Assurance Strategy and Audit Implementation Support Pack 6 th March 2008 The objective of this pack is to provide a summary of key materials to support SHA Flu Leads, PCT Flu Co-ordinators and key contacts in Acute and Mental Health trusts with Pandemic Flu Preparedness work Note: Information is correct at the time of publishing. The programme will endeavour to update documentation regularly, however if you have any queries relating to the content of this document please email: [email protected]This document is not in the public domain. Please restrict circulation to those involved with flu planning.
The objective of this pack is to provide a summary of key materials to support SHA Flu Leads, PCT Flu Co-ordinators and key contacts in Acute and Mental Health trusts with Pandemic Flu Preparedness work Note: - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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Assurance Strategy and Audit
Implementation Support Pack
6th March 2008
The objective of this pack is to provide a summary of key materials to support SHA Flu Leads, PCT Flu Co-ordinators and key contacts in Acute and Mental Health trusts with Pandemic Flu Preparedness work
Note:Information is correct at the time of publishing. The programme will endeavour to update documentation regularly, however if you have any queries relating to the content of this document please email: [email protected]
This document is not in the public domain. Please restrict circulation to those involved with flu planning.
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An Introduction to Pandemic Flu
• Influenza pandemics are natural phenomena that have occurred three times in the last century.
"Most experts believe that it is not a question of whether there will be another severe influenza pandemic but when” Chief Medical Officer 2002.
• It is recognised that the likelihood of a high pathogenic human influenza virus, capable of causing a pandemic, evolving in the near term is real but unquantifiable.
• This unquantifiable probability must be set against the possible huge impact of a pandemic. In the worst case a pandemic would have a massive impact, with many millions of people worldwide becoming ill and a proportion of these dying. In the UK this could mean up to half the population may become ill and up to 750,000 additional deaths.
• A pandemic will impact on all aspects of UK society. In the worst case scenario, with no interventions taken, the possible cumulative costs of a pandemic to society have been estimated to be up to £1,242 billion.
• The World Health Organization (WHO) currently advise that, out of six levels of alert, we are in the pandemic alert period at phase 3, where there are human infections with a new type of virus, but there is not efficient and sustained transmission from person to person. Phase 6 would be the start of a pandemic.
• As a pandemic flu virus has yet to emerge, we do not know how infectious it will be, or the severity of the illness it will cause. We do know that it is likely to take only a few weeks between a pandemic virus emerging somewhere in the world and it reaching the UK, and that it will spread quickly to all parts of the UK. As it will be too late to secure stocks of countermeasures once the pandemic virus has emerged, we need to allow some time to procure stocks and to ensure a response strategy can be implemented in the NHS. Therefore, decisions need to be taken in the pandemic alert period, before a pandemic emerges. This is supported by the WHO state “in view of the immediacy of the threat, WHO recommends that all countries undertake urgent action to prepare for a pandemic”*.
*Responding to the avian influenza pandemic threat. Recommended strategic actions. WHO. Page 1
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Useful reference documents
There are two useful reference documents that help build an understanding of the subject of pandemic flu.
Pandemic Flu Frequently Asked Questions
To open double click on the icon below
Pandemic Flu Key Facts
To open double click on the box below
FAQs
Key facts
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The programme’s intervention strategy
The programme’s intervention strategy is based on the need for ‘defence in depth’.
This strategy aims to
• Reduce amount of illness caused by pandemic flu
• Reduce number of deaths which result from pandemic flu
• Manage the increased pressure on the NHS and Social Care Services
The programme is building up capability in several areas to deliver to the above programme objectives
• Clinical countermeasure stockpiles are being built up e.g. Antivirals, antibiotics, face masks etc
• Infrastructure to deliver the pandemic response across the NHS and Social care is being built e.g. the national flu line service, surveillance mechanisms
• Processes are being put in place to ensure the right information is available to inform management of a pandemic emergency situation, such as identifying key information required by Ministers
• Public preparation and confidence is being built up through a public health and hygiene campaign
• A programme of public engagement is testing how the public will respond to proposed policy
The programme is also helping the NHS and the Social Care field prepare
• Health and social care service planning and preparation work is underway in the NHS
The programme is also liaising with the wider business continuity work being undertaken by the Department, in the Emergency Preparedness Division
Assurance Strategy and Audit
Summary of outputs from the Programme
Guidance
Position on countermeasures
Communications and training materials
Contact details
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Pandemic preparedness health guidance available
Guidance Current status Guidance document Document owner
A national framework for responding to an influenza pandemic Published Department of Health
Guidance for primary care trusts and primary care professionals on the provision of healthcare in a community setting
Published Department of Health
The ethical framework for policy and planning Published Department of Health
+ Cabinet Office
Guidance on preparing acute hospitals in England Published Department of Health
Guidance for ambulance services and their staff in England Published Department of Health
Planning for pandemic influenza in adult social care Published Department of Health
Guidance on the management of death certification and cremation certification
Consultation ends 22/0208
Draft Department of Health
Guidance on preparing mental health services in England
Consultation ends 22/0208
Draft Department of Health
Surge Capacity and prioritisation in health services Provisional UK Guidance
Consultation ends 22/0208
Draft Department of Health
Possible amendments to medicines and associated legislation during an influenza pandemic
Consultation ends 22/02/08
Draft Department of health
Human Resources guidance for the NHS
Consultation ends 22/0208
Draft NHS Employers + Department of Health
To open the document double click on the box below
National framework
Ethical framework
Acute
Primary care
Ambulance
Social care
Death + Cremation
Mental health
Surge capacity
HR
Medicines
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Pandemic preparedness infection control guidance available
Guidance Current status Guidance document Document owner
Guidance for funeral directors Published HPA + Department of Health
Guidance for cleaning staff and refuse collectors in non-healthcare settings Published HPA + Department of Health
Guidance for fire and rescue service Published HPA + Department of Health
Guidance for the hospitality industry Published HPA + Department of Health
Guidance for infection control for hospitals and primary care settings Published HPA + Department of Health
Guidance for infection control in healthcare setting Published HPA + Department of Health
Guidance for the police service Published NPIA
To open the document double click on the box below
Funeral directors
Cleaning
Fire and rescue
Hospitality
Police
Primary
Healthcare
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Infection control training materials available
Posters Current status Document Document owner
Poster: Prepare and Protect Published Department of Health
Poster: Hand-washing technique Published Department of Health
Poster: Alcohol hand-rub technique Published Department of Health
For access to the infection control training video go to
• Guidance published by the Department can be found http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publichealth/Flu/PandemicFlu/index.htm
• Guidance published by the Cabinet Office can be found http://www.ukresilience.info/latest/human_pandemic.aspx
• Guidance published by HPA can be found http://www.hpa.org.uk/infections/topics_az/influenza/pandemic/default.htm
• Guidance published by HSE can be found http://www.hse.gov.uk/biosafety/diseases/pandemic.htm
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Summary of the programme’s countermeasures strategy
• The programme has devised an intervention strategy, for use in the event of a pandemic, based on the need for ‘Defence in Depth’. This strategy aims to
– Minimise illness and death
– Reduce the burden on the NHS
– Reduce economic impact of a pandemic
• There are four layers to the ‘Defence in Depth’ strategy, these are reflected the portfolio of countermeasures the programme proposes to procure.
Figure 3 - Illustration of the Defence in Depth strategy
Reduce the spread of the virus
• The first line of the ‘defence in depth’ model is to reduce the spread of the virus, this is achieved through good public hygiene habits, social distancing measures and the use of facemasks.
Reduce the number of cases
• The next layer of defence aims to reduce the number of people who get the symptoms of flu. This is achieved through the use of vaccines and antiviral prophylaxis.
Reduce length and severity of symptoms, reduce the risk of complications, hospitalisations and deaths
• The following layers aim to reduce the number of symptomatic people who get complications and reduce the number of people with complications who die or become chronically ill through use of antivirals and antibiotics.
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Summary of countermeasures to be procured by the programme
Countermeasure What is it? Current national stockpile
Capacity in current NHS supply chain
Proposed stockpile Estimated date to start stockpile
Estimated date to complete stockpile
Face masks Protective mask to cover mouth and nose
100,000 FFP3 respirators 250,000 surgical masks
Unknown Facemasks for health and social care workers
Jan 2009 Beginning 2010
Antivirals Treatment that will reduce the duration of the flu for a patient and the risk of complications
14.6m courses of Tamiflu
Limited to seasonal use Enough antivirals to treat 50% of the population
By March 2009 End 2009
Antibiotics Treatment for bacteria complications that arise as the result of the flu
None Limited to normal supply chain –estimated 3 weeks supply
14.7m courses of antibiotics to treat all those with complications
By March 2009 By the end of 2010
Pandemic specific vaccine
A vaccine that will be developed against a specific strain of the virus. It will only be available in subsequent waves of a pandemic
None None Access to supply for 100% of the population, if required (this will not be available immediately, it make take several months)
Advance supply agreement signed in July 2007 for a 4 year period.
Consumables 8 categories of consumables that will enable the above countermeasures to be administered e.g. syringes
None Unknown Required to support delivery of pandemic countermeasures
By March 2009 By the end of 2010
Pre-pandemic vaccine
Vaccine for use against the H5N1virus
Programme is currently reviewing how pre-pandemic vaccine could be used.
Antivirals for household prophylaxis
Household prophylaxis - giving antivirals to all members of a household when one family member is symptomatic
Programme is currently reviewing how antivirals could be used to follow a policy of household prophylaxis
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Template for Consumables
A framework of the consumable items that may be in short supply to trusts / health care providers during an influenza pandemic was drafted in Autumn 2007 and shared with SHA Flu Leads.
The Department of Health is not creating a complete, comprehensive list of items that all trusts / health care providers will need. However the below list is provided as a guide to stimulate local discussion with local experts as to what items are required and in what quantities.
Click the icon below to open up the consumables template
Template for consumables
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Scientific Evidence Papers
Guidance Current status Guidance document Document owner
Risk of a human influenza pandemic emerging from Avian H5N1 viruses Published Department of Health
The use of face masks during an influenza pandemic Published Department of Health
The use of antibiotics for pandemic influenza Published Department of Health
Use of antiviral drugs in an influenza pandemic Published Department of Health
Pre-pandemic and pandemic influenza vaccines Published Department of Health
Antibiotics
Antivirals
H5N1
Face masks
Vaccines
Tables
To open the document double click on the box below
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Campaign materials
Posters Current status Document Document owner
CATCH IT, BIN IT, KILL IT
Catch it, Bin it, Kill it poster A3 Published Department of Health
Catch it, Bin it, Kill it poster A4 Published Department of Health
Local action pack Published Department of Health
Summary of regional advertising activity Published Department of Health
Summary of supporting research Published Department of Health
COUGHS AND SNEEZES SPREAD DISEASES
Poster Published Department of Health
Letter from Professor Lindsey Davies Published Department of Health
WET, SOAP, WASH, RINSE, DRY
Poster Published Department of Health
For access to further materials including a screensaver go to - http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_080839
To open the document double click on the icon below
A3
A4
Local action plan
Poster
Letter
Poster
Regional activity
Research
Assurance Strategy and Audit
Communications & Stakeholder Management
Communications &StakeholderRelationship
ManagerFiona Carr
Internal CommunicationsBridget Le Good
Respiratory and Hand Hygiene
CampaignsNicola Lewis
CommunicationsFor Vulnerable & Hard To Reach
GroupsAlison Langridge
Communications Support
Sarah Wheller
Clinical Countermeasures & Business Case
Clinical Countermeasures
ManagerDamien Bishop
Business Case Manager
Mark Thomas
Budget ManagerPaul Winslow
Budget SupportAnita Sharma
Healthcare
Primary Care/Community Setting Manager
Amy McCullough
Antiviral Project Office ManagerVasanti Shirodkar
Audit Tool SMERichard Puleston
Distribution arrangements/Audit Tool
Tony McDermott
Stock management ArrangementsUmesh Kumar
Mental Health/Vulnerable
Groups ManagerCatherine Heffernan
Pandemic Flu in Pregnancy Manager
Chole Sellwood
Clinical Advisor/Engagement with the ProfessionalsBarbara Bannister
Healthcare SupportKola Okunola
Legal, International, Cross Government &
Briefing
International & Cross Government Lead
Jo Newstead
Legal, International,Briefing
Neri Ineneji
Cross-Govt, Ethics, UKNIP, Briefing
Greg Hartwell
Briefing/SecretariatLorna Wilkinson
Administrative Support
Samuel Stewart
Science & Surveillance
Science Manager
Sandra Costigan
Surveillance Manager
Arlene Reynolds
Surveillance Clinical
Network DatabaseJane Leese
Scientific Manager
Colin Armstrong
Surveillance/SAG/Secretariat/ Support
Noorie Beeharry
National Director for Pandemic Influenza PreparednessLindsey Davies
Senior PA to National DirectorTanya Nickols
Programme Management OfficeLloyd Thomas (Contractor), Kevyn Austyn
Dan Oligive (Contractor), Anya Tahir
Programme DirectorKaren Fitzgerald
Branch HeadBruce Taylor
Branch HeadHelen Shirley Quirke
Implementation
Social careSimon Cole
Ian Summerscales
NHS ImplementationRuth Whitfield
NHS LiaisonJohn Pullin
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Key programme contacts
Subject area First Surname Telephone no. EmailNational Director Lindsey Davies 020 7210 5753 [email protected]
MISC 32 provides cross-government strategic direction / issue resolution and ensures strategy is aligned
DMB responds to escalated decisions & issues which affect stated ministerial & departmental positions
Operational Management Board actively coordinates and manages day to day risks, issues, conflicts and priorities of the PIG workstreams. PIG / Project Chairs are represented at formal meetings (together with DA, Finance and HPA representatives). PIG Leads participate in informal meetings.
Pandemic Influenza Groups (PIGS) /Project Boards take place regularly to discuss progress / risks and resolve issues on the day to day running of the workstream (eg: Health Care, Clinical Counter Measures, National Flu Line, Business Case etc).
The structure is designed to provide both strategic and operational direction to the programme. The complexity of the programme means that multiple stakeholders are involved in delivery. The governance process integrates these groups.
• Business Case
• Communications
• Countermeasures
• Healthcare
• Pharmacy
• Research
• Surveillance
• Social Care
• X-Cutting
Programme Board provides leadership, oversees the implementation of strategy and interacts with key stakeholders
NHSIB provides a bridge between the programme & regional operations & is responsible for the local implementation of the preparedness plan.
Programme Manager
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SHA Flu Leads contact details
SHA NAME EMAIL & ADDRESS PHONE
London Jackie SpibyPandemic Flu Lead(& Public Health Consultant)Karen HetheringtonNHS London Pandemic Flu Coordinator (Acting)
Alan Taylor [email protected] Lead Clinician & Senior Dental Officer, Oxfordshire Salaried Primary Care Dental Service
01869 604052
Carole Fry [email protected] Nursing Officer, Health Improvement and Protection Directorate 020 797 24419
Assurance Strategy and Audit
Summary of planning support materials
Implementation timings
Planning assumptions
Exercise feedback
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Feb Apr Jun Aug Oct Dec
A summary of key dates for NHS preparedness planning 2008
Key meetings
31/01Audits
complete
Jan
Current timingsAudit tools for• Acute• Community• Ambulance
Mar May Jul Sept Nov Jan
20/03 SHA confirm results
30/04 Action plans
complete
06/08 Implementation
check point
31/10Implementation
deadline
14/11Re-audit
completed
23/04 NHS Management Board update
tbc/10 NHS Management Board update
tbc/01 NHS Management Board update
= Milestone
= Meeting
Key = Programme activity
10/04 Actions plans
reviewed
10/06SC Audit launched
26/09Audit
completed
23/06 NHS National
Workshop
31/10 Action plans
complete
Proposed audit tool timing for
• SHA
• Mental health
• Social care
Programme work Agree forward look of
programme of exercises required
Agree the measure and target for an acceptable level of preparedness by end 2007
05/12 SHA
confirm results
Update to NHS Man. Board on audit results
Update to NHS Man. Board on audit results
21/03 SHA audit launched
04/04 Audit completed
15/05 mental health audit launched
30/05 audit completed
10/06 SHA confirm results
06/05 SHA confirm results
04/07 Action plans
complete
Programme delivers support to NHS Implementation
Programme offers independent review of plans/flu squad challenge sessions
Indicative timings*
Indicative timings*
Indicative timings*
*Indicative timings will be confirmed as soon as possible
tbc = to be confirmed. These will be confirmed as soon as possible.
Draft
Restricted: Policy
Page │ 25
Pandemic preparedness planning principles
The National Framework articulates the planning principles upon which the health and social care response to a pandemic should be planned
• Response arrangements should be based on strengthening and supplementing normal delivery mechanisms as far as is practicable
• Plans should be developed on an integrated multi-agency basis with risk sharing and cross-cover between all organisations
• Plans should encourage pan-organisational working, seeking to mobilise capacity and skills of all public and private sector healthcare staff, contractors and volunteers
• Response measures should maintain public confidence and ‘feel fair’
Source: National Framework, p94,95
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Plans should account for the following assumptions on how healthcare will be delivered during a pandemic
The National Framework explains that the NHS should plan on the basis that normal patient pathways and service delivery arrangements will need to be adapted. It suggests that plans should assume use of the following
1. From WHO Phase 6, UK Alert Level 2 a National Flu Line Service is activated to enable symptomatic patients rapid access to a assessment, advice and, if appropriate, antiviral medicine treatment and onward referral. This includes triage to another healthcare professional where further advice and care is required. The Flu Line Service is intended to help preserve primary healthcare capacity for seeing those people that most need their services, as well as facilitating rapid access to antiviral treatment
2. Provision of a wider range of treatments by health professionals other than GPs e.g. nurses following agreed guidelines
3. Care of patients, who under normal circumstances would be admitted to hospital, in their own home/residential settings
4. Treatment of severely ill patients in areas of a hospital not normally used for providing acute medical care by medical and nursing teams who do not normally manage such patients
5. Treatment of patients in private healthcare facilities not normally used for acute medical care by healthcare teams that do not normally manage such patients
6. Managing surge demand during the pandemic will require a focus on delivering essential services
Note:
DH is currently consulting on necessary changes to medicines or other legislation that may be required to implement these alternative operational arrangements
Source: National Framework, p97
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Plans must take account of the following surge management assumptions
Introduction
At WHO Phase 6, Alert Level 2 respective health departments will need to make decisions to reduce or change NHS services and, where appropriate, to modify or suspend some normal performance targets.
Health and social care organisations need to ensure their plans include provision for enhancing, scaling down, or ceasing some services at the pandemic threat increases. Their planning should be based on the following surge assumptions
Source: National Framework, p95, 96
• Up to 50% of the population may show clinical symptoms,
up to 25% of those may develop complications
• Up to 2.5% of those who become symptomatic may die
• Up to 22% of cases can be expected in the ‘peak week’ of
a pandemic wave
• Up to 28.5% of symptomatic patients will require
assessment and treatment by a general medical
practitioner or experience nurse
• Up to 4% of those symptomatic may require hospital
admission, average length of stay for those with
complications may be 6 days (10 if in intensive care)
• A short epidemic would be greater strain on services than
a lower-level but more sustained one
• Hospitalisations and deaths are likely to be greatest if the
highest attack rates are in older people, lowest burden if
highest attack rates are in adults aged 15-64
• Total healthcare contacts for influenza –like illness could
be up to 30 million
• Peak demand could last for 1-2 weeks, local epidemic
waves 6-8 weeks
• Most patients will be treated at home with antiviral
medicines initially
Severity of illness assumptions* Health and social care demand assumptions*
* All statistics are based on national planning assumption attack rate of 50%Further information can be found in the Primary care guidance and managing surge guidance
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Planners are asked to plan on the basis of a clinical attack rate of up to 50%
Expected healthcare demand over the course of a pandemic
Per 100,00 people Per GP practice
Clinical cases 50,000 2,900
GP consultations 14,250 2,900
Hospital admissions 2,000 120
Deaths 1,250 80
Expected healthcare demand during the peak of a pandemic
Per 100,00 people Per GP practice
Clinical cases 11,000 640
GP consultations 3,135 185
Hospital admissions 440 30
Deaths 280 20
Planning will assume a clinical attack rate of up to 50%, the table below shows the surge in demand healthcare providers must plan for.
Source: National Framework, p96, 97 * All statistics are based on national planning assumption attack rate of 50%. This is assumed to be a worst case attack rate/
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The following assumptions should underpin Primary Care planning
Source: National Framework, p107-113
Area Category Planners should assume…
Primary care • National Flu Line Service
• From WHO Phase 6, UK Alert Level 2 a 24/7 National Flu Line service will be activated to enable symptomatic patients rapid access to a assessment, advice and, if appropriate, antiviral medicine treatment and onward referral. This includes triage to another healthcare professional where further advice and care is required. The Flu Line Service is intended to help preserve primary healthcare capacity for seeing those people that most need their services, as well as facilitating rapid access to antiviral treatment
• That the National Flu Line service will be in place, with a minimum specification, by Winter 2008
• Automated channels such as the web and non clinical staff with access to clinical supervisions will be used to provide initial assessment for patients and either to authorise collection of antivirals or refer patients to GP as appropriate
• Although the Flu Line is intended to meet the majority of demand for antivirals some will still need to be issued through existing primary care arrangements. General practice for example will need to be able to issue antivirals when on home visits. Other services that are likely to need a local stockpile include hospitals for inpatient use. These antivirals will come from the central stockpile the programme is currently building
• Secure systems will allow for the collection of an antiviral treatment course and self-care leaflet by a friend, from a designated centre
• That Antiviral medicines should initially be available to all patient who have been symptomatic for less than 48 hours (unless clinically contra indicated)
• Primary care services
• That primary care services will need to continue provision of essential primary care
• That arrangements are required to deliver pandemic influenza programmes including targeted vaccination as/when available and antiviral supply and issuing
• Demand for primary care services
• That General practice can expect to see 3,135 influenza patients per 100,000 of population per week at the peak*
• That parents/guardians of symptomatic children weighing 15kg or less will need to contact a GP
• That although visiting all cases will not be possible, primary care plans should be based on influenza patients avoiding leaving home as far as possible
• That plans must recognise the need to respond to psychosocial issues and concerns such as anxiety, grief and distress and for sympathetic arrangements to manage additional fatalities
* All statistics are based on national planning assumption attack rate of 50%. This is assumed to be a worst case attack rate/
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The following assumptions should underpin Primary Care planning
Source: National Framework, p107-113
Area Category Planners should assume…
Primary care continued • Prioritising care • That Primary care response strategies should focus the available capacity and clinical skills primarily on treating those suffering with the complications of influenza or requiring other essential clinical care and assessing young children or patients in groups identified at being at particular risk
• That treatment and admission criteria should remain clinically based
Community Pharmacies • Services • Community pharmacies will contribute to support self-care, dispensing/repeat dispensing of routine medicines, signposting other NHS services, supplying regular medicines to vulnerable people, maintaining medicine supplies under contracts with other bodies e.g. mental health trusts etc
• New powers may be given to community pharmacists, to ease burden on GPs, consultation on this is in progress
Dentistry • Services • Emergency care should remain throughout the pandemic
• Skills of local dental practitioners should be used to support wider delivery of healthcare in a pandemic
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The following assumptions should underpin PCT planning
Source: National Framework, p107-113
Area Category Planners should assume…
PCT • Role of the PCT That role of the PCT is to
• Act as a focal point to provide a link to and oversight of the local health response, working with the SHA
• Monitor and coordinate the overall health response
• Maintain the continuing provision of primary care services (including GP and Community pharmacy) in/out of hours
• Collect, collate and report information on local health situation
• Link with social care and other agencies to support delivery of care and maintain patients at home
• Provide local link and health input and advice to the wider local coordination arrangements
• Ensure national messages cascaded from SHAs are reinforced
• Ensure the public are well informed and advised on local response arrangements
• Co-ordinate key pandemic influenza programmes including the supply and issuing of antivirals and a programme of specific vaccine, if and when it becomes available
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The following assumptions should underpin planning for acute care
Source: National Framework, p107-113
Area Category Planners should assume…
Acute care • Provision of services • That provision for emergency treatment will need to continue
• That that some symptomatic patients will present at accident and emergency departments, GP, pharmacies etc
• That plans should recognise the need to respond to psychosocial issues and concerns such as anxiety, grief and distress and for sympathetic arrangements to manage additional fatalities
• Demand for services • That 2,000 per 100,000 population may need hospital admission for acute respiratory and related conditions
• That demand for hospital admission can be expected to increase up to 440 new cases per 100,000 population per week at the peak
• That demand for critical care beds could rise up to 110 per 100,000 population per week at the peak
• Prioritising care • That agreed and consistently applied clinical criteria and thresholds for hospital admission are required
• That critical care will need to be prioritised
• That treatment and admission criteria should remain clinically based and hospital admission criteria should be applied in a transparent, consistent and equitable way that uses the capacity available for those who are most seriously ill and most likely to benefit
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The following assumptions should underpin Ambulance, Mental health and Social care planning
Source: National Framework, p107-113
Area Category Planners should assume…
Ambulance Service • Services • Ambulance services will be expected to maintain capacity to answer all emergency and urgent calls, some prioritisation and reduction in normal response time standards may become unavoidable
• Plans should recognise the need to respond to psychosocial issues and concerns such as anxiety, grief and distress and for sympathetic arrangements to manage additional fatalities
Mental health • Services • It should be assumed that may not be possible to move those with significantly disturbed behaviour to other settings
• Plans should recognise the need to respond to psychosocial issues and concerns such as anxiety, grief and distress and for sympathetic arrangements to manage additional fatalities
• Demand • Mental health trusts may experience increasing demands on services due to the impact of the pandemic on individuals and families
• Infection control • Contingency plans should include infection control measures to minimise spread of influenza in residential establishments
Community Pharmacies • Services • Community pharmacies will contribute to support self-care, dispensing/repeat dispensing of routine medicines, signposting other NHS services, supplying regular medicines to vulnerable people, maintaining medicine supplies under contracts with other bodies e.g. mental health trusts etc
• New powers may be given to community pharmacists, to ease burden on GPs, consultation on this is in progress
Dentistry • Services • Emergency care should remain throughout the pandemic
• Skills of local dental practitioners should be used to support wider delivery of healthcare in a pandemic
Social care • Demand • Must anticipate the need for additional short term and short notice demand from influenza sufferers no longer able to cope independently and others whose normal care arrangements have been disrupted
National Blood Service • Services • Blood, tissue and organ supply will be continued
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Planners may want to review feedback from the following exercises
Guidance Current status Guidance document Document owner
Phoenix and New Day Published HPA
United Endeavour 2 Published HPA
Exercise programme Published HPA
Phoenix New Day
United Endeavour 2
Exercise Programme
To open the document double click on the icon below
Page │ 35
Disclaimer
In carrying out our work and preparing our report, we have worked solely on the instructions of Department of Health and for Department of Health’s purposes. It should not be provided to any third party without prior written consent. Our report may not have considered issues relevant to any third parties, any use such third parties may choose to make of our report is entirely at their own risk and we shall have no responsibility whatsoever in relation to any such use.
The information in this pack is intended to provide only a general outline of the subjects covered. It should not be regarded as comprehensive or sufficient for making decisions, nor should it be used in place of professional advice. Accordingly, Assurance Strategy and Audit accepts no responsibility for loss arising from any action taken or not taken by anyone using this pack.
The information in this presentation pack will have been supplemented by matters arising from any oral presentation by us, and should be considered in light of this additional information.