India's maritime Policy Towards Gulf States

India’s Maritime Policy towards the Gulf States:

Planning, Projection and Prescription

Zakir Hussain

Research Fellow

Indian Council of World AffairsSapru House, New Delhi. 110 001

India

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Abstract: The peninsular outreach of India in the Indian Ocean assigns it a naturally predominant maritime status among the world powers. The incontestable fact, however, is that though the various coastal kingdoms constituting present-day India had legendary maritime prowess, independent India took an inordinately long time to evolve its hesitant maritime doctrine. In the positive perspective of history, this is merely a recounting of times bygone. Nevertheless, current policymakers can learn from this recounting. In the current scenario of India’s growing presence on the international scene, the country’s policymakers need to take advantage of every available opportunity to ensure its presence in the maritime field in the interests of a prosperous and secure world order.

This paper would aim at studying India’s maritime policy towards the Gulf states, which account high in India’s overall national interests, including security of energy, safe passage of trade and commerce, maintaining a safe and secure Sea Line of Communications (SLOCs), besides ensuring effective security to the nation.

The present paper is divided into three sub-parts. Part I deals with India’s Maritime Policy; Part II deals India’s Maritime Stakes and Challenges in the Western Indian Ocean Region; Part III Management of India’s maritime Interest.

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About the Author:

Dr. Zakir Hussain is Research Fellow at the Indian Council of World Affairs. His area of research is the political economy of West Asia and the Gulf. He has a rich experience on diverse issues of the Gulf region, including migration, energy, nuclear, maritime geo-strategy and India’s foreign relations with Gulf countries in the age of globalization and post-cold war. Before joining this institute, he was associated with International national Organisation, National Labour of Institute of India, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses and National Maritime Foundation. His book on India and Gulf: Emerging Dynamics is forthcoming. He can be accessed: [email protected]. Mobile: +91-7838608840. Currently he is working on Saudi Arabia and India in the 21st Century in the Gulf.

Disclaimer: Views are solely of the author. ICWA has nothing to do with this view.

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India’s Maritime Policy towards the Gulf States: Planning, Projection and Prescription

Dr. Zakir Hussian

Maritime policy essentially enunciates the protection, preservation, and augmentation of the

national interest accruing from a country’s territorial waters and in international waters. Since

time immemorial the oceans have played a crucial role in safeguarding and enhancing India’s

national interests.

Peninsular morphology has assigned to India a maritime status based on incontestable natural

foundations. It is a fact, however, that India’s hesitant maritime doctrine took a long time to

evolve, mature, and assert itself. For long decades the country suffered from virtual “sea

blindness”. The consequence was that it prospered less than it could have and compromised on

its territorial sovereignty. This in spite of the fact that Jawaharlal Nehru, the country’s first Prime

Minister, asserted:

We cannot afford to be weak at sea. History has shown that whoever controls the Indian Ocean has, in the first instance, India’s seaborne trade at her mercy and, in the second, India’s very independence itself. (Berlin, 2000)

Geographically, the southern Indian peninsula halves the country’s maritime domain into eastern

Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and western IOR. Eastern IOR encompasses the South China Sea

and beyond: India’s seaborne trade and traffic extends to the US in this direction; western IOR

reaches up to the Cape of Good Hope and east of Africa; while the lower south reaches

Antarctica. The western IOR is controlled by four entry points: Cape of Good Hope, Strait of

Hormuz, Strait of Bab el-Mandeb and Suez Canal; eastern IOR is safeguarded by three straits:

Malacca, Sunda and Lombok.

In India’s policy regarding IOR, both IOR halves have helped, even beyond IOR, including the

South China Sea, through which a great deal of Indian trade transits. However, on account of

vital stakes such as energy, trade, diaspora and major sea lines of communication (SLOCs),

western IOR plays a crucial role in India’s economic and political strategy regarding IOR.

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For India, in both advantages and security challenges, the two halves of IOR have different

connotations. China’s presence in the eastern region poses for India a geo-strategically tough

policy option. The Indian Maritime Doctrine of 2004 takes note of “attempts by China to

strategically encircle India” and comments adversely on “China’s vigorous exertions that tend to

spill over into our maritime zone”. While western IOR does not pose any big-power threat, the

emergence of strong asymmetrical forces in recent years, including non-state actors and their

attempts to make inimical use of the sea, pose serious challenges to the maritime interests of

India as well as other nations in the region. Statistically, only 20 per cent of the seaborne trade

that transits through the Indian Ocean belongs to the littoral states, the rest of it belonging to

exogenous countries.

Based on these realities, India’s maritime policy towards the Gulf, though not openly

pronounced, has some nuanced differences from its policy towards eastern IOR. The diverse sets

of stakes and challenges have convinced Indian policymakers to develop different sets of

maritime policy matrixes between the two IOR sectors.

Against this backdrop, this paper attempts to elucidate existing elements of India’s maritime

policy vis-à-vis the Gulf region and the required modifications in it. It aims at the following: (i)

explain and analyse the broad contours of India’s maritime policy; (ii) discuss India’s maritime

interest – both stakes and challenges – in the Gulf; (iii) discuss India’s efforts to manage its

maritime interests in the region, including policies and alliances; (iv) and based on this

discussion, come to certain conclusions.

I. India’s Maritime Doctrine

The Rig Veda of yore invokes the following prayer: Shano Varuna (“Be auspicious to us, O

Varuna”, Varuna being the Lord of the Sea). This is reflective of India’s long maritime tradition,

spanning more than four thousand years. The term “maritime” in general encompasses many

aspects that pertain to the sea, such as economic, political, military, scientific, technological, and

environmental. Maritime issues include seaborne trade and commerce, delimitation of

international seaward boundaries, deployment and employment of naval forces, and the

management of the living and non-living resources of the sea. The strategy of the Indian

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Maritime Doctrine is designed to “respond to a range of external threats and safeguard India’s

economic, political and security interests in the maritime domain, with a purposefully designed

set of maritime capabilities”. The doctrine has explained the concept of and principles underlying

India’s naval power. We notice that in recent years the Indian Navy’s maritime strategy has

focused on three crucial elements, namely, national interest, perceived threats and naval

capabilities.

India’s Maritime Doctrine has enumerated the role, missions and operational tasks of the Indian

Navy, underlining the likely scenario of the use of naval force:

Conflict with a state in India’s immediate neighbourhood or clash of interest with an extra-regional power

Operation in extended and/or strategic neighbourhood in response to a request for assistance from a friendly nation

Anti-terrorist operations, conducted multilaterally or unilaterally

Actions to fulfil international bilateral strategic partnership obligations

Ensuring good order at sea, which includes Low Intensity Maritime Operation (LIMO), to combat asymmetric warfare, poaching, piracy and trafficking in arms/drugs

Ensuring safety and security of international shipping lanes (ISLs) through the Indian Ocean

Actions to assist the Indian diaspora and Indian interests abroad

Peacekeeping operations, under the aegis of the United Nations, independently or as part of a multinational force.

Maritime Domain Awareness

The next focus of the Indian Maritime Doctrine is to clearly outline the maritime domain of the

country, so that the Indian Navy can perform its task smoothly and confidently, particularly in

the presence of neutral warships and mercantile marine during maritime warfare.

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Table 1 shows the basic features of the Indian maritime domains, total length of coastline, island

territories and maritime jurisdictions.

Table 1: Maritime statistics of India

Total Length of Coastline 7516.6 kmMainland 5422.6 kmLakshadweep Islands 132 kmA&N Islands 1962 kmIsland Territories 1197A&N Islands 572Lakshadweep Islands 27Off West Coast mainland 447Off East Coast mainland 151Maritime Jurisdiction UNCLOS Ratification dated 29 June 1995Territorial Waters 45,450 sq km/155,889 sq kmExtent of EEZ 587,600 sq km/2,013,410 sq kmDeep Sea Mining Area 150,000 sq km Pioneer Investor 1987

AntarcticaPosn-180 Cape Comorin 1080 kmDakshin Gangotri-1983Maitri-1989

Source: Freedom to Use Sea, 2007.

Area of Maritime Interest

The Indian Maritime Doctrine has reiterated its faith in the sixteenth-century Portuguese

Governor Alfonso de Albuquerque’s view, who once ruled in the IOR, that “the control of the

key chokepoints extending from the Horn of Africa to the Cape of Good Hope and the Malacca

Strait is essential to prevent any inimical power from making an entry into the Indian Ocean”.

Considering the vast expanse of the IOR, around 68.558 million sq km, and the present capacity

of the Indian Navy to manage the maritime affairs, Indian policymakers have bifurcated India’s

maritime interests into Primary and Secondary Areas. The former represents the immediate and

core interests of the country; the latter carries futuristic stakes, depending upon the future

expansion of the Indian naval power in the region and beyond. The Indian Maritime Doctrine

2009 enumerates the following areas of interest:

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The Primary Areas of maritime interest include:

The Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, which largely encompass India’s EEZ, island territories and their littoral reaches

The chokepoints leading to and from the Indian Ocean – principally the Strait of Malacca, the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb and the Cape of Good Hope

The Island countries

The Persian Gulf, which is the source of majority of the country’s oil supplies

The principal ISLs crossing the IOR

The Secondary Areas include:

The Southern IOR

The Red Sea

The South China Sea

The East Pacific Region

Figure 1 graphically shows the area of India’s maritime interests.

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Figure 1: Maritime Domain of India

Source: Berlin, 2006

II. India’s Maritime Stakes and Challenges in Western IOR

A: Stakes

India’s maritime stakes in western IOR are significantly high. India’s rapid economic growth,

soaring energy dependence, presence of vast diaspora, geo-political location as well as overall

peace, security and stability in the region are crucially linked to the state of affairs in this sector

of IOR. Over the years, these factors have required of India to evolve a consistent, stable and

broad-based maritime policy towards the Gulf States.

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Maritime Trade and Energy Security

India’s economic future depends on maritime trade; nearly 95 per cent of its trade by volume and

77 per cent by value is seaborne. Sustained high economic growth in the post-liberalization era

has not only increased India’s trade-GDP ratio from 9 per cent in 1990-91 to 19 per cent in 1998-

99 to 25 per cent to the present but also enhanced its share in global trade from 0.5 per cent to

1.8 per cent. The Indian economy has become integrated with the major economies of the world;

consequently, its trade both by volume as well as value has grown rapidly. For instance, in 1998-

99 India’s total foreign trade was of US$ 75.52 billion which increased to US$ 467.12 billion in

2009-10. As a result the capacity of Indian ports to handle foreign trade has also grown

simultaneously; the volume of traffic handled by Indian ports grew from 244.15 million tonnes

(MT) in 1998-99 to 849.9 MT in 2009-10. According to the Maritime Agenda 2010–2020, over

the last ten years (1998/99-2008/09) the Indian seaborne trade has been growing at a compound

average growth rate (CAGR) of 11.38 per cent; before the economic crisis, it was 12.25. At

CAGR of 12.25 per cent, the Maritime Report estimated that in absolute terms, the Indian

seaborne trade is expected to grow from the current 598.7 MT to 2,134 MT by 2020, i.e. about

3.56 times the current trade, leading to an increase in India’s share in global seaborne trade from

the current 3.66 per cent to 9.3 per cent by 2020. Table 2 shows the past and projected Indian

seaborne EXIM trade.

Table 2. India’s past and projected seaborne EXIM Trade, 1998/99–2008/9Year 1998-

991999-

002000-

12001-

22002-

32003-

42004-

52005-

62006-

72007-

82008-

92019-

20Million Tonnes 203.7 224.6 244.3 273 280.3 345.7 400.6 447.1 497.8 576.4 598.7 2134

Source: Maritime Agenda 2010–2020.

The rise in India’s seaborne trade is attributed more to the countries in western IOR. The

intensity is more towards the Gulf-OPEC and African countries. The Gulf Cooperation Council

(GCC) has emerged as the second-largest trading hub of India. India’s non-oil trade with some of

the GCC countries such as the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Iran has been consistently going up. In

2009 the UAE emerged as India’s leading non-oil trading partner, with a total trade of more than

US$45 billion, followed by Saudi Arabia as the fourth-largest non-oil trading partner (around

$23 billion).

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Several factors have contributed to the quantum jump in Indo-Gulf bilateral trade. A prominent

factor is policy transformation of both sides. India considers the Gulf region as its “extended

neighbourhood”. Similar to the 1990s’ “Look East Policy”, in 2005 the Indian government

announced a “Look West Policy”. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stated:

The Gulf region, like South-East and South Asia, is part of our natural economic hinterland. We must pursue closer economic relations with all our neighbours in our wider Asian neighbourhood. India has successfully pursued a “Look East” policy to come closer to the countries of South East Asia. We must come closer to our western neighbours in the Gulf.1

He directed the Commerce and External Affairs Ministries to rapidly conclude the Free Trade

Agreement (FTA) negotiation with the GCC. He also emphasized the need to promote bilateral

negotiations with all individual member countries of the GCC for a Comprehensive Economic

Cooperation Agreement (CECA) covering the services and investment sectors.

It is expected that once the FTA is signed, India-GCC trade between will increase by about three

and a half times the current size.

Similarly, the Gulf countries have realized the growing potential of the Indian economy and

technological prowess. Under its Look East Policy, the GCC Chamber of Trade and Commerce

has also shown an interest in economically targeting large and populous countries like China,

India and Malaysia in Asia.

This has considerably increased the prospects of maritime interactions between India and the

Gulf countries. During his recent visit to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the Indian Prime Minister has

also opened the prospects of better trade and commercial relations with African countries.

Table 3 shows the rising volume of trade between India and the West Asia and North Africa

(WANA) region.

Table 3: WANA share in Indian trade during 1998/99–2009/10

1 PM Launches ‘Look West’ Policy to Boost Cooperation with Gulf”, Press release, Prime Minister’sOffice, July 27, 2005. Available at http://pmindia.nic.in/prelease/pcontent.asp?id=278. Accessed 21.11.2011.

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(in US$ Million) Year 1998-99 1999-00 2000-1 2001-2 2002-3 2003-4Total Indian Trade 75,607.43 86,560.55 95,096.74 95,240.00 114,131.57 141,991.66

WANA Share (%) 15.8 16.4 9.1 9.4 9.7 10.6

Year 2004-5 2005-6 2006-7 2007-8 2008-9 2009-10Total Indian Trade 195,053.37 252,256.26 312,149.29 414,786.19 488,991.67 467,124.31

WANA Share (%) 12.2 10.9 23.8 24.7 27.0 25.9

Source: Ministry of Trade and Commerce, India, accessed 17.08.2011.

Energy Security

A factor that can seriously compromise India’s economic growth, currently at 9 per cent, is

interruption in hydrocarbons supply from the Persian Gulf countries. Currently, 65 per cent of

India’s oil import comes from the Gulf region; this is expected to grow to 85 per cent of the total

95 per cent import by 2030. Nirupama Rao, who was then Foreign Secretary, said that by 2020

India would be consuming around 245 MT of oil, which would be third in the world and second

in Asia. Any blockade either at chokepoints – Strait of Hormuz, Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb and at

the Suez Canal; or disruption in SLOCs – in the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea and the Red Sea

– would not only severely threaten India’s energy security but also critically affect its economy,

polity and society. Other countries that critically depend upon the Middle East oil, such as China,

Japan, European countries and the US, would also encounter a serious energy crisis. Therefore,

security of energy at sea is a crucial agenda of India’s maritime policy and maritime interest. To

India, securing energy supply is more important than for any other country in the world.

According to Rao (2000),

India is far more dependent than the US or even the former Western Europe on import of crude oil from West Asia. Whereas 90 per cent of India’s total imports of oil were sourced from the Persian Gulf, the equivalent figure for the US and Japan were 19 per cent and 74 per cent.

In addition, the bulk of India’s domestic oil production is offshore; these offshore installations

also need effective protection. Besides building huge offshore oil establishment, ONGC, GAIL

(Gas Indian Limited) and other bodies have invested massively in on land infrastructures,

including pipelines, LNG terminals etc. As noted by Freedom to Use Seas (2007):

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“Today, the offshore infrastructure of ONGC includes over 25 Process Platforms and more than 125 Well Platforms. In addition, over 3000 km pipeline has been laid on the seabed for the flow of oil and gas from the process platforms to onshore terminals at Hazira and Uran. The offshore regions where productions are taking place cover a total area in excess of 17,000 sq nm and it extends more that 100 nm into the EEZ. Offshore fields are, therefore, national assets of vital economic importance and any breakdown in either production of oil or gas or deviation in planned construction and expansion of the means of production is likely to adversely affect the long term strategic planning of the national economy…Since there are no physical barriers at sea, our offshore infrastructure is extremely vulnerable to disruptive attacks. It is obvious there is a need for constant surveillance and protection of these assets.”2

Since 1990, India has also ventured out to acquire oil acreages abroad. India’s OVL (ONGC

Videsh Limited) has been actively engaged in a dozen foreign oilfields; except Sakhalin, Russia,

its bulk of oil is transported through three most risky chokepoints: the Cape of Good Hope and

the Straits of Hormuz and Bab-el-Mandeb.

Table 4: India’s Domestic Oil Production and Consumption, 1970-/71-2009/10

(000’ tonnes)

Year 1970-71

1979-80

1989-90

1999-00 2001-2 2003-4 2004-5 2005-6 2006-7 2007-8 2008-9 2009-10

Domestic Production 6,822 11,766 34,087 31,949 32,032 33,498 33,498 32,190 33,988 34,118 33,506 33,691

Domestic Consumption

18,505 27,887 53,577 89,754 1,10,738 1,23,807 1,29,355 1,22,353 1,31,669 1,40,697 1,45,312 1,49,803

Source: Petroleum Statistics, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, (relevant issues)

2 Freedom to Use the Seas: India’s Maritime Military Strategy, http://indiannavy.nic.in/maritime_strat.pdf

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Figure 2: Domestic Production and Consumption of Crude Oil in India, 1970/71-2009/10 (in 000 Tonnes)Source: based on Table 4.

Figures 3 and 4 show the oil demand, domestic production and total import as well as major

destinations of crude oil imports.

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Fig 4: Import Destinations

Fig 3: Demand Projection & Domestic Production

Figures 3 and 4: Projection of oil demand, domestic production and percentage of import from different regions and countries, 2001/2–2024/25.Source: Indian Hydrocarbons Vision (IHV) 2025 and data from the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas.

However, India has also emerged as a significant supplier of refined petroleum products to most

of the countries like Iran, Oman. Its export of these products increased from 23.4 MMT in 2005-

06 to 144.03 MMT in 2009-10. The importing countries on western IOR are primarily Iran,

Oman, Bahrain and some Western countries. This also demands security of transportation.

Natural Gas

If the twentieth century was the century of oil, the twenty-first, it is said, belongs to natural gas.

Natural gas is a clean and green source of energy; it is 40 per cent less polluting, relatively

cheap, geographically more evenly distributed, as well as less susceptible to price fluctuation

than oil. Consequently, under its energy diversification programme, the Indian government has

also promoted the use of natural gas. Consumption of natural gas in India has grown rapidly in

recent decades. Under the government’s Vision Document, by 2020 the authorities have targeted

to increase the share of gas in the total energy mix from the present 9 per cent to 15 per cent. To

meet its demand, India has signed one of the biggest long-term LNG contracts with Qatar. Over a

period of twenty-five years, Qatar would supply approximately 24 MT of LNG, in three phases.

Bedsides Qatar, Iran and Oman have been India’s LNG suppliers from the Gulf countries. On

account of political logjam in the IPI (Iran-Pakistan-India Gas Pipeline) and TAPI

(Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) gas pipelines on one hand and growing gas

consumption in India on the other, LNG import will increase in a big way. (Table 5) Most of the

LNG carriers will ferry through the Western IOR, hence, they need effective protection at sea.

Table 5 shows the past and projected demand for natural gas in India.

Table 5: India’s Projected Natural Gas Demand,2004/5-2024/25

Base Year: 1997-(59 MSCMD)

Year 2004-05 2009-10 2014-15 2019-20 2024-25

Gas Demand 195 277 329 358 391

Source: Indian Hydrocarbons Vision (IHV) 2025.

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The Diaspora

Another important dimension of India’s maritime policy regarding the Gulf countries has been

shaped by the presence of the vast Indian diaspora community in the region. Approximately 5

million Indian expatriates are present in different Gulf countries, the majority being in the six

GCC countries, namely Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. (Table 6) In

any emergency situation, such as occurred in the Gulf crisis 1990, the Lebanon war (2006) and

the recent Libyan crisis, the Indian Navy has been called upon to evacuate the Indian expatriates

at short notice. This possibility has been enunciated in the Indian Maritime Doctrine of 2009 as

“action to assist the Indian diaspora and the Indian interests abroad”. During the Lebanon crisis,

the Indian Navy deployed two ships to evacuate Indian workers from the region; workers from

Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal were also taken on board. In the recent Libyan crisis the Indian

Navy was assigned the task of evacuating 17,000 Indians from Libya. Three ships were engaged

in the task and within a fortnight the mission was accomplished.

Table 6 shows the share of GCC countries in total clearance of migration during 1975-2010.

Table 6: Percentage Share of Migration Clearance to the GCC States in Total

Year 1975 1979 1981 1990 1995 2000 2001 2005 2010Total Clearances

2,66,555 5,01,000 5,94,500 1,43,565 4,15,334 2,43,182 2,78,664 5,48,853 6,41,356

GCC Share (%) 96.7 86.5 88.3 95.6 92.6 72.4 83.5 82.8 95.2

Source: Office of Protector General of Emigrants, Govt. of India & Annual Report,2010-11, Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, GOI. .

Economically, the Gulf diaspora community has been consistently contributing to the Indian

economy through constant flow of remittances. Currently, India receives approximately $53

billion remittances; approximately, 40 per cent is coming from the Gulf region.

B: Challenges

The challenges to India’s maritime interests in western IOR are myriad. Although unlike the

eastern sector, western IOR is not intensely subjected to international rivalry and encirclements,

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in recent years the rise and presence of strong asymmetrical forces, including non-state actors,

and their alliance with forces that contemplate inimical use of the sea have posed serious

challenges to Indian maritime interests. Re-emergence of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and

adjoining regions, the possibility of terror-piracy (alliance between pirates and terrorist groups at

sea), geopolitical instability in the energy-rich nations leading to possible blockade of

chokepoints, instability at sea as well as protection of SLOCs and ISLs and the misuse of sea for

illegal activities like narco-terrorism, gunrunning, human trafficking, etc., are some of the major

challenges India and other nations might confront in the region.

Piracy in the Gulf of Aden

At the onset of the current century, piracy resurfaced in the Gulf of Aden and its suburban

region. Somali pirates made global headlines for the first time on 5 November 2005, when they

tried to hijack the US cruise-liner Seaborne Spirit approximately 75 nautical miles off the coast

of Somalia. Their second, and successful, attack was on an Indian dhow Bhakti Sagar in

February 2006. Since then these pirates have stepped up their adventurism. In 2006, only 22

incidents of piracy in the Gulf of Aden were reported; 51 in 2007; 111 in 2008; 217 in 2009 and

2010; and by mid- 2011, 117 cases were reported.

Figure 5 shows the rising tide of piracy in the Gulf of Aden. It also shows the shifting destination

of piracy from the South-East Asian nations to the Gulf of Aden and adjoining region.

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Figure 5: Incidents of piracy worldwide and the Gulf of Aden, 2000–2011Source: International Maritime Bureau Reports (various).

The increasing menace of piracy has produced cascading effects both on security at sea as well

as increasing the economic cost of seaborne transportation, including trade and commerce. The

pirates have been raising their ransom demands steeply, from an average of $100,000–200,000 in

2005 to approximately $5.4 million in 2009. The highest ransom was paid to secure the release

of Samho Dream, a South Korean oil tanker, around $9.5 million. The pirates have been using

the ransom money to modernize their attacking equipment and extended their area of operation:

they even reached Lakshadweep in Indian territorial waters.

Several insurance companies have declared the Gulf of Aden and its suburban area as war-

affected region and raised their premiums. Since 2008 the premium charges on ships transiting

the Gulf of Aden have increased by 300 per cent, from $500 per ship per voyage to $150,000 per

ship per voyage in 2010. Annually, 24,000 ships transit the Gulf of Aden; with increased

premium rates the insurance companies are making a profit of approximately $3 to $4 billion 18

annually, which is a net loss to maritime trade passing through the Gulf of Aden. Big ships are

now avoiding the area and choosing the Cape of Good Hope as an alternative sailing route,

suffering in the process additional costs of oil consumption and delays. For instance, it entails an

additional $100,000–500,000 per voyage and 15–17 days of supplementary sailing time for the

longer route.

About 10 per cent of the crew involved in maritime trade are Indians. Consequently, Indian

crews suffer considerably from the ravages of piracy. Mostly, owners of merchant ships do not

care greatly for the safety of their crew: only the parent country comes to their rescue. Therefore,

Indian authorities are under great pressure to ensure the safety and security of Indian personnel

staffing these ships.

Figure 6 shows the expanding area of piracy in the Indian Ocean.

Figure 6: Expanding Threat Areas of the Pirates in the Gulf of Aden

Source: Upadayay, 2011.

SLOCs and Chokepoints

SLOCs and ISLs

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IOR connects the Western world like Europe and Africa with the eastern Pacific and Atlantic

Ocean. Almost 100,000 ships transit the IOR annually, and 24,000 transit though the Gulf of

Aden. These ships ferry two-thirds of global oil, half of the maritime trade, and one-third of

containerized cargo. As much as 95 per cent of India’s foreign trade is seaborne. Being the sixth-

or seventh-largest naval power in the world and foremost in the region, India has two major

responsibilities in IOR: one, to protect and safeguard the SLOCs and ISLs for legal maritime

activity; second, to prevent inimical use of the seas.

Figure 7 provides a glimpse of the importance of the Indian Ocean.

Figure 7: Major Maritime Arteries of the Indian Ocean

Source: Upadayay,2011.

Chokepoints

Peninsular India is equidistantly placed between the Straits of Malacca and Hormuz. In western

IOR four chokepoints are seriously considered under India’s maritime security and need special

policy attention. These chokepoints are not only crucial to energy security, but they are also 20

important to India’s trade and communication links beyond the Indian Ocean. For instance, the

Cape of Good Hope and Bab-el-Mandeb are important for India’s trade and commence, besides

the security of energy: they allow India to take its ships beyond Africa. The Suez allows transit

to the European markets.

The Strait of Hormuz is a chokepoint to India’s energy supplies. According to the estimates of

the Energy Information Administration (EIA), the strait recorded a transit volume of 15.4 million

barrels of oil per day in 1998, which is expected to cross around 30 per cent of the total trade in

the world. In the event that this strait is closed, Gulf supplies to east of Hormuz will be virtually

cut off altogether; it will also affect the West considerably. (Table 7)

Table 7 provides major energy choke points on the western IOR

Table 7: Major Choke Points on the Western IOR and their Energy Significance

No. Choke Points Capacity, mm b/d

% of total

world demand

Export destination Location, comments

1 Strait ofHormuz 16.5-17.0 20% Europe,

US, AsiaNarrow waterway between the Gulf of Oman in the southeast and the Persian Gulf in the Southeast

2 Strait ofMalacca 15.0 18% Asia Lies between & Singapore & connects the Indian

Ocean with the South China & the Pacific Ocean

3Abqaiq processing facility

6.8 8% Europe, US, Asia

The town, northeast of some of the largest Saudi oilfields (including the large Ghawar filed), houses the largest oil processing plant in the world & handles around 2/3s of the entire oil production of Saudi Arabia.

4 Suez Canal & Sumed pipeline 4.5 5% Europe, US The Suez Canal located in Egypt connects the Red Sea

& Gulf of Suez with the Mediterranean Sea.

5 Bab-el-Mandeb 3.3 4% Europe, US, Asia

Connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden & the Arabian Sea

Mina al-Ahmadi terminal

2.0 2% Europe, US, Asia

An oil part is north of Ash Shuaiba, & handles most of Kuwait’s petroleum products

6 Al Basrah Oil Terminal Iraq 1.5 2% Europe,

US, Asia

The Al Basrah Oil Terminal (ABOT) is an offshore crude oil marine loading terminal located off the south-eastern coast of Iraq in the Northern Persian Gulf. According to the US Embassy in India in Iraq. ABOT is Iraq’s primary oil terminal & accounts for 97%bof Iraq’s oil exports into world markets.

Source: Global Equity Research, Energy and Power, Lehman Brothers, January 18, 2006.

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Figure 5 shows the significance of the three chokepoints in energy security. It is noted that 19.4

per cent of the global oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz, followed by Suez (5.3 per cent}

and Bab-el-Mandeb (3.9 per cent).

Figure 7: Key Oil Transit Points in the Middle East and Share of Global Demand in 2006 Source: Cummins (2008), Wall Street Journal.

Maritime Terrorism and Terror-Piracy

There has been evidence of alliance between the Somali pirates and terror outfits. Al-Shabab of

Somalia and al-Qaeda of Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), an affiliate of al-Qaeda in Arab countries,

have tried to sabotage the safety and security of the Gulf waters. In 1998 USS Cole and in 2000

the French tanker MV Limburg were attacked and destroyed by al-Qaeda. In October 2010 two

parcel bombs via UPS and FedEx were dispatched from Yemen; the packages were intercepted

in Dubai and England. AQAP claimed responsibility for the parcel bombs. Several other

unsuccessful attempts on oil takers have also been made. For instance, in July 2010 a Japanese

oil tanker, MV M. Star, was reported to have been hit by an unidentified object whilst passing

the Strait of Hormuz.

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Two weak and failing coastal states, Yemen and Somalia, have produced an atmosphere

conducive to piracy and terrorism. It is said that pressure from the so-called global war on terror

led by the United States, focusing on land and aviation security, could force Al Qaida to move to

the seas: pirates for monetary incentive may forge alliances with its offshoots.

Figure 8: Possible Terro-Piracy Hot Spots in Indian Ocean.

Source: Upadayay,2011.

Gwadar: India’s Tight Spot

Developments regarding Gwadar are a new perceived challenge to India’s maritime interest on

the west coast. Gwadar is located at the coastal tip of Baluchistan in Pakistan, few hundred

nautical miles away from India’s nearest port of Kutch, but China’s involvement in the project

has been seen as a part of China’s policy of encircling India to the regional confines of South

Asia. The issue has been seriously discussed ever since Booze and Hamilton, a private consultant

agency, produced a report termed String of Pearls, mentioning a conscious Chinese policy of 23

building a series of ports in the littoral states, from the South China Sea to western IOR, to

encircle India in both the Pacific and Indian Oceans (Figure 9). Gwadar forms part of the

strategy of checking India in western IOR. With this development, China could also avoid

passing through the main IOR during crises and access the seas via Tibet. China is also

significantly dependent upon energy supplies from the Gulf, and has tried to develop alternative

routes to ensure uninterrupted energy supply from the region.

Figure 8: Location of Gwadar and Indian Port.Source: Jaffrelot, 2011.

Figure 9 shows the series of ports built by China in the Indian Ocean, which India suspects as an

encirclement policy of India by China in the Indian Ocean.

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Figure 9: Ports under String of Pearls

Source: http://www.marinebuzz.com/marinebuzzuploads/WeekendViewUpdatedChineseStringofPearls_AC3/Chinese_string_of_pearls.jpg

III. India’s Management of its Maritime Interests

In recent decades India has taken four broad steps to safeguard, secure and enhance its maritime

interests.

First, it has launched a massive modernization and expansion programme of its navy. The

Defence Ministry has raised the budget of the navy by 79.2 per cent between 2003-4 and 2010-

11, from approximately Rs. 11,980 crore to 21,467.51 crore.

Second, the Indian Navy has been equipped with modern weapons, equipment and nimble

platforms, both large and small. It has acquired a nuclear submarine, Arihant, purchased aircraft

carrier Gorshkov renamed Vikramaditya, and inducted several missiles and anti-submarine

missiles in its armoury.

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Third, the Indian Navy is conducting joint naval exercises with a number of countries. These

included Ex. Malabar (with the US and Japan), Ex. Indra with Russia, France, Ex. Varuna, UK,

Ex. Konkan with France, and two exercises with China, one at Belgaun and second in Yunan

Province. Since 1995, India has also started a multilateral naval meeting under Milan.

Approximately 16 to 13 countries participate in this annual exercise, including some of the Gulf

countries.

Fourth, India has taken an active role in developing regional mechanisms to protect the maritime

interests of IOR littoral states. Among the regional cooperative forums that it has promoted are

he Indian Ocean Rim–Association for Regional Cooperation (AIR-IOR) and the Indian Ocean

Nations Symposium (IONS). The former established in 1995 consists of 17 member states; it has

three major divisions: (i) Working Group on Trade and Investment (WGTI); (ii) Indian Ocean

Rim Business Forum (IORBF); and, (iii) Indian Ocean Rim Academic Group (IORAG). Its main

objectives are to protect the interests of the IOR littoral states. The IONS, established in 2008,

has 32 members, including Oman, Iran, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait; its charter defines

IONS as a:

“voluntary initiative that seeks to increase maritime co-operation among navies of the littoral states of the Indian Ocean Region by providing an open and inclusive forum for discussion of regionally relevant maritime issues and, in the process, endeavours to generate a flow of information between naval professionals that would lead to common understanding and possibly agreements on the way ahead.” 3

In combating piracy the Indian Navy has avoided joining any patrolling groups but has been

actively engaged in patrolling the Gulf of Aden. The Indian Navy sent its first squad to the

region in 2008. India has also raised the legal issue of piracy and expressed its preference to

work under the UN regime than at the behest of any individual country or group. Currently

several major world navies are operating in the Gulf of Aden: US, NATO and European and

independent navies, including those of India, China, Malaysia and Russia. India’s representative

to the UN suggested a five-point programme to tackle piracy under a guided system, ranging

from active patrol at sea to legal arrangements, including codification of piracy laws. Some

3 Indian Ocean Naval Symposium: http://indiannavy.nic.in/ion.htm. Accessed 12.11.201126

agreements on the Russian suggestion to establish an International Court for Piracy have also

been considered as a compatible option.

IV. Conclusion

During the cold war, India’s IOR policy was limited to seeking to ensure that the IOR remained a

“zone of peace”. In the changed international scenario it becomes essential for India, to

safeguard its maritime interests, to actively engage with all those whose interests are at stake in

this domain. This involves developing close cooperation with several countries that have

considerable naval ability or potential. Among the Gulf states, India has the best relations with

Oman: while the scope for improving these relations still remains wide open, India needs to

consider seriously broadening its relations with other oil-exporting countries in terms of its

maritime horizon. Some of the states requiring focused attention in the different regions of

western IOR are Saudi Arabia, Iran, Israel, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya, Seychelles,

Madagascar, and Mauritius. Developing relations with Yemen and Egypt is also required for

smooth transit in the Red Sea and Suez Canal. India also needs to develop a joint policy to

protect chokepoints like the Straits of Hormuz and Bab-el-Mandeb.

Additional policy measures would entail developing naval alliances with France and the US.

India should also provide training and exercise facilities to the Gulf countries. A measure of

universal benefit could be suggesting to the GCC to own an aircraft carrier operating under US

security protection and supported by Indian naval staff.

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