Indian philosophy of language

7/26/2019 Indian philosophy of language

1/16

Analysis of Meaning in the Indian Philosophy of Language

Author(s): Siddheshwar Varma

Source: The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, No. 1 (Jan.,

1925), pp. 21-35

Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25220633

Accessed: 17-06-2016 17:18 UTC

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at

http://about.jstor.org/terms

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted

digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about

JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Cambridge University Press, Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Irelandarecollaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of the Royal AsiaticSociety of Great Britain and Ireland

This content downloaded from 128.103.149.52 on Fri, 17 Jun 2016 17:18:17 UTCAll use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms


2/16

Analysis of Meaning in the Indian

Philosophy of Language

BY SIDDHESHWAR VA11MA, M.A., Shastri, Prince of Wales College,

Jammu (Kashmir).

I. Meaning as a Relation

"1%/TEANING has been defined by the majority of ancient

Indian writers on the philosophy of language in terms

of a relation. Thus, the great grammarian Nage^a Bhatta x

defines meaning as a particular relation between the word

and the object denoted. This relation is a power,2 which

exists in the object as signifiability, and in the word as

significativeness. It is only by the cognition of this relation

that the presentation of objects by means of words is possible.

The existence of this relation has been traced to the following

sources ?

(1) The direct instruction of trustworthy authority. As

Verikata explains 3 it, the child thus cognizes the relation

between the word and the object denoted:?When the

child's seniors, directly pointing out with the finger various

persons and things, say to the child, " This is your uncle/'

" That is the moon/' etc., it is repeatedly instructed in the

1 Mailjiisa, p. 28; cf. Ganges*n, Tattva-cintamani (iv, ii, p? G27) ;

Vij liana Bhiksu on Said'hya Sutra, v, 37.

2 According to the grammarians Bhaftoji Diksita and Kaunda Bhatta

denotative power resides exclusively in words (Sabda-kaustubha, p. 32 ;

Briliad-Vaiyakarana-Bhusana, p. 243). The Vedanta, and in a certain

sense the Sankhya, however, maintain that this power resides in objects

also. Thus the Vedanta assigns the " expressedness " of the jar to the

cid-abhasa " reflected consciousness" (Pancada&i, chap, viii, 4-15). Cf;

Benfey on Plato's Cratylus (pp. 10-11). The existence or absence of this

cognitive power in objects is more or less an epistemological question. But

from the linguistic point of view mere words cannot serve as the cause of

verbal cognition ; it is the relation between the word and the object which is

the most potent factor of that cognition (Gangesa, Tattva'Cintamani,

iv, ii, p. 540). Cf. De Saussure, Cours de Linguistique Gdnirale, p. 148 ;

Otto Jespersen, Language, p. 113.

3 Nyaya-parisuddhi, p. 395.



3/16

22 ANALYSIS OF MEANING IN THE

knowledge of various objects by means of various words.

The relation is definitely cognized by the child when it finds

that it has to understand only particular objects from par

ticular words

(2) Syntactical connexion with words already known.

As Aniruddha * points out, from the sentence, " The bird is

eating the mango," the child first understands that the object

signified is that which is eating the mango, and then cognizes

the relation of that object to the word " bird ".

(3) The movements of seniors. When a senior employer

orders a senior employee with the words " Bring a jar ", and

when the employee brings the jar, the child standing by first

comprehends that the act of bringing a jar is a sequence of the

sentence " bring a jar ". Then on another occasion the same

child hears the sentence " take away the jar " and perceives

the consequent act, and thus finding that a variety of acts

is connected with the common factor " the jar", it takes

this common factor and thus cognizes the relation of the word

" jar " to the object jar. VisVanatha 2 calls it a process of

assimilation and elimination (dvdpodvdpa).

NageiSa Bhatta3 points out in this connexion that the

child in this case infers from the action of the senior employee

that the latter has a cognition of the word "jar". So the

word " jar " is understood to be the cause of the cognition.

But causality is inconceivable without a relationship ; a

relation between the word and the object denoted must

therefore be recognized.4

(4) Ordinary usage in the genitive case also indicates the

relation between the word and the object denoted. Thus we

say, " This js the meaning of this word/' " this word is the

signifiant of this object." But for a relationship between the

two we could not speak of them in this way.6

1 Sankhya-vrilti, p. 108.

2 Nyaya-siddhanta-muktavali (Benares, iv, p. 15).

3 Manjusa (p. 23). Cf. Kumarila, Sloka-varltika, sutra 5, verses 140-3.

4 Cf. Bhartrhari, Vakya-padtya, iii, 3, 37.

6 Vakya-padtya, iii, 3, 3; Vatsyaynna on Nydya-Sutra, ii, 1, 50.



4/16

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 23

(5) If a relation between the word and the object denoted

be not accepted, the restriction as to the denotability of

particular words will be invalid. There will be no reason,

then, for instance, why the word " jar " should denote only

the object "jar " and not the object " cloth ". It is cognition

of this restriction by which we are led to accept a relation

between the word and the object denoted.1

(6) Ganges^ 2 thus establishes the duality of the factors

of verbal cognition:?A mere word cannot be the cause of

cognition. For an object may be cognized even without the

knowledge of its name, while sometimes the object denoted

is not cognized despite the knowledge of the word. It is

only when cognized as member of a relation that the word

can serve as a cognitive agent.

Objections to the conception of meaning as a relation

I. To this conception of meaning as a relation it is objected

that words do not co-exist with objects, words exist even in

the absence of objects. Now, if A exists, or can exist, even

in the absence of B, A cannot be said to be related to B.

And it is obvious that words often exist even before the

creation, or after the destruction, of objects.3

II. The word can give us only an abstract idea of innu

merable individual objects denoted by it. The word being

thus a mere abstraction, it would be irrelevant to assume

that the word " cow " is related to the object " cow ".4

III. In order that there may be a relationship between

the word and the object denoted, there should exist some

contact between them. But this contact between them is

impossible; for the word and the object denoted do not exist

in the same place, just as the Vindhya and the Himalayas

do not exist in the same place.6 The relation of conjunction

1 Nyaya-Sutra, ii, 1, 53. 2 Tattva-cintamani, iv, ii, p. 540.

3 Vide the brilliant Jain work, the Prameya-kamala-mdrtanda (p. 124).

Cf. VaUesika-Sutra, vii, 2, 17.

4 Prameya-kamala-martanda, p. 128.

5 Sloka-vdrttika, Sutra 5, Section Sambandhaksepa, 6-7.



5/16


is therefore not possible in the case before us. Nor is the

relation of inherence possible in this case. When we use such

expressions as " a one-eyed man ", we have a cognition of

inherence from the " one-eye " ; but we cannot similarly

speak of the object jar as having the word " jar " : thus the

expression " jar-worded jar " would be an absurdity.1

IV. If words denote objects, verbal cognition should be as

distinct as sensuous perception.2 If A is not apprehended by

the cognition of B, A cannot be called an object cognized

through B, i.e. A cannot be denoted by B. For instance, the

eye can reveal only the form, but not the smell of a flower.

We can then say that the eye does not " denote " smell. The

real signifiant of the object " burning " is not the word

" burning ", but the burning sensation. If the word were also

a similar signifiant, the utterance of the word " fire " should

burn the mouth.3

In refutation of the above objections the following argu

ments have been advanced by those who advocate the

definition of meaning as a relation :?

(1) As regards the objection that words used in the present

can have no relation with objects not existing in the present,

Vacaspati MiSra explains that a word denotes the universal,

including individuals. Now, though the universal is constant

and imperishable, yet, as it includes multitudes of individuals

variously dispersed in time and space, it thereby becomes

common to being and non-being.4 Mimamsakas of Kumarila's

school explain it on the ground that, as reality has aspects or

divisions, a tree is cognized from the word " tree ", although

we may not be able to determine its existence or non-existence

in the present from the mere word.5

(2) The word is not a mere abstraction; for practicality

is the criterion of meaning. For the word leads the hearer

1 Vaitesika-Sutra, vii, 2, 14.

2 Prameya-kamalamartanda, pp. 128-30.

3 Cf. Sloka-vdrttika (ibid.), verse 8.

4 Nyaya-varttika-tdtparya-pikd, p. 341.

6 Apoha-siddhi, p. 9.



6/16


either to cognize an object in the external world, or to perform

a particular action, or movement towards a particular place.1'

Particular words lead us only to particular practical actions ;

but if words denoted mere ideas, there would be no restriction

on the practical actions connected therewith, and thus the

word " water " might direct us to a mirage.2

(3) Actual contact or conjunction is not necessary for a

relation. Thus we find a relationship between father and son,

although contact is not a necessary element of this relationship.3

Moreover, as Vatsyayana 4 points out, the relation between

the word and the object denoted is not productive, but only

presentative. The cognition or utterance of the word does,

not actually produce before us the object denoted.

(4) Verbal cognition is, no doubt, less distinct than perceptual

cognition ;5 but that a means of cognition is less distinct than

the other cannot prove its worthlessness as a cognitive

agent. Thus many objects can be perceived both by touch

and by sight, though some of them are cognized more distinctly

by touch and others more distinctly by sight. In the same

way, the word " burning" does not give such a distinct

cognition of the fact of burning as the sensation of burning

does; yet the comparatively indistinct cognition obtained

through the word cannot prove that the fact of burning is

not denoted by the word " burning ".

(5) In reply to the objection that with the assumption of

the relationship between the word and the object denoted

the utterance of the word " fire " should burn the mouth,

Nage?a Bhatta6 maintains the subjectivity of both the word

and the meaning. " The meaning exists only in the mind,

it has no existence outside the mind." For if the subjectivity

1 Prameya-kamala-martanda, p. 136.

2 The Jain work Asfa-saliasrl, p. 249. Cf. William James, Pragmatism r

p 213

3 Sloka-varltika (ibid.).

4 Nyaya-Sutra, ii, 1, 50-1. Nyaya-varUika-tdtparya-filed, p. 289.

5 Prameya-kamala-martanda, ibid.

6 Manjiisa, pp. 45, 240.



7/16

6 ANALYSIS OP MEANING IN THE

of meaning be not accepted, if, for example, the word " jar "

denotes something existing outside the mind, then the word

u is " in the judgment " the jar is " would be superfluous ;

for by hypothesis the word " jar " means that the object jar

exists in the eternal world. And the judgment " the jar is

not" would be self-contradictory, as there is no subject of

which existence cannot be predicated,1 and as by hypothesis

the word " jar " means that the object jar does exist in the

external world.2 Thus, the word being subjective, and the

relation between the word and the object denoted being also

subjective, it would be irrelevant to assume that the utterance

of the word " fire " should burn the mouth.

The subjectivity of meaning: a criticism

The assumption of the absolute subjectivity of meaning

would run counter to the criterion of meaning, viz. prac

ticality, and would thus establish the unreality of the

relation between the word and the object denoted. More

over, verbal cognition is only less distinct than perceptual

cognition, as shown above. The word "fire" gives us an

ideax of fire, not the sensation of burning. As Nage6a

himself states in another passage,3 when we see a mango, our

eyes give us, in a general way, a cognition of its taste. But

the taste in particular can be cognized only with the tongue.

The assumption of the subjectivity of meaning is therefore

not necessary for averting the danger of burning our mouths

by the utterance of the word " fire", the word being only an

indistinct cognitive agent. Again, the assumption of the

absolute subjectivity of meaning would establish the unreality

of meaning itself. And this is the inevitable conclusion to

1 Cf. Bradley, Logic, p. 116, "every judgment,positive or negative, is in

tho end oxiatential." Also cf. Royce, The World and the Individual, vol. i,

p 272

* Cf. H. Paul, Priutipicn der Sprachgcschichtc, pp. 14-10 ; Hermann, Die

Sprachwisscnschaft nach ihrcm Zusammcnhange mil Logik, pp. 97-8.

Hermann contrasts language with music, calling the former as an " imago

of objectivity ".

3 Manjusa, p. 459.



8/16


which Nage^a is ultimately driven; for in another passagex

he remarks that both the word and the meaning are unreal.

As regards the superfluity or contradiction involved in

connecting " is " or "is not" with a word, compare Vacas

pati's explanation already given, that a word denotes the

universal including individuals.

The above discussion, in which the absolute subjectivity

of meaning as maintained by Nagesa has been criticized, should

not lead us to neglect or underrate the subjective aspect of

meaning. For, while it is invalid to assume that meaning

exists only in the mind, it would be even preposterous to

assume that meaning does not exist in the mind. Meaning

is a relation, and, all relation being an abstraction,2 it has a

subjective aspect. But the cognition of this relation must

have an objective reference.3 Thus, according to Bhartrihari,4

though meaning is, directly speaking, a cognition, the object

denoted may or may not exist in the mind. When the object

denoted by the word exists outside the mind, we have first

an indeterminate perception of this object, then an idea (as

meaning) of the object, then a desire or movement to express

that idea, and then the utterance of the word according to

our cognition. Thus it is the external object which in this

case is indirectly denoted by the word.5 But the object

denoted may sometimes be confined only to the mind, and

related to the word only through this mental cognition.

That the cognition of the relation in question must have an

objective reference is further confirmed by Gadadhara6 in

his treatment of objectivity. Cognition can operate only

with reference to an object. But objectivity, he adds, is not

1 Manjusa, p. 409.

2 Cf. Bradley, Logic, pp. 4-6.

3 Cf. Lotze, Logic, vol. i, pp. 14-20, who points out the difference '* blue "

as a meaning and " blue " as a mere impression?the former being an

objectification of the latter. Cf. Bosanquet, Logic, pp. 18-19.

4 Vakya-padiya, iii, 3, 33.

5 Helaraja, ibid.

6 Vishayata-vada, pp. 3-4. Objectivity according to Gadfidhara is a

separate category ; it equally differs from the object as from cognition.



9/16


a mere mental phenomenon, it does not reside only in the

mind, it is not merely cognitive. For, if objectivity were

nothing apart from cognition, there might arise a simultaneous

cognition of the jar and a cognition of the absence of the

cognition of the jar; for by hypothesis, objectivity being

mere cognition, it is not bound to any particular object

outside the cognition; it may therefore reside in the jar or in

the negation of the cognition of the jar. There would thus

arise a confusion of two concepts: on the one hand, the

objectivity of the concept " jar ", which, by hypothesis, is

mere cognition, and on the other, the objectivity of the

negation of that concept, which is also mere cognition.

We find a reconciliation of both the subjectivity and ob

jectivity of meaning in the Nyaya school. As Gadadhara x

points out, verbal cognition is determined by the cognition

of the object subjectively as well as objectively. For, if

meaning be absolutely objective, and have no reference to a

particular knowing subject, then, when one person compre

hends the meaning of a word, other persons should also have

the same verbal cognition, for the comprehension of the

meaning is not bound to any knowing subject. If, however,

meaning be absolutely subjective, then, as the manuscript

work2 Dharmitdvacchedakatd-praiydsatti " objective cog

nition " shows, as cognition is an inherent quality of the

knowing self, there is no reason why a word should denote

only a particular object; for cognition of several other objects

also inherently exists in the knowing subject. The particu

larity of the denotation therefore necessitates an objective

reference

This reconciliation between the subjective and objective

aspects of meaning is further amplified in the Jain work

As ta-sahasri, which (p. 251) disputes the view that the word

1 Vyutpalti-vada (Benares, p. 29).

2 Manuscript No. 1269 in the Raghunath Temple Library, Jammu.

There is unfortunately no mention of the author's name in the MS.; but the

nature of the paper shows that it must bo at least a century old.



10/16


" soul " denotes only the object soul. It points out that the

word, oognition and the object are three distinct categories.

Thus when we speak of jiva "a living being ", the word jiva

refers to an object in the phrase " A jiva should not be killed " ;

but it refers to a cognition in the phrase "jiva is cognized "

(as an idea), while it refers to a mere word in the phrase,

" He said ' jiva \" The word, cognition and object therefore

refer to three distinct categories, and hence we cannot

reduce meaning exclusively to subjectivity or objectivity.1

II. Meaning as a Negation

While the Hindu and Jain writers on the philosophy of

language define meaning in terms of a relation, Buddhist

philosophy defines meaning as a negation. Moreover, while

there is a consensus of opinion among the majority of Indian

schools in favour of the reality of the relation between the

word and the object denoted, the Buddhist school rejects

this view, and holds on the contrary that no relation,

such as that of the signifiant and the thing signified, exists

between the word the object denoted. The word " cow "

does not denote the object " cow ". It denotes, in the first

instance, only the negation (Apoha) of objects which are not the

cow, e.g. the horse, etc. It is only subsequently, by inference

through this exclusion, that the denotation of the word " cow "

being the object " cow " is arrived at.

The following are said to be the reasons for this negative

essence of meaning :?

Firstly, it is only by the negation of others that we can

conceive of a similarity or community between extremely

different objects, just as we can conceive of a community

or similarity between different objects such as the cow, the

horse, and the elephant only by cognizing them as not

camel. So the signification of the word " cow " can represent

1 Cf. Aristotle's reconciliation of both these aspects of meaning in

Steinthal, Geschichte der Sprachtvissenschaft bei den Qriechen und Rbmern,

p. 186. According to Aristotle language is primarily subjective and con

soquentjy objective.



11/16


different kinds of cow, the red cow, the black cow, etc., only

by the negation of the non-cow. Otherwise how can there be

a similarity or community between objects so very different

as the red and the black ? As it is said, " The red is not the

black, but the negation of other than red and black is common

to both." i

Secondly, in the case of every word we cognize an element

which is common to both being and non-being. If a word

like " cow" had an exclusively positive denotation, it

could be connected neither with the predicate " is not", as

it would be a contradiction ; nor with the predicate " is ", as

it would be superfluous. But the cognition of an element

which is common both to being and non-being must be due

to some cause or a generally inclusive principle. As regards

the cause, it cannot lie in objects other than the cow, for

causality cannot be attributed to other objects, if affirmation

or identity can be predicated of the cow. Hence, as the

cognition of this common element must be attributed to some

cause, and as that cause is not positively cognized, it must

lie in the negation of others.2

Thirdly, the psychological explanation of the negative

essence of meaning has been thus given:?According to the

Buddhist all perception is indeterminate. Objects are

directly perceived by the mind, independently of words and

ideas. For, when once an object has revealed itself in its

entirety to the mind, what portion of that object is left for

words and ideas to cognize ?

What, then, is the scope of words and ideas ? It is only

negative and exclusive. They serve the only purpose of

excluding other objects erroneously recalled to mind.3

Fourthly, the meaning of a word is directly experienced as

an exclusion. For, if this exclusion were not cognized in

experience, a man ordered to tie a cow might tie a horse, as

1 Nyaya-ratndkara of Parthasarathi Misra; Sloka-vdrttika, p. 566.

2 Nydya-varUika-tatparya-tikd, p. 340. Cf. Apoha-siddhi, pp. 8-9.

3 Nyaya-manjari, pp. 303, 306-8.



12/16


he does not cognize the cow as different from the horse. But,

if he does cognize this difference, there is no reason why he

should not cognize the negation of the non-cow.1

Thus the famous opponents of Buddhism represent the

Buddhistic definition of meaning to be exclusively2 the

negation of other objects. The Buddhist philosopher Eatna

kirti,3 however, propounds a qualified theory of negation; and

from the paucity of literature on the subject it is not quite

clear whether Ratnakirti represents the original Buddhistic

view or has modified it to meet his opponents. According to

this Buddhist philosopher words denote neither a mere

affirmation nor a mere negation of other objects. The essence

of meaning consists in affirmation qualified by the negation

of other objects. He holds that the essence of meaning

consists in the simultaneous cognition of affirmation and

negation. Just as when we use the word indlvara (blue lotus)

as a synonymn for nllotpala (blue lotus) and comprehend its

meaning being the blue lotus?just as at that very moment

the simultaneous cognition of " blue " is unavoidable, so,

when the word " cow " is used to denote the negation of the

non-cow, the simultaneous (positive) cognition of the cow, as

qualified by the cognition of the negation of the non-cow, is

unavoidable. The word " cow " therefore denotes something

positive qualified by the negation of the non-cow. By the

word positive is meant a reference to the external object,

determinate but excluded from other objects. If this refer

ence to an external object were absent, all practical activity

would be impossible.4

1 Nyaya-varUika-tatparya-jika, p. 340.

2 Cf. a similar theory in recent times: Saussure, Cours de Linguistique

Gendrale, pp. 167-75. In language, he says, there are only differences without

positive terms. The exact characteristic of terms is of being that which

others are not. But, as Bosanquet rightly points out (Logic, vol. i, p. 19),

every word must fundamentally have a positive content?a fact which

Saussuie's assertion has not disproved.

8 Apoha-siddhi in Six Buddhist Nyaya Tracts, by Haraprasada ^astrl.

4 Apoha-siddhi, pp. 6-16.



13/16


Objections to the definition of meaning as a negation

The conception of meaning as a negation has been disputed

in several works on Hindu and Jain philosophy. The following

are the main objections to this theory :?

(1) Cognition of community or similarity between different

objects is impossible without the conception of a positive

entity, class, which the Buddhist does not accept. Thus,

according to the Buddhist the community or similarity between

the black cow and the red cow consists in the fact that both

the expressions negative the non-cow. But without the con

ception of a positive entity, class, the expression " black

cow " will be only a contradiction. For what is the meaning

of " black cow " according to the Buddhist ? On the one

hand it means the negation of the non-cow, while on the

other hand it means the negation of the non-black, say of

Ted cows. Now it is apparent that the first aspect of the

negation, viz. the negation of the non-cow, is equivalent to

nil kinds of cows, whether non-black or black, while at the

same time the expression excludes the non-black cows. The

expression " black cow " would therefore signify both the

black and the non-black cows at the same time, which is

evidently a contradiction. With the conception of a positive

entity, class, however, we cognize a positive form " cow ",

which is common to all the black and the non-black cows.1

If it be objected that the object cognized by indeterminate

perception refers only to differentiating attributes, then how

does the cognition of community or generality arise at the

same time ? 2 Thus, when we perceive four fingers together

in a single glance, we cognize them not only individually

differentiated from one another, but also positively knit

together by one bond of community, viz. the peculiar form

common to all fingers. Even on first perception identity and

difference are perceived.

(2) What is this imperial decree, asks Jayanta Bhatta,3

Avhich requires the object to be cognized only by the first

1 Sloka-varttika, p. 667. 2 Nyaya-maiijari, p. 309. 3 Ibid.



14/16


perception, and not subsequently by other means of cognition

?words and ideas ? And, even if the superfluity of words

and ideas may be accepted, it does not prove that words and

ideas do not denote any real object. A block of ice is certainly

superfluous and unnecessary for a man who has no thirst;

but this superfluity of the ice does not prove it to be silver.1

(3) The logical contradiction involved in connecting " is "

or " is not " with a word is removed by the conception of the

universal or by the assumption of affirmation and negation

as the aspects of reality.

(4) All negation has a positive basis. Negation of a thing

positively unknown is impossible. Even such apparently

negative expressions as " non-Brahman " signify a positive

entity, viz. the Kshatriya, the Vaisya, and the Sudra.2

Moreover, the negation may be specific negation or bare

negation. Now specific negation implies acceptance of

affirmation. It should mean something that generally excludes

all that does not distinctly belong to the cow as a class. But,

if it is bare negation, it would make all words nonsensical.

It would mean the negation of all existence and all difference.3

(5) With the assumption of the theory of negation, the

relation of attribute and substance will be impossible. Accord

ing to Dinnaga 4 the expression " blue lotus " signifies the

negation of the relation " non-blue : non-lotus ". But how

can A be said to be the attribute of B, unless there is a positive

relation between A and B ? The attribute must colour the

substance with its own nature. Thus the term " blue " in

" blue lotus " does not give the idea of "red " in the lotus ;

it positively colours, as it were, the substance lotus with its

quality " blue ".5

(6) With the negative essence of meaning, grammatical

forms would be inexplicable. Thus the various meanings of

1 Ibid

2 Sloka-vdrttika, p. 569.

3 Prameya-lamala-martawJa, chap. iv. Cf. Caird's Hegel, p. 135.

4 Prameya-kamala-martanda, ibid.

5 Cf. Sloka-vdrttika, pp. 596, 597.

JRAS. JANUARY 1925. 3



15/16


the imperative will be inexplicable; for the negation of " other

than-bring " cannot give us an idea of the command involved

in the judgment "bring a jar".1 The particles "and",

" thus ", etc., will have no meaning. Similarly, the particle

" no" will mean the negation of the " non-no", and the

word negation will signify the " negation of non-negation ",

which will be nonsensical.2

Conclusion

We thus find two main lines of philosophical opinion on the

definition of meaning, the one emphasizing its positive, and

the other its negative aspect. It is true that the act of

Naming is an act of selection, and selection means the

exclusion, i.e. the negation, of others. But this is only one

side of the shield. For thinking as well as naming is not

only distinction ; it is at the same time relation. If naming

marks off one thing from another, it at the same time

connects one thing with another. We have seen this recon

ciliation between the affirmative and negative aspects

of meaning as expounded by the Buddhist philosopher

Ratnakirti and the Hindu philosopher Jayanta Bhatta.

But this reconciliation is only a metaphysical abstraction.

In the more concrete Science of Language it is easy to discern

which of these aspects is actually predominant. If practicality,

as has been shown above, is the criterion of meaning,

the question arises, does negation actually appeal to our

concrete thinking and common sense as the essence of meaning

when we hear a word ? To quote Kumarila's example again,

when we command our servant to bring a jar, does the word

" bring " immediately start in our servant's mind an idea

1 Ibid

2 Nyaya-manjari, p. 305. Tn this connexion Hcla-raja, the commentator

of the Vdkya-padlya (iii, 3, 42), quotes an interesting couplet which means

" Negation cannot bo predicated of the existing ; it docs not exist in the

non-existing, so there goes to death Negation in this universo "

" ?wi satatn ca nisedhosti so'satsu ca na vidyate.

Jagaty anena nydyena 7ianarthafy pralayam gatab."



16/16


of the negation of non-bringing, or does it induce in his mind

positive ideas related to the process of bringing ? Common

sense and concrete thinking must confirm the latter view,

while psychology also must corroborate the fact that an actual

modification of consciousness related to the word " bring "

does take place in the mind of the servant. For it has been

already shown above that the word, by direct associa

tion, at once starts relative ideas in the hearer's mind, though

the original act of Naming may have been partly actuated by

Negation. Again, if we apply the same test of practicality

to the logical side of meaning, we shall find that a name

generally stands, not for one individual, but connects a logical

group, viz. a community of which that individual is a member.

And by this very relation negation is also implied. Thus

Gautama has pointed out that the cognition of the limitation

as to the denotability of words leads us to accept a relation

between the word and the object denoted. We then

cognize that the word " jar " is related to the object jar,

and not to the object cloth. As the author of the Nydya

manjarl (p. 317) says in this connexion, we of course neces

sarily differentiate a thing from other things when we have

particularly determined its nature, as in the judgment " The

jar is a jar, and not a cloth " ; but this fact should not lead

us to suppose that we cognize only a negative object.

Definition of meaning as a relation is therefore more sound,

logically as well as psychologically.

October, 1923.

Indian philosophy of language

Documents