In pursuit of resistance: pragmatic recommendations for doing science within one’s means

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Title: In pursuit of resistance: Pragmatic recommendations for doing science within one's means

Article Type: SPSP: The Society for Philosophy of ...

Keywords: Charles Peirce; pragmatism; reality; scientific inquiry; inquiry; economy of research;

hypothesis testing

Corresponding Author: Amy McLaughlin

Corresponding Author's Institution:

First Author: Amy McLaughlin

Order of Authors: Amy McLaughlin

Abstract: Charles Peirce, the founder of pragmatism and himself a working scientist, was concerned to

formulate elements of his pragmatism so as to be of practical benefit to philosophers and scientists

alike. This discussion investigates the practical recommendations of Peircean pragmatism, especially

as it relates to questions of how we should conduct scientific inquiry. Peirce's model of inquiry is

supposed to demarcate appropriate from specious methods of inquiry. While, as Cheryl Misak points

out, Peirce's explicit account fails, the account can nevertheless be rescued by elements of his own

system. Specifically the account provided in this paper draws from Peirce's corollary to his "first rule of

reason," that one should not block the road to inquiry. Following this corollary, under the guidance of

Peirce's view of reality and the role it plays in inquiry, leads us to conclude that the optimal way to

conduct inquiry is to follow the path of greatest resistance. We cannot, however, as Peirce recognized,

pursue our researches optimally, since we are limited in time, energy, and other resources. Making the

best use of those resources requires a measure of economy. To this end, Peirce developed specific

recommendations about the economy of research. The focus here is on his recommendation regarding

hypothesis testing, which is that we "begin with that positive prediction . . . which seems least likely to

be verified." According to this suggestion, to test any given hypothesis we should begin by assessing

the probability of each of its predictions, given a suitable, contrary hypothesis. Once we note which are

the least likely of the predictions, we use other economic factors to determine which tests to perform.

The fortified Peircean account developed here maintains that inquiry should be conducted so as to

leave open the path to future inquiry. This means taking a particular attitude toward our set of beliefs -

being prepared to recognize their limitations and keeping the field of belief susceptible to doubt. In

accepting that inquiry is best that serves to maximize resistance, we require of ourselves a constant

striving, believing just what we believe, but never resting content with it. This is the attitude of the

consummate scientist, accepting the best of the theories available, but never dogmatically, and always

on alert for opportunities to recognize the shortcomings of those views and awake to the possibility

that other, better theories are on the horizon.

Response to Reviewers: My thanks to the editor and the reviewers for the encouraging comments and

for their insights. I have taken the reviewers' suggestions, and the resultant paper I believe to be

stronger for my having done so.

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In Pursuit of Resistance: Pragmatic Recommendations for Doing Science within One’s Means

Introduction1

Charles Peirce, the founder of pragmatism and himself a working scientist, was

concerned to formulate elements of his pragmatism so as to be of practical benefit to

philosophers and scientists alike. This discussion investigates the practical

recommendations of Peircean pragmatism, especially as it relates to questions of how we

should conduct scientific inquiry. The account developed here synthesizes various

elements of Peirce’s epistemology so as to showcase the ways in which the elements can

be unified, and the practical import of such unification. The resultant synthesis, as we

shall see, suggests that the optimal path of inquiry is the path of greatest resistance. We

cannot, as Peirce recognized, pursue our researches optimally, however, since we are

limited in time, energy, and other resources. In order to make the best use of those

resources, we must economize. To this end, Peirce developed specific recommendations

about the economy of research. If the aforementioned Peircean synthesis, where Peirce’s

general epistemology is represented as recommending the pursuit of resistance, is an

accurate representation of Peirce’s general approach, we should expect to see evidence of

this in Peirce’s specific recommendations for economizing in research contexts. That is,

if I am right that Peirce’s position recommends pursuing resistance, his views on the

economy of research should provide evidence of this recommendation. Here, I focus

attention on a restricted context of scientific research, specifically where one is interested

1 I wish to thank those present at the 2nd Biennial Conference of the Philosophy of Science in Practice who provided helpful comments on this material. My gratitude goes especially to Hasok Change for his extensive comments and advice regarding an early draft of the paper. Special thanks go to Carl Hoefer and two anonymous reviewers for their encouraging comments on a previous draft of this paper, and for their insightful and instructive suggestions.

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in determining which hypotheses to test and which experimental tests relevant to those

hypotheses to perform. I show that Peirce’s specific recommendations for how to

economize in determining which experimental tests to perform do indeed show traces of

the broader epistemological recommendation to pursue resistance. Thus, not only does

the pursuit of resistance give us a parsimonious way of unifying elements of Peirce’s

system, but that understanding finds support in some of Peirce’s particular

recommendations for conducting research.

There are three broad movements in the following discussion. First, I examine

Peirce’s theory of inquiry and Cheryl Misak’s insightful discussion of Peirce’s failure in

his explicit defense of the scientific method. Using elements of Peirce’s own work, I

supplement his theory of inquiry to formulate a fortified Peircean account that withstands

Misak’s objection and overcomes the shortcomings of her alternative account. Second, I

consider the role that reality plays in Peirce’s epistemology and, given that role, what is

required in order to pursue truth (understood as conformity with reality). The resultant

synthesis of elements of Peirce’s epistemology, as discovered through these two

investigations, implies that conformity with reality is best pursued through maximal

resistance, which makes the optimal path for inquiry the path of greatest resistance.

Third, because limited resources constrain research and so the extent to which we can

follow the optimal path for inquiry, I consider the practical implications of this

epistemological recommendation. Specifically, I examine Peirce’s discussion of the

economy of research and his advice about how to weigh the cost of gathering evidence

against the likely benefits of that research activity. I argue that Peirce’s recommendations

about conducting research economically can be, and given his broader epistemological

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commitments should be, understood in terms of maximizing opposition. What we are left

with, in the end, is a pragmatic account that synthesizes elements of Peirce’s

epistemology, applies that epistemological framework to a specific research context, and

results in practical guidance for conducting research under various economical

constraints.

1. Inquiry According to Peirce

For this discussion, two aspects of Peirce’s account of inquiry are of particular

importance. First is Peirce’s insistence that inquiry always begins with a set of beliefs in

hand. Second is that Peirce’s model of inquiry relies fundamentally on the operation of

doubt. In particular doubt is necessary for both prompting and sustaining inquiry. These

aspects of Peirce’s account are considered in some detail below.

According to Peirce, belief just is a habit of sorts; beliefs are manifest in us as

propensities to act. In “The Fixation of Belief” he states, “Our beliefs guide our desires

and shape our actions. . . . Belief does not make us act at once, but puts us into such a

condition that we shall behave in some certain way, when the occasion arises” (5.371-

373).2 The propensity to act in a particular way under particular circumstances is

indicative of habit. The nature of the habit characteristic of belief is clarified in the

passage below:

Belief is not a momentary mode of consciousness; it is a habit of mind essentially enduring for some time, and mostly (at least) unconscious; and like other habits, it is (until it meets with some surprise that begins its dissolution) perfectly self-satisfied. Doubt is of an altogether contrary genus. It is not a habit, but the privation of a habit. (5.417)

2 References of this form (n.m), are to volume n and paragraph m of Peirce’s Collected Papers.

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Beliefs, on Peirce’s account, are dispositional not propositional, and the set of habits that

constitutes one’s belief system will continue unaltered unless and until it “meets with

some surprise.” Once something happens to challenge one’s belief set, one may be

thrown into doubt.3

Peirce concerned himself with what he termed ‘genuine’ doubt. He writes: “[T]he

mere putting of a proposition into the interrogative form does not stimulate the mind to

any struggle after belief. There must be a real and living doubt, and without this all

discussion is idle” (5.376). To say that one recognizes a proposition to be dubitable is not

the same as to doubt the proposition. Manufactured doubt, or doubt that is simply a

matter of entertaining alternatives, Peirce thought useful for examining consequences and

such, but it is not the sort of impetus to inquiry as is genuine doubt. He states “[D]oubt

has a limen, that is, is only called into being by a certain finite stimulus” (5.416).4

Typically Peirce speaks of such stimuli as surprising, or recalcitrant experiences. Once

some surprising stimulus presents itself, it is then possible for one to be thrown into a

state of doubt. This state is sufficiently uncomfortable as to promote action of some sort.

In “The Fixation of Belief,” Peirce states: “The irritation of doubt causes a struggle to

attain a state of belief. I shall term this struggle inquiry…” (5.374). He acknowledges, of

course, that this use of the term ‘inquiry’ may be non-standard. ‘Inquiry’, in Peirce’s

sense, applies more broadly than the word in its usual sense and is defined by reference to

its goal.

According to Peirce, the sole object of inquiry is the settlement of belief. If one’s

beliefs are already settled—that is, if one’s beliefs have not been unsettled by doubt—

3 This is to be explored more deeply in what follows, especially with respect to the precise sort of relationship that exists between belief and doubt. 4 See also 5.374-5.

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then inquiry will not begin. Doubt is the promoter of inquiry and only occurs with the

presentation of some surprising stimulus. But, surprise just is a thwarting of expectations,

and having expectations requires that one have some beliefs about what is to be expected.

Thus, inquiry cannot begin from a state absent of belief. Potential inquirers always begin

with some set of beliefs already in hand.5 Included in this set are beliefs about what will

count as relevant evidence, whose accounts are to be believed, how to tell when a

hypothesis has been confirmed or defeated, etc. From what has been said above, it is clear

that Peirce requires these beliefs remain firm unless and until some source of doubt

provides a challenge to those beliefs in particular. Then inquiry relevant to those beliefs

can begin, but it has as its sole purpose to remove the irritation of doubt by settling on

some suitable, perhaps revised, set of beliefs.

Doubt’s abatement occurs when satisfactory beliefs are established, that is when

one’s belief set is settled. Peirce says, “Doubt … stimulates us to inquiry until it [doubt]

is destroyed” (5.373). Once doubt is destroyed, inquiry is bereft of its prompt and thus we

are left in the comfort and stability of that habit of mind known as belief – that is, unless

and until some further challenge initiates the process of inquiry anew.

For Peirce, the only aim of inquiry is to settle belief, and the path that inquiry

takes is determined by the method that one uses to achieve this aim. The key question at

this point is how to decide which methods to use. Under Peirce’s system, the criterion for

judging a method of inquiry must be how well the method is suited to the goal of inquiry.

5 This discussion leaves aside the question of from where beliefs come initially – though a thorough study of Peirce’s evolutionary cosmology would go some way to illuminating Peirce’s stance on this issue. For such a study, see (Kronz and McLaughlin 2002). Peirce himself took up this issue, though his treatment has not thoroughly satisfied his critics. See, for example, (Scheffler 1974, 66-67). It is enough for the present purposes that we incontrovertibly do have beliefs and that they may be consistently treated in the way that Peirce treats them. The issue of whether Peirce’s account of belief origination could be made satisfactory is left for future exploration.

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Cheryl Misak notes that, since “[Peirce] holds that the aim of inquiry is settlement of

belief, he is right to insist that he can appeal only to efficiency in that regard to judge

methods of inquiry” (1991, 56-57). The following discussion of Peirce’s theory of inquiry

focuses on Misak’s reformed Peircean account, which attempts to address a significant

criticism of Peirce’s explicit account. The criticism she raises deserves to be taken

seriously, more seriously, I suggest, than even she herself takes it.

2. Peirce on Methods of Inquiry

Peirce’s strategy in arguing against specious methods is to show that they cannot

succeed in permanently satisfying the aim of inquiry. The failure of the methods,

according to Peirce, rests in there being nothing in the methods themselves to safeguard

against the possibility that beliefs acquired through these methods will be unsettled by

doubt. He considers three methods—the method of tenacity, the method of authority, and

the a priori method—and argues that each of these fails to adequately satisfy the aim of

inquiry.6 The method of tenacity involves holding fast to what one already believes,

fixing that belief by constant reiteration and “dwelling on all which may conduce to that

belief, and learning to turn with contempt and hatred from anything which might disturb

it” (5.377). The method of authority, on the other hand, involves institutional fixation of

belief, as by a state or a religious authority dictating particular propositions to be

accepted or rejected. Lastly, the a priori method takes some first principles to be the

foundation of all other beliefs and, according to this method, beliefs are judged by how

well they accord with those first principles. The failure of each of these methods,

6 For a full description of these methods, and his argument against each of them, see Peirce’s “The Fixation of Belief” (5.358-387). Peirce offers something of a revised treatment of methods of inquiry in his “The Logic of 1873” (7.313-361). The discussion there is not substantively different from what appears in “The Fixation of Belief” concerning what makes a method of inquiry legitimate or specious.

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according to Peirce, derives from their attempts to fix belief according to something

potentially unstable. In each case, the beliefs that form the foundation might themselves

become subject to further doubt, and thus the method cannot, according to Peirce,

succeed in the long run. Primarily, this is because of the possibility that inquirers will

recognize the potential instability, and that recognition alone will suffice to give rise to

doubt.7 The only method of inquiry that successfully safeguards against the emergence of

doubt is the scientific method, according to Peirce.8

Peirce does not specifically define the contours of the scientific method, except to

say that it is sensitive to empirical and practical considerations and that it assumes there

to be facts about the world. The method of science, insofar as it is evidence-based, has

built-in corrective mechanisms. This method will not succumb in the same degree to the

vagaries of individual opinion as will the three specious methods discussed above. The

reason is science’s aim at external reality. The fundamental hypothesis of science, as

Peirce construes it, is that “[t]here are Real things, whose characters are entirely

independent of our opinions about them” (5.384). Thus, the beliefs settled by the

scientific method are supposed to be determined (at least in part) “by some external

permanency – by something upon which our thinking has no effect” (5.384). So, while

the scientific method does not necessarily result in permanently fixed belief, that is, belief

that would never be subject to doubt, it does include safeguards against the inevitability

of doubt’s resurgence. The very nature of the method results in beliefs that are least

susceptible to future doubt.

7 This is, of course, only a very cursory treatment of Peirce’s arguments against specious methods of inquiry, which for present purposes suffices. Much has been written on this subject, and I refer the interested reader to other sources for more detailed treatments of Peirce’s theory of inquiry; see (Hookway 2000), (Levi 1991), (Misak 1991), (Short 2000), (Skagestad 1981). 8 In his “The Logic of 1873” Peirce refers to this method as “investigation” and “reasoning.”

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It is critical for Peirce to have a clear and appropriate account of which methods

of inquiry to use, since his account of truth relies heavily on his account of inquiry.

According to Peirce, one would arrive at the truth about any particular matter if one were

to inquire far enough into the matter. Thus the truth about a matter is whatever opinion

would be the final opinion, resulting from inquiry carried sufficiently far.9 However,

Peirce’s fallibilism precludes his accepting that we can ever know for certain whether any

particular belief is true or not. Truth, then, on his account, serves primarily as a regulative

ideal; its primary function is to motivate inquiry. It is critical, then, that we know which

avenues of inquiry are legitimate and which to avoid.

3. Misak’s Challenge

Misak agrees with Peirce’s assessment of the methods of inquiry. That is, she

agrees that the methods Peirce claims to be specious are so. Misak takes issue, though,

with Peirce’s arguments for this claim. She claims that the arguments rely on an

empirical, psychological fact about inquirers – that they will be influenced by opinions

other than their own. If it were possible to safeguard against all opposing influence, (via,

e.g., a “belief-freezing” pill), then whatever the method, it would satisfy Peirce’s

requirements for permanently fixing belief. The fact that any such safeguards might be

built into an obviously specious method seriously undermines Peirce’s argument. I turn

now to Misak’s arguments to this effect.

The first vulnerability Misak detects in Peirce’s arguments against specious

methods is that the arguments are based on a supposed psychological fact about inquirers

9 See, for example, 2.693, 5.408, 8.43, more obliquely 4.62 and 7.336. The reasonableness of this account of truth is not discussed here; the account is mentioned only to showcase the role that inquiry plays in Peirce’s system.

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– that when we encounter beliefs that differ from our own we will be prompted to

examine our beliefs and perhaps to doubt them. The presumption that one is likely to take

seriously the claims of others is plausible “because inquirers are members of a

community, they utilize the results of other members” (Misak 1991, 58). This

interdependence is so widespread, in fact, that Peirce claims: “[O]ne man’s experience is

nothing, if it stands alone. If he sees what others cannot, we call it hallucination” (5.402

n.2).10 According to Misak, though, this will not suffice since judgments about

competence are made with respect to background beliefs. These beliefs will determine

the relevant members of the community to whom attention should be paid. If it is implicit

in the background beliefs that people who do not share belief X should not be listened to,

where X is a first principle for example, the a priori method might safeguard perfectly

well against the emergence of doubt. Thus, there may be opinions that are (more or less)

permanently settled that were derived from methods Peirce explicitly rejects. Misak also

points out that what counts as competence in science is not particularly well resolved.

The fact that there are controversies in science, and that scientists do not unanimously

accept results shows that even the scientific method can be subject to differences of

opinion. Misak, though, finds material enough in Peirce’s works to muster an alternative,

and she thinks better, argument against specious methods.

It seems, from what has been said so far, that Peirce’s account is as follows:

Whatever is true is what would be accepted at the end of all possible inquiry. Inquiry just

is the process of settling belief. So, those methods of inquiry that best fix a hypothesis in

one’s mind are the methods that will be best for arriving at the truth. Misak attempts to

refine somewhat this naïve notion of inquiry. She claims that inquiry is not intended to 10 See also 7.644.

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fix hypotheses or habits simply; its intended result is the fixation of a habit that satisfies

the requirements for being genuine belief. A hypothesis or disposition is a genuine belief,

according to Misak, when it is sensitive and responsive to evidence (1991, 59).

Otherwise, it is some tenacious psychological state, but not a belief. Peirce’s account of

truth, as Misak construes it, requires not that inquiry make hypotheses doubt-resistant but

that it fix genuine beliefs – which are hypotheses that were gathered in ways that respond

to evidence and that are themselves sensitive to evidence. Misak concludes as follows:

So, given that a belief, in order to be a belief, must be sensitive to evidence for and against it, the aim of inquiry, on Peirce’s account, is to get beliefs which are not merely fixed, but which are fixed in such a way that they fit with and respond to the evidence. (1991, 60)

This criterion for genuine belief, Misak claims, overcomes the shortcomings of Peirce’s

explicit arguments and provides an appropriate measure for evaluating methods of

inquiry.

4. Objection to Misak’s Account

Misak’s analysis relies crucially on the notion of evidence. On her account,

legitimate methods are the ones that produce genuine belief, and the criterion for genuine

belief is that it be sensitive to evidence. Defining genuine belief in terms of sensitivity to

evidence requires that one give some suitable characterization of what is to count as

evidence. Such characterizations, however, are notoriously difficult; entire treatises have

been written in attempt to suitably characterize what should count as evidence.11 Thus,

Misak’s account is programmatic at best – without a precise account of what is to count

as evidence, Misak’s refinement is of little use.

11 See for example: (Achinstein 2001), (Glymour 1980), (Horwich 1982).

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One might think that Misak could easily dismiss the charge that she gives

insufficient attention to defining evidence. Although the definition of genuine belief does

involve reference to evidence-sensitivity, there is (she might claim) nothing in particular

that is required about evidence in order for something to be sensitive to it. She might

argue, for instance, that whatever the actual inquirer would count as evidence will

suffice; and the same criterion need not be applied among different inquirers (or even

among different inquiries by the same inquirer). What is crucial is that the belief achieved

at the end of the process is in fact sensitive to evidence of some sort. Furthermore, being

sensitive to evidence does not require that a belief be actually revised in light of whatever

evidence comes along. No precise criterion for telling which evidence to take seriously

need apply in the context of conducting inquiry. Thus, Misak might argue, no

characterization of what is to count as evidence is necessary for determining what

methods of inquiry are legitimate.

On Misak’s account, one decides whether a method is a legitimate method of

inquiry by testing to see whether it produces genuine belief. Testing for production of

genuine belief might be done in one of two possible ways. Either one tests the result of

the inquiry (the hypothesis or disposition formed as a result of the inquiry) to determine

whether it is sensitive to evidence, or one tests the method to see whether in its

production of the hypothesis or disposition the method takes account of evidence. In each

case, one must consider what appropriately counts as evidence in order to determine

which methods of inquiry are legitimate. Appealing to evidence as determinant to any

degree of a method’s legitimacy requires reference to an independent evidence-criterion.

Without such a criterion in hand, anything one is willing to count as evidence suffices

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and consequently any method can count as legitimate. That is, Misak’s account succumbs

to the same objection she levels against Peirce. Criteria of evidence, just as much as

criteria of competence, are determined according to background beliefs. Thus, any

method could be made legitimate by appeal to suitable evidence criteria. Bereft of an

independent criterion for determining what should count as evidence, Misak’s account

does not clarify but rather seems to muddy the waters.

For the reasons Misak mentions, Peirce’s explicit account will not suffice to

delineate legitimate from specious methods of inquiry. Misak’s attempt to fortify Peirce’s

account, however, will not suffice either, and for similar reasons. Nonetheless, it is

possible to salvage Peirce’s account by supplementing it with other, complementary

elements of Peirce’s own work. What follows is a fortified Peircean account, drawing

from Peirce’s own writings but doing so in a way that supplements his explicit treatment

of methods of inquiry.

5. The “Open Path” Alternative

There is a relatively straightforward way of synthesizing elements of Peirce’s

view so as to resolve the question of which methods of inquiry are legitimate and which

are not. Peirce defines a method of inquiry as aimed at fixing or settling belief. Also,

inquiry begins, on Peirce’s account, at the onset of doubt—defined as the absence of a

fixed belief—and ends when one’s beliefs are fixed. So, whatever can successfully

remove doubt will be termed, on Peirce’s account, a method of inquiry. Removal of

doubt, however, clearly does not suffice to legitimate a method of inquiry. Some

supplement is required. I propose to supplement his account of inquiry with what Peirce

repeatedly invokes as a maxim, which follows from the assumption of fallibilism.

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Peirce’s fallibilism implies a particular “rule of reason,” which is “that in order to learn

you must desire to learn, and in so desiring not be satisfied with what you already incline

to think” (1.135). From this rule, “there follows one corollary which itself deserves to be

inscribed upon every wall of the city of philosophy: Do not block the way of inquiry”

(1.135).12 Following Peirce’s dictum, and allowing it to operate with his theory of

inquiry, I propose that we consider legitimate those methods of inquiry that are capable

of removing doubt without blocking the path of further inquiry. Thus, every legitimate

method of inquiry will have two components: it will (1) settle belief by removing doubt,

and (2) leave open the path to future inquiry into the matter. Note that while Peirce

invokes each of these elements in his work, nowhere does he marry them together. Doing

so, however, provides us with a fruitful criterion for legitimacy of method. Here is where

an explicitly normative element enters into the synthesized, and thereby fortified,

Peircean account, requiring that one settle one’s beliefs about the matter, but do so in a

way that leaves open the path to future inquiry. All of the methods that we would want to

reject as obviously specious can be shown to fail legitimacy on this account.

Any methods by which beliefs are fixed according to pre-existing opinions are,

according to the criterion mentioned above, clearly illegitimate. That is, they cannot

successfully remove doubt and leave open the possibility of future inquiry, since they

expressly take some beliefs to be fixed and so explicitly treated as closed to inquiry. The

method of science, broadly understood, succeeds on this view because science is treated

as “self-criticizing, self-controlling and self-controlled, and therefore open to incessant

question” (7.77).

12 See also 1.156, 1.170, 1.175, 6.273, 8.243. How this maxim follows from fallibilism is not explored here. The relationship between Peirce’s fallibilism and other of his epistemological commitments, though, is taken up again in a later section.

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There is one method considered by Misak that passes Peirce’s explicit legitimacy

test but is clearly to be counted among the illegitimate. Misak considers the possibility of

making a ‘belief-freezing’ pill – a pill that one could take to permanently fix all beliefs in

one’s mind. Strangely enough, the belief-freezing pill method (given Peirce’s account)

counts as a method of inquiry; it does in fact settle belief, and it does so permanently. If

one’s state of mind is frozen, the prospect of changing habits or dispositions is closed (it

need not be believed to be closed, but it must be in fact closed). Thus, the belief-freezing

pill perfectly satisfies the aim of fixing belief, and so counts as legitimate on Peirce’s

explicit account. Misak claims, however, that the belief-freezing pill method fails her

legitimacy criterion. It is instructive to see exactly how the method is supposed to fail

legitimacy on Misak’s account.

Recall that for Misak, methods are legitimate that fix genuine beliefs, defined by

being sensitive and responsive to evidence. There are two senses in which a method can

fail legitimacy, then, on Misak’s account. It can fail by virtue of the method itself failing

to take evidence into account, or it can fail by virtue of the resultant belief being

unresponsive to evidence. The belief-freezing pill method is clearly illegitimate in the

first sense, since no evidentiary relations enter into the method at all. When it comes to

applying this criterion to other methods, though, we will be lost unless we have in hand a

supplemental account of what should count as evidence. Consider, e.g., Pascal’s wager

concerning whether one should believe in God. Do the considerations Pascal introduces

count as evidence in favor of belief in God? In order to judge whether they do, we need

to have in hand independent standards of evidence. Without supplying us with such

standards, Misak’s account gives us little guidance for applying her criterion.

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What about the second sense of failure? Can the belief-freezing pill taker’s

resultant beliefs be sensitive or responsive to evidence? Misak claims that after

administration of the pill, the resulting state of mind cannot be a state of genuine belief

since the chance of additional information changing the belief set is null. That is,

according to Misak, whatever belief was fixed is not genuine because it could not

respond to further evidence. This way of talking about evidence, however, relies on a

notion of evidence independent of the pill-popping believer’s notion. If you asked the

pill-popper whether her beliefs are sensitive to evidence, she would likely say that they

are potentially sensitive to evidence. Presumably, the primary question is how the belief

could be responsive to evidence. It could not respond by changing; this much is certified

by the method itself. It could respond, however, by differentially interpreting the

evidence, or by simply ignoring it (i.e., not allowing that it counts as evidence at all).

That is, the pill-popper could take the same tack as does someone reliant on the method

of authority, which is to say that information that fails to conform to set of beliefs X

simply fails to count as relevant evidence at all. Thus, in order to substantiate the claim

that the resultant belief is not sensitive to evidence, we need some criterion for what is to

count as evidence. In the end, both means of analysis (aimed at the method or at the

resultant belief set) require an independent evidence criterion in order for Misak’s

account to be viable.

The “open-path-to-inquiry” criterion introduced here, however, allows us to reject

the belief-freezing pill method and other specious methods without having to supply an

independent evidence criterion. The belief-freezing pill method fails legitimacy, on the

“open path” account, because the method forever closes off the possibility of future

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inquiry. Once the pill has been swallowed, no issues may ever arise as the subject of

inquiry. Inquiry is prompted, according to Peirce, by doubt, which itself is defined as the

absence of fixed belief. Since the pill-popper’s beliefs cannot be unsettled, doubt cannot

ever arise. Inquiry, then, relevant to the frozen beliefs, is forever closed, and thus this

method is specious.

6. The Path of Greatest Resistance

Inquiry is instigated, on Peirce’s view, only by doubt. So, following his maxim to

keep the path of inquiry open requires keeping susceptible to doubt the field of one’s

belief set that is relevant to the inquiry. This does not require that one be in a state of

constant doubt, but rather it requires vigilance in detecting and pursuing possible sources

of doubt. Peirce’s recurring suggestions that doubt is an “irritation” and that it is

“unsettling” might incline one to seek its permanent removal.13 Peirce agrees that the

removal of doubt is a worthy pursuit. It is not the only significant goal, however, for if it

were the belief-freezing pill would be an ideal method of inquiry. While Peirce does not

address this sort of case explicitly, it is clear from other of his epistemological

commitments that how one pursues the goal (of removing doubt) is as important as the

goal itself. Peirce’s system is predicated on fallibilism, the view that nothing is entirely

certain, but nevertheless he believes that progress toward truth is possible. Indeed

progress is ensured by continual probing and inquiry. This relationship, between inquiry

and progress toward truth, is founded in Peirce’s system on his understanding of reality

and the role that it plays in the process of inquiry. To see how Peirce’s epistemological

commitments implicitly recommend the pursuit of resistance, then, requires a thorough

13 See 5.373-375, 5.394, 7.317.

17

examination of how Peirce conceives of reality and its manifestation in inquiry. It is to

these issues that I now turn.

The best method of inquiry is the scientific method, which is characterized by

taking reality as its object. According to Peirce, the real is “that whose characters are

independent of what anybody may think them to be” (5.405). This distinction, between

any particular representation of the real and the real itself, is central for Peirce and plays a

crucial role in his semiotics. In addition, it leads to the Peircean view that reality

manifests itself in experience primarily as opposition. According to Peirce, the notion that

there is such a thing as reality, conceived as distinct from our representations of it, must

have arisen “when we first corrected ourselves” and were thereby made cognizant of

illusion, or wrong representation (5.311). Such corrections are necessary when there is a

significant difference between the content of a sign or representation and the reality it is

supposed to represent. In order to highlight this sort of difference, Peirce introduced the

notions of a sign’s ‘immediate object’ and its ‘dynamical object.’ These are distinguished

as follows: “the Immediate Object … is the Object as the Sign itself represents it, and

whose Being is thus dependent upon the Representation of it in the Sign … [whereas] the

Dynamical Object … is the Reality which by some means contrives to determine the Sign

to its Representation” (4.536).14 Peirce says further that “the nature of things” prevents a

sign from expressing its dynamical object, which the sign “can only indicate and leave

the interpreter to find out by collateral experience” (8.314).15 Such indications, in terms

of the model of inquiry outlined above, are the experiential expectations we form based

14 For more on this relationship within the Peircean semiotic system, see Rosenthal (1990). Also helpful in this regard is chapter 7 of Short (2007). 15 For further information about Peirce’s conception of a dynamical object and its role in the broader semiotics, see: 8.183, 8.343-344.

18

on the set of beliefs we hold at a given time. It is only when future experience fails to

meet those expectations, however, that we encounter reality as independent of our

representations of it.16 This is what Thomas Olshewsky has in mind when he writes that a

dynamical object (in Peirce’s sense outlined above) can only be known “negatively,” and

therefore under Peirce’s system “reality must be understood as opposition” (1994, 28).

Our beliefs establish habits of action and sets of expectations; it is only when experience

surprises, when the course takes an unexpected turn, that an independent reality makes

itself known as such. None of this implies that real objects or events play merely

oppositional roles in experience or in our beliefs. Peirce presumes, as does any realist,

that real objects collaborate in the making of experience and hence beliefs.17 But the

manifestation of reality as independent of any particular conceptions, requires opposition.

Peirce acknowledges that inquiry properly conducted just is inquiry toward truth,

toward conforming one’s conceptions to reality. Insofar as we pursue this in earnest, we

seek ways of comparing hypotheses to reality (testing hypotheses) and assessing the

results.18 According to Peirce, we encounter reality primarily as opposition. What follows

from this, but is not explicit in Peirce’s work, is that comparing hypotheses to reality

requires that we maximize opposition. This means that the most fruitful testing will come

in the form of negative tests, where we deliberately seek out circumstances that would

undermine the hypothesis. If the hypothesis stands up to this sort of scrutiny, then our

confidence in its future success is substantially and legitimately boosted. The best way to

ensure against the resurgence of doubt, on this fortified Peircean account, is to take care

16 The discussion in the remainder of this paragraph relies significantly on Olshewsky (1994). 17 See, for example, 8.153. 18 Peirce makes some recommendations for how hypothesis testing should proceed, based on considerations of economy. Peirce’s work on the economy of research is explored below.

19

that in conducting inquiry we accommodate as far as possible those scenarios that could

otherwise become obstacles and thus doubt-producing circumstances. Subject the

hypothesis under scrutiny to the most rigorous of tests; if it passes these then the

subsequent emergence of doubt-prompting circumstances becomes less likely.19 Thus the

optimal path for scientific inquiry, on this fortified Peircean view, is the path of greatest

resistance – seeking out potential obstacles, facing and accommodating those that arise,

thereby enriching and fortifying our conceptions about the world.

7. Economy of Research

In practice, we cannot pursue all obstacles; we cannot inquire in a way that the

foregoing suggests would be optimal. Actual scientific inquiry is constrained by limited

resources. Peirce refers explicitly to limitations in “money, time, energy, and thought”

(7.220). Of course there may be other costs to doing research, such as risks incurred to

one’s professional reputation by pursuit of an unpopular research program. All of these

factors, physical, personal, and social, are weighed by scientists in determining how to

conduct their research. Which hypotheses to pursue and how best to pursue them is

dictated by considerations about economy, involving cost/benefit analysis. Peirce was

well aware of the need to economize in scientific investigation, and of the need to

develop appropriate standards by which economy might be achieved. He writes:

Research must contrive to do business at a profit; . . . it must produce more effective scientific energy than it expends. No doubt, it already does so. But it would do well to become conscious of its economical position and contrive ways of living upon it. (7.159)

19 Deborah Mayo agrees that the severity of the tests a hypothesis passes is indicative of the degree to which the hypothesis is to be believed. She also characterizes Peirce’s view of induction in similar terms. For her characterization, see section 12.2 of (Mayo 1996). Notice, though that a discussion of Peirce on inductive procedure is much more restricted than what is undertaken here. The account developed here is an account of Peirce’s theory of inquiry broadly understood, and supplemented by other epistemological considerations.

20

Much has been written about Peirce’s discussions of abduction and the extent to

which appropriate guidelines can inform the process of hypothesis formulation. Less

work has been done on Peirce’s recommendations about how to set research priorities in

the evidence-gathering phase. In what follows, I argue that Peirce’s specific

recommendations about how to economically gather evidence can be understood in light

of his general epistemology and its implication that optimizing inquiry requires

maximizing opposition. In particular, I argue that Peirce’s strongest recommendations for

how to go about economically amassing evidence are best understood as instantiations of

the general recommendation to pursue resistance.

For the purposes of the following discussion, we can think of evidence gathering

as involving three broad phases: narrowing the field of viable hypotheses, determining

which experimental results to test for, and then carrying out those tests. Peirce’s work

offers useful guidelines for navigating each of the first two of these phases, which I

discuss below. While these phases are treated separately, such treatment does not imply

that the phases are either exclusive or sequential. Their separation here is conceptual, and

serves only as a convenient device for discussion.

8. Narrowing the Field of Hypotheses

According to the foregoing discussion of inquiry, all of our scientific

investigations are instigated by doubt. We notice some ‘holes’ in existing theories, or

circumstances with respect to which the theories do not tell us what to expect. Or we

notice some data that conflicts with what our theories tell us to expect. In these early

stages of evidence-gathering, our investigations typically begin with abductive reasoning.

We posit some plausible explanations that, if true, would serve to explain what our

21

previously accepted theories did not. Supposing that we have two or more such plausible

explanations, the question is: Which hypothesis do we investigate first? Nicholas Rescher

has discussed Peirce’s work on economy of research, and notes that Peirce gives priority,

on economic grounds, to two sorts of hypotheses.20 The simpler among available

hypotheses, Peirce claims, as have many others, are more economical. Simple hypotheses

are operationally cheaper, since they will involve fewer variables to accommodate in

experimentation and are likely to have more obvious and easily calculable applications.

Peirce also gives priority to hypotheses with high generality relative to cost. The more

general the hypothesis, as Karl Popper noted, the more it will imply. Rescher carefully

points out that Peirce also recommends preference for generality, but that he balances

generality against the costs of investigating those implications (1978, 83). These general

recommendations, however, can serve only as general guides. Simplicity is a notoriously

difficult concept to explicate with any degree of rigor, and generality relative to cost is

not particularly useful without measures of generality and cost as well as some method

for weighing them against one another. Fortunately, Peirce has much more specific

suggestions, which can be applied without the addition of a great deal of conceptual

baggage.

When we have at hand two or more plausible hypotheses, we need some way to

determine which of these warrants the resources required for testing. As Rescher notes, as

does Kronz & McLaughlin (2005), the likelihood of a hypothesis is not, according to

Peirce, a reliable measure of its strength as a candidate for experimental testing.21 Instead,

20 See chapter 4 of (Rescher 1978). 21 (Rescher 1978, 69, n105, n108), (Kronz & McLaughlin 2005, 74). The reference to the strength of a hypothesis here means the strength of the hypothesis as a candidate for experimental testing. This is different from conceiving of the strength of the hypothesis in terms of its support. The difference is clearest

22

the strength of a hypothesis or, what is a better term in this context, its ‘urgency,’ is

measured in terms of the resources that scientists would be willing to commit to its

examination (2.780). That Peirce conceives thusly of the empirical urgency of hypotheses

helps to explain why he gives precedence to hypotheses whose examination involves

“very little expense of any kind” (7.220). Hypotheses that can be tested very

inexpensively will be among the strongest in contention for testing. Kronz and

McLaughlin point out that Peirce assigns priority to cheaply tested hypotheses not only

because refutable hypotheses might be eliminated, but also because hypotheses that are

contrary to existing presuppositions might be supported (2005, 73). Here is the first point

where the implications of Peirce’s general theory of inquiry, that we should seek the path

of greatest resistance, dovetail with his specific research recommendations. In suggesting

that we begin not with those hypotheses that seem most likely, given what we already

understand, but those that are “greatly at variance with preconceived ideas”, Peirce

implicitly invokes resistance (7.83). The resistance here is not between reality and our

conceptions, but rather between different conceptions. The way in which the resistance

force of reality enters in, however, is in the testing procedure – in exploring the practical

implications of a hypothesis at odds with our preconceptions, we would explore

implications that are opposed to the implications of what we already believe. The

pragmatic value of this suggestion is clear, since finding support cheaply for hypotheses

that undermine current views could bear significant scientific fruit. The epistemological

import of the recommendation is clear, too, since testing for hypotheses whose

when one notes that a hypothesis that has strong support (a lot of evidence amassed in its favor) is not likely to have much experimental ‘urgency’ since it is already well corroborated and so devoting resources to testing it would likely be wasteful. Peirce notes that there is a law of diminishing returns when it comes to further testing of hypotheses whose practical implications have been borne out by experimental results. See, e.g., 7.144.

23

implications vary greatly from what we would ordinarily expect opens the door for

resistance opportunities, which means that for little expense we are able to create

opportunities for reality to show itself in its character as independent of our expectations.

Supposing we take this initial suggestion seriously, we will begin to narrow the

field of viable hypotheses by first determining which hypotheses we can test very

cheaply. Some of these will be refuted and others will be supported by the ensuing

evidence. As the testing process continues, the urgency of supported hypotheses grows,

since the more support amassed for a hypothesis, the more confidence scientists will have

in it, and thus the more resources they will be willing to commit to it. This is so until one

hypothesis rises to the fore, and comes to be treated as true. Testing of that hypothesis

then stops, unless and until there arises some new impetus to doubt. The only further role

the accepted hypothesis plays in the experimental process is as foundational for the

testing of other, plausible but dubitable hypotheses. During the hypothesis testing

process, though, the question of which hypotheses deserve priority is not the only

relevant question. For any sufficiently general hypothesis, there will be a number of

experimental results that might be tested for. The next section addresses other of Peirce’s

suggestions, specifically about how to choose among the particular tests that might be

performed.

9. Determining which Experimental Results to Test for

Peirce requires that any hypothesis, in order to count as scientific, must conform

with the pragmatic maxim, the distinguishing feature of which is its implication that the

meaning of any hypothesis consists entirely in its practical consequences. The question

with which we are concerned here is which of those practical consequences is most

24

economical to pursue. That is, we want to determine which empirical tests are likely to

yield the best information for the costs. Kronz & McLaughlin (2005) presents a formal

expression of Peirce’s recommendations for how to determine which empirical tests to

perform. While a formal articulation of the Peircean Test Condition gives precise

meaning to Peirce’s recommendation and can provide robust supplementation to a formal

account of evidence, it also is onerous for working scientists or inquirers generally to

apply. Applying the formal condition requires making probabilistic calculations for each

and every empirically testable implication of each and every hypothesis under

consideration. Few scientists, and even fewer non-scientist inquirers, are likely to go to

such lengths to follow the Peircean recommendation. Thus, a less formal understanding

of the Peircean recommendation is in order; and if such a recommendation can be

grounded in general epistemological considerations so as to make it clear why the

recommendation should advance appropriate epistemic goals, so much the better.

As noted in Kronz & McLaughlin (2005), Peirce’s recommendation for which

predictions to test for is that we should “begin with that positive prediction . . . which

seems least likely to be verified” (7.206).22 By the least likely prediction of a hypothesis,

Peirce means that prediction that “appear[s] otherwise least likely to be true” (7.89).

Kronz and McLaughlin point out that the key word in this qualification, ‘otherwise,’ can

22 Peirce writes that “it will be a saving of expense, to begin with that positive prediction from the hypothesis which seems least likely to be verified.” While this sentence, as is, suggests that it is the hypothesis “least likely to be verified” with which one should begin, the rest of the paragraph makes clear that Peirce means the prediction, not the hypothesis. The full paragraph, without elision, follows:

Experiment is very expensive business, in money, in time, and in thought; so that it will be a saving of expense, to begin with that positive prediction from the hypothesis which seems least likely to be verified. For a single experiment may absolutely refute the most valuable of hypotheses, while a hypothesis must be a trifling one indeed if a single experiment could establish it. When, however, we find that prediction after prediction, notwithstanding a preference for putting the most unlikely ones to the test, is verified by experiment, whether without modification or with a merely quantitative modification, we begin to accord to the hypothesis a standing among scientific results. (7.206)

25

be understood in three different senses. First, ‘otherwise’ could mean “upon regarding the

hypothesis as false” (2005, 76). Second, it could mean “upon omitting consideration of

(i.e., upon conceptually setting aside) the hypothesis in question” (2005, 76). Third, it

could mean assuming a contrary, competing hypothesis (2005, 77). Kronz and

McLaughlin argue that only the third sense of ‘otherwise’ provides a suitable basis upon

which to make probabilistic assessments, and that a particular way of understanding

Peirce’s pragmatic maxim supports this interpretation of Peirce’s recommendation. In

what follows, I offer an example that illustrates, rather than rehearses, Kronz and

McLaughlin’s argument that an alternative hypothesis, h', is necessary for determining

the least likely prediction of a hypothesis, h.

Consider the hypothesis, h, to be that magnesium assists in muscle repair. From h,

we might derive a prediction about the presence of magnesium in an animal’s diet being

positively correlated with muscle repair. What would it mean to say that this prediction is

‘otherwise’ unlikely to be true? Perhaps we assess its likelihood based on the denial of

the hypothesis, which would be that it is not the case that magnesium assists in muscle

repair. Assuming ~h, however, does not allow us to assess the likelihood of the

prediction, since nothing in particular follows from ~h about how the presence of

magnesium in an animal’s diet should correlate with muscle repair. The hypothesis, ~h, is

consistent with several different states of affairs, but implies none of these. It is consistent

with a positive correlation between the presence of magnesium and muscle repair, a

negative correlation, or no correlation at all. Thus, the likelihood of the prediction derived

from h, given ~h, is impossible to assess. The least likely prediction of h, then, cannot be

understood as the one that would be least likely on the assumption that h is false, for in

26

this case no probabilistic assessment could be made. Suppose, then, we simply disregard

the hypothesis that magnesium assists in muscle repair. In this case, though, we have no

grounds upon which to assess the likelihood of the prediction. Suppose we consider some

alternative hypothesis, h', for instance that magnesium plays no role in muscle repair. In

this case we have some basis upon which to judge whether or not the prediction seems

likely. Assuming h', we should expect that magnesium’s presence will be statistically

independent of muscle repair, that the two will be neither positively nor negatively

correlated.23

Kronz and McLaughlin argue that Peirce should be understood as recommending

that we begin with those predictions “that appear least likely to be true on the assumption

of some competing, contrary hypothesis—the one that would be superseded if [the

hypothesis in question] were confirmed” (2005, 77). Not only does this recommendation

prove practically feasible, since it makes clear the basis for the probabilistic assessment

of the predictions at issue, it is founded on Peirce’s pragmatic maxim. They point to a

relatively late formulation of the maxim where Peirce highlights concerns not merely

about hypotheses on their own, but about how they compare with other, competing

hypotheses. The pragmatic maxim suggests that if two hypotheses have precisely the

same practical consequences, then they are identical with one another. If the practical

consequences differ, then the hypotheses differ. The significance of a conception or

hypothesis, then, on this understanding, is best elucidated by comparison with other

hypotheses.24

23 Note that in this case, as well as the general case, h' entails ~h, but the converse does not hold. 24 The significant passage referred to in (Kronz and McLaughlin 2005) appears at 5.196. Others, both before and after Peirce, have made similar suggestions. Paul Feyerabend argues that consideration of

27

Taking Kronz and McLaughlin’s understanding of Peirce’s recommendation,

then, we should begin by determining which predictions of a hypothesis have the lowest

probability, given a suitable, contrary hypothesis. Once we have the least likely

predictions in hand, we use other economic factors to determine whether to perform the

tests.25 This includes factors such as what equipment is required for testing, whether the

equipment is readily available, what expertise is required to run the experiment, etc. If the

least likely prediction is economically prohibitive, then we look for the least likely among

the remaining predictions and assess the economic feasibility of testing for it. One issue

of note, that Kronz and McLaughlin do not acknowledge but that clearly follows from

their discussion, is that this characterization not only gives practical guidance for

gathering evidence, but it also accommodates a wide range of context-sensitive issues.

Since the economic feasibility of performing any particular test—including physical,

political, professional, social, and personal factors in addition to concerns about

equipment, funding, human power, and time—can vary quite a lot dependent on context,

so may the recommendations about which tests to perform. In addition, as Kronz and

McLaughlin point out, even though their analysis of Peirce’s recommendation is more or

less confined to the case of one hypothesis under consideration, the recommendation can

be generalized to accommodate any number of hypotheses that might populate the field.

In recommending that we prefer the ‘least likely’ of a hypothesis’ predictions,

Peirce invokes, again, opposition or resistance. The likelihood of a prediction is

determined, on Kronz and McLaughlin’s interpretation, according to previously accepted

contrary hypotheses is necessary for understanding a hypothesis (Feyerabend 1981). John Stuart Mill makes a similar suggestion in On Liberty. 25 As noted previously, Kronz and McLaughlin formulate this recommendation in formal terms. What appears here is an informal rendering.

28

conceptions. So, resistance is invoked here in a way similar to its invocation in Peirce’s

express preference for cheaply tested hypotheses greatly at variance with our

preconceptions. That is, the resistance arises as a result of the opposition between the

hypothesis under consideration and the previously accepted hypothesis. Furthermore, in

understanding the least likely prediction as the one otherwise least likely to be true, a

relationship of opposition is explicitly invoked. Here the opposition arises from the

contrary hypothesis that must be used as a basis for determining the least likely

predictions. Thus, we see that Peirce’s general epistemology, understood in terms of the

pursuit of resistance, is manifest in his specific recommendations for conducting

research. So, even though we cannot pursue our inquiries optimally by searching for

every possible avenue of resistance, we can still maximize opposition within the

constraints of our limited resources. Indeed, Peirce’s specific advice about economizing

in research seems to recommend precisely such maximization.

10. Pursuing Paths of Resistance

While the foregoing recommendations are fairly specific to research contexts and

are clearly intended to accommodate the constraints that such contexts impose, it is clear

how Peirce’s general epistemological commitments are invoked in these specific

recommendations. The general recommendation to pursue the path of greatest resistance

can be understood as having application even within the constraints introduced by

specific contexts. In the first half of this paper, I argued that Peirce’s theory of inquiry is

best understood as dictating that we inquire in ways that leave open the path to future

inquiry. For a method to count, on Peirce’s view, as a method of inquiry it must

accomplish the goal of inquiry, and so end in settling (to some degree) our beliefs about

29

the matter at hand. In order to count as legitimate, however, methods of inquiry must

accomplish that end in a way that does not presume that the beliefs upon which we have

settled are the final word on the matter. If we follow the fortified Peircean account

developed here, we acknowledge that inquiry should be conducted so as to leave open

future doors to inquiry. This means taking a particular attitude toward our set of beliefs –

that we should be prepared to recognize their limitations and keep the field of belief

susceptible to doubt. We will also acknowledge that inquiry optimally conducted follows

the path of greatest resistance, which requires setting up our inquiries so that they

maximize opportunities for opposition. In accepting the account offered here, based on

Peircean commitments, we require of ourselves a constant striving, believing just what

we believe, but never resting content with it. This is the attitude of the consummate

scientist, accepting the best of the theories available, but never dogmatically, and always

on alert for the shortcomings of those views and the possibility that other, better theories

may be on the horizon.26

Since science, broadly construed, serves as a model of inquiry for Peirce, we

should not be surprised that the model scientist is also a model Peircean inquirer. What

might be surprising, however, is the way in which realism asserts itself in Peirce’s views

about science and inquiry. Peirce’s clear (later) commitments to realism seem prima facie 26 Many will recognize here some affinity with recommendations by Karl Popper. Popper’s falsificationism might be a way to capture the “pursuit of resistance” view advocated here. It is interesting to note that there are many similarities between Peirce’s and Popper’s accounts, down to their common use of the metaphor of a bog as the grounding of science. Peirce writes: “[Science] is not standing upon the bedrock of fact. It is walking upon a bog, and can only say, this ground seems to hold for the present. Here I will stay till it begins to give way” (5.589). Popper, on page 111 of The Logic of Scientific Discovery, writes:

Science does not rest upon a solid bedrock. The bold structure of its theories rises, as it were, above a swamp. It is like a building erected on piles. The piles are driven down from above into the swamp, but not down to any natural or ‘given’ base; and if we stop driving the piles deeper, it is not because we have reached firm ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that the piles are firm enough to carry the structure, at least for the time being.

A thorough comparison between the two on this and other issues is, of course, far beyond the scope of the current project.

30

at odds with his representationism, based on his claim that all thought is in signs. These

two commitments are more clearly coherent, however, when one notes the roles that

reality plays in Peirce’s system, especially his claim that reality manifests primarily as

opposition. This claim, coupled with Peirce’s conviction that truth takes reality as its

object, leads to the view that inquiry is best when it maximizes opposition. The more one

seeks out sources of resistance to one’s beliefs, the more one sets those beliefs up for

contact with reality.

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Hookway, Christopher J. Truth, Rationality, and Pragmatism: Themes from Peirce. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000.

Horwich, Paul. Probability and Evidence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.

Kronz, Frederick, and Amy McLaughlin. “The Complementary Roles of Chance and Lawlike Elements in Peirce's Evolutionary Cosmology.” In Between Choice and Chance: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Determinism, edited by Harald Atmanspacher and Robert Bishop, 189-207. Thorverton: Imprint Academic, 2002.

Kronz, Frederick, and Amy McLaughlin. “The Fast Track to Confirmation: Achinstein and Peirce on Evidence.” In Scientific Evidence: Philosophical Theories and Applications, edited by Peter Achinstein, 69-84. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005.

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Rescher, Nicholas. Peirce's Philosophy of Science. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1978.

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Scheffler, Israel. Four Pragmatists: A Critical Introduction to Peirce, James, Mead and Dewey. New York: Humanities Press, 1974.

Short, T. L. “Peirce on the Aim of Inquiry: Another Reading of ‘Fixation’.” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 35, no. 1 (2000): 1-23.

Short, T. L. Peirce’s Theory of Signs. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Skagestad, Peter. The Road of Inquiry: Charles Peirce's Pragmatic Realism. New York:

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Amy McLaughlin Harriet L. Wilkes Honors College, Florida Atlantic University, USA email: [email protected]

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