IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA ______________________ CASE NO. _________ ______________________ 5 th DCA CASE NO. 5D01-1829 RESIDENCE INN BY MARRIOTT, INC., a foreign corporation, and MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC., a foreign corporation, Defendants/Petitioners, v. CECILE RESORT LTD., a Florida limited partnership, and EURAMERICAN INVESTMENT CONSULTANTS CORP., a Florida corporation, Plaintiffs/Respondents. _____________________________________/ PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS Residence Inn by Marriott, Inc. and Marriott International, Inc. (collectively, Marriott), petition this Court for a Writ of Mandamus directing the Fifth District Court of Appeal to reinstate and rule on Marriott's Petition for Writ of Certiorari. The Fifth District dismissed Marriott's certiorari petition without reaching the merits, erroneously ruling that Marriott's Petition for Writ of Certiorari was
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA______________________
CASE NO. _______________________________
5th DCA CASE NO. 5D01-1829
RESIDENCE INN BY MARRIOTT,INC., a foreign corporation, andMARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL,INC., a foreign corporation,
Defendants/Petitioners,
v.
CECILE RESORT LTD., a Florida limited partnership, andEURAMERICAN INVESTMENT CONSULTANTS CORP., a Floridacorporation,
Residence Inn by Marriott, Inc. and Marriott International, Inc. (collectively,
Marriott), petition this Court for a Writ of Mandamus directing the Fifth District
Court of Appeal to reinstate and rule on Marriott's Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
The Fifth District dismissed Marriott's certiorari petition without reaching the
merits, erroneously ruling that Marriott's Petition for Writ of Certiorari was
2 2
untimely. We will demonstrate that Marriott's petition was timely and the Fifth
District should have reached its merits.
At issue in the courts below is a dispute concerning Marriott's obligation to
produce certain documents, documents that Marriott contends are irrelevant and
confidential. The question of timeliness arises because the trial court addressed the
production of the documents at issue over a series of hearings culminating in two
written orders, one on March 15, 2001 and one on May 24, 2001. Marriott took its
petition from the order of May 24, 2001. The Fifth District dismissed the petition
as untimely, ruling that Marriott should have filed its petition from the March 15,
2001 order.
As we show below, the district court's ruling overlooks that Marriott could
not have successfully petitioned from the March 15, 2001 order. That order merely
determined that Marriott would be required to produce documents already
produced in another case against Marriott, a case to be named by the plaintiffs.
Unexpectedly, plaintiffs selected a case in which the documents were sealed by a
California court as confidential. Marriott refused to produce these confidential
documents and the parties then litigated the confidentiality issue over a series of
hearings culminating in the May 24, 2001 order. In this order, the trial court, now
aware of the confidential nature of the documents at issue, nevertheless compelled
1 Mendez v. West Flagler Family Ass'n, Inc., 303 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1974) (interlocutory order thatdismisses a separate and distinct cause of action is a final order requiring an immediate appeal).
3 3
production. Marriott then filed a petition for writ of certiorari, complaining that the
trial court had ordered the production of irrelevant and confidential documents.
The Fifth District's erroneous determination that Marriott should have
petitioned from the March 15 ruling of the trial court ignores that the trial court had
not yet been presented, nor ruled on, the critical confidentiality issue that was the
centerpiece of Marriott's Petition for Writ of Certiorari. In fact, the March 15 order
was only the start, not the completion, of the trial court's judicial labors concerning
the discovery dispute dividing the parties. A petition for writ of certiorari from the
March 15 order would have been futile because Marriott could not then have
proved irreparable harm, and because the trial judge had not yet even reached the
confidentiality issue that was the subject of the petition.
In effect, the Fifth District resurrects the Mendez trap.1 The Fifth District's
ruling, if allowed to stand, would encourage parties who wish to preserve their right
to seek review of an ongoing dispute to file a protective petition for writ of
certiorari at every possible point of appellate entry, regardless of whether the
petition has merit, and regardless of whether the petition is premature. This Court
should discourage the piecemeal appellate review that would be the inevitable result
of the Fifth District's ruling by issuing the Writ of Mandamus and confirming that
4 4
Marriott's Petition for Writ of Certiorari was timely.
JURISDICTION
A petition for writ of mandamus is the appropriate remedy to correct an
erroneous refusal to exercise jurisdiction by a District Court of Appeal. See
During the first hearing on this matter, which occurred on March 1, 2001,
Marriott explained to the trial court that the discovery sought by Cecile did not even
remotely relate to the issues framed by the pleadings in this case (App. Tab 8 at
3 As counsel for Marriott later stated to the trial court, this order on rehearing "determined thatkickbacks, RICO, commercial bribery, all of that, is just not part of the case." (App. Tab 14 at 5). This statement was never disputed.
7 7
12-16). Rather, Marriott argued, Cecile’s last-minute “detour” into these claims of
unlawful payments, RICO, Robinson-Patman price discrimination, and commercial
bribery was nothing more than “a fishing expedition of the old type” (App. Tab 8 at
16). At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied Marriott’s motion for
protective order, ruling from the bench that “much of this discovery goes to the
damages issues” (App. Tab 8 at 31). On March 5, 2001, Marriott moved for
rehearing before the trial court order was reduced to writing (App. Tab 9).
Marriott's Motion for Rehearing was heard on March 13, 2001. At that
hearing, the trial court expressed concerns about the breadth and relevance of
plaintiffs' requests.3 In response to suggestions by plaintiffs that similar issues had
been raised in other litigation against Marriott, the trial court forged what it viewed
as a compromise. The trial court directed Marriott to produce documents already
produced in one case against Marriott, a case to be designated by Cecile after the
hearing (App. Tab 10). Later that afternoon, counsel for Cecile wrote to Marriott
informing Marriott that the case it selected was Pacific Landmark v. Marriott, et
al., a breach of management agreement suit filed in California in 1992 and settled in
1996 (App. Tab 1 at 2; App. Tab 11 at 2 and exhibits A; App. Tab 13 J. Akers
Aff.). Unaware of the designation, the trial court memorialized its ruling of
4 The case concerned matters that arose before 1992 and thus any information contained in thedocuments produced in Pacific Landmark hardly could relate to the damage period claimed in thepresent case to have begun in 1997 (App. Tab 5). Moreover, Pacific Landmark's suit against Marriottdid not involve issues relating to franchisees since there, Marriott simply managed the property ownedby Pacific Landmark Hotel, Ltd. (App. Tab 13 J. Akers' Aff.). For other information describing thecase, see Pacific Landmark Hotel, Ltd. v. Marriott Hotels, Inc., 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 555 (Cal. Ct.App. 1993).
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March 13, in a written order executed immediately thereafter on March 15, 2001.
The order granted Marriott's Motion for Rehearing and ruled that Marriott "shall
only be required to produce documents from the case identified by Plaintiffs'
counsel" (App. Tab 10). The order does not refer to the Pacific Landmark
documents.
The parties discovered that Cecile's designation of the Pacific Landmark
case complicated, rather than simplified, plaintiffs' discovery request. The
documents in Pacific Landmark were the subject of a confidentiality order entered
by the California trial court and subsequently incorporated into the parties'
agreement settling the Pacific Landmark case (App. Tab 11; App. Tab 13
J. Aker's Aff.; App. Tab 14 at 5; App. Tab 15 at 8-9). 4
Having determined that the documents were confidential, Marriott advised
the plaintiffs at a corporate deposition on March 21 that the documents would not
be produced. Plaintiffs responded with their tenth motion to compel on March 26,
presenting the confidentiality issue to the trial court for the first time.
Acknowledging that the documents found to be confidential by the California
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court were "beyond [its] authority to reach" (App. Tab 15 at 12), the trial court
grappled with whether it could facilitate Cecile's discovery while still according
comity to the California court's determination that these documents were
confidential (App. Tab 15 at 8-13, 16, 20). At a series of hearings occurring on
April 24, April 30, May 7, May 21, and May 24, the court wavered between several
potential solutions, including ordering Marriott to produce the Pacific Landmark
documents subject to the existing order of the California court (App. Tab 14 at 6;
App. Tab 15 at 16, 20) or compelling Marriott to produce documents in its
possession relating only to its business dealings with the Pacific Landmark Hotel
entities (App. Tab 15 at 22-23). Recognizing the difficulties presented by the
confidentiality order, the trial court stated that it was prepared "at some point" to
enter an order requiring the production of the Pacific Landmark documents, but
that it did not want to violate the California court order, which required leave of
court for release of the documents under seal (App. Tab 21 at 26-27).
The Trial Court Rules.
This series of hearings culminated in the trial court's written order of May 24,
2001. In an abrupt turnabout, the May 24 order, which was prepared by Cecile's
counsel, compelled Marriott to produce within 20 days the Pacific Landmark
documents that were "under seal in a warehouse in California pursuant to the
California dismissal order" (App. Tab 22 at 3-5, 7, 14, 18, 22; App. Tab 23).
10 10
Marriott Files its Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
On June 21, Marriott filed its Petition for Writ of Certiorari seeking the Fifth
District Court of Appeal's review of the trial court's order compelling production
(App. Tab 24). In that petition, Marriott argued that the trial court had departed
from the essential requirements of law by compelling the production of documents
that had absolutely no relevance to the litigation and would not lead to the
discovery of relevant information. Marriott demonstrated that the improper
discovery order resulted in irreparable harm not redressable upon plenary appeal
because of the confidential nature of the documents at issue. Thus, Marriott's
petition presented the classic "cat out of the bag" discovery dispute often
successfully addressed by certiorari. See, e.g., Martin-Johnson, Inc. v. Savage,
509 So. 2d 1097, 1100 (Fla. 1987).
The Fifth District sua sponte issued an order to show cause why Marriott's
petition should not be dismissed as untimely (App. Tab 25). The show cause
order questioned whether Marriott should have filed its petition for writ of certiorari
from the trial court's March 15 order requiring Marriott to produce documents from
a case to be designated by the plaintiffs. Id. Marriott responded, pointing out that
the confidentiality issue did not become apparent and was not presented to the trial
court until the series of hearings that began on April 24, 2001 (App. Tab 26; App.
Tab 28). These hearings culminated in the May 24, 2001 order from which
Marriott filed its certiorari petition.
5 Marriott's petition for certiorari was actually filed June 21, not July 21, 2001.
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On August 6, 2001, the Fifth District dismissed Marriott's petition as
untimely. According to the court:
The court finds that the March 15, 2001 order rendered belowsubjected petitioners to discovery of the documents from theCalifornia case. Accordingly, it is
"ORDERED, sua sponte, that the PETITION FOR WRIT OFCERTIORARI, filed July 21, 2001,
5 being untimely, is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Such dismissal is withoutprejudice to petitioners raising the discovery issue in any subsequent direct appeal.
(App. Tab 29).
Marriott Seeks a Stay of the Document Production.
Marriott filed a motion with the trial court to extend the stay of the document
production pending review of the jurisdictional question presented by this mandamus
petition in this Court. The trial court denied the motion and ordered that the documents
be delivered within seven days to a discovery special master. The documents are to be
released by the special master to the plaintiffs on October 16, 2001 unless ordered
otherwise by this Court or the trial court (App. Tab 30).
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ARGUMENT
Marriott's Petition for Writ of Certiorari was timely. The May 24 Order was
the trial court's first written ruling addressing the issue of confidentiality and
ordering Marriott to produce the documents despite the California confidentiality
order. A petition for writ of certiorari from the March 15 order would have been
correctly dismissed because Marriott could not have shown irreparable harm and
because the petition would have been premature until the trial court completed its
labors concerning the confidentiality issue. To suggest that Marriott was required
to preserve its right of review by filing an unmeritorious and premature petition
would encourage wasteful and piecemeal appellate review. Parties would be
required to file multiple preliminary protective petitions for certiorari or risk that the
right of review would be denied as untimely. Put simply, if the Fifth District's order
is allowed to stand, the Mendez trap, which plagued litigants in the mid-1970's,
would be reincarnated in another form.
Marriott Had No Right of Review From the March 15 Order.
As this Court has cautioned on numerous occasions, not every order
erroneously compelling discovery is worthy of certiorari review. See Martin-
Johnson, Inc. v. Savage, 509 So. 2d 1097, 1100 (Fla. 1987). It is not enough to
prove that the trial court's ruling departed from the essential requirements of law.
To successfully invoke the appellate court's certiorari jurisdiction, the petitioner
must show that the production of the documents "may reasonably cause material
6 See also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Cumming, 736 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); LibertyMut. Ins. Co. v. Lease America, Inc., 735 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Suroor Bin Mohammedal Nahyan v. First Inv. Corp., 701 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997).
13 13
injury of an irreparable nature." Id. The most common example is "cat out of the
bag" material such as privileged or confidential information that causes harm that
cannot later be corrected once the information is released. Id.
Thus, to successfully invoke the Fifth District's certiorari jurisdiction,
Marriott had to do more than show that the documents requested are irrelevant.
Marriott was also required to show that the discovery of the information will cause
Following the teaching of Martin-Johnson and Langston, the district courts of
appeal routinely dismiss petitions for certiorari seeking to review discovery orders
in the absence of a showing of irreparable harm. See Megaflight, Inc. v. Lamb,
749 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (dismissing petition for certiorari because the
documents at issue were not privileged or confidential); Aspex Eyeware, Inc. v.
Ross, 778 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) ("the production of irrelevant material
does not rise to the level of irreparable harm for certiorari to lie").6
These cases leave no doubt that Marriott had no right to certiorari review of
the March 15, 2001 order of the court. That order simply confirmed that the
plaintiffs could request the production of documents relating to a particular case
selected by the plaintiffs. It was not until the series of hearings taking place after
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March 15 that the confidentiality problem created by plaintiffs' choice of Pacific
Landmark was recognized and presented to the court. To summarize the
chronology of events:
March 1, 2001. The trial court denies Marriott's motion for protective order in aruling from the bench.
March 5, 2001. Marriott moves for rehearing.
March 13, 2001. Ruling from the bench, the trial court grants Marriott's motionfor rehearing. Plaintiff's production request will be narrowed to documentsfrom one case to be designated after the hearing by the plaintiffs.
March 13, 2001. After the hearing, the plaintiffs send a letter designating thePacific Landmark case.
March 15, 2001. The trial court enters the written order compelling production ofdocuments from one case to be designated by the plaintiffs. The order did notidentify the Pacific Landmark documents but only memorialized the March 13ruling from the bench.
March 21, 2001. Marriott refuses to produce the documents because of theCalifornia confidentiality order.
March 26, 2001. Plaintiffs file a motion to compel addressing for the first timethe Pacific Landmark documents and the confidentiality issues raised by theproduction of these documents.
April 24 – April 30 – May 7 – May 21, 2001. The trial court holds a series ofhearings grappling with the confidentiality problem.
May 24, 2001. The trial court rejects Marriott's confidentiality argument andenters a written order requiring the production of the Pacific Landmarkdocuments.
June 21, 2001. Marriott files its Petition for Writ of Certiorari
Had Marriott filed a petition for writ of certiorari from the March 15 order, it
7 Indeed, there was nothing in the record to indicate that the trial judge was even aware of plaintiffs'designation at the time of the March 15, 2001 order.
15 15
would have been dismissed for lack of any irreparable harm. At that point in the
proceedings, there was nothing in the record to suggest that the documents
designated by the plaintiffs on March 13 presented significant confidentiality
issues.7 Thus, there was nothing in the record to support the "cat out of the bag"
confidentiality argument that formed the heart of Marriott's later Petition for Writ of
Certiorari. The record on the confidentiality issue was not created until after
March 21 when Marriott, having recognized the confidential nature of the
documents recently designated by plaintiffs, raised the issue and refused to
produce, and plaintiffs filed their motion to compel.
Nor can there be any complaint that Marriott did not act promptly in raising
the confidentiality issue. Plaintiffs' designated the 1992 litigation the afternoon of
March 13. Within 8 days, Marriott determined that plaintiffs' choice of the Pacific
Landmark case raised confidentiality issues and brought this issue to the attention
of the plaintiffs. The parties promptly brought the issue to the attention of the trial
court. Recognizing the importance of the issue, the trial court addressed it over a
series of four more hearings attempting to reach a solution that balanced the interest
of plaintiffs' request for production and Marriott's interest in confidentiality. It was
this record, created over those four hearings, that led to the May 24 order and
which, in turn, gave rise to Marriott's right to petition the Fifth District for a writ of
16 16
certiorari.
Marriott Could Not Have Raised theConfidentiality Order in an Earlier Petition.
Had Marriott filed a petition for writ of certiorari from the March 15 order
and, in that petition, had attempted to raise the confidentiality issue, the petition
would have been dismissed as violative of the rules of appellate procedure and as
premature. To begin with, any attempt to raise the confidentiality issue would have
required going outside the record. The plaintiffs' letter designating the Pacific
Landmark documents had not yet been considered by the trial court and was not
yet part of the record. As discussed above, the record on confidentiality was
developed between March 26 and May 24.
Moreover, any petition prior to May 24 would have been premature because
the judge's labor on the issue of the production of the documents was not yet
complete. Basic principles of appellate review counsel that an appellate court
should not reach issues not yet ruled upon by the trial court and should not
intercede until the trial court's work on the issue is complete.
Applying these principles, appellate courts routinely dismiss requests for
interlocutory review when the trial court has not yet had an opportunity to rule on
the issue presented. See, e.g., Barber v. Wonderland Greyhound Park, 656 So.
2d 961, 962 (Fla. 5th DCA) (declining to review matter not yet reached by a trial
court); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lenard, 531 So. 2d 180, 182 (Fla. 2d
8 For example, Rule 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iv) permitted interlocutory review of orders granting affirmativerelief in favor of a party. In interpreting the rule (before its recent repeal) courts restricted the rule toorders that determine the issue of liability in favor of a party seeking affirmative relief as opposed to anissue of liability. Vanaman v. Suggs, 767 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). Similarly, interlocutoryrulings on attorneys fees are not appealable until the court has ruled on both entitlement and liability. Winkelman v. Toll, 632 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).
17 17
DCA 1988) (dismissing petition for writ of certiorari as premature because the
discovery issue had not yet been presented to or ruled on by the trial court);
Cousino v. State, 473 So. 2d 777, 778 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (dismissing petition for
common law certiorari because the trial court's tentative ruling did not yet constitute
the denial of the motion for protective order.)
Similarly, in an effort to avoid piecemeal appellate review, appellate courts
deny attempts to seek interlocutory review before the trial court has finished its
labors in connection with the issue to be reviewed. For example, in Morton v. City
of Miami Beach, 376 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), the trial court entered an
interim order granting an accounting. At the time, additional issues in connection
with the accounting remained to be decided. The appellate court determined that
there was no right to interlocutory appeal or certiorari review until the trial court
completed the full accounting. Id. at 281. According to the court, "[t]o review this
partial order of accounting before the full accounting is completed in the trial would
be contrary" to the rule against "piecemeal appeals." Id. See also Hernando
County v. Leisure Hills, Inc., 648 So. 2d 257, 258 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (partial
ruling on liability could not support an interlocutory appeal).8
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The Fifth District's ruling below seems to suggest that, because the trial
court's March 15 order requires the production of the documents at issue, Marriott
had to file its petition from that order or forever lose its right to interlocutory
appellate review. As discussed above, as of March 15, the trial court had not yet
ruled on the confidentiality issue and there was no record of irreparable harm.
Marriott was not required to file a meritless petition to preserve its right of appellate
review.
The clearest statement of this principle appears in State v. Ayala, 604 So. 2d
1275 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). In Ayala, the trial court in January, 1992 determined that
certain evidence was inadmissible. Later, the state obtained new information and
reraised the evidentiary issue with the trial court in July which again ruled the
evidence inadmissible. The defendant attempted to dismiss the state's petition for
writ of certiorari as untimely, arguing that the state was required to bring its petition
within 30 days of the January ruling. The Fourth District disagreed. The state had
the right to supplement the record in the trial court and seek review of the trial
court's later ruling. According to the court:
The mere fact, standing alone, that the state has the right to seekimmediate review of pre-trial orders excluding similar crimes evidencedoes not necessarily yield the conclusion that the state must do so atthe moment of the trial court's first expression on the subject, orforever lose it.
604 So. 2d at 1276.
Similarly, in Balboa Ins. Co. v. Vanscooter, 526 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 2d DCA
9 There are cases that suggest that a party may not evade the thirty day time limit for filing a petitionfor writ of certiorari merely by re-raising the same issue in a duplicative motion. See BensonhurstDrywall, Inc. v. Ledesma, 583 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). Here, by contrast, the trial court'sextensive May 24 order was much more than just a reiteration of its sketchy order of March 15. The
19 19
1988) the trial court ruled in December, 1987, that the defendant was required to
produce its claim file unless it prevailed on its upcoming motion for summary
judgment. Summary judgment was later denied. In February, 1988, the court
ordered production and defendant petitioned for certiorari. The Second District
rejected plaintiff's argument that defendants should have petitioned from the
December, 1987 order and not waited until the February, 1988 ruling. The court
recognized that the issue of disclosure "was not ripe for appellate review" until
summary judgment was denied and the court ordered production.
Marriott's case is even stronger. In both Ayala and Balboa, the appellate
courts permitted petitions for review from the trial court's second ruling on the
disputed issue. Here, Marriott seeks review of the trial court's first ruling on
confidentiality. The trial court did not rule on the confidentiality issue raised by
plaintiffs' choice of the Pacific Landmark documents until the May 24 order from
which Marriott sought review. The court's March 15 order did nothing more than
suggest generally that plaintiffs could designate a case and that Marriott would be
required to produce documents from the designated case. Marriott had the right
(and indeed the duty) to present to the trial court the confidentiality issues raised by
plaintiffs' designation before seeking appellate review. See Ayala, 604 So. 2d at
1276.9
May 24 order for the first time dealt with the specific documents sought by the plaintiffs and the issue ofconfidentiality. See Balboa, 526 So. 2d at 779-80 (second of two orders was not just a "ministerial"enforcement of the earlier order).10 This Court disengaged the trap by the adoption of Rule 9.110(k) which states that a party may seekreview of a partial final judgment either immediately or at the end of the case upon plenary appeal.
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Resurrection of the Mendez Trap
To deny Marriott's mandamus petition would be to encourage either
piecemeal review or the filing of unnecessary "protective" petitions for certiorari.
Essentially, the Fifth District's ruling springs the "Mendez Trap,” long thought to be
dormant. In Mendez v. Flagler Family Ass'n, Inc., 303 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1974) this
Court determined that a trial court's partial ruling on liability could be sufficiently
separate and distinct from the rest of the case to constitute a final order and require
an appeal within thirty days. Mendez left litigants in the difficult position of having
to guess whether particular interlocutory rulings were sufficiently final to support an
appeal. Careful litigants filed protective notices of appeal from every interlocutory
ruling dismissing a portion of a case to protect against a later determination that the
ruling could support a separate and independent appeal. 10
The Fifth District's ruling resurrects the same dilemma once created by
Mendez. Litigants in Marriott's position would be forced to file protective writs of
certiorari whenever a trial court touches upon an issue that may later be the subject
of interlocutory review, even if the record is not yet complete and the trial court has
not ruled on the critical issue. Such protective petitions are even more disruptive
21 21
than the protective notices of appeal once required by Mendez. A protective
petition for certiorari requires the petitioner to fully brief the arguments raised and
the appellate court to review those arguments for sufficiency.
Marriott had no obligation to file its petition before the development of the
record and the trial court's ruling on confidentiality. Its petition for certiorari was
timely. This Court should issue the petition for writ of mandamus and refuse the
Fifth District's invitation to resurrect the Mendez trap.
CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, this Court should issue the petition for writ of
mandamus and direct the Fifth District Court of Appeal to reinstate and rule upon
Marriott's petition for writ of certiorari.
Respectfully submitted,
HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLPCounsel for Defendants/Petitioners
By: __________________________
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