CONFIDENTIAL Peer Review SIA Browse LNG Precinct ImpaxSIA Consulting 1 Independent expert peer review of the Social Impact Assessment component of the Browse LNG Precinct Strategic Assessment Undertaken for the Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities. Dr Annie Holden, ImpaxSIA Consulting March 2011 Summary Findings In relation to the SIA, the interpretation of the results and the assessment itself are inadequate. In particular, in view of the size of the construction workforce (up to 6,000 workers for two years), consideration of likely impacts and impact management associated with construction should be more clearly separated out from likely impacts and impact management during the operational phase. I am also of the view that some negative social impacts that could potentially occur at the margins of the affected communities, associated with the presence of the construction workforce, are either not identified at all or are seriously under-estimated. In relation to the Strategic Social Impact Management Plan, this document needs to be rewritten. It needs to identify overarching principles and objectives, as per a Strategic document, and it needs to be better informed in terms of how best to manage and mitigate impacts, including through possible project design considerations. It is evident that more relevant expertise needs to be brought to the task. Similarly, the monitoring regime needs to be more rigorously developed and the ASIA governance recommendations adopted. While I appreciate that more work will be done on this once a proponent/project commences, this does not obviate the need to at this stage identify appropriate indicators and governance and to set a standard through providing illustrative strategies. The ASIA has more competently addressed this important matter. In relation to the ASIA the report is thorough and comprehensive and, as discussed in more detail in this Review Report, an excellent document in all respects. However, the summary of the ASIA in the KLC Overview document is inadequate and does not include all relevant highlights. It should be more carefully rewritten. Also, the SSIMP does not correctly and adequately incorporate the strategic findings and recommendations of the ASIA.
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CONFIDENTIAL
Peer Review SIA Browse LNG Precinct ImpaxSIA Consulting 1
Independent expert peer review of the Social Impact Assessment component of the Browse LNG Precinct Strategic Assessment
Undertaken for the Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities.
Dr Annie Holden, ImpaxSIA Consulting
March 2011
Summary Findings In relation to the SIA, the interpretation of the results and the assessment itself are inadequate. In
particular, in view of the size of the construction workforce (up to 6,000 workers for two years),
consideration of likely impacts and impact management associated with construction should be
more clearly separated out from likely impacts and impact management during the operational
phase. I am also of the view that some negative social impacts that could potentially occur at the
margins of the affected communities, associated with the presence of the construction workforce,
are either not identified at all or are seriously under-estimated.
In relation to the Strategic Social Impact Management Plan, this document needs to be rewritten. It
needs to identify overarching principles and objectives, as per a Strategic document, and it needs to
be better informed in terms of how best to manage and mitigate impacts, including through possible
project design considerations. It is evident that more relevant expertise needs to be brought to the
task. Similarly, the monitoring regime needs to be more rigorously developed and the ASIA
governance recommendations adopted. While I appreciate that more work will be done on this
once a proponent/project commences, this does not obviate the need to at this stage identify
appropriate indicators and governance and to set a standard through providing illustrative
strategies. The ASIA has more competently addressed this important matter.
In relation to the ASIA the report is thorough and comprehensive and, as discussed in more detail in
this Review Report, an excellent document in all respects. However, the summary of the ASIA in the
KLC Overview document is inadequate and does not include all relevant highlights. It should be
more carefully rewritten. Also, the SSIMP does not correctly and adequately incorporate the
strategic findings and recommendations of the ASIA.
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Acronyms The ASIA Aboriginal Social Impact Assessment (Volume 3 Aboriginal Social Impact
Assessment Report)
EPBC Act Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999
FIFO Fly in fly out
IFPIC Indigenous Free and Prior Informed Consent
KLC Kimberley Land Council
LNG Liquefied Natural Gas
NTHs Native Title Holders
SAR Strategic Assessment Report (The entire set of documents and all volumes).
The SIA Social Impact Assessment (All components of Part 5 Social Assessment)
SIMP Social Impact Management Plan
The SSIMP Strategic Social Impact Management Plan (Volume 3, Part 5)
STIs Sexually Transmitted Infections
TOR Terms of Reference
UNDRIP United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
Background In February 2008 an agreement between the Australian and the Western Australian Governments
was signed under the Strategic Assessment provisions of the Environment Protection and
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (the EPBC Act) relating to the selection and management of a site
for a common-user liquefied natural gas (LNG) precinct to service the Browse Basin gas reserves off
the Kimberley coast, Western Australia. Following a comprehensive site selection process, James
Price Point, located some sixty kilometres north of Broome, was selected as the most suitable site to
undergo a full assessment. This Peer Review does not include the site selection methodology or
process.
Under the EPBC Act, the strategic assessment agreement provides direction for the development of
a Strategic Assessment Report (“the SAR”) and Plan. The Minister is required to take into
consideration any relevant social and economic impacts resulting from the development.
In concert with the public review process, the Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water,
Population and Communities engaged Dr Annie Holden of ImpaxSIA Consulting to undertake an
independent expert peer review of the Social Impact Assessment components of the Draft Browse
Basin LNG Precinct Strategic Assessment. In undertaking the Review Dr Holden was required to
review the Draft Strategic Assessment Report as well as peruse relevant associated background
reports.
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Dr Annie Holden is an Adjunct Associate Professor at Southern Cross University and has undertaken
over thirty social impact assessments over the past nearly twenty years across Australia. She has
taught in universities and published in social impact assessment methods and purpose. Annie
Holden manages the consulting firm ImpaxSIA Consulting which is Australia’s only dedicated social
impact assessment consultancy firm. Annie has drawn on her experiences of similar development
projects in this review. Over her extended career Annie has interviewed literally thousands of
stakeholders, supervisors, community members, service providers, government officers, company
representatives and others who have experience and concerns and aspirations in relation to
development projects. It is important to note that the potential negative social impacts on sectors
of host communities (as discussed below) associated with the presence of large construction crews
are not well researched or documented. Although there is a good deal of evidence to suggest there
are significant social impact issues requiring prudent and proactive management, the evidence at
this stage is principally anecdotal.
The potential social impacts associated with the Project were assessed separately for Indigenous
and non-Indigenous communities-of-interest. The West Australian Government project managed
and authored the non-Indigenous social impact assessment (“the SIA”), while the Indigenous
impacts were assessed and reported on by the Kimberley Land Council (“the ASIA”). Both Reports
are the subject of this review.
Best Practice SIA Methodology Social Impact Assessment is a rapidly evolving discipline and even in the last decade has changed
significantly, and continues to change, with regard to what is commonly regarded as best practice.
Australia, however, is at the leading edge of world best practice social impact assessment. The
changes in SIA methods and practice are largely a reflection of changes to the role of SIA. Whereas
in many quarters it was traditionally regarded as a desk top activity which was largely the purvey of
social planners, SIA has increasingly taken on a wider role as a tool for democracy – a way to bring
forward voices from the margins into decision-making processes. For this reason social impact
assessment increasingly relies less on demographic projections and estimates of demands on
services and more on community consultation as its basic methodology and in particular in ensuring
that project benefits are available to all parties, or that at least those likely to be disadvantaged by
the project are to be compensated. So social impact assessment is principally now about social
justice.
The International Association for Impact Assessment (IAIA) has spent many years compiling best
practice principals and methods and the author has been involved in the development of these.
These are constantly changing and improving. These principles are attached at Appendix One and
are the reference point against which the SIA and ASIA documents are reviewed here.
It is noted that Dr Nick Taylor of Taylor Baines and Associates, who is a highly regarded social impact
assessment specialist, provided peer review to earlier iterations of the SIA. Dr Taylor’s December
2010 peer review report made particular reference to demographic profiling issues. His report also
notes correctly that “there is no single document that defines *best+ practice” (pp2).
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Separate Indigenous and mainstream SIA processes On another point, Dr Taylor’s peer review does raise concern that there could be an “unnecessary
overlap between the two assessments [the SIA and the ASIA] or, more importantly, some aspects
falling between the cracks” (7.3) and he suggests that “For future strategic assessments a shared
scoping of issues would help in defining more clearly the role of an ASIA versus a full SIA and
enhance integration of the two.” (7.3). Dr Taylor also states, however, that he did not have the
opportunity to view the ASIA as it was not available at the time he wrote his report.
While it might be possible that in future an ASIA team and an SIA team could more closely and
regularly brief one another on relevant issues, findings and methods as they progress, mainstream
SIAs and Indigenous SIAs in the Australian context are fundamentally different processes, have
different purposes (the latter ideally being the basis for negotiation of agreements), are undertaken
under different governance arrangements and for different audiences and usually end up dealing
with qualitatively different issues. If each is undertaken according to best practice there will be
nothing falling between the cracks, and overlap is not a concern since Indigenous and non-
Indigenous communities rarely respond and are rarely impacted in exactly the same way by the
same event. Furthermore, aligning the consideration and management/mitigation of impacts on
Indigenous communities with that of impacts on non-Indigenous communities regularly sees
Indigenous stakeholders being marginalized. Therefore, it is my view that the approach used in this
instance, where the SIA and ASIA were separate parallel projects, would continue to be the ideal,
and Dr Taylor’s proposal to make the KLC only one of a number of stakeholders in a proposed
Regional SIA Reference Group (7.6) would be very detrimental to the interests of Indigenous
stakeholders in the region.
Having said this, it is the case that the SIA does not adequately address issues relevant to Indigenous
members of the Broome community, in their capacity as community members. Indigenous youth,
and women and girls, both Indigenous and non-Indigenous, in particular, appear to have no voice in
the SIA and this is not explained by the KLC having responsibility for the ASIA. This is discussed
further below.
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Summary Findings as per the TORS
TOR Review Finding
Ensure that each component of the SIA and ASIA has been developed in accordance with best practice standards. This will include an analysis of consistency and logical flow between SIA objectives, methods, results, conclusions and any summary documents.
The SIA is weak and does not comply with the International Principles for SIA as attached at Appendix 1. The SIA is consistent and there is a logical flow, however, major flaws relate to lack of innovation, failure to fully explore social vulnerabilities, failure to provide a voice to vulnerable community members, under-estimation of the potential negative social impacts of the construction workforce, bias towards service provision and the SSIMP is not robust. The ASIA is an excellent document and sets a new standard for Indigenous social impact assessment in Australia.
Explore whether the SIA and ASIA have fulfilled required criteria under the Agreement and Terms of Reference.
The criteria are very broad and have been addressed in full by both the SIA and the ASIA.
Explore whether the findings of the SIA and ASIA have been adequately considered in the SAR
The findings appear to have been adequately considered in the SAR, with some minor omissions as noted in the Review. The key issue is, however, that the SAR can only be as good as the SIA, and the SIA is weak and flawed.
Provide recommendations for improvement if required.
Improvements are required and recommendations for these provided at the end of this Review.
Terms of Reference The Peer Review is to consider the following:
1. Ensure that each component of the SIA and ASIA have been developed in accordance with
best practice standards. This will include an analysis of consistency and logical flow between
SIA objectives, methods, results, conclusions and any summary documents;
2. Explore whether the SIA and ASIA have fulfilled required criteria under the Agreement and
Terms of Reference;
3. Explore whether the findings of the SIA and ASIA have been adequately considered in the
SAR; and
4. Provide recommendations for improvement if required.
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It should be noted that the reviewer was not required to audit the findings of the social impact
assessments for non-Indigenous or Indigenous communities but to conduct a desktop review only.
Therefore the reviewed documents are assumed to accurately represent the views of those they
purport to have consulted and that the data presented in the documents are complete and
accurate.
The following table gives the structure of the reports. Those highlighted in blue are the documents
reviewed.
Part 1 Executive Summary
Part 2
Strategic Assessment Process, including Site Selection, Facilities Description and Consultation Process
Part 3 Environmental Assessment - Marine Impacts
Part 4 Environmental Assessment - Terrestrial Impacts
Part 5 Social Assessment
Section 1 Introduction
Section 2 Strategic Social Impact Assessment
Volume 1 Scope and Profile
Volume 2 Assessment of Impacts and Specialist Studies
Tourism Impact Assessment
Fishing, Pearling and Aquaculture Impact Study
Infrastructure Assessment
Volume 3 Strategic Social Management Plans
Section 3 Strategic Indigenous Social Impact Assessment
Volume 1 Overview and consolidated recommendations
Volume 2 Report on Traditional Owner Consent and Indigenous Community Consultation
Volume 3 Aboriginal Social Impact Assessment Report
Volume 4 Heritage Impact Assessment Report
Volume 5 Aboriginal Archaeological Site Avoidance Survey
Volume 6 Ethno biology Studies Report
Section 4 Direct Social Surrounds and Socio-economic factors
Section 5 Strategic Social Impact Management Plan
Part 6
Commonwealth Matters including Precinct Plan and Matters of National Environmental and Social Significance
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Methodologies
The methodology employed for the SIA, as outlined in Part 2, Sections 8 and 9, is an acceptable
social impact assessment methodology. That is, the methodology required that the issues be
scoped, stakeholders mapped, an extensive consultation campaign undertaken, technical studies in
key areas commissioned, scenario-building undertaken, risks associated with identified potential
impacts rated, additional opportunities for community feedback and input created, and so forth.
However, an assessment is only as good as the “assessor” and the assessor in this instance appears
to have a clear bias towards planning of government services and industry support. Some parts of
the SIA and SAR are very strong, for example, the industry studies and the infrastructure studies,
but I am of the view that the SIA has failed to reach the heart of issues of vulnerability and
marginalization.
The ASIA methodology is excellent and has been comprehensively undertaken. Contrasting the
characteristics, principles, methods and parameters of the ASIA against the IAIA best practice
standards and methods, the ASIA is a good model of a quality example of what was intended by
these guidelines.
Mapping of stakeholders
A perusal of the stakeholder list suggests that while generally stakeholders were adequately
mapped, Indigenous persons who are not Native Title holders do not appear to have been
recognised as a distinct stakeholder group resident in Broome having specific vulnerabilities. While
the ASIA Report does make reference to this group (Chap 2, Page 49), this community sector
needed to be acknowledged and incorporated into the SIA assessment. Social Impact Assessment
needs to take into account power relations and gender relations in communities. While Indigenous
people are empowered through the ASIA, (leaving aside empowerment issues dealt with specifically
in the ASIA), the notion of empowerment and disempowerment itself is not adequately directly
tackled in the SIA.
Similarly, I do not feel that women and girls have been offered a real voice in this SIA Report, other
than through advocacy by service providers and, even here, concerns raised by health professionals
do not appear to have been taken seriously enough. This is discussed in more detail below. There is
an apparent lack of community engagement strategies targeting members of this group, although
there appeared to be numerous other opportunities and avenues for all other stakeholders to have
input.
Use of existing evidence base
It is not evident that enough research was undertaken on the experience of other communities
associated with similar projects, or that these learnings were shared with the relevant stakeholders
so that they might reflect on whether their community was likely to have similar issues. There is
very little documented research on the social impacts of mining on communities that addresses the
risks and such research therefore needed to be primary research (for example, trips to Wadeye and
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Gove to speak with women and community leaders in those communities on their experiences, an
attempt to access the mid-term review of the social impacts of the Blacktip LNG plant
construction). There is no mention of having undertaken any primary research, other than the
report authored by Pollard (discussed again below).
Furthermore, the evidence that was identified by the SIA team does not appear to have been
shared with those likely to be affected. For example, were the findings of Pollard’s report shared
and debated with relevant stakeholders? Given that the affected communities have limited
experience of a project of this type and of this magnitude, it would be important for them to have
information from other communities about perceived and real impacts associated with this kind of
development.
The issue of an evidence-base is a vexed one because there is surprisingly little research that I am
aware of that can provide hard evidence on the impact of construction forces in particular on host
communities. Throughout the years I have interviewed literally hundreds of police, service
providers, hospitals and health services, women’s groups, women’s rape crisis centres and women
and girls and spoken at length to PhD researchers and other consultants working in remote and
rural communities and around mining projects. Based on this anecdotal evidence I am confident
that the impacts of the presence of large construction workforces on host communities are
seriously under-estimated. The reasons for the lack of research and almost invisibility of these
impacts are:
Sexual assault often happens in private spaces or in dark public places without witnesses.
Often there are drugs or alcohol involved or illegal activities associated with assault.
Shame and fear and an expectation that there will not be any support means that women
do not formally report their experiences.
Jealousy of partners, anger of families, and blame mean women continue to keep these
things quiet.
Inability to deal with the issues, even if they were acknowledged, means that proponents
and government service providers choose to downplay or ignore them.
The relative marginalisation of women and girl’s voices.
An assumption that it is not possible to conduct this kind of research.
A belief that it is only a minor issue and therefore not worthy of attracting a research
investment.
The recent revelations of the sexual assaults and activities that some football teams appear to
embark on is shining some light on some of the unseen behaviours of young men. Some elements
of large male construction forces, fuelled by alcohol, long working hours and the heat, are
reportedly a good match for these footballers. The Browse precinct development provides an
opportunity to undertake some quality research on the impacts of construction workforces on host
communities.
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Social Risks not adequately addressed in the SIA and SSIMP
The SSIM Plan groups impacts as follows:
1. Economic Impacts 2. Demand for Land and Housing 3. Infrastructure, Social Services and Health 4. Education, Training and Employment 5. Sport, Tourism and Recreation 6. Police, Justice, Social Needs and Services 7. Community Identity and Sense of Place 8. Social Mix and Values Conflict (Part 5 Social Assessment Vol 2: Strategic Social Impact
Management Plan, Page 4)
In this grouping, concerns raised by professionals, and experience of these types of impacts of a
predominately male itinerant workforce consisting of large numbers of single persons, are buried
amongst other concerns under the heading of Police, Justice, Social Needs and Services, that are
related, such as social mix and values conflict, but are not the same. The authors identify three
“significant issues” – high natural population growth, lack of current service capacity and social and
land management issues of importance to Traditional Owners.
There is a failure here to note the following significant issues:
1. Indigenous persons who are not members of the Traditional Owner group and are resident
in non-Indigenous communities constitute a highly vulnerable population group and need to
be more clearly identified as a distinct community-of-interest requiring specific
management strategies to ensure they benefit from the Project and are not
disproportionately marginalised or further disadvantaged.
2. The impacts of construction need to be dealt with as a separate significant issue to all other
potential impacts. (As discussed above).
3. The potential for some sectors of the existing community to pay a disproportionately high
cost for the development while others not currently resident (and who, indeed, may never
reside in the locality) benefit.
With reference to the third point, Part 5 Social Assessment Volume 1, Scope and Profile (page 70),
notes that individuals in the vicinity of the Project already earn on average only 90% of average
earnings of other West Australians. On the other hand, it is known that construction jobs and
operational jobs associated with projects such as this pay well. Fundamentally, poverty is a relative
measure. As those around us become more wealthy, we feel more poor, even when our own
absolute income and buying power remains the same. The prospect of current residents of Broome
and other impacted communities perceiving themselves as relatively poorer than workers
associated with the projects (even leaving aside increased land and housing costs, or higher rents)
is a potential negative impact. A sense of marginalization and alienation, frustration and
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resentment can build followed by a sense of grief and loss. The SSIMP addresses this issue through
highlighting the need to maximise local procurement and to maximise training and employment
opportunities for local residents. The SSIMP fails to recognise the issue as significant and to
describe more fully in the Report the likely impact of failing to provide targeted support to
marginalized sectors of the local population to participate in the benefits.
Furthermore, the SIA and SSIMP are not underpinned by the Precautionary Principal which requires
that potential social risks where evidence is not available to confirm, should be treated as real risks
and managed as such, until such time as evidence is available to confirm or refute the identified
risk. In the absence of enough research on negative social impacts relating to the construction
workforce as discussed in this review, concerns based on anecdotal evidence should be treated as
real concerns until evidence is provided to refute these concerns.
Social impacts of FIFO workers
The social impacts on the families of FIFO workers living outside the region are mentioned but not
addressed.
Separate out impacts of construction from impacts once operational
While generally speaking the SIA report as it stands is well written and well structured, it would be
preferable for the impacts during the construction phase to be dealt with separately to the
anticipated impacts once the project is operational. This is a major flaw in the report.
While the assessment acknowledges that there are differences between the two project phases,
the implications of this are not drawn out adequately. The estimates are that the construction
workforce is likely to be around 6,000 while the operational workforce is likely to be 500 to 750
(page 2-15 SAR Part 5). Mitigating the potential negative impacts, preparing for and strategizing
around taking up opportunities and managing the ongoing impacts will require different resources,
different governance arrangements, the nature and magnitude of the impacts will be different and
different sectors of the population will be impacted in various ways during the construction phase
as compared with the operational phase.
These differences are not just nuances but significant. In this instance, the SSIMP could also better
identify management and mitigation strategies and principles for the construction phase as a
separate exercise for the operational phase. In particular the monitoring regime for the
construction phase needs to be of an entirely different order to that for the operational phases.
For example, the report identifies the following areas of vulnerability: housing, community identity
and sense of place, development, cost of living and community well-being. Each of these areas has
different issues depending upon whether the project is in construction or operational phase.
Taking community well-being for instance, 6,000 predominately young male workers on a site for a
short period of time will require dramatically different policies and resources to manage them
effectively and prevent harm than will managing the potential impacts on community well-being of
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long-term permanent workers, many with families. Similarly, the proponent has a greater
responsibility for management of a construction workforce and its impacts than it does for longer
term permanent employees and their families, for whom local governments might be expected to
assume a greater responsibility.
Accordingly, the proponent might partly manage the potential negative social impacts of a 6,000
construction workforce by requiring its contractors to actively recruit females to aim for a better
gender balance. However, an entirely different recruitment strategy might be needed to optimize
outcomes for the operational phase.
Under-estimation of the potential negative social impacts of the construction workforce
The Assessment, Report and SSIMP need to be amended to address the additional significant risks
associated with a large construction force. The risks described below are less apparent with an
operational workforce, first because it is significantly smaller, but also because the construction
workforce represents a sudden shock to a community when the numbers build rapidly from zero to
six thousand over a matter of months. It is more challenging for a community to respond to this
sudden impact than it is for a community to respond to a more gradual build up of a workforce who
intends to stay longer. An operational workforce has a greater stake in a smooth transition,
whereas an operational workforce is there for a short period of time and has less investment in
seeking community acceptance and modifying its own behaviour to meet community concerns.
Appropriate, experienced professional input and research need to be brought to the assessment
and there needs to be clearer articulation of issues such as:
Impact on gender relations within the existing community. For example, jealousy by
men and boys in the host community of project workers who are better paid and with
greater access to resources such as vehicles, drugs and alcohol and provide competition
for available women. Anecdotal evidence suggests men and boys become more vigilant
of their girlfriends with a resulting increase in domestic violence. Also, there have been
reports that men and boys move towards younger women and girls as the women and
girls in their own age group start to take up association with workers. Increase sexual
assault as reported by sexual assault services but not reported to the Police. These
issues are commonly overlooked because they usually occur after dark, in private spaces
or in hidden public spaces.
Increased prostitution both formal and informal. Increased pregnancies and STIs.
Greater risk of drug trafficking and increased alcohol-related issues, including increased
traffic accidents. For example, a number of deaths have occurred on the road from
Wadeye to Darwin involving contractors working on the construction of the LNG plant at
Blacktip including an Indigenous man being run over by a contractor driving after dark,
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despite strict instructions that contractors were not supposed to bring in vehicles to the
plant and were not supposed to drive after dark.
This list is not comprehensive, but illustrative only.
It is noted that while some of the professionals consulted did raise some of these concerns:
“Participants at the Health Workshop were apprehensive about an increase in informal prostitution
by some of Broome’s existing younger residents…. *and+ raised fears of increase in the level of STI
transmissions.” (Section 9.2.2 of Volume 2) But it is evident that their concerns were not taken
seriously enough. The SIA report responds by stating that “measures are expected to be put in
place which will control access into and out of the accommodation camp” and they expect this to
manage the potential problem. However, my experience from what mining companies around
Australia have told me is that that controlling access to and from camps is very difficult. Most
workers are likely to pose little risk to host communities, there is a percentage who can be anti-
social and looking to “party”. Intent on exploring their surrounds, locating drugs if they are
recreational drug users, and looking for entertainment to break up an otherwise monotonous
working break, controlled their movements is not easy to maintain.
The same participants also raised concerns about “members of workforce who ‘took breaks’ in
Broome and caused havoc in the town specifically in relation to public intoxication, sexual assault
and harassment”. The Report’s response of “this impact is likely to remain for incoming
independent contractors who service the Precinct or workers who choose to remain in Broome for
their recreational leave” is manifestly inadequate. It is noted that these concerns did not make
their way into the summary of issues listed above.
The SIA makes reference to a previous FIFO in Broome case study undertaken by Pollard (1990). In
that instance 50 to 60 people relocated to Broome which had a population at the time of 7500.
Despite noting that at the time “the hospital identified an increase in the number of outpatients on
the Saturday morning after the shift changeover” the SIA does not then take this finding and
extrapolate the implications for a workforce of 6,000 with possibly 600 being temporarily
accommodated in Broome.
In the absence of documentation of social impacts of construction workforces on host
communities, the Precautionary Principle must apply. This means that where there is any possibility
of such potential negative impacts, policy makers need to develop management and mitigation
strategies to prevent such negative social impacts even without hard evidence of their likelihood. If
there is any suggestion that the types of scenarios I have described above are alarmist, I can state
that these impacts have been described to me repeatedly by service providers, community
members, women’s groups and girls over the past twenty years in the Pilbara, Darwin, Alice
Springs, Catherine, Weipa, Nhulunbuy and other smaller communities across Australia where the
community has hosted or been adjacent to large construction projects where good mitigation and
management were not implemented or failed.
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Anecdotal evidence is the only evidence that I am currently aware of, and perhaps consideration
could be given to funding post graduate research, for example, by funding one or more PhD
scholarships, to undertake research of the impacts on the margins of large itinerant construction
workforces arriving in the vicinity of small host communities.
Bias towards services planning and government
The SIA demonstrates a bias towards the potential impacts of the project on services and the
capacity of services to deal with additional demands upon them. It is very difficult to find the voices
of those sectors of the community with the potential to be marginalized or negatively impacted by
this project. In this sense, the SIA is an older style methodological approach and does not represent
best practice.
The SIA also seems to assume that the existing social services in nature are appropriate and that it
is only the issue of capacity that needs to be assessed. New types of services with different models
of intervention will be required to meet the new demands of the potential impacts of the
development of the project, if they are to be met.
Into the future, governance and transparency will be crucial to an equitable development, yet again
there is a heavy bias in proposed governance arrangements towards service providers as
stakeholders. Accountability for successfully managing impacts is best provided independently and
an independent body to monitor and report on ongoing social impacts and the efficacy of social
management will be important. The ASIA recommendations in regard to social monitoring relate to
this also.
Strategic Social Impact Management Plan
It is acknowledged that the strategic nature of the SIA restricts the SSIMP to providing a strategic
framework only and that more detailed strategies would be developed once there is greater
certainty in relation to development. Nevertheless, unless the SSIMP is robust any SIMPs that might
follow will not succeed in maximizing opportunities and mitigating potential negative impacts.
Because of the scale of the project, both the risks and opportunities are significant, and given the
relative vulnerability of some community members, and in particular, Indigenous people in the
region, the vulnerabilities are potentially serious.
First and foremost, social impact assessment is about social justice. This assessment is heavily
weighted towards planning of services and its findings and recommendations reflect this. The
Strategic Social Impact Management Plan (SSIMP) needs to capture the principal of social justice and
equity as a guiding principal. Research has demonstrated that local people frequently pay the costs
of development while individuals and corporations from outside the region and governments share
disproportionately in the benefits. This SIA has not embraced this premise and it is reflected in the
skewed assessment and the absence of social justice as an explicit guiding principle in the SIA and
flowing through to the SSIMP.
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The following comments are specific to relevant strategies (where suggestions are made, these are
by way of illustration and not meant to be exhaustive):
1. In relation to 6.1 Managed-access construction camp – the proposed measure is not appropriate
as it does not distinguish between Broome and regional residents who have successfully
obtained employment at the project and those who have migrated in because of the project.
More appropriate monitoring measures would be, for example:
a. Survey workers on a regular basis in order to monitor the number of workers who
recreate locally.
b. Fund a police liaison officer position to monitor and report on disturbances, including
sexual assault, assaults, drunkenness, purchase and/or supply of drugs and car accidents
involving construction workers.
c. Fund a part-time position at the local hospital to collect data and report on incidences of
STI amongst vulnerable populations (young girls, Indigenous and non-Indigenous) and
anecdotal stories of incidences of sexual assault (both reported to the Police and those
not reported).
d. Fund a youth worker to monitor anecdotes of girls partying or obtaining alcohol or drugs
from workers and young males in Broome and the region displaying resentment towards
construction workers.
These are examples only. There are many other potential measures and investments in resources
needed to monitor and potentially manage direct impacts.
2. Similarly in relation to 6.1 – it is unrealistic to think that either the proponent or local
governments will be able to stop workers recreating in Broome and other regions. A more
realistic and effective strategy would be to do the following:
a. Maximise local employment
b. Encourage gender balance in the FIFO workforce
c. Create disincentives for workers to recreate locally – eg require them as a condition of
employment that on breaks they must fly to the location from which they were
recruited (eg a Perth worker must return to Perth on the company jet and sign off on
arrival at Perth in order to be eligible for payment for the work period)
d. Establish formal arrangements with tour operators (preferencing Indigenous operators
or joint venturers) to provide recreational opportunities for workers in a managed and
regulated way.
e. Impound cars being driven to site and insist that workers use FIFO travel options only.
These or something similar should not be left to later management plans but should be
articulated as strategic objectives and policies in the SSIMP.
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3. In relation to 6.2 – the aim should be to isolate the construction workforce to the extent
possible and the priority should be on closely regulating interactions. The proponent acting as
an intermediary is the only way in which local recreation, fishing and tour operators can enjoy
low risk benefits. These should principles established in the SSIMP.
4. In relation to 6.3 – “a Register of feedback from community email or hotline” is an entirely
inadequate measure to monitor access to and use of drugs, alcohol and dangerous behaviour by
construction workers. The SSIMP needs to establish a clear strategic principle – for example,
“Management policies and strategies will be put in place to ensure:
a. There is no opportunity created for construction workers to share alcohol or drugs with
local youth.
b. Workers will not be able to purchase drugs from local suppliers.
c. Workers will only have restricted access to alcohol during work periods.
d. These are examples only.
5. Given the vulnerabilities of the potentially impacted local communities, particularly the
Indigenous communities, and the magnitude of the projected construction workforce/s, 6.4 as a
strategy would be a disaster. Rather, the position of the SSIMP should be that the proponent
must provide adequate accommodation on-site for all its construction workforce – in other
words a strict policy of isolation of the work-force and insulation of the potentially affected
communities is justified during the construction phase/s of this project/s. The proposal that
“initially, there may be a small impact on accommodation during the pioneer stage of the
project as some workers may need to be accommodated in Broome while camp accommodation
is being constructed” (Volume 1, Page 14) seriously underestimates the potential social
negatives of this strategy and focuses naively on accommodation as the only area of impact.
6. In relation to 6.6 and 6.7, time is of the essence because of the long lead times involved in
upskilling local workforces. Therefore, this strategy should include a timing metric – for
example, “Within one month of the investment decision to proceed, the Australian government
will commence implementing its training and development plan.”
7. In relation to 6.8 – it is good that this potential issue has been identified and will be managed.
Workers and families simply “arriving” in a town looking for work is common and creates
problems when there are not adequate housing or services or facilities (or suitable jobs) for
these workers. There is a need to establish a strategic principle in relation to this group – eg are
they to be encouraged or discouraged? It is also noted, as discussed above, that the
management strategy is skewed towards service provision and does not adequately deal with
the secondary impacts of the presence of this group in terms of marginalization of members of
the host community.
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8. It is noted that the SSIMP contains a local procurement strategy, a transport strategy, an
Indigenous employment strategy, sense of place strategy, housing strategy, West Kimberley
socio-economic development strategy and other responses, all of which are well set out.
9. Given that this is a strategic social impact assessment, high level principles should be identified.
As examples, the Precautionary Principle should apply, as should the Principle that all sectors of
the impacted community should benefit in some way and ensuring that some sectors do not pay
a greater cost while others benefit. Other strategic principles relevant to this situation need to
be identified.
Data sharing
The Social Monitoring SSIMP component is inadequate, as discussed elsewhere in this Review. In particular it fails to pick up on a point made in the ASIA that
“Another limitation involved the reluctance of some organisations to assist the ASIA by
providing access to relevant baseline data … despite repeated written and oral requests,
declined to assist the ASIA… a small percentage of (predominately non-Indigenous) agencies
refused to engage with the ASIA because of personal views of the staff concerned regarding
the proposed LNG Precinct.” (Chap 1: Page 39).
This has been my experience also, that Government agencies are not willing to share data with a
private consultant compiling a base line data set. For example, I was forced to re-do a housing
survey in Wadeye to establish housing density in a recent SIA in that community for the LNG Plant,
despite the fact that the relevant NT Government Department had only recently conducted such a
study. Similarly, I have struggled to extract crime data, for example, from Police Services, despite
writing letters to the Senior Officers involved. The SSIMP should make statutory provision for the
sharing of information by Government agencies for legitimate purposes such as social monitoring of
impacts.
Capacity to respond
In any impact assessment, an important component of the assessment is to assess the capacity of
the affected communities and individuals to respond. For example in the recent floods in Brisbane,
we saw that some businesses were open for business as soon as the floodwaters receded and were
fully operational again within months, whereas some other businesses have never re-opened. This
is evidence that the first group of businesses had a capacity to respond to the impact of the floods,
either because they had more financial and practical resources, or because they were better able to
get help, or they were less psychologically damaged by the experience, or whatever the source of
their resilience might be.
In relation to a project such as the LNG precinct, those who have a greater capacity to respond are
better able to recognize an opportunity and act to take it up. Others with less capacity to respond
may be already experiencing a negative affect (for example such as marginalization) and find that
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the project compounds this disempowerment. These individuals have less capacity to respond to
the risk of marginalization than does another individual, for perhaps a variety of reasons.
Accordingly, identifying the capacity to respond of a potentially impacted community or sectors of
the community and looking at ways of enhancing their capacity to respond is an important outcome
for a quality social impact assessment.
The issue of capacity to respond does not appear to have been directly addressed in the SIA, and
consequently neither has the issue of ways to capacity-build and strengthen the capacity to respond
been directly addressed, although there are some capacity-building issues discussed in particular in
the industry reports. An assessment of the capacity to respond would normally take into account
some measures of social capital, or certainly some discussion of governance in the area. Political
efficacy, available resources and characteristics of the affected populations that would enhance or
undermine their capacity to respond is not addressed in the SIA. (It is noted that the ASIA addresses
capacity-building of local and regional organisations and in Volume 3, Chapter 4 also addresses the
capacity of policy-makers to respond). Building the capacity to respond should be included as a
policy imperative of the SSIMP at the very least.
Ironically, the SIA Volume 1 at page 113 includes a Table A.1 Social Impact Assessment Variables,
which lists, among others, Political and Social Resources such as Leadership capability and
characteristics, and a range of variables relating to Individual and Family Level Impacts such as Trust
in political and social institutions. I am unable to find where in the report these have been
described and assessed.
The Governance arrangement at Annexure C is heavily skewed towards government agencies and
needs to include independent specialist expertise.
Monitoring Regime
A “monitoring regime” refers to the entire package of identified indicators, governance, reporting,
determination of what is to be monitored, how it is to be monitored, how it will be resourced (both
in terms of expertise as well as finance), how stakeholders will be selected and participate and all
other aspects relating to ongoing monitoring of impacts.
The monitoring regime proposed by the SIA is weak. The failure to come to grips with what
constitutes a robust monitoring regime and the necessity for one to be in place is reflected in the
weak SSIMP, as discussed above. The proposed monitoring regime needs to be strengthened, for
example through the establishment of a relationship with a Cooperative Research Centre, or funding
of a PhD scholarship, or other means to bring specialist expertise in to the mix in an ongoing way.
The proposal of an independent authority to monitor and report on impacts proposed in the ASIA is
an excellent suggestion as it will ensure that governance of the social impact monitoring is
independent, transparent and accountable.
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KLC Overview and Consolidated Recommendations
Volume One identified a range of Overarching Themes and Issues. Given that this Volume purports
to be an Overview, it would be helpful if it were written on the assumption that readers may only
read this Volume, in which case, the authors should summarise the findings and provide illustrations
of these. For example, dot point One is self-evident, but dot point Two is indirectly referencing a
number of key events that adversely affected the consultation and agreement-making process. The
authors should summarise these briefly in order to ground this dot point in actual events. Otherwise
readers may simply believe that these are statements merely of general principle.
On Page 6, dot point Three states that there is a need for fundamental change in approach by
Governments and companies to avoid negative impacts. It would be helpful, since this is a summary,
if the concrete changes that are needed can also be summarised as part of this Overview (see
comments on Volume 2 below). Similarly, dot point Four calls for the principles of respect for IFPIC
and for Traditional Owners and their cultural and social values. The point needs to be made that the
evaluation demonstrates that these principles have not always been met in the events to date.
On page 7, dot point Six argues that areas of impact cannot be identified in an “arbitrary” way. It
would be better to remove the word “arbitrary” with another word, such as “European”. It might be
more accurate to state that areas of impact cannot be identified without reference to the way in
which Indigenous landowners view their land. Same page, dot point Seven, it is assumed that the
authors mean here that appropriately-resourced “indigenous” institutional arrangements be
created.
KLC Volume 2 Traditional Owner Consent and Indigenous Community Consultation
Volume Two addressed the question of whether the Traditional Owners had given information
consent in a culturally appropriate manner and provided details of consultations about the proposal.
First, the authors correctly identify the principle of Indigenous Prior Informed Consent (IFPIC) as the
measure against which the Traditional Owner Consent and Indigenous Community Consultation
process should be evaluated. IFPIC is a specific right for Indigenous Peoples as recognised in the
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).
The key findings of Volume Two are provided on pages 7 to 10. While overall the Report is very
clear, and the conclusions that it draws supported by evidence throughout the body of the Report, it
would be helpful if dot point 7 on page 10 could be elaborated upon. Specifically, the authors state
that “without a change in State Government policy, any influence [the native title holders] wield
through the ILUA negotiations will not constitute an ability to provide or withhold their consent in a
manner consistent with the principle of IFPIC.” The Report has clearly established that the lack of
information, for example on land height above sea level and water depth along the Kimberley Coast
(p 35), the threat of compulsory acquisition forced a pressured and truncated and at times culturally
inappropriate negotiation process, and the compulsory acquisition of land for the proposed LNG
precinct, unequivocally disqualified the consent process from being one that is consistent with the
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principle of Indigenous Free and Prior Informed Consent (IFPIC). However, it would be helpful if the
authors could articulate the concrete Government policy changes that they consider are needed to
equip the Native Title Holders (NTHs) with the necessary influence for the future.
Similarly, the authors state that “the outcome of the Strategic Assessment process … will be an
important measure of the efficacy of consultations.” It would be helpful if the authors were more
concrete on exactly how the outcomes will measure efficacy of consultations with affected
Indigenous people. For example, it seems that the nature of management arrangements that are
eventually put in place might be one measure of the efficacy. It is presumed this means the extent
to which Indigenous people have decision-making power over management strategies and resources
is one measure of a good outcome. The tone is a little too polemical since in this instance concrete
outcomes that will indicate genuine efficacy need to be articulated.
In relation to the consultation process described in the Report that was undertaken by the KLC,
while this appears to meet world’s best practice, it is noted that it is the KLC reporting on its own
undertakings so we can only rely on what the KLC’s own consultants have reported. We understand
that there are some Traditional Owners who object to the project and who are critical of the KLC’s
consultation methods and methods for obtaining instructions. While it is problematic that it is the
KLC itself reporting on its own performance in relation to these matters, it is also the case that there
are legal processes available to these Traditional Owners through which their concerns can be
explored and if found to be with basis, able to be rectified.
The KLC arranged a number of consultative structures including the Traditional Owner Task Force
and a Senior Leadership Group. It allowed the Traditional Owners themselves to drive the design of
the consultation program and representative structures arising out of those. This represents world’s
best practice in engaging with Indigenous people. As outlined in Appendix 2, the KLC arranged a
number of opportunities for stakeholders to receive information in a variety of ways, participate in
discussion and feed into decision-making over an extended period of time from December 2007 to
December 2008. A perusal of the detailed description of the reasons for consulting in the manner
that it did illustrates appropriate and rigorous consultation methods. For example holding seven
different meetings with different ‘cultural blocs’ demonstrated sensitivity to the way in which
Indigenous people self-identify and prefer to be consulted. The discussion on page 29 describes
flexibility in delivery of information by the KLC and the organisation of consultation events in
response to different requirements of different groups, again demonstrating that it allowed those
being consulted to drive the design.
KLC Matrix of Impacts, Risks and Recommended Management Responses
Overall, the KLC ASIA and management strategies and recommendations are innovative,
comprehensive, well thought through and pertinent. Without rewriting the Matrix, there are some
minor suggestions that I have to add:
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1. The first recommendation should be rewritten to be more explicit about how this would be
demonstrated. It errs on the side of sounding polemical and needs a more substantive
recommendation.
2. I realize that this is difficult, but similarly Recommendations 2 and 3 and the desired outcomes
are too vague. Is there an objective measure by which we would know if this outcome has been
met?
3. Recommendation 3 is an excellent recommendation and should be extended to the mainstream
SIA also.
4. Recommendation 16 could possibly be strengthened to allow for Indigenous Traditional Owners
to sign off on any plans, assuming there are no other considerations that are pertinent. It could
also be strengthened by requiring the design and implementation of a Communications Strategy
rather than simply “inform”. This applies also to Recommendation 38.
5. Recommendation 18 is an excellent recommendation.
6. As per my comments on the SIA, while the ASIA is more cognizant of the risks associated with
addressing gender relations impacts, I would rate the risk as “high” rather than “medium”, and
while I agree with the three strategies of Recommendations 49, 50 and 51, I believe these will
only partly address the concerns and that additional strategies should be considered, including
aggressive recruitment drives for female workers with an aspirational target of minimum 20%
female employment. My experiences, and those of my colleagues with whom I have raised this
issue, is that workplaces where there is a higher percentage of women tend to be less aggressive
and have fewer behavior issues. Newmont’s Tanami operation, for example, has 17% female
employment, without any particularly conscious effort on the part of management to achieve
this target. This would suggest that 20% female representation in the workforce would be
achievable with the benefit of an aggressive recruitment drive. Women who work in
predominately male workplaces regularly report that as more women come into their
workplaces the atmosphere changes away from a “football locker room” mentality towards a
more mature and socially responsible work place.
There are already recommendations in the SIA to maximize local employment, which will also be
important.
7. In relation to Impact 28, which I am grateful has been recognised as an issue, the management
strategy of Recommendation 75 needs to be expanded – this is discussed below.
KLC ASIA – Social conflict around LNG development
One experience of the Blacktip LNG project at Wadeye was a strong resentment towards the project
because “the project always gets what it wants”. So while the Wadeye community might wait
weeks or months for something to be repaired or an essential part to be delivered, of if the
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community suffered certain shortages, their difficulties seemed exacerbated by the ease and speed
with which the construction team was able to “get whatever they needed” sometimes even on the
next plane. This created enormous resentment towards the project as the community’s own
relative poverty and the under-resourcing of local services came in to focus. Impact 28 identified by
the ASIA study picks up on this impact and it can be expected that the mainstream Broome
community may have similar perceptions and resentments. This is a matter for the proponent to
deal with but it needs to be raised in the SIA as a potential impact.
Explore whether the SIA and ASIA have fulfilled required criteria under the
Agreement and Terms of Reference.
The ASIA has fulfilled all the required criteria under the Agreement and Terms of Reference.
The SIA has also fulfilled these. To the extent that the terms of reference outline what is to be
addressed, the SIA has addressed all those requirements, but not done so consistently well, as
discussed above.
Conclusion
There is a bias in the SIA towards the planning of government services. Social impact assessment is
much more than this. SIA is a tool of democracy and a mechanism for ensuring equity in
development, including inter-generational equity and protecting the vulnerable. It is a tool for
identifying opportunities to modify a project plan. Managing impacts, either through mitigating
potential negative impacts or maximizing potential benefits, needs to be innovative and principled.
There also needs to be an appropriate governance arrangement in place.
The SIA, on the other hand, has succeeded in many important ways – it has created a
comprehensive base line data set; it identified some key communities of interest and
commissioned technical studies to deepen the understanding of relevant issues, ie the tourism
study, fishing and infrastructure studies, etc; it has completed extensive work on scenario-building
and population projections.
The ASIA fully meets these criteria and is a quality document that sets a new standard in social
impact assessment in Australia, and possibly internationally.
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Recommendations
It is recommended that the following improvements are made to the SIA:
1. Recommendation: Re-design the Strategic Social Impact Management Plan to incorporate
strategic guiding principles, including the Precautionary Principle, and be more innovative
and lateral in its approach.
2. Recommendation: In order to best manage the risks identified in this Review, more
consideration should be given to adopting a policy objective of isolating the construction
workforce and insulating the potentially affected communities, to the extent possible.
3. Recommendation: Set an aspirational target of a minimum of 20% females in the
construction workforce, requiring an aggressive recruitment drive to achieve these
numbers.
4. Recommendation: Separate out the treatment of construction impacts from operational
impacts as separate chapters both in the discussion of impacts in the SIA and in the SSIMP.
5. Recommendation: Acknowledge adequately vulnerable groups including young women and
girls and Indigenous members of the Broome community not identified as Traditional
Owners, the nature of that vulnerability, the identity and prevalence of members of those
groups resident in particular in Broome. Establish their voices more clearly.
6. Recommendation: Establish a robust social impact monitoring regime (as detailed above),
including guaranteeing access to necessary data held by Government agencies, establishing
alliances with independent academic institutions or researchers and providing appropriate
resources, and ensuring that governance of the social impact monitoring is independent,
transparent and accountable.
In relation to the ASIA
7. Recommendation: Rewrite sections of the KLC Overview document to more accurately summarise the thrust of the ASIA findings and recommendations, as discussed in this Review above.