Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR) Document · 3. Transport had played major role in Kenyas economic development, and the quality of transport infrastructure and services

Document of

The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Report No: ICR00004798

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT

<Credit Number 5140-KE>

ON A

CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 43.96 MILLION

(US$ 92.53 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

Republic of Kenya

FOR THE

KENYA: NATIONAL URBAN TRANSPORT IMPROVEMENT

PROJECT June 26, 2019

Transport Global Practice

Africa Region

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective {December 28, 2018})

Currency Unit = KES

US$ 1.00 = KES 101.77885

SDR 1.00 = US$ 1.39064

FISCAL YEAR July 1 - June 30

Regional Vice President: Hafez M. H. Ghanem

Country Director: Carlos Felipe Jaramillo

Senior Global Practice Director: Guangzhe Chen

Practice Manager: Benedictus Eijbergen

Task Team Leader(s): Josphat O. Sasia

ICR Main Contributor: Akiko Kishiue

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AF Additional Financing

BRT Bus Rapid Transit

CBD Central Business District

CPS Country Partnership Strategy

EASA East African School of Aviation

EBK Engineering Board of Kenya

EIRR Economic Internal Rate of Return

ESIA Environmental and Social Impact Assessments

EU European Union

FM Financial Management

GoK Government of Kenya

ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization

ICT Information and Communication Technology

IDA International Development Association

INTP Integrated National Transport Policy

ITS Intelligent Transportation System

JKIA Jomo Kenyatta International Airport

KeNHA Kenya National Highways Authority

KRC Kenya Railways Corporation

KTSSP Kenya Transport Sector Support Project

KURA Kenya Urban Roads Authority

M&E Monitoring and Evaluation

MoR Ministry of Roads

MoT Ministry of Transport

MoTIHUD&PW Ministry of Transport, Infrastructure, Housing, Urban Development and Public Works

MRTS Mass Rapid Transit System

NaMATA Nairobi Metropolitan Area Transport Authority

NCA National Construction Authority

NCTIP Norther Corridor Transport Improvement Project

NMA Nairobi Metropolitan Area

NPV Net Present Value

NTSA National Transport and Safety Authority

NUTRIP National Urban Transport Improvement Project

PAD Project Appraisal Document

PAP Project Affected Person

PDO Project Development Objective

PPP Public-Private Partnership

RAP Resettlement Action Plan

SDoI State Department of Infrastructure

SDoT State Department of Transport

SDR Special Drawing Rights

ToR Terms of Reference

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DATA SHEET .......................................................................................................................... 1

I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES ....................................................... 5

A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL .........................................................................................................5

B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION ................................................................7

II. OUTCOME .................................................................................................................... 10

A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs ............................................................................................................ 10

B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY) ...................................................................................... 10

C. EFFICIENCY ........................................................................................................................... 14

D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING- Unsatisfactory ............................................ 15

E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS ......................................................................................... 15

III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME ................................ 16

A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION ................................................................................... 16

B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION ............................................................................. 17

IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME .. 19

A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E) ............................................................ 19

B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE ..................................................... 20

C. BANK PERFORMANCE ........................................................................................................... 23

D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME ....................................................................................... 24

V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................. 25

ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS ........................................................... 27

ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION ......................... 37

ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT (IDA, GOK) .......................................................... 38

ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS ........................................................................................... 39

ANNEX 5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS ... 47

ANNEX 6. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS (IF ANY) ..................................................................... 51

MAP .................................................................................................................................... 67

The World Bank KENYA: NATIONAL URBAN TRANSPORT IMPROVEMENT PROJECT (P126321)

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DATA SHEET

BASIC INFORMATION

Product Information

Project ID Project Name

P126321 KENYA: NATIONAL URBAN TRANSPORT IMPROVEMENT

PROJECT

Country Financing Instrument

Kenya Investment Project Financing

Original EA Category Revised EA Category

Partial Assessment (B) Partial Assessment (B)

Organizations

Borrower Implementing Agency

Kenya National Treasury

Kenya National Highways Authority, Kenya Urban Roads

Authority, Ministry of Transport, Infrastructure, Housing

and Urban Development, Kenya Railways Corporation

Project Development Objective (PDO) Original PDO

The Project Development Objectives (PDO) are to: (a) improve the efficiency of road transport along the northern corridor; (b) improve the institutional capacity and arrangements in the urban transport sub sector; and (c) promote the private sector participation in the operation, financing and management of transport systems.


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FINANCING

Original Amount (US$) Revised Amount (US$) Actual Disbursed (US$)

World Bank Financing IDA-51400

300,000,000 92,531,367 61,868,482

Total 300,000,000 92,531,367 61,868,482

Non-World Bank Financing 0 0 0

Borrower/Recipient 39 0 0

Total 39 0 0

Total Project Cost 300,000,039 92,531,367 61,868,482

KEY DATES

Approval Effectiveness MTR Review Original Closing Actual Closing

02-Aug-2012 24-Dec-2012 31-Dec-2018 31-Dec-2018

RESTRUCTURING AND/OR ADDITIONAL FINANCING

Date(s) Amount Disbursed (US$M) Key Revisions

27-Dec-2018 62.01 Change in Components and Cost Cancellation of Financing Change in Financing Plan

KEY RATINGS

Outcome Bank Performance M&E Quality

Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory Negligible

RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRs

No. Date ISR Archived DO Rating IP Rating Actual

Disbursements (US$M)

01 30-Mar-2013 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0


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02 22-Oct-2013 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 3.90

03 02-Jun-2014 Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 8.91

04 23-Jan-2015 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 12.05

05 14-Dec-2015 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 15.68

06 30-Jun-2016 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 18.33

07 01-Feb-2017 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 34.58

08 18-May-2017 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 36.87

09 15-Feb-2018 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 44.84

10 07-Sep-2018 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 54.64

SECTORS AND THEMES

Sectors

Major Sector/Sector (%)

Transportation 100

Urban Transport 79

Public Administration - Transportation 21

Themes

Major Theme/ Theme (Level 2)/ Theme (Level 3) (%) Economic Policy 1

Trade 1

Trade Facilitation 1

Private Sector Development 25

Jobs 15

Job Creation 15

Public Private Partnerships 10


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Public Sector Management 1

Public Administration 1

Administrative and Civil Service Reform 0

Municipal Institution Building 1

Human Development and Gender 6

Disease Control 6

HIV/AIDS 6

Urban and Rural Development 76

Urban Development 61

Urban Infrastructure and Service Delivery 61

Rural Development 15

Rural Infrastructure and service delivery 15

ADM STAFF

Role At Approval At ICR

Regional Vice President: Makhtar Diop Hafez M. H. Ghanem

Country Director: Johannes C.M. Zutt Carlos Felipe Jaramillo

Senior Global Practice Director: Jamal Saghir Guangzhe Chen

Practice Manager: Supee Teravaninthorn Benedictus Eijbergen

Task Team Leader(s): Josphat O. Sasia Josphat O. Sasia

ICR Contributing Author: Akiko Kishiue


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I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES

A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL

Country Context 1. At appraisal, Kenya was urbanizing rapidly and experiencing relatively strong economic growth, which reached 5.7 percent in 2010, mainly attributed to productive activities in urban areas1 For instance, while Kenya’s overall population grew from 31.5 million in 2000 to 43.6 million in 2012, recording an average of 2.7 percent per year, the urban population living in urban areas increased from 6.3 million to 10.6 million during the same period thereby recording an annual growth of 4.5. percent. Kenya’s urban population was projected to reach 19.1 million or 37 percent of the total population in 2020.2 The high population growth in urban centers in Kenya arose from rural-urban migration of people searching for better employment and education opportunities as well as access to basic public services. This, however, placed a tremendous strain on urban services, including transport, ultimately affecting both economic productivity and citizens ‘quality of life’. Poverty in urban areas had increased with the mushrooming of informal settlements in major towns. By the time of Appraisal, in 2012, urban areas played an increasingly important role supporting Kenya’s effort to develop to a middle-income country and were emerging as a policy priority. 2. Vision 2030, Kenya’s long-term development strategy, aimed at transforming the country into a middle-income country. Under its economic pillar, GDP was expected to grow at 10 percent per annum. For the expected high rate of growth to be realized it required the removal of key bottlenecks to growth through reforms and increased investment in infrastructure, including Information Communications Technology (ICT). This investments in turn were anticipated to unlock existing potential and productivity, promote competitiveness, and improve access to public services, all of which were necessary in the transformation of Kenya into a middle-income country. Urban areas, as the engines of economic growth, would play a crucial role in the realization of this vision. Much of the effort of the Government of Kenya (GoK) to accelerate economic development was focused on growth poles along the Northern Corridor, such as Nairobi, Kisumu, Mombasa, Eldoret and Nakuru - the largest urban centers with the highest levels of industrial activity.

Sectoral Context 3. Transport had played major role in Kenya’s economic development, and the quality of transport infrastructure and services in the country were improving by the time of Appraisal. The Government of Kenya had implemented major policy and institutional reforms in critical areas: the establishment of three autonomous road authorities3 for national, rural, and urban roads; separation of policy formulation from execution of the road program; adoption of a new road policy; and development and adoption of a 15-year Road Sector Investment Plan (RSIP 2010-2024). In recognition of the importance of the provision of quality infrastructure to support economic growth prospects, the GoK allocated significant resources toward improvement of transport infrastructure in its RSIP. Transport sector budgetary allocation increased from 9.5 percent of total GoK expenditures in FY2004 to 14 percent in FY2010.

1 Economic activities in urban areas contributed a significant share (75 percent) of Kenya’s GDP growth around the time of National Urban Transport Improvement Project (NUTRIP) appraisal 2 Project Appraisal Document 3 Kenya National Highway Authority, Kenya Urban Transport Authority, and Kenya Rural Road Authority


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4. Urban sections of Northern Corridor, Kenya’s most important transport route, and a crucial artery for its land-locked neighbors were heavily congested and required capacity expansion with the rapid urban growth. In Nairobi, the GoK attempted to respond to this challenge by offering a section of the corridor to the private sector for expansion and tolling, through a concession, under the Nairobi Urban Toll Road Project (NUTRP), which was to be supported by the World Bank Group. Unfortunately, the process was canceled due to limited interest from the private sector and significant circumstances changed at project and country level. The congestion in the Northern Corridor through Nairobi remained one of the major bottlenecks on the flow of traffic to Nairobi’s Central Business District (CBD), Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (JKIA) and neighboring countries. New approaches were needed, including utilizing the private sector more extensively and effectively. 5. The multiplicity of government agencies involved in provision of urban infrastructure and services posed a challenge in coordination, planning and execution of programs. There were as many as 15 organizations involved in urban transport with overlapping and contradictory mandates and responsibilities. The ineffective institutional structures and weak legal and regulatory framework diminished quality, reliability and safety for public transport users, particularly in urban areas. In addition to poor public transport services, inter-modal linkages and connectivity were minimal. Unregulated matatus (mini-buses) were the backbone of the public mass transport system. Studies indicated that matatus carried about 33 percent of urban commuter traffic, while about 47 percent of residents of Nairobi walked to their places of work (MTRS, 2011). In the Nairobi metropolitan area, it was estimated that public buses carried about 350,000 - 400,000 passengers per day (about 19 percent). Due to inadequate service, modal share of commuter rail in urban passenger transport was only 1 percent (13,000 passengers per day4) despite the potential demand for rail services since its core network served in densely populated urban area.

6. In 2011, Parliament approved the establishment of the National Construction Authority (NCA) and the Engineers Board of Kenya (EBK), regulatory boards for the construction industry and the engineering profession and practice, respectively. An Integrated National Transport Policy (INTP), which was waiting for the Parliament’s endorsement at the time of project appraisal provided for the creation of the Nairobi Metropolitan Transport Authority (NaMATA) and the National Road Transport Safety Authority (NTSA), together with introduction of mass rapid transit system (MRTS), among other recommendations.

Theory of Change (Results Chain) 7. Theory of change is presented in figure 1 below.

Project Development Objectives (PDOs) 8. The Project Development Objectives (PDOs) are to (a) improve the efficiency of road transport along the

Northern Corridor; (b) improve the institutional capacity and arrangements in the urban transport sub sector; and

(c) promote the private sector participation in the operation, financing, and management of transport systems.

Key Expected Outcomes and Outcome Indicators 9. The original outcomes and outcome indicators for the project were:

(a) improved efficiency of road transport along the Northern Corridor;

• Reduction in average travel time from Junction Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (JKIA)-Rironi road;

• Reduction in vehicle operating costs on Junction JKIA-Rironi road;

• Number of road crashes reduced along Junction JKIA-Rironi Road;

4 Development of Commuter Rail Master Plan for Nairobi Metropolitan Region, Kenya Railway Corporation, August 2018


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• Direct beneficiaries: Road uses per day (of which % female) (b) improved institutional capacity and arrangements in the urban transport sub sector;

• Nairobi Metropolitan Transport Authority established and functional;

• National Road Transport and Safety Authority established and functional;

• Urban public transport rules and regulations development and in use (c) Enhanced private sector participation in the operation, financing, and management of transport systems

• Offer one Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) corridor for Public Private Partnerships (PPP);

• Offer one commuter rail line for PPP;

• Institutional setup within KeNHA (Kenya National Highways Authority) for the promotion of PPP in

financing and management of road infrastructure and services developed and adopted

Components 10. The original components of the project, and original and actual costs are summarized in Table 1. Please note that original counterpart fund and total project amount were US$113.11 million equivalent and US$413.11 million equivalent, but these were wrongly recorded in the system as US$39, and US$300,000,039, respectively (please see page 2 Financing).

B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION

11. PDOs, Outcome Targets, PDO indicators and components of the project were not revised throughout the project life.

Other Changes 12. Given the project’s performance and the low disbursement of the IDA Credit (22.7 percent) (details are discussed in Section III), the GoK requested to cancel the undisbursed amount of the credit, via a letter dated December 21, 2018. The consequent Level II restructuring entailed (a) cancellation of the entire undisbursed amount of the IDA credit of SDR149.54 million (US$207.47 million equivalent), (b) revision of the cost of each component; and (c) amendment of the amounts allocated to the Categories set forth in Section IV of Schedule 2 to the Financing Agreement. The remaining aspects of the project, including the Closing Date of the IDA Credit (December 31, 2018), remained unchanged. The revised credit amount is therefore XDR43.96 million (US$92.53 million equivalent with actual disbursement of US$62.01 million, at the project closure. The gap between net commitment and actual disbursement in US$ is due to currency exchange rate). Rationale for Changes and Their Implication on the Original Theory of Change 13. Adoption of the new constitution and changes in the GoK’s priorities towards promoting public transport, particularly including BRT aspects in enhancement of JKIA-Rironi sections impacted the major civil works planned under the project. This required retrofitting the project and resulted in inordinate delays to civil works and increased in resettlement impacts and costs. The project also suffered from delays in GoK’s releasing counterpart financing resources for compensation for Project Affected Persons (PAPs) as well as the relocation of services and implementation of the revised scope of civil works. Implementation was also delayed by major institutional changes in the structure of the Kenyan government as well as transport sector, which took place during NUTRIP implementation, including merging the functions of roads and other modes of transport under one Ministry. Notwithstanding, given the project’s slow progress and the low disbursement of the IDA Credit of December 21, 2018, the GoK decided to cancel the undisbursed amount of the credit.


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Table 1: Components and costs5 of NUTRIP Component A: Support to KeNHA to Upgrade the Urban Road Transport Infrastructure

a) Expanding and upgrading the Northern Corridor road section through Nairobi from JKIA turnoff to Rironi

b) Constructing the Kisumu Northern Bypass road. c) Constructing and rehabilitating non-motorized transport facilities. d) Carrying out feasibility and detailed engineering design studies of roads adjoining major towns

and studies for improvement of traffic flows e) Strengthening the capacity of KeNHA

Original (US$ million)

IDA GoK Total

223.26 87.89 311.15

Actual (US$ million)

IDA GoK Total

44.94 14.96 59.90

Component B: Support to Kenya Urban Road Authority (KURA) and Kenya Railway Corporation (KRC) to Develop Selected Mass

Transit Corridors

Subcomponent B1, KURA

a) Feasibility studies for selected Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) road corridors b) Providing public transport and associated services c) Regulatory reform for public transport services and a scheme to decongest major urban areas d) Improve traffic management in Nairobi e) Constructing the Meru bypass roads. f) Strengthening the capacity of KURA g) (i) Feasibility and detailed engineering design studies of missing road links in major towns; and

(ii) developing an urban transport plan for the city of Mombasa, and (iii) a study for the improvement of traffic flows of major towns


IDA GoK Total

47.77 17.06 64.83


IDA GoK Total

32.43 15.70 48.13

Subcomponent B2, KRC

a) Feasibility studies and detailed designs for construction of selected commuter rail systems in Nairobi and other major towns. b) Preparing bidding and contract documents for the selection of private sector operators providing commuter rail operations. c) Supplying and installing information Technology systems (IT) and building the capacity of KRC in IT


IDA GoK Total

11.93 3.70 15.63


IDA GoK Total

2.03 0 2.02

Component C: Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building

Subcomponent C1 State Department of Transport, former Ministry of Transport (MoT)

a) Implementing selected activities in the Integrated National Transport Policy, including establishing the National Transport Road and Safety Authority and building its capacity to carry out its functions, b) Establishing the Nairobi Metropolitan Transport Authority and building its capacity to carry out its functions, c) Strengthening the capacity of the East Africa School of Aviation and promoting private sector participation in the aviation sub-sector d) Carrying out urban transport sub-sector studies e) Capacity building of MoT staff to carry out its responsibilities


IDA GoK Total

13.44 3.46 16.90


IDA GoK Total

11.03 1.29 12.32

Subcomponent C2 State Department of Infrastructure, former Ministry of Roads (MoR)

a) Capacity building of MoR staff to carry out its responsibilities, including on monitoring and evaluation of the Project b) Building the capacity of the newly established National Construction Authority Engineers Board of Kenya and developing the implementing regulations


IDA GoK Total

3.60 1.00 4.60


IDA GoK Total

2.10 0 2.10

5 Actual cost is based on the revised project amount in US$ equivalent, not the actual disbursement amount in US$ at project closure.


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Expanding/ upgrading/ Construction of the Northern Corridor Road sections

Preparatory work for BRT and Commuter rail in Nairobi, Mombasa

Reduction in average travel time (JKIA-Rironi section) Reduction in vehicle operating cost (JKIA-Rironi section) Reduction in number of road crashes (JKIA-Rironi section)

52km of roads section along the Northern Corridor upgraded

Kisumu Bypass (9km) constructed

Designs for selected BRT corridor and commuter rail available for development Offer One BRT corrido for

PPP Offer One Commuter rail line for PPP Institutional setup with KeNHA for PPP promotion

Traffic management improvement in Nairobi

Establishment and Capacity building of regulatory bodies in Transport

Traffic Control center in Nairobi built

Traffic signalization installed in Nairobi

Enhanced capacity of regulatory bodies in Transport (NCA/EBK)

NTSA established

NaMATA established

Private sector participation in the operation, financing and management of transport systems

Component Activities Outputs Outcome indicators PDOs

Institutional capacity and arrangements in the urban transport sub sector improved

Improved efficiency of road transport along the Northern Corridor

Component A: Support to KeNHA to Upgrade the Urban Road Transport Infrastructure

Component B: Support to KURA and KRC to Develop Selected Mass Transit Corridors


Construction of Meru Bypass

NaMATA established and functional NTSA established and functional

Urban Public Transport rules and regulations developed and in use

Meru bypass roads (22km) constructed

Capacity building of KeNHA including private sector participation in road investments

Option study carried out and implemented

Figure 1. Theory of Change


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II. OUTCOME

A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs

Assessment of Relevance of PDOs and Rating: HIGH 14. The PDOs of the project are consistent and relevant to the current Bank Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) and Kenyan context. The GoK’s long term development strategy “Vision 2030” promotes the development of an efficient public transport system as the key to improve connectivity and accessibility, reduce travel time and cost saving, enhance safety and security. The CPS objectives for FY 14-20 remain valid and its implementation has been broadly on track, as presented in the Performance and Learning Review (PLR) in 2017. The PLR identified NUTRIP as a key on-going program for outcome 1.2 and outcome 2 of Domain of Engagement 1: Competitiveness and Sustainability—Growth to Eradicate Poverty of CPS. In light of this, relevance of PDOs is considered HIGH.

B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY)

Assessment of Achievement of Each Objective/Outcome PDO 1 improve the efficiency of road transport along the Northern Corridor 15. As discussed in section III, due to change in priority by the GoK focusing on promoting public transport, it was prudent to revise the design features to incorporate future mass rapid transit systems interventions notably BRT. As the result, it became evident that the available funds under the project could only cover James Gichuru road junction-Rironi section (26km) of the JKIA-James Gichuru road junction-Rironi road (53km), leaving JKIA-Southern bypass-James Gichuru sections unfunded.

16. Civil works of James Gichuru-Rironi road section was with about 12 percent physical progress, and Kisumu Bypass was under the design review at project closure. Currently civil works are underway within right-of-way and a projected completion date of civil works of James Gichuru-Rironi is scheduled by the end of 2022. Since JKIA-Southern bypass-James Gichuru sections became unfunded and the physical progress of James Gichuru-Rironi section is limited, there is no reduction in travel time and vehicle operating cost for JKIA-Rironi section. In addition, as the Northern Corridor is a trade route linking the landlocked countries of the Great Lakes Region in East and Central Africa with Mombasa in Kenya, the statement of PDO1 is too broad to achieve through the project activities. 17. Road safety in Kenya has substantially improved. The number of road crashes along the Northern Corridor (JKIA-Rironi section) has decreased by 30 percent and 22 percent in 2016 and 2017, respectively 6, exceeding the target (15 percent). Considering the progress of civil works at the closure, this achievement is attributed to the operationalization of the newly established NTSA and its enhanced enforcement capacity in road safety (as discussed under PDO 2). Taking these outcomes into account, achievement of PDO1 (improving road transport efficiency along the Northern Corridor) is considered nominal. 18. KURA successfully implemented the Meru Bypass, which is demonstrating significant impact. At the project closure, civil works of Meru Bypass were substantially completed with 80 percent physical progress. The bypass is composed of western and eastern bypasses to ease traffic congestion in Meru town. At the time of the ICR mission, all but 5 km of the road has opened, and KURA has reported 37 percent and 21 percent average

6 NTSA report to ICR


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travel time reduction during rush hour between Meru town (Central Business District) and Maua and Isiolo roads, respectively. Though causal relation between PDO1 and construction of Meru Bypass is missing from the results framework, it is evident that the construction of Meru Bypass had substantial impact on road transport efficiency. The anticipated impact of the bypass had been disseminated in local media7. PDO 2. improve the institutional capacity and arrangements in the urban transport sub sector 19. The project’s impact on institutional and policy reforms in urban transport subsector is significant and preparatory work undertaken under the project is expected to contribute to the implementation of major inventions and transformation in the urban transport sector. Sector governance and accountability have improved. NTSA, a lead agency for transport road safety, EBK a regulatory body for engineering practice, and NCA, an oversight body for the construction industry have been established and are fully operational. The GoK has also established NaMATA and is currently operationalizing it. The Board of Directors and acting Chief Executive Officer of NaMATA have been appointed. NUTRIP’s support on institutional capacity building and preparatory work for future urban transport projects contributed to the following: a) KURA: NUTRIP was the first World Bank project for KURA. NUTRIP has helped KURA enhance its capacity to

manage urban trunk roads. Major outputs are: i) development of a master plan for Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) in Nairobi. This includes the analysis and preliminary designs of 102 critical junctions and a design for a traffic management center. The Korea Exim Bank is currently preparing a project to finance the implementation of the master plan in two phases; ii) software purchase and training enabled KURA to improve in-house design and design review capacity; and iii) disaster recovery center has been established in KURA and data in KURA’s headquarters have been backed up adequately.

b) KRC: KRC developed a commuter rail master plan for the Nairobi Metropolitan Area. It identifies quick wins and long-term intervention to improve the level of service on the existing commuter railway network and increase the number of daily passengers from 13,000 (existing) to 132,000 (planned). The master plan also includes measures necessary to support development of the planned commuter rail network, such as regulatory, institutional, transport policy, and legal requirements. Implementation of some of the recommendations notably revival of the commuter rail services in Nairobi has begun. The on-going Kenya Transport Sector Support Project (KTSSP, P124109) has supported the development of railway regulatory framework, which has advanced to draft railway bills.

c) NTSA: The institutional arrangements in the management of road safety has improved and road safety has been mainstreamed through the operationalization of NTSA. Oversight function is now handled by NTSA with a clear leadership and coordination mechanism, which have contributed to a reduction in fatalities on the Kenyan roads. For instance, road crashes along JKIA-Rironi have been reduced by 30 percent by 20168 with enhanced enforcement capacity. The quality of motor vehicle inspection service has improved after the installation of the automated test lanes under the project. The vehicle inspection capacity increased to 300 inspections per center per day, which has boosted the overall annual inspection output from 180,000 in 2015 to 385,000 in 2018. Further improvements are noticeable with the acquisition of traffic enforcement equipment, public awareness on road safety and increased compliance with the traffic law which are in turn gradually contributing to change in behavior on the Kenyan roads.

7 https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001290125/twin-bypasses-set-to-ease-perennial-traffic https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001292354/sh4-5b-road-set-to-open-up-county-to-investment 8 Due to internal re-organizations occasioned by the Presidential Directive of January 2018 on Enforcement, the NTSA handed over the

responsibility and the enforcement gadgets to the National Police Service.

https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001290125/twin-bypasses-set-to-ease-perennial-traffic


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d) NCA: NCA has contributed to the enforcement of building code. There was no law to deal with cases of poor workmanship particularly in the building industry that led to deaths at construction sites or collapse of poorly constructed buildings and other structures such as bridges. Site inspection vehicles purchased by the project have strengthened construction oversight of civil works. For the first-time, contractors presiding over substandard structures that collapsed were taken to Court, and poorly constructed buildings in major towns were demolished. NCA has 14 regional offices across the country and Headquarters in Nairobi.

e) EBK: NUTRIP financed a customized Enterprise Resource Planning system, which enables EBK to accept on-line application/registration of engineers. As about 2,000 Kenyan engineers graduate from accredited programs each year, online registration will increase efficiency, reducing registration time by 60 percent compared to the paper-based system. Currently 42 programs from 10 universities have been accredited. 397 consulting engineers, 1,893 professional engineers, and 12,129 graduate engineers have registered with EBK.

f) NaMATA: NUTRIP has supported dialogue among Ministry of Transport, Infrastructure, Housing, Urban Development and Public Works (MoTIHUD&PW) and counties in NMA, resulting in signing of a Memorandum of Understanding and an Executive order to establish NaMATA. This dialogue supported the development of BRT network (finalized in 2014) and development of BRT design framework (waiting for the formal approval/adoption) which ensures a uniform specification for design of BRT corridors in the network. GoK has offered one BRT line for development (Thika road on a pilot basis). Bench marking technical study tours, board retreat, training of PSV operators and stakeholder consultation workshop financed by the project have supported its initial stage of operationalization.

g) East Africa School of Aviation (EASA): Installation of a 3D simulator and construction of a library helped EASA became the world’s 9th regional center of excellence accredited by ICAO. These improvements helped EASA conduct flight safety courses for safety inspectors in collaboration with ICAO, Singapore Aviation Academy, and the Incheon Aviation Academy of Korea. The school is attracting students from Africa and other regions, and the total number of students has increased from 985 in 2011/12 to 1,976 in 2017/18.

20. The momentum of the implementation of the institutional and policy reforms in urban transport, initiated under this project should be noted. The involvement of various agencies in NUTRIP and necessary dialogues with stakeholders created an opportunity and a platform for the agencies to share information and experience on matters related to urban transport and to discuss the way forward. This platform has brought together players in both the public and private sectors including the Matatu and Consumer organizations, as well as other Development Partners. Prior to NUTRIP, it is important to note that the urban transport sub-sector was fragmented and there was very little focus on mass public transport. NUTRIP helped to raise the profile of urban transport challenges.

21. In addition, it is worth mentioning that recent accelerated progress on operationalizing the institutional architecture for urban transport in the NMA is a remarkable achievement of NUTRIP. The implementation of

NUTRIP put a spotlight on the significance of urban transport sector, which was neglected for decades. NUTRIP

also influenced on the GoK’s approach to urban transport, which has shifted from vehicle-centric to human-centric with more attention to road safety and green transport. In addition, the ICR mission observed that whereas

implementing agencies felt the decision to cancel the undisbursed IDA credit (equivalent to 77 percent of original credit) was rather abrupt, implementing agencies give this decision serious consideration and appear to

acknowledge the challenges and shortcomings under the project and draw lessons for future projects.


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PDO 3. promote the private sector participation in the operation, financing, and management of transport systems

22. This activity was partly implemented under another Bank financed project, Kenya Infrastructure Finance/PPP Project (P121019). KeNHA has established PPP department which is functional and offered one road section Nairobi-Nakuru-Mau Summit for tolling under PPP. Meanwhile planning of BRT and commuter rail is advanced and promotion of private sector for the public transport has been guaranteed, but there is no PPP arrangement finalized for BRT and commuter rail at project closure. As the project focused on the preparatory activity of BRT and commuter rail, these indicators are more suitable with the project which includes the construction and operation of BRT and commuter rail. 23. As the system generated results framework in annex 1 is incomplete and incorrect, PDO level indicators, targets and actual values at project closure are presented in table 2.

Table 2 PDO level indicator, target and actual value at project closure

Justification of Overall Efficacy Rating - Negligible

PDO Level Results Indicators Target Actual Value

PDO 1. improve the efficiency of road transport along the Northern Corridor

Reduction in average travel time from Junction JKIA- Rironi road. 2.1 h 3.0 h

Reduction in vehicle operating costs on Junction JKIA-Rironi road. US$1.1/km US$1.5/km

Number of road crashes reduced along Junction JKIA-Rironi Road. * 15 %

reduction

30 % reduction in 2016

22 % reduction in 2017

Number of beneficiaries

380,000 the corporate indicator no longer requires the project beneficiaries to be measured.

PDO 2. improve the institutional capacity and arrangements in the urban transport sub sector

Improved institutional capacity in the urban transport sub-sector 1) Nairobi Metropolitan Transport Authority (NMTA) established and functional;

2) National Road Transport and Safety Authority (RTSA) established and functional;

3) Urban public transport rules and regulations developed and in use.

1) Yes

2) Yes

3) Yes

1) Substantially Yes

2) Yes

3) Substantially Yes

PDO 3. promote the private sector participation in the operation, financing, and management of transport systems

PPP promotion and opportunities in the transport sector developed.

1) Offer one BRT corridor for PPP; 2) Offer one commuter rail line for PPP; 3) Institutional setup within KeNHA for the promotion of PPP in

financing and management of road infrastructure and services

developed and adopted.

1) Yes 2) Yes 3) Yes

1) No 2) No 3) Yes

24. As the financing agreement of the project does not indicate the relative importance of different

objectives within the PDOs, this ICR assumes the equal importance for each objective. While the project

recorded remarkable achievements in road safety and institutional arrangement and capacity in urban


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transport sub-sector, civil works of James Gichuru road junction- Rironi section is still on-going, two road

sections along Norther Corridor have been unfunded, Kisumu Bypass is under design review, and achievement

in private sector participation is partial. Overall efficacy of the project is, hence rated Negligible.

C. EFFICIENCY

Assessment of Efficiency and Rating – Modest 25. This ICR examines efficiency of project based on the revised credit amount of XDR 43.96 million due to

the cancellation of undisbursed balance of the IDA Credit on December 21, 2018. About 45 percent of the

revised credit amount was allocated for James Gichuru – Rironi road section and 30 percent for Meru bypass,

respectively. Since the physical progress of James Gichuru- Rironi road section at ICR mission was only 18

percent, this ICR focuses on ex-post economic analysis of Meru bypass which has been substantially completed

(80 percent progress at ICR mission), using the latest costs obtained from the actual bids and any amendments

thereof, the expanded scope of works, and the latest traffic data. Net benefits were computed using the

Highway Development and Management Model (HDM-4), which simulated lifecycle conditions and costs and

provided economic decision criteria for multiple road design and maintenance alternatives.

26. The evaluation followed the same methodology as economic analysis at project appraisal assessing road

users’ benefits and actual/estimated construction cost, estimated maintenance cost, and traffic data obtained

from existing studies. The expected benefits from the interventions include savings to be made by motorists on

vehicle operation costs, travel time costs, and environmental costs.

27. The following results were obtained: (a) the Net Present Value (NPV) of the rehabilitation and

improvement program is US$91.19 million at a 12 percent discount rate and (b) the Economic Internal Rate of

Return (EIRR), over 20 years after the completion of construction is 30.7 percent. The details of updated economic

analysis are presented in Annex 4 including the updated economic analysis of James Gichuru -Rironi Road section

(including social and environmental mitigation cost of land acquisition, and resettlement) and Kisumu Northern

Bypass as a reference. The results compare well with those at project appraisal as presented in Table 3.

Table 3. Summary of Economic Analysis Road Section Net Present Value

(US$, millions) at appraisal

Economic Internal Rate of Return (%)

at appraisal

Net Present Value (US$, millions)

Ex-post

Economic Internal Rate of Return (%)

Ex-post

Meru Bypass roads 11.6 17.2 91.19 30.7

28. Implementation of policy reform and institutional setup/capacity building. About 25 percent of IDA

credit is for the remaining activities which are mostly allocated for policy reform and institutional set up/capacity

building. An economic analysis of policy reform and institutional set up/capacity building was not carried out at

appraisal. However, most activities that supported PDO 2 were financed within the revised IDA credit and

completed before project closure without cost overruns, and the outcomes and achievements are noteworthy, as

discussed above. Therefore, economic benefit of institutional enhancement can be considered high.

29. Cost and time overruns of civil works. Table 4 presents the estimated costs of major civil works and

Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) implementation at appraisal and actual/latest estimates. The cost of civil works

for Meru Bypass and James Gichuru-Rironi section increased markedly, and on-going design review indicates the


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cost increase of Kisumu Bypass, as well. However, these cost increases are mainly due to increases in the scope of

work, such as additional road safety interventions and additional lanes for future BRT. All civil works including the

design stages, land acquisition and compensation payment, and relocation of services have experienced

considerable delays and affected the project implementation. As presented in Table 3 and Annex 4, nonetheless,

these interventions are still economically viable with positive NPV and EIRR greater than 12 percent. The increased

cost of RAP implementation is noticeable, on the other hand, particularly for James Gichuru-Rironi section. Hence

cost and time overruns are considered significant.

Table 4. Summary of costs for major civil works and RAP Civil works (US$M) RAP implementation (US$M)

Road Section At

appraisal9

Latest estimates10 At appraisal Actual/latest estimates

James Gichuru-Rironi 54.08 163.8 1.3 (JIKA-Rironi) 120

Kisumu Bypass 8.45 41.77 9.9 9.6

Meru Bypass 25.0 34.4 4.4 7.8

30. Based on above discussions, efficiency of the project is considered Modest.

D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING- Unsatisfactory

31. Ratings for relevance, efficacy, and efficiency of outcome are, High, Negligible, and Modest. Therefore, Overall outcome rating of the project is Unsatisfactory.

E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS

Institutional Strengthening 32. As discussed above in efficacy, the project achieved remarkable institutional strengthening of various

organizations among them KURA, KeNHA, EBK, NTSA, EASA KCAA, NCA since institutional strengthening was one

of the PDOs. As listed in the section B of Annex 1, various detailed designs and studies such as ITS master plan,

commuter rail master plan, BRT design framework, and so on have contributed to the institutional strengthening.

In addition, the project also enhanced the institutional capacity through training of numerous staff of

implementing agencies and beneficiary entities. In total about 500 staff (more than 35 percent of them is female

staff) have received the training under the project. Such trainings helped improve the performance of the

individuals and the effectiveness of the institutions in delivery of services to the public.

Human capital development

33. Efforts to develop human capital are a highlight of NUTRIP. In addition to the staff training as discussed

above, through the operationalization of EBK, NUTRIP introduced an internship program. This initiative was

implemented through the partnership with EBK, KURA, KeNHA, and MoTIHUD & PW. For example, KURA provided

internship opportunities to 79 undergraduate students through the construction of Meru Bypass, totaling 264

man-months, among which, 21 students (27 percent) were female.

9 PAD Annex 6 economic analysis 10 Latest cost estimate of Meru Bypass includes the amendment of the contract due to expansion of scope, which was not reflected in the economic analysis in annex 4.


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Gender

34. Promoting gender mainstreaming is part of national policy in Kenya. As discussed in institutional

strengthening and human capital development, NUTRIP promoted equal opportunities for men and women in the

transport sector, monitoring them with sex-disaggregated data whenever possible.

III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME

A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION

35. NUTRIP was designed through extensive dialogue between the World Bank and GoK, selecting activities to reflect the priorities of GoK, potential beneficiaries and stakeholders to ensure the ownership of the project. The Project was also built on the lessons learned from previous World Bank projects in Kenya, Africa as well as other regions, and sector policies including road sector governance and integrity improvement action plan, and draft Integrated National Transport Policy of Kenya. The GoK has successfully implemented numerous sector reforms under the NCTIP (P1086) and KTSSP (P124109). The defunct Urban Toll Road Project provided lessons learned. The good practices under the NCTIP and KTSSP, project oversight committee (POC) and appointment of project coordinator (PO) were also replicated in NUTRIP. For BRT preparatory work, experiences of similar efforts in cities in Africa and other regions were studied and adopted.

36. From concept to appraisal, the scope of the project was streamlined based on guidance from the World Bank’s internal review procedures. The guidance advised scaling-down the project to exclude development of a MRTS, including BRT and Commuter rail, given the complexity and time required to develop MRTS in Nairobi. Component B was scaled down to preparatory activities such as feasibility and detailed engineering designs. The civil works related to MRTS and/or public transport were planned at appraisal to be included in a follow-on project. 37. At appraisal, the GoK changed course and requested to include the MRTS design in NUTRIP. In May 2012, the GoK instructed its consultants to incorporate the BRT system into the JKIA-Rironi road section design (Component A of NUTRIP). The Bank supported this approach to avoid disruption associated with duplication of civil works that would result from adding the BRT later, with the understanding that it would require additional financing. These decisions substantially reduced the project readiness of NUTRIP. For instance, including the BRT in the design delayed finalization of the JKIA- Rironi road section design until after World Bank Board decision (the JKIA-Rironi road section accounted for about 70 percent of total IDA credit). The decision to proceed to Board approval relied on the following assumptions: the final designs – including the BRT aspects – would be ready within a year and would cause only minimal implementation delays, and a follow-on project would cover the additional civil works. These assumptions were optimistic because; BRT was at the concept stage in the Nairobi Metropolitan Area and there was limited urban transport capacity and experience in counterparts and necessary preparatory work to plan a BRT operation such as demand analysis, BRT service plan, BRT design guideline, and so on were not complete. The tight schedule between appraisal (May 2012), negotiation (May 2012) and the Board approval (August 2012) left little time for review of the proposed change in the project scope. 38. While the NUTRIP’s project design included mitigation measures for many project risks, certain risks associated with the establishment of NaMATA were not well identified or mitigated. For example: (a) There were no concrete mitigation measures proposed how to manage the resistance from national and local governments. The NUTRIP PAD identified the risk of resistance from City Council of Nairobi but did not anticipate or mitigate resistance from other surrounding cities/counties. These other jurisdictions were playing a stronger


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role in urban transport due to delegation of powers under the new Constitution. Some other institutions that had roles in urban transport were not identified as possible sources of resistance. Secondly, (b) even though successful establishment and operationalization of NaMATA within the proposed timeframe was crucial to the development of MRTS and improvement of public transport in Nairobi Metropolitan area, the PAD did not address the risk of inadequate political will to ensure NaMATA was adequately established, funded and staffed in time to carry out its expected role in the project. In practice, a “champion” would be necessary to establish and operationalize NaMATA. Though the Ministry of Transport was leading the establishment of NaMATA, changes in leadership are not uncommon in Kenya and could easily pause or hinder the process. More analysis was required to identify strategic mitigation measures for both key risks.

B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION 39. After Board approval of the project, Kenya’s Parliament endorsed a new Integrated National Transport Policy (INTP) for Kenya in December 2012. In support of the implementation of the new transport policy, the GoK undertook several urban transport studies and, based on the recommendations therein, decided in 2014 to prioritize the development of MRTS such as BRT systems and commuter railway in NMA. A 2011 study identified nine MRTS corridors with BRT and Light Rail Transit (LRT), but commuter rail was not part of the proposed MRTS network at this stage. In addition, the scope of interventions for the development of commuter rail under the partnership with Infraco was yet to be finalized. Hence, a vision for the commuter rail development became clear only after 2014 which paused the implementation of KRC component at initial stage.

40. It was necessary to retrofit the project to respond to the requirements of implementing the new Constitution (2010) that shifted the balance of power by creating local governments. Under the changing governance landscape, GoK initiated and carried out discussions to agree on the concept of MRTS in the wider geographical NMA by bringing all the new five counties11 on board, which took a long time to conclude. The ongoing institutional changes prevented identification of the final and feasible implementing structure, which, in turn, delayed the project Restructuring. 41. Incorporating BRT into the JKIA-Rironi road design process adversely impacted: a) implementation schedule, b) total project cost, and c) the scale of involuntary resettlement and land acquisition: a) finalization of designs was delayed by almost 3 years. Additional feasibility and design studies on BRT, service

plan, and design framework for BRT were necessary to incorporate BRT aspects into the works contracts. The on-going detailed engineering designs and bidding documents for expansion of ‘JKIA- Southern Bypass (Lot 1)’ and ‘James Gichuru-Rironi (Lot 3)’ road sections, which lacked a leading agency, were kept in abeyance until BRT issues could be resolved. Re-negotiation of contracts with design consultants took an inordinately long time to conclude because the consultant needed to bring BRT experts on board. Renegotiation with the consultant for Southern Bypass -James Gichuru section (Lot 2) eventually failed. Final designs for Lot 1 and Lot 3 were only completed by July 2015 and March 2015.

b) the design changes contributed to major increases in cost and a significant shortfall in financing, as expected. The GoK requested Additional Financing of US$250 million through a letter dated September 14, 2015. In February 2016, Bank management’s reply recommended that the GoK carry out MRTS design studies with the aim of finetuning priority actions and developing costs estimates. This was a sensible decision as funding for ‘Southern Bypass-James Gichuru section’ (Lot 2) was still unclear and the entire BRT section should be constructed as a package to maximize potential positive impacts of developing the first phase of the BRT system in Nairobi. The Bank decision called for restructuring the project as dropping, scaling-down, or

11 Nairobi and four counties bordering Nairobi: Machokos, Kajiado, Murang’a, Kiambu,


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modifying some activities became indispensable to respond to the new priority areas within the available funds.

c) these delays exacerbated resettlement costs as encroachment worsened on the right-of-way of the project road corridors, especially the James Gichuru road junction-Rironi section (Lot 3). RAPs for JKIA-Southern Bypass (Lot 1) and James-Gichuru (Lot 3) were updated after the finalization of designs but were found unsatisfactory; the Bank’s ground-truthing exercise in 2015 indicated that some PAPs were left out of the Lot 1 RAP and meaningful consultations were not carried out in Lot 3. Hence, these RAPs had to be updated by different independent consultants. To accelerate the process, the Bank team agreed to staged development of resettlement action plans12 for James Gichuru-Rironi section, based on the severity of encroachment for the entire road corridor. It took about two years for the GoK to conclude the RAP update to satisfactory standards. The second updated RAP revealed far higher monetary costs and significant, large scale and irreversible adverse environmental and social impacts and risks.

42. Due to findings of the updated RAP, the World Bank recommended the re-classification of the project to Category A. This decision also contributed to delays to both the civil works and a planned restructuring. Changing the environmental category to A required a Level I Restructuring and Board approval. In addition, certain additional safeguards documents also became necessary for the project restructuring13, but the World Bank did not determine which additional safeguards documents would be required until about five months after the last RAP section (Section 3c) was cleared, in April 2018. A total of nine safeguards documents have been prepared and disclosed both in-country and at the Bank’s website as presented in Annex 6. 43. The lengthy process of RAP implementation was a further significant challenge. At the time of the ICR mission, the National Land Commission had completed land valuation of RAPs for Zambezi-Rironi section (3C) of James Gichuru- Rironi road, but land valuation for two other sections were still pending, and no award letters had been issued. Although the Meru Bypass RAP was successfully completed, some succession disputes are still pending14. Whereas the Bank team engaged closely with implementing agencies throughout the process of RAP preparation and implementation to provide necessary technical support, the land valuation and awarding process are beyond the control and responsibility of the project. 44. The main fiduciary challenges during implementation were delays in the release of counterpart funds as well as IDA funds and budgetary allocation which significantly slowed down the implementation progress, and eventually hampered the project restructuring. Delays in flow of funds could be attributed to the lengthy approval processes at the line Ministry and the inadequate and late release of budgetary allocation by the National Treasury. As of June 2019, US$23.4 million in payments under NUTRIP are still pending. While the implementing agencies’ capacity has improved over the years, the limited capacity of staffing at the initial stage of implementation in some of the entities, and frequent transfer of accountants at the line ministry may have affected the efficiency of operations of the project. Although these issues have been discussed with GoK and implementing agencies and recorded in Aide Memories and Management Letters, situation was not changed.

45. Changes in leadership in GoK as well as Task Team Leader (TTL) of World Bank affected the project implementation. Transport, Roads, Housing, Urban Development and Public Works ministries were merged into one Ministry (MoTIHUD&PW) during the project. As each department under MOTIHUD&PW has a Principal Secretary (PS), different project implementing agencies under the Transport Sector report to different PSs. At

12 RAP was prepared in three sections: James Gichuru road junction-Uthiru (3A), Uthiru-Zambezi(3B), and (i) Zambezi-Rironi (3C). 13 The restructuring was not concluded before cancellation of undispersed IDA Credit. 14 The funds for these affected persons have been deposited in an escrow account with the National Land Commission.


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the same time, the TTL of NUTRIP was replaced three times during the project implementation; in 2014, 2015 and 2016. The changes in TTLs took place when GoK’s priorities and focus on urban public transport were changing and the project was preparing additional financing and restructuring, which did not materialize as discussed above. These changes slowed down dialogue with GoK.

46. Delays in establishment and operationalization of leading institution in urban transport limited the

project’s impacts on public transport. NaMATA is not yet with full capacity at the project closing. If the NaMATA

had been fully operational by the end of 2014 as originally scheduled, it might have turned the operating

environment of NUTRIP into more favorable direction. Additionally, certain vital actions identified during NUTRIP

preparation were not fully implemented. These include preparing an urban transport strategy with action plans

and re-regulation of matatu services. These actions are critical in moving forward the urban transport agenda.

Thus, consideration should be made to address these issues.

47. Given the project’s performance and the low disbursement of the IDA Credit (22.7 percent), the GoK decided to cancel the undisbursed amount of the credit. The World Bank highlighted project implementation

issues in letters and aide memoires in December 2016, August 2017, January 2018, and August 2018 following

Implementation Support missions; and in meetings with counterparts at the MOTIHUD&PW and the National Treasury on December 11, 2018. Nevertheless, the combination of delays and shortfalls in providing counterpart

funding, particularly for compensation for PAPs as well as the relocation of services, and implementing the re-

scoped civil works hampered project progress. On December 21, 2018, the undisbursed balance of the IDA Credit

in amount of XDR 149.5 million (US$207.5 million equivalent as of December 21, 2018) was cancelled following

the GoK’s request. This decision was communicated to GoK by the Bank in a letter dated December 27, 2018. While the IDA Credit closed on December 31, 2018 as scheduled, many activities are still on-going.

48. Nonetheless, the effective coordination mechanism among implementing agencies and GoK which helped improve project implementation should be acknowledged, in addition to the accelerated progress on operationalizing the institutional architecture for urban transport in the NMA (as discussed in Section II). The POC and quarterly coordination meetings which were initiated under the NCTIP, (P082615) remained active and effective throughout the project life of the NUTRIP. The Project Management Office was also identified as a key player enabling smooth coordination of this complex project.

IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME

A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E)

M&E Design 49. As presented in figure 1, the operation’s ‘theory of change’ is clear. However, there were some

shortcomings in the PDOs and identification of indicators. For example, PDO (a) ‘improve the efficiency of road

transport along the Northern Corridor’ could be more specific, reflecting selected road sections traversing through

urban areas of three counties of Nairobi, Kisumu and Meru. For the PDO (c) promote the private sector

participation in the operation, financing, and management of transport systems, there are gaps between PDO and

PDO indicators. As the project focused on preparatory work on MRTS, offering of BRT and commuter rail services

for PPP would be possibly premature indicators for this project.


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M&E Implementation 50. In spite of good M&E design adopted under the project, M&E implementation had significant

shortcomings. The project was planning to recruit an accredited university in Kenya for the M&E, which could also

enhance the competencies of local academia and connect them with transport industry. The selection process for

a consultant was significantly delayed. Proposals were received from public universities and evaluated. The Bank

was, however, informed that there were certain technicalities in the process and the project closed before the

procurement process was concluded. While each implementing agency has been responsible for M&E tasks for

the relevant indicators the overall project M&E exercise and particularly analytical part of M&E was missing as a

result. The World Bank raised concerns about significant delays of recruitment of M&E consultant and followed

this matter up repeatedly. However, it could have intervened in this matter more proactively at an early stage

and taken necessary actions.

M&E Utilization 51. Absence of the M&E consultant on board affected the M&E utilization of the project. The M&E

consultant was supposed to compile the data from each implementing agency, collect additional data and

information from various stakeholder groups, analyze data and risks, assess the progress of the project, and

recommend actions. Annual workshops with wider stakeholders were also planned to share the progress of the

project and incorporate advice into the report. Unfortunately, the well-designed M&E mechanism under NUTRIP

did not materialize. Results of the data collection are evident, but utilization of data and analysis are not.

Justification of Overall Rating of Quality of M&E – Negligible 52. In spite of a well-designed M&E mechanism, NUTRIP suffered from limited M&E implementation and

utilization. Kenya’s transport sector institutions have not yet established a track record of effectively utilizing M&E

to manage for results.

B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE

Environment 53. The project’s anticipated social and environmental impacts triggered Bank Operational Policy OP 4.01 (Environmental Assessment), as well as OPs 4.12 (Involuntary Resettlement) and 4.11 (Physical Cultural Resources). The environment category of the project was B – Partial Assessment – because the proposed activities for the most part involve rehabilitation/expansion of existing roads within the existing right of way (in addition to some relatively short bypasses that will not traverse natural habitats), would have moderate and reversible impacts. However, as discussed above, incorporating BRT aspects into the JKIA-Rironi road section required wider resettlement areas and land acquisition, which resulted in significant, large scale and irreversible adverse environmental and social impacts and the re-classification of the project to Category A. While the updated Integrated Safeguards Data Sheet was approved and disclosed on November 9, 2018, the Level I Restructuring was not finalized. A list of safeguards documents prepared, cleared and disclosed are summarized in annex 6.

54. Overall environmental Safeguards Performance of the NUTRIP was Moderately Satisfactory while the Environment Risk-Rating was considered substantial because of ongoing construction works and ongoing implementation and monitoring of the occupational health and safety action plan related to James Gichuru junction-Rironi road section.


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55. KeNHA and KURA both had adequate and competent human resources for Environmental and Social safeguards for NUTRIP. The Supervision Consultants and Contractors under the NUTRIP had fulltime Environmental Specialists and/or Health & Safety Officers (for Contractors), and fulltime (Contractors) or part-time (Consultants) social safeguards officials, who coordinated with KeNHA and KURA Safeguards Units at the time of the project closure. However, given the urban setting within which James Gichuru junction-Rironi road section construction works was located, occupational health and safety risks were high.

56. The following environmental matters were pending as of project closure: a) Compensation to the family of a deceased victim of a fatal incident that occurred in October 5, 2017 along James Gichuru-Rironi section has not taken place since the case is pending before the magistrate’s court in Limuru; (b) slope protection works such as construction of gabions or rigid surface protection works, is necessary to prevent slope erosion at the Kathita East bridge and other road sections of Meru Bypass that have been completed, given the hilly terrain and high rainfall conditions in the area. While the fatal accident along James Gichuru- Rironi section was due to inadequate traffic management at the construction site, gaps were immediately identified based on the investigation, and an action plan was prepared and implemented adequately.

Social 57. Overall Social Safeguards Performance of the NUTRIP was Unsatisfactory. KeNHA and the Contractor have been satisfactorily implementing the action plan agreed with the World Bank to address the community/occupational health and safety risks and impacts in the James Gichuru junction-Rironi road section. KURA has successfully managed the implementation of the RAPs associated with the construction of the Meru Bypass roads. However, significant delays in RAP implementation has had a considerable impact on project performance, as elaborated in Section III. 58. As noted previously, the second RAP update for the James Gichuru junction-Rironi (Lot 3) identified a dramatic increase in resettlement impacts and costs. This updated RAP identified 5,181 PAPs, 3,364 structures and 839 parcels of land, whereas at project Appraisal the original A104 corridor improvement program (Lots 1, 2, and 3) identified only 1,322 PAPs and 133 structures (and no land acquisition). Implementation cost of RAP for the James Gichuru- Rironi was estimated at project completion to cost US$120 million compared to the original estimate of US$1.3 million. 59. During implementation, public feedback led KeNHA to take steps to preserve an important cultural resource, the Sigona House, which could have been affected by the proposed service road to James Gichuru-Rironi Road. A petition to preserve Sigona House was lodged before the High Court of Kenya. The petition applicants claimed that Sigona House has historical and architectural value and demolition of the property was unacceptable to them. KeNHA sought guidance from the National Museums of Kenya (NMK), the national institution mandated by law to make a determination on whether a resource could be considered of having cultural, historical or architectural importance or not. NMK’s decision was that the Sigona House was not qualified to be categorized as a structure of historical importance, in accordance with national guidelines. Nevertheless, KeNHA explored alternative options and redesigned the service road to avoid impacting the Sigona House. 60. PAPs on the James Gichuru road -Rironi section submitted a petition to the Bank on December 13, 2018 alleging delay in payment for land acquisition and associated compensation. Other related issues raised in the petition include: (a) health and safety concerns; (b) dust emissions; (c) access to homes and businesses; and (d) restoration of community water connections. On request by PAPs, a Bank team met with the representatives of the PAPs on December 19, 2018 and discussed the same issues raised in the petition.


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61. The latest RAP implementation status as at April 25, 2019 under NUTRIP is presented in table 5.

Table 5. RAP implementation status under NUTRIP (as at April 25, 2019)

62. While there have been allegations of eviction of PAPs associated with the ongoing construction works along the James Gichuru Junction-Rironi road section, the KeNHA officially confirmed by letter dated on April 8, 2019 that “there has been No Eviction of Project Affected Person without compensation whatsoever.” Post-closure requirements 63. The outstanding safeguards obligations of the GoK as stipulated in the disclosed NUTRIP Safeguard Instruments will continue to be binding on the GoK after the closing of the project, including the GoK’s obligation to fully implement the RAPs and ESIAs of the Project and that the GoK sets aside adequate funds to fulfil such obligations. The World Bank conveyed this message to GoK in a letter dated March 5, 2019 as follows: “GoK is required to continue honoring safeguards commitments assumed before the cancellation of the credit and to implement ongoing safeguards activities - including but not limited to all resettlement action plans - in line with the disclosed Safeguards Instruments after the closing date for the credit. The Bank team will continue to provide periodic oversight as you implement the safeguards instruments.” Financial Management 64. The FM arrangements in the Project were implemented as designed. The implementing agencies maintained qualified accountants throughout implementation. The Project-level budgeting, funds flows, internal controls, financial reporting and audit arrangements were deemed to be effective. There were no outstanding audit issues on the Project at the closure. The quarterly IFRs and annual audit reports were submitted to the Bank within the stipulated timelines, in form and content satisfactory to the Bank. The FM risk for the Project was assessed as moderate with the FM ISR rating being assessed as satisfactory.

65. However, during the initial stages of the Project, some delays in submission of quarterly IFRs were identified with the State Department of Infrastructure (SDoI). This was caused by high turnover of project accountants. Nevertheless, this was eventually addressed. Some of the audit reports were qualified but the qualification was not on fiduciary issues but rather on implementation challenges delays in contract and works implementation and outstanding payments/bills that attracted interest and penalties. The Project registered low disbursement of 22.7 percent at the cancellation of undisbursed credit on December 21, 2018. While the Project did experience in-country budget and funds flow delays (which is a Portfolio-level issue), the low disbursement

15 This amount has been deposited in an escrow account with the National Land Commission.

James Gichuru-Rironi Sub lot 3C (Lot 3A and 3B are still under valuation by NLC project closure.)

Total No of PAPs Number of Paid PAPs Total Amount (KES) Amount Paid (KES) Balance outstanding (KES)

808 133 1,037,554,915.74 724,124,449.47 313,430,466.27

Kisumu Northern bypass

Total No of PAPs Number of Paid PAPs Total Amount (KES) Amount Paid (KES) Balance outstanding (KES)

507 299 947,034,632.00 277,242,405.00 669,792,227.00

Meru bypass (compensation for PAPs has been completed, excluding those who have succession issues)

Total No of PAPs Number of Paid PAPs Total Amount Amount Paid (KES) Balance outstanding (KES)

921 890 775,149,522.94 755,815,684.94 19,333,838.0015


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can be attributed largely to slow implementation of activities, procurement-related challenges, contract management issues, and safeguards matters.

Procurement 66. While implementing agencies’ procurement teams were confirmed to have reasonable capacity and skills, agencies appear to have inadequate accountability and business standards in procurement processes. Delayed procurement processing, Inadequate or incomplete engineering designs, land acquisition and compensation payments, and safeguard measures were major causes of delays. These challenges during design stages spilled over to contracts implementation phases and induced inordinate extensions of time and cost overruns for various activities/contracts.

67. Although there was no mis-procurement under the NUTRIP, service standard in making procurement decisions and quality of civil works contract management needed to be strengthened further. Enforcement of internal service standards and monitoring of procurement process were limited, and some procurement process was not concluded within the proposal and bid validity periods ranging from 120 to 150 days. The generic gap of procurement function such as not being streamlined and not professionalized remains as procurement performance challenges in the project implementing agencies. It is imperative for institutions like KeNHA to prioritize sound procurement as their core business.

C. BANK PERFORMANCE

Quality at Entry

68. The project was designed based on a comprehensive analysis of institutional and policy reforms in the transport sector and lessons learned from the defunct and on-going transport projects and other BRT projects. The project aligned well with the country’s development priorities such as Road Sector Investment Plan, Vision 2030, and the World Bank’s Africa strategy 16 and the Country Partnership Strategy. NUTRIP was originally designed to improve transport infrastructure (roads) that was a critical bottleneck to economic growth. NUTRIP would only finance the preparatory work for the provision of efficient transport services, focusing on development of the proposed MRTS. 69. Nonetheless, the GoK’s decision to incorporate BRT into road design at appraisal in May 2012 focusing

on public transport and not merely expansion of road infrastructure though sound, eventually altered the project design. With the endorsement of INTP in December 2012, GoK’s urban transport policy officially called for transformation of the project into an urban mobility project. This introduced unpredicted complexity in addition to reversing the implementation phase to preparation to respond to the new changes in policy, and the assumptions at the project entry were completed changed. The change in policy is also attributed to the parallel dialogue with the Bank encouraging improvement of mobility in Nairobi alongside expansion of the road infrastructure. The project should have been restructured immediately at this stage. However, it took time for this to be done as new set of skills were required to design MRTS related activities such as BRT and manage the process. 70. The assessment of risks foresaw a changing environment, but magnitude of its implications was not

fully appreciated. In risk assessment related to establish NaMATA, the actual complexity and political economy of setting up and operationalizing NaMATA under a new devolved system of Government were not anticipated at

16 Africa’s Future and the World Bank’s support t It, the World Bank March 2011.


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the time of project preparation through to Board approval. Nevertheless, the successful establishment, reform and operationalization of other three institutions (NTSA, NCA, EBK), exceeded expectations.

Quality of Supervision 71. The Bank team conducted eleven supervision missions after the Board approval of the project. Most missions visited all project sites and prepared a comprehensive Aide-Memoire, documenting progress and challenges of project implementation. Implementing agencies commended physical presence of the Task Team and team leader in the country office and their daily support and communication with the implementing agencies and beneficiary entities in technical, fiduciary and safeguards aspects of the project. The Bank’s leadership among development partners in the urban transport sector was also noteworthy. The Bank played a leading role organizing and leading sector coordinating meetings on urban transport to coordinate each support and interventions to the GoK. The Bank’s initiative to introduce internship program in transport sector should be highlighted, too. 72. As noted above, high turnover of project TTLs affected project implementation unfavorably. Turnover to some degree hindered seamless dialogue with GoK and slowed down implementation of various activities: For example, a) second replacement of TTL was happened just after GoK’s requesting additional financing, and third replacement was a few months after that concept review meeting for the additional financing which advised project restructuring without additional financing; b) updating of RAP for James Gichuru-Rironi section was agreed by October 2014, but it is only in August 2017 that Zambezi-Rironi section (C) of RAP (first section out of three sections) was cleared, and disclosed, after the Bank team agreed to staged development of RAP to accelerate the process. 73. The Bank should have been more proactive to improve several key challenges, including, a) insufficient and delayed counterpart funding which was a common and serious challenge for the Bank’s entire portfolio in Kenya; b) delayed procurement process such as Kisumu Northern Bypass, M&E consultant; and c) delayed safeguards guidance such as finalization of necessary safeguards document list for the restructuring. Justification of Overall Rating of Bank Performance 74. Taking into consideration all the above, the Bank’s overall performance is rated Unsatisfactory.

D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME

75. Although PDO1 was not achieved at the project’s closure, it may still be realized to some extent in the near future. With the completion of civil works for James Gichuru-Rironi and Kisumu Bypass, improvement of transport road efficiency can be partially materialized. As undisbursed original credit has been cancelled, the outcomes depend on GoK’s carrying out the unfinished project activities with its own resources. As counterpart funding was inadequate during implementation, the risks related to unfinished project activities and partial attainment of PDO1 in the near future are substantial.

76. The NUTRIP supported the establishment of NTSA, NCA, and NaMATA, and the institutional enhancement of KeNHA, KURA, KRC, MoTI, EASA, NCA, EBK, NTSA and NaMATA. Their implementation capacities have been increased through a technical assistance program: e.g. KURA has enhanced inhouse capacity to design and design review capacity, EASA has accredited by ICAO as a regional training center of excellence and attracting trainees from abroad, and EBK started on-line registration system and its revenue is increasing. Since these institutions supported under the project are already performing all mandated areas excluding NaMATA, risks that the project


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outcomes in institutional capacity and arrangement will not be maintained are negligible. However, Bank’s continuous engagement with further enhancement of these institutions is still recommended in urban transport projects17. On the other hand, sustainability risks related to NaMATA are substantial because not all stakeholders have fully endorsed its roles.

V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

77. NUTRIP’s contributions to policy reform and institutional capacity enhancement are well recognized accomplishments, particularly given the extremely challenging and fluid institutional environment due to the ongoing government reforms. The most significant lessons learned and recommendations from NUTRIP are: 78. Enhancement of project readiness check before Board approval is recommended to early startup of project implementation: It is advisable that most of the design and preparatory work/documents be complete with clear scope before presentation of projects to the Board. Whenever possible, ongoing projects should include the preparatory work for the follow-on projects. Alternatively, Government should have carried out most of the preparatory work at the time of seeking Bank financing. In addition, when critical changes were made during the advanced stage of preparation, it is important, in such situation, to re-assess the impact of the change on the project implementation and provide additional time for the project preparation. NUTRIP experienced reclassification of EA category during the implementation due to a change in project scope18. This affected implementation and hampered rapid restructuring. Finalizing the project scope and preparatory work for major activities during preparation is necessary to reduce readiness risks. As delayed procurement is still one of the key challenges in Kenya, this lesson is particularly important to future projects in Kenya. 79. Where the operating environment is changing rapidly, and major changes are envisaged in the near future but the degree of their impact on the project design is unknown as was the case for this project, flexibility should be inbuilt in operation. For instance, the changed operating environment resulting from adoption of new focus on urban transport coupled with new constitutional dispensation creating a totally new governance structure adversely affected the design of NUTRIP. However, the impact of the implementation of the 2010 Constitution on the design of the project was unknown until 2013. While the project restructuring was necessary at an earlier stage to respond to shifts in focus, the fluid operating environment paused the restructuring process and prevented from having a clear view on implementation situation. When such situations are expected, it is recommended that team undertake additional risk analysis, present the anticipated issues to management, and obtain guidance and support from the Country Management Unit and GP management. Waiver for some requirements to allow for faster and partial or phased restructuring of the project would be for considerations. 80. Urban transport projects are typically complex, involve a variety of stakeholders, and require longer planning and implementation periods. The existence of a lead agency and a champion for the project is critical for success, including for managing the diverse interests. Rigorous stakeholder analysis needs to be conducted, and institutional arrangements must be clarified and streamlined, either as part of the project or before the project commences. Based on the previous World Bank transport projects in Kenya, when adequate political support is available, new transport sector institutions can be established and operationalized with the provision of continuous technical and financial support of five to ten years. Recruitment of the right skilled staff into critical departments and positions as early as possible is vital to build institutional capacity and establish norms. In addition, the urban transport sector was neglected for decades before NUTRIP and the number of experts and

17 IEG report identified a longer time engagement with institutional development a driver of success in urban transport projects. An IEG Evaluation of the World Bank Group’s Support for Urban Transport, 2017 18 As the Level 1 restructuring was not finalized, EA category was not officially changed.


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institutional expertise are still limited, even though importance of the sub sector is increasing. These conditions could hinder future urban transport projects in Kenya. Therefore, support to build expertise in the urban transport subsector (perhaps including by coordinating with local universities) is recommended. 81. Clear post closure arrangement in case there are many on-going and active contracts with high value is necessary. When the NUTRIP closed, about 78 percent of the original IDA credit was committed and most of major activities were still on-going or awarded waiting for the commencement. Implementing agencies were informed about the cancellation of undisbursed IDA credit after the decision was made and little time was left for them to prepare for project closure. Though the restructuring paper clearly states that GoK is responsible for unfinished activities with own resources, most of implementing agency did not understand the post closure arrangement well. Particularly, for high value contracts with large financial commitment and activities with significant social and environmental risks that will continue to be implemented after the project closure, it is critical to discuss with all key stakeholders how to proceed after the project closure and clear guidance needs to be provided on post closure arrangements and outstanding GoK’s obligations so it is well understood by implementing agencies.

82. Disconnection between budgetary allocation and project implementation plan as well as delays releasing counterpart funds and IDA funds are serious challenges in Kenya. At NUTRIP closure, KRC had US$650,000 in its designated account but as KRC’s proposed budget was not approved by National Treasury, KRC could not access the funds until the deadline passed. Budget submitted from implementing agencies, particularly on IDA portion should be approved and secured as it is needed to support and enhance the project implementation. Such systematic issues need to be discussed and addressed at country level. 83. Continuous engagement is critical to preserve the momentum of institutional and policy reforms in the urban transport subsector. Several efforts initiated under NUTRIP – including the increased focus on urban transport and mass transit, and priority actions of the commuter rail master plan – may easily stall without sustained engagement. Likewise, sustained capacity building will be essential to ensure NaMATA is able to fulfill its tole coordinating and leading urban transport initiatives in NMA, including hosting dialogue among key stakeholders and establishing coordination and implementation mechanisms. While advancing with the operationalization of NaMATA, implementation of prioritized actions identified under the commuter rail master plan supported by the project can also be explored as the GoK has initiated her efforts to improve the level of service and overall quality of commuter rail. Future interventions also explore further coordination with broader stakeholders including within the Bank (e.g. Urban, Gender, Poverty). .


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ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS A. RESULTS INDICATORS A.1 PDO Indicators Objective/Outcome: Improve the efficiency of road transport along the Northern Corridor

Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Formally Revised

Target

Actual Achieved at Completion

Reduction in average travel time from Junction Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (JKIA)-Rironi road

Hours 3.00 2.10 3.00

09-Jul-2012 31-Dec-2018 31-Dec-2018

Comments (achievements against targets):

Due to the including BRT aspects into original design, the project covers civil works of James Gichuru-Rironi section, instead of JKIA-Rironi. As the civil works of James Gichuru-Rironi is still on-going, no reduction in average travel time.


Target


Reduction in vehicle operating costs on Junction JKIA-Rironi road

Amount(USD) 1.50 1.10 1.50

09-Jul-2012 31-Dec-2018 31-Dec-2018



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Due to the opening of Southern Bypass, which is not financed under this project, through traffic (heavy trucks) is not passing the project sections of A104. Thus, this indicator does not provide accurate measure of the direct project impact.


Target


Number of road crashes reduced along Junction JKIA-Rironi Road

Percentage 0.00 15.00 22.00

31-Dec-2015 31-Dec-2018 31-Dec-2017


Baseline data was collected in December 2015. With the enhanced enforcement capacity of National Transport Safety Authority (NTSA), the number of road cashes reduced by 30 percent and 22 percent, in 2016 and 2017 respectively, exceeding the original target.

Due to internal re-organizations occasioned by the Presidential Directive of January 2018 on Enforcement, the NTSA handed over the responsibility and the enforcement gadgets to the National Police Service. Therefore, this ICR will take the data of 2017 as the achievement within the project.

Objective/Outcome: Improve the institutional capacity and arrangements in the urban transport sub-sector


Target


Improved institutional capacity in the urban transport sub-sector

Yes/No N Y Y

09-Jul-2012 31-Dec-2018 31-Dec-2018


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The project achieved remarkable institutional strengthening of various organizations among them KURA, EBK, NTSA, EASA KCAA, NCA since institutional strengthening was one of the PDOs. NaMATA has also established and its operationalization is underway.


Target


Direct project beneficiaries Number 300.00 380.00 300.00

09-Jul-2012 31-Dec-2018 31-Dec-2018

Female beneficiaries Percentage 40.00 40.00 40.00

04-Jul-2018


The corporate indicator no longer requires the project beneficiaries to be measured.

Objective/Outcome: Promote private sector participation in the operation, financing & management of transport systems


Target


PPP promotion and opportunities in the transport sector developed.

Yes/No N N N

09-Jul-2012 04-Jul-2018 31-Dec-2018


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While Kenya National Highway Authority (KeNHA) has established PPP department which is functional, this achievement is rather attributed to technical support provided by Kenya Infrastructure Finance/PPP Project (P121019).

A.2 Intermediate Results Indicators

Component: Support to KeNHA to Upgrade the Urban Road Transport Infrastructure


Target


Roads rehabilitated, Non-rural

Kilometers 0.00 118.00 20.00

09-Jul-2012 31-Dec-2018 31-Dec-2018


Completed part of Meru Bypass.


Target


Roads in good and fair condition as a share of total classified roads

Percentage 60.00 60.00 60.00

09-Jul-2012 04-Jul-2018 04-Jul-2018


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Size of the total classified network

Kilometers 60.00 60.00 60.00

04-Jul-2018


The corporate indicator no longer requires the project beneficiaries to be measured.

Component: Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building


Target


Draft legal, institutional and regulatory framework for railways developed

Yes/No N N N

09-Jul-2012 04-Jul-2018 04-Jul-2018


This is not an indicator for NUTRIP. Therefore, this is not applicable.


Target


Feasibility and engineering designs studies completed to acceptable standards

Number 0.00 2.00 2.00

09-Jul-2012 04-Jul-2018 04-Jul-2018


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Component: Support to KeNHA to Upgrade the Urban Road Transport Infrastructure


Target


Draft Bill for NaMATA presented to parliament, and rules and regulation for urban public transport developed

Yes/No N N Y

09-Jul-2012 04-Jul-2018 31-Dec-2018


The Bill for NaMATA was presented to parliament though it was withdrawn.

BRT design framework, commuter rail master plan with quick win have been developed. Therefore, it is considered this indicators has substantially achieve.


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B. KEY OUTPUTS BY COMPONENT

Improve the efficiency of road transport along the Northern Corridor

Outcome Indicators

1. Reduction in average travel time from Junction Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (JKIA)-Rironi road 2. Reduction in vehicle operating costs on Junction JKIA-Rironi road 3. Number of road crashes reduced along Junction JKIA-Rironi Road

Intermediate Results Indicators

1. Roads rehabilitated, Non-rural 2. Roads constructed, Non-rural 3. Road length in good and fair condition as a percentage of the total classified network in the project area [non-rural, Northern Corridor (Mombasa – Malaba/Busia) 930 km (no longer cooperate indicator) 4. Feasibility and engineering designs studies completed to acceptable standards

Key Outputs by Component (linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 1)

Component A: 1. Detailed engineering designs incorporating BRT and preparation of bidding documents for the Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (JKIA) - Likoni road junction/Southern Bypass road section (Lot 1) 2. Preliminary design for the Likoni/Southern Bypass road junction-James Gichuru road junction road section (Lot 2) 3. Detailed engineering designs and civil works of capacity enhancement of James Gichuru (18 % progress)4. A program to address HIV/AIDS in all the roads contracts has been mainstreamed to civil works contracts. 5. Detailed engineering designs of Kisumu Bypass (design review is on-going) Component B 1.Detailed engineering designs and construction of Meru Bypass -substantially completed (80%) and all but 5 km of the road has opened:37 percent and 21 percent average travel time reduction


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during rush hour between Meru town (Central Business District) and Maua and Isiolo roads have been reported, respectively 2.Final ITS and associated Civil Works plan in Nairobi including concept design for Traffic Management Center completed

Improve the institutional capacity and arrangements in the urban transport sub-sector

Outcome Indicators

1. Improved institutional capacity in the urban transport sub-sector 1) Nairobi Metropolitan Transport Authority (NMTA) established

and functional; 2) National Road Transport and Safety Authority (RTSA)

established and functional; 3) Urban public transport rules and regulations developed and in

use.

Intermediate Results Indicators

1. Draft Bill for NMTA presented to parliament, and rules and regulation for urban public transport developed 2. Feasibility and engineering designs studies completed to acceptable standards


Component A 1.KeNHA has enhanced institutional capacity to manage safeguards with nine full time staff for safeguards matters (social, environmental, land valuer) 2. 133 officers; comprising of 77 male and 56 female staff received training

Component B 1. Final draft of Master Plan study of commuter rail in Nairobi is ready and quick win activities are identified 2.Through the procurement of software and equipment, KURA has

established a) inhouse capacity to design and review design of civil works, b) data center, and c) disaster recovery center.


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3.KURA:126 staff received training and KRC:72 staff (25 female staff) received training with total 846 man-days 4. KURA has successfully implemented RAP and GRM with full time safeguards staff 5. KURA provided internship opportunities to 79 undergraduate students through the construction of Meru Bypass, totaling 264 man-months, among which, 21 students (27 percent) were female 6. Mombasa commuter rail feasibility study: currently negotiating with bidder 7. Supply of a track recording car for Kenya Railways corporation- notification of award issued Component C 1.NaMATA has been established through Executive Order (Board member and chief executive selected)

2. Draft BRT design framework prepared

3. Feasibility study for BRT line 1 completed.

4. NaMATA has acting CEO and Board of director, and developed a

draft strategic plan (2019-2023)

5. NTSA has been established and functioning covering all mandate

6.With the procurement of automated vehicle test lanes, NTSA is

providing more accurate suspension test at Vehicle Inspection Center

in Nairobi (300 vehicles per day) and Mombasa (200 vehicles per day)

7.Construction of the Library in East Africa School of Aviation (EASA) has completed

8.With the installation of 3D simulation, training capacity of traffic controller in EASA has increased from 27 to 54 trainee per session.

9. ICAO has certified EASA as center of excellence in the World

10. SDoT received 25 individual training and 65 group training 11. EBK is a) currently piloting on-line registration, Full scale operation

starts in April 2109, which expects 60-70% time saving, b) modules also includes, Financial Management, payroll, procurement/supply


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management, customer management, inventory management, E-procurement.

12. With the procurement of vehicles (2 in Nairobi, 8 in regional

offices), NCA is conducting compliance and due diligence activities in

construction sites across the country.

Promote private sector participation in the operation, financing & management of transport systems

Outcome Indicators

1. PPP promotion and opportunities in the transport sector developed. 1)Offer one Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) corridor for Public Private Partnerships (PPP); 2)Offer one commuter rail line for PPP. 3)Institutional setup within KeNHA (Kenya National Highways Authority) for the promotion of PPP in financing and management of road infrastructure and services developed and adopted.

Intermediate Results Indicators 1. Draft legal, institutional and regulatory framework for PPP in transport developed


1.PPP department in KeNHA has been established and functioning


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ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION

A. TASK TEAM MEMBERS

Name Role

Preparation

Supervision/ICR

Josphat O. Sasia, Task Team Leader

Tesfaye Ayele, Dahir Elmi Warsame, Joel Buku Munyori Procurement Specialist(s)

Henry Amena Amuguni Financial Management Specialist

Lucie Muchekehu Team Member

Susan Apudo Owuor Team Member

Rosemary Ngesa Otieno Team Member

Peter Ngwa Taniform Team Member

Haileyesus Adamtei Mengesha Team Member

Akiko Kishiue Team Member

Lilian Wambui Kahindo Social Specialist

Beatrice Adhiambo Okiro Team Member

Ben Okindo Ayako Miranga Environmental Specialist

B. STAFF TIME AND COST

Stage of Project Cycle Staff Time and Cost

No. of staff weeks US$ (including travel and consultant costs)

Preparation

FY12 34.154 189,465.43

FY13 6.175 48,032.05

FY16 5.025 25,091.37

FY17 4.275 25,783.68


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Total 49.63 288,372.53

Supervision/ICR

FY13 16.112 92,513.19

FY14 17.050 130,902.41

FY15 28.075 277,904.07

FY16 42.947 376,156.75

FY17 41.427 372,412.19

FY18 47.606 555,508.26

FY19 50.074 310,922.29

Total 243.29 2,116,319.16

ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT (IDA, GoK)

Components Amount at Approval

(US$M) IDA / GoK

Actual at Project 19Closing (US$M)

IDA / GoK

Percentage of Approval

IDA / GoK

Upgrading Urban Road Transport infrastructure along Northern Corridor through Nairobi to be implemented by Kenya National Highway s Authority (KeNHA)

223.26 / 87.89

44.94 / 14.96 20.13 / 17.02

Support to the development of selected Mass Transit Corridors

59.70 / 20.76 34.46 / 15.70 57.72 / 75.62

Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building in the Urban Transport and Technical Assistance.

17.04 / 4.46 13.13 / 1.29 77.05 / 28.92

Total 300.00 / 113.11 92.53 / 31.95 30.84 / 28.25

19 Actual at project closing is based on the revised project amount in US$M equivalent, not the actual disbursement amount in US$ M at project closure.


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ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS

1. The ICR examines the efficiency of NUTRIP based on the revised credit amount of XDR 43.96 million (due to the cancellation of undisbursed balance of the IDA Credit on December 21, 2018). About 45 percent of the revised credit amount was allocated for James Gichuru – Rironi road section and 30 percent for Meru bypass, respectively. Since the physical progress of James Gichuru- Rironi road section at ICR mission was only 18 percent and design review is underway for Kisumu Bypass, this ICR focuses on ex-post economic analysis of Meru bypass which has been substantially completed (80 percent progress at ICR mission).

2. This annex summarizes the updated economic analysis for Meru Bypass using the latest cost obtained from the actual bids, the expanded scope of works, and the latest traffic data. The annex includes the updated economic analysis for the road sections of James Gichuru road junction-Rironi road and Kisumu Northern Bypass for reference.

3. The revised economic analysis of road rehabilitation and improvement under the project was conducted and the following results were obtained: (a) the net present value of the rehabilitation and improvement program is US$221.78 million at a 12 percent discount rate and (b) the economic internal rate of return, over 20 years after the completion of construction, varies from 16.4 percent to 30.7 percent, depending on the road section, as presented in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1 Summary of Economic Analysis Road Section Net Present Value

(US$, millions) Economic Internal Rate

of Return (%)

Meru Bypass 91.19 30.7

James Gichuru road junction-Rironi road section 74.16 16.4

Kisumu Northern Bypass 56.43 20.9

Total 221.78

Road Sections:

4. The civil works consist of rehabilitating and improving one road section and two bypasses, totaling about 62 km (Meru Bypass, James Gichuru road junction-Rironi road section, and Kisumu Northern Bypass). The above road sections are further categorized into seventeen homogenous road sections (Meru Bypass (13), James Gichuru road junction-Rironi road section (3), Kisumu Northern Bypass (1)) in terms of traffic and road condition for evaluation in the Highway Development and Management Model (HDM-4).

5. Revised proposed interventions for each road section comprise of the following:

Table 4.2 Summary of revised proposed interventions Road section Total road

length Proposed intervention

Meru Bypass 22 • Construction of a bypass

James Gichuru road junction-Rironi road

26 • Provision of facilities for non-motorized traffic


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section • Increase number of lanes from 4-lane divided carriageway to 6-lane carriage way including the provision of BRT lanes in the section James Gichuru road junction to Uthiru

• Reconstruction of existing pavement

• Reconfiguration of access to roadside buildings

Kisumu Northern Bypass 16 • Construction of Bypass

• Provision of facilities for non-motorized traffic

• Installation of Grade separated interchange at junction with B1

• Expanding the adjoining Kisumu airport-Kisian road section

6. The expected outcome of the proposed road works is to increase the efficiency of road transport in the project target areas. The existing pavement structure, road conditions, and traffic load classes remain unchanged since the project Appraisal stage.

Main assumptions and methodology:

7. Net benefits were computed using HDM-4, which simulated lifecycle conditions and costs and provided economic decision criteria for multiple road design and maintenance alternatives. The evaluation followed the same methodology as the economic analysis at project appraisal, assessing road users’ benefits and updated construction cost20, estimated maintenance cost, and traffic data obtained from existing studies21. The discount rate was set to 12 percent and the evaluation period to 20 years. Maintenance and reconstruction cost were estimated in financial and economic term. The data and information were provided by KURA (Meru Bypass) and KeNHA (James Gichuru road junction-Rironi road section and Kisumu Northern Bypass).

8. The main benefits are road user savings on vehicle operating costs, maintenance costs, and passenger/freight time. The evaluation calculated these benefits to road users and costs of the investments in road works as compared to a without-project scenario and assessed streams of a net economic benefit to a society. Additional benefits, which have not been quantified, include the reduction of accidents, reduction of vehicle emissions such as GHG, and the improvement of driving and riding comfort. The costs to the road agency are the works costs.

9. Maintenance works. The following routine maintenance costs have been considered in the HDM-4 analysis:

Table 4.3 Maintenance Unit Costs (economic cost)

Meru Bypass James Gichuru road junction-Rironi road section

Kisumu Northern Bypass

Routine maintenance (50mm overlay) (US$ per lane per km)

1990 2380* 2380*

Periodic maintenance (US$ per sqm) 20 20 20

20 Project costs for James Gichuru road junction-Rironi road section and Meru Bypass have been taken as per the signed contract agreement 21 Traffic data has been extracted from the following studies:

• Economic Feasibility Study Report, Design Review and Construction Supervision of Meru Bypass Road, KURA (April 2017); and

• Economic Analysis Report, Rehabilitation and Capacity Enhancement of the Road A104 from James Gichuru road section to Rironi

(A104/B3 Junction), and Construction of Kisumu Northern Bypass from Mamboleo Junction (A1/C34) to Otongolo Junction (b1) road,

KENHA, May 2017.


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Routine maintenance cost of Ksh 250,000 is applied (1US$ = 105 Ksh)

10. Table 4.4 presents the road sections lengths, road works and estimated financial base investment costs and/or actual base investments costs at the project appraisal and at the restructuring evaluation. Standard Conversion Factor of 0.8 and 0.89 have been used to convert financial cost into economic costs, for Meru Bypass, James Gichuru road junction-Rironi road section and Kisumu Northern Bypass, respectively.

Table 4. 4 Road Sections and updated Investments Costs

Road

Section

Total

Length

(KM)

Interventions Cost at Appraisal Cost in 2018

Base Cost

(US$ Million)

Base Unit

Cost (

US$ Million/

km)

Base Cost

( US$ Million)

Base Unit

Cost (

US$ Million/

km)

Meru

Bypass

22

• Construction of a bypass

to bitumen standards.

25 0.51 28.87

1.34

James

Gichuru

Road

Junction to

Rironi

26 • Provision of facilities for

non-motorized traffic

• Increase number of

lanes from 4-lane

divided carriageway to

6-lane carriage way

including the provision

of BRT lanes in the

section James Gichuru

road junction to Uthiru

• Reconstruction of

existing pavement

• Reconfiguration of

access to roadside

buildings

54.08 2.14 259.2922 10.2323

Kisumu

Northern

Bypass

16 • Construction of Bypass

• Provision of facilities for

non-motorized traffic

• Installation of Grade

separated interchange

at junction with B1

• Expansion of the

adjoining Kisumu

airport-Kisian road

section

8.45

0.94

41.77

2.61

22 Total project cost includes social and environmental mitigation cost of land acquisition, and resettlement and rehabilitation. 23 Civil cost US$5.6 million/km and social and environmental mitigation cost US$ 4.63 million/km


Page 42 of 67

11. Vehicle Operating Cost. Vehicle fleet characteristics and economic unit costs were defined for eleven: (i) motor cycle; (ii) car; (iii) jeep/4WD; (iv)pick up; (v) minibus/matatu; (vi) small bus; (vii) large bus; (viii) light truck; (ix) medium truck; (xi) heavy truck; and (xi) articulated truck. Table 4.5 presents typical road user unit costs for each type of vehicle.

Table 4.5 Vehicle Fleet Characteristics and Economic Unit Costs24 Meru Bypass

Meru Bypass motor cycle

car jeep/ 4WD

pickup matatu +mini bus

small bus

bus LGV MGV 3-4 Axle

Truck articulated

trucks

PCSE 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.40 1.50 1.60 1.50 2.50 5.00 10.00

Number of wheels

2 4 4 4 4 6 6 6 6 10 22

Number of axles

- 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 3 >3

Average Operating

Weight (ton)

0.20 1.50 2.20 2.20 2.90 6.00 11.60 4.80 11.10 17.00 38.10

Service Life (years)

6 10 10 8 8 6 8 10 10 10 10

Km driven per year

10,000 20,000 25,000 45,000 34,000 85,000 100,000 55,000 75,000 75,000 75,000

Hours driven per year

300 370 425 1,000 850 1,750 2,200 1,400 2,000 2,000 2,000

Number of passengers

1.00 2.40 2.40 2.40 11.50 20.00 49.00 2.20 2.20 2.20 2.20

ESA loading factor

- - - 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.80 0.10 1.26 2.28 4.63

Economic Costs in 2008 price

New vehicle price (US$)

714 19,698 42,857 23,809 38,095 69,620 94,268 26,190 54,745 102,142 131,614

New tire price (US$)

20 104 120 115 115 115 321 220 115 321 530

Fuel cost (US$/Liter)

1.22 1.22 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08

Lubricants cost

(US$/Liter) 2.68 2.68 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.14

Labor cost of maintenance (US$/hour)

2.00 6.10 6.10 6.10 6.10 6.10 8.14 6.10 8.14 8.14 8.14

Crew wage (US$/hour)

- - 0.62 1.24 2.72 2.82 3.52 3.08 3.31 4.27 4.27

Time costs for working passenger (US$/hour)

0.36 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 - - - -

Time costs for non- working

passenger (US$/hour)

0.09 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 - - - -

24 HDM4 Workspace Calibration Report and Guidelines (Kenya Roads Board, 2008)


Page 43 of 67

Cargo time (US$/hour)

- - - - - - - 0.02 0.04 0.12 0.21

Annual Interest Rate

(%) 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12

James Gichuru road junction-Rironi road section and Kisumu Northern Bypass

James Gichuru road junction-Rironi road section (2012) Kisumu Northern Bypass

motor cycle

car jeep/ 4WD

pickup Matatu +mini bus

small bus

bus LGV MGV 3-4 Axle Truck

articulated trucks

PCSE 0.25 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.20 1.40 1.60 1.40 1.50 1.80 2.20

Number of wheels 2 4 4 4 4 6 6 4 6 10 18

Number of axles - 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 >3

Average Operating Weight (ton)

0.10 1.50 2.20 2.20 2.90 5.90 11.60 4.80 11.10 17.00 38.10

Service Life (years) 10 10 10 8 6 10 8 10 10 10 10

Km driven per year 6,000 20,000 25,000 45,000 85,000 75,000 100,000 55,000 75,000 75,000 75,000

Hours driven per year 250 370 425 1,000 1,850 1,750 2,200 1,400 2,000 2,000 2,000

Number of passengers 1.00 2.40 2.40 2.40 11.50 25.00 49.00 - - - -

ESA loading factor - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.11 2.24 0.07 1.26 1.44 4.14

Economic Costs in 2008 price New vehicle price

(US$) 1,000 19,698 36,855 16,799 20,919 39,110 87,026 25,239 49,504 71,462 131,614

New tire price (US$) 25 55 101 74 83 115 115 220 220 372 372

Fuel cost (US$/Liter) 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7

Lubricants cost (US$/Liter)

2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8

Labor cost of maintenance (US$/hour)

2.9 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 8.14 6.1 8.14 8.14 8.14

Crew wage (US$/hour) 0 0 0.62 1.24 2.72 3.52 3.52 3.08 3.31 3.88 4.27

Time costs for working passenger (US$/hour)

0.99 1.98 1.98 1.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0 0 0 0

Time costs for non- working passenger

(US$/hour) 0.22 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.22 0.22 0.22 0 0 0 0

Cargo time (US$/hour) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1

Annual Interest Rate (%)

12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12


Page 44 of 67

12. Traffic volume. The traffic volumes (Average Annual Daily Traffic) and the annual traffic growth rates are presented in Table 4.6 and 4.7 Traffic growth rates have been recalculated based on the present GDP figures in Kenya.

Table 4.6 Existing Traffic Volumes of Project Road Section (AADT)

Meru Bypass motor cycle

car jeep/ 4WD

Matatu +mini bus

small bus

bus pick up

LGV MGV 3-4 Axle

Truck

5-6 Axle Truck

Total

1

144 178

36 66 20 6

6

27 7 9

4 503

2

171 212

43 78 23 7

7

32 8 10

4 595

3

1,030

1,274

256 468 138 38

39

187 47 56

16

3,549

4

320 396

80 146 43 12

12

59 15 18

6

1,107

5

267 330

67 121 36 10

10

49 12 16

6 924

6

160 198

40 73 22 6

6

30 8 10

4 557

7

1,425

1,762

354 647 191 53

53

259 65 76

21

4,906

8

855

1,058

212 389 115 32

32

156 39 45

12

2,945

9

1,490

1,843

370 677 199 55

56

271 67 79

22

5,129

10

191 236

48 87 26 7

8

35 9 11

4 662

11

231 285

58 105 31 9

9

42 11 13

4 798

12

1,030

1,274

256 468 138 38

39

187 47 56

16

3,549

13

424 524

105 193 57 16

16

77 20 23

7

1,462

James Gichuru road junction-

Rironi Road section (2012)

motor cycle car

jeep/ 4WD matatu minibus bus LGV MGV HGV

articulated trucks

oil tankers Total

James Gichuru road junction-

Uthiru

670

14,368

8,892 7,792 2,958 636

670

1,150 564 1,444

10

39,154

Uthiru-Giratu

448

8,229

5,549 5,473 1,598 621

618

835 462 1,138

76

25,047

Gitaru- Rironi Road section

237

5,001

3,262 4,137 399 504

759

949 594 1,345

152

17,339

Kisumu Northern Bypass (2013)

motor cycle

car jeep/ 4WD

matatu +minibu

s

bus

LGV MGV HGV articulated

trucks others Total

Kondele-Mambaleo

3,132

4,684

4,155 5,144 240

762

755 121 382

-

19,375

Kondele-Otonglo 1,415

3,285

2,939 3,951 318

84

1,032 196 622

-

13,842

Airport-Kisian

875

1,537

1,287 1,538 230

253

193 138 154

9

6,214


Page 45 of 67

Table 4.7 Estimated Traffic Growth Rate

13. Estimating economic benefits. The economic benefits of road rehabilitation and upgrading works are: (i) reduction in vehicle operating costs and (ii) travel time savings. The project contributes to increased average traffic speeds as well as improved riding comfort. Accordingly, the economic benefits from the road works consist of the reduction of the following transport costs: (i) vehicle operating costs, mainly, reduction in consumption of fuels and reduction of wear due to vibration during driving, and (ii) reduction in travel time for passengers and freight, which is converted into monetary terms and added as economic benefits.

Economic Evaluation

14. In the HDM-4 model, benefits are calculated as the difference in transport costs and benefits between a with-project scenario (alternative case) and a without-project scenario (base case). ‘With-project scenario’ basically involving widening and construction of a new pavement and subsequent routine and periodic maintenance while the ‘without project’ case basically involving patching and crack sealing.

15. Sensitivity Analysis. Sensitivity Analysis was undertaken for each of the sub-sections and compared with the base case scenario as follows:

a. High capital cost scenario assuming that the cost of capital and that of recurrent works will be

20 percent higher than the base case scenario costs;

b. Low benefits scenario assumes that accrued benefits will be 20 percent lower than the base

case scenario benefits; and

c. High capital cost and low benefits scenario which assume that the cost capital and that of recurrent works will be 20 percent higher than the base case scenario and accrued benefits

will be 20 percent lower than the base case scenario benefits.

16. The NPV and the EIRR for the reconstruction are shown in Table 4.8.

James Gichuru road

junction-Rironi road

section (2012)

motor

cycle car

jeep/4W

D Matatu mini bus bus LGV MGV HGV

articulate

d trucks Oil tankers

2012-2020 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0

2021-25 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0

2026-39 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0


(2013)

motor

cycle car

jeep/4W

D Matatu LGV MGV HGV VHGV others

Kisumu Northern Bypass 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0

Kisian-Airport 6.0 6.0 5.5 4.0 4.0 5.0 3.0 3.0 -

Meru Bypass (2016)

motor

cycle car

jeep/

4WD

Matatu

+mini bus small bus bus pick up LGV MGV

3-4 Axle

Truck 5-6 Truck

midium growth scenario 4.2 6.8 6.8 6.9 6.9 6.9 5.3 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9

4.0

bus

6.0


Page 46 of 67

Table 4.8 Summary of NPV and EIRR

Road Section Benefits (US $ Million) NPV (US$

Million)

EIRR (%)

Meru Bypasses Base Case 91.19 30.7

Costs up by 20% 85.22 27.1

Costs up by 20% and Benefits down by 20% 85.22 27.1

James Gichuru Road Junction

to Rironi

Base Case 74.16 16.4

Costs up by 20% 43.70 14.3

Benefits down by 20% 29.29 13.9

Costs up by 20% and Benefits down by 20% 4.10 12.2


Base Case 56.43 20.9

Costs up by 20% 43.48 18.1

Benefits down by 20% 27.68 17.5

Conclusion

17. Updated information on the cost of interventions shows the three road sections continue to be economically viable (positive NPVs and EIRR>12%) even under the worst-case scenario (when both costs go up by 20 percent and the benefits go down by 20 percent), or with low traffic growth scenario.


Page 47 of 67

ANNEX 5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS


Page 48 of 67


Page 49 of 67

NATIONAL URBAN TRANSPORT IMPROVEMENT PROJECT

GOK COMMENTS ON THE BANK’S DRAFT ICR

The Bank’s ICR has been reviewed by the Implementing Entities under the Ministry of Transport,

Infrastructure, Housing and Urban Development. The report is concise and identifies and has clearly

articulated the issues affecting the development of urban transportation in Kenya. We have specific

comments on the ICR as detailed below:

i) Paragraph 14: The Borrower takes note of the delays in compensation of PAPs which slowed down

progress. This is a lesson learnt and in future compensation should be done before commencement

of works.

ii) Paragraph 15: The Borrower takes note of the sudden decision by Government to request for

cancellation whereas the restructuring was ongoing. This is a lesson learnt that in future wider

consultations should be carried out to avoid a similar recurrence.

iii) Paragraph 17: The Borrower takes note that completion of road designs during implementation is not

a good practice and in future all the designs should be completion before commencement of works.

iv) Paragraph 33: The Borrower takes note that introduction of complex activities such as the BRT

should not be done hurriedly as it has had serious implications which could have been addressed if

more time had been dedicated to wider consultations.

v) Paragraph 34: The Borrower notes the comments from the Bank and would like to clarify that the

County Governments needed to understand the proposed landscape on urban transport in order for

them to buy-in into the proposed changes. This therefore meant stakeholder engagement and

communication.

vi) Paragraph 38: The Borrower takes note of the reclassification of the project from B to A and would

like to state that in future such major changes which are done midway should be highly avoided or

other ways of addressing the need to change the category be considered. The reclassification process

is not only long but requires that previous safeguards documents are done away with and new ones

developed. This is detrimental to an ongoing project and very costly as well.

vii) Paragraph 40: The Borrower takes note of the need to ensure adequate and timely availability of

counterpart funding for smooth implementation of the project.

viii) Paragraph 41: The Borrower requests the bank to ensure minimum changes in TTLs and preference

be given to TTLs based in the country to facilitate adequate consultation and communication. The

issues on urban transport are complex and requires dedicated TTLs based in the country in order to

appreciate the environment in which they are operating.

ix) Paragraph 44: The Borrower appreciates the recognition of the effort made by the Project Oversight

Committee and the Project Management Office in providing the necessary leadership and oversight

in Project Implementation.


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x) Paragraph 46: The Borrower takes note of the delays in the recruitment of an M&E consultant and

regrets the delay. However, this is a lesson learnt and in future the recruitment of the M&E

consultants will be done at the onset of the project.

xi) Paragraph 58: The Borrower takes note of the post closure environmental and social safeguards

obligations and will endeavour to ensure that all the obligations will be met. The lesson learnt

however, is that in future the design team will be encouraged to consider designs with minimal social

and environmental impacts by looking for innovative engineering solutions.

xii) Paragraph 61: The Borrower takes note of the comments from the Bank and would like to confirm

that there are adequate accountability and procurement processes. It is also worth noting that the

introduction of STEP has been a challenge to many entities more so because most of the entities and

agencies do not have stable internet connectivity.

xiii) Paragraph 62: The Borrower takes note of the comments from the Bank and would like to reiterate

that the existing procurement legal framework is professional. The challenge has been the

applicability of Bank Procurement procedures and Borrowers procedures. Although the Financing

Agreement states that Bank procurement procedures take precedence, the same has not been widely

appreciated in all government institutions such as the Office of the Attorney General.

Final Remarks

Overall the draft ICR provides a good assessment of the issues relating to implementation of an urban

transport project in Kenya. Several issues need further attention and focus, for example full

operationalization of NAMATA and sustainability of the reforms. We trust that a further engagement on

the basis of the experiences of project implementation and the lessons learned will be possible to consolidate

the gains thus far.


Page 51 of 67

ANNEX 6. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS (IF ANY)

Project documents

1. Project Concept note 2. Project Appraisal Document 3. Financing Agreement 4. ISRs 5. AMs and MLs 6. Country Partnership Strategy 7. Performance and Learning Review 8. Resettlement Action Plans

List of Environmental and Social Safeguard Documents prepared under the project

No Activity Clearance by the World Bank

Disclosed in World Bank website

Disclosed in-Country

Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (ESIAs)

1 Expansion and improvement of the Northern Corridor road section through Nairobi starting from JKIA turnoff-Westlands-Rironi

May 4, 2012 May 9, 2012 May 9, 2012

2 Construction of Kisumu Northern Bypass May 4, 2012 May 9, 2012 May 8, 2012

3 Construction of Meru Bypasses - Construction of approximately 20 km of single carriageway, two-lane 6.5 m wide, and bitumen surfaced road with 1.0 m shoulders on each side.

April 23, 2012 April 24, 2012 April 24, 2012

Resettlement Action Plans (RAPs)

1 Expansion and improvement of the Northern Corridor road section through Nairobi starting from JKIA turnoff-Westlands-Rironi

April 26, 2012 May 3, 2012 May 2, 2012

2 Kisumu Northern Bypass: new road to link Mamboleo to Otonglo (approx. 9 km).

May 6, 2012 May 9, 2012 May 9, 2012

3 Construction of Meru Bypasses - Construction of approximately 21 km of single carriageway, two-lane 6.5 meters wide, and bitumen surfaced road with 1.0 meter shoulders on each side.

May 7, 2012 May 9, 2012 May 9, 2012

4 Expansion of the James Gichuru road junction-Rironi road section

(i) Zambezi-Rironi section (C) August 2, 2017 August 4, 2017 August 2, 2017

(ii) Uthiru-Zambezi(B) November 20, 2017

January 22, 2018 December 29, 2017

(iii) James Gichuru road junction-Uthiru (A) March 17, 2018 April 16, 2018 April 13, 2018,

Terms of References (ToRs) Preparation Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA)

1 Environment and Social Impact Assessments for development of Bus Rapid Transit Systems and Commuter Rail network

May 6, 2012 May 11, 2012

May 28, 2012 (disclosed on the

websites of KURA and KRC)


Page 52 of 67

No Activity Clearance by the World Bank

Disclosed in World Bank website

Disclosed in-Country

2 Review and updating the ESIA for the Kisumu Northern Bypass

Oct. 5, 2018 Oct. 16, 2018 Oct. 15, 2018 (KeNHA website)

3 Feasibility and detailed engineering design studies for selected roads adjoining major towns


4 Construction of traffic control center and provision of traffic management ICT solutions, installations and monitoring of an intelligent transport system in Nairobi

Oct. 15, 2018 Oct. 17, 2018 Oct. 16, 2018 (KURA website)

5 Strategic Environmental Social Assessment (SESA)-for the development of masterplans and the investment plans for sustainable Commuter Rail System for Nairobi and Mombasa

Oct. 22, 2018 Oct. 26, 2018 Oct. 25, 2018 (KRC website)

Terms of Reference for Preparation of Resettlement Action Plans (RAPs)

1 ToRs for the review and updating the RAP for the Kisumu Northern Bypass


2 RAP ToRs for the feasibility and detailed engineering design studies for selected roads adjoining major towns

Oct. 11, 2018 Oct. 17, 2018 Oct.15, 2018 (KeNHA website)

3 Construction of traffic control center and provision of traffic management ICT solutions, installations and monitoring of an intelligent transport system in Nairobi

Oct. 15, 2018 Oct. 17, 2018 Oct. 16, 2018 (KURA website)

Reference

1. Integrated National Transport Policy (Kenya), 2012, 2. Vision 2030 3. Africa’s Future and the World Bank’s support t It, the World Bank March 2011. 4. IEG report identified a longer time engagement with institutional development a driver of success in

urban transport projects. An IEG Evaluation of the World Bank Group’s Support for Urban Transport, 2017


Page 53 of 67

National Urban Transport Improvement Project (CR.5140-KE)

Borrower’s Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR)

Date: June 21, 2019

I. Background

1. The National Urban Transport Improvement Project (NUTRIP) was approved by the World Bank

Board on 2nd August 2012 and became effective on 24th December 2012. The credit amount was US$300

million. As at 27th December 2018, the undisbursed balance of the IDA Credit was XDR 149.5 million

(US$207.5 million equivalent. The Government of Kenya decided for various reasons including slow

progress of execution of the project and significantly changed project environment to cancel the

undisbursed amount of the credit on December 21, 2018. Thus, the project closed as per the original date

of December 31, 2018 and the restructuring process that was underway cancelled. The revised credit amount

therefore changed to XDR 43.96 million (US$92.5 million equivalent with actual disbursement of US$61.1

million as of March 27, 2019).

Table 1-Project Data

Board Approval August 2, 2012

Effectiveness Date December 24, 2012

Closing Date of IDA Credit December 31, 2018

Original IDA Credit Amount XDR 193.5m (US$ 300m)

Revised IDA Credit Amount XDR 43.96m (US$ 92.5m)

Actual Amount Disbursed US$ 61.1m

Amount Cancelled XDR149.5m (US$ 207.5)

Request for Restructuring and

Extension

May 17, 2017

Request for Cancellation of

undisbursed Credit

December 21, 2018

2. Project Development Objectives: The Project development objectives are: (a) improve the

efficiency of road transport along the Northern Corridor; (b) improve the institutional capacity and

arrangements in the urban transport sub-sector; and (c) promote private sector participation in the operation,

financing and management of transport systems.

3. Project Implementing Entities: There were five Project Implementing Entities (PIEs) namely:

Kenya National Highways Authority (KeNHA), Kenya Urban Roads Authority (KURA), Kenya Railways

(KRC), State Department of Transport (SDoT) and State Department of Infrastructure (SDoI).

4. Project Components: The project is composed of three components and following activities as

presented in table 2.

Table 2 Project component and activities

A. Support to KeNHA to Upgrade the Urban Road Transport Infrastructure

1. JKIA junction-Southern Bypass junction (7 km, 6 lanes) and associated interchanges, service and

access roads (8 km)


Page 54 of 67

2. Southern Bypass junction-James Gichuru road junction (12 km) including 9 interchanges and

elevated highway (4 km)

3. James Gichuru junction-Rironi (26 km of which 7 km 6 lanes and 19 km 4 lanes)

4. Kisumu Northern Bypass (9 km)

5. Updating Designs and Supervision of works

(a) JKIA junction-Southern Bypass

(b) Southern Bypass-James Gichuru junction

(c) James Gichuru junction-Rironi

(d) Kisumu Northern Bypass 6. Promotion of Private Sector participation in Road sub-sector

7. Feasibility and detailed design studies for improvement of road arteries adjoining major towns.

8. Capacity Building and Technical Assistance

9. Training of KeNHA, External Resources Department (MoF) and State Law Office staff

10. Operating costs

11. Feasibility and detailed designs studies of JKIA junction - Southern Bypass-junction; Southern

Bypass-James Gichuru junction; James Gichuru-Rironi; Kisumu Bypass and Machakos Turnoff-

Konza ICT City

12. Implementation of RAPs and relocation of public utilities associated with works contracts

B. Support to KURA and KRC to Develop Selected Mass Transit Corridors KURA

a) Feasibility and design studies of selected Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) Corridors & preparation of

bidding documents for BRT services operations

b) Feasibility and design studies of selected missing road links in Nairobi and other major towns.

c) Improvement of Traffic Management systems

d) Construction of Meru Bypass roads (23 km)

e) Supervision of construction of Meru Bypass (23 km)

f) Study and development of an urban Transport Master Plan for Mombasa

g) Institutional Strengthening, Technical Assistance (TA) and modernizing management

information systems and ICT

h) Traffic management studies and activities

i) Training of KURA Staff

j) Operating costs

k) Implementation of RAP associated with works contract (GoK)

2. KRC

a) Feasibility and detailed design studies for selected Commuter and Light rail routes in Nairobi and

other major towns.

b) Institutional Building, TA and advisory services.

c) Training of KRC staff.

d) Operating costs

C. Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building

1. MoT

a) TA for strengthening: (i) the National Road Transport and Safety Authority and the National Road

Safety Program; (ii) the Nairobi Metropolitan Transport Authority; (iii) the East African School

of Aviation; and (iv) support PPP activities in aviation industry.


Page 55 of 67

b) Urban Transport sector studies, including, among others, the development of an urban transport

sector strategy; and promotion of PPP in the provision of transport services

c) Road safety interventions

d) Training and capacity building

e) Operating Costs

MoR

a) Project Monitoring and Evaluation and sector coordination

b) Capacity building, Technical Assistance and support implementation of NCA Act and Engineers

Act

c) Training

d) Operating Costs

5. Financing Proportions: The financing of various components as per the financing agreement was

done as indicated on table 3 with IDA funding being at 80% and Counterpart funding at 20% for all

categories except training.

Table 3

Financing Proportions IDA GOK

Civil works 80% 20%

Consulting services 80% 20%

Goods/Equipment 80% 20%

Training 100% 0%

II. Key Design and Implementation issues

6. Over the last five years, the country has experienced major changes that altered significantly the

project operating environment and requiring substantial modification to the project design. The changes

included: (i) commencement of the implementation of the 2010 Constitution in 2013 introducing devolved

system of government which for instance resulted in the division of the Nairobi Metropolitan Area (NMA)

into five counties; (ii) Development of a new integrated transport policy which promotes public transport

and introduction of mass transit systems; (iii) development of new mass transit corridors (including for

BRTs) in Nairobi; (iv) Creation of new institutions such as Nairobi Metropolitan Area Transport Authority

(NaMATA) set up in February 2017 to plan and oversee urban transport in the NMA.. These changes had

substantial impacts on the major civil works planned under the project for which the designs were underway

including the James Gichuru road junction-Rironi which apparently needed to be further widened to

accommodate the BRT, which was not considered at appraisal. As a result, civil works were delayed, and

resettlement impacts increased.

7. The amendments to the project design therefore became essential in order to accommodate the

rapidly changing environment and changing needs. During the Design of the project the urban transport in

Kenya had the following challenges:

1. Lack of a comprehensive urban traffic and transport strategy

2. Weak legal and regulatory framework


Page 56 of 67

3. Weak institutional capacity of public agencies and weak professional capacity of operations involved

in public transport provision

4. Lack of sufficient enforcement and control on encroachment on road reserve particularly within the

metropolitan areas

5. Lack of a lead agency to spearhead the development of Mass Rapid Transit Systems for the Nairobi

Metropolitan.

6. The skyrocketing land value in Nairobi and its environs.

7. The unforeseen challenges posed by the new constitution which led to increase in litigation.

8. Lack of technical capacity on Mass Rapid Transit Systems.

8. Project Design: After the World Bank Board approved the project, the Kenyan Parliament endorsed

a new Integrated National Transport in December 2012 leading to:

(a) shift in focus from mere road expansion to development of Mass Rapid Transit Systems for Nairobi,

particularly Bus Rapid Transit (BTR) and commuter rail. The new developments affected the

project design and pace of implementation because it entailed modification of some project

components.

(b) the change in the governance structure of the country, from a centralized to a devolved system

leading to the creation of counties during the implementation phase called for retrofitting of some

of the activities; and

(c) due to severe traffic congestion and poor public transport in Nairobi, the Government shifted to

prioritization of mass transit system hence the need to urgently revive the commuter rail services

in the NMA by utilizing the existing meter-gauge railway, measuring about 200km.

(d) Conflicting advice from the Bank on the design and construction approach to follow. While the

GoK preferred carrying out detailed engineering design and thereafter procuring a contractor, an

approach agreed with Bank team at project preparation stage, the new Bank team that took over the

management of the project on the Bank side, at implementation phase preferred design and build

approach. This approach was new to Kenya at that time and it stalled procurement process.

9. Impact of Government change in priorities on Project Design: Arising from the changed

circumstances, most of the designs for works that had commenced during the preparation stage purely for

road expansion were to be modified during the project implementation phase to incorporate change in

priorities. This entailed carrying out additional feasibility and design studies on BRT. Thus, the detailed

engineering designs and bidding documents for expansion of JKIA- Southern Bypass and James Gichuru-

Rironi road sections which were ready to commence the bidding process were kept in abeyance to allow

for review of designs to incorporate BRT aspects in the works contracts. KeNHA had to re-negotiate with

the design consultants, a process that took inordinately long time to conclude because the consultants

needed to bring BRT experts on board. This was exacerbated by the divergent views between the Bank

and GoK on the design and construction approach to adopt.

10. Delays in Commencement of the Road Contracts: The delays in commencement of the main road

contracts due to changes in design to accommodate BRT and the inability to keep the road reserve clear,

led to a major encroachment of the right of way by traders. It became clear that the significant magnitude

and impact of social issues were greater than envisaged during preparation and appraisal of the project,

resulting in significant, large scale and irreversible adverse environmental and social impacts. The

disclosed safeguards documents required to be updated, reviewed and cleared by the Bank for redisclosure


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to reflect the actual situation at the time. The Bank took relatively long, close to two years to provide clear

guidance on the environment category. It was not until 2016 that the GoK was informed of the change in

environmental category to A which entailed selecting new consultancy to prepare resettlement action plans.

This took time and by the time the safeguards documents were cleared by the Bank, less than two years

had been left to the closing date of the project.

III. Key Achievements of Project Development Objectives

11. Transport Sector Reforms: The institutional and policy reforms agreed under the project were fully

implemented. This included Setting up (a) a road safety lead agency, National Transport and Safety

Authority (NTSA); and (b) a body to coordinate the planning and development of urban transport initiatives

in the Nairobi metropolitan region, Nairobi Metropolitan Area Transport Authority (NAMATA). NTSA is

fully operational. NaMATA was established through Legal Notice No.18 of 17th February 2017 with

ongoing initiatives to operationalize the institution. The establishment of NTSA has given road safety

issues the much-needed attention at the National level. This includes capturing of road safety data which is

very critical when designing road safety interventions. There has been more focus to road safety and the

number of accidents on Kenya roads are declining.

12. NaMATA on the other hand has created the enabling environment to facilitate discussions on issues

of public transport because there is now an institution that various stakeholders can approach. The

importance of public transport has now been accepted and concerted efforts have been put in place to

actualize the Government’s intentions including reviving commuter rail services in Nairobi and above all

embracing mass rapid transit systems as a key initiative to address congestion in major towns. Already GoK

has offered one BRT line for development based on the BRT network that was developed as part of the

project. Similarly, based on the commuter rail masterplan developed for Nairobi the recommendation

therein to revive the commuter rail services by making use of the existing rail infrastructure is underway.

13. BRT designs standards have been developed with financing through the project. This enabled

stakeholder engagement and harmonization of various initiatives to be carried out and hence the project has

created a platform for discussing and shaping the development of mass rapid transit systems in the country.

The Bank has been the lead development partner in this effort and therefore to sustain the momentum,

further support in the urban transport sector is urgent and extremely critical.

14. Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building: The project supported institutional

strengthening of various organizations among them Engineers Board of Kenya (EBK), NTSA, Kenya Civil

Aviation Authority (KCAA) and National Construction Authority (NCA) through purchase of equipment,

automation, and construction of critical infrastructure and training of staff. The support has enabled these

institutions to effectively deliver on their mandate. There is now more effective oversight on the

construction industry. Shoddy workmanship is now punishable compared to the situation before NCA was

established. EBK is now able to accredit all engineering professional courses in the country and has started

an internship program for graduate engineers.

15. Platform for Coordination and Engagement on Urban Transport: The NUTRIP project created an

opportunity and a platform for the agencies to share information and experience on matters related to urban

transport and to discuss the way forward. This platform has brought together players in both the public and

private sectors including the Matatu and Consumer organizations, as well as other Development Partners.


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The project has indeed raised the profile of urban transport challenges. Further support from the Bank in

this area is required in order to sustain the gains made.

16. NUTRIP has helped in undertaking preparatory work for future urban transport project:

The project has helped in designing the architecture of urban transport projects in Kenya and provides a

basis on what issues must to be considered before and after approval of financing from the Bank. For

instance, the importance of stakeholder engagements, the need to have a champion and overall buy-in before

commencing implementing an urban transport project.

Details of Activities implemented and completed.

Kenya National Highways Authority

17. Feasibility and detailed design studies of James Gichuru-Rironi section and Kisumu Bypass: The

completion of the designs facilitated the financing of the James Gichuru – Rironi road which is currently

under implementation. It is also important to note that since the designs for the other road sections are

ready it will be easier to attract financing from other partners.

Kenya Urban Roads Authority

18. Consultancy services for the feasibility study, preliminary and detailed engineering design of the

construction of Meru, Western and Eastern Bypasses: The completion of the design has facilitated the

financing of the construction of the road which his currently nearing completion.

19. Construction of Meru, Western and Eastern Bypasses: The Construction of Meru bypass is

substantially complete at 80 percent physical progress. The completed sections (excluding 5 km road

section) are open for traffic and average travel time during rush hour between Meru Town (CBD) and

Maua/Isiolo has been significantly reduced, by 37 percent and 21 percent, respectively. This activity has

transformed the face of Meru town and ease traffic movement in and out of Meru town.

20. Supply of office equipment and software: The supply of office equipment and software has

continued to facilitate institutional strengthening of the beneficiary entities.

Kenya Railways

21. Development of a Commuter Railway Master Plan for Nairobi: The completion of the

Development of the master plan has elevated the focus of commuter rail. The GoK has expressed interest

on the need to revive the commuter rail services in Nairobi as part of improving urban mobility. The

Masterplan led to the development of a quick-wins report which identified interventions that can be

undertaken between 6 – 12 months at an estimated to cost US$ 30 million.

22. Support to Project Implementation Unit at KRC: Through NUTRIP Kenya Railways was able to

refurbish offices to support the project team. The refurbishment included structured cabling and purchase

of office furniture.


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23. Offsite Backup System: Kenya Railways purchased and implemented an off-site backup system to

support the business continuity of the organization in the event of any disruption.

24. Digitization of Records at Kenya Railways: KR has been able to digitize more that 15 million

records hence enhancing accessibility of the records.

East African School of Aviation 25. Consultancy and construction of EASA Library: The construction of the Library has contributed

to the recognition of the East African School of Aviation as a centre of excellence in the World by ICAO.

26. Supply, delivery and Installation of Training Simulators: The training simulators has enhanced

training and has made the school more attractive in the region hence the centre of excellence.

National Transport and Safety Authority 27. Purchase of Speed Cameras: The purchase of speed cameras is one of the road safety interventions

undertaken by NTSA and has made significant contribution in the reduction of accidents along major

highways.

28. Supply and Installation of Motor Vehicle Testing Lanes in Nairobi and Mombasa: The supply and

installation of motor vehicle testing equipment has contributed to the assessment of roadworthiness of

motor vehicles by NTSA. The state-of-the-art equipment has contributed to both efficiency and

effectiveness of the motor vehicle testing. Prior to the purchase of equipment, there were long delays for

getting a vehicle tested.

29. TA for NTSA on the development of priority action plan: The development of the priority action

plan for NTSA enabled NTSA to identify priority road safety interventions and to ensure that financing of

the same is prioritised. The Priority Action Plan also contributed to the raising awareness on road safety

matters.

30. Support to Road Safety Enforcement: NTSA received 12 motor-cycles, Breathalyzer Machines,

Mobile Night and Day Vision Cameras and Fleet management system. The equipment enhanced the

enforcement function of NTSA.

Nairobi Metropolitan Authority (NaMATA)

31. Support to NaMATA: The support to the NAMATA has facilitated the operationalization of the

NAMATA offices through provision of office equipment, bench marking technical study tours, board

retreat, training of PSV operators and stakeholder consultation workshop. These activities have contributed

to the creation of confidence on the existence of NAMATA as the lead agency on the development Mass

Rapid Transit Solutions for Nairobi.

National Construction Authority 32. Capacity building and institutional strengthening of National Construction Authority: The

proceeds from the credit facilitated the purchase of motor vehicles which has enhanced enforcement and

quality of construction of buildings in Nairobi.


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Engineers Board of Kenya 33. Capacity building and institutional strengthening of Engineering Board of Kenya: The proceeds

from the credit financed the supply, delivery and implementation of an ERP system for the organization.

The ERP system has made significant contributions in the enhancement and efficiency of operations at

EBK.

Ongoing Activities at Project Closure

34. As at 31st December 2018 the following activities were still in progress at different levels of

implementation as indicated on the table 4 below:

Table 4

Component A: Support to Kenya National Highways Authority (KeNHA) to Upgrade the

Urban Road Transport Infrastructure

1. Improvement of James Gichuru road junction-Rironi of which 7 km is six lanes while

19 km is four lanes - physical progress is at 18% as at March 15, 2019.

2. Consultancy services for supervision of improvement of James Gichuru road junction-

Rironi

3. Consultancy services for design review and supervision of construction of Kisumu

Northern Bypass.

Component B: Support to Kenya Urban Roads Authority (KURA) and Kenya Railways

Corporation (KRC) to Develop Selected Mass Transit Corridors

Component B1: Kenya Urban Roads Authority

4. Design and supervision of an ITS for Nairobi - While final ITS installation and

association Civil works Plan, preliminary cost estimate, and draft bid packages have been

completed.

5. Design Review and Construction of Meru Western and Eastern Bypasses - substantially

complete at 80% at March 15, 2019. Remaining works include 5km road stretch and one

bridge/structure)

6. Consultancy services for the supervision of the construction of Meru Western and

Eastern Bypasses

35. It is anticipated that Government will allocate finances to complete the ongoing activities. This

includes Governments commitment to honor safeguards arrangements as per the agreements during closure.

Activities under Procurement at Project Closure

36. As at 31st December 2018 the following activities were at different stages of procurement. The

implementing entities are expected to budget for the activities to facilitate implementation. However, it is

also anticipated that some of the activities might be dropped if finances are not allocated by the National

Treasury.


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Table 5



1. Consultancy services for design of improvement of Southern Bypass junction-James

Gichuru road junction-Rironi – expression interest cleared but was not advertised

2. Construction of Kisumu Northern Bypass – design review is underway as well as

updating the safeguards documents after the clearance of the terms of reference in

November 2018. Part of the payment toward land acquisition and compensation has been

made.




3. Supply and installation of an ITS for Nairobi – finalizing the preparation of bidding

documents. Installation was expected to take 48 months (until December 2022)

Component B2: Kenya Railways Corporation

4. Supply of a track recording car for Kenya Railways corporation- notification of award

issued but contract was yet to be signed.

5. Development of a commuter rail masterplan and feasibility study for Mombasa –

technical evaluation was cleared by the Bank.


C1: State Department of Transport

6. Development of an integrated public transport network for Nairobi

C2: State Department of Infrastructure

7. Project Monitoring and Evaluation

Activities that were dropped due to financing gaps 37. Due to the significant changes that affected the project design the activities shown on table 6 were

dropped mainly due to financing gaps that could not be accommodated. It was expected that the activities

will be implemented under the Mass Rapid Transit Improvement Project.

Table 6



1. Expanding and upgrading the Northern Corridor road section through Nairobi from

JKIA turnoff to James Gichuru and the associated service roads and access roads - Due

to the design change to incorporate BRT aspect, IDA credit could cover only civil works

of James Gichuru-Rironi section.

2. Feasibility studies and detailed design for improvement of arteries adjoining major

towns. The selection of consultant has been kept in abeyance due to inadequate funds

under the credit.





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3. Carrying out a range of feasibility studies including detailed designs and preparing

bidding documents for selected Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) road corridors through pro-

vision of technical advisory services required for that purpose. – EU has taken over this

activity.

4. A study and developing an urban transport plan for the city of Mombasa – JICA has

taken over this activity

IV. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome:

38. Rating: High. The risk rating in the Project Appraisal document was noted as high. Although the

government has taken steps to alleviate the risks, the issue of land compensation and counterpart funding

remained a major risk to the actualization of the project activities. The government through KeNHA has

created capacity in management of safeguards as demonstrated by the safeguard’s implementation plans at

James Gichuru-Rironi, the site was sliced into three parts and safeguards handled per section. These

enabled KeNHA to undertake partial site handover and these enabled works to go on as other sections were

being addressed. The implementation of the Resettlement Action Plan for Meru Bypass had high

satisfaction ratings from the PAPs, and this is because government availed 100% of the finances required

for Land Compensation. This is a clear demonstration of a case where a contract is 100% compliant with

the World Bank procedures despite the fact that the road corridor had acquired a completely new alignment.

The implementation of Kisumu Northern Bypass experienced serious delays due to land compensation as

the road required a new alignment hence huge funding requirements for acquisition.

39. The impact of implementing the 2010 constitution was not fully appreciated during the project

preparation phase. The creation of counties and election of Governors with their own aspirations slowed

down execution of the project when it emerged that some of the activities under the project involved

functions that had been devolved. For instance, public transport including traffic management is a devolved

function and activities such as BRT, commuter services, ITS and matters to do with NaMATA required the

inputs of the county governments that were not in place during preparation and early start of execution of

the project. All these risks were not clearly understood.

40. Underestimation of the cost of most of the activities. The project had been designed as purely road

infrastructure expansion project and not an urban public transport project. Thus, incorporating of the public

transport aspects in the design led to major cost overruns and the available funds under the project could

not accommodate all the original activities of the project without additional financing or dropping some of

them.

V. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry

41. Rating: Moderately Satisfactory. The NUTRIP credit was consistent with the World Bank’s Africa

Strategy which aims to build on the foundation of governance and public sector capacity. The main

objective of the credit was to lay a foundation for developing an efficient urban public transport system for


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Nairobi in order to improve governance in the urban transport sector, consolidate fragmented functions,

make Nairobi competitive and enhance the adoption of the Integrated National Transport Policy.

42. However, it’s important to note that immediately upon approval of the credit significant changes

that had a huge impact on the project design were by Government. This includes the endorsement of the

Integrated National Transport Policy, shift in focus from road expansion to development of Mass Rapid

Transit solutions and change in governance structure of the country from a centralized system to a devolved

system. Despite the significant changes the Bank was flexible enough to accommodate some of the changes

to ensure that the activities within the project remained relevant following the change. However, there was

a delay in quick restructuring of the project. New requirements were introduced for instance discarding the

safeguards documents that had been prepared and cleared and demanding preparation of new ones in the

midway in the implementation of the project. This was a major setback to the implementation of the project

were two years were lost.

43. At the onset of the project implementation the Task Team Leader was based in Washington DC

and this posed a challenge to implementing entities due to slow decision making for an urban transport

project that requires intense consultations. The NUTRIP project has also experienced numerous changes

of TTLs which contributed to poor performance of the project particularly different approach in engagement

and dialogue and technical advice, for instance change in design and construction approach which was not

supported by the Government. The Government formally raised concerned on this matter and the Bank

responded positively which in turn improved the performance of the project significantly.

44. There was lack of clarity on the form of restructuring required to turn around the project. Initially,

Bank had indicated a possibility of additional financing. Progress was made on this basis but midway, GoK

was advised that instead a new project would be prepared instead. The project was to be restructured without

no additional financing, however, this process was equally protracted due to fresh requirement mainly

relating to the change in the environmental category and the need to prepare new safeguards documents.

The procurement of a new consultant to prepare these documents was delayed as a result of slow decision

making.

Borrower Performance

45. Government Performance: Moderately Satisfactory: The shift in focus from road expansion to

development of Mass Rapid Transit solutions was a sound decision after realizing that mere expansion of

the road would not solve the congestion problem but had to be accompanied by other traffic management

measures. The Government implemented all the agreed reforms that have improved the governance

framework in the transport sector and effective delivery of services. Also, at the time of project closure

about 90 percent of the credit proceeds had been committed and execution was at various stages of

implementation.

46. The Government through the project has established a framework to consult and deliberate on urban

transport matters, which was not in place before.

47. The change in governance structure of the country from a centralized system to a devolved system

had a negative impact on the project design and implementation of the proposed activities. The delay in


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implementation of the major contracts namely James-Gichuru Rironi, Meru Bypass and Kisumu Northern

Bypass led to the slow disbursement rate. As at closure it is evident that unless the Government of Kenya

provides financing to complete the ongoing contracts the intended outcomes of the project as outlined in

the results monitoring framework will not be achieved.

Implementing Agencies Performance

48. Rating: Moderately Satisfactory. The Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure set up a Project

Oversight Committee (POC) to oversee and oversight the overall implementation of the project. The POC

met on quarterly basis and dealt with a cross-section of issues from various Project Implementing Entities.

Members of the POC were the chief Executive Officers, of the Project Implementing Entities and Project

Implementation Team leaders and members Principal Secretaries for the State Departments of

Infrastructure and transport and Principal Secretary of the National Treasury. The Project was being

coordinated by the State Department of Infrastructure, with the Principal Secretary as Chairman and

Principal Secretary (Transport) as co-chairman. The Project Management Office which comprises of the

Project Coordinator and the Deputy Project Coordinator provide secretarial services to the Project

Oversight Committee. This includes follow up of resolutions made during the POC. The Project

Implementing Entities namely KeNHA, KURA, KRC, SDoT and SDoI had set up a multi-disciplinary

Project Implementation Teams (PITS) that managed the implementation of NUTRIP project components

to completion.

49. The implementing agencies ensured most of the contracts were procured. The agencies have

acquired experience through the project as this was the first Bank financed urban transport project in 20

years. The main challenge that hampered their performance was inadequate and untimely releases of budget

both for IDA and counterpart funds. This slowed down particularly the designs under KeNHA which were

fully funded by the Government.

50. Monitoring and Evaluation: As at closure of the credit the State Department of Infrastructure had

not procured the consultant to undertake the M&E. The lack of M&E has affected the evaluation of

outcomes.

VI. Lessons Learnt

51. Unclear Policy Direction: Implementation of projects at a time when there is no clear policy

direction from Government may pose a serious risk on the project design. This is evidenced by the shift in

focus by the Government to Mass Rapid transport System which affected the project design and pace of

implementation: the designs for JKIA-Southern Bypass and James Gichuru-Rironi which were ready for

bidding could not proceed to allow for review of the of designs to accommodate the BRT. These led to

major delays and it emerged that the financing as earlier envisaged was not adequate to implement the entire

corridor hence the decision to only award the James Gichuru-Rironi Contract. The lesson learnt is that

where there are no clear indications of government policy it is advisable that project preparation takes a

cautious approach on such activities.

52. Relocation of Services: Relocation of services during implementation as the responsibility of the

employer poses a serious risk in terms of access to site by the contractor. It has now emerged that delays


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in relocations leads to huge claims by the contractor and in future all the relocation of services should be

part of the works of contract as the responsibility of the contractor. The lesson learnt is that government

should develop a policy on usage of road reserve and relocation of services.

53. Identification of Land requirements during design stage: The identification of land requirements

during implementation is a risk to contract implementation which leads to claims because the contractor

does not get full access to site. Therefore, it is important that all land acquisition requirements should be

identified during design stage to facilitate compensation of the same before commencement of the contract.

54. Compensation of PAPS before commencement of Works: Compensation of PAPs during

implementation is a major risk to the project because some grievances might result in stoppage of works.

A good example is the 100% compensation of the PAPs under the Meru bypass which facilitated contractors’

access to site and high satisfaction rating from the PAPs.

55. Close Collaboration with County Governments: Following the new governance dispensation it is

important that implementing entities are required to work closely with the county governments where the

project is being implemented. The collaboration will facilitate smooth implementation of the project.

56. Undertaking of Design Review after commencement of Works: The culture of undertaking design

reviews after commencement has resulted in serious variations which have had a huge impact on the project

cost. It is now evident that design reviews should be undertaken before bidding to ensure that there will be

no surprises during implementation.

57. Monitoring and Evaluation: There is need to ensure that procurement of Monitoring and

Evaluation Services is done immediately upon effectiveness of the credit to ensure that as the

implementation progresses the M&E team is able to monitor and evaluate hence increasing the effectiveness

of the M&E activity.

58. Implementation Duration: It was noted that implementing entities have been conservative on the

implementation timelines leading to extension of time which is increases the cost of implementation. It is

therefore imperative that implementation periods are well planned to ensure that the time allocated is

sufficient particularly urban transport projects with many stakeholders with diverse interests.

59. The Bank should consider relooking at its procedures when the categorization of a project from an

environmental point view change midway. Retrofitting the safeguards documents rather than demanding

for new documents be prepared would have led to positive outcomes for NUTRIP. The main contract James

Gichuru road junction-Rironi that accounted for over 56 percent of the credit proceeds would have been

completed if the two years lost recruiting a new consultant, preparing new documents and obtaining

clearance from the Bank before commencement of works would not have been a requirement.

60. The Bank tied conclusion of the restructuring process of the project to the clearance of new

safeguards documents which restricted the implementation of new and emerging priorities slowing down

the implementation of the project. Perhaps separating the two and allowing retrofitting the safeguards

documents as part of project implementation should be considered in future.


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61. Closure of projects with many incomplete contracts: The closure of the project with incomplete

contracts is a major challenge to implementing agencies and this should be done as a last resort after

examining all available viable options through discussions with key players before such a decision is made.

In this case, cancelation occurred in the first half of the financial year when the budgeting process had been

completed. It became a big challenge to continue with the execution of the project due to the new and huge

financial burden to the implementing agencies as well as having to deal with significant contractual issues

and safeguards instruments already disclosed. The cancellation also made the contractors uncomfortable

and unsure on the completion of the projects.

62. In an environment that is changing very fast, there should be inbuilt flexibility in project design

that also allow for quick restructuring of the project. In the case of NUTRIP there was slow decision making

and introduction of new requirements which hampered implementation progress.


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MAP