Navnita Chadha Behera India Prospects for Conflict and Peace Country Risk Profile 2000 2000 Swiss Peace Foundation ⋅ Institute for Conflict Resolution and SDC ⋅ Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs Swiss Peace Foundation Sonnenbergstrasse 17, Postfach, CH-3000 Bern 7 Telefon ++41 (0)31 330 12 12, Telefax ++41 (0)31 330 12 13 E-mail: [email protected]www.swisspeace.ch Country Risk Profile
59
Embed
India y Prospects for Conflict and Peace Countr · Prospects for Conflict and Peace 3 1. Executive Summary The nature and character of the Indian nation-state has rested on three
This document is posted to help you gain knowledge. Please leave a comment to let me know what you think about it! Share it to your friends and learn new things together.
Transcript
Navnita Chadha Behera
India Prospects for Conflict and Peace Country Risk Profile 2000 2000 Swiss Peace Foundation ⋅ Institute for Conflict Resolution and SDC ⋅ Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs
5. International Risk Assessment..................................................................................... 49
End Notes ........................................................................................................................... 54
Prospects for Conflict and Peace
2
Preface
The present series of case studies on Afghanistan, India and Pakistan
were presented and discussed at the “Second Workshop on Conflict
Dynamics in South Asia: Early Warning in Practice” in September 2000 in Bern,
Switzerland. The workshop was organized by the Swiss Peace Foundation's
early warning unit FAST (Early Recognition of Tension and Fact Finding) and
brought together scholars, local experts, and representatives of NGOs
dealing with the South Asian region.
FAST's main objective is the early recognition of impending or potential
crisis situations for the purpose of early action towards the prevention of
armed conflict and – if given – seizing opportunities for peace building.
Combined with a collection of statistic evidence and systematic monitoring
of conflictive and cooperative events, the present Country Risk Profile is part
of FAST's early warning methodology linking early warning and early action by
relevant decision makers. FAST is mandated by the Swiss Agency for
Development and Cooperation (SDC).
The case studies on Afghanistan (Rahimullah Yusufzai), India (Navnita
Chadha Behera) and Pakistan (I.A. Rehman) shed light on the various
political, socio-economic and demographic causes of specific ongoing
conflicts in the South Asian region.
Prospects for Conflict and Peace
3
1. Executive Summary
The nature and character of the Indian nation-state has rested on three
key pillars of democracy, secularism and federalism. While Nehru secured
constitutional subordination of sub-national identities, Mrs. Gandhi sought their
submergence into a pan-Indian identity, resulting in several violent regional
movements. The Congress strategy of politicizing religion to electoral ends was
exploited by the BJP to articulate Indian nationalism driven by the ideology of
Hindutva. The recent series of attacks on Christian minorities, against this
backdrop, have been analyzed to show that religion is being used as a
convenient tool to divert attention from deeper political and economic
struggles. The key political features in the current evolution of Indian nation-
state pertain to the growing demand and creation of new states, steps towards
multi-level governance and regionalization of political forces. At the same time,
India continues to be rocked by several secessionist movements along with
caste, class and agrarian violence. The armed conflicts in Jammu & Kashmir
and the North-East region continue to simmer. A peace process is underway
that may not be buried despite various difficult obstacles it faces. Development
induced displacement of millions of people because of big dams and its
implications for leading to new social conflicts have been addressed. In the
external realm, the border tensions between India and Bangladesh resulting in
skirmishes and killing of soldiers as well as civilians have been discussed. More
importantly, the scenario of another “Kargil” or “mini-war”, arising out of
miscalculation, between India and Pakistan cannot be completely ruled out.
This logic extends to the nuclear realm, although there are several factors such
as economic constraints, ambiguity about the current status of nuclear
weaponization and growing international pressure especially from the USA,
militate against such a possibility. The paper maps a vibrant nuclear debate
regarding India’s proposed nuclear posture, doctrine and size and structure of
its proposed nuclear arsenal.
Prospects for Conflict and Peace
4
2. Policy Recommendations
The policy recommendations are addressed to three broad sets of
actors: the Indian government, the civil society players and institutions within
India and, the international community.
2.1. The Domestic Arena
The policy recommendations in the domestic arena are primarily for the
most critical set of players—the Indian government, that is, the central
government in New Delhi as well as the relevant state governments and the
key non-state actors such as militant groups.
With regard to Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government must clearly spell out the agenda and the mandate of the K.C. Pant mission in terms of its scope, substance and proposed strategy.
The central government’s initiative to begin the dialogue process with different segments of the Kashmiri society is a welcome step in the right direction. This should be further broad-based to include political leaders and representatives of other communities such as Kashmiri Pandits, Dogras, Paharis, Gujjars, Ladakhi Buddhists and Shia Muslims of Kargil region in J&K.
The government should also facilitate a dialogue between the Kashmiri groups across the Line of Control.
New Delhi should allow the Hurriyat leaders to visit Pakistan to pave the way for their inclusion into the dialogue process.
The All-Party Hurriyat Conference, in return, should drop its pre-condition of being accepted as the sole spokesman of Kashmiris. They have yet to establish their credentials as the true representatives of Kashmiris and considering they are fighting for Kashmiris’ right of self-determination, they cannot in principle usurp the rights of other political groups (e.g Shabir Shah led Jammu and Kashmir Democratic Freedom Party) and militant outfits’ direct participation in the dialogue process, leave alone the rights of Jammuites and Ladakhis whom they do not even claim to represent.
Farooq Abdullah’s government needs to undertake serious measures to improve the quality of governance in the state. The restoration of a democratically elected government has done little to redress popular grievances and urgent steps are needed to rectify the situation.
Prospects for Conflict and Peace
5
Both the central and state government need to revive the agenda of autonomy. The former needs to clarify and revise its stand on the recommendations of the State Autonomy Commission while the latter should initiate a state-wide debate on the recommendations of the Regional Autonomy Commission.
A similar set of measures needs to be undertaken in the North-East region. These include improving the quality of governance and sanitizing the political processes to break the grid of links between the state governments and militant groups.
The central and state governments need to seriously and squarely address the issue of influx of foreigners and outsiders that has changed the demographic balance of the area and lies at the root of several conflicts in the region.
The government needs to encourage border trade and industrial growth centers along North-East’s international borders with Bangladesh, Myanmar and Bhutan. This will help connect the North-East’s hinterland to markets in South-East Asia and South-Western China apart from the markets of the three neighbouring countries.
Another economic initiative could be to develop the river systems of the North-East. The river ports and tributaries of the Brahmaputra in addition to the main stem of the river can become a busy natural highway, transporting goods and people through the Valley and to and from Bangladesh. The most important aspect of such focused developmental initiatives lies in their sincere implementation. That is because earlier initiatives, for example that of Rs 61 billion economic package by the Prime Minister H.D. Deve Gowda in 1996 and those by I.K. Gujral and Atal Bihari Vajpayee with an increased quantum of aid, were very poorly implemented with actual devolution of funds falling below the amounts announced and a very limited ‘trickle down’ to the intended beneficiaries.
In the long-term, the Indian State needs to evolve new kind of state structures, which are based on decentralization of power, empowerment of the local people and mass participation in political, economic and social decision making. There has to be effective devolution of development functions and government authority to the local self-governing units. In developing a looser, more confederate character, the Indian State needs to become a ‘federation of federations’. A five-tier, or perhaps six-tier, structure of federal governance may be adopted to create a new federal balance. The basic structure of the center-state relations should be renegotiated. The Seventh Schedule of the Constitution may be reworked whereby only matters of national importance such as territorial security, foreign affairs, communications and currency should come under the center’s jurisdiction, vesting the residuary powers in the states. States must themselves become federations and devolve powers to sub-state units and Panchayati Raj
Prospects for Conflict and Peace
6
institutions. There is also a need to imagine and create new sub-state formations such as elected regional councils, autonomous hill councils or autonomous tribal councils depending on the specific features and requirements of each state. Governance needs to be de-bureaucratized and made accountable to the people at every step.
The growing demand for reorganization of states need not be feared. Instead, the center and the federating units should evolve mutually agreed upon criteria for reorganization of states along the lines of “(i) administrative and political manageability involving closer contacts between the people and their elected representatives; (ii) techno-economic viability; (iii) and socio-economic homogeneity (in terms of tribes/jatis, languages/dialect, belief system/religious communities and ethnic identities).”1
With regard to the minority rights, institutional mechanisms such as the Minorities Commission and the Human Rights Commission should be empowered to not only investigate the violation of human rights, but also enjoy judicial powers for directly redressing such grievances.
2.2. The External Realm
The first set of policy recommendations are addressed to the political
leaders and government officials of the ruling NDA government, and General
Musharaf’s regime in Islamabad.
India and Pakistan need to reopen the official channels of communication and resume a bilateral dialogue at the governmental level. They should renew their commitment to resolve all conflicts and outstanding issues particularly that of Jammu and Kashmir through peaceful negotiations and re-affirm their faith in the Shimla Accord and the Lahore peace process.
The SAARC process should be revived that could provide a platform for General Musharaf and Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee to meet.
The two countries should formalize the understanding of a “maximum restraint” or the ceasefire on the Line of Control and undertake a commitment to prevent any acts detrimental to peace and tranquility across Line of Control. This has two dimensions. One pertains to ending the cross-border firing and the second, to check the cross-border infiltration into the Kashmir Valley. For the latter, the onus clearly lies on Islamabad rather than New Delhi.
The two countries should adopt a basket approach to the bilateral negotiating process along the lines of a composite dialogue initiated in Islamabad and New Delhi in October-November 1998. Each round of
Prospects for Conflict and Peace
7
negotiations should address itself to two sets of issues: one to discuss Kashmir and peace and security issues; and second to discuss other bilateral issues.
The governments should undertake a commitment not to undertake military exercises of specified level within mutually identified zones near the Line of Control and International Border (IB), and notification of military exercises of specified level along the international border.
In the nuclear realm too, the two countries need to begin a serious dialogue to reduce the risk of a nuclear war, ensure reliable communication between the two security establishments, and promote greater transparency through exchange of military information and senior defence officials between the two countries.
With the immediate focus on stabilizing the nuclear deterrence, the two countries should avoid putting nuclear weapons on short range nuclear missiles (SRBMs) because the use of these missiles really shorten the time available to respond.
The two sides should also consider the creation of a nuclear safety zone, as suggested by Amitabh Mattoo.2 This would involve three declaratory agreements: a “no-first use,” “a no-use against non-nuclear powers,” and a “no-use-against-national capitals”. The second part of such a zone is a nuclear assistance regime. This would encompass at least three elements: a crisis management center consisting of civilian and military officials who would deal with incidents or accidents that threaten to escalate to crisis levels; a hotline dedicated to communication on nuclear matters; and nuclear scientific exchanges. The third and final part of such a zone is a nuclear collaboration regime whereby the two countries could collaborate on nuclear energy.3
Vajpayee government should unilaterally relax the visa restrictions on Pakistanis traveling to India to promote people-to-people level contacts between the two countries.
As a specific confidence building measure in the socio-cultural realm, the two governments should resolve to stop misusing history for their respective political ends and suitably modify the historical texts and textbooks which have, thus far, served as an important medium for reproducing hatred and conflict. It is important to note that the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Pakistani Premier Benazir Bhutto had arrived at an understanding in 1988 to examine freshly the textbooks prescribed in educational institutions particularly relating to history and geography to erase misperceptions of facts on either country promising to break down the barriers of stereotype prejudices which were reinforcing the public indifference to the quality of bilateral relations and poisoning the minds of younger generations. The need of the hour is to implement this agreement sincerely.
Prospects for Conflict and Peace
8
The second set of recommendations seeks to strengthen the civil society
players and institutions and create more spaces for dialogue among the larger
publics in India and Pakistan.
The organizers of the non-official dialogues between India and Pakistan need to broaden the base of such exercises by reaching out to those segments of society whose goodwill has not been harnessed thus far. These include the younger generations, women, grassroots organizations and those who live outside national capitals.
The enormous potential of satellite technology and internet needs to be utilized to consolidate their gains.
The budding peace constituency in the two countries needs to be consolidated both at the grassroots level to mobilize the public and change popular mindsets as well to work as a pressure group to lobby with the highest rungs of the government.
Finally, the international community especially the United States has an
important role to play in averting any armed confrontation in the subcontinent.
The United States and G-8 countries should nudge the two governments to initiate and engage in a sustained bilateral dialogue.
The use of the technology of permissive action links (PALS) that decreases the chances of unauthorized use or accidental detonation should be considered for stabilizing the nuclear deterrence in the region. PALS are electronic circuits wired into a bomb and do not allow activation except under very particular circumstances. They are connected directly with the appropriate authority by radio so that conspiracies could be worked against. PALS are of course, not the perfect answer or absolute assurance of nuclear safety or stability. But these may serve as a first step towards alleviating the fears of possible use of nuclear weapons. The United States and other nuclear weapon powers may be able to share PALS technology with India and Pakistan, as they did with France.
The international community could also provide the right kinds of economic incentives rather than coercion to persuade India and Pakistan to carry out negotiations to stabilize the strategic environment in South Asia. Both the Indian and Pakistani economies require inputs of foreign investment if they are to carry out successful market reforms and modernize. In fact, India has made the lifting of technology restrictions, particularly in the area of civilian nuclear technology, a precondition for signing the CTBT. Given that there is a need for developmental aid, technology transfers and foreign aid, such incentives may well persuade both sides to carry out meaningful arms control and produce visible results.
Prospects for Conflict and Peace
9
Finally, the international community should work towards strengthening the civil society voices and the peace constituency in the region.
Prospects for Conflict and Peace
10
3. Background
The nature and character of Indian nation-state and its political
boundaries—internal and external—have evolved throughout centuries. It has
shown a varying mix of “high” and “low” degree of “stateness” that varied with
historical experience, institutional legacies and political culture.4 The state-
society relationship in pre-colonial India was primarily instrumental, "the state
upheld and protected society and its values rather than itself constituting the
highest form of community and the means for realizing value".5 The colonial
state structure in India was, however, qualitatively different as the British
constructed a unitary state and centralized political unity based on the notion
of a ‘singular and indivisible sovereignty’ through its practices of ‘bureaucratic
authoritarianism’, rooted in an impersonalized and institutionalized vast
administrative structure that penetrated the lowest rungs of the Indian society.
The nationalist consciousness of the nineteenth century did not question
or attempt to radically transform the colonial state. The dominant argument
was that the British rule was alien and unrepresentative, and hence the
demand for an independent state representing Indian nationalism. The logic of
a modern state representing one nation, or of transferring the responsibility of
managing social relations among individuals and collective identities from
indigenous social regulatory mechanisms to the state, was not questioned. The
political leadership of modern India perceived the state as the prime mover,
the key repository of political power that would act as an agency of
collectively intended social change.
The Constituent Assembly rested the foundations of the Indian State on
three key pillars of democracy, federalism and secularism. The Congress
leadership had upheld the secular, pluralist idea of the Indian nation. Given the
European model of nation building, however, the cultural unification of India
was a prerequisite for building a modern nation state, which did not fit the
pluralities and diversity of Indian society. The result was a paradox. Nehru
insisted that conceptually the imagining of the Indian nation was an
Prospects for Conflict and Peace
11
accomplished and irreversible fact that did not have to be constantly
negotiated, presented and justified.6 Materially, however, it was in infancy, a
nation-in-the-making that needed to be protected against contending
identities. Accordingly, state formation processes were geared towards
constructing a strong state, capable of defending a nascent nation.
India's federal set-up especially the state-state relations were designed
after the 1935 Act. The need for instituting power-sharing devices was
subordinated to the imperatives of state building and forging national
solidarity. Since the federation was founded by the Union vesting powers in
the states, “most institutional devices for inter-governmental consultation and
participation of states in national decision-making processes owed their
origins to central initiatives, their authority to central statutes and their
agendas and terms of reference to central ministries”. Federalism under
Nehru’s regime, the first phase of its evolution, functioned essentially within
the Congress system, to the extent that inner party democracy within the
limits of the consensual model was a reality.
In Nehru’s vision, a person could be an Indian and be a Bengali or
Tamil or Hindu or Muslim. It was the primacy a person accorded to the
regional, religious or ethnic identity and the national identity that was in
question. Nehru hoped that in the process of nation building, an individual
would become first an Indian and then Bengali or Tamil or Hindu or Sikh, and
perhaps ultimately the forces of modernization would sweep away the
ascriptive identities of ethnicity, caste and religion. Secondly, the Congress
leadership had developed a secular nationalism, which could encompass all
Indian cultures and religions. Nehru’s concept of a secular state did not
negate religions; it meant equal protection to all faiths. The core of this value
system was the recognition of multiple diversities, both behavioural and
normative, and legitimacy of group identities and autonomies.7
Nehru’s daughter and political successor, Mrs. Indira Gandhi's regime
marked the second phase of the evolution of India's federal structures. Nehru
had secured the constitutional subordination of sub-national identities to the
Prospects for Conflict and Peace
12
Indian nation in order to preserve the political and territorial integrity of the
Indian State. But recognizing the plural realities of a diverse society, they were
allowed adequate political space to grow within the Indian polity. The
institutionalized process to deal with state-state conflicts favoured “inclusionary
over exclusionary strategies as long as the demands were non-secessionist,
secular in character and met with the approval of more than one side in
conflict”.8
Mrs Gandhi’s state policies were driven by the much narrower political
objective of keeping herself and the Congress party in power. She
systematically destroyed political institutions by creating a top-down system of
governance in the Congress party and government and adopted a highly
confrontational posture towards demands for political autonomy by sub-
national identities. She sought total submergence of sub-national identities,
because to concede the idea of Bengali or Tamil or Punjabi identity in principle
would bestow political legitimacy on the demands of regional political parties,
which had mobilized such identities into electoral majorities in the states. In her
attempts to homogenize the Indian nation by negating its diversity, repudiating
sub-national identities by forcing them to become only Indian, and in
identifying the Indian nation with the Congress party, Mrs Gandhi’s regime had
arrived at a particularly narrow conception of the Indian identity. The more she
tried to tighten her grip on sub-national identities, the more assertive they
became. Often the result was volatile regional movements demanding outright
secession. The fact that the current political dispensation in India is dotted with
regional, state and locally-based parties is a direct consequence of Mrs.
Gandhi's politics and the centralization drive.
By the early 1980s, the electoral strategy of the Congress of projecting
the image of the Indian nation in danger from the so-called ‘anti-national’
opposition and regional parties had developed communal and rightist
overtones in its reformulation as India’s “Hindu majority in danger” from anti-
national Muslim and Sikh minorities. This shift though prompted by electoral
compulsions, was part of the retreat from the central principles of the
Prospects for Conflict and Peace
13
Nehruvian project and the long-term decline in the secularity of the state. The
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a Hindu rightist party, took advantage of this to
rework the balance of power by taking the communal issue beyond the
boundaries set by the Congress and thus, forcing open the ambivalence
between secular and communal politics.9 The following sections will discuss this
issue in detail.
3.1. Political Factors
This section will discuss several positive and negative forces at work in the
Indian polity.
3.1.1. Creation and Demand for New States The Indian State is under growing pressure for redrawing the country’s
political map. Demands for new states and/or administrative units exist in
fourteen states.10 These include Uttarakhand/Uttaranchal, Bundelkhand (with
Madhya Pradesh districts) and Purvanchal (Rohilkhand and Bundelkhand) and
grazers, fisher-folk and the like who depend on the region’s natural resources
are not even compensated for their loss.43 In fact a humanitarian definition of
displaced persons is yet to be accepted by the Central and State governments
in India. For instance, it is estimated that when the 3,200 dams on the Narmada
river, as part of the Sardar Sarovar Project are completed, more than one
million people will have been displaced. The inadequacies of the resettlement
and rehabilitation programmes of the Gujarat, Maharashtra and Madhya
Pradesh governments show that in all likelihood, more of these displaced
people will not be rehabilitated by the state.44 The people of Narmada Valley
through a grassroots mobilization of the Narmada Bacho Andolan (Save
Narmada Campaign) led by Medha Patkar and supported by Baba Amte,
have opposed the construction of dams.
However, in a recent judgment passed by the Supreme Court of India in
October 2000, the construction of the dam was allowed to proceed. The NBA
has sought to mobilize the people around the rallying cry of the displaced
persons – “Whatever your law says, Narmada Valley is ours”. Clearly there is a
social and political conflict brewing in this situation. As Arundhati Roy cautions:
“A 15 years-old non-violent peoples movement … if it is dismissed in this
contemptuous fashion, if violence is the only thing that forces the government
to the negotiating table, then anarchy lurks around the corner.”45 The
economics of large dams must, therefore, incorporate values that respect
ecology and human rights.
Prospects for Conflict and Peace
34
3.3. Foreign Affairs
3.3.1 Ties with Pakistan
The India-Pakistan conflict continues to be embedded in the history and
politics of the two countries. While many Pakistanis believe that India has not
reconciled to their independent existence or at best, many Indians view
Pakistan only as a recalcitrant neighbour against which India must be on its
guard. It is important to understand some of the structural variables
underpinning this conflict. First pertains to an ideological dimension. The Islamic
lobby in Pakistan perceives India as an embodiment of Hindu values, being
intrinsically antithetical to the Islamic faith. The paradox is that while there is little
electoral support for the Islamic lobby within Pakistan, it has an enormous
nuisance value for thwarting the rapprochement between the two countries. In
India too, the rise of the political fortune of the BJP with an increasing support
for its ideology of Hindu nationalism and its stand towards the Muslim minority, in
particular, impacts upon their bilateral relations. While Pakistanis had always
labeled India as a `Hindu state' and attacked its secularism as `bogus' and
`superficial', it is interesting to note that they are much more worried about the
rise of Hindu nationalism in India.
Secondly, India and Pakistan's self-images of their power status vis-à-vis
each other in the regional context have, ever since independence been at
variance. India believes that its predominant place in the natural power
hierarchy of the subcontinent must be asserted by it and acknowledged by
others, while Pakistan has always sought to achieve and enjoy an equal
standing in politico-military terms with India. Pakistan's fears of Indian hegemony
emanate partly from latter's military might and are partly rooted in the history of
three wars between the two countries. Such fears of hegemony extend to the
realm of economic relations and bilateral trade where India is viewed as an
"economic Leviathan". Indian threat perceptions vis-à-vis Pakistan, on the other
hand, derive their origin from the latter being an anti-status quo power in the
Prospects for Conflict and Peace
35
subcontinent. From an Indian point of view, Pakistan has time and again
attempted to change the status quo by annexing Kashmir forcibly in 1947-48
and then in 1965. Pakistan's attempts to capture the Kargil heights in summer
1999 reinforces this viewpoint.
On Kashmir too, the official stand taken by both India and Pakistan is
untenable. The Indian position that Pakistan has no locus standi and that
Kashmir is an integral part of India does not stand scrutiny. The Shimla
Agreement is, per se, evidence that there is a dispute, so also the ground reality
of a Line of Control and Article 48 of the Jammu & Kashmir Constitution which
makes provision for 24 seats to be filled from areas of the state currently under
Pakistan’s control. Pakistan’s demand for the implementation of the UN
resolutions also remains a non-starter, partly because Pakistan has always
demanded Part III, a plebiscite, without complying with the specific
preconditions set out in Parts I and II which include complete withdrawal of its
armed forces from the areas under its occupation.46 The plebiscite option also
overlooks the current ground realities where several prominent militant groups
including the All-Party Hurriyat Conference demand inclusion of a third option—
independence.
The leadership as well as the larger concerned public in India and
Pakistan need to change their way of thinking about the Kashmir issue. The
bilateral negotiating process on Kashmir needs to be disentangled from its
historical and ideological baggage. It needs to be de-ideologized and
delinked from the respective countries’ nationalist discourse that ‘Pakistan is
incomplete without Kashmir’ or that ‘Kashmir is the crown-symbol of Indian
secularism’. The Pakistani logic that Kashmir is the ‘unfinished agenda of
Partition’ because Pakistan was meant to be the ‘homeland of Indian Muslims
on the subcontinent’ has not stood the test of time. After the creation of
Bangladesh in 1971, India has more Muslims than Pakistan. Five decades after
an independent existence, the Pakistanis must evolve an identity that no longer
hinges on the inclusion of Kashmir in Pakistan. Likewise, the secular tenets and
Prospects for Conflict and Peace
36
beliefs of the Indian polity must not be held hostage to the political choices of
the Kashmiris.
Given these structural impediments and in wake of the Kargil crisis, the
negotiating process between India and Pakistan has suffered a grave setback.
Following closely on the heels of Vajpayee’s bold and historic Lahore visit in
February 1999, the Pakistani misadventure in Kargil resulted in loss of trust and
hardening of the national mood that will stymie the early resumption of
dialogue. The BJP government had invested a lot in the bus diplomacy. It was
relying on the four B’s—the Bus, the Budget, the Bomb and Bihar—to win the
forthcoming elections. Of these, the Bus was clearly closest to Vajpayee’s
heart. A BJP Prime Minister could not hope for any greater tribute to his
statesmanship than a breakthrough in India-Pakistan relations.47 But after Kargil,
the BJP adopted a tough posture evident in Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh’s
three conditions, including a renewed commitment to respect the sanctity of
the Line of Control and cessation of support to the Kashmiri militants, before the
resumption of bilateral talks. In Pakistan, its diplomatic isolation, the Washington
agreement and Pakistan’s sudden and unilateral withdrawal produced a
furious political backlash in the country, imperiling the Muslim League
government, ultimately resulting into its ouster. Opposition political parties,
specially the right wing Jamaat-i-Islami, accused the government of treason
and betrayal of the ‘Kashmiri freedom struggle’. Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif also attributed the overthrow of his democratic government last year to
his differences with army chief General Pervez Musharaf on the Kargil crisis.48 In
India too, there is a growing body of public opinion, that argues in favour of
lobbying for getting Pakistan declared as a terrorist state and isolating it
diplomatically or ignoring it at best. There are very few voices in favour of the
resumption of a bilateral dialogue with Pakistan. The SAARC summit process has
also been stalled by India since November 1999.
It is important to take into account the people-to-people level contacts
between the two countries, the growing civil society voices and more
specifically, the non-official dialogues between different segments of their
Prospects for Conflict and Peace
37
intelligentsia. These include the Neemrana dialogue, the Royal Military College
(RIMC) Boys Network, the India-Pakistan Soldiers Initiative, Pakistan-India
Peoples Forum for Peace and Democracy, Summer and Winter Schools, Joint
Chambers of Commerce of India and Pakistan and so on. These are well
documented elsewhere.49 Suffice to say that they have, in a modest way,
begun to mobilize public opinion, influence government policies and change
public mindsets towards improving the bilateral relations between the two
countries.
3.3.2 India-Bangladesh Border Problems India and Bangladesh are friendly neighbours, though there are several
outstanding issues between them, most of which relate to the 4,000 km long
common border. The border, with its long history of movements between
people, cultures, beliefs and ideas and customs was unreal right from the
beginning. Even more problematic was that each country had its enclaves
within the boundary of the other. Land on both sides was mostly cultivable and
was locked, and there were farms within 40 yards of zero point on either side.
Perhaps the most important characteristic of the border was that in many cases
it was not contiguous but separated by 53 rivers which make its functioning
more complicated.
The border problem has two key aspects. One of border demarcation
and the other of return of the enclaves. Out of the 4095 km long border, only
6.5 km remains to be demarcated, which includes areas of Duikhata, Muhurir
Char and Lathitila. As for the enclaves, there are 97 Indian ones inside
Bangladesh and 114 Bangladeshi ones inside India. 50 In addition, 47 “adverse
possessions” belonging to Bangladesh are under Indian control while 43 such
positions belonging to India are under Bangladesh’s possession.51
These problems were attempted to be tackled by the Indira Gandhi-
Mujibur Rehman Accord of 1974. Bangladesh immediately ratified the Accord
and brought into effect all the necessary constitutional amendments for
Prospects for Conflict and Peace
38
implementing it. The Indian government has not ratified the Accord till date on
the grounds that it requires parliamentary approval, which cannot be done
until the entire border has been demarcated and the areas to be exchanged
identified on the ground. The border dispute, therefore, remains a major irritant
between the two countries, often sparking skirmishes in which many lives have
been lost. In the last two years alone there had been 53 clashes in which 45
Bangladeshis, including 2 Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) men, were killed. The most
recent conflict escalated on April 15, 2001 when BDR forces attacked the
Border Security Force (BSF) outpost in Pyrdiwah village on the Indian side and
held them captive. In retaliation the BSF sent a team to Boraibari village in
Bangladesh, which was attacked by BDR and Bangladeshi villagers and 16
soldiers were killed. This incident was downplayed by both India and
Bangladesh. Most senior Indian leaders, especially Prime Minister Atal Bihari
Vajpayee, home minister L.K. Advani and foreign minister Jaswant Singh were
all extremely circumspect.52 Jaswant Singh in a statement in Parliament termed
the incident as unfortunate, but refrained from castigating the Bangladeshi
Prime Minister. Sheikh Hasina, on her part, expressed anguish and regret. Her
most conciliatory gesture was withdrawing the BDR forces from Padua within a
day after capturing it from BSF. It was a bold gesture risking considerable
domestic backlash in view of the upcoming elections in October, 2001, but she
did it to assuage India’s feelings. Thus, the two countries formed joint groups to
resolve bilateral issues relating to border demarcation. Bangladeshi Prime
Minister Sheikh Hasina was expected to visit New Delhi and address the border
problem at the highest political level.
3.4 Nuclearization of South Asia
The nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in the summer 1998 had raised
fears of turning South Asia into a nuclear flashpoint. The specter of a nuclear
arms race and at worst, a nuclear war breaking out between the two hostile
neighbours has been much talked about. At home, it triggered a vibrant and
unprecedented debate on the nature of nuclear policy and posture,
Prospects for Conflict and Peace
39
especially on questions such as: “ How far is India from establishing a viable
program for deploying and delivering weapons? What kind of doctrine will
govern the role of nuclear weapons in India’s security policy? What will be the
size and structure of its proposed arsenal?”
Kanti Bajpai identifies three schools of thought amongst those who
belong to the “pro-bomb” lobby.53 These are rejectionists, pragmatists and
maximalists.54 Rejectionists hold that nuclear weapons are regrettably
necessary in a world where there are others who refuse to give them up and
who may threaten India’s security.55 Nuclear disarmament is both desirable
and feasible, but in the emerging fundamentally unequal and hegemonisticl
world order, India should not sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) or
join a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Pragmatists also believe that nuclear
weapons are vital for India’s security but they argue in favour of New Delhi
cutting a deal with the international community whereby India joins the (CTBT)
and a possible (FMCT) in return for a de facto if not de jure recognition of its
new nuclear status and a lifting of ban on nuclear-related technologies. In this
viewpoint, India should set aside its traditional posture on nuclear disarmament
and instead focus on arms control.56 The maximalists want India to arm itself as
quickly as possible with the whole range of nuclear weapons, for security
reasons. They argue in favour of a classical deterrence posture defined by a
triad of air, land and sea launched nuclear weapons with sophisticated
command and control.57 India, according to this school of thought, must
refuse to join the non-proliferation regime primarily so that a CTBT and a future
FMCT do not constrain the achievements of a credible nuclear force. Nuclear
abolition is, accordingly, regarded as both undesirable and unfeasible on
strategic and technical grounds.
The basic disagreement of these three viewpoints, however, concerns
the logic of deterrence. Nuclear deterrence depends upon the survival of a
retaliatory force. The threat of retaliation is what deters the other side from
attacking in the first place. The rejectionists/pragmatists argue that deterrence
is achieved by uncertainty.58 Given that both sides have nuclear weapons,
Prospects for Conflict and Peace
40
what deters both of them from launching an attack is not the certainty that
that the other side may retaliate but that it may do so. Since no-one can be
absolutely sure that the other side’s nuclear force can be absolutely destroyed
in the first-strike, it is deterred from striking. The uncertainty regarding residual
capabilities and the will of the adversary to use that capability to deliver an
unacceptably punitive return blow is enough to deter.59 The implication of
accepting this line of argument is that India can afford to take a much more
relaxed view of force size and structure, doctrine, deployment patterns and
command and control.60 The maximalists, as pointed out earlier, take a more
classical view of deterrence. They argue that for the purposes of deterrence,
certainty, or near-certainty, rather than uncertainty of retaliation is vital. Any
“potential aggressor must have no doubt that India could and would use
nuclear weapons against population and industrial centers if a nuclear strike is
initiated against it”61 Some have argued in favour of India developing a sea-
based deterrence to ensure second strike capability.62
Divergent opinions also exist on what are nuclear weapons needed
against. While some argue that Pakistan and China are the extent of the
nuclear threat to India, others believe that India must reckon with nuclear
threats in terms of a global theatre. The possible implication is that India must
ultimately develop a nuclear capability to target the United States as well.63
Accordingly, in terms of size of force structure, the moderates argue that India
needs only a small nuclear force of 60-100 Hiroshima-size nuclear devices. They
also reject the development and deployment of tactical nuclear weapons
which are associated with war-fighting doctrines rather than doctrines of
minimum deterrence. General K. Sundarji, for instance, has proposed that 90-
135 fission devices would suffice in the sense that India could absorb a first strike
and have enough to retaliate. To deter Pakistan and China, he suggests that
India needs to be able to punish five counter value targets in Pakistan and ten
in China. Each target (e.g. a city) would be targeted by at least a 20-kiloton
fission devices. In making these calculations, he explicitly rejects the idea that
India needs to arm itself with either fusion bombs or boosted fission devices.64
Prospects for Conflict and Peace
41
The maximalists, on the other hand, want India’s nuclear arsenal to be as big as
that of the secondary nuclear powers like France, U.K. and China.
With regard to the proposed nuclear doctrine, rejectionists and
pragmatists, by and large, support a No-First-Use posture. While those who are
more cautious acknowledge that No-First-Use is simply an undertaking, with no
guarantee that it will be observed at the limit; the more radical ones believe
that it is a vital CBM. For them, the No-First-Use signals India’s desire to deploy
nuclear weapons in a strictly defensive role. For example, K. Subrahmanyam
argues that No-First-Use is more than a paper commitment: India will be
committed to a specific operational and deployment posture as the result of
the No-First- Use policy.65 Under the No-First-Use, India would place nuclear
weapons in a de-alerted/de-mated posture. If India is in a position to bring
together the warheads and the delivery vehicles in a short order, say, within 24
hours or so, deterrence, it is argued, will be stable.66 This would also reduce the
dangers of unauthorized and inadvertent use of nuclear weapons and of rapid
escalation in a crisis with the attendant risk of unintentional nuclear war. The de-
mated posture may be verifiable and in such a case, the No-First-Use would be
the basis for a safe, credible and restrained deterrent.67
Maximalists are, by contrast, very dubious about a No-First-Use policy.
They believe that the operational posture of de-alerting and de-mating is not a
credible nuclear posture. The armed forces will not and cannot adopt a
strategic posture in which nuclear weapons are not “ready to go”. Maximalists
want a more classical deployment of nuclear weapons, which means a mated
deployment pattern. In this, the warheads and delivery systems are
permanently on alert and permanently mated. These ready-to-go weapons
would be appropriately dispersed and mobile. An invulnerable national
command authority would coordinate military responses in the event of an
attack or a threat of attack. Maximalists feel that a de-mated /de-alerted
posture may be the only option in the short run, but is not viable in the long-
run.68 Besides, de-alerting and de-mating is difficult if not impossible to verify.
Prospects for Conflict and Peace
42
Judging by official pronouncements in the wake of the tests, India
appears to be set for a pragmatic course of action. The Indian government’s
policies’ on seven issues—minimum deterrence; No-First-Use; and, non-use
against non-nuclear states; continued missile testing; a moratorium against
testing and possible accession to the CTBT; an active negotiating stance on the
FMCT; tightening export controls on dual-use technologies; and, global nuclear
disarmament—indicate that official policy reflects this approach substantially.69
The Draft Nuclear Doctrine prepared by the National Council Advisory Board
(NSAB) in August 1999, thus, declared: “India’s strategic interests require
effective, credible nuclear deterrence and adequate retaliatory capability
should deterrence fail.”70 It provided a broad framework for the development,
deployment and use of India’s nuclear forces and proposed that India should
establish a credible, minimum nuclear deterrent capability comprising
sufficient, survivable and operationally ready nuclear forces based on the
principle of no first use of nuclear weapons and non-use against non-nuclear
states. It will also develop a robust command and control system under civilian
control. The force itself will be “based on a triad of aircraft, mobile land-based
missile and sea-based assets.” Survivability will be enhanced by a combination
of “multiple redundant systems, mobility, dispersion and deception”. Space-
based and other assets will be created to “provide early warning,
communications, damage/detonation assessment.” Finally, the Indian
government will take steps to ensure the security and safety of nuclear
weapons and will ensure that “unauthorized and inadvertent activation/use
does not take place and risks of accidents are avoided.” The proposed
doctrine also rejects the concept of nuclear war-fighting and does not, hence,
consider it necessary for India to match its nuclear warheads and delivery
systems with those of its potential nuclear adversaries. The government asserted
that India had no interest in engaging other states in an arms race and its
arsenal will be pegged at the lowest possible level required for credible
deterrence. It also repeats India’s desire for universal disarmament and global
Prospects for Conflict and Peace
43
arms control and states that the country will continue working to achieve these
goals.71
While the pragmatists seem to be on the ascendancy, they may not
necessarily prevail. The other schools remain strong and more importantly, the
government has not signaled a closure on the issue of India’s nuclear posture.72
The NSAB’s proposed nuclear doctrine is suggestive of a nuclear posture that is
much more ambitious than minimum deterrence and is closer to the posture of
the maximalists. Also, contrary to the hopes of the pragmatists, the prospects of
India signing the CTBT appear to have receded, especially after the US
Senate’s failure to ratify the Treaty.
In the final analysis, India is likely to have a modest nuclear force that will
be relatively smaller in size and is likely to be “recessed” rather than deployed.73
There is a near consensus on the need for a triad as well as the realization that
India will not be in possession of the three legs of the deterrent for at least a
decade, unless the rocket programme can be readily adapted to the missile
development programme i.e. the PSLV/GSLV programme must be grafted onto
the DRDO programme.74 India has already taken the decision to induct the
Agni-2 IRBM into service, and reports suggest that the country may test an ICBM
named Surya in 2001.
Prospects for Conflict and Peace
44
4. Internal Risk Assessment
In the preceding sections, we have analyzed the structural factors that
could lead to a conflict in different domestic situations ranging from internal
armed conflicts to social and political conflicts over land rights or resource
sharing. Here, an attempt will be made to identify the proximate causes of
conflict, discuss various scenarios and make a prognosis for the future.
The potential for an armed conflict in Jammu & Kashmir and the North-
East, and the future of the peace process are the most critical variables in this
regard. Let me address Kashmir first. Hizbul Mujahideen's short-lived cease-fire
followed by the unilateral ceasefire announced by the central government has
opened a window of opportunity. There are both positive and negative
indicators for peace.
The most important positive development has been that it has proved
the existence of a genuine constituency for peace in J&K. Hizbul's ceasefire
had received widespread public support and the initial criticism of APHC had
earned the public fury. The core constituency of the Islamic Right, lower level
government servants, shopkeepers and elements of the Bar Association were
also disappointed by the collapse of the Hizbul-led ceasefire. The Vajpayee
government’s announcement of the Ramzan ceasefire was in response to
this popular yearning for peace. A wide spectrum of political leaders
advocating Kashmir’s secession welcomed the government’s peace
initiative. The APHC, for instance, dropped its earlier condition that it would
only enter into a dialogue if it was trilateral in nature, involving the
governments of India, Pakistan and 'Kashmiri representatives', and accepted
a bilateral dialogue between India and Hurriyat leaders, on the one hand,
and separately between the APHC and Pakistan, on the other. Unofficial
parleys for formulating the modalities of the proposed dialogue, ‘talks about
talks’ were held with the Hurriyat leaders. Subsequently, Shabir Shah-led
Jammu & Kashmir Democratic Freedom Party also accepted the
government’s offer of dialogue. The JKLF leaders such as Hasim Qureshi on
Prospects for Conflict and Peace
45
one hand, and Ammanullah Khan, on the other, welcomed the talks.
General Musharaf also pitched in by announcing its decision to observe
maximum restraint along the Line of Control, on December 2, 2000.
According to official sources, the level of infiltration by the militants from
across the border has resultantly, come down drastically.
On the negative side, the central government has failed to unveil a
clear and coherent strategy on political and military fronts. For example,
during the earlier phases of Ramzan month, the security forces had
suspended all offensive operations. Their operations were largely restricted to
engagements of chance or those based on information about the presence
of militants in specific built-up areas. However, in a more recent communiqué
announced on 4 April, 2001, the security forces have been instructed to
launch wide-area operations. Although a ceasefire is still in force, significantly
this communiqué makes no demand that the security forces refrain from
initiating combat operations in J&K.75 Much of the renewed fighting is taking
place in the border districts of Jammu, where troops and police personnel
have renewed aggressive search operations in forest areas. The Valley has
also seen an increasing number of encounters. This is mainly due to the sharp
increase in the ratio of security forces losses to those of militant groups in the
post-ceasefire period. Some comparative statistics on casualties for two
months preceding and succeeding the November 27/28 cease-fire indicate
that militants enjoyed a greater degree of impunity particularly when it came
to incidents of attacks with Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) that left a
large number of civilians and security force personnel injured. By the second
and third week of March 2001 the ratio of security force losses to those of the
terrorist groups had become unacceptably high (1:1.25). Compared to this,
in 1998 this ratio stood at 1:4.1 and in 1999 stood at 1:3.05.76 Also, the militant
attacks against the security forces and civilians have considerably increased.
This keeps the security forces on a constant trigger alert, resulting in
unprovoked attacks on civilians and, ultimately, in sustaining a vicious cycle
of violence. Most militant groups especially the better armed and trained
Prospects for Conflict and Peace
46
cadres of Pakistan-based Lashkar-i-Toiba, Harkat-ul-Ansar and Jaish-e-
Muhammadi have rejected the ceasefire. One must not underestimate their
ability and determination to leave no stone unturned in derailing the peace
process. The massacre of hundred civilians in different parts of the Valley soon
after the Hizbul-announced ceasefire was an indication to that effect. More
importantly, General Musharaf is unlikely to rein in major militant groups,
operating from Pakistan, to terminate violent activities in J&K.
On the political front too, the central government appears to be
fumbling. Although it announced Mr K.C. Pant to be the chief interlocutor for
initiating the dialogue process with the “Kashmiri organizations which are
currently engaged in militancy in the state, but are desirous of peace”, along
with the J&K government as well as the larger spectrum of all political parties,
NGOs, trade unions, social and religious bodies from all the regions of the
state”, a clear action plan is yet to emerge. The Hurriyat Conference rejected
the invitation on two grounds. First, the central government had failed to
permit a proposed APHC delegation visit to Pakistan to confer with militant
groups based in that country and, second that the invitation was open to all
Kashmiri bodies, which meant that the government was not willing to endorse
the amalgam's self-assumed mandate of being the 'sole genuine
representative' of the State's people. APHC Chairman Abdul Ghani Bhat said
that the alliance “is not ready to join the crowded train which goes
nowhere”.77 New Delhi should have allowed the Hurriyat leaders to visit
Pakistan ostensibly to persuade the Pakistan-based militant groups to join the
ceasefire. If they succeeded in their mission, it would be a valuable
contribution to the peace process and if they failed, it would only expose
Hurriyat’s lack of influence over the militants. The official argument that
allowing the APHC representatives to travel to Pakistan would legitimize its
untested claims to represent the people of J&K does not stand scrutiny. The
Pant initiative rightly seeks to involve a wide cross-section of groups in the
dialogue process. As it is, the APHC leaders need to prove their credentials as
representatives of J&K by securing some form of electoral mandate. The
Prospects for Conflict and Peace
47
fissures between the pro-peace and pro-jehad elements in the APHC have
also come into a sharp focus. At a December 10, 2000 seminar in Srinagar,
violence broke out between members of the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Islamic
Student’s League on the one hand, and backers of the more centrist
People’s Conference and the JKLF. Also, while Hizbul Mujahideen did not split
as speculated by sections of government officials at the center and state
governments, differences between the Kashmir-based leadership led by
Abdul Majid Dar and the Pakistan-based supreme leader, Syed Salauddin
have also come to the fore.
On balance, the Kashmir conflict is likely to simmer in the near future,
albeit the stakes for peace are very high on both sides. Overall, the hardcore
sections of militants are likely to keep up their attacks on military as well as soft
targets of unarmed innocent civilians in order to strike terror. Yet, the
government's steadfast determination to carry forward the peace process and
the people's longing for peace may yet win the day.
The prospects for peace in the North-East also remain mixed. There has
been steady erosion in the popularity base of all insurgency movements in the
region and there is a growing public pressure for peaceful resolution of
conflicts. A number of ceasefire agreements are already in place and others
are being negotiated. Where a multiplicity of militant groups are operating,
negotiations with some groups have led to escalation of violence by others.
Negotiations have also not resulted in a decline of extortion and other criminal
activities by such groups, though there is a significant diminution in killings. The
most significant obstacle to peace in the region is the crisis of governance.
Levels of corruption in the North-Eastern governments are very high and the
political patronage of militants has now become entrenched in the region.
There have been several announcements by the Union Home ministry that
some sort of official ceasefire and peace package preceding talks with various
militant groups, would be initiated in the whole North East region in the near
future. However a policy of drift and overwhelming reliance on the army has
tended to define the Center’s attitudes towards these insurgency movements.
Prospects for Conflict and Peace
48
The most important positive development increasing the prospects of
peace has been the growing voices and institutions of the civil society in the
region and a gradual yet definite coalescing of the peace constituency in the
region. The traditional institutions of civil society have played a significant role in
the containment of tensions and that of the larger conflict. The Church of
Nagaland, for instance, has been involved in the peace process since the
beginning of the conflict. In July 1997, the Baptists church had organized the
Atlanta Peace Meet where the NSCN leadership accepted initiatives to start
an unconditional dialogue process. Naga Hoho, the apex council of Naga
tribals has also sought to engage the militant factions and is particularly
engaged in efforts to bring about unity among the NSCN factions. Women’s
groups have also been involved in peace initiatives. The Naga Mothers
Association boasts of nearly 35000 active members. The Bof Meira Paibis
(Women activist group) is active in Manipur. In every village, locality and
community, the womenfolk have organized themselves into associations and
have been very active in protesting human rights violations and unjustifiable
arrests by the security forces and taking actions against social evils of drugs and
alcoholism in the youth. The Nupi (women’s) movement has also organized
many demonstrations for peace in Manipur. In Tripura, the Jamatiya Hoda, the
Supreme Council of the Jamatiya tribe, has initiated a peace movement. At
the four hundred and tenth conference of the Hoda, in December 2000, the
tribal leaders resolved not to pay any kind of “tax” to the militant groups
operating in the state. In addition to the Jamatiyas, the Reangs and Uchais are
the other communities that have joined the larger peace campaign.
There will of course be many more political battles waged in the country
for resource sharing, for land rights and for socio-economic rights by the weaker
sections of the society, as well as for more political and financial powers by the
states. These have very important and far-reaching implications for the political
future and evolving character of the Indian State but are unlikely to trigger an
armed conflict which is more of a danger in the external realm, especially in
context of India-Pakistan relations.
Prospects for Conflict and Peace
49
5. International Risk Assessment
With the traditional reservations of the successive Indian governments to
negotiate with the military rulers of Pakistan especially with General Pervez
Musharaf—the military mind behind Kargil—at the helm of affairs, an early
resumption of dialogue appears unlikely. More importantly, the possibility of
another "Kargil" or an overt military engagement, perhaps a "mini-war" cannot
be totally ruled out between India and Pakistan. It could simply result from a
miscalculation by either side or spiral out of an increasingly tenuous situation on
the borders. Pakistan's Kargil operation, for instance, was politically and
strategically, an ill-conceived and fundamentally flawed strategy and its
political objectives were not clearly thought through.78 Its military as well as
political assumptions proved to be grave miscalculations. What makes the
situation even more complicated is the presence of nuclear weapons on both
sides.
Nuclearization of South Asia had led many observers to believe that the
Indo-Pak dispute over Kashmir would perforce get frozen, as neither country
would risk a confrontation that could escalate to the nuclear level. The Kargil
crisis proved this assumption to be erroneous because that threshold was not
reached. In focusing on Kashmir’s likelihood of a full-blown conventional
conflict, the argument overlooks an essential aspect that unconventional and
limited war between them is not deterred by the so-called nuclear balance of
terror. Indeed, a corollary of the inability to wage an all-out conflict has been
the pursuit of ‘war by other means’. Pokhran and Chagai, in this sense, have
opened the space for more low-intensity, localized wars, which in themselves
are as debilitating as a regular war.79 There is also a small albeit influential
section of opinion among the Indian intelligentsia that advocates hot pursuit of
militants into Pakistan-occupied Kashmir or smashing of the militants training
camps across the border so that our security forces are not forced to fight
Pakistan's proxy war on latter's terms. While it is not the avowed policy of the
ruling National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government and it is also not clear if
Prospects for Conflict and Peace
50
the Indian army supports this strategy but should it happen, the possibility of its
spiraling out of control could not be ruled out.
It is equally important to take account of the factors that militate against
the possibility of an armed confrontation between India and Pakistan in the
region. First and foremost, neither can afford it. The Pakistani economy is in
shambles. While Pakistan's proxy war in Kashmir is financed by a mix of the
jehadi groups and drug money, it cannot afford to fight a full-fledged
conventional war with India. Pakistan's dependency on the World Bank and
IMF "bail-out" packages is also a critical factor in this regard. While Indian
economy is relatively in a much better condition, it too cannot risk a war. Kargil
exposed the chinks in its armour forcing the NDA government to increase the
defence budget this year and initiate a drive for defence modernization.80
More importantly, its preoccupations are different and focused on economic
development and the war clouds would no doubt, seriously undermine the
investor confidence, painstakingly built over last decade or so.
On the nuclear front, two questions need to be addressed: how stable is
the nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan? And what are the risks of
a nuclear conflict taking place in South Asia? The grave dangers posed by
nuclear weapons in a bilateral situation marked by tension, animosity and
distrust were underscored by Kargil. There were no fewer than 13 occasions
when the leaders of the two countries delivered direct and indirect nuclear
threats to each other from vowing to use ‘any weapon’ to defending ‘national
integrity’ and spelling out the consequences of India going ‘all out’, if
threatened.81 On the other hand, India and Pakistan, in the wake of nuclear
tests in May 1998, have sought to stabilize their nuclear rivalry. India had first
proposed a declaration of no first use of nuclear weapons by both states that
was rejected by Pakistan because in a purely conventional conflict, the
asymmetry of forces favoured India. Pakistan made three different proposals
that: Kashmir be made the core issue in resolving the broader India-Pakistan
relationship; they work towards conventional force reductions; and, both
countries neither weaponize nor deploy their nuclear arsenal.. The first round of
Prospects for Conflict and Peace
51
negotiations made little headway. After almost a year of efforts combined with
US pressure, domestic political and economic concerns and the need to
stabilize the situation brought them again to the negotiating table when they
took the first steps towards formalizing a nuclear restraint in South Asia.
At the Lahore summit in February 1999, the two countries signed a
memorandum of understanding to develop a set of confidence building
measures. They agreed to exchange strategic information about their nuclear
arsenal and to give each other advance notice about ballistic missiles tests.82
When India tested Agni-II in April 1999 and Pakistan followed by testing the
Shaheen and Ghauri missiles, both countries notified the other about the missile
launch.83 The two sides also agreed to engage in bilateral consultations “on
security concepts and nuclear doctrines, with a view to developing measures
for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields aimed at the
avoidance of conflict.” In other words, both sides would exchange information
on any C3I measures they planned to implement to safeguard their nuclear
arsenals. Further, both countries agreed to provide notice of “any accidental,
unauthorized or unexplained incident that could create the risk of a [nuclear]
fallout.”84 Without a secure C3I system, however, long-term stabilization will not
occur. In the near future, keeping nuclear forces recessed or at least not on
alert is the cheapest and easiest option for maintaining command and control
over them.
A nuclear exchange in South Asia is likely to occur not because of
rational calculations, but through miscalculations or through accidental or
unauthorized detonation. There is a history of miscalculations between India
and Pakistan, the most prominent examples being that of the 1965 war and
when miscalculation almost triggered a war at the time of Indian military
exercises-Brasstacks in the mid-1980s and as earlier pointed out, the recent
Kargil crisis. The possibility of an inadvertent nuclear exchange also stems from
the difficulty of setting up a command and control system in the subcontinent
that is reliable and safe. This is further complicated because unlike the US-Soviet
equation where missile flight times-25 minutes-through the use of satellite
Prospects for Conflict and Peace
52
monitoring allowed enough time for making a rational response. Between India
and Pakistan, there is approximately 2-5 minutes warning once a missile is
launched, which allows almost no time for making a thoughtful decision.
Another key factor affecting the possibility of miscalculation or
accidental detonation of nuclear weapons is the number of those weapons.
Simply put, the more weapons there are, the more difficult it will be to control
them. Therefore, the actual number of weapons in each country must be
controlled. Both countries might be willing to adhere to such controls given their
stated commitments against engaging in a nuclear weapons race. What is not
clear is if either India or Pakistan will accept as a minimum level of deterrence in
terms of numbers of nuclear weapons. Alternatively, the numbers could be
limited by controlling the amount of fissile material available to both countries
through their participation in the proposed Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.
It is important to take into account the China factor as well. If China is
India’s main nuclear threat, it would mandate different kinds of deployment
and targeting. A lot of emphasis has been on the need for transparency,
command and control and deterrent stability in the South Asian context. But to
an Indian strategic planner, “it would seem best that deterrence vis-à-vis China
be pursued along the lines of China’s deterrence policy vis-à-vis the former
Soviet Union which involved a lot of calculated ambiguity, deception and
dispersal.”85 If India very explicitly identifies China as a threat, it might provoke a
major reallocation of Chinese strategic resources towards nuclear weapons.
However, for the foreseeable future, China is unlikely to accept any linkage
between its nuclear strategy and India’s declared nuclear motivations.
Another critical factor pertains to the growing international pressure especially
from United States for both countries to refrain from deploying nuclear
weapons, to revert to the negotiating table and resume a dialogue on all
outstanding conflictual issues including Kashmir. There is a growing appreciation
in the world capitals of Indian viewpoint that Pakistan is supporting Kashmiri
militant groups with arms and training. This was particularly reinforced at the
time of Kargil crisis. The Vajpayee government’s restrained approach, at a time
Prospects for Conflict and Peace
53
when military and political logic dictated that it should cross the Line of Control,
won overwhelming international approval. The G-8 held Pakistan, without
naming it, responsible for ‘the military confrontation in Kashmir’, describing ‘the
military action to change the status quo as irresponsible’ and asked Pakistan to
withdraw its forces north of the Line of Control. It called Pakistan’s nuclear bluff
by refusing either to intervene in the Kashmir—as distinct from Kargil—dispute
and refusing to put any pressure on India to stop the fighting.86 The European
Union publicly called for ‘the immediate withdrawal of infiltrators’.87 President
Clinton underlined the point that ‘no progress was possible until Pakistan pulled
out its forces from the Indian zone of Kashmir.’88 China’s response suggested
guarded neutrality, urging both Islamabad and New Delhi to defuse the
situation. The US effectively intervened when in an emergency meeting sought
with President Clinton on 4 July 1999, Sharif promised to take ‘concrete steps’ to
restore the sanctity of the Line of Control in accordance with the Shimla
Agreement, and agreed that the bilateral Shimla-Lahore process was the ‘best
forum’ to resolve all disputes including Kashmir—in that sequence. The new
Republican administration led by George Bush also concerned about the
India-Pakistan conflict and is likely to weigh in on both sides to avert risking
another armed confrontation.
Prospects for Conflict and Peace
54
End Notes
1 Khan, Rasheedudin, ed., (1997), Rethinking Indian Federalism, Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, pp. 261-262. 2 For a detailed account of this set of proposals, see, Mattoo, Amitabh, (1999), “Post-Pokaran II: Arms Control and Disarmament Issues”, in Post-Pokaran II: The National Way Ahead, New Delhi: India Habitat Center, pp. 104-106. 3 Mattoo, (1999), p. 106. 4 Nettle, J.P., (1968) “The State as a Conceptual Variable,” World Politics, vol. 20, July, p. 566. 5 Rudolph, L.I., & Rudolph, S.H., (1987) In Pursuit of Lakshmi: The Political Economy of the Indian State, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, p. 67. 6 Kaviraj, Sudipto, (1994), “On the Structure of Nationalist Discourse,” in State and Nation in the Context of Social Change, Vol. I, Sathyamurthy, T.V., ed., New Delhi: Oxford University Press, p. 330. 7 Kothari writes that this was based on the “pan-Indian cultural identity and common civilizational values” which over the centuries had achieved a remarkable degree of cohesion and held together different sub-systems in a continental-size society. See, Kothari, Rajni, (1988), “Integration and Exclusion in Indian Politics,” Economic and Political Weekly, 22 October, p. 2223. Also see, Heimsath, Charles H., (1964), Indian Nationalism and Hindu Social Reforms, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 139-141. 8 Kohli, Atul ,ed., (1988) India’s Democracy: An Analysis of Changing State-Society Relations, New Delhi: Orient Longman, p. 311. 9 Hasan, Zoya, (1999) “Region and Nation in India’s Political Transition,” in Copland, Ian, and Rickard, John, eds., Federalism: Comparative Perspectives from India and Australia, New Delhi: Manohar, p. 178. 10 For details, see Khan, (1997), p. 264. 11 “The Birth of Three New States”, Frontline, 1 September 2000, pp. 34-35; and “Splitting Headache”, Outlook, 21 August 2000, pp. 33-36. 12 Ibid. 13 Ahuja, M.L., (1990), Electoral Politics and General Elections in India (1952-1998), New Delhi: Mittal Publications, pp. 9-10. 14 Hasan, (1999), p. 172 15 Hasan, (1999), p. 177. 16 In 1996, for example, a prominent section of the Congress in Tamil Nadu broke away to form the Tamil Maanila Congress (TMC). In 1998, the Congress witnessed Mamata Banerjee breaking away the West Bengal unit to launch the Trinamool Congress; S. Bangarappa cut loose in Karnataka to form the Karnataka Vikas Party; Jagannath Mishra in Bihar created the Bihar Jan Congress and V. Ramamurthy in Tamil Nadu floated his own outfit. Sharad Pawar formed the Nationalist Congress Party in 1999. In the Janata Dal, an influential section of the party in Orissa broke away to launch the Biju Janata Dal; the entire Bihar unit broke away with Laloo Yadav to form the Rashtriya Janata Dal; and Ramakrishna Hegde floated Lok Shakti in Karnataka. Even the BJP did not escape this phenomenon when S.S. Vaghela split the Gujarat unit to launch the Rashtriya Janata Party. 17 Copland and Rickard, (1999), p. 15. 18 For major militant groups that have been active in the North-East, see, Sinha, S.P., (2000), “Insurgencies in North-East India: An Appraisal,” AAKROSH, vol. 3, no. 7, April, pp. 40-61. For a detailed analysis, see, Hazarika, Sanjoy, (1995), Strangers of the Mist, New Delhi: Penguin. Also see, Gen. Rao, K.V. Krishan, (1998),“Insurgency in the North-East,” Part I and II, USI Journal, vol. CXXVIII, No. 531 & 532, January-March and April-June; Lt Gen. Nayar, V.K., (1992) “Management of Insurgency in the North-East,” Indian Defence Review, October, pp. 11-28. 19 In 1947, the population of tribals in Tripura was 93 per cent of the total population of 600,000, but by 1981, they had been reduced to a minority of 28.5 per cent of a population of 2.06 million. Hazarika, (1995), pp. 123-124. 20 Behera, Ajay Darshan, (1999), “Politics of Violence and Development in South Asia”, RCSS Policy Studies 6, Colombo: RCSS, May, p. 45.
Prospects for Conflict and Peace
55
21 Under the agreement, the state government would take the initiative to redraw the boundaries of the Tripura Tribal Area Autonomous District Council (TTAADC) and to facilitate restoration of alienated tribal lands. The central government also agreed to reserve three additional seats for Scheduled Tribes in the Tripura Assembly. 22 Behera, (1999), p. 46. 23 Large scale attacks were carried out against Santhal tribals in May 1996, displacing tens of thousands of people. A second wave of attacks in May 1998 resulted in further distress migration. 24 Sinha, (2000), p.47 25 Sahni, Ajai, (2001), “Survey of Conflicts and Resolutions in India’s Northeast”, a paper presented at a conference on Conflict Prevention and Management Activities in South Asia, 15-17 May. 26 Sahni, Ajai, (2001), “The Terrorist Economy in India’s Northeast: Preliminary Explorations,” Faultlines, vol. 8, April, pp. 127-148. 27 Sahni, (2001). 28 Sinha, (2000), p. 56; also see “North East Rebels getting weapons from Khmer Rouge: GOC”, The Times of India, 24 July 1997. 29 Prasad, Pradhan H., (1989), “Agrarian Violence in Bihar”, in Prasad, Pradhan H., Lopsided Growth: Political Economy of Indian Development, Bombay: Oxford University Press, p. 75. 30 Sinha, Arvind, and Sinha, Indu, (1996), “State, Class and Sena Nexus”, Economic and Political Weekly, 2 November, p. 2908. 31 Bhelari, Kanhaiya, (2000), “Love for the Outlaws”, The Week, 30 April. 32 For an excellent exposition of Hindu nationalism and its belief systems, see, Malik, Yogendra K., and V.B. Singh, (1994), Hindu Nationalists in India: The Rise of the Bhartiya Janata Party, New Delhi: Vistaar, pp. 3-5, 9-15. For an analysis of the RSS, the BJP’s precursor, views on Hindu revivalism and Hindu ideology, see Anderson, Walter K., and Damle, Shridhar D., (1987), The Brotherhood in Saffron: The Rashtriya Swaymsevak Singh and Hindu Revivalism, New Delhi: Vistaar, pp. 71-82. 33 Malik and Singh, (1994), p. 15. 34 Brass, Paul R., “Regionalism, Hindu Nationalism and Party Politics in India's Federal System”, in Copland and Rickard, (1999), p. 156. 35 Brass, (1999) 36Das, J.S., (1999), “Lessons for the Christians”, The Pioneer, 8 January. 37 India Today, (1999), 11 January. 38 Sethi, Lokpal, (1998), “Sangh Parivar Plays Tribal-Christian Card to Arouse Communal Passion”, The Hindustan Times, December 22. Also see Fernandes, Walter, (1996), “Conversion to Christianity, Caste Tension and Search for a New Identity in Tamil Nadu”, in Fernandes, Walter, ed., (1996), The Emerging Dalit Identity : The Reassertion of the Subalterns, New Delhi: Indian Social Institute, pp. 140-165 39 Koithara, Verghese, (1999), Society, State and Security, New Delhi: Sage, p. 245. 40 The two prominent research projects investigating this question are the Swiss Based Environment and Conflict Project (ENCOP) and the project led by Prof. Thomas Homer-Dixon of the University of Toronto concerning environmental scarcity and acute conflict. The ENCOP work seeks to develop a typology of environmentally induced conflicts, while Prof. Dixon’s work is directed towards theory building. See, Libiszewski, Stephan, (1992), “What is an Environmental Conflict?” ENCOP Occasional Paper No. 1, Bern: Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Homer-Dixon Thomas F., et al, (1993), “Environmental Change and Violent Conflict,” Scientific American, February, pp. 38-45; Homer-Dixon, Thomas F., (1994), “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict,” International Security, vol. 19, no. 1, Summer, pp. 5-40. Also see, Wallensteen, Peter, (1992), “Environmental Destruction and Serious Social Conflict: Developing a Research Design,” PRIO Report No. 3, May, pp. 47-54. 41 Ray, Parshuram, (2000), “Development Induced Displacement in India”, South Asian Refugee Watch; Vol. 2, No. 1, July, p. 35. 42 Judge, Paramjit S., (1997) “Response to Dams and Displacement in Two Indian States,” Asian Survey, vol. 37, no. 9, September, p. 841. 43 Roy, Arundhati, (1999), “The Greater Common Good”, Frontline, 4 June; Kothari, Smitu, (1996), “Whose Nation? The Displaced as Victims of Development”, Economic and Political Weekly, 15 June.
Prospects for Conflict and Peace
56
44 Bavadam, Lyla, (2001), “The Dam and the Displaced”, Frontline, 5 January, pp. 119-120 45 Arundhati Roy’s interview with N. Ram, (2001), “Scimitars in the Sun,” Frontline, 19 January, p. 8. 46 Verghese, B.G., (1997), “Who’s Afraid of Kashmir Talks?”, Outlook, 11 June. 47 Kang, Bhavdeep, (1999), “Lull before the Fall”, Outlook, 26 July, p. 28. 48 The News, 9 March 2000. 49 See, Behera, Navnita Chadha, Paul M. Evans and Gowher Rizvi, (1997), Beyond Boundaries: A State of Non-official Dialogues on Security, Peace and Cooperation in South Asia, Toronto: University of Toronto-York University; Behera, Navnita Chadha, (2000), “Popular Interactions in South Asia: A Post-Modernist Agenda,” in Behera, Navnita Chadha, et al, (2000), People-to-People Contacts in South Asia, New Delhi: Manohar. 50 Banerjee, Paula, et al, (1999), “Indo-Bangladesh Cross Border Migration and Trade”, Economic and Political Weekly, 4 September. 51 Times of India, 30 April 2001 52 The Indian response to the Pyrdiwah incident indicated a certain internal power struggle. While the Home Minister Advani took a hardline stance and wanted to carry out countermeasures, the External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh was more conciliatory towards Bangladesh and was more sensitive to the domestic political compulsions of Sheikh Hasina. In fact, a brigade strength reinforcement of the Assam Rifles (headquarters in Shillong) was put on standby a day after the Pyrdiwah incident at the instruction of the Home Ministry. But the decision to move them was ultimately shot down by Jaswant Singh, who, apparently is against annoying the friendly neighbor. It was Jaswant Singh who was given the job to make a statement in parliament although it was Advani’s task as the BSF comes under his ministry. This was because the Home Ministry was supposed to have created the embarrassing situation by sending troops into Boraibari, indicating a hardline stance against Bangladesh. 53 Examples of anti-bomb writings include Vanaik, Achin and Praful Bidwai, (1999), South Asia on a Short Fuse: Nuclear Politics and the Future of Global Disarmament, New Delhi: Oxford University Press; Ram, N., (1999), Riding the Nuclear Tiger, new Delhi: Leftword; Chatterjee, Partha, (1998), “How We Loved the Bomb and Later Rued It,” Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 33, no. 24, 13 June. 54 Bajpai, Kanti, (2000), “The Great Indian Nuclear Debate,” in Majumdar, Anindyo J., ed., Nuclear India Into The New Millennium, New Delhi: Lancer, p. 49. 55 Ghose, Arundhati, (1999), “Post-Pokhran II: Arms Control and Disarmament Aspects,” in Post-Pokaran II , (1999), p. 94; Vardarajan, Siddarth, (1998), “Testing the World Order,” Seminar, No. 468, August, p. 29. 56 The pragmatist viewpoint is best articulated by Rajamohan. See Rajamohan, C., “Post-Pokhran II: Nuclear Defiance and Reconciliation,” in Post-Pokaran II, (1999), pp. 21-22. Also, K. Subrahmanyam, (1998), “Nuclear India in Global Politics,” Strategic Digest, vol. 28, no. 12, December, p. 2007; and “Nature of CTBT in Pragmatist’s View,” Economic Times, 20 July 1998. 57 The best known maximalist is Bharat Karnad, (1998), “A Thermonuclear Deterrent,” in Mattoo, Amitabh, ed., (1998), India’s Nuclear Deterrent: Pokaran II and Beyond, New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, pp. 108-149. He refers to his preferred nuclear option as “maximally strategic”. The need for a classical nuclear deterrent is also advocated by Menon, Raja, (1998), “Parallel Stories: Stories, Scientists and Nuclear Logic,” IIC Quarterly, Summer-Monsoon, pp. 76-78; and Nair, Vijai, (1998), “The Structure of an Indian Nuclear Deterrent,” in Mattoo, (1998), pp. 93-98 and 101. 58 Bajpai, (2000), p. 66. 59 ibid., (2000), pp. 66-67. 60 Ibid., (2000), p. 67. 61 Nair, (1998), p. 81 62 The proposed deterrent includes a sea-based version of the Prithvi (renamed Dhanush) SRBM aboard Indian surface vessels; the building of a nuclear powered submarine and the induction of an SSBN force ; and the deployment of an indigenously produced submarine-launched cruise missile named Sagarika. Thomas, Raju G.C., and Amit Gupta, eds., (2000), India’s Nuclear Security, New Delhi: Sage, pp. 278. 63 See, South Asia After the Tests: Where Do We Go From Here? (1999), A Report on 1st July 1998 Roundtable Workshop, New York: Asia Society, p. 21; and Karnad, (1998), p. 111. 64 Sundarji, K., (1996), “Imperatives of Indian Minimum Nuclear Deterrent,” Agni, vol. 2, no. 1, May, p. 18.
Prospects for Conflict and Peace
57
65 K. Subrahmanyam as cited by Bajpai, (2000). 66 Bajpai, (2000), p. 63. 67 Subrahmanyam, (1998), p. 2015. 68 Bajpai, (2000), pp. 65-69. 69 Ibid., (2000), p. 71. 70 The Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine is available at http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/CTBT/nuclear_doctrine_aug_17_1999.html 71 Thomas and Gupta, (2000), p. 277. 72 Ibid., (2000), pp. 272-273. 73 The Indian Defence Minister, George Fernandes characterized the “recessed forces” as peacetime deployment. It means that India would develop and flight-test its ballistic missiles and produce nuclear weapons but would not mate the warheads to the delivery systems. The warhead and the delivery systems could be stored separately and only assembled in the event of a crisis. See, “Fernandes: US Nuclear Policy is Hypocritical,” Hindustan Times, 19 June 1998. 74 Bajpai, (2000), p. 61. 75 Swami, Praveen, (2001), “The Pant Mission”, Frontline, 11 May. 76 Ibid., (2001). Also see http://www.satp.org/India/J&K/Assessment_J&K.htm for original figures 77 Initially displaying confusion, the Hurriyat failed to issue an official reaction to the government's invitation for talks. The alliance’s top-most decision making body, the Executive Committee, on April 15, referred the issue to the Working Committee and the larger General Council which includes the seven members of the Executive Committee and representatives of all constituent parties. After a session of the Working Committee on April 21 and that of the General Council on April 23, the issue was tossed back to the Executive Committee which, on April 28, rejected the government’s offer. 78 Amir, Ayaz, (1999), “A Fiasco in the Making”, The Dawn, 26 June; Maleeha Lodhi, (1999), “Anatomy of a Debacle”, Newsline, July, pp. 31-36. 79 Editorial, (1999), “Pokhran-Kargil Connection’, Frontline, 2 July, pp. 8-9. 80 See, Kanwal, Gurmeet, (2001), Nuclear Defence: Shaping the Arsenal, New Delhi: Knowledge World and IDSA, pp. 192-197. 81 Bidwai, Praful, (1999), “War and Peace,” Newsline, July, p. 40. 82 The entire memorandum is available on the Indian Ministry of External Affairs website, The Lahore Declaration, http://www/meadev.gov.in/govt/lahore.htm 83 Cherian, John, (1999), “The Arms Race,” Frontline, 24 April-7 May. 84 Ibid., (1999). 85 Asia Society, (1999), pp. 21-22. 86 Outlook, 12 July 1999, p. 13. 87 Lodhi, (1999), p. 32. 88 Ibid., (1999), p. 32.