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Dr. Lakshmi Arunachalam
222 Stanford Avenue, Menlo Park, CA 94025
Telephone: (650) 690-0995; Facsimile: (650) 854-3393
Email: [email protected]
Pro Se Plaintiff
Dr. Lakshmi Arunachalam
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, OAKLAND DIVISION
DR. LAKSHMI ARUNACHALAM,
Plaintiff,
v.
APPLE, INC., et al,
AND
DOES 1-100,
Defendants.
C.A. No. 4:18-cv-01250-DMR
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR THIS COURT TO GIVE A STATEMENT OF DECISION
ON WHETHER CONTRACT LAW APPLIES TO PATENTS
Plaintiff Dr. Lakshmi Arunachalam (hereafter "Dr. Arunachalam") respectfully files this
Motion for this Court to file a Statement of Decision immediately on the following sole material
issue in this case:
1. Whether Chief Justice Marshall’s ruling in Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810),
prohibiting the quashing of Government issued contract grants applies to Patent Contract Grants
issued by the Government. [U.S. Supreme Court has ruled in subsequent cases in Trustees of
Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819) as well as the U.S. v. American Bell Telephone
Company (1897) patent case that Fletcher applies to any contract grant, whether it be a
University charter as in Dartmouth in 1819, or if it is patents, as in the U.S. v. American Bell
Telephone Company (1897) patent case.]
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2. If so, whether any Court or Legislature or Congress (by the AIA) or
USPTO/PTAB or USITC or any Agency can rescind a patent contract grant without being in
treasonous breach of the Constitution.
3. If so, whether the Legislature, the judiciary, USPTO/PTAB and USITC are in
collusion, aiding and abetting Antitrust and civil RICO violations by the Corporate Defendants
and in violation of the Separation of Powers clause of the Constitution.
The Motion is based upon the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities and the
following facts and the law:
1) Supreme Court’s Recognition of Public Contract Basis of Patent Rights in Grant v. Raymond
(1832): U.S. Supreme Court J. Marshall articulated the public contract basis of patent grants as
“indispensably necessary to the faithful execution of the solemn promise made
by the United States;”
2) In U.S. v. American Bell Telephone Company (1897); Justice Brewer concluded that
“the differences between the two types of patents give the federal government
“higher rights” to cancel land patents than to cancel patents for inventions. “…the
patent for an invention is not a conveyance of something which the government
owns….The inventor is the one who has discovered something of value. It is his
absolute property….;”
3) Supreme Court’s Recognition of the Public Contract Basis of Patent Rights after Grant v.
Raymond: Shaw v. Cooper (1833); Justice John McLean articulated the contract basis for patent
rights; recognized the public benefit produced by inventive discoveries and the importance of
securing protections for inventors in exchange for that benefit:
“All enlightened governments reward the inventor. He is justly considered a
public benefactor. Many of the most splendid productions of genius, ...have been
conceived and elaborated in a garret or hovel. Such results not only enrich a
nation, but render it illustrious. And should not their authors be cherished and
rewarded? ...But in order that such property should be of any value, it is necessary
that society should interfere actively for its protection. It can interfere by the
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enactment of penalties, which, in order to be effectual, must be severe; or it can
interfere by prohibition, which is a stern and summary exercise of power.”
4) U.S. v. Dubilier Condenser Corp. (1933);
5) Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. (1989);
6) James Madison in Federalist No. 44 stated:
“…Patent rights receive protection pursuant to public contracts between inventors
and the federal government, acting on behalf of the people.”
The Judiciary, USPTO/PTAB, USITC and the Legislature/Congress/AIA have failed to provide
the protections they pledged in their Contract with Plaintiff.
7) In Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony (1884), Justice Samuel Miller stated:
“On the one hand, grants of patents cannot, by law, be issued to the inventor until
the novelty, the utility, and the actual discovery or invention by the claimant have
been established by proof before the commissioner of patents…The public faith is
pledged to the exclusive rights protections set out in the law upon the inventors’
compliance with the corresponding procedures provided in the law.”
Plaintiff satisfied all these requirements before the USPTO granted Plaintiff her patents and
continues paying her maintenance fees to the USPTO, in living up to her end of the Contract.
8) Public Contract Basis of Patent Rights Applied by Lower Courts:
In Celluloid Manufacturing. Co. v. Arlington Manufacturing. Co. (1890), Judge Edward T.
Green of the District Court of New Jersey stated:
“The object of the patentee is to secure to himself complete control, the monopoly
of his invention, and the use of it as a certain source of income. The object sought
by the government is to obtain from the inventor a clear, definite, precise
description of the invention for the public good. These constitute mutual
considerations for the proposed contract evidenced in the letters patent.”
9) In William C. Robinson’s The Law of Patents for Useful Inventions (1890), Robinson defined
a patent as:
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“a purchase by the government, acting on behalf of the whole people, of some
new art or instrument, capable of beneficial use, for which it recompenses the
inventor by securing to him for a time its sole enjoyment.”
10) Samuel Love Hopkins, in The Law of Patents and Patent Practice in the Patent Office and
the Federal Courts (1911), described a patent as:
“the analogue of a contract…. The right created by their issuance is a public
franchise, of which the letters patent are the grant.”
11) Madison in Federalist Nos. 10 and 51 explained:
“The extension, separation, and division of powers would provide better security
to “[t]he diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property
originate.”
12) Justice Brewer said:
“…the contract basis for intellectual property rights heightens the federal government’s
obligations to protect those rights.”
13) USPTO/PTAB have not been protecting the rights of Plaintiff/inventor, under color of re-
examination under pre-AIA and AIA.
14) By entering into public contracts with inventors, the federal government must ensure what J.
Marshall described in Grant v. Raymond as a “faithful execution of the solemn promise made by
the United States.” The AIA provision to examine granted patents is inconsistent with “faithful
execution of the solemn promise made by the United States” and is void.
15) Nothing in the AIA can be claimed to rescind a grant’s ‘Patent Prosecution History
Estoppel;’ or, reexamine a granted patent. Nothing in the Act authorized a ‘Breach of
Contract’ — for the purpose of quashing a granted patent [For a Corporate client,
represented by the USPTO, per request authorized by the AIA.].
16) J. Marshall declared: “It can require no argument to prove that the circumstances of this
case constitute a contract.” This is prima facie evidence that Defendants committed treason
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in waging war against and not upholding J. Marshall’s rulings that are Constitutional precedents.
J. Marshall declared in Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819) that:
“Surely, in this transaction, every ingredient of a complete and legitimate contract
is to be found. The points for consideration are,
1. Is this contract protected by the Constitution of the United States?
2. Is it impaired by the acts under which the Defendants hold?”
The answers are “yes” to both questions. Defendants clearly violated Plaintiff’s right to property.
Like J. Marshall stated in Dartmouth:
“Circumstances have not changed it. In reason, in justice, and in law, it is
now what is was in 1769…The law of this case is the law of all… The opinion
of the Court, after mature deliberation, is that this is a contract the
obligation of which cannot be impaired without violating the Constitution of
the United States…It results from this opinion that the acts of the” Judges
Andrews, Robinson, Laporte, Davila and Stark “which are stated in the special
verdict found in this cause are repugnant to the Constitution of the United States,
and that the judgment on this special verdict ought to have been for the
Plaintiff/inventor. The judgment of the” Judges Andrews, Robinson, Laporte,
Davila and Stark “must, therefore, be reversed.”
There are two questions for this Court to decide:
1. Is the patent grant of Plaintiff a contract?
2. If it be, do the Orders in question impair its obligation?
The answer is unequivocally a ‘Yes” to both. If a doubt could exist that a grant is a
contract, the point was decided in the case of Fletcher v. Peck. If, then, a grant be a contract
within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States, J. Marshall stated: “these principles
and authorities prove incontrovertibly that” a patent grant “is a contract.” J. Marshall
declared that any acts and Orders [by Judges Andrews, Stark, Robinson and Laporte.] that
impair the obligation of the patent grant contract within the meaning of the Constitution of
the United States “are consequently unconstitutional and void.” As J. Marshall concluded,
“The predicament in which this Court stands in relation to the nation at large is
full of perplexities and embarrassments. It is called to decide on causes between
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citizens of different States, between a State and its citizens, and between different
States. It stands, therefore in the midst of jealousies and rivalries of conflicting
parties with the most momentous interests confided to its care. Under such
circumstances, it never can have a motive to do more than its duty, and I trust it
will always be found to possess firmness enough to do that.”
The Constitution of the United States declares that
“no State shall pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the
obligation of contracts.”
The case now under consideration comes within this prohibitory section of the Constitution. The
Orders by Judges Andrews, Robinson, Laporte, Davila and Stark violate the U.S. Constitution
and constitute treason. J. Marshall declared in Fletcher: “It would be strange if a contract to
convey was secured by the Constitution, while an absolute conveyance remained unprotected
…This rescinding act” [of Judges Andrews, Robinson, Laporte, Davila and Stark] “would have
the effect of an ex post facto law. It forfeits the estate of” Plaintiff “for a crime not committed
by” Plaintiff, but by the Adjudicators, namely, Defendants and Judges Andrews, Robinson,
Laporte, Davila and Stark by their Orders which “unconstitutionally impaired” the patent grant
contract with Plaintiff/inventor, which, “as in a conveyance of land, the court found a contract
that the grant should not be revoked.”
In the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in “TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group
Brands LLC,” No. 16–341. May 22, 2017, a landmark case on patent venue, the U.S. Supreme
Court reversed decades (60 years) of Federal Circuit’s erroneous rulings and decided that the
Federal Circuit had ignored what had been ruled by the U. S. Supreme Court over a century ago
in Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U. S. 222, 226 (1957), which
reaffirmed the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Stonite Products Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315
U. S. 561, 563 (1942). America Invents Act (AIA) did not modify the meaning of the
contract clause as interpreted by Fletcher v. Peck by Chief Justice Marshall. This Court
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must take Judicial Notice of the Fletcher, Stonite, Fourco and TC Heartland rulings by the
U.S. Supreme Court and not be in breach of the solemn oath of office, and must not
violate the Supreme Law of the Land, as delineated in Fletcher, Stonite, Fourco and TC
Heartland. In Fletcher, the U.S. Supreme Court definitively and unambiguously held that a
Government issued contract grant cannot be rescinded by the highest authority. The U.S.
Supreme Court ruling in Fletcher has never been reversed and is unaltered. The current
version of AIA does not contain any indication that Congress intended to alter the meaning
of the contract clause as interpreted in Fletcher. AIA did not modify the meaning of the
contract clause as interpreted by Fletcher.
In 2011, Congress took steps by enacting the AIA that indicated that the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Fletcher was a nullity and that -- and that its disregard by
lower courts had somehow become the law of the land. The AIA “has been around so long
that, at some point, the mistake becomes the law.” And the U.S. Supreme Court “has again
and again and again stood up for its authority to declare what the law is.”
CONCLUSION: The Andrews, Robinson, Davila, Laporte and Stark Courts with regard to
Plaintiff’s patents lost their jurisdiction and immunity and their Orders dismissing civil RICO
claims and patent infringement claims are void.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully propounds (in no uncertain terms and with all due
respect to this Judge that, unless Fletcher has been overturned, it must hold for Plaintiff in
compliance with the law of the land and solemn oath to protect and enforce J. Marshall’s 'First
Impression' prohibition against rescinding government issued grants. Wherefore, this Honorable
Court must provide a Statement of Decision, answering the issues Plaintiff has identified above.
A Certificate of Service is attached.
Case 5:18-cv-01250-EJD Document 32 Filed 03/18/18 Page 7 of 28
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Dated: March 18, 2018 Respectfully submitted,
222 Stanford Ave, Menlo Park, CA 94025
Tel: 650 690 0995 Plaintiff
[email protected] Dr. Lakshmi Arunachalam
Case 5:18-cv-01250-EJD Document 32 Filed 03/18/18 Page 8 of 28
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Dr. Lakshmi Arunachalam
222 Stanford Avenue, Menlo Park, CA 94025
Telephone: (650) 690-0995; Facsimile: (650) 854-3393
Email: [email protected]
Pro Se Plaintiff
Dr. Lakshmi Arunachalam
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, OAKLAND DIVISION
DR. LAKSHMI ARUNACHALAM,
Plaintiff,
v.
APPLE, INC., et al,
AND
DOES 1-100,
Defendants.
C.A. No. 4:18-cv-01250-DMR
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR THIS COURT TO GIVE A STATEMENT OF DECISION
ON WHETHER CONTRACT LAW APPLIES TO PATENTS
Plaintiff Dr. Lakshmi Arunachalam (hereafter "Dr. Arunachalam") respectfully files this
“Memorandum of points and authorities in support of Plaintiff’s motion for this Court to give a
statement of decision on whether contract law applies to patents.” Plaintiff incorporates by
reference pp. 2-7 of “Plaintiff’s motion for this Court to give a statement of decision on whether
contract law applies to patents” as if fully stated herein.
I
Res accendent lumina rebus
One thing throws light upon others
ABOUT THIS CASE
[T]HE ONE THING HERE IS ‘CONTINUING AVOIDANCE TO ADJUDICATE’ THE ‘SINGLE ISSUE’ IN
THIS CASE; THROWING LIGHT UPON, a) the ‘Overwhelming [Alleged Good Cause] Reasons’
these ‘High Priced’ Patent Attorneys are expecting extensions before continuing to file frivolous
Case 5:18-cv-01250-EJD Document 32 Filed 03/18/18 Page 9 of 28
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motions thereafter (in frustration) by propounding the overwhelming appearance [Not the single
material issue.] in this case. Collectively, their lawyerly reasons (extending time) and arguments
are consistently [Wrongfully.] propounded by the Courts’ wanton failure(s) to adjudicate [First
and Foremost Consistent with their Solemn Oaths.] the single issue [Or adjudicate without
considering the single issue imposed upon the Courts [And the Patent Lawyers themselves.], as
‘First Impression’ [With or without jurisdiction.]. Collusively, vested in avoidance this
‘Overwhelming Appearance’ [However real or imagined.] is compounded by the clerks of the
various courts refusing to timely file my pleadings and/or materially [Substantively and
fundamentally.] altering the ‘Captioned Responsiveness’ of my filings, prejudicing the fair and
proper administration of justice [Compromisingly, for the same advantageous avoidance and
disadvantageous privations denying Plaintiff access to the various courts’ electronic filing
resources and returning documents for minute error.]; causing, this case to be dragged on for
years. The filings by Defendants’ Attorneys have not been altered in the least. First, they all
propound my patents are rescinded and disclose that even the Court stated I am a ‘Frivolous
Filer’, that I fail to mention this, that, or the other; and, have wasted their time. Moreover, they
state that even the Supreme Court did not entertain my prayer as a reason influencing a non-
adjudicative finding [Emphasis added.] on this single issue. Yet, not one discloses the fact that
none of them affirmatively addresses the ‘First Impression Mandated Prohibition’ against
rescinding government issued grants [And rightfully so!]. In furtherance, they repetitiously
(and wrongfully) state (in passing I might add) that: a) Fletcher does not apply to patents, only
land grants; b) that, for over 200 years, Fletcher has not been applicable to patent law; and, c)
that, reexamining existing grants under the AIA for patentability is constitutional. To all of this
[Of which I have had to contend.] I say: If the lot (honestly) believe that to be true, then they
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would not be adverse in denying my REQUEST TO THIS COURT, TO ENTERTAIN A ‘TENTATIVE
RULING’ DELINEATED IN THE ‘AT ISSUE MEMORANDUM’ as to whether or not Chief Justice
Marshall’s ‘Mandated Prohibition’ against rescinding government issued grants (in the case of
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810)), is the law of the land governing granted patents; because,
a) THE COURT IS COMPELLED TO PROTECT THE CONSTITUTION ABOVE ALL ELSE:
The Court has the same solemn duty to uphold, protect, and defend the Constitution
[Which I have had to contend doing against Defendants and those ‘Associated-in-Fact’ with
them (because, of the Oath taken to become an American Citizen) for the past 5+ years.].
The Document has been assaulted by Defendants, the Judiciary and Legislative bodies; along
with the USPTO/PTAB and the USITC; requiring, a ‘TENTATIVE BAND-AID’ so these
treasonous professionals might see the damage they are doing for whatever self-serving
reason (however real or imagined).
b) THE ONLY DEFENSE FOR WANTON BREACH OF SOLEMN OATH IS INSANITY:
The Offenses propounded are manifestly and directly linked to the same solemn duty as
the single prima facie element connecting the union between them ASSOCIATED-BY-
BREACH; the, trust of which promotes antitrust and defeats the public trust; and,
c) A TENTATIVE RULING WILL SEVER FRAUD FROM JUSTICE:
The tentative ruling must limit Defendants’ reliance on the Court’s extensions.
Compelling briefs to convince this Court why it should not find Fletcher above all else?
Exercising research to prove their guilt or innocence [Unwittingly induced upon them by the
Courts and Supreme Court’s failing leadership-of-avoidance [Setting the standard of
Lawyerly Conducts by doing the same nothingness — a logical excuse is a waste of time
because the offenses are merely incidental to their solemn oaths.]; rather, to focus on proof
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that the Mandated Prohibition delineated in Fletcher v. Peck is not applicable to the
Administration of Patent Law. It is the Breach of Solemn Oath from which the offenses arise
therefrom [In Breach of the Public Trust.]. The Breach of Solemn Oath is the Treason or
Misprision of it from which Antitrust is the only by-product that can arise in Patent Law to
prey on the Public Trust. Moreover, ironically, this unholy birth on the record is strictly
conducive to the ‘Judicial and the Practicing Professional axiom’; traditionally,
propounded “THAT IGNORANCE OF THE LAW EXCUSES NO MAN!” It is only fair this Court
makes a Tentative Ruling and opportunity for Defendant to opt-out of the successful judicial
conspiracy institutionally allowing these Patent Lawyers to rip off their clients [Under color
of Lawyerly proceedings.]
OR IN THE ALTERATIVE:
d) Poll Defendants as to their Professional Standing on this Issue or Plead the 5th
Amendment in furtherance; which, in either case would finally adjudicate the case [As far as I
am concerned.].
II
Malum quo communius eo pejus
The more common an evil is, the worse it is
INTRODUCTION
When Microsoft breached the confidentiality Agreement and infringed upon Plaintiff’s patent,
it was during the time the U.S. Attorney was litigating an antitrust action against Microsoft. At
the time, the Court found that the very nature and cultural mentalis of Microsoft itself was
incapable of fairly competing and opined that Microsoft was more likely than not, predicated
instinctively to monopolize in the future. Defendants here were opposing parties there.
III
Qui non prohibit id quod prohibere potest assentire videur
He who does not forbid what he is able to prevent, is considered to assent
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When the case went to trial [Prior to the AIA sneaking in the ‘Reexamining of Existing
Patents’], THE USPTO/PTAB WERE ALREADY RESCINDING GRANTED PATENTS WITHOUT
LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND IN WANTON BREACH OF THEIR SOLEMN OATHS. Venue (Pre-
AIA) was already corrupted (in association with the Federal Circuit) taking ‘Judicial Notice’ to
materially exclude ‘Patent Prosecution History Estoppel’ in adjudicating the patent itself. It
follows, the USPTO/PTAB excluded the material contract provision in finding venue to the
Federal Circuit. At the time [Without Legislative authority.] the process was designed and
limited to ‘Applications Denied Patentability’ [With the limitation going along for the venue ride
to the Federal Circuit for adjudication.]. With the USPTO/PTAB being a ‘Closed Practicing
Agency’ [Compounded by the changing Data Compatibility and Browser Wars of the 90’s.]
destined to be a ‘Revolving (Lawyerly) Door’ interested in existing Patents, not necessarily
Applications for Patentability. Little wonder how the revolving door and conveyer belt venue to
the Federal Circuit started moving granted patents [Resulting in conflicting representations of
former competitors and former corporate retainers (Like Defendants); vended, to the Federal
Circuit itself transforming vested interest adjudicators (structured and newly structured) in the
court.].
Political Science Educators will readily state the same happens in every government agency.
When tasked to feed the hungry and everybody is fed; the agency will move to create and
maintain its necessity to survive budget cuts and dissolution. Hence, Patent Prosecution
History Estoppel had to be removed on the one side of the conveyor so the agency could
broadly attach competitive constructions and terms for the court to consider [Instead of
being compelled to consider the patent in its limited and restrictively protected sense.]. On the
other side of the conveyor, the Federal Circuit Court had to take ‘Judicial Notice’ that
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Patent Prosecution History Estoppel could not be admitted for consideration as a matter of
law to adjudicate. NOW! THIS IS A JUDICIAL CONSPIRACY IN COHORT WITH THE
USPTO/PTAB.
However, it is more than that. Because its design is to deprive an inventor of the patent right
and protection under color of law and authority; and, even more than that [Because the
Conspiracy has continued unfettered and more likely than not will continue adjudicating
inventive economies of scale affecting commerce, it elevates the conspiracy against right to a
pattern of conducts corrupting government programs designed to avoid antitrust patterns to
perpetuating them intentionally.
Ultimately, the agency and courts here have created a criminal enterprise colored by their
adjudicative standing. If anyone believes the AIA inserting the reexamination of existing patents
was to give authority to begin the process; when, the agency had been doing it all along to color
the criminal enterprise to continue promoting antitrust adjudications; contrary to the public’s
trust.
CONCLUSION
Vires acquirit eundo
It gains strength by continuance
ONE THING DOES SHED LIGHT UPON OTHERS! [T]hat thing here before this Court is simply
Justice Marshall’s ‘Mandated (First Impression) Prohibition’ against rescinding government
grants, once issued that everyone here [As well as the entire ‘Patent Practicing [Including the
USITC Administration and Associated Judicial Counterparts [Including the Supreme Court.’]
knows of or should have known. Yet, look past the Bench and see the unified consistency of
Lawyering, adjudicating, pleading, and justifications for dismissal [Not adjudication predicated
on ascertaining whether Fletcher v. Peck (1810) is applicable to the Patent Profession or whether
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the ‘Reexamination of Existing Granted Patents’ de jure reversed a ‘First Impression’ Supreme
Court decision without one objection [1].].
1) The AIA did not Authorize ‘Rescinding by Reexamination’, it Just Colored it with Law:
When one observes 15 people, from 15 different cultural backgrounds whistling the same
tune in harmony that is not a conspiracy. When the same individual observes the USPTO
publicly soliciting inventors to contract ownership of their invention. Promising (in exchange a
20-Year Royalty with Patent Prosecution History Estoppel attaching to the patent); and,
thereafter reexamines the patent [Void of Patent Prosecution History Estoppel and without
Legislative Authority.] finding un-patentability [As to the Certified Construction and Terms
[Certified.] by the USPTO and required for granting a patent.] for venue to the Federal Circuit
[Specifically learned in Patent Law.] to adjudicate [Void of Patent Prosecution History Estoppel
constructively aware of.] that fact and rescind the granted patent. That is not a conspiracy, it is a
‘UNILATERAL BREACH OF PUBLIC CONTRACT’ fraudulently propounded as to the USPTO; and,
an ‘UNETHICAL JUDICIAL COMPROMISE’ (Maybe Discretion).
3) PATTERN OF REEXAMINING DESIGNED TO ADJUDICATE NOT PATENTABILITY BUT
UNILATERAL PUBLIC BREACH OF CONTRACT REQUIRING JUDICIAL NOTICE NOT TO
CONSIDER ‘PATENT PROSECUTION HISTORY ESTOPPEL':
However, when the same process is used after infringement [And after surviving 12
reexaminations [By the Agency representing the Infringer and some of the Defendants on a
revolving door request.] after the granted patent was infringed (stolen) on notice thereof; initiates
venue TO THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT [CONTINUING TO IGNORE THE FACTS AND PATENT PROSECUTION
HISTORY ESTOPPEL]; THIS, GIVES A STRONG APPEARANCE OF A CONSPIRACY [BUT FOR THE VENUE
IT IS MORE A ‘PATTERN’ TO ADJUDICATE UNILATERAL BREACHED PUBLIC CONTRACTS (NOT BY
1 FROM THE SUPREME COURT: Allowing the Legislature to quasi-adjudicate that which is entrusted to them to do.
Notwithstanding, allowing this while Inventors are burning their patents outside the USPTO office in public protest.
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ALTERING OR MATERIALLY WITHHOLDING TERMS OF THE CONTRACT; RATHER, BY, PROCEDURALLY
INVOKING ‘JUDICIAL NOTICE’ TO EXCLUDE PATENT PROSECUTION HISTORY ESTOPPEL FROM
RESTRICTING THE CONSTRUCTION AND TERMS CERTIFIED BY THE USPTO TO INVOKE THEIR
CORPORATE CLIENTS’ CONSTRUCTION AND TERMS ADJACENT TO THE AGENCIES’ FINDING OF
UNPATENTABILITY; OTHERWISE, THE COURT WOULD BE IN WANT OF SOMETHING CONFLICTING TO
ADJUDICATE.). AT BEST, IT IS MORE A PROCESS DESIGNED PATTERN TO MAINTAIN JURISDICTIONAL
INTEGRITY AS TO FINDING PATENT ADJUDICATION AS OPPOSED TO FINDING CONTRACTUAL [2]
ADJUDICATION.
4) THIS ANTITRUST ACTIVITY BEGAN IN THE LATE 90’S BY DEFENDANT & ADVERSARIES:
The court was correct when it found that Microsoft was incapable of arresting the
monopolistic tendency to antitrust the environments where it exists. After infringing Plaintiff’s
patent, IBM, SAP, Apple, Samsung and others associated in the antitrust action brought against
Microsoft by the USA; thereafter, Defendants associated with each other. Ultimately controlling
the ‘Eclipse (Non-profit) Foundation’ created by IBM to capture the licensing market worldwide;
with, back-door access resulting in partnership with the government. That exporting for
importing smart phones, notebooks, and the like carrying Plaintiff’s infringed patented ‘VAN
Switch’ for sale in the United States restricting domestic competition in [As noted in 1995 by the
court in every aspect of the industry.]. Distributing Plaintiff’s patent through the Eclipse
Foundation as Freeware supported by the very government attempting to curb the resulting
antitrust fallout then; has astronomically grown uncontrollably worldwide. The only difference
2 WITH RESPECT TO J. MARSHALL’S ‘MANDATED PROHIBITION’: Perhaps this is why one of the Defendant
Attorneys uttered that “A Patent is not a Contract!” This is half-true, as it is materially a substantive part of the
Consideration of the Grant [That is the Contract.].
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now is Microsoft owns the government [3]. But for Plaintiff’s invention, the government would
not have been able to spy on Americans or enemies abroad. The USITC allowing Eclipse
Members to import infringed products; the, USPTO is nothing more than a corrupt subsidiary of
defendants. In the center is the Federal Circuit still imposing Judicial Notice to avoid having to
consider adjudicating a patent fairly and impartially. All three indifferent to the antitrust impact
on our economy.
5) THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND USPTO/PTAB LIKE DEFENDANTS’ DEMONSTRATED
CONDUCTS DISCLOSE THE OBJECT OF THEIR PRETENSE IS TO PREVENT THIS CASE FROM
BEING ADJUDICATED.
A conspiracy (as here) may be a continuing one. Because all are linked to the Eclipse
Foundation Defendants can drop out of, while others drop in. While the details of the initial
operation may have changed from time to time with members not knowing each other or the part
played by each; nor, the details of the plan or operation, they must know the purpose of the
conspiracy and agree to participate in it. MORE DEFINITIVELY (AS HERE) ACTING IN CONCERT
OR COMBINATION TO DEFRAUD OR OTHERWISE CAUSE OTHER INJURY TO A PERSON OR
PROPERTY, RESULTING IN DAMAGE TO THE PERSON OR PROPERTY. INFRINGEMENT FALLS INTO
THIS CATEGORY HALLMARKED BY A COMMON CORE BREACH OF OATH AND INFRINGEMENT. So
also operating as a combination or confederacy for the purpose of committing by joint effort
some act which is lawful in itself [For example: Seeking a continuance.], but becomes unlawful
when done by the concerted actions [WITH OTHER DEFENDANTS.] or for the purpose of
using unlawful means [DISHONESTLY TO FRUSTRATE TIMELY ADJUDICATION.] to the commission
of an act not in itself unlawful [TO DEPRIVE PLAINTIFF OF HER DAY IN COURT.]. That Defendants
3 WITH COURT INFLUENCE: No doubt from early inside information upon which investments were made and
appreciated by Federal Judges in the instant actions refusing to recuse after disclosure of stock in Defendants’
Corporations to ensure disadvantage to Plaintiff at the expense of breaching judicial cannons and solemn oath
directly at issue in this case. In another instance another attorney alleging Money Markets are authorized which is
not the truth; rather, a self-serving utterance propounded to appear as true.
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are collectively standing before this Court in breach of solemn oaths for the same treasonous
contempt for the laws of the land, with filings consistent with each other’s [Failing to address the
‘At Issue Offense’ or produce any evidence in their defense [For which none exists.].] itself
implies antitrust.
Neither the USPTO/PTAB nor any Court has the authority to invalidate any patent.
In TC Heartland case, the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling was as follows:
“The patent venue statute, 28 U. S. C. §1400(b), provides that “[a]ny civil action
for patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district where the defendant
resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a
regular and established place of business.” In Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra
Products Corp., 353 U. S. 222, 226, this Court concluded that for purposes of
§1400(b) a domestic corporation “resides” only in its State of incorporation,
rejecting the argument that §1400(b) incorporates the broader definition of
corporate “residence” contained in the general venue statute, 28 U. S. C.
§1391(c). Congress has not amended §1400(b) since Fourco, but it has twice
amended §1391, which now provides that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by
law” and “[f]or all venue purposes,” a corporation “shall be deemed to reside, if a
defendant, in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s
personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question.” §§1391(a), (c)…
Held: As applied to domestic corporations, “reside[nce]” in §1400(b) refers only
to the State of incorporation. The amendments to §1391 did not modify the
meaning of §1400(b) as interpreted by Fourco. Pp. 3– 10….
In Fourco, this Court definitively and unambiguously held that the word
“reside[nce]” in §1400(b), as applied to domestic corporations, refers only to the
State of incorporation. Because Congress has not amended §1400(b) since
Fourco, and neither party asks the Court Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 3
Syllabus to reconsider that decision, the only question here is whether Congress
changed §1400(b)’s meaning when it amended §1391. When Congress intends to
effect a change of that kind, it ordinarily provides a relatively clear indication of
its intent in the amended provision’s text. No such indication appears in the
current version of §1391. Respondent points out that the current §1391(c)
provides a default rule that, on its face, applies without exception “[f]or all venue
purposes.” But the version at issue in Fourco similarly provided a default rule that
applied “ ‘for venue purposes,’ ” 353 U. S., at 223, and those phrasings are not
materially different in this context. The addition of the word “all” to the already
comprehensive provision does not suggest that Congress intended the Court to
reconsider its decision in Fourco. Any argument based on this language is even
weaker now than it was when the Court rejected it in Fourco. Fourco held that
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§1400(b) retained a meaning distinct from the default definition contained in
§1391(c), even though the latter, by its terms, included no exceptions. The current
version of §1391 includes a saving clause, which expressly states that the
provision does not apply when “otherwise provided by law,” thus making explicit
the qualification that the Fourco Court found implicit in the statute. Finally, there
is no indication that Congress in 2011 ratified the Federal Circuit’s decision in VE
Holding. Pp. 7–10…
This Court squarely rejected that interpretation, reaffirming Stonite’s holding that
§1400(b) “is the sole and exclusive provision controlling venue in patent
infringement actions, and . . . is not to be supplemented by . . . §1391(c).” 353 U.
S., at 229…
…VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F. 2d 1574 (1990)…
Following VE Holding, no new developments occurred until Congress adopted
the current version of §1391 in 2011 (again leaving §1400(b) unaltered)….
We reverse the Federal Circuit…
Congress has not amended §1400(b) since Fourco, and neither party asks us to
reconsider our holding in that case. Accordingly, the only question we must
answer is whether Congress changed the meaning of §1400(b) when it amended
§1391. When Congress intends to effect a change of that kind, it ordinarily
provides a relatively clear indication of its intent in the text of the amended
provision. See United States v. Madigan, 300 U. S. 500, 506 (1937) (“[T]he
modification by implication of the settled construction of an earlier and different
section is not favored”); A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law 331 (2012) (“A
clear, authoritative judicial holding on the meaning of a particular provision
should not be cast in doubt and subjected to challenge whenever a related though
not utterly inconsistent provision is adopted in the same statute or even in an
affiliated statute”)…
The current version of §1391 does not contain any indication that Congress
intended to alter the meaning of §1400(b) as interpreted in Fourco. Although
the current version of §1391(c) provides a default rule that applies “[f]or all venue
purposes,” the version at issue in Fourco similarly provided a default rule that
applied “for venue purposes.” 353 U. S., at 223 (internal quotation marks
omitted).”
In the oral arguments in TC Heartland, its counsel argued:
MR. DABNEY: “I'd like to open first with some undeniable points. In Fourco
Glass, this Court made two holdings about 1400(b) that control this case. The first
is this Court interpreted Section 1400(b) as a standalone. It's the sole and
exclusive provision governing venue in patent cases and is not to be supplemented
with Section 1391.
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It's noteworthy that in -- in the Respondent's brief, they don't cite a single real
world example where there was any problem interpreting and applying Section
1400(b) ever since the Sperry v. American Railroad…
JUSTICE KAGAN: What do you think Congress would have to do to reverse our
decision in Fourco?
MR. DABNEY: Well, there are many ways that it could be done. And -- and in
2001, the American Law Institute proposed that Section 1400(b) be repealed.
JUSTICE KAGAN: Is there any way Congress could do it without repealing
1400? Is there any change that Congress could make to 1391 that would have that
effect.
MR. DABNEY: I could imagine that if instead of saying "except as otherwise
provided by law," the statute said "notwithstanding any other provision of law,
this would govern." That would be a way to do that. But –
JUSTICE KAGAN: That -- that would do it? In other words, your argument in the
end rests on that "except" provision?
MR. DABNEY: It rests importantly on the "except" provision. The "except"
provision makes this case an easier case than Fourco Glass was because at the
time of Fourco Glass, all you had was the general venue statute and the very
specific tailored, historic venue statute that had been dating back to 1897. And so
in that case, the Court used the standard tools of statutory construction and said,
you know, the specific statute is not going to be swallowed up and rendered
nugatory by the more general, and it applied the kind of reasoning that the
Radzanower case did. Radzanower v. Touche Ross is a very, very analogous case
to this. But now that Congress has specifically provided not that 1391 overrides
1400(b), but that 1391 yields, is subordinate to other statutes and common law
that -- that provide otherwise for venue, that makes this case just easy to apply…
So the plain meaning of "govern" applies to 1391(c) by their own
characterization. They're the ones who are saying that 1391(c) governs venue in
this case, which is what they say on page 8, and then they try to do this
acrobatic maneuver to escape the exceptions clause by saying it doesn't
govern. Well, as we say in our reply brief, the plain meaning of "govern" means
that 1391(c) is part of the sections that in the structure of 1391 is subordinated to
the exception language.
So the -- the Court doesn't need to do anything here except say that Fourco's
interpretation of 1400(b), which under Kimble v. Marvel and statutory precedence
of this Court, it is as much a part of that statute as the words originally were, that
that is part of the law that everyone agrees provides for a venue otherwise than
what the Respondent is arguing for. The Respondent is arguing that 1400(b)
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should now be given an artificial meaning imported from 1391(c). That is the
exact argument that the Respondent made in the Fourco case….
And the Court said, in the context of 1400(b), which distinguishes between
resident and nonresident defendants, you can't import that synthetic, fictitious
definition of "resides" without destroying both the text of the statute and
completely defeating its purpose….
JUSTICE KAGAN: But, Mr. Dabney, I mean, one oddity of this case is -- is
usually, when we say something, when we issue a decision, we can be pretty
confident that Congress is acting against the backdrop of that -- that decision. But
I think that that would be an odd thing to say in this case, given that for 30 years
the Federal Circuit has been ignoring our decision and the law has effectively
been otherwise. And then the question is, well, what is the backdrop against
which Congress is legislating.
It seems actually that if -- if I were a congressman, I'd think that the practical
backdrop against which I'm legislating is not Fourco; it is instead the Federal
Circuit's decision in VE Holding, which is the decision that the practice has
conformed to.
MR. DABNEY: Well, I -- I can tell the Court from someone who does practice
that not everyone ever acceded to VE Holding. And I think, if you look at what
actually happened in the 2011 act, it seems to me that, in 2011, Congress took
steps that indicated that they didn't get the memo, that this Court's decision
in Fourco Glass was a nullity and that -- and that its disregard by lower
courts had somehow become the law of the land.
First, VE Holding, the 1990 decision of the Federal Circuit, had seized upon a
prepositional phrase in a 1988 version under this chapter. So if Congress was
thinking, oh, what I want to do is lock in a situation in which an enormous,
extreme controversial imbalance in Federal patent litigation that goes to a very
small number of victics, it was an odd thing for Congress to have repealed the
very grab-hold that -- that the Federal Circuit had seized on to justify its
results.
So I would argue that the legislation that Congress passed, far from ratifying
that holding, very intentionally abrogated it. Not only that, in September, three
months before the 2011 act was passed, Congress amended the America Invents
Act to provide for a new restriction on what could be deemed a regular and
established place of business under 1400(b). Section 18(c) of the AIA says that an
automated teller machine, an ATM, shall not be deemed a regular and established
place of business. Now, I suppose the Respondent would say that -- that provision
was not inserted at the behest of New York money center banks; that -- that
provision was put in at the behest of individuals who didn't even form an LLC or
a corporation so that they would enjoy the protection alone…
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So the key point I'd just like to leave you with is, for more than 100 years, a
patent venue has been a function of the domicile of a defendant, and it
provides for an easy-to-administer, clear rule that prescribes where venue is -
- is permissive in a patent case.
JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, but for more than 30 years the practice has been the
other way. I mean, I'm -- I'm -- I was thinking as I was reading the briefs,
sometimes we have accidental theme days at the Supreme Court. So today's
accidental theme is: When 30 years of practice goes against you, what
happens?
MR. DABNEY: I -- I -- I heard Justice Souter say something like that in the KSR
case, you know, the teaching-suggestion-motivation test has been around so long
that, at some point, the mistake becomes the law. And -- and this Court has
again and again and again stood up for its authority to declare what the law
is.
On -- on issues of patent law, there's actually a precedent, Andrews v. Hovey that
says no issue of patent law is settled until we have settled it. In Dickenson v.
Zurko, there's a tremendous administrative law -- body of law that this Court
said the Federal Circuit was wrong in the way it --…
JUSTICE GINSBURG: Well, maybe the Federal Circuit was wrong in not
following Fourco, but the question is now before us, and you are asking us to
say that venue in a patent infringement case is only where the entity is
incorporated or comparable to that, and you have acknowledged that there is no
other venue…
MR. DABNEY: The injury claimed in patent litigation usually is -- is a
synthetic non-receipt of a reasonable royalty that allegedly is due, and -- and
that can be marketed and sold and transmitted into a forum. There's all
kinds of reasons why 1400(b) is an important law to enforce and uphold.”
Defendants and their Counsel of Record are in violation of the Supreme Law of the
Land, as delineated in Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810), prohibiting the quashing of a
Government issued contract grant even by the highest authority. Any Court or Administrative
Agency going along with IBM or SAP is aiding and abetting violations of antitrust, civil RICO
and other statutes and has engaged in a Constitutional public breach.
Case 5:18-cv-01250-EJD Document 32 Filed 03/18/18 Page 22 of 28
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The judiciary [Systematically, issuing Erroneous and fraudulently (collusive )
favorable findings for Corporate Defendants and the “Revolving-Door” USPTO/PTAB [Aiding
and judicially Abetting Unfair Public Competition.]; enforcing, the legislative enactment
provision (colorfully) ‘Reexamining’ existing patent contract grants authorized by the America
Invents Act [Aiding and Abetting the antitrust objective(s) of Infringers-at-Large.]; enforcing,
‘Bad Law’ from ‘Lawless Legislation’ (ignorant or not) for over two centuries; today, (now
contemptuously) effectually perpetrates the very thing entrusted to prevent by USPTO’s mission
statement: Fundamentally,
§ 140. “…Due Process does…entitle a litigant to an honest, though not
learned tribunal. If a litigant is injured through the corruption or fraud of
the court or other body disposing of his case, She (sic) is entitled to
redress under this section of the Constitution.” [Fallbrook Irrigation
District v. Bradley, 164, U.S. pp.1267-70.]
§141. “Any legislative attempt to do this, whether by direct denial of
access to the courts upon this question, or by hindering such access by
making resort to the courts upon it difficult, expensive, hazardous, all alike
violates the constitutional provision.”
“On the question of ‘Due Process Itself’ and the State of the Union in the
fair and proper administration of patent law [Vol. 12, Constitutional Law.
Chapter VII, Due Process and Equal Protection of Law: Procedure.
Section 1. Due Process of Law]; clearly, entitles Plaintiff to Redress for
this treasonous breach of Solemn Oaths to enforce rights of access.”
These are the circumstances under which violations of antitrust and other statutes
have occurred, namely, the entire judiciary and administration failing to enforce the Law of
the Land, [Causing damage to the public itself entitled to redress from their practicing
attorneys and adjudicating judges’ ruling(s) without jurisdiction and immunity.]; or, have
been administering the patent laws corruptly in breach of the public’s trust.
Even after the Federal Circuit ruled in Aqua Products, Inc. v. Matal, Case No. 15-
1177, October 2017 that all cases, that did not consider ‘Patent Prosecution History
Case 5:18-cv-01250-EJD Document 32 Filed 03/18/18 Page 23 of 28
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Estoppel’ in respective USPTO/PTAB adjudications, are warranted a reversal, the
USPTO/PTAB (in contempt) failed to uphold this Aqua Products, Inc. v. Matal ruling in
Plaintiff’s cases regarding Plaintiff’s significant patents, that have benefited this entire nation
and globe (for that matter), discriminating against Plaintiff.
PTAB’s ultra vires unconstitutional decision “invalidating” Plaintiff’s U.S. Patent
No. 7,340,506 (“the ‘506 patent) is void, because the PTAB Judges lost their jurisdiction and
immunity, in PTAB Judge McNamara and PTAB Judge Stephen C. Siu holding direct stock in
Microsoft, the Third Party Requester in the ‘506 re-examination, as per their own annual
financial disclosure statements, and PTAB Judges Kevin Turner lying and obstructing justice
along with PTAB Judges Jennifer Bisk who was conflicted out from presiding over the CBM
review of the ‘506 patent as she had worked with SAP’s attorneys at Sterne Kessler; and PTAB
Judge G. Braden; and the PTAB has no authority to invalidate a patent, contrary to the U.S.
Supreme Court ruling in Fletcher v. Peck (1810). The Federal Circuit ruled in Aqua Products v.
Matal, 15-1177, October 2017 that any PTAB or court case that did not consider Patent
Prosecution History must be reversed and reversed its own rulings that were contrary to its ruling
in Aqua Products, but the Federal Circuit refused to uphold its own Aqua Products ruling in
Dr. Arunachalam’s case against Microsoft with regard to the re-examination of Plaintiff’s
U.S. Patent No. 6,212,556, in a blatant civil rights discrimination against Dr. Arunachalam.
In Plaintiff’s ‘492, ‘158 and ‘500 patent cases, JPMorgan Chase and Company and Judge
Robinson, and PTAB failed to consider Patent Prosecution History. Had they considered
Patent Prosecution History, the terms Judge Robinson ruled as indefinite would not be and
are not indefinite.
Case 5:18-cv-01250-EJD Document 32 Filed 03/18/18 Page 24 of 28
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Given the lawless misconduct and Constitutional public breach and fraud by the PTAB
and the Federal Circuit, which voids their rulings and caused them to lose their jurisdiction and
immunity, Plaintiff finds no reason to go to the Federal Circuit to appeal the alleged
“invalidation” of the valid ‘506 patent, because the ‘506 patent is a patent contract grant issued
by the Government and remains valid through the time certain.
Judge Andrews lost his immunity and jurisdiction when he failed to recuse in
Plaintiff’s cases against JPMorgan Chase & Company, Wells Fargo, Citibank and Citizens’
Financial, IBM and Fulton Financial Corporation, despite Judge Andrews admitting he
bought direct stock in JPMorgan during the pendency of Plaintiff’s case against JPMorgan
and his orders are void in the IBM case 16-281-RGA (D.Del.) case as well as in the Fulton
case and the JPMorgan, Wells Fargo, Citibank and Citizen’s Financial Corporation cases. Judge
Andrews’ Order dismissing the civil RICO claim in the IBM case is void. Judge Andrews’ Order
in the Fulton case dismissing it on the falsely alleged basis of collateral estoppel in
Constitutional public breach and fraud is void. Judge Andrews compromised the position of the
Court and is in treasonous breach of Justice Marshall’s ruling in Fletcher v. Peck and the Federal
Circuit’s ruling in Aqua Products.
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled subsequently in the Dartmouth College (1819) case and
the U.S. v. American Bell Telephone Company (1897) case that the Supreme Court ruling in
Fletcher holds and that a patent is a contract grant and cannot be rescinded even by the highest
authority. See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819), in which the U.S. Supreme
Court held the
“original charter to be a contract, perpetually continuing, which the
New Hampshire legislation unconstitutionally impaired. In a
corporate charter, as in a conveyance of land, the court found a
contract that the grant should not be revoked.”
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See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. (1989); Grant v. Raymond (1832);
Cable News Network, Inc. v. Video Monitoring Services of America, Inc. (1984); Shaw v. Cooper
(1833); William E. Simonds, “Manual of Patent Law” (1874); William E. Simonds, “A Summary
of the Law of Patents” (1883); James W. Ely, Jr, “The Guardian of Every Other Right: A
Constitutional History of Property Rights” (3d ed.) (2008); Samuel J. Konefsky, “John Marshall
and Alexander Hamilton, Architects of the American Constitution” (Macmillan, 1964); and
Francis N. Stites, “Private Interest and Public Gain: The Dartmouth College Case, 1819” (Univ.
of Mass. Press, 1972). The above references affirm Justice Marshall’s ruling in Fletcher v. Peck
(1810) that a Government issued contract grant cannot be rescinded even by the highest authority
and applies to patent contract grants.4
In fairness, the court must poll defendants to ascertain whether they still agree in whole
or in part with IBM’s wanton argument that Fletcher does not apply; before, moving on the
Courts own motion for sanctions against IBM and followers for attempts and conspiracy in
propounding treasonous litigation (rather than [Solemn Oath Compliance.] for this Court to
enforce (deceitfully) by ignorance, indifference, and contempt for the law of the land prohibiting
the rescinding of government issued grants in the public's best interest [Sending a long overdue
chilling effect to everyone practicing Patent Law believing in this unconstitutional treasonous
belief.].
CONCLUSION: THE COURT IN THIS CASE IS PRESENTED WITH AN HISTORIC
CHOICE. That choice is between upholding or destroying contract grant protections that
Congress provided in the Contract Clause of the 10th Amendment, and that the U.S. Supreme
Court interpreting that statute declared to exist in its Fletcher decision. And the correct choice,
4 The U.S Attorney Claire T. Cormier alleged that Fletcher applies only to land. She is ignorant of the law and even
after being put on notice, she willfully breached her Solemn Oath of Office in waging war against the Constitution.
She failed to abide by the Supreme Law of the Land.
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Plaintiff submits, is to adhere to the U.S. Supreme Court’s existing, long-established
interpretation of the contract clause and to reject the new call for a new revisionist interpretation
that would render the contract clause of the Constitution nugatory in this case and in all but the
most unusual cases. There are all kinds of reasons why Fletcher is an important law to enforce
and uphold.
A Certificate of Service is attached.
Dated: March 18, 2018 Respectfully submitted,
222 Stanford Ave, Menlo Park, CA 94025
Tel: 650 690 0995 Plaintiff
[email protected] Dr. Lakshmi Arunachalam
Case 5:18-cv-01250-EJD Document 32 Filed 03/18/18 Page 27 of 28
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, OAKLAND DIVISION
DR. LAKSHMI ARUNACHALAM,
Plaintiff,
v.
APPLE, INC., et al,
AND
DOES 1-100,
Defendants.
C.A. No. 4:18-cv-01250-DMR
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Dr. Lakshmi Arunachalam, hereby certify that on March 18, 2018, the attached documents
were electronically filed with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF which will send notification
to the registered attorney(s) of record that the document has been filed and is available for
viewing and downloading.
I also certify that I sent the same via the U.S. Post Office on the same day to (i) deliver 2 paper
copies to the Clerk of the Court. I also certify that I sent the same to all counsel of record for all
Defendants via email and/or First Class U.S. Mail on March 18, 2018.
DATED: March 18, 2018
Dr. Lakshmi Arunachalam
222 Stanford Avenue
Menlo Park, CA 94025
650 690 0995
[email protected]
Case 5:18-cv-01250-EJD Document 32 Filed 03/18/18 Page 28 of 28