP-014, which addresses physical security requirements.67 11
The physical security requirements, however, depend on information technology. 12
• FERC directed NERC to conduct a study that assesses the effectiveness of the CIP 13
remote access controls, the risk posed by remote access-related threats and 14
vulnerabilities, and the appropriate mitigating controls. The results could cause 15
further mandated standard requirements.68 16
• FERC explored the need to develop mandatory requirements for cyber controls in the 17
supply chain, including during a Technical Conference on January 28, 2016. 18
3. Scope and Cost Forecast 19
This project includes cost estimates for complying with FERC-approved requirements 20
that remain to be implemented, and cost estimates for complying with anticipated FERC requirements 21
applicable to this rate case period. The FERC-approved controls require work covering the years 2016, 22
2017, and 2018. These forecasts are summarized in Table III-10 below, and follow with a description of 23
the work these forecasts will support. 24
66 See FERC Order No. 822, issued on January 21, 2016, 154 FERC 61,037, Docket No. RM15-14-000. 67 See FERC Order No. 802, issued on November 20, 2014, 149 FERC 61,140, Docket No. RM14-15-000. 68 See FERC Order No. 822, issued on January 21, 2016, 154 FERC 61,037, Docket No. RM15-14-000.
40
Table III-10 Capital Forecast by NERC CIP Standard
(Nominal $Millions)
First, to support NERC CIP-006 compliance, SCE identified 90 low-impact facilities 1
needing physical security perimeter protection as stated in SCE-07, Volume 5, Chapter V. As NERC 2
CIP required and as the historical expenditures reflect, physical access to high-impact and medium-3
impact facilities has already been addressed. For low-impact facilities, information technology 4
commensurate with the requirements can be leveraged to manage physical access. SCE plans to use 5
cost-effective smart keys to manage this physical access. Similar to hotel card key systems, SCE can 6
program the keys and remotely enable and disable key access. The solution requires performing 7
telecommunications work, which includes installing kiosk and renewal stations in various locations that 8
can connect to SCE’s network, and implementing a smart key application. Capital expenditure is 9
estimated to be $5 million in 2016. 10
Second, to support NERC CIP-014 compliance, SCE has identified nine facilities 11
requiring physical security controls as stated in SCE-08, Volume 1, Chapter V. SCE plans to execute the 12
following related to these nine sites at an estimated cost of $16.39 million covering years 2016 and 13
2017: 14
• Implement new monitoring systems to detect intrusions, including gunshots, seismic 15
events, and other activities that could pose a threat to the facility or BES. 16
• Enhance the Physical Security Information Management system to provide a secured 17
and integrated application allowing Corporate Security personnel to quickly identify 18
Service, HR, Legal, IT, Power Supply, Operational Services, Finance, and Corporate Communications. 1
These Lotus Notes solutions will be migrated to existing SCE standard tools such as SAP, Microsoft 2
SharePoint, and BMC Remedy. In doing so, this project will provide for the following operational 3
benefits: 4
1. Simplify SCE’s technology tools by reducing the number of email systems we 5
maintain and support; 6
2. Maximize SCE’s investment in Microsoft Office 365; 7
3. Eliminate the need for a major upgrade to Lotus Notes in 2018 due to technology 8
obsolescence; 9
4. Eliminate operational issues associated with using obsolete Lotus Notes software and 10
maintaining co-existence of Lotus Notes and Office 365; 11
5. Reduce ongoing maintenance costs by decommissioning all remaining components of 12
Lotus Notes at SCE; and 13
6. Improve data governance and data monitoring capabilities through adoption of Office 14
365 functionalities. 15
2. Need for Project 16
In 2014, SCE migrated email, desktop and collaboration tools from Lotus Notes to 17
Microsoft Office 365. The key deliverables of the Office 365 project were the migration of 17,500 email 18
boxes, 1,500 document libraries, and the update of the office productivity tools. The successful 19
completion of the Office 365 project in 2015 now enables SCE to simplify our Lotus Notes business 20
solutions by migrating them to Office 365 or decommissioning them. 21
There are 230 complex Lotus Notes business solutions and 202 shared Lotus Notes mail 22
boxes operating at SCE. As part of this project, SCE will migrate approximately 44% of these 23
applications and decommission the remaining 56% of applications. Of the applications to be migrated, 24
40% will be migrated to Microsoft SharePoint, 22% will be migrated to existing business applications 25
such as OpenText or Remedy, 21% will be migrated to third-party or custom applications, and 17% will 26
be migrated to SAP. Migration or decommissioning of these business solutions and shared mail boxes 27
will facilitate savings in hardware refresh, software license, and maintenance/upgrade costs estimated at 28
$9.66 million over 5 years once the project is implemented. 29
48
3. Scope and Cost Forecast 1
Project costs include all project management, organizational change management, data 2
migration services, application development services, testing services, and software and hardware 3
components.72 This estimate is based on analysis and estimation of migration costs associated with 4
existing business solutions. In addition, costs for decommissioning of all remaining Lotus Notes 5
components have been included. The project forecast is included in Table IV-13. 6
a) Alternatives Considered 7
Alternative: Continue to use Lotus Notes as a business solutions technology. This 8
alternative is not recommended due to the following reasons: 9
1. This alternative would cost SCE an additional $5.64 million over 5 years 10
between 2017 and 2021 to maintain both Lotus Notes and Office 365 email and application services. 11
These costs include an additional $4.960 million for Lotus Notes email software licenses over 5 years 12
between 2017 and 2021 and approximately $0.7 million to upgrade Lotus Notes software, servers, and 13
storage to maintain continued vendor support, operations, and cybersecurity compliance in 2017; 14
2. This alternative would not remediate the operational and usability issues 15
associated with using obsolete Lotus Notes software and maintaining co-existence of Lotus Notes and 16
Office 365; and 17
3. This alternative would prevent SCE from fully realizing the value in our 18
investment and use of Office 365. 19
72 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk A p. 223.
49
C. Backup and Disaster Recovery Optimization 1
Table IV-14 Backup and Disaster Recovery Optimization73
Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) Authorized, Recorded, & Forecast Capital Expenditures (Nominal $Millions)
1. Project Description 2
Disaster Recovery (DR) includes the strategies, plans, and computing infrastructure to 3
minimize interruption and recover business application systems if a disaster occurs. SCE currently 4
maintains DR capabilities through redundant computing capabilities at SCE’s two data centers, in 5
Alhambra and Irvine, such that when a Mission Critical Application (MCA)74 fails at one location, the 6
failure is mitigated by the resumption of operations by its redundant counterpart in the other location. 7
This project will mitigate deficiencies in the current disaster recovery environment and replace existing 8
backup systems with newer technologies. Improvements in DR will improve SCE’s ability to enable 9
restoration of business functions, associated with mission critical systems, at either data center during a 10
disaster. 11
This project will implement new technology to improve DR capabilities in the following 12
areas: 13
• Install DR hardware and software in each data center to provide adequate support 14
should a critical application need to operate from a non-primary data center location 15
in the event of a disaster. DR hardware and software is composed of data storage, 16
network equipment, and computer processing units. 17
• Conduct controlled DR scenarios in the production environment to provide data 18
replication and system recovery for all required components. 19
73 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk A pp. 224-229. 74 SCE’s Mission Critical Applications (MCA) include applications that support power procurement,
transmission and distribution, and customer service business processes, such as the Outage Management System, Energy Management System, Power Costs Inc. (energy trading), and Customer Service System Account Management.
Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) Authorized, Recorded, & Forecast Capital Expenditures (Nominal $Millions)
a) Project Description 14
The Commission approved the SCE.com Strategic Upgrade project in SCE’s 2012 15
GRC, and subsequently in SCE’s 2015 GRC.78 While SCE has completed the majority of work 16
approved in previous GRC applications, there is remaining work to be completed in 2016. This 17
77 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk B pp. 6-8. 78 Please see D.12-11-051, p. 859, for the authorized forecast costs in 2011 and 2012 with a 10% reduction for
all SAM projects including SCE.com and D.15-11-021 for the authorized forecast for the remaining scope of work for this project.
testimony updates the Commission on the remaining scope of work to be completed in this rate case 1
period and a summary of the completed scope of work. 2
The SCE.com Strategic Upgrade/Stabilization project replaces existing SCE.com 3
legacy web platform with a modernized IBM WebSphere web platform, and it includes the migration of 4
existing core applications to a new platform. This enables SCE to support the continued use of the 5
website as a robust source of information for rates, programs, and services, while enabling new and 6
contemporary self-service tools for customers to complete core transactions online.79 The project was 7
originally intended to span four years, beginning in 2011 and ending by 2014; but due to program design 8
changes, and longer periods required to test and stabilize functional and technical capabilities, the 9
project completion date has been extended to 2016. 10
b) Need for Project 11
SCE.com’s prior platform and architecture had reliability risks and could not fully 12
support the changing business needs of SCE and its customers. The SCE.com applications lacked a 13
standards-based design, rendering the entire system difficult to maintain and scale. If SCE did not 14
implement this project, extensive reprogramming efforts would have been needed to accommodate 15
increases in the types and volumes of transactions SCE expects in the near future. For these reasons, the 16
Commission approved SCE’s 2012 and 2015 GRC projects to replace the current SCE.com 17
infrastructure. 18
c) Scope 19
(1) Remaining Scope to be Completed in 2016 20
The remaining scope of this project includes migration of the existing My 21
Account and Billing and Payment options to the new platform, which is targeted for completion in 2016. 22
While many of the My Account information items were provided under the prior platform, this project 23
will migrate these same offerings to the new platform so customers can access these features through the 24
79 SCE considers core transactions to include Service Enablement: allowing customers to submit their electric
service turn on / off / transfer requests; Billing: access to current bills and billing history; Payment (credits / arrangements): ability for users to submit payments or set up payment arrangements; Outage: allowing customers to quickly report an outage, and receive updates about outages via the channel of choice (email, text, or voice message); and Usage Data: easy access to energy usage information to help customers understand their bills.
54
updated WebSphere platform. A high-level summary of the completed project scope for migration of 1
core legacy .NET applications is provided below. 2
(2) Completed Scope 3
The following scopes of work have been completed through 2015: 4
Online Turn-On, Turn Off, or Transfer (Move Center): Customers are 5
now able to initiate a turn-on, turn-off, or transfer-service-location request any time online.80 Additional 6
foundational capabilities have also been implemented with the SCE.com Move Center such as 7
“shopping cart” and “check out” functionality for enrolling in SCE Products/Services. 8
Device Flexibility/Responsive Design: By auto-detecting device access 9
format requirements, the webpages resize and present content appropriate for the device. This is known 10
as adopting a mobile-first design approach, which provides a multiplatform foundation that delivers 11
content parity for any device. Additionally, this eliminates the need to create separate websites with 12
content optimized for desktop, tablet, and mobile device access. The remaining programs to be migrated 13
to the mobile-first design approach include My Account and Billing and Payment options. The project 14
scope to complete this work is a part of the Digital Customer Self-Service project. 15
Outage Center: Customers have been provided with a stand-alone mobile-16
first outage center website where customers can report outages and street-light outages through their 17
mobile devices. Through Google Maps, customers have an at-a-glance view of current outages across 18
SCE’s territory with one-click access to additional details on the outage, such as the cause of the outage, 19
the status of the repairs, and the estimated restoration time. 20
Stabilization: Upon implementation of the initial phase in 2013 and 21
subsequent releases of SCE.com on the new IBM WebSphere platform in 2015, a period of stabilization 22
was required to focus on improving site performance. This effort also included identification and 23
resolution of underlying platform issues created by the necessity of having both SCE’s legacy web 24
platform and the new WebSphere platform in co-existence during this transition. The primary objectives 25
during this stabilization period were to reduce the number and severity of Business Impact Events 26
80 Customers who opt out of the Edison SmartConnect® program or non-residential customers can also use the
online process; however, the service transaction does not currently use the Remote Service Switch (RSS).
55
(BIEs);81 address the root cause of recent BIEs; understand and reduce the risk of all deployments that 1
impact SCE.com; and improve the process for future releases. Each stabilization period was a six-month 2
effort requiring all in-progress work to be temporarily placed on hold until the achievement of functional 3
and technical stability. 4
d) Recorded and Forecast Expenditures 5
The capital forecast for this project was developed using SCE’s internal cost 6
estimation model along with the recorded expenditures for 2011-2015. This model utilizes industry best 7
practices and SCE subject matter expertise to estimate project cost components. SCE’s forecast for this 8
project includes costs for labor, hardware, licensing, and other costs. See this project’s workpaper for the 9
cost breakdown information.82 10
SCE forecast $6.15 million in 2016 to complete the remaining scope of work for 11
the SCE.com Strategic Upgrade/Stabilization project. The recorded and forecast project expenditures 12
from 2011-2016 total $69.38 million, which is $2.77 million above our 2015 GRC forecast of $66.61 13
million. The increase in project expenditures is due to the need to resolve technical and stabilization 14
issues beyond the original project scope and forecast that occurred in 2013. These challenges delayed 15
completion of the planned and previously authorized original scope of work from 2013 to 2014 and 16
2015. The difference between the updated total project forecast and the 2015 GRC revised authorized 17
project costs is discussed below. 18
In SCE’s 2015 GRC, SCE forecast project expenditures of $66.61 million to 19
complete the scope of work under a revised timeline. In D.15-11-021, however, the Commission 20
authorized 2013 recorded costs for all capitalized software projects. For the SCE.com Strategic 21
Upgrade/Stabilization Project, SCE spent approximately $8 million less in 2013 than originally forecast. 22
The Commission authorized $58.62 for this project in the 2015 GRC, as shown in Table V-16, which 23
reflected the $8 million underspend in 2013. 24
81 A Business Impact Event (BIE) is an incident that causes disruption to an IT service (e.g., application failure),
which ultimately impacts the business user. BIEs track and monitor the incident through its lifecycle and regularly communicate the status and mitigation plans to SCE business users.
82 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk B pp. 6-8.
56
2. Digital Customer Self-Service 1
Table V-17 Digital Customer Self-Service83
Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) Authorized, Recorded, & Forecast Capital Expenditure(Nominal $Millions)
a) Project Description 2
The purpose of the Digital Customer Self Service (DCSS) project is to expand the 3
customer self-service capabilities of SCE.com by implementing solutions that make it quick and easy for 4
our customers to take action regardless of the device they are using. This project will make possible new 5
electronic billing and payment transactions, will upgrade customer security specifically for program 6
enrollment, and will make website functionality improvements. The project will create O&M savings by 7
streamlining new ebilling enrollments and will result in avoided cost savings related to customer 8
security and authentication. 9
Our customers expect simple, easy, and intuitive interactions with us through a 10
variety of methods, with an increasing reliance on mobile connectivity. Investing in digital as the 11
channel of choice for customer transactions is a primary focus for SCE. SCE aspires to have digital as 12
the channel of choice84 to serve the online needs of our customers. We expect digital core transactions to 13
increase to over 60% by 2020.85 To serve this growth in self-service transactions, SCE is undergoing a 14
major transition in how we view and manage our digital interactions. 15
83 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk B pp. 9-21. 84 SCE defines digital or digital as the channel of choice as web and mobile. 85 SCE considers core transactions to include Service Enablement: online ability of customers to submit their
electric service turn on / off / transfer requests; Billing: access to current bills and billing history; Payment (credits / arrangements): ability for users to submit payments or set up payment arrangements; Outage: allowing customers to quickly report an outage, and receive updates about outages via the channel of choice (email, text, or voice message); and Usage Data: easy access to energy usage information to help customers understand their bills.
Customers are becoming more technologically savvy and expect to be able to 2
complete day-to-day transactions online themselves such as receiving and paying bills, turning service 3
on and off, and accessing news and information.86 Easily transacting with their electricity provider 4
should be no exception. Failed digital transactions result in dissatisfied customers and, more often than 5
not, a higher-cost transaction to SCE.87 6
Part of the Customer Service Strategy is to make it easy for customers to use 7
channels like digital. Enabling and optimizing digital features allow customers to self-serve at their 8
convenience. When a digital transaction is properly designed and reliably built, it will shift and maintain 9
volume to the digital channel, meeting basic customer needs and leading to higher customer 10
satisfaction.88 11
Mobile devices are driving the growth in the digital marketplace, and the 12
transition to mobile is affecting how SCE designs our future digital interactions with our customers and 13
how we provide that service on their preferred channels. Sixty-five percent of smartphone users say 14
paying and receiving bills on a smartphone increases their satisfaction.89 On SCE.com, over 40% of our 15
traffic today is generated by mobile devices and is forecast to grow to 70% by 2020.90 For SCE to meet 16
customer expectations we must develop solutions that work on mobile devices and make completing 17
transactions secure and easy. 18
c) Scope 19
The scope of this project will leverage the enhancements established by the 20
WebSphere Platform discussed in the SCE.com Upgrade project. The project scope includes an 21
integrated set of solutions: Device Support, Electronic Billing and Payment transactions, Security and 22
Authentication, and Website Functionality Improvements. These project scope components are 23
discussed below. 24
86 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk B pp. 22-24. 87 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2C pp. 1-16. 88 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk B pp. 23-30. 89 Eric Leiserson, “Mobile Billing and Payment: Consumer Preferences and Billers’ Strategic Response,”
Fiserv, p. 12. 90 Refer to WP SCE-03, Ch. VII-X, p. 148.
58
(1) Device Support 1
The project scope for Device Support provides for the continued 2
implementation of our mobile-first framework, which auto-detects device access format requirements 3
and resizes webpages to present appropriate content, making it quick and easy for our customers to take 4
action regardless of the size of the screen. By allowing customers to use their device of choice when 5
transacting, we will increase customer usage of SCE.com and the volume of self-service transactions. 6
This device-support framework, which starts with responsive design, 91 is applied to each new and 7
enhanced digital feature, including development of conceptual wireframes, clickable prototypes, 8
execution of customer research, user experience implementation, cross-browser and device testing. 9
(2) Electronic Billing and Payment Transactions 10
The project scope includes My Account / Billing and Payment 11
optimization that is focused on improving customers’ ability to easily view and pay bills and on 12
improving the main Billing & Payment webpages. These capabilities will be enabled once the migration 13
to the WebSphere platform is complete. This project will consolidate existing websites, webpages, and 14
mobile applications into one integrated experience to simplify and make consistent the online customer 15
experience. The Electronic Billing & Payment (B&P) scope is a key enabler for increasing Paperless 16
Billing adoption. Increased customer participation in electronic billing is forecast from enrolling 17
customers who choose to pay electronically (e.g., credit card, EFT, SCE ePay) automatically in the 18
Paperless Billing program. 19
The increased customer participation in electronic billing will save 20
postage expense and billing production costs (e.g., paper, ink, printing costs). Additionally, other 21
electronic billing enrollment initiatives including marketing efforts will require SCE.com programming 22
and modifications to achieve the forecast number of new ebilling customer enrollments. The annual 23
forecast for 2018-2020 in O&M reductions for increased customer participation in ebilling is $4.839 24
million for Postage Expense (FERC 903.100) and $1,257 million for billing (903.500).92 The forecast 25
savings in postage expense and billing expenses depend on approval for this capitalized software project 26
or the reductions will need to be removed from the O&M forecast. Table V-18 below shows the forecast 27
91 Responsive web design is a webpage approach aimed at allowing webpages to function on multiple devices,
independent of display device (e.g., desktop monitors, mobile phones, tablets). 92 See SCE-03, Chapter IV. B. for Billing and Chapter IV. D. for Postage testimony.
59
number of new ebilling transactions for 2016-2018 and the 1.25 million in additional customers 1
expected to participate in ebilling by the Test Year. 2
Table V-18 SCE Planned Electronic Billing Program Initiatives
Forecast New Customer Ebilling Transactions and Enrollments 2016-2018
(3) Security and Authentication 3
This project will also enhance our existing Authentication framework 4
while upgrading our customer-facing identity management security. Authentication is one of the largest 5
hurdles for self-service transactions for SCE customers expecting to access and complete core 6
transactions without a lengthy, complex registration and log-in process. The project scope for Security 7
and Authentication includes simplifying account set-up and password resets that allow for guest 8
transactions through Two-Factor authentication.93 Online Two-Factor authentication will increase the 9
security of authentication and increase the success rate of customers signing on. Currently, SCE.com 10
requires an account number to register as a user, which can be inconvenient for customers unable to 11
93 Two-Factor Authentication is a security process in which the user provides two forms of identification from
separate categories of credentials.
Line No.
Description 2016 2017 2018
Estimated New Ebilling Transactions1 Default SCE ePay Customers 2,201,859 1,169,289 - 2 EV Sweepstake - 960,000 480,000 3 Default Credit Card Customers 379,512 212,796 - 4 Default DP Customers 486,918 462,306 - 5 Offer Paperless to remaining - 210,000 126,000 6 iPad Promotion 187,150 88,850 - 7 Marketing 537,207 500,000 8 New Initiatives 997,580 1,045,129 544,871 9 Default EFT Customers 345,000 1,635,000 - 10 Total Yearly New Ebilling Transactions 5,135,226 6,283,370 1,150,871 11 Total Cumulative New Ebilling Transactions 5,135,226 11,418,596 12,569,467 12 Weighted Average Postage Rate $0.385 $0.385 $0.38513 Cumulative Postage Savings $1,977,062 $4,396,159 $4,839,24514 Postage Study Savings in $000 $1,977 $4,396 $4,839
15Estimated Number of New Ebilling Customer Enrollments based on 10.05 mailings per year 510,968 1,136,179 1,250,693
60
quickly find their bill and locate their account number. The project will allow SCE.com users to choose 1
from multiple options to authenticate (e.g., phone number, zip code, address, and social sign-on). This is 2
expected to avoid increasing the number of calls placed to our Customer Call Center (CCC) to assist 3
with these requests. Additionally, the project scope includes providing different levels of account access 4
through roles/permissions to further the customer experience and protect the account holder from 5
unauthorized changes to their SCE account. 6
Table V-19 below provides the forecast avoided cost savings from the new 7
Authentication framework. The forecast is based on estimated number of calls to the CCC by transaction 8
type, historical percentage of customers who failed to complete authentication and then exited SCE.com 9
or clicked on “Contact Us,” and forecast increase of customers using SCE.com post-authentication 10
improvements. The forecast avoided cost savings to be realized with implementing the Authentication 11
initiative is forecast to be $3.5 million over 2016-2020 period.94 12
Multiple CITs: CIT-00-SD-PM-000107, CIT-00-SD-PM-000238, and CIT-00-SD-PM-000171
Recorded Forecast
65
alignment to enrolled customers, and (5) improved reporting on customer contact enrollment, customer 1
type, alert preferences, and unenrollment reasons. 2
b) Need for Project 3
In 2014 and throughout much of 2015, SCE used multiple isolated systems to 4
store contact and alert preferences, and multiple notification systems to send alerts to customers. The 5
new platform will consolidate multiple core and auxiliary support systems into two systems: a contact 6
and preference management system (single source of accurate information) and a notification system. 7
The new platform reduces the complexity of SCE’s technology portfolio. It also increases customer 8
adoption by allowing customers to enroll and receive timely and accurate alerts for the programs and 9
services they choose, and to select the digital channel they prefer most (email, voice or text).101 Digital 10
alerts will include core electricity service alerts such as outage alerts and final call notices, and optional 11
alerts and notification such as bill ready notification, demand response program events, and energy 12
efficiency recommendations.102 13
The new Alerts & Notifications platform is necessary to provide integrated and 14
scalable systems to support compliance with TCPA and the CAN-SPAM federal laws. The new platform 15
will store customer consent to use their landline, mobile phone, or email address for automated digital 16
communications, which will reduce SCE’s risk of TCPA and CAN-SPAM non-compliance. This portion 17
of the project scope will develop and maintain a centralized repository to capture customer “Do Not 18
Contact” preferences for meeting the “Do Not Call” requirements set forth in various federal statutes.103 19
c) Completed Project Scope 20
SCE is using a phased development approach for the Alerts and Notifications 21
project and has implemented Releases 1 and 2a. These two releases are discussed below: 22
Project Release 1 – Implemented in September 2015 23
Release 1 provided the capability for approximately 300,000 eligible small 24
business customers to optionally enroll and receive proactive maintenance and repair outage alerts via 25
101 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk B pp. 35-36. 102 There are approximately 3.5 million maintenance or repair outages each year that impact residential and non-
residential customers. 103 E.g., Mobile Marketing association and Direct Marketing Association Code of Conduct, California’s Shine
the Light Law, FCC Telephone Consumer Protection Act, Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, CAN-SPAM.
66
their channel of choice (email, voice, or text message). This release improved and simplified outage alert 1
message content and format for all enrolled customer types and facilitated self-service opt-out of outage 2
alerts when desired. The opt-out process also identifies when an outage alert delivery failed due to 3
inactive phones and email addresses, which enables SCE to discontinue sending unnecessary outage 4
alerts. The total cost to implement Release 1 was $1.3 million. 5
Prior to Release 1, small business customers only received initial maintenance 6
outage alerts via U.S. Mail or door hangers. When there were outage schedule changes a few days 7
before the outage there was rarely enough time to inform impacted customers before the original outage 8
date. Release 1 addressed this issue by enabling digital maintenance outage updates throughout the 9
lifecycle of the outage so small business customers receive sufficient time to prepare and help ensure 10
their employees and customers remain informed. 11
Project Release 2a – Implemented in December 2015 12
Release 2a established a new SAP CRM platform for outage alert preferences that 13
stores and manages small business and residential customer contact information and digital outage alert 14
preferences. The new SAP CRM platform delivers the following functionality: (1) enabled residential 15
customers to enroll and receive proactive maintenance and repair outage alerts using self-service tools, 16
(2) enabled new customer self-service tools to manage their outage alert preferences on SCE.com, (3) 17
established auto-enrollment for eligible customer contacts in outage alerts, (4) automated the processing 18
of outage alert customer opt-outs and unenrollment for inactive phones and email addresses from 19
required systems, and (5) provided new and improved outage and alert enrollment reporting. Release 2a 20
established the base framework of the new platform that will help SCE create a simple and efficient 21
outage experience for our customers. For Release 2a, the recorded costs to implement this project were 22
$6.8 million in 2015. 23
d) Remaining Project Scope 24
Project Release 2b – Planned Implementation in Early 2017 25
The next phase of this project is Release 2b, which will refine our customer 26
contact and outage alert preference self-service tools and the actual content of the outage alerts based on 27
customer feedback. Release 2b scope includes (1) simplifying the customer self-service alert-preference 28
management online experience by making it easier to enroll in outage alerts, (2) introducing new 29
customer self-service alert preference management tools using Interactive Voice Response (IVR), and 30
67
(3) refining outage alert preparation and send rules to improve the timeliness and accuracy of outage 1
alerts sent to enrolled contacts. 2
Release 2b is expected to improve our customers’ outage experience satisfaction. 3
This Release will also help to avoid increasing customer calls to the Customer Contact Center (CCC) to 4
update their contact information and outage alert preferences, by providing customers with effective and 5
easy-to-use self-service tools along with timely and accurate outage alert communications. 6
Future Project Releases – Planned Implementation in 2018 and 2019 7
Additional releases are needed to continue expanding and enhancing SCE’s 8
digital Alerts and Notifications platform to realize all the business capabilities described above. The 9
remaining scope includes the following: 10
• Migrating contact and alert preference information from multiple systems 11
(i.e., legacy Customer Service System (CSS) and SCE.com) into the new 12
platform; 13
• Decommissioning of multiple legacy and aging contact management and 14
notification systems where possible; 15
• Providing new customer self-service and employee tools, such as: 16
o Customer contact information management (e.g., name, phone, phone 17
type, email address); 18
o Enrollment and preference management for migrated alert programs (e.g., 19
work against resources. Employees across departments and business functions perform these work 1
management activities using independent processes and tools. They do so leveraging a blend of core IT 2
systems (i.e., SAP and Design Manager), outdated Project Management solutions, and standard 3
Microsoft applications such as Excel and Project. Processes, where similar, do not allow for data across 4
departments to be easily integrated. Processes for T&D internal and contract resources are dissimilar, 5
making data sharing and data integration virtually impossible. 6
Work Management within T&D can be improved by optimizing work schedules and 7
resource assignments across the IPSEC process. To meet the increasing demands of the grid and our 8
customers, SCE performed two process assessments with separate independent partners. These 9
assessments resulted in recommendations for improving the way SCE manages its work across the 10
IPSEC model. 11
The “Work Management Assessment” looked at organizations, people, processes, and 12
technology to address key objectives. The objectives include: (1) Increase the accuracy of project scope 13
estimating, (2) Reduce the technology footprint and redundancies by using common tools, (3) Improve 14
and standardize IPSEC workflow processes, and (4) Improve performance through integrating enterprise 15
solutions across the company. The Project Controls Improvement Initiative (PCII) performed a gap 16
analysis between SCE and industry best practices in the areas of project scope, costs, and expenditure 17
controls.112 This initiative identified gaps in the current scope development, cost estimating tools and 18
processes, while also noting the benefits of integrating the scope estimating process with our current 19
enterprise system (SAP). 20
Based on these assessments the scope definitions for each of the IT capital projects 21
(supporting T&D Work Management) were refined to align the business capabilities being sought with 22
the appropriate technical solution. Portfolio management needs originally authorized in the 2015 GRC 23
as the “Integrated Portfolio Management for MPO” were identified to extend beyond MPO.113 This 24
project scope expanded to include project management capabilities. This change was made based on 25
project management capabilities being more aligned with portfolio management than with work 26
management dashboards. The Work Management Dashboard project was reduced accordingly. Another 27
112 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk B pp. 77-101. 113 Major Projects Organization (MPO) integration details can be found in the assessments further described in
the subsequent Work Management projects.
74
example of how project scopes were redefined is the Scope Cost Management Tool (SCMT). Project 1
forecasting capabilities were originally planned to be delivered through the SCMT application. The 2
assessments determined that project forecasting capabilities were better suited to be delivered with 3
portfolio management than with SCMT. The scope and costs for these projects were then revised to 4
reflect this change. The scope refinement outcomes are included in the project descriptions that follow. 5
The assessments resulted in a proposed system architecture provided in Figure V-6 below. 6
The series of projects based on the assessments and that are included within the suite of 7
Work Management Solutions include: 8
1. Portfolio Management; 9
2. Scope Cost Management Tool; 10
3. Work Management Dashboard; 11
4. Transmission Telecom Work Order Lifecycle; and 12
5. Click Schedule Refresh Release 1 & 2. 13
These projects will deliver to T&D the increased work management capabilities in 14
portfolio management, resource and budget forecasting, project scope estimating and scheduling, and 15
reporting and analytics. By leveraging standard industry work management tools in a consistent manner, 16
the improved work management capabilities also enable T&D to integrate oversight of work assigned to 17
contract resources. 18
75
Figure V-6 Work Management Assessment
1
2. WM - Portfolio Management 2
Table V-24 WM - Portfolio Management114
Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) Authorized, Recorded, & Forecast Capital Expenditures (Nominal $Millions)
D.15-11-021 adopted the project as part of SCE’s 2015 GRC, where it was 2
included as part of the “Integrated Portfolio Management for MPO” project. The project was delayed to 3
complete the Work Management Assessment (WMA) described above. Besides delaying the start of this 4
project until late 2016, the WMA confirmed the gaps and benefits were not isolated to “Integrated 5
Portfolio Management for MPO” but all Work Management projects across T&D. This broadened the 6
effort to include all T&D capital projects. 7
T&D capital projects are planned and managed as a portfolio. Each portfolio 8
component represents a collection of projects similar in nature. The similarity is usually based on the 9
asset being worked on, or the construction being performed. For example, substation circuit breaker 10
infrastructure replacement projects follow a common process, similar project timeline, and require 11
essentially the same project management, engineering, electrician, and field construction skillsets. 12
Likewise, transmission reconductor projects have commonalities when compared to each other. 13
Resource requirements and project schedules for transmission reconductor work would not be the same 14
as those for substation circuit breaker infrastructure replacement work. The same analogy would be true 15
for Distribution overhead conductor programs, and all other portfolio components. 16
Conflicts within different projects across the portfolio can occur due to resource, 17
scheduling, or operating constraints. It may not be feasible to perform Distribution overhead conductor 18
replacement concurrent with Transmission reconductoring on the same overhead pole line, from a field 19
coordination perspective. Nor may it be feasible from a grid operations perspective to perform 20
Transmission reconductoring concurrently with Substation Infrastructure Replacement, if the outages 21
required to support each activity cannot be simultaneously managed. Potential resource constraints may 22
also exist while attempting to simultaneously execute Distribution 4kV substation elimination work and 23
Substation Infrastructure Replacement work if both projects depend on the same substation apparatus 24
personnel. The Portfolio Management solution identifies these potential conflicts early to resolve the 25
operational impacts and maximize productivity. 26
By building a long-term plan for the portfolio based on standardized project 27
schedules, the Portfolio Management solution will allow T&D to quantify demands across T&D by 28
work group, asset, circuit or system, and geography. This will allow SCE to assess the organizational, 29
customer and financial implications related to “what if” scenarios or changes in investment plans. If 30
several projects within the portfolio were tracking under budget or behind schedule, the Portfolio 31
77
Management solution would allow the organization to assess various mitigation alternatives. By 1
managing all large projects as a portfolio, schedule or cost deviations of individual projects from their 2
respective project plans can be balanced by adjusting plans for other projects if feasible. 3
Project schedules will be developed based on the standard project template for 4
each area of the portfolio. This will allow SCE to monitor actual project performance against the 5
standard portfolio schedule template and will improve visibility to project risk. Actual project 6
performance, across many projects over time, can be aggregated for each area of the portfolio. The 7
aggregated data can be fed back to improve the corresponding standard portfolio schedule template. This 8
performance-based feedback loop will drive continuous improvement of the portfolio standard schedule 9
and maximize long-term planning efforts. 10
The capabilities delivered would be focused on large capital projects that typically 11
last from a few months to multiple years. The final solution is not designed to address short-duration 12
work (typically from a few days to a few weeks). 13
b) Need for Project 14
The level of infrastructure replacement and modernization that SCE expects to 15
execute within the next few years requires effective and efficient long-term planning and project 16
management. Ineffective planning and project scheduling can cause project delays, project over runs, 17
write offs, or frequent cycles of work ramp-up and ramp-down. These results can cascade into 18
overloaded workloads for employees as work spikes and deadlines accelerate. 19
Portfolio and project management capabilities within T&D are performed to 20
various degrees of maturity and across a variety of applications. Substation projects are submitted for 21
portfolio review within a custom-built solution and managed using several older versions of a 22
scheduling tool, which cannot work together. Conversely, Distribution employees rely on Excel and 23
Access to perform reviews of the portfolio. Distribution capital projects are managed using a 24
combination of multiple tools (e.g., SAP, Design Manager, Access, and Excel). The MS Office-based 25
tools are not integrated with SCE’s enterprise applications. Therefore, data for reporting within 26
Distribution are not integrated. Integrating project information between Transmission, Substation, and 27
Distribution is even more problematic. This lack of integration creates an organizational blind spot for 28
resource managers and employees within Substation and Operations. These groups regularly support 29
work plans being driven by Transmission and Distribution projects. Transmission reconductor and 30
distribution 4kV circuit elimination projects may depend on support from grid operators and substation 31
78
apparatus employees. However, the resource managers for these employees do not have access to the 1
project plans or visibility to the timing for the planned work. Instead, they rely on email communications 2
and Excel files for this information. This information can be unreliable and becomes difficult to manage 3
when project dates change. 4
The Portfolio Management project will enable resource managers to balance 5
demand and capacity more efficiently by providing a long-range overview of project needs. This will 6
drive faster project execution. Roles and hand-offs will become more defined and standardized across 7
the system. Implementing Portfolio Management will provide focus on critical activities. It will also 8
minimize rework and false starts resulting from a lack of overall job coordination. The tool will allow 9
resource constraints to be identified earlier to better assess the ramp-up needs of resources (internal or 10
contract) or the resequencing of work, before capital charges record. 11
A common project-management solution that all employees utilize will provide 12
portfolio and project managers a comprehensive view of project status and risk. This will cause drive 13
project delivery or reduced project costs as project risks are mitigated in advance. By meeting these 14
objectives, SCE will improve its overall ability to deliver capital projects as measured by quicker project 15
execution, reduced project delays, timely and effective scope on-ramp/off-ramp, and improved resource 16
and contractor management. Project plan progress can be consistently and accurately monitored, and 17
project plan risk can be mitigated. 18
c) Scope and Forecast 19
The Portfolio Management project will implement a COTS Project and Portfolio 20
Management Solution (PPM) integrated with the balance of T&D’s existing work management 21
solutions. Project scope includes: 22
1. Portfolio Planning & Forecasting—Provide a centralized tool for all large 23
capital programs where program scope, costs,115 resources and schedules are 24
prioritized and approved, as the baseline portfolio investment plan. Provide a 25
tool where project data related to schedule, costs and resources can be 26
aggregated and summarized across capital programs, resource pools and cost 27
categories. Provide the ability to generate forecasts (schedule, budget, and 28
115 Portfolio and project costs would be calculated within the application provided as part of the SCMT project
and input as a project cost estimate by the portfolio or project manager.
79
resource) for capital projects, the programs the capital projects belong to, and 1
the portfolio of capital programs. 2
2. Project Scheduling—Provide a standard tool for all large capital work to be 3
planned and managed allowing for consistent management of schedules and 4
resources and project monitoring against portfolio baselines. Integration of 5
project schedule data into Portfolio Planning solution for risk management, 6
change control governance, and project oversight. 7
3. SAP Integration—Align project schedule structure with recorded costs within 8
SAP work order operations. Provide integration to allow cost data to be 9
provided to project and portfolio managers. 10
4. Contractor Enablement—Provide a tool where project data for project work 11
assigned to contractors can be integrated into the view of the overall portfolio, 12
reducing the specialized hand-offs between groups and eliminating the 13
translation of contractor data into project status views on a delayed basis. 14
Provide a means for contractor collaboration through a standard project 15
documentation exchange and project documentation retention solution. 16
5. Reporting Data—Provide portfolio and project data to enterprise reporting 17
databases. This would be for integration into the centralized reporting and 18
analytics solution with data for work outside the Portfolio Management 19
solution.116 20
The total project cost forecast is $14 million.117 The capital forecast for this 21
project was developed using SCE’s internal cost estimation model. This model utilizes industry best 22
practices and SCE subject matter expertise to estimate project cost components. SCE’s forecast for this 23
project includes costs for SCE employees, supplemental workers and consultants, software and vendor 24
costs, and hardware costs. See this project’s workpaper for the cost breakdown information. This 25
116 Examples of work not included with the Portfolio Management solution include Distribution Inspection,
O&M and New Service Connections. The reporting needs from this integrated reporting database would be the scope of the Work Management Dashboard project.
117 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk B p. 110.
80
includes the implementation of COTS Portfolio Management and Scheduling solutions across T&D and 1
integration of these solutions with our SAP enterprise system. 2
(1) Alternatives Considered 3
Alternative 1: SCE considered replacing the existing solution by building 4
a customized solution using SCE and consultant resources or contracting with a third party to build it. 5
We did not pursue this option because it would require SCE and contracted resources to identify the 6
required skills and to set up the development and testing environments. This alternative was also not 7
pursued because it would not be cost-effective to create such a solution because it would require 8
significant future maintenance costs. 9
Alternative 2: SCE considered replacing the existing solution by 10
procuring a new commercially available tool or service. We did not pursue this alternative because it 11
would require SCE to go through the competitive bid process for both the tool and additional support 12
services to integrate it with the existing tools in our IPSEC model. This option was also not pursued 13
because implementing a new tool would also carry additional costs for training and other organization 14
change management activities. 15
3. Scope Cost Management Tool (SCMT) 16
Table V-25 Scope Cost Management Tool118
Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) Authorized, Recorded, & Forecast Capital Expenditures (Nominal $Millions)
a) Project Description 17
The Scope and Cost Management Tool (SCMT) is foundational to the Work 18
Management process as it will provide a standard method of estimating the scope and costs of a project 19
throughout its lifecycle. An improved scope estimating solution is required for SCE to accurately 20
estimate the cost for all T&D and FERC 1000 projects, while managing to forecasts (via Portfolio 21
Management) in a consistent manner. SCMT will allow for estimation accuracy commensurate with the 1
phase of the project and level of engineering estimate available. As large capital projects progress from 2
initial template-based estimates, to post job walks, or to detailed design,119 SCMT will provide the 3
ability to conduct scope and cost estimates with more detail and improved accuracy. 4
SCMT is intended for larger, non-programmatic projects120 that are included with 5
the Portfolio Management project, described above. SCMT will allow SCE to perform accurate scope 6
and cost estimating earlier in the project planning process. As an input into the Portfolio Management 7
solution, it will enable SCE to produce a comprehensive project forecast from inception to completion. 8
SCE’s existing process develops scope based on conceptual engineering prior to work order creation.121 9
However, revisions to scope and costs can also occur later in the planning and development phases of a 10
project. These revisions can cause impacts to the project schedule and budget when not properly re-11
estimated. 12
The SCMT project implements a solution that will: 13
1. Provide an accurate initial estimate of scope and cost using standard project 14
templates, then modified and revised as project scope is refined; 15
2. Provide a standardized platform for capital project scope estimation so they 16
are consistent and repeatable; 17
3. Expand the range of projects that can be estimated (e.g., major capital project, 18
programmatic project, interconnection, FERC 1000 projects, etc.); and 19
4. Assist in improved cost controls by providing a standard cost estimating 20
methodology. 21
SCMT will replace the disparate set of tools in use today with a single user-22
friendly platform. SCE uses a combination of software tools developed in-house, along with 23
commercially available products. As these products age, their performance diminishes. Their inability to 24
119 Detailed design estimates for work orders managed in SCE’s Design Manager would be produced from
within the Design Manager application. 120 Non-Programmatic work refers to projects whose scope is unique in nature and not repeatable. The
construction of a new large transmission line would be an example. 121 SCE’s Design Manager performs CU bases cost estimation for sub-transmission and distribution work, after
the work order has been pulled and engineered.
82
handle new types of work make them less useful. Replacing them with up-to-date technology will 1
alleviate the issues described above and provide a platform capable of meeting future needs. 2
b) Need for Project 3
Implementation of an industry-standard Scope and Cost Management Tool will 4
allow SCE to cost out the scope included in our current capital operating roadmap plans and more 5
accurately determine future spending needs. This allows SCE work managers and planners to perform 6
more accurate estimates for increasingly complex projects. This is accomplished by providing 7
predictable and consistent scope and cost estimating tools integrated to other enterprise work 8
management tools. Additionally SCMT will help enable SCE management to better analyze variances 9
between planned and actual project costs and scope, across all large capital projects. This analysis will 10
provide opportunities to improve the cost basis for future projects and improve our future project scope 11
costing and project controls capabilities. The estimates that the SCMT solution will provide are expected 12
to be an input into the Portfolio Management solution described above. 13
This project modernizes SCE’s tools and processes in use today and improves our 14
current capabilities in several major areas: 15
1. Ease of use – Effective project scoping and costing is an involved and often 16
complex process. The solution will allow for a simpler user experience by embedding complex rules and 17
processes into the workflow. It will also provide project scope and cost templates easily adjusted for a 18
project. 19
2. Consistency – A standardized tool will improve consistency of estimates and 20
therefore will cause improved accuracy. It will also provide more intelligence for users to understand the 21
variances between estimated and actual costs. 22
3. Performance – Besides not meeting SCE’s functional needs, the tools in use 23
are slow and cumbersome. The current tool can take up to 10 minutes or longer to calculate and display 24
results for large projects. Due to the architecture of the current tool, a user’s computer and its processor 25
are wholly occupied when running the SCMT analysis. The employee is left with little else to do other 26
than to wait for the transaction to complete. By using contemporary tools and technology with modern 27
architecture, the new solution will be more responsive and scalable. 28
4. Better Integration – As SCE moves toward a more robust EPC (engineering, 29
procure, construct) model, the project scope and costing tools must integrate with both internal and 30
external systems. This is especially true for major capital construction projects. 31
83
5. Flexibility – The current tools are limited in functionality to Transmission and 1
Distribution projects only. Since SCE is expanding the need for project scoping and costing accuracy 2
into other areas (e.g., Transmission Telecom), a more extensible and scalable tool will be required. As 3
other project types are incorporated into SCE’s IPSEC model, we can leverage the new Scope and Cost 4
Management Tool for them as well. By addressing the areas mentioned above, SCE will improve overall 5
capital project efficiencies, while providing more accurate capital spend plans. 6
c) Scope and Cost Forecast 7
In this rate case period, the total project costs are $5.0 million.122 The capital 8
forecast for this project was developed using SCE’s internal cost estimation model. This model utilizes 9
industry best practices and SCE subject matter expertise to estimate project cost components. SCE’s 10
forecast for this project includes costs for SCE employees, supplemental workers, and consultants, 11
software and vendor costs, and hardware costs. See this project’s workpaper for the cost breakdown 12
information. 13
(1) Alternatives Considered 14
Alternative 1: SCE considered enhancing the existing solution by 15
addressing the performance issues and extending the capabilities to include all project types. We did not 16
pursue this option because it would not be practical to meet our needs for better performance and would 17
require extensive work to integrate with other future systems. As stated above, the performance issues 18
are inherent to the system architecture and data model. Any enhancements would require significant 19
changes in the code and database, which would not be practical. Additionally, since the data model is 20
very different from other systems used in the IPSEC model, integration would be especially difficult and 21
prone to errors as there is no effective way to directly map across the data models. 22
Alternative 2: SCE considered replacing the existing solution by building 23
another customized solution to meet the needs of the SCMT scoping and costing functionality. We did 24
not pursue this option because it would not meet our requirements to use an industry-standard platform 25
and to minimize future maintenance costs. As stated previously, the existing tool was a custom-built 26
122 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk B p. 118.
84
solution that was internally developed by leveraging the existing database from the MDI123 tool, and it 1
did not perform adequately. 2
Alternative 3: SCE considered leveraging its existing portfolio and 3
performing an integrated build by distributing the current functionality across other IT work 4
management initiatives, such as P6, SAP Project Systems, and Design Manager upgrades, if possible. 5
This would include a detailed gap analysis of the capabilities of these tools to the business requirements 6
and then develop processes for leveraging them. As reporting and notifications are major components of 7
SCMT, other systems must also be leveraged (e.g., Business Intelligence (BI) tools, eDMRM,124 8
SharePoint, Outlook). Similar to Alternative 1 above, modifying other systems to meet the requirements 9
was not pursued as there are significant gaps in functional requirements as well as dependencies on 10
systems and work processes that would require major changes (e.g., earlier creation of SAP work orders, 11
even for conceptual/unapproved project analysis). 12
4. Work Management Dashboard 13
Table V-26 Work Management Dashboard125
Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) Authorized, Recorded, & Forecast Capital Expenditures (Nominal $Millions)
a) Project Description 14
D.15-11-021 adopted the Work Management Dashboard project as part of SCE’s 15
2015 GRC. This project was delayed initially while the team assessed the project scope, business 16
impacts, and method of deployment. During the delay, it was discovered that additional business lines 17
123 MDI (Multiple Document Interface) is a Microsoft Windows programming interface for creating an
application that enables users to work with multiple documents at the same time. 124 eDMRM is Enterprise Document Management Records Management, a central records repository where
certain archived documents are stored. 125 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk B pp. 119-127.
2015 GRC Authorized 3.74 10.73 15.65 10.82 5.42 - - - 46.37 2015 GRC - Original Request 3.74 10.73 15.65 9.00 7.03 - - - 46.16 * In D.15-11-021, the Commission adopted 2013 recorded costs and authorized 2014 costs.
Recorded Forecast
105
eMobile field tool is technically obsolete and is difficult to maintain. eMobile was an in-house-1
developed solution that consolidated several field tools. In eMobile, information transfer is a batch-2
process, not real-time, which leads to inconsistencies between field conditions and back-office data. It is 3
programmed in an older version of the programming language and operates on Windows XP. Windows 4
XP is out of normal support by Microsoft; this lack of support requires SCE to pay an additional support 5
cost of $0.59 million per year. The additional support costs are adjusted upwards each year. 6
c) Scope and Cost Forecast 7
The CMS project has deployed to approximately 700 T&D field users. 8
Deployment to the remaining 700 users’ devices is underway and planned to be completed by Q1 2017. 9
The CMS project has completed the application configuration, implementation, and deployment to T&D 10
Grid Operations (Streetlight team in 2013 and Substation Operators in 2015), Distribution organization 11
(Electrical System Inspections and Quality Assurance teams in 2014), and Substation Construction & 12
Maintenance organization (from 2015 to 2016). 13
In 2016 and 2017, the CMS project requires $5.82 million to complete the SCE 14
configuration of the application, implementation, training development, deployment and stabilization of 15
the remaining user groups (Grid Ops Troubleman, Distribution Construction & Maintenance (DC&M) 16
users, and Apparatus and Transmission). This will fully decommission the legacy eMobile application 17
and eliminate the continuing Windows XP support requirements, significantly reducing the operational 18
risks of relying on outdated and unsupported hardware and software for this highly utilized application. 19
SCE used a phased approach to roll out the solution to field users. Each roll out 20
was allowed to stabilize, while the lessons learned were applied to subsequent releases. One of the 21
lessons learned was that more end-user involvement in determining the functional look and feel of the 22
application was needed. This approach also resulted in the reworking of requirements to clarify 23
functions and a subsequent redesign of the software. The changes were larger than anticipated, resulting 24
in deployment delays and higher development costs. The software vendor had difficulty developing 25
solutions to meet the new requirements, which also contributed to schedule delays and resulted in 26
additional costs. However, the resulting delay has allowed SCE to deploy a solution that is higher 27
quality and rapidly accepted by the field users. 28
D.15-11-021 authorized total CMS project costs of $46.4 million. The total 29
project costs are now forecast to be $58.6 million. This increase in expenditures is a result of the 30
increase in scope described above. The remaining capital forecast for this project was developed using 31
106
SCE’s internal cost estimation model. This model utilizes industry best practices and SCE subject matter 1
expertise to estimate project cost components. SCE’s forecast for this project includes costs for SCE 2
employees, supplemental workers, and consultants, software and vendor costs, and hardware costs. See 3
this project’s workpaper for the cost breakdown information.149 4
(1) Alternatives Considered 5
SCE considered stopping development of this in-flight project due to the 6
extended schedule and higher than forecasted costs. From a technical risk assessment, the option to stop 7
the project and consider an alternate solution is not viable. While solutions are available in the market, 8
none acceptably meet SCE’s requirements without a significant amount of customization. When the 9
project started, none of the existing market vendors had a viable solution. Over time, these vendors 10
developed a comprehensive workforce solution. However, none of these vendors provide an integrated 11
work management and mapping capability similar to what is provided by CMS. 12
12. Field Tools Upgrade 13
Table V-34 Field Tools Upgrade150
Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) Authorized, Recorded, & Forecast Capital Expenditures (Nominal $Millions)
a) Project Description 14
D.15-11-021 adopted the completion of the Consolidated Mobile Solution (CMS) 15
project, to deploy approximately 1,400 field tools to T&D,151 as part of SCE’s 2015 GRC. The Field 16
Tools Upgrade builds on the CMS platform and enables SCE’s field personnel, system operators, and 17
office workers to improve employee safety, outage responsiveness, and SCE’s ability to meet 18
compliance obligations. 19
149 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk B p. 174. 150 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk B pp. 175-180. 151 See Consolidated Mobile Solution (CMS) Testimony for foundational project description.
Analytics” under the Phasor program. The objective of the CSAT program is to provide the ability for 1
Grid Control Operators to assess the status of the entire transmission system at a glance and provide 2
quick access to detailed data and robust analytics to make more informed decisions during critical 3
operational periods. This project was scheduled to be deployed from 2014 through 2016. 4
SCE did not launch the Phasor Analytics project as proposed in our 2015 GRC 5
Application. The delay in the CSAT project launch was a result of the extended deployment and 6
stabilization157 of the Phasor project. CSAT requires Phasor data, and the effectiveness of the analytics 7
engine depends on the deployment of several strategically located time-synchronized Phasor 8
Measurement Units (PMUs) to provide improved wide area situational awareness data. SCE will have 9
deployed a sufficient number of PMUs by 2018 to enable the analytics engine to deliver reliable and 10
accurate real-time information. 11
b) Need for Project 12
SCE requires an Advanced Analytics platform to provide improved visibility of 13
grid conditions by utilizing EMS and PMU data. CSAT will use this data to display a graphical, visual 14
representation of the transmission grid in its current state. Operators can overlay circuit information with 15
other key data elements such as asset location, weather, traffic, and fire. These capabilities will 16
collectively give the operators early warning of developing events or impending faults to enable a 17
proactive mitigation strategy and faster, more targeted responses to those events. 18
This proposed solution will follow the recommendations outlined in the Federal 19
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)/North American Reliability Council (NERC) report on the 20
2011 San Diego blackout. The report concluded that improved real-time situational awareness would 21
have allowed the system operators both to take proactive action and to take timely restoration measures 22
to operate the system in a secure state without affecting millions of customers on a hot summer day, 23
potentially endangering public safety.158 Implementing the CSAT solution will significantly improve 24
SCE grid dispatcher situational awareness of fast moving abnormalities in the electric grid and will 25
provide targeted mitigation procedures to combat grid instability conditions. 26
157 Stabilization is a common IT process to monitor initial operations of new systems/equipment and optimize
their use in the production environment. 158 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk B pp. 194-349.
112
SCE continues to procure renewable power to meet the needs of our customers 1
and make progress toward State policy goals.159 As this happens, SCE’s grid control centers and 2
personnel must be equipped with upgraded tools to enable them to respond effectively to challenges 3
posed by higher penetration of renewables on our grid. Renewable generation sources produce 4
electricity intermittently, not on a predetermined schedule as is the case with more traditional power 5
sources. Both solar and wind power are accompanied by similar variability and reliability challenges. 6
This variability in generation from renewable sources makes it difficult to accurately forecast the 7
amount of expected output, which is a new challenge for Grid Operators who currently rely on 8
scheduled and accurate projections of generation output to maintain the grid in a balanced state. Other 9
challenges related to renewable generation include power quality, contingency planning, and predictive 10
analytics. These factors combine to increase the complexity of operating the grid and drive the need for 11
accurate tools to equip Grid operators with actionable information in a timely manner, improving 12
Situational Awareness in the Grid Control Center. 13
(1) Benefits 14
The CSAT project will provide benefits in three major areas listed below: 15
• Avoidance of Major Outages: Certain fast moving system disturbances 16
and resulting voltage instability could cause outages over a wide area 17
before mitigation actions can be taken. With real-time situational 18
awareness through PMU data and advance analytics, such disturbances 19
could be responded to and the impacts reduced. 20
• Improved Utilization of select Stability Limited Transmission Paths: 21
The analytics will enhance transmission models, specifically the 22
refinement of the dynamic models, to increase power load while still 23
meeting safety and operational requirements. These changes must be 24
coordinated and agreed to by the CAISO & Peak RC.160 25
159 State policy goals related to increasing the percentage of power deliveries from renewable resources can be
found in legislation such as Assembly Bill 32 and Senate Bill 350. 160 PEAK RC is Peak Reliability Coordinator provides real time monitoring of the Western Interconnection.
113
• Energy Procurement Benefits: SCE has conducted a study161 to 1
forecast benefits from increased utilization of transmission line 2
capacity, providing a potential opportunity to reduce energy 3
procurement costs. An average of $1.44 million and $2.36 million 4
annual savings on procurement cost of energy are estimated for a 5% 5
and 10% transmission capacity increase scenario, respectively. 6
c) Scope and Cost Forecast 7
Phase 1: CSAT – Real Time Monitoring and Analytics 8
In this phase, a new analytic platform consisting of the additional hardware and 9
software needed to run the application will be implemented. The system will integrate with SCE’s 10
Geographic Information System (GIS) and Energy Management System (EMS) for PMU data, and 11
provide the visualization capability to monitor real-time grid dynamics, such as phase angles, 12
oscillations, damping, and intelligent alarms. This phase will provide the foundational capabilities for 13
real-time monitoring. 14
Phase 2: CSAT – Enhanced Multi-layer Displays 15
In Phase 2, multi-layer displays will be implemented to enable effective 16
presentation of large amounts of information from various sources and applications, such as geographic 17
layers, electric circuit data, environment & weather data, and synchronized phasor data. The system can 18
diagnose and assess the system events and stressed conditions, plan actions, create preventative analytics 19
using the enhanced state, produce analytic compliance reports, and interface with multiple real-time 20
feeds from multiple sources.162 21
Phase 3: CSAT – Intelligent Displays, Events and Alarms for post-event analytics 22
This phase will provide the Grid Operators with trend displays, adding the 23
capability to view collected data plotted against time (e.g., the operator could observe a downward trend 24
in voltage that could lead to system instability). Operators can also play back and perform post-event 25
analysis. In addition, the CSAT system will enhance the prioritization criteria applied to incoming 26
alarms, improving the operator’s ability to separate and focus on high-priority alarms. The system will 27
display historical records and events using geospatial maps, present alarms on the geographical map, 28
161 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk B pp. 350-353. 162 Id.
114
assign priorities, and record change of priority. These features will benefit Grid Operators by providing 1
early warning of risks posed by environmental factors such as temperature, wind, wildfires, and changes 2
in renewable generation levels due to weather changes, etc. 3
The preferred solution is to purchase a COTS application to deploy the 4
capabilities mentioned above. The COTS application will be capable of integrating with SCE’s Grid 5
Analytics platform, which will enable seamless access to data from applications that directly monitor 6
and/or control the grid, as well as from other enterprise applications such as the GIS or services that 7
deliver environmental data. The integration of data from various sources will be implemented using a 8
data lake technology aligning with SCE’s analytical platform. 9
In our 2015 GRC, we forecast $13.1 million for this project. We now forecast 10
total project costs to be $21.8 million.163 The increase in cost is due to additional scope items (explained 11
above), such as integration with other enterprise data sets (e.g., geographical data, environmental and 12
weather data), post-event analysis, and intelligent alarms and events. The capital forecast for this project 13
was developed using SCE’s internal cost estimation model. This model utilizes industry best practices 14
and SCE subject matter expertise to estimate project cost components. SCE’s forecast for this project 15
includes costs for SCE employees, supplemental workers, and consultants, software and vendor costs, 16
and hardware costs. See this project’s workpaper for the cost breakdown information. 17
(1) Alternatives Considered 18
Alternative 1: SCE considered building a customized solution on its 19
standardized data analytics platform. We did not pursue this option since the subject matter expertise 20
required for this endeavor is scarce and expensive in the industry. There are COTS applications 21
available today that will meet the business needs with some additional enhancements and integration. In 22
SCE’s experience, long-term support and maintenance of a custom application will generally cost more 23
than vendor costs to support a licensed COTS application. 24
SCE implemented CRAS in April 2016. The CRAS project included CRAS application development, 3
implementation of central control telecommunication infrastructure, and deployment of two RASs 4
(Remedial Action Schemes, defined below) to validate full capabilities of CRAS on SCE’s transmission 5
grid. As part of the final testing and implementation of CRAS, we have been able to observe that the 6
inability of GOOSE165 messages to be routable validated the need to upgrade the communication 7
capability of the architecture. This upgrade is discussed in the subsequent RGOOSE Project request.166 8
Remedial Action Schemes (RASs) are designed to detect predetermined system 9
conditions on the transmission grid and automatically take specific corrective actions such as tripping 10
generation or shedding load. When problematic system conditions are detected via RAS monitoring 11
relays, the RAS system arms and prepares to take protective action. This is our protection against 12
cascading outages and similar system conditions. If system conditions worsen, system load is shed (in 13
cases where load exceeds the remaining transmission capacity resulting in overloads or voltage collapse) 14
or generation is tripped (in cases where generation exceeds transmission capacity). This isolates the 15
system emergency, and prevents it from causing widespread services outages. 16
164 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk C pp. 3-91. 165 GOOSE refers to Generic Object Oriented Substation Events. 166 RGOOSE Project is a network upgrade project that improves the accuracy, failover capability, and
traceability of CRAS communications by upgrading the communications from current protocol (called GOOSE) to RGOOSE (Routable GOOSE). Please see the RGOOSE Project, presented below, for more information.
* In D.15-11-021, the Commission adopted 2013 recorded expenditures and allowed SCE to reapply for capital expenditures in later years.
Recorded
116
As an example, a RAS might sense an overload on a transmission line it monitors. Based 1
on that reading, the RAS will send a signal to a generator, taking the generator offline to avoid 2
overloading lines and damaging equipment. Most RASs are far more complex than this simple example, 3
with many monitoring points and numerous conditions under which an action to either curtail generator 4
output, drop generation, or shed load would be initiated. Although technically complex, RAS systems 5
are significantly less expensive than constructing redundant transmission lines. Also, RASs can be 6
implemented much faster and avoid the extensive licensing processes required for new transmission 7
lines. RAS installations are approved by the Western Electricity Coordinating Council’s (WECC’s) RAS 8
Reliability Subcommittee (RASRS).167 9
a) Project Description 10
In the 2015 General Rate Case, SCE proposed its CRAS (Centralized Remedial 11
Action Scheme) project at a cost of $49.392 million. In D.15-11-021, the Commission partially 12
approved the CRAS funding request by authorizing expenditures through 2013.While the Commission 13
Decision cited CRAS’s “intuitive appeal,”168 it disallowed recovery of costs for 2014 and 2015. In its 14
Decision, the Commission allowed SCE to reapply for the denied capital expenditures in our next GRC, 15
if we provided a detailed cost-benefit analysis in support of that request. We are providing that analysis 16
in this filing. The balance of unrecovered amounts between 2014 and 2016 is $15.31 million. 17
Since SCE’s transmission system is networked, we must protect against a single 18
transmission line outage resulting in a cascading blackout and wide-scale interruption of service. Our 19
transmission system network connects large, remotely located generators to major load centers and 20
connects our system to neighboring utilities. The reliability of the grid must be preserved as new 21
generation comes online. One factor we consider when a new generator interconnects is how the power 22
from that generator will flow under normal and contingency conditions. 23
167 “The purpose of the RASRS is to review the reliability aspects of existing and planned Remedial Action
Schemes (RAS) and to enhance grid performance within the Western Interconnection by providing a uniform review process.” https://www.wecc.biz/OC/Pages/RASRS.aspx
168 See D.15-11-021, pp. 43-44 (“[T]he intuitive appeal of the CRAS benefits that SCE describe are strong and the outcome of any effort to quantify them at this time may be primarily driven by preliminary assumptions (number of interconnections, policies on economic curtailment, etc.). As a matter of policy, this Commission supports a future with renewable generation resources operating efficiently on the grid and seeks opportunities to improve grid operations with respect to such resources. CRAS appears to be such an opportunity, and may be cost-effective in some scenarios. . . .”).
117
When new generators request interconnection and the existing transmission 1
system is not capable of handling all required contingencies, SCE has two choices. We can either build 2
redundant transmission lines or install a transmission system RAS. A redundant transmission line 3
provides the alternate pathway for energy during an outage and prevents other networked lines from 4
overloading. On the other hand, RASs work by shedding generation and/or load when a load flow 5
congestion condition occurs that risks system reliability or stability. This reduces power flows on the 6
system and prevents overloads that could lead to cascading outages. 7
Building many redundant transmission lines takes years to license and construct 8
and can be very expensive. These lines can cost as much as $9.5 million per mile and run dozens of 9
miles or more. SCE prudently pursues the construction of transmission line in some situations, but we 10
also rely on RASs to protect system reliability. To date, SCE has implemented 17 RASs across its 11
service territory. These systems are designed to automatically disconnect generators, load, or both under 12
certain identified system conditions. Prior to implementing CRAS, each RAS was designed as a 13
separate, self-contained system (e.g., a stand-alone system), including all of the relays, instrumentation, 14
and other equipment necessary for the RAS to function as designed. 15
SCE’s existing RASs are field-based (“stand-alone”) and have logic controllers in 16
the substations. CRAS, in contrast, has centralized decision-making and trip settings (“analytics”) 17
running on high-speed servers that are considerably more powerful than the field-based logic processors 18
in stand-alone RASs. Unlike a stand-alone RAS logic processor, CRAS is scalable by using additional 19
high-speed servers. This is important because the field-based logic processors have hard constraints 20
inherent in their design that limit the level of RAS complexity that can be accommodated. In contrast, 21
SCE designed and tested the initial hardware capacity of the CRAS system to be scalable to meet five-22
year “worst case” expected growth (30 RASs). SCE cannot envision a scenario where CRAS analytics 23
processing capacity would be exceeded by RAS data demands because CRAS blade servers are scalable 24
in processing power. SCE would either add additional blade servers, or upgrade existing servers, or 25
both. 26
b) Need for Project 27
The increasing RAS complexity that SCE described in its 2015 GRC application 28
occurred sooner than anticipated. The interconnect tariff requires four RASs in 2018-2020. These RASs 29
have a high complexity level. That complexity is composed of a higher number of generators, 30
118
substations, and lines to protect and, therefore, more contingency conditions to evaluate and on which to 1
take action. 2
The best measure of RAS capacity and complexity combines these factors in what 3
are called “arming points.” Arming points are the specific thresholds where a RAS will take action for a 4
particular generator as it evaluates a specific contingency (problematic system condition) related to that 5
generator or load. A generator might have one or more arming points based on the number and types of 6
contingencies involved. These arming points are defined by flow on transmission lines, in combination 7
with generation output that require mitigation if critical contingencies occur. Regarding specific arming 8
points for a generator, the contingency involved (such as a line being overloaded) might also apply to 9
other generators with other arming points. Arming points requirements, because they relate numbers of 10
contingencies and the number of generators, are a reasonable measure of a stand-alone RAS’s capacity. 11
Current stand-alone RAS logic capacity, without CRAS, is limited to 48 arming points due to limitations 12
in the relay hardware and firmware. 13
The technical problem that SCE faces is the complex stand-alone RASs needed in 14
the 2018-2020 timeframe would run out of capacity to add generators. In other words, a stand-alone 15
RAS would run out of available arming points. For example, one of these RASs (Northern Area RAS, a 16
new RAS) is significantly complex, requiring an estimated 76 arming points total to accommodate 17
Queue Cluster 8 (QC-8) or 124 arming points total when factoring in Queue Cluster 9 (QC-9).169 18
Northern area RAS cannot be accommodated as a stand-alone RAS.170 This is supported by SCE’s 19
planning and protection study. Therefore Northern RAS must be served by CRAS. The other alternative 20
to CRAS for the Northern Area RAS is building new transmission lines. This would be prohibitively 21
expensive,171 and the licensing and construction timeline would cause significant delays to two large 22
queue clusters in process (QC-8 and QC-9). Alternative design considerations of trying to “dumb down” 23
169 These queue clusters are groupings of projects in the interconnection queue that fall into similar geographic
areas and timeframes as describes further in the Generation Queue Completion section. 170 See testimony section Generation Queue Completion for additional details, which shows that most future
generation projects come to completion. 171 For more information on alternatives, refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk C pp. 9-56 and refer to WP SCE-04,
Vol. 2 Bk C pp. 57-71 (Northern Area Transmission tab), which shows transmission build timeline). In addition, the cost study compares CRAS for Northern Area versus a hypothetical stand-alone RAS for comparison purposes.
119
a stand-alone RAS approach (e.g., compress the required logic tables) have many undesirable effects, as 1
explained below. 2
In the past, SCE has compressed the logic tables for a stand-alone RAS (as 3
described in the 2015 GRC CRAS testimony), using Devers stand-alone RAS as an example.172 4
“Compression” is the grouping together of multiple contingencies on each logic step that would result in 5
sufficient corrective action. SCE considered using this approach for Northern Area, but there are two 6
potential problems: 7
1. Combining contingencies and/or generation would result in consistently 8
tripping more generation than needed for mitigation,173 which could expose the system to unwarranted 9
risks and potential incremental costs. Over-tripping uses more system spinning reserves than necessary, 10
which could cause the system to operate closer to stability limits. 11
2. Tripping more generation than needed for mitigation has impacts on the 12
generators. The more interruptions experienced by a generator, the more wear and tear occurs on the 13
mechanical and electrical systems of the generator; interruptions also cause an overall decrease in the 14
generator’s power production and associated revenues. 15
CRAS is needed to mitigate the potential issues caused by the compression of 16
contingencies/logic steps using a traditional stand-alone RAS. CRAS is designed to allow for 17
significantly more arming points, thereby permitting improved corrective action options that are tailored 18
to the specific needs of the grid, and avoiding over-tripping generation that is unnecessary. As 19
demonstrated in the workpaper entitled “Northern Area RAS Arming Points Comparison,” CRAS would 20
provide up to 189 arming points compared to the 45 provided by traditional RAS, providing a significant 21
increase in operational flexibility 22
(1) Analysis of additional complex RASs 23
Arming points requirements have been increasing significantly in 24
renewables-rich areas, as shown in the Figure V-7 below.174 25
172 See SCE-03, Vol. 2 of SCE’s 2015 GRC Application. 173 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk C pp. 72-74. 174 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk C pp. 75-78 and WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk C pp. 79-80.
120
Figure V-7 Arming Points (Current & Future)
In addition, the diagram below Figure V-8 “RASs Nearing or Exceeding 1
Capacity Limits” provides a schedule of upcoming RASs, including Northern Area RAS in 2018. These 2
are the upcoming complex RASs in renewables-rich areas that are driving the need for CRAS.175 3
175 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk C pp. 81-85.
121
Figure V-8 RASs Nearing or Exceeding Capacity Limits
As a further illustration of the need for CRAS, please refer to Figure V-9 1
below on Northern Area RAS, which shows the numerous generators in queue. SCE is seeing large 2
queue numbers in renewables-rich areas, with still more expected as a result of the State’s 50% 3
renewables mandate by year 2030. 4
The challenge is more than just a RAS being complex at a certain point in 5
time. RASs in renewables-rich areas have many generators in queue, and this means a high rate of 6
change to the RAS. This has two undesirable effects concerning stand-alone RASs: (1) Any attempt to 7
increase capacity, such as by changing the relay CPUs (central processing units) and firmware, merely 8
creates another hard limit in arming points capacity that is likely to be exceeded in the future, and 9
(2) Changes to a stand-alone RAS are much more expensive than changes to a RAS in CRAS due to the 10
ease of making programming changes in CRAS centrally as well as considerably more streamlined test 11
procedures in the field to validate the RAS functionality. The CRAS Cost Study Overview and 12
Reference176 has a detailed explanation of the differences in testing methods and levels of testing 13
automation available in CRAS versus a stand-alone RAS which drive large differences in required labor 14
between the two approaches. 15
176 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk C pp. 9-56.
122
Figure V-9 177 Northern Area RAS Area Diagram with Generators in Queue
Regarding the method used to tally Northern Area arming points, when 1
QC-8 cluster additions are accounted for, 76 arming points are estimated for Northern Area. This is the 2
trigger for realizing we must use CRAS, as a stand-alone approach will not work. When we look further 3
out and add QC-9 cluster, total arming points for Northern Area climbs to 124 arming points, which far 4
exceeds the current maximum limit of 48 arming points for traditional stand-alone RAS, as well as the 5
66 arming points total offered by a stand-alone RAS capacity upgrade.178 6
(2) Generation Queue Completion 7
In the last two SCE GRC decisions, the Commission raised questions 8
about the percentage of queue projects that actually reach completion. A recent study on queue data 9
performed by SCE using CAISO queue data shows that a large majority of these projects do in fact 10
complete, and that the rate of completion is generally increasing over time. Table V-38 below shows 11
available CAISO queue data. As the numbers for individual years indicate, more projects can come on-12
177 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk C pp. 86-87. 178 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk C pp. 88-89.
123
line in a particular year because prior projects have slipped from their original proposed operating dates 1
to subsequent years. Also, it is not uncommon for more projects to come on-line in any given year 2
compared to what was expected at the beginning of a queue cluster study cycle. CAISO’s generator 3
interconnection study process is ongoing, with each queue cluster taking up about two and one-third 4
years from inception to completion. In any given year, there are typically two clusters that overlap each 5
other in a staggered manner. For instance, Queue Cluster 8 (QC-8) is in the Phase II study stage 6
concurrently with Queue Cluster 9’s Phase II study, with various reassessments in progress as well. 7
Detailed information on the application and study processes, timing, posting requirements, etc., can be 8
found at the CAISO link.179 9
Table V-38 Queue Completion Table
As shown in the Queue Completion Table, from 2006 to 2016, there were 10
41 queue applications. Thirty of these applications actually went into operation, which is an overall 11
completion rate of 73% over 11 years. The completion percentage has also increased significantly since 12
the CRAS project was launched, which is why the growth in complexity of RASs was greater in 13
magnitude and occurred sooner than originally expected. SCE must prepare to interconnect most of the 14
relays, in contrast, are individually customized. This customization drives increases in labor in all phases 12
of work, placing greater demand on SCE resources. 13
With detailed cost data for (1) the CRAS Project in hand, (2) the 14
underlying stand-alone RASs before they were brought into CRAS, and (3) many changes to stand-alone 15
RASs since 2013, SCE now has the data available to perform a more detailed cost-benefit comparison of 16
CRAS to stand-alone RASs. The cost-effectiveness for CRAS can be demonstrated for all new RASs 17
and certain types of existing RASs planned to be brought into CRAS. These RASs are existing complex 18
RASs in renewable-rich areas (e.g., Colorado River RAS, Whirlwind RAS, and Mojave Desert RAS) 19
that are running out of logic capacity, as explained above. 20
SCE considered a stand-alone RAS relay capacity upgrade to increase the 21
approximate number of arming points from 48 to 66.182 This would still leave the drawback of a hard 22
limit in arming points in place in the future for the stand-alone RASs, albeit a higher hard limit. SCE’s 23
cost study shows that such a capacity upgrade is prohibitively expensive due to high implementation and 24
change costs (as future generators will be added each year). CRAS addresses the expensive nature of a 25
stand-alone RAS installation through the following cost efficiencies: 26
• Reducing labor for each round of test. 27
180 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk C pp. 90-91. 181 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk C pp. 9-56 and WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk C pp. 57-71. 182 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk C pp. 72-74.
125
• Reducing field crew requirements by eliminating the need for physical 1
inputs from field test sets in the final and most time-consuming phase 2
of testing (end-to-end field testing). 3
• Reducing the rounds of tests triggered by different design and logic 4
capabilities. 5
The complex RASs in generation growth areas brought into CRAS have 6
long test plans in terms of the number of test steps needed to validate the RAS’s functionality (250 – 7
1,000 or more lines of code). Stand-alone RASs and CRAS have very different test methodologies. 8
CRAS has automated test capabilities, which leads to dramatic differences in field labor requirements 9
for the same basic type of RAS validation. 10
The test methodology for a stand-alone RAS involves providing physical 11
inputs (currents and voltages) to field relays from test sets in the substations. Each test set typically can 12
only be hooked up to four relays at a time, depending on the scenario being tested. Frequently during the 13
lengthy test plans (250 – 1,000 or more lines of test steps) the test sets must be moved and connected to 14
different field relays. The substation environment is hazardous, making fast changes of temporary test 15
lead wiring unsafe. In summary, stand-alone RAS testing is cumbersome and slow, using significant 16
labor to validate the RAS. 17
By contrast, CRAS first validates physical inputs during the individual 18
testing that all relays must have, to make sure the relay is correctly sending and receiving data, and then 19
uses virtual inputs and automated test scenarios that can be loaded and activated centrally—a much 20
faster process than using the test sets with physical inputs as the stand-alone RASs do. 21
An additional benefit CRAS provides is that it eliminates the need to 22
repetitively enter physical inputs, which reduces the number of crews required per substation during 23
field end-to-end testing. In the end-to-end phase of testing, eliminating this need for physical inputs 24
reduces or eliminates the need for test sets, which are limited to about four relay connections per test 25
scenario. This in turn reduces the number of test technician hours needed, and represents a significant 26
reduction in required labor as RASs get more complex with larger test plans (e.g., more scenarios and 27
more line items in the test plan). 28
In addition, CRAS is more efficient in its test methodology and flexible in 29
its logic. As a result, we can consolidate designs and redesigns as generators are added, in order to 30
minimize the number of rounds of field end-to-end testing compared to stand-alone RAS testing. This 31
126
means that labor for CRAS testing is much more efficiently used, with fewer test hours per round of test 1
and significantly fewer rounds of end-to-end testing per year for the complex RASs ahead. In qualitative 2
terms, CRAS’s more efficient testing approach can cut times for scenarios (groups of test plan lines in a 3
test plan) from “hours” to “minutes” and time for a complete round of end-to-end testing in a complex 4
RAS from “weeks” to “days.”183 5
An additional CRAS benefit falls more into the area of risk mitigation than 6
direct cost avoidance: As part of the logic testing that SCE does centrally for CRAS logic validation 7
(e.g., the logic and algorithms present in the CRAS central controller servers), CRAS can centrally 8
execute more tests to validate logic, detect failures, and monitor communication volume and speed. 9
These additional tests, especially in the area of additional logic validation, would be prohibitively 10
expensive to perform for a stand-alone RAS because of the physical test set requirements described 11
above. The reason is that additional logic validation involves testing a range of increasingly unlikely 12
combinations of system conditions that would be high impact if they occur. This additional logic 13
validation is practical to test when high-speed CRAS automated testing is available. It is not practical 14
when stand-alone RAS test methods are used because field test plans would increase to thousands or 15
tens of thousands of lines. For a stand-alone RAS, this would result in a large increase in labor that is 16
beyond field crew availability constraints. In addition, it is impractical to schedule outages (with CAISO 17
and the generator customers involved) of the required length to do such additional testing for stand-18
alone RASs. 19
To clarify SCE’s plans to use CRAS going forward, not all existing stand-20
alone RASs will be converted into CRAS. We do not expect that all stand-alone RASs will reach the 21
threshold values of complexity or number of generators as the RASs in the cost study. The majority of 22
SCE’s existing RASs generally do not meet these criteria for conversion because of the conversion costs 23
to CRAS. It is the RASs in high renewables growth areas that typically meet the criteria for inclusion 24
within CRAS. Any RAS with arming points growth could meet criteria for inclusion even if their current 25
level of complexity is not that high because costs to accommodate growth in number of generators or 26
additional transformer banks are very high for stand-alone RASs and moderate with CRAS. SCE’s cost 27
study also confirms the benefits of deploying all new RASs into CRAS. 28
183 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk C pp. 9-56.
127
i. CRAS Cost Avoidance Summary 1
Table V-39 below shows the sum of expected cost avoidances for 2
CRAS for years 2018 – 2030 (in nominal dollars) in the more detailed cost study. A new transmission 3
build for Northern Area, as the only feasible alternative to CRAS, is a significant cost-avoidance driver. 4
In addition, the table contrasts stand-alone RAS implementation and change costs versus the 5
significantly lower implementation and change costs for CRAS. Designing and implementing stand-6
alone RASs is significantly more expensive than CRAS. Much of the difference is caused by high end-7
to-end field crew testing requirements for stand-alone RASs. These field testing requirements are much 8
more streamlined as explained above because a different test methodology is feasible and CRAS has 9
automated testing capabilities after the relays are given certain initial testing.184 10
Regarding Whirlwind RAS, at first glance it would appear that 11
there is lower than normal cost avoidance versus CRAS. This is due to the unusually high number of 12
existing generators served by the Whirlwind RAS. SCE tariffs require SCE to pay for CRAS change 13
costs in customer facilities. These costs are factored into the results of the cost study. 14
ii. CRAS and RGOOSE Cost Recovery 15
RGOOSE, as explained further in the RGOOSE section, is a 16
network communications protocol upgrade that serves as an enabler for further CRAS deployment. As 17
shown in SCE’s cost studies, CRAS appears to be more cost-efficient than alternatives. Therefore CRAS 18
cost avoidances (covered in detail in this CRAS section and CRAS Cost Study work papers) should 19
apply to both CRAS remaining unrecovered project costs and RGOOSE project costs. 20
184 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk C pp. 9-56.
128
Table V-39 CRAS Expected Cost Avoidance
(in Nominal Dollars)
c) Scope and Cost Forecast 1
The CRAS project consisted of system deployment work, including procuring, 2
developing, and testing software applications for communications processing, grid monitoring, 3
performance self-monitoring, security monitoring, security monitoring and controls, and protection logic 4
algorithm management. The project scope also included procuring, configuring, testing, and installing 5
servers and racks for these applications. Project implementation included converting two RASs into 6
CRAS as part of the deploying and demonstrating CRAS. SCE tested these two RASs in parallel with 7
the existing stand-alone RAS’s, and they are currently operational as part of the CRAS system. 8
Telecommunications work included fiber modifications, microwave link modifications, new switches, 9
and new routers. Substation equipment and telecommunication equipment within the substation must be 10
physically and electronically protected from unauthorized access to comply with NERC/CIP standards. 11
SCE included the construction of these physical and electronic security perimeters as part of the project 12
deliverables. 13
SCE is estimating revised total CRAS project costs of $49.13 million from 2010 14
through 2016. In our 2015 GRC, SCE requested $49.39 million for total CRAS project costs. D.15-11-15
129
021 allowed recovery of recorded costs from 2010 through 2013, which totaled $33.82 million. This 1
leaves remaining unrecovered CRAS Project costs at $15.31 million.185 2
(1) Alternatives Considered 3
Alternative 1: SCE considered not implementing this “project” (in this 4
sense, by “project” we mean further deployment of CRAS, not the base CRAS project already 5
implemented). Instead, for the three RASs out of the four under consideration where a stand-alone RAS 6
capacity upgrade is possible, we considered increasing the capacity of stand-alone RAS relays instead of 7
converting the RASs into CRAS. This alternative is not recommended because it is cost-prohibitive and 8
merely sets another hard arming-points limit that will be exceeded in the future, eventually causing the 9
same capacity shortfall. In addition, a critical deficiency of this alternative is that Northern Area RAS 10
(the remaining RAS out of the four under consideration) cannot be accommodated as a stand-alone RAS 11
because it would not meet grid protection requirements186 even if there is an increase in stand-alone 12
RAS relay capacity (see Alternative 2). Alternative 1 provides no long-term solution to arming-point 13
capacity and is not cost-efficient. 14
Alternative 2: SCE considered not implementing this “project” (in this 15
sense, by “project” we mean further deployment of CRAS, beyond the base CRAS project already 16
implemented) and instead, build a transmission line to meet the Northern Area protection needs. This 17
alternative is not recommended due to costly infrastructure and lead time requirements that would 18
significantly impact the feasibility of QC-8 and QC-9 renewables generation projects. 19
185 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk C p. 8. 186 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk C pp. 88-89.
130
16. RGOOSE Project 1
Table V-40 RGOOSE Project187
Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) Authorized, Recorded, & Forecast Capital Expenditures (Nominal $Millions)
a) Project Description 2
The RGOOSE Project is a communications network upgrade project. It takes 3
advantage of the significant communication improvements offered by a new industry standard for 4
network communication and security.188 This industry standard improves the existing GOOSE (Generic 5
Object Oriented Substation Events) protocol used in substations to Routable GOOSE (RGOOSE). 6
The GOOSE protocol sends data packets (like small messages) in broadcast 7
fashion, much like a radio network. The packets go to all network points and all devices “hear” the 8
messages whether they need to or not. This broadcast approach puts a substantial burden on a large 9
network.189 RGOOSE significantly improves performance by making the protocol “routable” by giving 10
each packet precise targeting to go only where it needs to go, to a specific device or set of devices. As 11
networks expand beyond the substation (such as a large network combining many substations and 12
control centers), this precise targeting is important for the capabilities of the system and for effective 13
troubleshooting. The RGOOSE communication protocol will first be used by SCE to meet the growing 14
data communications needs of CRAS project. As described in the following sections, RGOOSE is 15
required for CRAS moving forward to accommodate the high data volume and complexity of network 16
communications associated with upcoming RASs that contain significantly greater arming point 17
requirements. 18
187 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk C pp. 94-106. 188 Industry standard IEC 61850 90-5. Background information: https://www.pacw.org/no-
The following diagram provides a simplified view of the CRAS system and 2
indicates the high flow of data at all points in the communication structure. For example, monitoring 3
relays send information about the status of transmission lines to the central controllers, and mitigation 4
relays receive instructions about the generation tripping to be executed through opening circuit breakers 5
at the generation plant interconnection. 6
Figure V-10 CRAS Simplified System Diagram
In Figure V-10, “CRAS Simplified System Diagram,” blue lines indicate high-7
speed diverse path communication links with switches and routers. A and B side monitoring and 8
mitigating data go to and from control centers. Per WECC requirements, RASs have A and B sides and 9
diverse paths for redundancy/reliability purposes. The small arrows represent a high volume of 10
messages. CRAS central controllers are servers in control centers that evaluate monitoring data and send 11
mitigation signals. Mitigation relays trip generation or shed load as needed to protect the transmission 12
grid (via circuit breakers not shown). 13
RGOOSE is the communication architecture that enables high speed and reliable 14
communication between the substation and control center. Its central value is the ability to target 15
messages to the specific devices that need them, providing greater accuracy and traceability for CRAS 16
communications, as well as adding communications failover capabilities that a GOOSE network cannot 17
provide. 18
Our experience during late phases of testing and since CRAS implementation has 19
validated the capacity of relay equipment to emit extremely high volumes of data, as this characteristic 20
is required to meet the control functions of CRAS. The high data traffic in the current GOOSE network 21
132
raises concerns that, due to the required GOOSE tunnel architecture, the communication equipment may 1
not be capable of handling the expected increase in transmitting all data packets reliably in the current 2
design.190 With the current GOOSE deployment, the system will not be able to satisfactorily handle the 3
increased data flow for the more complex RASs such as Colorado River, Northern Area, Mojave Desert, 4
and Whirlwind. 5
The only way to effectively use GOOSE protocol on a large network is to limit 6
where it can go. To accomplish this communication, tunnels are created on the network. These tunnels 7
force communication from substation A to go only to a limited number of devices (such as the central 8
controllers in the control center) but not get mixed with communication from substation B on the wider 9
network. Each substation requires multiple tunnels for GOOSE to be operating effectively. 10
Unfortunately, the settings for the communications devices to create the tunnels are one-off, customized, 11
and cumbersome to configure. The proliferation of these cumbersome tunnels as a GOOSE network 12
grows in size raises performance risks as more substations are added. 13
Two additional challenges exist with GOOSE: First, there is a concern that as 14
more relays are “talking” and the tunnel architecture is overwhelmed, critical data packets can be 15
dropped. This problem can occur when tunnels fail. Second, as additional tunnels are created to enable 16
more communications, diagnosing failures becomes extremely challenging. Each device in the network 17
is individually customized and is not addressable on an individual basis, making it considerably more 18
difficult to track and troubleshoot problems. To use an analogy, the monitoring relays speaking GOOSE 19
can be viewed as a group of radio stations emitting different radio programs. Each mitigation relay must 20
listen to all of the programs on a particular tunnel, but only operate when it hears a particular song. In 21
contrast, RGOOSE architecture is more akin to a telephone exchange where relays are called and given 22
instructions without every relay having to listen to the phone call targeted for only one relay. 23
With the more complex RAS requirements SCE now faces, RGOOSE is needed 24
so that the functional requirements of CRAS can be fulfilled and the full benefits of CRAS are realized. 25
The first system to benefit from the use of the RGOOSE communication protocol will be CRAS. The 26
description, business need, and benefits of the CRAS solution are provided in the section above. To 27
move beyond the initial substation deployment of CRAS and support the full deployment of this 28
190 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk C pp. 103-106.
133
solution, we need to use RGOOSE. We need to adopt this more advanced protocol because of 1
significantly greater number of arming points191 in upcoming RASs. 2
The most significant arming point challenge SCE faces is with the Northern Area 3
RAS, which requires 76 arming points in the near term and 124 in the longer term, as explained further 4
in the CRAS project presented earlier. Each arming point drives continuous messaging traffic on the 5
network about the conditions affecting that arming point, such as electric current flow or the status of a 6
transmission line. This data volume requires the certainty of message delivery as well as the rapid 7
diagnostics of communication failure. We can obtain these capabilities by deploying RGOOSE on the 8
CRAS network for future RAS deployments. 9
The RGOOSE Project has been developed to take advantage of the now-available 10
standard (IEC 61850 90-5) to overcome the limitations inherent in GOOSE. The RGOOSE standard was 11
not available when CRAS project was launched in 2011; it was necessary to use the protocol available at 12
the time (GOOSE) to design, implement, and test the central controllers for CRAS. The industry has 13
been developing the RGOOSE protocol for several years due to increasing data needs on the electric 14
grid. SCE is able to upgrade to RGOOSE as it is now technically and commercially feasible to 15
implement. In the meantime, a great increase in RAS complexity occurred as the rate of generation 16
queue project completion increased to substantially greater levels compared to when the CRAS project 17
was first launched. This increased complexity leads to the need for the RGOOSE network upgrade 18
shortly after CRAS project implementation. 19
(1) Benefits: 20
The primary benefits of RGOOSE are: 21
• More accurate, stable, and secure high-speed communication on the 22
wide area network, regardless of the volume of communication. This 23
reduces the risk of outages on the transmission grid. 24
191 As explained in the CRAS section, the increasing RAS complexity that SCE described in its 2015 GRC
Application is being experienced, with four RASs required in 2018-2019 that have a high complexity level. That complexity represents a higher number of generators, substations, and lines to protect—and therefore more contingency conditions to evaluate and take action on. The best measure of RAS capacity and complexity combines these factors in what are called “arming points.” Arming points are the specific thresholds where a RAS will arm for a particular generator as it evaluates a specific contingency (problematic system condition) related to that generator.
134
• Better capabilities in monitoring internal communications and 1
troubleshooting. This leads to quicker restoration if a communication 2
problem does occur. 3
Adopting RGOOSE brings the network capability up to match the 4
advanced capabilities of the CRAS platform central controllers and field relays. 5
b) Scope and Cost Forecast 6
Upgrading network gear and central controller software to the RGOOSE protocol 7
to prepare for upcoming RAS deployments, consists of four main areas: 8
1. Upgrading relays. General Electric Company will deliver RGOOSE-9
compatible test relays. This is a relatively minor cost component (General Electric incurred the design 10
and development costs to convert their relays to RGOOSE). 11
2. Upgrading to RGOOSE-capable networking gear (switches and routers for 12
test purposes), including communications network design costs. 13
3. Upgrading the CRAS central controller software to use RGOOSE, which 14
includes costs for designing and developing the upgrade. 15
4. Testing key aspects of the overall CRAS system using RGOOSE in Site 16
Acceptance Test - Cycle 1 to make sure the communications changes will succeed. See cost workpaper 17
for additional details. 18
The actual rollout of communications networking for a particular RAS and the 19
detailed testing of that particular RAS are not included in the RGOOSE project. Instead, these items are 20
covered as part of infrastructure work performed regardless of the conversion to RGOOSE. The network 21
gear will be at similar cost to the current CRAS network gear (or, communications gear for stand-alone 22
RASs). The testing for CRAS deployment for particular RASs will be much more comprehensive, 23
automated, and efficient than for stand-alone RASs and will therefore be highly cost-effective.192 24
SCE launched the RGOOSE project in June 2016, and it is expected to be 25
completed in Quarter 2 of 2017 (with completion of the first cycle of Site Acceptance Testing). SCE will 26
then deploy CRAS using RGOOSE for upcoming RAS infrastructure investments. The net present value 27
of the T&D capital cost avoidances more than offset the CRAS Project and RGOOSE Project costs, as 28
192 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk C pp. 9-56 and WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk C pp. 57-71.
135
discussed in the CRAS Project section of the filing and associated work papers. RGOOSE is a key 1
enabler for further CRAS deployment, as described in this section. Therefore CRAS cost avoidances 2
(covered in CRAS section and CRAS Cost Study) should cover both CRAS remaining unrecovered 3
project costs and RGOOSE project costs. 4
The capital forecast for this project was developed using SCE’s internal cost 5
estimation model. This model utilizes industry best practices and SCE subject matter expertise to 6
estimate project cost components. SCE’s forecast for this project includes costs for SCE employees, 7
supplemental workers, and consultants, software and vendor costs, and hardware costs. See this project’s 8
workpaper for the cost breakdown information. 9
(1) Alternatives Considered 10
Alternative 1: SCE considered not implementing this project. In other 11
words, we considered not implementing the RGOOSE protocol193 and not deploying CRAS further due 12
to the risks of using GOOSE protocol with significantly more complicated RASs. Instead, we could 13
implement stand-alone relay capacity increases on three of the four RASs (Colorado River, Mojave 14
Desert, and Whirlwind) and a new transmission build for Northern Area (i.e., the remaining RAS that is 15
too complex for a stand-alone RAS architecture). This combined alternative is not recommended, as 16
described above in the CRAS testimony. For three of the four RASs, this alternative does not provide a 17
long-term solution to capacity issues, and it is not cost efficient. For Northern Area RAS, the only other 18
alternative besides CRAS with RGOOSE is building out very expensive and redundant transmission. 19
Alternative 2: SCE considered not implementing the RGOOSE Project 20
and instead deploying CRAS with the existing GOOSE network approach. This alternative is not 21
recommended, as complex data volumes make it technically difficult and cumbersome to determine 22
where a failure occurs without using RGOOSE protocol. Though it was necessary to have a wide area 23
network approach to properly develop and test the CRAS platform, GOOSE is less stable than 24
RGOOSE, and its non-standard usage on the wide area network would be imprudent, given that a better 25
standardized approach is now available. SCE has seen a large increase in RAS and required arming 26
point complexity. This increased complexity drives higher data volume requirements and the need for 27
the stronger, more stable, and more precise RGOOSE communications network protocol. 28
193 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk C pp. 103-106.
136
17. Energy Management System (EMS) Refresh 1
Table V-41 Energy Management System Refresh194
Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) Authorized, Recorded, & Forecast Capital Expenditure(Nominal $Millions)
a) Project Description 2
The Energy Management System (EMS) is operated by the Grid Control Center 3
(GCC). The GCC monitors and controls the bulk power system 24/7, using SCE’s EMS, and its output is 4
displayed on a video wall that graphically depicts the status of SCE’s and neighboring utilities’ bulk 5
power systems. 6
This project will refresh the aging hardware and software components of the EMS 7
system to maintain system availability. In addition to a technical refresh of the EMS hardware and 8
software, this project will consolidate the EMS and Phasor systems. SCE’s Phasor system collects, 9
stores, and shares Phasor Measurement Units (PMU)195 data. Consolidating EMS and Phasor onto a 10
single platform will reduce hardware and software costs and simplify the maintenance of both systems. 11
It will also provide a unified operator view of system conditions, eliminating the need for two separate 12
but related systems. 13
b) Need for Project 14
The primary driver for the EMS Refresh Project is the aging EMS system, since 15
the vendor will not support the current version after 2017. The risk of hardware failure continues to rise 16
as the system ages. By the time of the refresh, the hardware will be 7 years old. Refreshing EMS will 17
allow SCE to maintain system reliability at 99.95% or greater and reduce the risk posed by components 18
reaching the end of life. System reliability of EMS is important to SCE Grid Operations because EMS 19
194 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk C pp. 107-115. 195 A Phasor Measurement Unit is a device installed in the field that monitors & reports electrical signal on the
• The ability to handle new automated devices added to the distribution network to 1
better analyze circuits, leading to better planning and remediation of system problems; and 2
• Improved capabilities of meeting security requirements for authentication of user-3
command and control data. 4
The Phase 2 schedule was revised due to technical challenges involved with 5
enhancing a COTS solution to meet operational requirements. These operational requirements were 6
associated with user interfaces, system alarm settings and notifications, and reliable and safe operation 7
of field devices. The COTS product required multiple iterations of enhancements and testing to meet 8
these operational requirements which resulted in a rescheduling of implementation and rollout activities. 9
Phase 2 was planned to be implemented in three releases: 10
• Release 1 was implemented in 2014 and deployed AVVC (Advanced 11
Voltage VAR control) capability; 12
• Release 2 was implemented in 2015 and deployed Operation Training 13
Simulation capability; and 14
• Release 3 will be implemented in 2016 and will deploy advanced 15
control and analysis capabilities. 16
Phase 2 will provide following benefits: 17
• AVVC (Advanced Voltage VAR control) is a method of Conservation 18
Voltage Reduction (CVR) where automated field capacitors on distribution circuits optimize 19
overall customer voltage and reduce energy use for distribution purposes. This advanced control 20
allows SCE to provide the required quality of service (i.e., voltage level) to its customers, but 21
with less purchased power.201 22
• An operator training-simulation feature for all switching center 23
operators, which provides a realistic behind-the-wheel training experience that tests the 24
operator’s capabilities to perform under a real-world stress situation; and 25
201 See SCE 2015 GRC, SCE-05, Vol. 2, Pt.2, Table IV-27 “Estimated DMS Avoided Purchase Power Benefits.”
143
• An advanced control and analysis capabilities allowing SCE to 1
implement self-healing security,202 which provides automated responses to system problems. 2
b) Recorded Costs and Forecast 3
SCE has recorded $31.9 million through 2015 and expects to spend an additional 4
$1.5 million to complete the project in 2016. This total project cost of $33.4 million is above the 5
Commission’s 2010 – 2015 authorized expenditures of $29.9 million. This is primarily due to additional 6
testing needed to meet operational requirements. 7
In our 2015 GRC, SCE estimated that the total cost of completing the DMS 8
project would be $32.6 million, as reflected in Table V-43. SCE is requesting expenditures in this GRC 9
to complete the project at a total cost of $33.4 million. This increase relative to our original request and 10
our authorized amount from the GRC is due to two primary factors described below. 11
First, in D.15-11-021, the Commission authorized 2013 recorded costs for this 12
project. SCE underspent in 2013 relative to our requested amount by $2.7 million, primarily due to the 13
technical challenges in aligning the commercial product to SCE’s operational needs. These challenges 14
delayed a portion of the original scope of work for 2013 to future years. As this scope of work is integral 15
to DMS performance, SCE subsequently completed this work to enable the project to provide its 16
intended benefits. Since the scope that the Commission adopted for this project remains through this 17
request, the original forecast from the 2015 GRC is still the appropriate benchmark of costs required to 18
achieve the adopted project scope. 19
Second, the complexity of the DMS project required longer periods to test, 20
stabilize, and implement the functional and technical capabilities of the system. As the DMS is 21
responsible for core aspects of our electric system operations, this extended effort was critical to our 22
ability to introduce DMS upgrades in a phased approach that could handle the large volume and 23
diversity of data, while maintaining system and operational performance standards. 24
The capital forecast for this project was developed using SCE’s internal cost 25
estimation model. This model utilizes industry best practices and SCE subject matter expertise to 26
estimate project cost components. SCE’s forecast for this project includes costs for SCE employees, 27
202 Self-healing is the ability of the system to detect that it is not operating correctly, and without human
intervention make the necessary adjustments to restore itself to normal operations. This feature will provide capability to detect faults and restore the grid to normal operations.
144
supplemental workers, and consultants, software and vendor costs, and hardware costs. See this project’s 1
workpaper for the cost breakdown information.203 2
accommodate DERs into system operations. GAA will provide SCE personnel with the capability to 1
perform analytics on large data sources, including smart meter data, weather data, outage data, and 2
electrical network field measurement data (e.g., Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition, or SCADA, 3
data). In addition, the GAA will allow engineers to further analyze field measurements of the electrical 4
network for abnormal grid conditions and augment it with Smart Meter data to accurately predict asset 5
load profiles, which can then be used for long-term system-planning analysis. These applications also 6
allow SCE personnel to visualize the analytics on geographic information system maps and asses circuit 7
voltage degradation, line transformer utilization, and accuracy of transformer to meter relationships. 8
SCE personnel will also be able to perform more granular post-mortem analyses of outages to improve 9
current and future reliability management. For the sake of clarity, GAA will provide capabilities that are 10
separate and distinct from the CSAT project described above. Moreover, GAA will provide unique 11
analytics capabilities associated with planning and operating the distribution system, whereas the CSAT 12
project will provide unique analytics capabilities associated with the bulk power transmission system. 13
b) Need for Project 14
Implementation of Smart Meters has provided a significant opportunity to 15
leverage the historical hourly customer meter information (e.g., hourly peak demand, average voltage 16
reads, and energy demand usage) provided by these devices to better understand customer energy usage 17
patterns and overall status of the grid. This smart meter data, when integrated with electrical network 18
connectivity information and status of the grid assets, provides the most accurate information for 19
operators and engineers to make proactive and reactive decisions. This integrated data, made available 20
through GAA, will better inform SCE personnel on troubleshooting power outages and restorations and 21
power quality issues. Analytics can also be performed to better understand the asset load conditions to 22
proactively predict loss of life or catastrophic failure of assets before it occurs, enabling a proactive 23
corrective action. 24
To perform these types of analytics, key applications will be procured to enable 25
further detailed analysis of the electrical grid. A voltage analytics tool will be developed to provide a 26
more granular view into voltage characteristics across the distribution system, which will enable 27
enhanced system planning and operation of the grid. Load profile analytics using raw field measurement 28
data would be provided to system planners to develop foundational circuit load profiles. These profiles 29
can then develop system planning forecasts to analyze and compare DER-based solutions to traditional 30
wire-based solutions. In addition, load profile analytics can be leveraged to develop more realistic DER 31
152
device profiles. System planning requires comprehensive Photovoltaic (PV) profiles for determining 1
output capacity based on attributes such as local geographical solar insolation, local historical cloud 2
cover, and historical PV performance to supplement distribution system forecasts. DER profiles (from 3
GIPT data), and load profiles acquired from field measurement data, enable the ability to operate and 4
plan a dynamic distribution system capable of integrating large numbers of DERs and their impacts to 5
system planning performing a comprehensive capacity analysis. 6
The GAA enables the ability to develop analytics around assets to understand 7
characteristics such as historical load and DER adoption rates and operational asset overloads. Localized 8
load growth and DER adoption rates (using information from systems such as GIPT) can be integrated 9
to inform system planning forecasts to better understand future distribution grid needs by analyzing 10
historical installations throughout the SCE territory. In addition, during storm conditions (i.e., peak 11
conditions) grid operations could use the GAA in evaluating historical line transformer overloads, circuit 12
overloads, substation overloads, and at any aggregate level within the distribution grid using smart meter 13
data, and field measurement data to prioritize and communicate those overloads that may cause large 14
outages. 15
Today, SCE can perform grid analysis using distribution circuit and substation 16
data points to evaluate utility assets for overloading and voltage concerns for substations and circuit 17
mainlines. However, this analysis is conducted without the benefit of leveraging load and voltage 18
profiles available from customer smart meters. These raw data reads are used in system planning to 19
perform peak load forecasting for circuit and substation assets. In addition, availability of circuit and 20
substation level data points only provides a high-level overview of distribution grid peak demand, and 21
does not provide insight to individual customer’s peak demands and localized issues such as low 22
voltage. Manual labor-intensive processes are required to include customer meter information in the 23
analysis. Customer meter information only allows for a “point in time” view of customer behavior and 24
may not completely reflect the history required to both inform and proactively assess customer electrical 25
service and power quality issues. 26
(1) Benefits 27
Once the Grid Analytics Applications are functional, the following 28
benefits can be realized: 29
1) Analytics on customer meter data can be automated to perform routine 30
calculations such as voltage degradation (i.e., low/high voltage 31
153
evaluation), accurate line transformer loading, and historical outage 1
conditions. These capabilities proactively enable system planners and 2
operators to quickly evaluate portions of the grid that may be at risk of 3
exceeding acceptable operating thresholds and conditions. A system 4
planner can accurately assess the current loading of a line transformer 5
serving multiple customers (based on an automated aggregate service 6
customer meter data) and can adequately predict the effect of load and 7
generation increases on these transformers based on a new customer 8
request of installing a large motor, air conditioning unit, or DER. In 9
addition, grid operators during outages can assess the electrical service 10
status for groups of individual customer meters by evaluating meter 11
statuses through interactive GIS maps. 12
2) An analytics application using customer meter data can supplement 13
and automate missing historical circuit and substation operating data 14
points. This is required during abnormal circuit re-configurations and 15
when SCE initiated demand response events occur. The ability to 16
aggregate and blend collections of customer meter data with circuit 17
and substation load trends allows for more accurate system planning 18
during peak conditions. These newly blended historical load profiles 19
for SCE’s 4600+ circuits can then be leveraged by other tools such as 20
a Long Term Planning Tool (LTPT) to perform load and generation 21
forecasts to then evaluate mitigation for potential infrastructure 22
overloads. 23
3) The ability to develop time series profiles, such as load and DER 24
profiles, enables system planning and grid operations the insight to 25
further integrate DER installations with a future dynamic distribution 26
system. These profiles will accurately communicate how DER and 27
load demand may coincide to benefit or create issues on the 28
distribution system that will require the grid solutions to mitigate (e.g., 29
traditional capital projects). 30
154
c) Scope and Cost Forecast 1
The GAA will deliver the functional capabilities and will have the following 2
implementation plan: 3
• 2016-2019: Foundational Asset Analytics – Automated customer meter and 4
field measurement asset voltage and current analytics to inform SCE 5
distribution engineers, distribution grid designers, and grid operators of asset 6
violations. 7
• 2017-2020: Engineering Analytics – Ability to perform statistical analytics on 8
power system data (i.e., voltage deterioration and circuit load profiles) both 9
manually and as an automatic service. 10
• 2017-2018: Operational Analytics – Near real-time streaming analysis of grid 11
asset overloads and customer outage playback behavior to further enhance 12
operating the distribution grid through proactive mitigation. 13
SCE forecasts $17.59 million to complete this scope of work. The capital forecast 14
for this project includes project team costs for SCE employees, supplemental workers, and consultants, 15
software and vendor costs, and hardware costs. The project estimation is based on our internal SCE IT 16
cost estimation process. See the workpaper for more detail.209 17
(1) Alternatives Considered 18
Alternative 1: SCE considered not pursuing this project and continuing to 19
use existing manual data analysis methods for planning and operating the grid. We did not pursue this 20
option due to the vast amounts of electrical and asset data types, sources, and formats that SCE 21
maintains that require significant time and resources to access, consolidate, validate, and then analyze. 22
This approach does not allow SCE personnel to fully utilize SCE’s smart meter data to support grid 23
analytics at the customer and distribution circuit level. 24
209 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk C p. 136.
155
22. Long-Term Planning Tools 1
Table V-46 Long-Term Planning Tools210
Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) Authorized, Recorded, & Forecast Capital Expenditures (Nominal $Millions)
a) Project Description 2
The Long-Term Planning Tools (LTPT) is a set of software tools that will 3
facilitate integrated planning and forecasting over a five-to-ten-year horizon to identify optimal solutions 4
to system planning challenges. These challenges include poor reliability and loading conditions created 5
when installed assets are expected to exceed design limits because of forecasted changes in loading and 6
generation. Functions of the LTPT include advanced circuit and substation modelling to support 7
distributed energy resources (DER) integration, power flow and system planning analyses, calculation of 8
load blocks at circuit and substation levels, and capacity planning analyses. LTPT is not a single stand-9
alone tool; rather, it is a compilation of several software products integrated together into a single 10
platform. LTPT will replace the existing suite of outdated software tools incapable of performing the 11
analyses needed for the modern electric grid. 12
b) Need for Project 13
Due to the limited capabilities of the current analysis and planning tool set, there 14
is the potential risk of introducing errors into SCE’s long-term plans resulting in over- or under-15
estimation of load and generation capacity. SCE must forecast the load and DER growth accurately and 16
quantify and rank all elements of project risk. Therefore, SCE must develop advanced system planning 17
methodologies, which require the implementation of new tools. 18
The need to replace the current suite of tools with a more complete solution 19
includes: technical obsolescence of the current tool, inability of current tools to integrate with other SCE 20
systems, and changes in the business needs and legislation that cannot be met with the existing tools. 21
210 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk C pp. 137-139.
156
Obsolescence 1
The current tools are approaching the end of their lives and are degrading rapidly 2
in terms of usefulness and maintainability. Current issues include: 3
• Difficulty to maintain. The current tools were built in-house during the last 4
decade using a complex architecture of custom-built code and business logic. 5
Over time, it is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain the skill sets 6
required to support the ongoing operation of this aging technology. 7
• Increased user base. The current tools were designed and built specifically for 8
the distribution circuit and substation projects. However, as SCE realized 9
operational efficiencies in integrating the work groups (e.g., system planning, 10
district (load growth) planning, programmatic projects, project management), 11
the number of users has increased by over 50 times. The underlying 12
architecture of the tool cannot handle this many users, which is impacting 13
system performance. 14
• Inability to scale. Besides the dramatic increase in users, the current system’s 15
database has grown to almost five times its original design limit. This is a 16
major architecture problem as the current tool maintains all projects (and their 17
alternatives) indefinitely. As the user base and number of projects expanded, 18
the database grew exponentially. 19
Inability to integrate with other systems 20
As SCE moves to an integrated approach to grid planning, our systems and 21
software need to interoperate with each other seamlessly. Examples include a unified analysis of 22
transmission, sub-transmission, and distribution needs from a “bottoms-up” and “top-down” analysis. 23
Functions such as risk-based analysis, protection engineering, and reliability studies need to be 24
integrated with the other analyses. The current tool lacks the ability to integrate with other important 25
systems (e.g., CYME211, PSLF212) and cannot be made to integrate without completely rebuilding much 26
of the architecture or using extensive manual processes. 27
211 The CYME software package, acquired in 2008, is used to calculate power flow and short-circuit duty for actual or simulated configurations and generation/loading conditions on distribution circuits.
157
• Sub-transmission and transmission analyses and project simulations are 1
performed independently using a separate set of software tools. In the LTPT 2
all will be performed in one integrated platform where manual re-entry is 3
eliminated and personnel can perform multiple iterations for optimizing their 4
solutions. 5
• The current tool does not have the capability of fully evaluating and 6
quantifying risks associated to each condition or proposed project. Since it 7
cannot integrate with the risk analysis tools, this function must be done 8
outside of the tool and the results analyzed independently. This lack of 9
integration creates inefficiencies as proposed projects must have their risk 10
assessments performed outside the tool and subsequently have the results 11
brought back into the tool. This problem is magnified by the iterative 12
approach required in analyzing risk for a large portfolio of projects. 13
• The current tool cannot integrate with other project management and financial 14
systems. 15
Changes in business needs. The increasing complexity of the electric grid 16
demands new cutting-edge methodologies to identify capital projects. The current tool lacks several 17
major required functions, including: 18
• The growth of DERs on our system will require us to evaluate the grid based 19
on load profiles as opposed to a single peak load value as done today. The 20
current tool is incapable of providing this functionality. 21
• There are multiple load forecasts used for different purposes at SCE. 22
Historically, these forecasts include a distribution forecast, and transmission 23
forecast, and a system-level forecast. These forecast are primarily developed 24
independently by different organizations and are not aligned. SCE must align 25
these forecasts to understand the implications that DERs may have on the 26
Continued from the previous page 212 Positive Sequence Load Flow (PSLF) is a software package that is used to calculate power flows on transmission and subtransmission systems.
158
distribution and bulk electric systems. To coordinate planning and 1
identification of optimal grid solutions and to align with the vision in the 2
Distribution Resources Plan (DRP), SCE must utilize a load and DER forecast 3
coordinated with the CEC Integrated Energy Policy Report (IEPR) and across 4
all internal planning organizations. 5
• The current planning tool performs system analysis assuming one-way power 6
flow. In this manner it can forecast potential problems such as circuit and 7
substation overloads based on loading limits and forecasted demand. The 8
current tool cannot perform analyses resulting from bi-directional flow213 and 9
cannot evaluate overloads at a more granular level such as a line segment. 10
• The current tool cannot evaluate the risk types associated with identifying 11
optimal grid projects/solutions. To enable a process for managing the elements 12
of the risks identified, LTPT will facilitate the concurrent evaluation of 13
multiple types of projects for risk mitigation, including utilizing DERs to defer 14
or replace traditional capital upgrades. System Planners can evaluate the 15
project driver and evaluate multiple project alternatives. System Planners can 16
better determine the value that DER can add to the distribution and 17
transmission systems by creating load profiles for DERs as well as customer 18
demand and evaluating the profiles over an annual period. 19
In conclusion, a profile-based, coordinated load and DER forecast will enable 20
SCE to determine where affected areas will be. A risk-based, coordinated planning process will enable 21
SCE to determine risks on the distribution grid. A methodology to develop optimal grid solutions to 22
address the identified risks will enable SCE to fully utilize DERs while developing a safe, reliable and 23
affordable future distribution grid. 24
213 Bi-directional power flow: Historically, power has flowed from the source (transmission system) to the load
(customers). In the present system, the high penetration of distributed generation can cause power to flow in the “reverse” direction, from the customer to upstream portions of the system. The existence of power flow in both directions is referred to as “two-way” or “bi-directional” power flow.
159
(1) Benefits 1
The LTPT will provide better response to customer requests, with the 2
GIPT discussed previously in this volume, allowing customers to get faster, more accurate answers, 3
reducing power quality issues, and increasing the ability to use the full hosting capacity of the 4
distribution system. The LTPT will also integrate with the Work Management’s Portfolio Management 5
project, described previously, for effective bundling of work to be performed in the field. This will allow 6
SCE to better utilize its field resources while maintaining reliable grid system. 7
i. Forecasting 8
The LTPT will increase the accuracy of SCE’s Load and DER 9
Forecast by incorporating load profiles versus a single point representation of load and generation. As 10
described above, this may cause better identifying mitigations, and may cause a reduction of the capital 11
upgrades identified using a point based forecast. 12
ii. System Analysis 13
The LTPT will expand SCE’s capability to perform analysis to 14
allow SCE engineers to proactively address forecasted grid concerns. This may cause reduction in 15
customer minutes of interruption (CMI). 16
The LTPT will allow planners to address multiple risks within a 17
project. This may prevent multiple projects in the same geographic area, which may cause fewer 18
customer outages, less cost due to coordinating resources, less cost due to avoiding duplicative scope. 19
The LTPT will automatically determine circuit reconfigurations 20
resulting in a time savings to distribution planners. 21
iii. Optimal Grid Solutions 22
The LTPT will allow planners to create optimal grid solutions. For 23
example, the LTPT may recommend the full utilization of available capacity, or the utilization of DER 24
to defer grid upgrades. 25
c) Scope and Cost Forecast 26
The Long Term Planning tool(s) will have the following implementation plan, 27
which includes the following functional capabilities to be provided to the Electric System Planning, 28
Long-Term Demand Forecasting, Strategy, Integrated Planning and Performance, and Grid Operations 29
departments: 30
160
• 2016-2017: Load and DER profile-based Forecasting, Aggregation, 1
Distribution System Analysis, Capacity Analysis, Protection Analysis, Basic 2
Distribution Reliability Analysis, Optimal Grid Solutions, Basic Risk Model, 3
Basic Geographical Modeling, and Basic Integration with internal tools, Basic 4
Real Time Analysis. 5
• 2018-2019: Sub Transmission Analysis, Transmission Analysis, Advanced 6
Distribution System Analysis, Advanced Risk Model, Advance Geographical 7
Modeling, Full Integration with internal tools, Full Integration with external 8
tools. 9
The LTPT must be fully integrated with the planning tools and operational tools 10
described in this GRC, including the Grid Analytics Application, Grid Connectivity Model, System 11
Modeling Tool,214 Grid Interconnection Processing Tool, and the Grid Management System.215 The tool 12
must be integrated with the Grid Connectivity Model, the Grid Interconnection Planning Tool, and the 13
System Modeling Tool to minimize the amount of rework that must be done for each project and reduce 14
the amount of field data collection. The LTPT supports adding extensions into the Grid Connectivity 15
Model, again reducing the manual rework required and helping to keep the connectivity model accurate. 16
The LTPT solution will allow SCE to develop a load, DER and generation 17
forecast, perform system analysis to identify all grid risks, and determine optimal solutions to reliability 18
risks for the entire power grid from the lower end of distribution to the Bulk Transmission system. This 19
allows SCE to fully evaluate risks and opportunities related to existing and forecasted DERs in its long-20
term system planning process. The Long Term Planning Tool will allow SCE to develop and continue to 21
shape a safer, more reliable and affordable grid while encouraging DERs and enabling customer choice. 22
SCE forecasts $15.07 million to complete this scope of work. The capital forecast 23
for this project includes project team costs for SCE employees, supplemental workers, and consultants, 24
software and vendor costs, and hardware costs. The project estimation is based on our internal SCE IT 25
cost estimation process. See the workpaper for more detail.216 26
214 Please refer to SCE-02, Vol. 10 for a detailed description of the System Modeling Tool. 215 Please refer to SCE-02, Vol. 10 for a detailed description of the Grid Management System. 216 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk C p. 139.
161
(1) Alternatives Considered 1
Alternative 1: SCE considered pursuing the enhancement of an existing 2
distribution system planning COTS solution to meet LTPT functional requirements. We did not pursue 3
this option because no product in the marketplace possesses the full suite of capabilities required by 4
LTPT (i.e., capacity planning, project alternatives analysis for DER versus wires-based solutions, risk 5
analysis). Due to the level of complexity required to fully implement the LTPT solution, a complete re-6
design of both the technology and planning methodologies would be necessary to fully address 7
enterprise scalability and utility system planning requirements. Based on the large amount of 8
customization expected, SCE does not recommend this solution approach. 9
Alternative 2: SCE considered modifying the existing planning tool 10
currently used by SCE and enhance it to meet the new requirements. We did not pursue this option 11
because the current software solution cannot meet the existing system planning requirements and has 12
numerous performance issues. This option would require SCE to locate and identify qualified resources 13
and onboard them, as the technology is seldom used in practice in today’s industry technology 14
landscape. Based on our research, the LTPT project as presented here is the most responsive option that 15
SCE has found. 16
23. Grid Connectivity Model 17
Table V-47 Grid Connectivity Model217
Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) Authorized, Recorded, & Forecast Capital Expenditures (Nominal $Millions)
a) Project Description 18
The Grid Connectivity Model (GCM) is a software model of SCE’s complete 19
electrical grid. This model replaces existing disparate and disconnected models and will serve as the 20
single, centralized source of connectivity information for all assets—from bulk generation down to the 21
end-consumer meters. This new software model will support other enterprise tools that require the use of 1
SCE’s electric system connectivity information and the operational configuration of devices.218 To 2
provide up-to-date information about the grid, this connectivity model will receive near real-time 3
information about device settings219 through multiple operational systems, such as the Distribution 4
Management System (DMS). 5
b) Need for Project 6
SCE’s current grid connectivity information is stored across different software 7
solutions, including separate electrical-based and structural-based solutions. Business processes around 8
these datasets vary across the owners of data, and automated synchronization of datasets is limited. In 9
the current state of the network model, gaps exist in three broad areas: 10
• No existing systems of record, 11
• Lack of information and inconsistent data, and 12
• Business process gaps in maintaining and synchronizing information across 13
systems. 14
The GCM represents the network of electrical devices and structural components 15
connected by conductors, in terms of nodes and links. The model considers various device statuses and 16
the electrical characteristics to represent the power flow network.220 The model will maintain various 17
perspectives of the grid, such as the as-built configuration, which represents the grid in its permanent 18
static configuration, and the as-operated configuration, which accounts for operational deviations from 19
the as-built permanent configuration of the circuit due to abnormal conditions or switching. Other 20
perspectives include historical as-operated views, and the as-planned view, which depicts the long-term 21
configuration of the distribution systems. 22
Grid connectivity information is currently scattered across multiple systems such 23
that no unified end-to-end connectivity model exists. SCE’s mapping organization uses a legacy system 24
for maintaining the electrical connectivity model for the schematic view of the distribution circuits. The 25
218 The GCM will support many tools and systems, including: planning tools (like CYME), analytical systems
(like Hadoop), and operational systems, such as the Outage Management System (OMS). 219 Examples of these device settings include capacitor bank settings and auto-recloser settings. 220 A distribution circuit model is composed of the following: connectivity model, asset data (nameplates,
ratings), device settings (capacitor bank operating limits, circuit breaker trip settings, automatic recloser trip settings), and planning and operation data (such as forecast electrical models).
163
transmission group uses the Energy Management System (EMS) system for static and dynamic views of 1
the transmission connectivity model. Grid operators use the distribution connectivity model in the 2
Outage Management System (OMS) system for managing outages and determining the extent of an 3
outage. Customer Service uses pieces of distribution secondary circuit connectivity information in 4
Customer Service System (CSS) and information from OMS for identifying the list of customers 5
impacted by an outage. The above business functions and roles will benefit from having a centralized 6
and unified grid connectivity model. 7
Engineering, design, construction, operations, maintenance, and customer service 8
departments rely on various network models manually created by various users for different analysis 9
required to operate the electric system. It is becoming more resource-intensive for users of network 10
models to manually gather data from different sources and analyze the distribution system. Today, the 11
attributes of various distribution assets and the grid require significant manual validation to verify that 12
the electric system models represent actual field conditions. There is no automated and reliable way of 13
inputting the actual device settings from the field into the connectivity model. These device settings are 14
important in simulations because the results should represent what is achievable in the electric system. 15
Verifying this information for one distribution circuit takes an engineer roughly five hours to complete. 16
It would be labor intensive and expensive for SCE to manually verify and model each of its distribution 17
circuits for the entire territory. The GCM will be integrated with operational systems like the 18
Distribution Management System (DMS) so near real-time data from DMS will provide actual device 19
settings information to the Grid Connectivity Model. 20
(1) Benefits 21
This project will provide several benefits by addressing the gaps in the 22
current state of the network model. It will eliminate the need to manually update various connectivity 23
models by interfacing directly with operational systems for device setting information. This results in 24
consistent connectivity data across systems and user groups. The GCM will also contain information 25
about distributed energy resources (DERs), collected from the customer-facing Grid Interconnection 26
Processing Tool (GIPT). Both grid-connected and behind-the-meter DERs will be modeled with their 27
interconnection information (e.g., generating capacity, technology, contractual parameters) in the overall 28
connectivity model. 29
The GCM will provide the system of record for reliable, up-to-date, and 30
end-to-end connectivity model of the entire SCE grid such that various stakeholders (including system 31
164
planners, distribution engineers, and system operators) will have consistent information. The model will 1
be the system of record for all the connectivity information and allow users to effectively and reliably 2
manage the grid across planning, analysis, and operations. The project will leverage the existing GIS 3
system to provide an end-to-end view of the grid: from transmission to the distribution secondary. 4
Two models will be included as part of the GCM: the electrical 5
connectivity model and a structural connectivity model. The electrical connectivity model will provide 6
various business capabilities including tracing of the circuits, simulation capabilities, topology of the 7
These changes resulted in a lower-than-expected project complexity. The project spend varies year by 1
year depending on the size and complexity of the CAISO changes implemented. 2
Since implementing the CAISO Market Redesign and Technology Upgrade 3
(MRTU) project in 2009, the CAISO energy market continues to evolve. SCE will need to modify its 4
existing systems to handle the required changes according to the latest CAISO roadmap. 5
SCE forecasts the IMEP project to be $19.8 million for the 2016-2020 period.231 6
The capital forecast for this project was developed using SCE’s internal cost estimation model. This 7
model utilizes industry best practices and SCE subject matter expertise to estimate project cost 8
components. SCE’s forecast for this project includes costs for SCE employees, supplemental workers, 9
and consultants, software and vendor costs, and hardware costs. See this project’s workpaper for the cost 10
breakdown information. 11
Based on an analysis of the information from CAISO about market changes in 12
this period, SCE has estimated this project to be a high complexity COTS software implementation 13
requiring significant upgrades to existing applications, the system interfaces that connects the systems 14
and databases, and hardware infrastructure. 15
(1) Alternatives Considered 16
This project implements tariff changes CAISO, which are required for 17
regulatory compliance. Therefore, no alternatives have been considered. 18
231 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk C p. 211.
176
4. Energy Planning Platform Upgrade (EPP) 1
Table V-52 Energy Planning Platform Upgrade232
Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) Authorized, Recorded, & Forecast Capital Expenditures (Nominal $Millions)
a) Project Description 2
This project will upgrade the existing Energy Planning Platform application to 3
incorporate new market requirements and reporting functionalities. SCE implemented this application in 4
2013 to support portfolio analysis and regulatory reporting and to provide advanced analytics for SCE’s 5
energy hedging program. The original application has grown from a single risk-reporting module to 6
several complex analytical modules. This project will provide the EPP application with the upgrades 7
required in 2018-2019. 8
b) Need for Project 9
As SCE’s power procurement portfolio continues to change, so does its reporting 10
requirements. As Community Choice Aggregators (CCAs) are established in the SCE service territory 11
there is a need to map and track the energy and customers served by these CCAs. SCE also expects the 12
need to track resources installed on the distribution grid, usually referred as distributed energy resources 13
(DERs). 14
SCE requires a refresh of its analytic platform to accurately capture SCE’s market 15
position (i.e., how much supply is available vs. the how much demand is projected at different times and 16
locations). Additionally, SCE must be able to track and report on CCAs and expected future distributed 17
energy resources, and to be able to report on how different forecasts for future market prices will impact 18
the cost of supplying power to customers. 19
232 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk C pp. 212-218.
CIT-00-DM-DM-000078 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020Recorded / Forecast 1.13 1.19 0.58 0.29 - - - 2.00 2.00 - *2011-2014 recorded costs pertain to previous phases of the EPP application, and do not pertain to this GRC's EPP Upgrade project.
Recorded Forecast
177
Furthermore, SCE is also seeking to retire some of its older applications and move 1
the functionality to the new EPP system. This will create a more robust data management process and 2
will also avoid future IT maintenance costs for the systems that are replaced by the new EPP system. 3
(1) Benefits 4
This project will enhance SCE’s energy portfolio reporting capabilities. 5
c) Scope and Cost Forecast 6
SCE forecasts total project costs of $4.0 million over the 2018-2019 period to 7
upgrade the EPP.233 The capital forecast for this project was developed using SCE’s internal cost 8
estimation model. This model utilizes industry best practices and SCE subject matter expertise to 9
estimate project cost components. SCE’s forecast for this project includes costs for SCE employees, 10
supplemental workers, and consultants, software and vendor costs, and hardware costs. See this project’s 11
workpaper for the cost breakdown information. 12
(1) Alternatives Considered 13
Alternative 1: SCE considered not pursuing this project. However, if we 14
chose not to pursue this project, then we would not be able to accurately monitor SCE’s market position, 15
track and report on CCAs and expected future distributed energy resources, and report on how different 16
forecasts for future market prices will impact the cost of supplying power to customers. 17
233 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk C p. 218.
178
5. PCI Replacement 1
Table V-53 PCI Replacement234
Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) Authorized, Recorded, & Forecast Capital Expenditures (Nominal $Millions)
a) Project Description 2
D.15-11-021 adopted the Power Costs, Inc. (PCI) Replacement project, where it 3
was referenced as the Market Systems Replacement project, with a forecast of $5.8 million. The project 4
start was delayed due to dependencies on the Commodity Management Platform (CMP) project that 5
implements a new system to manage renewable power contracts. The CMP project is scheduled to be 6
fully implemented in 2016. 7
The existing system is used to enable SCE to participate in the California 8
Independent System Operator (CAISO) energy market. The system was installed at SCE in 2009 and 9
manages generator outages, captures power trades, creates and submits energy bids to the CAISO energy 10
markets to purchase and sell electric power, and downloads market awards and market prices from 11
CAISO. 12
This project will replace the existing system with new third-party vendor 13
solutions selected through a competitive solicitation process. Since the installation of the existing 14
system, the software vendor landscape has changed significantly; several vendors have merged and 15
continued product development has been done by multiple vendors to enhance the integration, 16
performance, and analytics offered by their systems. 17
This project is related, yet distinctly different, to the CAISO Market Enhancement 18
(IMEP) project described above. While both projects relate to CAISO, the IMEP project implements 19
ongoing market changes mandated by CAISO, whereas this project is a one-time effort to replace the 20
system platform used for day-to-day operations. 21
The existing ETRM system is obsolete and is not being enhanced by the vendor. 2
It runs on older versions of Microsoft Windows Server and Oracle database server, which are no longer 3
supported with software upgrades and security fixes by the vendors. 4
SCE has already selected a new energy trading and contract management 5
platform, which is being used to implement the CMP project. By replacing the existing ETRM system 6
with this new system, SCE can handle conventional, renewable, and financial transactions in a single 7
system. This will simplify the accounting and reporting processes since data from only a single system 8
must be extracted. 9
The existing ETRM system requires a multitude of spreadsheet workarounds to 10
support the current business needs. Moving to the new system will reduce the need for these manual 11
spreadsheet workarounds. 12
(1) Benefits 13
This project will consolidate all of SCE’s wholesale energy trades and 14
bilateral contracts into a single system. It will reduce the need for manual spreadsheet workarounds and 15
streamline the capture and management of energy transactions. It will also simplify accounting, internal, 16
and regulatory reporting processes. 17
c) Scope and Cost Forecast 18
We reevaluated the scope of this project as part of this 2018 GRC application, and 19
the total cost estimate was reduced. In addition, we enhanced the cost estimates based on experience 20
gained from the CMP project. 21
The forecast total project costs are $5.4 million.239 The capital forecast for this 22
project was developed using SCE’s internal cost estimation model. This model utilizes industry best 23
practices and SCE subject matter expertise to estimate project cost components. SCE’s forecast for this 24
project includes costs for SCE employees, supplemental workers, and consultants, as well as software 25
and vendor costs. See this project’s workpaper for the cost breakdown information. 26
239 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk C p. 242.
183
(1) Alternatives Considered 1
Alternative 1: SCE considered not pursuing this project. However, if we 2
chose not to pursue this project, then we would have to rely on the existing system, which is not being 3
enhanced by the vendor going forward and relies on obsolete operating system and database software. 4
Based on this we concluded that keeping the existing system is not a viable solution. 5
Alternative 2: SCE considered enhancing the existing solution by 6
upgrading the existing system to the latest product from the existing vendor to meet the needs of the 7
energy trading and risk management functions. We did not pursue this option because it would not meet 8
our needs. The implementation costs for the latest product would be similar to the new SCE system that 9
is being implemented for the CMP project since the latest vendor product requires a new system 10
implementation rather than an upgrade. In addition, we would have significant integration expenses 11
since half of our portfolio (renewable power) would be in the new SCE system and the other half 12
(conventional power and financial contracts) would be in the latest vendor product. 13
Alternative 3: SCE considered replacing the existing solution by 14
procuring an existing COTS solution to meet the needs of the energy trading and risk management 15
functions. We did not pursue this option because it would not meet our needs. We have already 16
purchased the license for the new system, which is a class-leading product. It is unlikely SCE could find 17
another vendor that can provide better functionality and/or lower price. In addition, implementation 18
expenses for another vendor would be higher than for the new vendor, since for the new vendor we are 19
starting from a system already implemented (through the CMP project) for renewable contracts. We 20
would also have additional integration expenses since half of our portfolio (renewable power) would be 21
in the new system and the other half (conventional power and financial contracts) would be in the 22
second new system. 23
184
7. Aggregated Demand Response (ADR) 1
Table V-55 Aggregated Demand Response240
Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) Authorized, Recorded, & Forecast Capital Expenditures (Nominal $Millions)
a) Project Description 2
D.15-11-021 adopted the Aggregated Demand Response project, as part of SCE’s 3
2015 GRC. ADR Phase 1 was developed during 2013-2015 with a total expenditure of $2.29 million, as 4
shown in Table V-55. SCE will complete this project in 2017. 5
Phase 1 was implemented in first quarter 2015. The second phase is scheduled to 6
be implemented in 2017. The project is dependent on the CAISO Proxy Demand Resource (PDR) 7
implementation, which has been delayed. This, in turn, delayed the completion of SCE’s ADR project. 8
The CPUC has encouraged the growth of demand response programs to enhance 9
electric system reliability, reduce power purchases, and protect the environment. In D.05-11-009, the 10
CPUC developed a strategy and initiated programs to promote demand response. In proceeding A.05-11
05-006, the CPUC adopted programs and goals for demand response for SCE and the other California 12
energy Investor Owned Utilities. Demand response constitutes between one and two percent (in terms of 13
MW) of SCE’s portfolio. SCE anticipates that demand response will become a more significant factor in 14
determining overall power requirements going forward. Load aggregators are now allowed to create 15
demand response blocks241 from individual consumers participating in the aggregation programs. An 16
effective demand response program might be equivalent to a significant dispatchable generation 17
resource. 18
240 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk C pp. 243-248. 241 Demand response blocks (also known as load control groups or blocks) are aggregations of individual
consumers that can be dispatched (activated) as an all-or-nothing option. For example, a load aggregator may create a demand response block of 2 MW. This block can then be not dispatched (0 MW) or fully dispatched (2 MW), but it cannot be partially dispatched (e.g., 1 MW).
In R.07-01-041, the CPUC required demand response programs be integrated into 1
the CAISO markets. Under the market rules of CAISO, the location of the demand response resources 2
will affect SCE’s power costs due to Locational Marginal Pricing, and SCE’s costs for congestion 3
management and Resource Adequacy (RA). SCE must be able to accurately track and model how 4
demand response is affecting SCE’s net power need in order to manage its energy procurement for its 5
customers. 6
The ADR project is implemented in two phases. ADR Phase 1 was implemented 7
in 2015. It enabled Demand Response bidding into the market starting June 17, 2015. 8
The scheduled implementation of ADR Phase 2 in 2017 will provide the 9
additional capabilities to facilitate the full functioning and usage of demand response resources by 10
aggregating the demand resource attributes and providing them to the CAISO Day-Ahead and Real-11
Time markets. 12
b) Need for Project 13
In D.14-12-024 the CPUC required SCE to develop a plan for integrating demand 14
response into the CAISO markets by January 1, 2018 to retain the Resource Adequacy value of demand 15
response resources. CAISO requires SCE to provide demand forecast information into its market to 16
mimic generation resources. SCE will require analytical tools to operate in the CAISO market with 17
aggregate demand response as a dispatchable resource. Demand Response resources differ from other 18
energy resources because they bridge the retail and wholesale businesses. Multiple retail accounts (with 19
corresponding meters) that have similar attributes (e.g., location or demand response program 20
participation) are aggregated into a single wholesale resource to be bid into the CAISO market. 21
The Aggregated Demand Response application will provide the following 22
functions: (1) Store the definition of wholesale demand response resources that can be bid into the 23
CAISO market based on an aggregation of retail customers; (2) Forecast the capacity of each of the 24
defined demand response resources on a daily and hourly basis; (3) Generate bids for each demand 25
response resource and submit these bids to the CAISO markets; (4) Retrieve awards from CAISO for the 26
demand response resources and translate these awards into instructions to the retail demand response 27
186
participants;242 (5) Monitor the actual performance of demand response resources by comparing their 1
actual usage during a demand response event to a baseline usage to determine the actual load reduction; 2
and (6) Perform settlements by calculating data (including resource performance data) for submission to 3
CAISO and validate CAISO settlement payments and charges. 4
(1) Benefits 5
This project will comply with R.07-01-041 and will enable SCE’s 6
customer demand response programs to participate in the wholesale CAISO energy markets. Based on 7
the attributes of the various customer demand response programs these programs will be aggregated into 8
wholesale energy resources. These resources will then be bid into to the CAISO Day-Ahead and Real-9
Time energy markets. 10
c) Scope and Cost Forecast 11
The total project costs are forecast to be $5.8 million. SCE is requesting $3.5 12
million to implement Phase 2 and complete the project by 2017.243 The capital forecast for this project 13
was developed using SCE’s internal cost estimation model. This model utilizes industry best practices 14
and SCE subject matter expertise to estimate project cost components. SCE’s forecast for this project 15
includes costs for SCE employees, supplemental workers, consultants, as well as software and vendor 16
costs. See this project’s workpaper for the cost breakdown information. 17
(1) Alternatives Considered 18
Alternative 1: SCE considered keeping the existing solution without 19
modification. We did not pursue this option because it would not meet our needs. If we choose not to 20
implement the remaining functionality, then all the DR programs would not be fully integrated into 21
CAISO. This will introduce operational risks of a partly integrated solution. Potential impacts are 22
suboptimal market participation by SCE and CAISO non-performance penalties. The partial resource 23
integration may also result in Resource Adequacy disallowances. 24
242 This function is complicated by the fact that a bid can be partially awarded by CAISO. For example, if a
demand response resource represents 1,000 retail customers participating in one of SCE’s demand response programs, the bid submitted to CAISO is for 2MW and CAISO awards 1MW to the resource in the auction, the Aggregated Demand Response system needs to determine which retail customers will participate in the program, by how much and for how long.
243 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk C p. 248.
187
Alternative 2: SCE considered replacing the existing solution by 1
procuring an existing COTS solution to meet the needs of the demand response integration function. We 2
did not pursue this option because it would not meet our needs. SCE evaluated third-party vendor 3
solutions as part of Phase 1 of this project. However, significant product flexibility (and potentially 4
costly custom development) would be required to manage changing CAISO requirements. Also, demand 5
response bidding into a wholesale market like CAISO is a relatively new field with few proven vendor 6
solutions available. SCE therefore developed the ADR system in-house. 7
required to migrate some high risk records lacking records management controls into eDMRM, manage 1
Engineering Drawings within eDMRM, and improve system performance. 2
Figure V-12 Content Management Tools
b) Need for Project 3
eDMRM houses a large volume of critical records that have been migrated from 4
fileshares over the past few years. Current system performance limitations impact adopting and using 5
eDMRM. Not implementing enhanced records retention and disposition capabilities will affect SCE’s 6
ability to comply with the records retention and disposition requirements. SCE plans to deploy a pilot of 7
the digital signature capability for select business processes across the company. This will help improve 8
the business process associated with obtaining signatures for records that already exist in eDMRM and 9
reduce costs associated with scanning and maintaining original documents with wet signatures. 10
c) Scope and Cost Forecast 11
As part of SCE’s 2015 GRC, we originally requested $32.6 million to implement 12
eDMRM over the 2013-2017 timeframe. Since that authorization, SCE has modified eDMRM and 13
expects the total project cost to be $13.01 million over the 2013 – 2016 timeframe. SCE recorded $10.41 14
million from 2013 – 2015 to establish the eDMRM technical infrastructure, migrate around 10 million 15
Public Safety and other high-risk records to eDMRM, implement engineering drawing management 16
unique to eDMRM, and create disposition and retention management capabilities. 17
SCE is requesting $2.6 million in 2016 to complete the project at the revised 18
scope by implementing capabilities previously outlined as part of a multi-phased implementation. These 19
capabilities consist of: improving eDMRM system performance; migrating additional critical records 20
repositories from file shares to eDMRM; enhancing the eDMRM-based engineering drawing 21
Before 2014 2014 and Beyond
eDMRM
MS SharePoint(Office365)
Document Management(Primary)
+Records Management
(Primary)
--Did not Exist--Document Management
(Primary)
+Records Management
(Primary-enhancements required)
Records Management (limited use)
202
management module we implemented in 2015; piloting digital signature technology to streamline 1
manual “wet signature” processes across a small set of organizations within the enterprise; and 2
completing and operationalizing records retention and disposition capabilities within eDMRM. 3
We developed the capital forecast for this project using SCE’s internal cost 4
estimation model. This model utilizes industry best practices and SCE subject matter expertise to 5
estimate project cost components. SCE’s forecast for this project includes costs for system integrator 6
labor, SCE labor, and infrastructure hardware. See this project’s workpaper for the cost breakdown 7
information.258 8
SCE’s revised scope and cost forecast for eDMRM represents a reduction of 9
$19.5 million from SCE’s original request. As discussed above, this reduced scope is primarily due to a 10
shift in SCE’s strategy to use Microsoft Office 365 as our enterprise content management platform for 11
managing enterprise content and email. 12
(1) Alternatives Considered 13
SCE considered forgoing the eDMRM enhancements planned for 2016. 14
This approach has significant compliance implications. Not implementing and operationalizing the 15
eDMRM records retrofit and disposition functionality would prevent SCE from fully effectuating its 16
Records Management Policy, which is based on over 5,800 legal and regulatory compliance 17
requirements. Not enhancing functionality in the engineering drawing module and overall system 18
performance will create a risk in terms of employees being able to efficiently access high-risk 19
documents, while performing critical reliability and business resiliency operations. 20
258 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk C p. 299.
203
E. Finance Capital Projects 1
1. Plant Ledger Upgrade and Tax Module Installation 2
Table V-62 Plant Ledger Upgrade and Tax Module Installation259
Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) Authorized, Recorded, & Forecast Capital Expenditures (Nominal $Millions)
a) Project Description 3
In SCE’s 2015 GRC, the Commission authorized SCE to implement the Tax 4
Department Repairs project. The tax repairs scope of the project was originally scheduled to complete in 5
2014, however during the technical design phase in late 2013, SCE identified dependencies within the 6
PowerPlan suite of capital accounting software that required SCE to align the implementation with an 7
upgrade to the latest commercially available version in order to meet the original project objectives.260 8
The PowerPlan capital accounting software was implemented in 2008 and was due for a refresh given 9
needed updates to the software. Reflecting its increased scope, SCE has renamed this project the Plant 10
Ledger Upgrade and Tax Module Installation project. 11
The upgrade to the PowerPlan capital accounting software version was needed not 12
only to support the full implementation of tax repairs functionality, but also to address maintenance and 13
efficiency impacts associated with the outdated version. SCE originally implemented PowerPlan version 14
10.2.1.2 in 2008, and at this time this version is no longer eligible for standard support from the vendor. 15
This results in more costly custom maintenance support agreements. Moreover, SCE identified over 16
259 Refer to WP SCE-04, Vol. 2 Bk C pp. 300-318 260 In addition to the Tax Repairs module, the eight modules in SCE’s current suite of PowerPlan capital
accounting software that required upgrade are the following: Project Cost Management (work order processing, CWIP, unitization), Asset Management (fixed asset accounting), Depreciation (book depreciation and reserve analysis), Depreciation Studies (actuarial analysis and analysis of book accrual rates), PowerTax (tax depreciation, book/tax reconciliation, deferred taxes), Tax Provision (current/deferred tax provisions), Property Tax (filings, analysis, payments), and Charge Repository (SAP-PowerPlan GL interfaces, allocations, validations).
204
ninety accounting business process inefficiencies that are driven by the aging PowerPlan software 1
version. The accounting business process inefficiencies were focused primarily in the following areas: 2
construction work in progress, property tax, and tax provisions related to depreciation. As a result of tax 3
repairs requirements, software obsolescence, and capital accounting process inefficiencies, SCE 4
proceeded with the PowerPlan upgrade project. From inception through year-end 2015, $5 million was 5
recorded to complete the following project activities: solution design, test installation of the upgraded 6
software, and build of integration with SCE’s SAP system. SCE requests $4.2 million for 2016 capital 7
expenditures to complete solution development, integrated system testing, data conversion, and 8
production implementation. The project will upgrade the PowerPlan application to the latest version to 9
eliminate the need for software customization, improve SCE’s capital accounting processes, and enable 10
new business capabilities to support the company’s property tax and income tax filings. 11
b) Need for Project 12
PowerPlan is the software application that manages the sub-ledger for SCE’s 13
fixed asset accounting, property tax and income taxes. As SCE’s business needs for managing capital 14
asset accounting and IRS tax regulations continue to change, PowerPlan capital accounting software 15
must be upgraded to remain technically supported and enable the processes. Since its initial 16
implementation as part of SCE’s Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) program, however, this 17
application has not been upgraded to a more current version supported by the vendor. Moreover, when 18
PowerPlan was originally deployed, the software did not account for all business scenarios within their 19
product suite. As a result, SCE invested in customizations to enable the processes not fully supported. 20
Over the last eight years, PowerPlan has designed and improved their software to account for many of 21
the SCE customizations as part of their standard product offering. This project will update the software 22
and hardware infrastructure and add application functionality. This upgrade will accomplish the 23
following key objectives: 24
• Reduce risk by ensuring the application has the technology updates needed to 25