Information Sharing Bulletin - Premudasqems.premuda.net/Premuda Bulletin/9.pdf · The Academic Lesson: the concept of arrived ship and the Notice of readiness Information Sharing

Dear Premuda's fellows,

The year is quite ended and it’s time to reflec-

tions and analysis of what has been done and

what is still to be done.

The global financial market is suffering a serious

moment: the entire economic world entered into

a deep recession. The complex of vicious circles

which contributed to the crisis included high oil

prices, high food prices and the collapse of sub-

stantial housing bubble centered in the United

States. Heavily penalized is the bulk carried mar-

ket. In such a depressed time, our Company has

to give the maximum in order to keep our Cli-

ents. We have to continuously improve by using

all the available tools to render our service more

effective.

The Risk Assessment is one among those tools.

Unfortunately we have to report lacks in the use

of the Risk Assessment software installed on

board of our managed vessels and a serious

lack of commitment.

Again, another lack is to be reported for the

Safety Day: to better promote safety, Company

established one day entirely dedicated to safety

matters, not limited to drills performances but

including also reviews and explanations of Com-

pany Management System. Unfortunately, also

for this topic, we have to report lack of commit-

ment.

A relevant section of this edition is for the out-

come of the Management review carried out by

Shell at the end of September at Company prem-

ises. The result was that the management stan-

dard required by Shell is higher than the stan-

dard level our Company system is presently set

to. Therefore, our Company is not reaching the

sufficient score Shell is looking for in order to

approve its supplier. Company has now to

strongly work in order to meet the required stan-

dard Shell is requiring.

The selected closed cases

In this Issue:

Incident reports: incidents occured during drills on board

Open Letter from the General Director

The vessel in the hurricane: the Company and the out

come of the Shell Vettting at Company premises

Company System under discussion

The Academic Lesson: the concept of arrived ship and the

Notice of readiness

Information Sharing Bulletin

is published by:

Premuda SpA - SQE Dept.

Email: [email protected]

Collection of selected

Vetting Issues

Commercial issues

Remarks to be shared

Lesson‟s bearing

Information Sharing Bulletin

Summary:

§ Two cases of minor injuries happened during drills on board

§ One case of minor injury due to not use of proper PPE

§ Two cases of lack of attention by the operators, luckily procuring minor injuries

§ A damage to a very important life saving appliance: the lifeboat

§ One incident caused by having not followed properly Company procedures

§ One machinery failure involving the COT pressure monitor system

www.premuda.net Be sure, be safe

Please, send any comment

to the Editor:

[email protected]

Lesson Learned

Issue n° 9

December 2008

Due to the high importance of the topics dealt

with this issue, the Commercial Issue section

and the Academic Lesson have been incorpo-

rated together.

You will also note this edition has been enriched

with some cartoons which have been provided

by our Site Control Mgr/CSO.

Once again, we would like point out that it is cru-

cial everyone give the best effort and support to

our Company during these difficult times, waiting

for the rough seas to calm.

By G. Mortola

Academic lesson

This incident luckily occurred when the vessel was in port: the injured Officer was immediately hospitalized

ashore. The incident was closed as “ lack of familiarity “ and incorrect use of fire fighting technique. During

the last years, In the shipping industry a large number of incidents was noticed during the periodical drills

performed on board, mostly during the lowering of the lifeboat (new regulations were issued for this type of

drill to prevent future incidents). Prior any drill, Company reminds ships Commands to examine previous drill

reports and crew skill, organize the drill having not tired crew, plan it with the participation of other officers,

possibly perform a risk assessment highlighting the possible hazards and the controls to eliminate or reduce

them.

Selected closed cases

Page 2

The incident occurred during the performance of one drill on board, when the Chief Officer accidentally slept

down (to report that some other four slippery cases were analyzed during the period).

Pagina 3

The incident occurred on june, again during the performance of a drill on board.

This incident was caused by the defective hand flare.

Page 3


Many incidents occur because early warnings of hazards are ignored until sufficient hard evidence is ac-

cumulated. A system approach to incident analysis can help to identify points in the chain of events

where timely action may be crucial. Ships and marine systems are becoming increasingly complex and

integrated: it is now recognised that a „system‟ includes its operators. Many improvements in operational

safety can be achieved by paying close attention to the relevant systems that support operation, not

least when these systems fail. Obtaining the fullest picture therefore necessitates an effective method of

abstracting information from incident data. Company reminds to report with as much as possible details

any near miss or hazardous situation that after analysis can help to improve the prevention of incidents.

Many injuries happen because seafares are not correctly kitted out for the task in hand. Supply the correct

safety clothing has became an integral part of ship‟s managers responsibility: there is no doubt that wearing

the right PPE for the task is vital and has saved lives, but the requirement to use the PPE has to make sense

if it is going to be obeyed, if the rule does not appear to make sense is often broken (i.e: if we say that hard

hats must be worn on deck, where there are no falling objects). The best way to ensure that all crew wear

the correct PPE is to create a very strong safety culture: in doing so, it becomes second nature to work safely

and use the correct safety equipment.


Page 4

Some other similar occurrences were closed during the period, which would had lead to more serious conse-

quences if no PPE , incorrect PPE or their incorrect use were in place.

The case is a typical example of operator‟s distraction and adequate supervision. Potential hazards should

be identified and delimited on main deck: result of investigation was that no tape or warning signs were

available. Furthermore, it is to be reported that vessel was in an operative mode and it is not recommended

that both Master and C. Officer inspect together an enclosed space like the COT. The simultaneous danger-

ous task or condition for both the deck or engine senior officers should be avoided for the safety of the crew

and of the vessel. Masters and Officers should always maintain awareness of situations at all time and un-

derstand the effects of their actions and decisions.


Page 5

The incident fortunately resulted in minor burnings: we have however to remember that multiples reported

cases led to more serious consequences.

Pagina 6

The incident occurred on board on 12 December 2008 and was quickly closed, one week after the occur-

rence.

Page 6


Cadets are the future officers and their training is very important: through introductions on routine works

and activities of the daily life on board, the cadets can understand the necessity of a cooperative spirit,

environment protection, acquiring fundamental skills. They have to continuously take part in actual re-

pair/maintenance works to develop their skills for maintenance but always under the direction of a re-

sponsible Officer as an instructor. Through these maintenance works, the Cadets learn correct proce-

dures to be taken when maintenance works are in progress, inspection techniques and safety measures

to be taken for protecting themselves from injury. It is therefore important that the Cadet knows and ap-

ply the correct procedure (e.g. the correct use of PPE) and is followed always by one responsible Officer.

The crack in the hull of the free fall was only detected during an external survey: this occurrence is showing

some lacks in the safety inspection program executed on board (prior to any external survey, ship‟s crew

have to perform one deep inspection in order to be ready and rectify, where possible, any eventual deficiency

found. Without a proper maintenance and inspection, the safety equipments may not be fit for purpose. Dur-

ing external inspections, when serious defects are detected, the perception is that the ship is unsafe and

vessel can be detained, by the Port State, until she is deemed to be “safe”. Company reminds to execute all

the inspections and the maintenance to the safety equipments, immediately reporting to the Office any defi-

ciency that cannot be solved by crew onboard.


Page 7

The hazardous situation was discovered during the annual survey to the safety equipment carried out by the

Classification Society on 25/08/08.

The cargo handling is responsibility of all Officers: ISGOTT and Company procedures on this regard have to be

strictly followed, taking all steps to ensure that everyone safety and health, and the environment are pro-

tected. Improper handling can result in serious injury or death caused by fire, explosion. Cargo released into

the environment (after lines ruptures due to pressure surge) can contaminate the water around the vessel.

The consequences in terms of pollution, fines applicable to the Owner, bad image of the Company, possible

refuse by Charterers and Terminals to accept future service of vessel have to force everyone involved in

cargo operation to strictly follow the International and Company procedures: all loading plans should be well

coordinated between the ship‟s officers trained for the specific task.


Page 8

The incident (overpressure at ship‟s manifolds) is important for its significance. It should reflect to all Com-

pany staff that various procedures were not followed, causing serious damages to the image of the Com-

pany.

Pagina 9

The failure occurred on July 2007 but it was only closed on may 2008.

Page 9


The monitoring system was restored at normal condition in a short time; however, the closure of the re-

port was delayed without a clear reason. The COT monitoring is one of the sensitive equipments in-

cluded into the critical systems by the Company and it is therefore subject to a more stringent attention.

When discovered, the failure has to be immediately rectified and—when impossible—an alternative mean

to control the situation has to be be used in agreement and/or following the suggestions by Company

shore departments involved.

Open Letter from the General Manager

Page 10

To the great family of Premuda

Dear all,

The year 2008 is just ended and I would like to convey my personal greetings

– along those of Premuda’s Board – for a prosperous new year to each of you

and to your family.

I sincerely wish to thank everyone in Premuda for the great support and co-

operation, always a plus to the professional service and job demonstrated on

board of our vessels and in the office.

My message is particularly addressed to the people working on board of our

vessels.

This issue of the Bulletin, closing the year 2008, it’s a special issue as it looks

at the way the global financial meltdown of the recent few months has af-

fected the shipping market and how our Company can weather the storm.

The world economic landscape has changed radically. Companies have

seen their share values plummeted down, the banking system is in cri-

sis, business confidence has been destroyed and the Chinese industrial mira-

cle, which has been the engine of word economic growth for a number of

years, has been stopped dead in its tracks.

Especially the bulk carriers are deeply involved the crisis.

In this context, we have to offer our best services and picture to keep our Clients and be able to fix our vessels at the maxi-

mum possible. We have to be careful in the costs management , saving the maximum possible, from our side; from the

other side, we have to offer our best services and grant full respect of our procedures and international requirements to be

competitive. The modern shipping industry is improving and the demand of quality, safety and security is always and continu-

ously upgrading: we have to follow this indication, well knowing our Company, our resources and possibilities.

Our DPA, the link between vessels outputs/requests and the Board, is constantly informing, updating and highlighten-

ing problems and needs. Some of these problems are endemic and we are constantly working in order to improve: however,

our time of reaction time is not fast and immediate. We need time, probably more than required by the modern industry dur-

ing these times.

As example, we can take our jobs and resources invested in the electronic PMS. We are working since a long time,

and some discrepancies still appear. During the year 2008, our quality objective related to this matter failed.

Again, we report some problems related to the use of moderns and mandatory tools for the shipping industry as the Risk As-

sessment is. At this stage, the Risk Assessment program should be used on a regular base and could be the support for any

future investigation in case of incident: it has to be a mandatory tool before any operation and job on board of our vessels

starts. For this topic too, I understand that we need additional commitment and have to adjust our mentality in order to intro-

duce it in our daily work mentality. The Risk Assessment should be something that we feel and not something that we have

to do as it is required/ordered by the Company.

Another important issue is the record of incidents or injuries work related and reported on board of our vessels.

We have one excellent vessel, with very few incidents reported in the last two years, while all the other vessels are report-

ing cases with more frequencies. Company is really very sensitive for this argument: the mission is ZERO incident, then ves-

sels with frequencies over our standards need serious investigation in order to understand the cause. Any incident and near

miss should be reported and analyzed, but one serious selection and classification of the cases should be done in order to

report to the DPA/Board all significant cases for which a deep investigation should be done.

This time is particularly complicate and extremely difficult for the commercial/financial aspects involved: in this

rough sea, we have all to show the best of our Company in term of saving costs, thus providing the best services a at the

highest standards. We have to avoid any problem caused by the wrong application or non compliance with our Company

standard, that will only signify to be non in compliance with the modern industry requirements and international require-

ments. We have to improve our mentality and be committed in our mission: we have to share to all our people the required

standards and procedures, which are nowadays mandatory if we want to remain in the shipping business.

Even the above could seem only paper job, waste time and documentary work, each Company representative and Senior Offi-

cer has to correct the feeling and clarify that ALL required jobs and duties are important, since the vessels management is a

sort of ―orchestra‖ with one conductor…. the Company Board. Each orchestra component has to play one specific part and

has one specific duty: if only one will not follow the rules, the false note is granted!

Good job to everyone and good year 2009: Company is trusting in each of you.

Marco Tassara

General Manager

Pagina 11

Page 11

Vetting Issues

Then Chevron accepted vessel referring to Shell SIRE dd.

15 Sept. 2008, and deferring inspection to March 2009.

BP evaluated our vessel basis Shell SIRE, accepting our

vessel and deferring inspection to March 2009

Also ExxonMobil accepted vessel basis Shell SIRE.

Four Island

Vessel (Master Rainò) performed a SIRE inspection with

Shell, Singapore 03/11/2008 (10 NO) with positive result.

Chevron accepted our vessel referring to previous Shell

SIRE dd. 11 May 2008 and deferred inspection to Novem-

ber 2008, after that no request was sent.

Framura

Vessel (Master Al-

bamonte) performed

a SIRE inspection

with Shell, Singapore

23/08/2008 (6 NO),

and consequent

Chevron acceptability

based on that positive

SIRE, with inspection

deferred to February 2009.

Four Springs

Vessel (Master Castriotta) performed a SIRE inspection

with BP, Singapore 12/10/2008 (11 NO) with positive re-

sult and 6 months validity.

This was the last inspection as tank vessel.

Four Moon

No inspection performed during this period due to trade

Venezuela – Cuba.

Dear all,

Below are reported the SIRE inspections during the period

August—December 2008.

From this edition we are inserting the Master, as reference

to the performed SIRE inspection, in order to underline im-

portance of leading/instructing/checking position of the

Captain on respect of Vetting activity.

As it is possible to witness by the below short report, all the

SIRE inspections were completed with a final acceptance for

all the vessels.

From the last quarter, the most complicate situation was the

one related to the M/T Four Springs, failing last Shell/BP

inspections and so compromising the vessel trading

Although the dedicated conversion project from Tanker to

Bulk trade expecting the vessel from 12/2008, vessel was

submitted to BP inspection, recovery SIRE inspection, car-

ried out with satisfaction and acceptance of the vessel for 6

months.

We here thanks to Master Castriotta for the application and

vessel preparation to BP vetting also in consideration of not

easy task to keep an high attention and performance stan-

dard in the last period before conversion starting.

Four Bay

Vessel (Master Meneguzzi) performed Shell, Dalian

15/09/2008 (16 NO) with positive result.

Under conversion works since October

The vessel in the “hurricane”

Page 12

For this Bulletin issue, the selected vessel

in the hurricane is the fleet admiral: our

Company.

Yes! This time, we have to report and share

to all Premuda employees at sea and

ashore that during this year first quarter,

the Company (shore based office and the

Company System) is involved in a very seri-

ous hurricane: all around us the wind is

tottering and squeaking and our Company

system is under discussion after having

been examined closely and in deep detail

during the last six months.

What is happening has an explanation in

the fact that the shipping industry is quickly

changing and is becoming more and more

demanding towards ships operators and

managers as far as service quality, reliability

and safety operations are concerned.

All started up in September 2008 after the

visit Shell Quality Assessment Group repre-

sentatives carried out for the periodical Management Review to our Company offices (due yearly on account of the fact two of

our good ladies MM/TT ―Framura‖ and Four Island‖ are on sub charter to Shell) and from the list of observations arisen after

the Company management system review was completed. In order to better focus everybody’s attention on this issue, we would

like to explain that, in order to approve a Company as ― Manager of Time Chartered vessels‖ the Major Oil Companies are car-

rying out one vetting inspection not only to the vessel (this is required also for the vessel employed on voyage charters), but

also to the Company Offices and especially the Company System is examined and evaluated in detail in order to establish if the

subject Company has a management system in compliance with the requirements established by the Oil Majors themselves.

The Fleet Director comments:

Premuda, as above stated, having two vessels presently under

T/C with Shell (since a long time, expected both to remain on

Time Charter for some additional time) has been seriously ap-

proached by Shell in order to evaluate the reliability of its man-

agement standards.

The serious situation arose from the inspection carried out in

September 2008 and subsequent results discussions: in par-

ticular, the analysis pointed out that the shipping company

management standard established by Shell (and by other

MOCs) is actually requiring a higher level of procedures and

quality control than our System standard is actually set to.

In this respect, our Company seriously risks not to get to the

s u f f i c i e n t s c o r e r e q u i r e d t o b e a c c e p t e d

as Shell use, notwithstanding the fact we know and are sure

that our System and Management is already compliant with the

average level required by the industry and assessed through

the TMSA or its equivalent systems by most of the MOCs.

As a matter of fact the Quality management level required by

the ISM, Premuda is fully compliant with of course, is definitely

inferior to the Quality management level required by MOCs and

therefore it is not more to be taken as in indication of the Ship-

ping companies possessing the proper qualities required by the

market industry if Company intention is to make business with

the MOC as is the case of Premuda.

As a final comment to the present evaluation we would like to

stress the fact that the Company is now committed in comply-

ing with the additional Shell requirements arising from the

last assessment even if in this delicate economical moment

additional resources are strictly limited or not available and

we have to rely on good will and cooperation among the vari-

ous office department and vessel crews in order to imple-

ment the additional procedures and control that have been

required to us.

This is an additional effort we all are required to carry out

since failure of the Company to be accepted by Shell, when

they will verify the implementation of the additional measures

and procedures they have required, will be verified during the

closing assessment due to be carried out on April 1st

2009, will have catastrophic consequences for the Company

on the commercial point of view, putting at serious stake Com-

pany survival.

Once more we have to thank You all Company employees

ashore and at sea for the continuous commitment and efforts

carried out to constantly improve the Company management

system.

Thank You all and good work. By F. Beltrami

For information and divulgation to all Premuda people, listed

on the subsequent pages, are reported the final comments

issued by Shell:

“Is this structural failure????”

Pagina 13

Page 13


It may be advantageous to require new Masters and Chief

Engineers to serve an initial Probationary Period in the new

rank, to ensure the persons suitability to these crucial posi-

tions prior to full confirmation of promotion.

It is recommended that specific minimum requirements are

documented for handover periods for newly promoted Senior

Officers.

The monitoring of compliance to ILO 180 regulations with

respect to rest periods is presently carried out during Super-

intendent visits. To enable early detection of any possible sys-

temic non-conformance situations, it may be advisable to re-

quire vessels to submit monthly reports of non-conformances.

Furthermore the present log book format of recording rest

periods seem to be assessing only how much rest has been

taken by the seafarer over the period midnight to midnight

and how much rest has been taken in a one week period. The

requirements of the ILO 180 regulations are much more in-

volved and stringent than these factors, and therefore it is

recommended that consideration be given to industry avail-

able software to enhance the monitoring of rest hours and

ease the burden on the seafarers.

It is noted that only Master and Officers are subject to unan-

nounced Drug and Alcohol tests from an external agency. It is

recommended that you review this procedure to ensure that

all shipboard personnel are potentially subject to such tests.

A number of external training courses are noted to have been

undertaken by Premuda Officers. However records suggest

that there is extremely limited participation by the Indian Of-

ficers. It would be well worth investigating how best to ensure

involvement of Indian Officers on such courses so as to avoid

a two-tier system in training levels of your Officers.

A documented procedure was noted to be in place for recruit-

ment of shore based personnel. Whilst it is acknowledged that

there are no recent recruits to the shore office in respect to

technical personnel, the most recent records of recruitment

were not backed up with interview records. It is recommended

that an interview checklist is developed for the interview proc-

ess, which is used to standardise the process and provide re-

cord of the process.

Office Management & Emergency Response

We suggest developing a pocket booklet to be carried by the

persons that may be contacted in case of an incident/casualty

and containing an initial contact checklist to avoid omission

of any vital information. This booklet should also provide

contact numbers facilitating a rapid activation of the emer-

gency response team.

You may consider adopting a policy for assigning an on-site

company representative in case of a crisis.

The company website is a useful tool for dissemination of in-

formation and could be used for crisis information and media

management.

While last years ship-shore drill identifies learning points,

which is a positive aspect of the drill, there is no documented

record of corrective action being taken..

************

The two major observations: 1) It was noted, in couple of instances, a complete breakdown

in the documented process on issuing hot work approval by

the office. As an example in March 2008 the Four Bay re-

quested approval to conduct hot work on the main deck (fire

station). Approval was granted without evidence of submis-

sion of a hot work permit or risk assessment by the vessel. The

review team felt that in one of the instances of failure in par-

ticular, where the Safety Superintendent was away form the

office on Company Business, the situation could be linked to

there being no back-up available within this persons depart-

ment.

2) It was noted that three lost time incidents (LTI) were re-

ported in April 2008. Whilst the crewing department had re-

ceived notification of such incidents, and had passed onto

administration staff within the SQE department for entering

into the records, members of the management team appeared

unaware of these incidents, and certainly there was no evi-

dence of any investigation having been carried out. Even fol-

lowing initial enquiries the exact circumstances of the re-

ported incidents were not known, and required further follow

up. None of these facts appeared to have been cross-

questioned during the mid year in-house management review.

The process of receiving, recording and investigating these

cases was noted to have failed. A thorough review of the sys-

tems in place in this respect needs to be undertaken.

We confirm our verbal comments as discussed in the closing

session of our review and summarise them below for your con-

sideration.

Human Resource Management

Procedures for review of the Recruiting Agencies require an

actual “physical audit” of the agencies on a two yearly basis.

It would be well worth considering, bringing your policy in line

with the industry standard by requiring annual review of Re-

cruiting Agencies.

With respect to the audits of the Recruiting agencies, it was

pleasing to note that in the examples sighted, the process had

identified action points. However there was no objective evi-

dence available to indicate that the action items had been

closed.

It was noted that the procedures for recruitment of Officers

require an interview by the Recruiting agency and “mainly for

officers” by the Crewing Manager. There was little objective

evidence available to indicate any involvement of the Crewing

Manager in interviews for prospective Officers. It is recom-

mended that investigation is made as to how best satisfy your

requirement, particularly where recruitment of Senior Officers

is concerned. Furthermore the development of a standard inter-

view checklist would be of value that it would enable like for

like comparisons of prospective candidates.

You may wish to re-consider the value in documenting require-

ments as to time required in a rank before becoming eligible

for promotion to the next rank.

“Is this structural failure????”


Page 14

On board Safety Management and Certification

The classification of LTI’s, as with our 2005 review of the com-

pany, does not appear to be consistent with OCIMF guidelines.

Inherent medical conditions seem to have been classed as

LTI’s. The standard industry practice is to include contractors’ safety

performance, while onboard companies ships, figures within

company statistics.

We failed to see clear targets posted for safety performance

within the fleet. It is strongly recommended that clear targets

are set for specific key performance indicators (KPI) and

propagated throughout the company, particularly related to

safety performance.

It was noted that near miss / hazardous situation reporting was

being carried out on a very limited basis. Consideration should

be given to providing additional guidance to ship’s crew on

reporting requirements, and how to best motivate ship’s staff in

submitting near miss and hazardous situation reporting and the

possible gains from the learning associated with these. Addi-

tionally, the inclusion of specific targets for near miss report-

ing will indicate senior management commitment to establish-

ing an open reporting system.

You may consider a more structured approach to the daily

work planning meetings onboard to include HSSE matters and

possible posting of minute meetings. This will help to keep all

informed on planned work throughout the day and avoid any

conflicting jobs.

You may wish to clearly define at what level a shore-based

investigation of incidents is required, as opposed to a ship led

investigation.

Maintenance & Performance Management

We note that you have recently adopted a software based risk

assessment tool for use by ship and shore staff. The process of

risk assessment may be even further enhanced by the develop-

ment of a library of routine and non-routine jobs, which are

made available to all ships for their guidance.

The Amos PMS used may be enhanced by incorporating tank

inspection schedules and reports which are currently only pa-

per based. Inventory of spare parts is included within Amos but

no minimum stock keeping is highlighted for assistance in

eliminating shortages.

Critical equipment listed in the SMS is only identified within

the Amos PMS individual item page. We recommend that for

every vessel the critical equipment onboard is clearly identi-

fied/highlighted in job lists and due or overdue lists. It should

also be possible to list the status of critical items for a particu-

lar ship at any given time.

The technical department stated the companies policy towards

minimum condition of vessels. However a clear steel repair

policy, such as how substantial corrosion is dealt with and a

policy on the protection of tanks with respect to coatings and

anodes was not found documented. A clear policy would assist

in portraying the actual minimum standards of the company

and what is expected when bringing in second hand tonnage.

Navigation Procedures

It is noted that the Under-keel clearance policy refers to re-

quired under keel clearances as a percentage of the mean

draft. The review team feels that there is potential for possible

confusion in that seafarers may possibly apply the required

value of the clearance to the mean draft, which could possibly

leading to grounding exposure when the vessel is trimmed

during ballast passages. It is recommended that you consider

whether the use of the mean draft is appropriate, and if it is

decided that you wish to persist with the mean draft, it should

be made implicitly clear that the UKC requirement is actually

applied to the vessels maximum draft,

Whilst procedures take into account squat, density of water,

and tidal heights it would be appropriate to offer increased

guidance within your SMS as to other factors which can affect

Under keel clearances such as, but not limited to, any angle of

heel, hogging or sagging, accuracy of hydrographic data etc.

It was noted that in the supplied example of the passage plan,

an obsolete version of the “Port plan” was in use, which had

been superseded by a new issue in May 2008.

It is understood that new build vessels due for delivery in

2009/2010 will be fitted with Electronic Chart System, in ad-

dition to supply of paper charts. It is recommended that you

clearly document your policy as to which will be the primary

system used onboard for monitoring passage progress.

It may be appropriate to document specific geographical lo-

cations around the world, where vessels are specifically re-

quired to be steaming under manoeuvering conditions. Such

documented areas would not preclude the Master identifying

other areas where the vessel would sail under manoeuvering

condition.

Cargo Custody and Transfer Procedures

Whilst the SMS does give advice regarding dangers of Hydro-

gen Sulphide, it is recommended that procedures are devel-

oped which should be followed during the loading, carriage

and discharging of cargoes with high Hydrogen Sulphide con-

tent.

It would be appropriate to offer instructions within your pro-

cedures for the relative settings of pressure and vacuum

alarms in relation to the PV valves for vessels that use such

alarms as the SOLAS alternative means to secondary venting.

You may wish to develop a procedure for handling cargoes

with low cloud points or low pour points, with particular ref-

erence to ballast handling in such cases.

It may be worth considering purchasing complete spare sets

of portable gas detection equipment that could be located at

strategic locations. Such spare sets could then be utilized to

replace vessels standard sets when these are landed for their

annual calibration.

************

As everybody can easily understand, the situation could

not satisfy our Company.

Some of the remarks are due to having not followed our

procedures, as for the two major observations.

Pagina 15

Page 15


Corrective action

Since the possibility to have an on-line connection with

Company mail server when out of the office is dependent

from many conditions most of which out of Company

control, thus making the possibility to provide a fast and

motivated (based on actual examination of Company

documents) reply to the vessel enquiries unlikely and

therefore in order to provide always office availability to

the enquiries, it has been decided to modify the Com-

pany Win-SAF-12 – Welding and flame cutting operations

– to include the provision and responsibility of office

back up function to the Safety Superintendent limited to

the hot works permits approval, when he is out of the

office , to be taken over by the vessel technical superin-

tendent or by the Fleet Director in case the former is ab-

sent as well. The Working in instruction in caption is be-

ing modified according to the above and its updated ver-

sion will be published into the Company SQEMS within

next week. Related office personnel will be trained ac-

cording to the new provision of the approval back up

function as specified in the updated Win-Saf-12 by the

Safety Superintendent.

B) LTIs – Incidents reports cross checks: lack of analysis

Root cause analysis

In the Marine Injury Report (April 2008), matter of the

analysis, three LWD cases are reported that result to be

wrongly reported/evaluated by Ship due to the fact that:

only one case is a real case of LWC while the other two

were not work related cases.

Additionally, to note also that the case of LWC did not

happen during the month of april, but was reported as

incident on 23/03/08 and duly analysed by Company,

as per

procedure.

For additional investigation/evidence, one copy of the

Deck Log Book (Giornale Nautico Parte Seconda), of the

Medical Log Book and of the ―Registro degli Infortuni‖

(namely Injuries record) relevant to the period will be

asked on board.

Shore - in receiving the monthly injury report - failed to

properly analyze the report and classified the three

cases as LWCs.

The above is showing:

lack of diligence and adequate control by ship side in

the preparation/management and issue of documents

related to injury/illness required by Company system,

Flag Administration and Insurance requirements;

lack of effective control by shore side done on the

mere principle of checking numbers and not in the

merit of checking consistency of the reported events;

ineffective cross checking between the involved Com-

pany departments

Corrective action

Official letter issued by the DPA has been immediately

divulged on board of all Company managed vessels to

The two major observations (those red written) were imme-

diately analyzed and the related corrective action arranged/

started to be implemented.

The Company plan was passed to Shell, as follows:

A) Hot Work Permit

Root cause analysis

Company procedure relevant to the Hot work permit au-

thorization to be given by the Company Safety Superinten-

dent upon examination of the vessel permit request and

RA can be and is properly followed when Saf. Supt. is at

Company head office. Due to the possible lack or insuffi-

cient Email/Internet connectivity, Saf Supt is not always

in a position to be able to unload/review Company docu-

ment attached to the vessel mail messages. In the specific

case therefore the Safety Supt. being out of the office on

his way to another company vessel replied to the hot work

permit request, confirm it , without having the possibility

to check the attachment, which were not actually sent by

the vessel command. Therefore besides the fact the ves-

sel command did not send to the Saf. Supt the required

supporting documentation to the hot work permit request,

the Company identifies the root cause of the system fail-

ure in the lack of proper office support when the Safety

Superintendent is away from the office.

“Will the PPE be suitable?”

Pagina 16

Page 16


explain the occurrence and reinforce the requested atten-

tion on Company procedures/circulars related to the inci-

dents/injuries on board reporting system and to the in-

volved chains of information.

Master who was on board of the analysed vessel during

the specific period (April 2008), responsible of the issue of

all the reports related to injuries on board will be con-

vened in Office for a specific meeting with Fleet Director

and SQE Mgr.

The related Company Working Instruction (WIN-SAF-03,

Marine Injury Reporting) will be revised by better explain

responsibilities and inserting instructions related to the

cross checking/exchange of information between the in-

volved Company departments.

The shore people involved in the process of analysis of the

documents received by the ships (and subsequent data

insertion into Company system) will be indoctrinated by

specific briefing.

The Marine Injury Report form will be modified by inserting

one part related to Company analysis and eventual com-

ments.

HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 1. Annual audit of recruiting agencies: we confirm we are

changing Internal procedures in order to have yearly au-

dits of Recruiting Agents carried by either Company inter-

nal or external auditors, as of 01.01.2009.

2. Evidence of Recruiting agencies audits action points clos-

ing: we agree with Your suggestion to provide objective

evidence of the closing of actions points evidenced dur-

ing the audit. These will be dealt with by the Crew Man-

ager by attaching proper evidence of the same in the au-

dit Company checklist.

3. Your suggestion well noted and we can confirm we will

develop a Company standard check list for Officers’ inter-

view that will be used internally by the Crew Manager in

case of senior officers’ interview and that will be handed

over to Recruiting agencies in case of other officers’ inter-

view.

Copy of the same will provide indication of the Company

expected level of competency required for each role, as

well, as standard reference.

4. We are working on the development of a Company crew

matrix to cover Premuda’s requirements for rank promo-

tions.

5. We noted Your suggestions anyhow believe it would be

difficult for our Company, due to the small number of offi-

cers under contract, to develop such procedure for newly

promoted Masters and Chief Engineers. On the other

hand we are currently considering eligible of promotion to

the same ranks only officers that have been in service

with our Company for long period and have acquired a

suitable number of satisfactory evaluation/eligibility re-

sults from different Company Masters and Chief Engi-

neers.

6. Crew Manager will modify the existing Company proce-

dure to cover minimum requirements for overlapping peri-

ods of newly promoted senior Officers.

7. Compliance with ILO 180 regulations: we are evaluating a

procedure aimed at getting vessels’ monthly non confor-

mance as per Your suggestion. As far as the use of a

dedicated Software to manage and check compliance of

ILO 180 rest requirements is concerned, we will evaluate

the possibility to introduce it in the Company systems.

8. Unannounced D&A test: we agree with Your suggestion

and will extend scope of current contract in order to in-

clude random test of ratings as well.

9. External training courses: we have resolved to rescind

recruiting contracts with Indian nationals due to the low

retention rate and other factors affecting their availability

to attend Company courses. We are also providing to

have Company training courses held at facilities located

at the same places of foreign recruiting agencies in order

to homogenize training levels of personnel.

10. We have passed Your recommendation to the Company

Human Resource Manager who will evaluate and take

the necessary actions to implement it.

OFFICE MANAGEMENT AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE

1. Company Management Members and OPS/Fleet Dept

Managers members of the EGA team have a Company

palmtop containing all data and contact numbers that

might be required to be contacted in case of emergency,

besides the EGA team members data. 2. The Company Managing Director and General Manager

are in charge of any decision in case of crisis that in-

cludes direct contact with MTI (appointed media manag-

ers ) and lawyers. Appointment of an on-site local Com-

pany representative might be decided by them according

to the need after consultation with the above persons/

organizations.

3. Crisis information is under the control of Company man-

agement through MTI, appointed media managers. Any

decision to make it available on Company website should

be evaluated by the Company Management, to whom we

have passed over Your useful suggestion. 4. Shore drill MOM: it will include evidence of corrective ac-

tions resulting from the EGA drills evaluation as well.

ON BOARD SAFETY MANAGEMENT AND CERTIFICATION

1. Classification of LTI in compliance with OCIMF guidelines:

we confirm OCIMF guidelines were wrongly interpreted

and by vessel commands in many cases and included


Page 17

also inherent medical conditions. This is being rectified by

a proper Company Circular.

2. Contractors’ safety performance on board of Company

vessels: the Fleet Director is preparing proper safety in-

structions to contractors working on board and Company

instruction relevant to the same that will include Com-

pany record and analysis of the relevant performances. 3.

Safety Performances targets: we agree the same require

proper evidence of targets and establishment of relevant

KPI. The same will be developed during the course of the

next months and posted as year 2009 targets.

4. Near Miss/Hazardous situation reporting: we agree Com-

pany vessel commands awareness about this target

should be implemented and we are evaluating proper

action to do it that will include but might not be limited to

an extended pre boarding Company briefing to cover ad-

ditional training on the same.

5. Daily work planning: inclusion of specific HSSE matters

and MOM in daily work planning meeting is being evalu-

ated.

6. Shore based investigation of incidents: this subject is al-

ready covered in the scope of the existing system proce-

dures, anyhow we will evaluate a possible review of the

same in order to better define the same, should the need

arise.

MAINTENANCE AND PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT

1. Risk assessment Dbase: creation of standard routine and

non routine works R.A. library is being evaluated. Cur-

rently Company is collecting R.A. reports issued by ves-

sels into a D-base from which the library could be devel-

oped later on.

2. Tank inspection schedules to be incorporated into Amos

Dbase: the Technical Department is evaluating

the change over of the tank inspection schedule and

reporting from forms based into Amos w. Minimum spare

parts stock keeping has already been planned by Com-

pany as a future extension of the Amos W D base.

3. Critical equipment listing: this issue has been already

pointed out during audits, at the moment Amos D soft-

ware flexibility is limited so that specific print outs could

not be carried out. Therefore the Company Tech Dept is

working on the current Amos D base. Possibility to modify

the Amos software is being evaluated only at the mo-

ment.

4. Company policy stating vessels’ minimum or standard

requirements: Your suggestion well noted thanks. We will

develop and issue a Company technical policy document

regarding existing and second hand tonnage to be

brought in Company fleet.

NAVIGATION PROCEDURES

1. Under Keel clearance policy: Company procedure is cur-

rently being reviewed to include provisions and evalua-

tions as per Your suggestion.

2. Under Keel clearance/squat factor: as per above, we

have taken note of Your suggestions and are working on

revision of the Company Bridge Management Manual in

order to provide officers with suitable guidelines to cover

the issues You have pointed out.

3. Port Plan: old issue was immediately replaced by the lat-

est May 2008 issue.

4. Electronic Charts System Management: proper dedicated

Company WIN and/or Bridge Team Management update

will be provided to state Company policy. This item was

already in the Company agenda.

5. Ships Maneuvering conditions in specific world areas:

The Company Safety/Navigation Supt has issued a dedi-

cated Company poster to deal with this matter.

CARGO CUSTODY AND TRANSFER PROCEDURES

1. Management of cargo containing H2S: Company Cargo

manual will be updated to include specific procedures for

dangerous cargoes, like those containing H2S, that are

already included in the system specific WIN, in order to

make reference more readily available.

2. Pressure and vacuum setting of COT pressure alarms: the

Technical Office has been already working on this issue

and will issue a dedicated technical instruction shortly.

3. Handling of cargo with low cloud/pour points: Company

cargo manual will be updated to include spe-

cific information relevant to proper handling of cargo

having the above characteristics.

4. Spare sets of portable gas detection equipment: this is-

sue is being considered even if Company procedures pro-

vide for proper number of equipment to be fitted to avoid

lack of the same when annual ashore calibration is due.

Lesson’s Bearing

Page 18

Exploring recruitment and retention

Attract Perceptions

Poor image of shipping

Criminalisation

Piracy

Pollution

Major passenger incidents

“Worse things happen at sea”

Required expectation

Responsible employer

Company branding

Happy and healthy lifestyle

Safe and secure working environment

Decent working and living conditions

Fair terms of employment

Quality of life

Health protection

Medical care

Family support

Contact with home

A job for life

Induct Perceptions

No interest in new recruits

No sense of Company brand


Welcome into the Company

Join the Team

You‟re a sailor now

Recruit Perceptions

Poor education

Lack of interest

Unregulated manning agencies

Required expectations

Good education

Motivation

Commitment

Ability

Self discipline

Aspirations

Professionalism and pride

Train Perceptions

Minimum training to comply with regulations

No ship/system specific training

No onboard continuation training

No career development training


Competency

Ship/system specific training

Company seminars

Career development

Continuous professional development

Retain Perceptions

Bad employer

Badly run ships

No support

No career development

No career prospects

Required expectations

Company branding

Happy and healthy lifestyle

Safe and secure working environment

Decent working and living conditions

Fair terms of employment

Quality of life

Health protection and medical care

Family support

Contact with home

Good career prospects

Career development

Pagina 19

Page 19

The Academic Lesson

An arrived ship and

the Notice of readiness

Traditionally, the performance of a voy-

age charterparty has been broken into

four segments: the approach voyage,

loading, carriage of the cargo and discharge.

The commencement of laytime is concerned with the

points at which the first segment ends and the second seg-

ment starts, and the third segment ends and the fourth

starts.

Laytime is the amount of time which the parties agree it

will take to load and discharge the contracted cargo.

If the time which a vessel takes to load and discharge

cargo is greater than laytime, Owners will seek compensa-

tion in the form of demurrage. If the time taken to load and

discharge is less than the laytime, then Owners may agree

to pay a bonus incentive to the Charterers, called despatch

(usual for the bulk market, not for the tanker).

Therefore, there are strong commercial reasons for the

parties to identify when laytime starts.

Laytime will start when the four following requirements are

met:

A) the vessel arrived at the agreed destination;

B) She is ready to load/discharge the cargo;

C) A valid Notice of Readiness has been tendered;

D) Any agreed preparation time has expired.

A) Arrival at the agreed destination

The agreed destination will vary depending on the type of

the charterparty. The common are:

Dock charterparty: the agreed destination is a dock. The

vessel is deemed to have arrived when she has passed

the dock gate. This type of Charter Party is very rare now.

Port charterparty: the most commonly used form. In most

cases a vessel will load at a berth, not at an anchorage.

If a vessel can proceed directly to a berth, then the arri-

val voyage will end when she is tied up at the berth. It will

not end when she is sailing through the port to the berth.

However, various factors can intervene to prevent the

vessel arriving at the berth (congestion, fog, bad

weather, etc.): in those circumstances, the vessel must

anchor. Even though she has not arrived at the berth,

she may have arrived at her agreed destination.

Berth Charterparty: when a berth is named as the place

for loading or discharge. That berth is the agreed desti-

nation. The vessel must be securely moored there to be

an arrived ship.

B) Readiness

The second requirement is that the vessel must be ready

to load or discharge all the cargo at that particular port,

when she reaches her agreed destination and/or tenders

her Notice of Readiness. Readiness can be defined as the

vessel being available for use by the Charterers. This can be

divided into three sub categories: the ship‟s holds, the

ship‟s equipment and legal documents (e.g free pratique,

custom clearance).

C) Notice of readiness

The Notice of Readiness is a statement made by the ship to

the Charterers or their agents it has arrived at the agreed

destination and is ready to load/discharge the cargo.

A Notice of Readiness:

May be written or oral;

Can be given to Charterers, their agent or anyone else the

charterers may nominate;

It is not necessary if the Charterers know the true facts of

the vessel‟s position and status;

Can be given at any time;

Must be a true statement at the time is given. If it is not, it

will be invalid.

Charterparties usually require written NOR to be given at

each loading and discharging port, to identified people,

sometimes within limited hours e.g. office hours.

If an invalid NOR is given, a new NOR must be given later,

when the statements as to the vessel having arrived and

being ready are true.

If the Charter party requires a NOR to be given within par-

ticular time limits, a NOR which would otherwise be valid,

but is given outside those time limits, will be deemed to be

given at the next first available time within those time limits.

The point here is that the statements made in the NOR were

true, so the statement was not invalid.

This will also apply to a NOR given before the laycan period.

D) Expiry of preparation time

It is common for charter parties to include express clauses

allowing a certain amount of time from the giving of (a valid)

Notice of Readiness to the commencement of laytime (this

is to allow the vessel to berth, open her hatches, etc. These

time periods rarely cause disputes as they are clearly de-

fined in the Charter Party.

Determining when laytime commences can be contentious

and will depend upon a careful consideration of the charter

party clauses in the light of the facts.

Often, the Courts favour a commercial approach over a le-

galistic approach, except for the validity of the Notice of

readiness which remains one of the important point in the

respect of the Charter party.

Selected by P. Linari

http://www.ship2shore.it/_media/images/rivista/articoli/zoom/2009/11/1511.jpg

Visit our web at:

Www.premuda.net

Premuda, founded in 1907, is one of the most expe-

experienced shipping Company with the mission of

transporting oil and dry-bulk cargoes.

The Company operates also in the FPSO market.

Premuda holds the most qualified certifications in

Safety, Environmental protection, Quality and Secu-

rity standards.

Premuda S.p.A

Via Fieschi 3/21

I—16121, Genova

Tel.: +39 010 5444.421

Fax: +39 010 5444.313

E-mail: [email protected]

There are no shortcuts to

safety, and everyone has to

contribute

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