Case No. 13-14590 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT EARL E. GRAHAM, etc., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellants. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida AMICUS BRIEF OF ENGLE STATE PLAINTIFFS’ FIRMS IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF’S PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC Steven L. Brannock Celene Harrell Humphries Philip A. Padovano Maegan P. Luka Brannock & Humphries 100 South Ashley Drive, Suite 1130 Tampa, Florida 33602 (813) 223-4300 [email protected]John S. Mills Courtney Brewer The Mills Firm, P.A. 203 North Gadsden Street, Suite 1A Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (850) 765-0897 [email protected][email protected]Kenneth S. Canfield Doffermyre Shields Canfield & Knowles, LLC 1355 Peachtree Street, Suite 1600 Atlanta, Georgia 30309 (404) 881-8900 [email protected]Counsel for Amici Curiae Engle State Plaintiffs’ Firms Case: 13-14590 Date Filed: 05/04/2015 Page: 1 of 37
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Case No. 13-14590
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
EARL E. GRAHAM, etc., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
AMICUS BRIEF OF ENGLE STATE PLAINTIFFS’ FIRMS IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF’S PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC
Steven L. Brannock Celene Harrell Humphries Philip A. Padovano Maegan P. Luka Brannock & Humphries 100 South Ashley Drive, Suite 1130 Tampa, Florida 33602 (813) 223-4300 [email protected]
John S. Mills Courtney Brewer The Mills Firm, P.A. 203 North Gadsden Street, Suite 1A Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (850) 765-0897 [email protected][email protected] Kenneth S. Canfield Doffermyre Shields Canfield & Knowles, LLC 1355 Peachtree Street, Suite 1600 Atlanta, Georgia 30309 (404) 881-8900 [email protected]
Counsel for Amici Curiae Engle State Plaintiffs’ Firms
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Graham v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Case No. 13-14590
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
In compliance with 11th Cir. R. 26.1-1, the undersigned certifies that the
following is a complete list of all trial judge(s), attorneys, persons, associations of
persons, firms, partnerships, or corporations that have an interest in the outcome of
this particular case or appeal, and includes subsidiaries, conglomerates, affiliates
and parent corporations, including any publicly held company that owns 10% or
more of the party’s stock, and other identifiable legal entities related to a party.
1. Abrahamson & Uiterwyk – Amicus Curiae
2. Altria Group, Inc.- Publicly held parent corporation of Defendant
Philip Morris USA, Inc.
3. Arnold & Porter, LLP – Counsel for Defendant Philip Morris USA,
Inc.
4. Arnold, Keri – Counsel for Defendant Philip Morris USA, Inc.
5. Avera & Smith, LLP – Amicus Curiae
6. Baker, Frederick C. – Former Counsel for Plaintiff
7. Bancroft, PLLC – Counsel for Defendant R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Company
8. Baringer, Randal S. – Counsel for Defendant R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Company
9. Barnett, Kathryn E. – Former counsel for Plaintiff
C-1 of 13
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Graham v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Case No. 13-14590
10. Bedell, Dittmar, DeVault, Pillans & Coxe, PA – Counsel for former
Defendant Lorillard Tobacco Company
11. Bernstein-Gaeta, Judith – Counsel for Defendant Philip Morris USA,
Inc.
12. Beaver, Renee T. – Counsel for Defendant Philip Morris USA, Inc.
13. Bidwell, Cecilia M. – Counsel for Defendant Philip Morris USA, Inc.
14. Blasingame, Janna M. – Counsel for Plaintiff
15. Boies, Schiller & Flexner, LLP – Counsel for Defendant Philip Morris
USA, Inc.
16. Bradford II, Dana G. – Counsel for Defendant Philip Morris USA,
Inc.
17. Brannock & Humphries – Amicus Curiae
18. Brannock, Steven L. – Counsel for Amicus Curiae
19. Brenner, Andrew S. – Counsel for Defendant Philip Morris USA, Inc.
20. Brewer, Courtney – Counsel for Amicus Curiae
21. British American Tobacco p.l.c – Through its ownership interest in
Brown & Williamson Holdings, Inc., the indirect holder of more than
10% of the stock of Reynolds American Inc., parent company of
Defendant R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company
C-2 of 13
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Graham v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Case No. 13-14590
22. Brown, Joshua Reuben – Counsel for Defendant Philip Morris USA,
Inc.
23. Brown & Williamson Holdings, Inc. – Holder of more than 10% of
the stock of Reynolds American Inc., parent company of Defendant
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company
24. Browne, Mallori C. – Counsel for Defendant Philip Morris USA, Inc.
25. Budner, Kevin – Counsel for Plaintiff
26. Burnette, Jason – Counsel for Defendant R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Company
27. Byrd, Kenneth S. – Counsel for Plaintiff
28. Cabraser, Elizabeth Joan – Counsel for Plaintiff
29. Canfield, Kenneth S. – Counsel for Amicus Curiae
30. Clement, Paul D. – Counsel for Defendant R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Company
31. Coll, Patrick P. – Counsel for former Defendant Lorillard Tobacco
Company
32. Corrigan, Timothy J. – Judge of the Middle District of Florida
33. Council for Tobacco Research, USA, Inc. – Former Defendant
34. Crane, Eliza S. – Counsel for Defendant Philip Morris USA, Inc.
35. Daboll, Bonnie C. – Counsel for Defendant Philip Morris USA, Inc.
C-3 of 13
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Graham v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Case No. 13-14590
36. Dalton, Jr., Roy B. – Judge of Middle District of Florida
37. David J. Sales, P.A. – Amicus Curiae
38. Deupree, Rebecca M. – Counsel for Plaintiff
39. DeVault III, John Andrew – Counsel for former Defendant Lorillard
including over a dozen not named as defendants in Engle).
These counts alleged that the defendants manipulated nicotine levels in their
cigarettes to ensure addiction, failed to use available safer alternative designs, and
failed to warn consumers of what they had done. Compl. at 36-37, 50-51. The
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defendants’ answers claimed that the nicotine in their cigarettes occurred naturally
and not through manipulation and that their cigarettes were not addicting, and they
asserted federal preemption as an affirmative defense. E.g., RJR Answer 6, 19; PM
Answer 5, 16.
This preemption defense was thoroughly argued before and during the trial,
both in hearings dedicated to the topic and through objections to evidence and
argument offered by the class. E.g., Tr. 96:10,736-63; 149:16,400-01, 170:18,708-
21, 253:27,957-58, 421:42,393-94. At trial, they directed their arguments primarily
to the extent the class challenged their failure to warn of the dangers of smoking
after the July 1, 1969, effective date of the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act,
Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 5(b), 84 Stat. 87 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b)). The trial
court sustained several preemption objections and overruled others. At the
defendants’ request, it ultimately instructed the jury:
Preemption is a doctrine of federal law that limits the claims the plaintiffs can make in this case. You need to understand this limitation in order to perform your duty as jurors.
Tr. 351:37,569. After explaining the requirements of federal labelling law, the
court warned that the jury could
not base any finding of liability on a determination that after July 1 of 1969, one or more of these defendants should have included additional or more clearly stated warnings on their cigarette packages or in their advertisements. However, federal law does not limit the liability of any defendant against claims based on negligence [or] strict liability ….
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Tr. 351:37,569-70.
The defendants made relatively few arguments before or during trial that the
strict liability and negligence claims were preempted as an effective ban on the sale
of cigarettes because they well understood the claims did not go that far. For
example, they argued to the jury, without objection, that the case was not about
whether cigarettes themselves as a product category are wrong or unethical or immoral or against religion, or whatever other words were used. That’s just not what the law requires you to do. That’s not what the case is about. The case isn’t a referendum on smoking. Just not – that’s not what it’s about.
Tr. 349:37,361; see also Tr. 542:53,913 (“[U]nder the theories of this case, the
harm is not merely caused by actually selling cigarettes.”); Tr. 578:57,569 (“It is
an undeniable fact that no matter what is decided in this courtroom, cigarettes will
be available on the market in this country for the foreseeable future.”).
The trial court instructed the jury that the class had to satisfy one of two tests
to prevail on their strict liability claims – that each defendant’s cigarettes “fail[ed]
to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used as intended”
or that “the risk of danger in the design outweighs the benefits.” Tr. 351:37,571. It
instructed that to prevail on the negligence claim, the class had to prove that each
defendant was “negligent in designing, manufacturing, testing, or marketing of
cigarettes [and] prior to July 1, 1969 in failing to warn smokers of the health risks
of smoking or the addictiveness of smoking.” Tr. 351:37,577.
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The jury was asked only two questions applying to cigarettes generally. The
first asked, “Does smoking cigarettes cause one or more of the following diseases
or medical conditions?” followed by yes/no blanks for 23 different diseases. Phase
I Verdict 1-2. The jury answered yes for all but three. The second question asked,
“Are cigarettes that contain nicotine addictive or dependence producing?” and the
jury answered yes. Id. at 2. But those answers did not establish liability. Instead,
the strict liability question asked whether each defendant had “place[d] cigarettes
on the market that were defective and unreasonably dangerous.” Id. at 2. The jury
answered yes for each defendant separately. Id. at 2-3. Far from suggesting that all
cigarette manufacturers are negligent, the negligence question expressly posited
the existence of a non-negligent manufacturer, asking whether each defendant had
“failed to exercise the degree of care which a reasonable cigarette manufacturer
would exercise under like circumstances.” Id. at 10. The jury was provided yes/no
answer blanks for each defendant and for time periods before, after, and both
before and after July 1, 1969, and it answered yes for all defendants and all time
periods. Id. at 10-11.
The defendants unsuccessfully sought a new trial based on preemption,
among other arguments. Phase I Motion for New Trial 69-86; see also Phase II-B
Motion for New Trial 33; accord id. at 31 & n.15, 76-77 (contending that
comments by class counsel were “tantamount to suggesting that cigarettes should
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not be sold because they present health risks,” a position they argued was “contrary
to the framework for the sale of cigarettes established by Congress, which allows
the sale of cigarettes”).
The intermediate appellate court reversed the judgment in favor of the class
on a range of issues, including the exact preemption defense adopted by the panel
here, concluding that “Congress has foreclosed the removal of tobacco products
from the market” and therefore “[f]ederal law preempts claims that selling
cigarettes is tortious or otherwise improper.” Liggett Group, Inc. v. Engle, 853
So. 2d 434, 460 & n.35 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (citing FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000)).
While the panel quotes favorably from that decision (Opinion 39-40), the
Supreme Court of Florida quashed it, not only holding that the strict liability and
negligence findings (and others not relevant here) would have res judicata effect,
but also directly rejecting the preemption argument:
Although compliance with the federal warnings preempted any claim based on failure to warn, it did not eliminate the other causes of action that the jury had to consider in Phase I.
Engle, 945 So. 2d at 1273.
The defendants sought certiorari on preemption grounds, acknowledging that
if the Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari on the federal
preemption issue, that would “subject petitioners to adverse judgments” in progeny
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Despite their admission to the Supreme Court, the defendants nonetheless
sought to avoid adverse judgments in progeny actions by raising the same
preemption argument adopted by the panel in the briefs they filed that led to many
of the opinions cited by the panel that considered their challenges to the res
judicata effect of the Engle findings on strict liability and negligence. Walker, 734
F.3d 1278; Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 611 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2010);
Waggoner v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 835 F. Supp. 2d 1244 (M.D. Fla. 2011);
Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Douglas, 110 So. 3d 419 (Fla. 2013); Philip Morris
USA, Inc. v. Douglas, 83 So. 3d 1002 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012). Every court,
including this one, rejected this preemption argument without comment.1
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
Whether the panel’s application of preemption law was correct is beyond the
scope of this amicus brief. Even if it were correct, rehearing (whether by the panel
or en banc) is still warranted because the panel misapprehended both the basis for
1 The defendants also raised this same preemption argument in numerous Engle progeny certiorari petitions, all of which have been denied. E.g., Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Douglas, 134 S. Ct. 332 (2013); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Clay, 133 S. Ct. 650 (2012); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Gray, 132 S. Ct. 1810 (2012); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Hall, 132 S. Ct. 1795 (2012); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Campbell, 132 S. Ct. 1795 (2012); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Martin, 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012).
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Engle progeny strict liability and negligence claims, which do not apply to all
cigarettes, and the res judicata effect of the Engle findings that this Court mandated
in Walker, which would bar the preemption defense even if it had not been
adjudicated against the defendants (though it was).
Before developing these points, amici acknowledge that their criticisms of
the panel’s opinion are directed to points that the parties briefed either sparsely (the
Engle litigation history related to preemption) or not at all (the res judicata
argument). Rehearing is warranted, nonetheless, because a panel decision will bind
future panels on an issue even if contrary arguments were not raised by the parties.
E.g., Tippitt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 457 F.3d 1227, 1234 (11th Cir.
2006). The prior panel rule is not “dependent upon the skill of the attorneys …
involved with the prior decision,” and the prior panel’s “holding is the law of this
Circuit regardless of what might have happened had other arguments been made to
the [prior] panel.” Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d 1069, 1076 (11th Cir.
2000). Moreover, even when the parties’ briefs do not address the issue, “this
Court may consider the preclusive effect of a prior judgment sua sponte.”
Community State Bank v. Strong, 651 F.3d 1241, 1261 n.17 (11th Cir. 2011).
Deciding the issue raised in this appeal based on amici’s arguments would
also serve the first rule of judicial restraint, which the parties’ briefs led this panel
to unknowingly violate:
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If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality ... unless such adjudication is unavoidable.
Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105, 65 S. Ct. 152, 154
(1944), quoted with approval in, e.g., Brown v. United States, 748 F.3d 1045, 1049
(11th Cir. 2014) (Tjoflat, J.).
I. THE PREMISE OF THE PANEL’S OPINION – THAT THE ENGLE FINDINGS APPLY TO ALL CIGARETTES – IS MISTAKEN.
The panel’s opinion could not be more clear that it rests entirely on the
conclusion that the Engle strict liability and negligence findings apply to “all
cigarettes,” an assertion the panel repeated again and again. E.g., Opinion 38, 43,
48, 49. Perhaps misled by Graham’s failure to correct the defendants’
mischaracterization of these claims, the panel erred in concluding that the Engle
findings at issue are “premised on the theory that all cigarettes are inherently
defective and that every cigarette sale is an inherently negligent act.” Id. at 49.
If that were the case, the jury’s answer to the first question (cigarettes cause
disease) would have been the basis for liability. But it was not. True, this fact was
necessary to the class’s claims, but it no more established liability here than the
fact that car wrecks cause injuries would establish a manufacturer’s liability in an
auto products liability case. The basis for liability asserted in the strict liability and
negligence claims was that these specific manufacturers designed their
cigarettes by manipulating the nicotine to ensure addiction, failed to warn their
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customers of this manipulation before 1969, and declined to use safer available
alternative designs that would not addict. By the very definition of the class, these
smokers did not get cancer merely because they smoked some cigarettes; their
injuries are caused by smoking multiple packs of cigarettes a day for decades as a
result of addiction, not free choice. See Douglas, 110 So. 3d at 431-32 (“[P]roving
class membership often hinges on the contested issue of whether the plaintiff
smoked cigarettes because of addiction or for some other reason (like the reasons
of stress relief, enjoyment of cigarettes, and weight control argued below).”).
In short, the defendants are liable to class members because they became
addicted, which led them to smoke enough cigarettes over a long enough period of
time to get cancer, and they became addicted as a result of the unreasonably
dangerous design of these manufacturers’ cigarettes and by these manufacturers’
negligence. Had these defendants instead sold cigarettes based on available
alternative designs that were not manipulated to ensure addiction, the plaintiffs
would have avoided injury or at least would not be entitled to the res judicata effect
of the Engle findings.
While the jury answered the liability questions the same for all defendants
still in the case by the time of trial, that was not inevitable as the jury instructions
demonstrate. It simply shows that class counsel chose these particular defendants
wisely based on what they could prove. The findings do not suggest, for example,
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that top-25 selling brands of cigarettes like Dosal’s 305’s, Santa Fe’s American
Spirit, or Nat Sherman’s New York Cut would subject those manufacturers to
The panel also overlooked the fact that the Engle findings expressly applied
to time periods before the July 1, 1969, effective date of Congress’s requirement
that cigarette labels warn that smoking is dangerous. This was the very legislation
from which the panel took an express legislative finding that it construed to imply
the political judgment that Congress did not want to remove cigarettes from the
national market and expanded that into an implied finding that Congress intended
to prevent each State from making its own judgment on such a controversial topic.
Contra 21 U.S.C. § 387p(a)(1)) (preserving the right of states to “prohibit[] the
sale … of tobacco products by individuals of any age”). Most class members
became addicted well before 1969 (indeed, most became addicted by the 1950s).
Thus, even if the panel’s decision were correct as a matter of preemption law, the
error below was the failure to instruct the jury that it could only award damages on
the strict liability and negligence counts for defense conduct before 1969.
II. THE PANEL’S ADOPTION OF THE DEFENDANTS’ PREEMPTION DEFENSE CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT’S APPROVAL OF THE RES JUDICATA EFFECT OF THESE FINDINGS IN WALKER.
Although Graham failed to articulate res judicata as a bar to the preemption
defense, he did contend that it is too late to revive the issue. The panel derided this
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suggestion as a “too-big-to-fail” argument to which the Constitution “lends [no]
credence.” Opinion 49. That may be, but the panel overlooked that the full faith
and credit statute compels respect for the finality of Engle:
The general rule implemented by the full faith and credit statute – that parties should not be permitted to relitigate issues that have been resolved by courts of competent jurisdiction – predates the Republic. It “has found its way into every system of jurisprudence, not only from its obvious fitness and propriety, but because without it, an end could never be put to litigation.” This Court has explained that the rule
is demanded by the very object for which civil courts have been established, which is to secure the peace and repose of society by the settlement of matters capable of judicial determination. Its enforcement is essential to the maintenance of social order; for, the aid of judicial tribunals would not be invoked for the vindication of rights of person and property, if, as between parties and their privies, conclusiveness did not attend the judgments of such tribunals in respect of all matters properly put in issue and actually determined by them.
San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, Cal., 545 U.S. 323, 336-
37, 125 S. Ct. 2491, 2501 (2005) (footnote and citation omitted) (quoting S. Pac.
R. Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 49, 18 S. Ct. 18 (1897)).
In Douglas, the Florida Supreme Court reaffirmed that Engle finally
adjudicated the “defendants’ common liability” on the conduct elements of the
strict liability and negligence claims, including every class-wide defense that either
was raised or could properly have been raised:
res judicata prevents the same parties from relitigating the same cause of action in a second lawsuit and “is conclusive not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim, but as to
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every other matter which might with propriety have been litigated and determined in that action.” …. Engle defendants are precluded from arguing in individual actions that they did not engage in conduct sufficient to subject them to liability.
110 So. 3d at 432-33 (quoting Engle, 945 So. 2d at 1259); see also Hess v. Philip
that the res judicata effect of the Engle findings bar the statute of repose defense
because it goes to the defendants’ conduct, not the plaintiff’s reliance).
In Walker, this Court decided that this decision “is entitled to full faith and
credit in federal court” because the defendants “had a full and fair opportunity to
be heard in the Florida class action and the application of res judicata under Florida
law does not cause an arbitrary deprivation of property.” 734 F.3d at 1279-80.
Applying Douglas, it held, “R.J. Reynolds has exhausted its opportunities to
contest the common liability findings of the jury in Phase I.” Id. at 1288. The
panel’s decision to give the defendants another opportunity to contest these
findings – this time under a preemption argument – conflicts with Walker’s express
holding every bit as much as it conflicts with the silent rejection of the same
preemption argument raised in Reynolds’ briefs and on rehearing in Walker.
Whether one looks at this as a question of claim preclusion that does not
require a prior actual adjudication, as Douglas requires with Walker’s blessing, or
as a question of issue preclusion requiring a prior actual adjudication, as the
defendants unsuccessfully argued in Walker, the preemption defense is barred.
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While the defendants initially succeeded in the state intermediate court on the same
obstacle preemption defense credited by the panel here, Liggett Group, Inc., 853
So. 2d at 460, the Florida Supreme Court quashed that decision and held the claims
not preempted. Engle, 945 So. 2d at 1273. Once the United States Supreme Court
denied certiorari, that was the end. The panel erred in reviving this issue.
A state court’s final determination of an issue, even a purely federal issue
like preemption, precludes federal courts from revisiting the issue between the
parties. E.g., Town of Deerfield, N.Y. v. F.C.C., 992 F.2d 420, 428-29 (2d Cir.
1993); Bd. of Trs. of Carpenters Pension Trust Fund for N. Cal. v. Reyes, 688 F.2d
671, 673 (9th Cir. 1982). This Court has held that federal courts may not entertain
an argument that a state court judgment is void because the claims it adjudicated
were preempted, so long as the defendant had an opportunity to litigate the
preemption issue in state court – even if the state court did not actually adjudicate
the defense and even when complete preemption, which would deprive the state
court of jurisdiction altogether, is at issue. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Md., Inc. v.
Weiner, 868 F.2d 1550, 1554-56 (11th Cir. 1989).
While the procedural posture of Weiner (state court loser bringing a federal
action) and this case (state court loser defending a federal action) implicate
doctrines with different names (Rooker Feldman in Weiner, preclusion here), that
is a distinction without a difference for these purposes. See Weiner v. Blue Cross of
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Md., Inc., 925 F.2d 81, 83 (4th Cir. 1991) (affording res judicata effect to the same
state court judgment because the state court had jurisdiction to determine
preemption and noting that this Court did the same thing as a matter of abstention).
This Court has also held that a state court determination of a federal issue
that would have preclusive effect in the subject state binds federal courts in actions
between the same parties involving the same issue. Strong, 651 F.3d at 1262-71.
And the Supreme Court has held that when a class action in state court finally
resolves even “exclusively federal claims,” federal courts are required to give that
determination preclusive effect, so long as (1) courts in that state would do so and
(2) the Full Faith and Credit Act applies. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein,
516 U.S. 367, 373-75, 116 S. Ct. 873, 877-78 (1996).
This Court having held in Walker that both elements apply to the Engle
findings and that the defendants had a full and fair opportunity to be heard in state
court, the panel’s decision to entertain the preemption argument conflicts with
Walker, Weiner, Strong, and Epstein.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, if the panel denies rehearing, the Court should
vacate the panel’s opinion and order en banc briefing to address not just the merits
of the preemption argument, but also whether the Engle findings apply to all
cigarettes and whether the preemption defense is barred by res judicata.
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/s/ Steven L. Brannock Steven L. Brannock Celene Harrell Humphries Philip A. Padovano Maegen P. Luka Brannock & Humphries 100 South Ashley Drive, Suite 1130 Tampa, Florida 33602 (813) 223-4300 [email protected]
Respectfully submitted, /s/ John S. Mills John S. Mills Courtney Brewer The Mills Firm, P.A. 203 North Gadsden Street, Suite 1A Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (850) 765-0897 [email protected][email protected] /s/ Kenneth S. Canfield Kenneth S. Canfield Doffermyre Shields Canfield & Knowles, LLC 1355 Peachtree Street, Suite 1600 Atlanta, Georgia 30309 (404) 881-8900 [email protected]
Attorneys for Amici Curiae Engle State Plaintiffs’ Firms
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on May 4, 2015, I had the foregoing document
electronically filed using the Court’s Appellate PACER system, which will
automatically send electronic notification constituting service of the foregoing to
all counsel of record.
/s/ John S. Mills Attorney
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