The IRS correctly notes that the appellant improperly named the United States and 1 Mark W. Evers, the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service (whose real name is Mark W. Everson), as defendants. Under the FOIA, a court has jurisdiction to “enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2006) (emphasis added). A FOIA plaintiff may not assert a claim against an individual federal official; the proper defendant is the agency. See Petrus v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 581, 582 (5th Cir. 1987) (“Neither the Freedom of Information Act nor the Privacy Act creates a cause of action for a suit against an individual IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 08-20724 MARK E BATTON, Plaintiff - Appellant v. MARK W EVERS, Commissioner Internal Revenue Service; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendants - Appellees Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas Before KING, GARZA, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges. HAYNES, Circuit Judge: Appellant Mark E. Batton appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) on his Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) claims. He also asserts that the district court erred 1 United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D February 24, 2010 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk Case: 08-20724 Document: 00511034757 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/24/2010
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE … · See Petrus v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 581, 582 (5th Cir. 1987) (“Neither the Freedom of ... neither the United States nor Mr. “Evers”
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The IRS correctly notes that the appellant improperly named the United States and1
Mark W. Evers, the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service (whose real name is MarkW. Everson), as defendants. Under the FOIA, a court has jurisdiction to “enjoin the agencyfrom withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperlywithheld from the complainant.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2006) (emphasis added). A FOIAplaintiff may not assert a claim against an individual federal official; the proper defendant isthe agency. See Petrus v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 581, 582 (5th Cir. 1987) (“Neither the Freedom ofInformation Act nor the Privacy Act creates a cause of action for a suit against an individual
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSFOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-20724
MARK E BATTON,
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
MARK W EVERS, Commissioner Internal Revenue Service; UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendants - Appellees
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
Before KING, GARZA, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.
HAYNES, Circuit Judge:
Appellant Mark E. Batton appeals the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) on his Freedom of
Information Act (“FOIA”) claims. He also asserts that the district court erred1
United States Court of AppealsFifth Circuit
F I L E DFebruary 24, 2010
Charles R. Fulbruge IIIClerk
Case: 08-20724 Document: 00511034757 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/24/2010
No. 08-20724
employee of a federal agency.”); see also Santos v. DEA, 357 F. Supp. 2d 33, 36 (D.D.C. 2004)(“A plaintiff may not assert a FOIA claim against individual federal officials.”). Accordingly,neither the United States nor Mr. “Evers” is a proper party to this action. On remand, theplaintiff should be given an opportunity to substitute the IRS as the proper party to thisaction.
During its investigation, the IRS served Batton with a summons requiring him to2
testify and produce documents relating to his tax filings. When Batton did not respond, theIRS brought an action to enforce the summons. The district court found Batton in contemptand ordered him to be incarcerated. Batton appealed to this court and we affirmed. UnitedStates v. Batton, 267 F. App’x 363 (5th Cir.) (unpublished), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 310 (2008).Batton later filed a motion for a stay of detention pending appeal, which was also denied.United States v. Batton, 287 F. App’x 414 (5th Cir. 2008) (unpublished). Batton hassubsequently been released from incarceration.
The IRS informed this court at oral argument that it is no longer investigating3
Batton’s criminal liability; it is, however, continuing to investigate his potential civil liabilityfor tax years 2001 to 2003.
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by denying his motion for a Vaughn index, quashing the subpoenas he served on
several IRS agents, and denying his motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. We
conclude that the district court abused its discretion by failing to order a Vaughn
index; accordingly, we REVERSE the award of summary judgment and
REMAND for further proceedings.
I. Background
In 2005, the IRS conducted an audit of taxpayer Mark E. Batton (“Batton”)
to assess his federal income tax liabilities for the tax years 2001 to 2003. While2
the IRS has not brought any criminal charges against Batton, it has developed3
a substantial file concerning his potential tax liabilities. It is this file that is the
subject of the instant litigation.
On November 7, 2006, Batton, acting through his attorney, filed a FOIA
request, seeking all information and documents relating to the audit that are in
the possession of the IRS. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006). Batton’s FOIA request
identified sixteen categories of documents to be produced, including his 2001
federal tax return; copies of all communications between himself and the IRS
pertaining to his federal tax liabilities for the 2001 to 2003 tax years; and copies
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No. 08-20724
FOIA obligates the IRS to determine within twenty days of receiving a request4
whether it will comply and “immediately notify the person making such request of suchdetermination and the reasons therefor.” § 552(a)(6)(A)(i). The statute does authorize anagency to grant itself a ten-day extension before commencing the investigation,§ 552(a)(6)(B)(i), but states that a person making the FOIA request “shall be deemed to haveexhausted his administrative remedies with respect to such request if the agency fails tocomply with the applicable time limit provisions.” § 552(a)(6)(C)(i). A court may thenauthorize the agency to take additional time to review the records only if the agencydemonstrates that “exceptional circumstances exist and that the agency is exercising duediligence in responding to the request.” Id.
In a letter dated February 28, 2007, the IRS informed Batton that he needed to pay5
a $300 fee before the IRS could process his requested documents. The letter instructed Battonthat failure to pay the fee by March 30, 2007, would result in his request being terminated andthe file closed. Batton paid the fee before the deadline.
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of any checks, deposit slips, or other banking records related to his tax liabilities
for those years.
On December 8, 2006, the IRS responded to Batton’s FOIA request by
informing Batton that additional time was needed to comply with his request.4
The IRS sent similar letters to Batton in January, February, March, May, July,
and August 2007. During this time, the IRS did not produce any of the5
requested documents. On September 6, 2007, Batton filed suit in federal district
court, seeking disclosure of the requested documents, as well as costs and
attorneys’ fees.
On January 18, 2008, the IRS notified Batton that approximately 5,318
pages of documents had been located and identified as responsive to his FOIA
request. At that time, the IRS released 953 pages of documents to Batton, of
which thirty-four pages were partially redacted. On July 29, 2008, the IRS
released an additional 249 pages of documents pursuant to Batton’s FOIA
request. Only one of the 249 pages was partially redacted.
Batton then subpoenaed five IRS agents for depositions and to compel
production of the remaining documents relating to his FOIA request. The IRS
moved to quash the subpoenas. The district court granted the motion. Batton
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No. 08-20724
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later filed a motion to extend the discovery period. That motion was denied by
the district court.
The IRS moved for summary judgment, asserting that it was entitled to
withhold the requested documents under several exemptions to the FOIA. In
support of its motion, the IRS submitted declarations by IRS agents Sarah
Sheldon (“the Sheldon declaration”), Michael Gregory (“the Gregory
declaration”), and Karen Hines (“the Hines declaration”). The Sheldon
declaration identified two broad types of documents—“Examination
Workpapers” and “Agent’s Working Papers”—and the purportedly applicable
exemptions justifying withholding. For each statutory exemption asserted,
Sheldon listed the page numbers of the file that were withheld in whole or in
part. The Gregory declaration supplemented the Sheldon declaration and
asserted that Examination Workpapers are exempt from disclosure because they
would constitute a “serious impairment to the Federal tax administration.” The
Hines declaration set forth the procedures by which the IRS conducted its search
for responsive documents.
Batton moved to compel the IRS to produce a more detailed index
identifying the documents located in response to his FOIA request and
articulating a basis for the withholding of each document (“a Vaughn index”).
See Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see also Jones v. FBI, 41
F.3d 238, 241 (6th Cir. 1994) (“A Vaughn index is a routine device through which
the defendant agency describes the responsive documents withheld or redacted
and indicates why the exemptions claimed apply to the withheld material.”).
The district court denied Batton’s motion for a Vaughn index and granted the
IRS’s motion for summary judgment. The court held that Batton did not create
a genuine issue of material fact about the application of any of the exemptions
claimed by the IRS.
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No. 08-20724
The parties concede a de novo standard applies here. Earlier precedents have6
suggested what appears to be a different standard of review for FOIA summary judgments.Villanueva v. Dep’t of Justice, 782 F.2d 528, 530 (5th Cir. 1986) (“An appellate court reviewinga trial court’s Freedom of Information Act decision must determine whether the district courthad an adequate factual basis for its decision, and, if so, whether the decision it reached wasclearly erroneous.”). However, a review of the cases shows that the focus in each is different.In Villanueva, the court conducted an in camera inspection of the documents and, necessarily,made findings of fact thereupon. In that instance, of course, our usual standard of review forfact findings—the clearly erroneous standard—would apply. Thus, where the courtnecessarily has to determine facts as part of the FOIA withholding analysis, the clearlyerroneous standard applies. However, where, as here (and as in Cooper) the question is moreof a threshold one of whether the court had sufficient information from which to determine theexemptions—a question of law—the de novo standard applies.
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Batton filed this timely appeal. He asserts that the district court erred by
denying his motion to compel production of a Vaughn index, quashing his
subpoenas, granting summary judgment, and denying him costs and attorneys’
fees.
II. Standard of Review
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.
Flightsafety Servs. Corp. v. Dep’t of Labor, 326 F.3d 607, 610 (5th Cir. 2003). In
general, summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). In the FOIA context, however, the traditional standard is
modified because “the threshold question in any FOIA suit is whether the
requester can even see the documents the character of which determines
whether they can be released.” Cooper Cameron Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor,