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Impact File

Warming

Real/AnthropogenicThe scientific consensus reveals 97% of scientists say Climate Change is real and anthropogenic.Institute of Physics 13, Institute of Physics, "Scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate change." ScienceDaily. www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/05/130515203048.htm (accessed July 8, 2016).

The study is the most comprehensive yet and identified 4000 summaries , otherwise known as abstracts, from papers published in the past 21 years that stated a position on the cause of recent global warming -- 97 per cent of these endorsed the consensus that we are seeing human-made, or anthropogenic, global warming (AGW) Led by John Cook at the University of Queensland, the study has been published 16 May, in

IOP Publishing's journal Environmental Research Letters. The study went one step further, asking the authors of these papers to rate their entire paper using the same criteria. Over 2000 papers were rated and among those that

discussed the cause of recent global warming, 97 per cent endorsed the consensus that it is caused by humans. The findings are in stark contrast to the public's position on global warming; a 2012 poll* revealed that more than half of Americans either

disagree, or are unaware, that scientists overwhelmingly agree that Earth is warming because of human activity. John Cook said: "Our findings prove that there is a strong scientific agreement about the cause of climate change, despite public perceptions to the contrary." There is a gaping chasm between the actual consensus and the public perception. It's staggering given the evidence for consensus that less than half of the general public think scientists agree that humans are causing global

warming. "This is significant because when people understand that scientists agree on global warming, they're more likely to support policies that take action on it." In March 2012, the researchers used the ISI Web of Science database to search for peer-reviewed academic articles published between 1991 and 2011 using two topic searches: "global warming" and "global climate change." After limiting the selection to peer-reviewed climate science, the study considered 11 994 papers written by 29 083 authors in 1980 different scientific journals. The abstracts from these papers were randomly distributed between a team of 24 volunteers recruited through the "myth-busting" website skepticalscience.com, who used set criteria to determine the level to which the abstracts endorsed that humans are the primary cause of global warming. Each abstract was analyzed by two independent, anonymous raters. From the 11,994 papers, 32.6 per cent endorsed AGW, 66.4 per cent stated no position on AGW, 0.7 per cent rejected AGW and in 0.3 per cent of papers, the authors said the cause of global warming was uncertain. Co-author of the study Mark Richardson, from the University of Reading, said: "We want our scientists to answer questions for us, and there are lots of exciting questions in climate science.

One of them is: are we causing global warming? We found over 4000 studies written by 10 000 scientists that stated a position on this, and 97 per cent said that recent warming is mostly man made."

Climate change is real and anthropogenicGSA 15, Geological Society of America, 2015, http://www.geosociety.org/positions/position10.htm, Accessed 7-8-16

Decades of scientific research have shown that climate can change from both natural and anthropogenic causes. The Geological Society of America (GSA) concurs with assessments by the National Academies of Science (2005), the National Research Council (2011), the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2013) and the U.S. Global Change Research Program (Melillo et al., 2014) that global climate has warmed in response to increasing concentrations of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases. The concentrations of

greenhouse gases in the atmosphere are now higher than they have been for many thousands of years. Human activities (mainly

greenhouse-gas emissions) are the dominant cause of the rapid warming since the middle 1900s (IPCC, 2013). If the upward trend in greenhouse-gas concentrations continues, the projected global climate change by the end of the twenty-first century will result in significant impacts on humans and other species . The tangible effects of climate change are already occurring. Addressing the challenges posed by climate change will require a combination of adaptation to the changes that are likely to occur and global reductions of CO2 emissions from anthropogenic sources.

Not Real/AnthropogenicWarming numbers are not consistent, 17 year gap, no anthropogenic warming, models unreliableFerrara 14(Peter Ferrara, Feb. 24, 2014, Director of Entitlement and Budget Policy for the Heartland Institute, Harvard graduate, “The Period Of No Global Warming Will Soon Be Longer Than the Period of Actual Global Warming,” Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterferrara/2014/02/24/the-period-of-no-global-warming-will-soon-be-longer-than-the-period-of-actual-global-warming/2/#788d74604674) Accessed 7/8/16 BE

If you look at the record of global temperature data, you will find that the late 20th Century period of global warming actually lasted about 20 years, from the late 1970s to the late 1990s. Before that, the globe was dominated by about 30 years of global cooling, giving rise in the 1970s to media discussions of the return of the Little Ice Age (circa 1450 to 1850), or worse. But the record of satellite measurements of global atmospheric temperatures now shows no warming for at least 17 years and 5 months, from September, 1996 to January, 2014, as shown on the accompanying graphic. That is surely 17 years and 6 months now, accounting for February. When the period of no global warming began, the alarmist global warming establishment responded that even several years of temperature data does not establish a climate trend. That takes much longer. But when the period of no global warming

gets longer than the period of actual global warming, what is the climate trend then? Even worse for the theory of catastrophic, anthropogenic (human caused), global warming is that during this now extended period of no global warming mankind’s emissions of the carbon dioxide (CO2) that are supposed to be predominant in causing global warming continued to explode, with one third of all CO2 added to the atmosphere since the industrial revolution occurring during this period . The Economist magazine shocked the

global warming establishment with an article in March, 2013 that began with this lede: “OVER the past 15 years air temperatures at the Earth’s surface have been flat while greenhouse-gas emissions have continued to soar. The world added roughly 100 billion tonnes of carbon to the atmosphere between 2000 and 2010. That is about a quarter of all the CO2 put there by humanity since 1750.” That one quarter is actually now one third since the industrial revolution, which is now increasingly at stake in this debate. We are not going to be able to power anything remotely like the modern industrial revolution, which is actually straining even now to burst out of the “Progressive” bonds holding it back (at least in America), using the wind sources that powered the Roman economy, plus dancing on sunbeams. Moreover, the now extended trend of no global warming is not turning around any time soon. That increasingly established trend is being produced by long term natural causes. Even rank amateurs among the general public can see that the sun is the dominant influence on the Earth’s temperatures. Even the most politicized scientists know that they cannot deny that solar activity such as sun spot cycles, and variations in solar magnetic fields or in the flux of cosmic rays, have contributed to major climate changes of the past, such as the Little Ice Age, particularly pronounced from roughly 1650 AD to 1850 AD, the Medieval Warm period from about 950 AD to 1250 AD, during which global temperatures were higher than today, and the early 20th century Warming Period from 1910 to 1940 AD. That solar activity, particularly sunspot cycles, is starting to mimic the same patterns that were seen during the Little Ice Age, as I discussed in a previous column. As a result, outside politically correct Western circles, where science today has been Lysenkoized on this issue, there is a burgeoning debate

about how long of a cooling trend will result. Britain’s Met Office, an international cheerleading headquarters for global warming hysteria, conceded in December, 2012 that there would be no further warming at least through 2017, which would make 21 years with no global warming. The German Herald reported on March 31, 2013 regarding Russian scientist Dr Habibullo Abdussamatov from the St. Petersburg Pulkovo Astronomical Observatory, “Talking to German media the scientist who first made his prediction in 2005 said that after studying sunspots and their relationship with climate change on Earth, we are now on an ‘unavoidable advance towards a deep temperature drop.’” His colleague Yuri Nagovitsyn is quoted in The Voice of Russia saying, “we could be in for a cooling period that lasts 200-250 years.” Skepticism over the theory of catastrophic anthropogenic global warming is increasingly embraced in China and elsewhere in Asia as well. In addition, every 20 to 30 years, the much colder water near the bottom of the oceans cycles up to the top, where it has a slight cooling effect on global temperatures until the sun warms that water. That warmed water then contributes to slightly warmer global temperatures, until the next churning cycle. Known as the Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO) and the Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation (AMO), these natural causes are also contributing to the stabilized and now even slightly declining

natural global temperature trends. The foundation for the establishment argument for global warming are 73 climate models collected by the UN’s IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). But the problem is that the warming trends projected by these models are all diverging farther and farther from the real

world trend of actual temperature observations discussed above, as I showed in a previous column, with another

graphic. Because none of these models have been scientifically validated based on past temperature observations, they constitute a very weak scientific argument that does not remotely establish that the “science is settled,” and “global warming is a fact.” The current data discussed above establishes indisputably that global warming is not a fact today. The politicians seeking to browbeat down any continuing public debate are abusing their positions and authority with modern Lysenkoism, meaning “politically correct” science not established by the scientific method, but politically imposed.

Scientific consensus shows warming is not anthropogenic, we are C02 starved – high levels of C02 is K2 high food levels, green energy is unreliable and can’t sustain itselfFerrara 14(Peter Ferrara, Feb. 24, 2014, Director of Entitlement and Budget Policy for the Heartland Institute, Harvard graduate, “The Period Of No Global Warming Will Soon Be Longer Than the Period of Actual Global Warming,” Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterferrara/2014/02/24/the-period-of-no-global-warming-will-soon-be-longer-than-the-period-of-actual-global-warming/2/#788d74604674) Accessed 7/8/16 BE

The science behind all of this is thoroughly explained in the 1200 pages of Climate Change Reconsidered II, authored by 50 top scientists organized into the Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change (NIPCC), and published by the Heartland Institute in Chicago. You will want to own this volume if for no other reason than that it says here that future generations of scientists will look back and say this is the moment when we took the

political out of the political science of “climate change,” and this is how we did it. Real scientists know that these 50 co-authors are real scientists. That is transparent from the tenor of the report itself. The publication is “double peer reviewed,” in that it discusses thousands of peer reviewed articles published in scientific journals, and is itself peer reviewed. That is in sharp contrast to President Obama’s own EPA, which issued its “endangerment finding” legally authorizing regulation of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, without submitting the finding to its own peer review board, as required by federal law. What were they so afraid of if

97% of scientists supposedly agree with them? The conclusion of the report is that the U.N.’s IPCC has exaggerated the amount of global warming likely to occur due to mankind’s emissions of CO2, and the warming that human civilization will cause as a result “is likely to be modest and cause no net harm to the global environment or to human well-being.” The primary, dominant cause of global climate change is natural causes, not human effects, the report concludes. The fundamentals of the argument are that carbon dioxide is not some toxic industrial gas, but a natural, trace gas constituting just 0.038%

of the atmosphere, or less than 4/100ths of one percent. The report states, “At the current level of 400 parts per million, we still live in a CO2-starved world. Atmospheric levels (of CO2) 15 times greater existed during the pre-Cambrian period (about 550 million years ago) without known adverse effects,” such as catastrophic global warming. Much was made of the total atmospheric concentration of CO2 growing past 400 parts per million. But one percent of the

atmosphere would be 10,000 parts per million. Moreover, human emissions of CO2 are only 4% to 5% of total global emissions, counting natural causes. In addition, CO2 is actually essential to all life on the planet. Plants need CO2 to grow and conduct photosynthesis, which is the natural process that creates food for animals and

fish at the bottom of the food chain. The increase of CO2 in the atmosphere that has occurred due to human emissions has actually increased agricultural growth and output as a result, causing actually an increased greening of the planet. So has any warming caused by such human emissions, as minor warming increases agricultural growth. The report states, “CO2 is a vital nutrient used by plants in photosynthesis. Increasing CO2 in the atmosphere ‘greens’ the planet and helps feed the growing human population.” Furthermore, the temperature impact of increased concentrations of CO2 declines logarithmically. Or as the

report says, “Atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2)…exerts a diminishing warming effect as its concentration

increases.” That means there is a natural limit to how much increased CO2 can effectively warm the planet, as the effect of more and more CO2 ultimately becomes negligible as CO2 concentration grows. Maybe that is why even with many times more CO2 in the atmosphere in the deep past, there was no catastrophic global

warming. The Obama Administration is busily at work on a project to define what it is calling “the social cost of carbon.” But the only documented effect of the increased atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide so far is the resulting increased agricultural output, valued in one study at $1.3 trillion . The Obama Administration is

effectively conducting a cost-benefit analysis with no consideration of the benefits. Note that this project is being conducted on a planet populated by what is known as “carbon-based” life forms. That includes plants, animals, and marine

life. The biggest problem with the catastrophic, anthropogenic, global warming fantasy is that it is very costly for the economy. It is already delaying the Keystone Pipeline, which is privately financed infrastructure that would produce thousands of good paying jobs. Should be a no-brainer. The Administration’s policies are also sharply restricting the production of oil and gas on federally controlled lands. Then there is the Administration’s War on Coal, which threatens thousands of more jobs. Perhaps most importantly, reliable supplies of low cost energy powerfully promote economic growth. Already burgeoning supplies of inexpensive natural gas resulting from the fracking revolution on state and private lands are stimulating a budding revival of American manufacturing. But the whole point of the EPA’s global warming regulation would be to impose a cost wedge on the traditional carbon

based energy sources that have powered the industrial revolution – coal, oil and natural gas. Alternative energy from wind, solar, even biofuels is inherently more costly because the energy in wind, sunrays, corn, etc. is much more diffuse, so more expensive to collect in usable form. Moreover, these alternative energy sources are inherently unreliable, because sometimes the wind does not blow, and the sun does not shine. So back up traditional fossil fuel sources are still needed, which further adds to the costs. This will all result in higher costs for electricity, the fundamental power source for the modern, consumer based economy.

Causes ExtinctionGlobal Warming causes extinction- half of the earths life is at riskCOX, February 2016[Jeff Cox, Science Matters columnist, The Next Die-off Is Now, Vol. 113, Issue 1]

Half of all species on Earth could be extinct by the 2050s, says a recent study the next time you take a nature walk,

take a mental snapshot of the landscape. Cherish the sight, because human beings may never see a landscape like that

again. Scientists report that our planet is now in the midst of its sixth mass extinction of plants and animals—the worst species die-offs since the demise of the dinosaurs 65 million years ago. As many as 30 to 50 percent of all species on Earth are possibly heading toward extinction by the middle of the 21st century, according to the Center for Biological Diversity. The reason? Human activities resulting in global warming, habitat loss and the introduction of exotic species to mature ecosystems. “Because the rate of change in our biosphere is increasing, and because every species’ extinction leads to the extinction of others bound to that species in a complex ecological web, numbers of extinctions are likely to snowball in the coming decades as ecosystems unravel,” the center reports. Global warming due to climate change from the build-up of green-house gases in the atmosphere is the biggest culprit in the die-offs facing Earth's current life forms. Surely technologically savvy humans can reverse climate change—we can employ organic agriculture, replace fossil fuels with renewable energy sources, sequester carbon in the soil instead of dumping it into the air and develop new ways to remove green-house gases from the atmosphere. Perhaps, but science teaches us an ineluctable fact:

Even if we solve the greenhouse-gas problem and return global temperatures to what they were 100 years ago, the landscapes we have today are not the landscapes we'll have tomorrow. They will have

changed. Scientists, led by Eske Willerslev, a researcher of ancient DNA and the director of the Center for GeoGenet-ics at the Natural

History Museum of Denmark in Copenhagen, along with 30 teams of scientists from 12 countries, studied the permafrost sediments laid

down during the last Ice Age from 110,000 to 10,000 years ago—a climate change as strong as the one we're heading into today, but in the opposite direction. They examined the frozen plant material, stomach contents and DNA of woolly rhinoceros, mammoths and 3 other kinds of megafauna from among the estimated 150 genera of large mammals that roamed the Eurasian landmass when the Ice Age started. Mysteriously, they all died out by 10,000 years ago. In a paper published in the journal Nature, they wrote that “the common image of a light brown grass-steppe dominating the northern hemisphere before and during the Ice Age does not hold any longer. The landscape was far more diverse and stable than today and big animals like woolly rhino and mammoth fed particularly on protein-rich forbs.” (A forb is any herb that is not a grass or grass-like.) At the last Glacial Maximum 25,000 years ago, when the climate was

at its coldest and driest, a major loss of plant diversity took place. The large animals barely survived. After the Ice Age ended, the Earth became warmer again. The scientists found that now another kind of vegetation appeared, one of grasses and woody shrubs. One of the key food sources of the large mammals—the protein-rich forbs—did not recover their former abundance. This—and the arrival of hungry humans over the land bridge from Asia—likely proved fatal for the large mammals. Because of climate change, global warming and habitat loss today, these findings have relevance for our future. Professor Willerslev says, “Interestingly, one can also see our results in the perspective of the present climate changes. Maybe we get a hold on the greenhouse gases in the future, but don't expect the good-old, well-known vegetation to come back when it becomes cooler again after the global warming. It is not a given that the old ecosystems will reestablish themselves to the same extent as before the warming. It's not only

climate that drives vegetation changes, but also the history of the vegetation itself.” Of the more than 300,000 known species of plants on Earth, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature has evaluated only 12,914 species, finding that

about 68 percent of these are now threatened with extinction. With plants making up the foundation of ecosystems and the food chain, that's bad news for every species on earth.

Global Warming causes extinction Kearney, 2013[Michael R. Kearney, Department of Zoology, The University of Melbourne, Activity restriction and the mechanistic basis for extinctions under climate warming, Ecology Letters, (2013) 16: 1470–1479, ebscohost]

A second possibility is that recent warming is indeed the culprit behind extinctions, and is causally connected to declining population growth rates irrespective of whether it imposes activity restriction. The activity restriction model considers only how

warming might reduce birth rates, but body temperature has direct effects on birth and mortality rates, which act jointly to determine population persistence (Adolph & Porter 1993; Dunham 1993; Dunham &

Overall 1994; Buckley 2008). Increased temperature should typically have a continuous impact on mortality rate via reduced lifespan (Munch & Salinas 2009) and via increased predation rates in cases where activity increases (Adolph &

Porter 1993). Assuming that sufficient food is available, warming will also potentially increase fecundity due to increased activity time, earlier maturity and more frequent clutches (Adolph & Porter 1993, 1996;

Kearney 2012). However, the effect on clutch frequency is discontinuous; with larger clutches or longer clutch retention, warming may often cause increased mortality without compensatory effects on fecundity. Such an asymmetrical effect can

be seen in Fig. 4. These energy budget analyses show in general that warming can cause reductions in population growth rate even under increasing activity times, and when food (when activity is permitted) is abundant.

Most evident in these analysis is the lower overall population growth rate that viviparity imposes, relative to oviparity, irrespective of warming. This may help explain the most striking pattern reported by Sinervo et al. (2010) – the higher risk of extinction in the viviparous lineages of Mexican Sceloporus lizard. Clutch size emerges as particularly influential on the response of viviparous taxa (Fig. 4). From this perspective, life history traits such as clutch size, clutch frequency and the phenology of reproduction emerge as important traits to consider when assessing adaptive potential for responses to warming.

Doesn’t Cause Extinction/Small IMPXTheir evidence is alarmist propaganda – warming is a natural process that will not lead to extinction, the sun is a major factor in warming – models unreliableHorvath and Molnar 9(Anton Horvath and Boris Molnar, 2009, “Disputing Global Warming,” Pg. 3-5, Nova Science Publishers, Inc.) Accessed 7/8/16 BE

The media have missed the big pieces of the puzzle when it comes to the Earth’s temperatures and mankind’s carbon dioxide (C02) emissions. It is very simplistic to feign horror and say the one degree Fahrenheit

temperature increase during the 20th century means we are all doomed. First of all, the one degree Fahrenheit rise coincided with the greatest advancement of living standards, life expectancy, food production and human health in the history of our planet. So it is hard to argue that the global warming we experienced in the 20th century was somehow negative or part of a catastrophic trend. Second, what the climate alarmists and their advocates in the media have continued to ignore is the fact that the Little Ice Age, which resulted in harsh winters which froze New York Harbor and caused untold deaths, ended about 1850. So trying to prove man-made global warming by comparing the well-known fact that today’s temperatures are warmer than during the Little Ice Age is akin to comparing summer to winter to show a catastrophic temperature trend. In addition, something that the media almost never addresses are the holes in the theory that C02 has been the driving force in global warming. Alarmists fail to adequately explain why temperatures began warming at the end of the Little Ice Age in about 1850, long before man-made CO2 emissions could have impacted the climate. Then about 1940, just as man- made CO2 emissions rose sharply, the temperatures began a decline that lasted until the 1970’s, prompting the media and many scientists to fear a coming ice age . Let me repeat, temperatures got colder after C02 emissions exploded. If C02 is the driving force of global climate change, why do so many in the media ignore the many skeptical scientists who cite these rather obvious inconvenient truths? Sixty Scientists My skeptical views on man-made catastrophic global warming have only strengthened as new science comes in. There have been recent findings in peer-reviewed literature over the last few years showing that the Antarctic is getting colder and the ice is growing and a new study in Geophysical

Research Letters found that the sun was responsible for 50% of 20th century warming. Recently, many scientists, including a leading member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, predicted longterm global cooling may be on the horizon due to a projected decrease in the sun’s output . “If, back in the mid- 0s, we knew what we know today about climate, Kyoto would almost certainly not exist, because we would have concluded it was not necessary.” 60 Scientists Call on Harper to Revisit the Science of Global Warming “Open Kyoto to Debate” An open letter to Canadian Prime Minister

Stephen Harper Financial Post, Thursday, April 06, 2006 A letter sent to the Canadian Prime Minister on April 6 of this year by 60 prominent scientists who question the basis for climate alarmism , clearly explains the current state of scientific knowledge on global warming. The 60 scientists wrote: http://www.can ada.com/nationalpost/financialpost/story. html?id=3711460e-bd5a-475d-a6be4db87559d605 “If, back in the mid-1990s, we knew what we know today about climate, Kyoto would almost

certainly not exist, because we would have concluded it was not necessary.” The letter also noted: “‘Climate change is real’ is a meaningless phrase used repeatedly by activists to convince the public that a climate catastrophe is looming and humanity is the cause. Neither of these fears is justified. Global climate changes occur all the time due to natural causes and the human impact still remains impossible to distinguish from this natural ‘noise.’” One of the ways alarmists have pounded this mantra of “consensus” on global warming into our pop culture is through the use of computer models which project future calamity. But the science is simply not there to place so much faith in scary computer model scenarios which extrapolate the current and projected buildup of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and conclude that the planet faces certain doom. Dr. Vincent Gray, a research scientist and a 2001 reviewer with the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IP CC) has noted, “The effects of aerosols, and

their uncertainties, are such as to nullify completely the reliability of any of the climate models.” Earlier

this year, the director of the International Arctic Research Center in Fairbanks Alaska, testified to Congress that highly publicized climate models showing a disappearing Arctic were nothing more than “science fiction.” “The effects of aerosols and their uncertainties, are such as to nullify completely the reliability of any climate models.” Dr. Vincent Gray Climate researcher and IPCC reviewer In fact, after years of hearing about the computer generated scary

scenarios about the future of our planet, I now believe that the greatest climate threat we face may be coming from alarmist computer models. This threat is originating from the software installed on the hard drives of the publicity and grant

seeking climate modelers. It is long past the time for us to separate climate change fact from hysteria.

Climate Change has only a small impact in disease – Warming will have positive impacts on our food supply and data suggests it increases agricultural production(Charles Kenny, April 9, 2012, “Not Too Hot to Handle,” Foreign Policy, http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/04/09/not-too-hot-to-handle/) Accessed 7/8/16 BE

And what about the impact on global health? Suggestions that malaria has already spread as a result of climate change and that malaria deaths will expand dramatically as a result of warming in the future don’t fit the evidence of declining deaths and reduced malarial spread over the last century . The authors of a recent study published in the journal Nature conclude that the forecasted future effects of rising temperatures on malaria "are at least one order of magnitude smaller than the changes observed since about 1900 and about two orders of magnitude smaller than those that can be

achieved by the effective scale-up of key control measures." In other words, climate change is and will likely remain a small factor in the toll of malaria deaths into the foreseeable future. What about other diseases? Christian Zimmermann at the University of Connecticut and Douglas Gollin at Williams evaluate the likely impact of a 3-degree rise in temperatures on tropical diseases like dengue fever, which causes half a million cases of hemorrhagic fever and 22,000 deaths each year. Most of the vectors for such diseases — mosquitoes, biting flies, and so on — do poorly in frost. So if the weather stays warmer, these diseases are likely to spread. At the same time, there are existing tools to prevent or treat most tropical diseases, and Zimmerman and Gollin suggest "rather modest improvements in protection efficacy could compensate for the consequences of climate change." We can deal with this one. It’s the same with

agriculture. Global warming will have many negative (and a few positive) impacts on food supply, but it is likely that other impacts — both positive, including technological change, and negative, like the exhaustion of aquifers– will have far bigger effects. The 2001 IPCC report suggested that climate change over the long term could reduce agricultural yields by as much as 30 percent. Compare that with the 90 percent increase in rice yields in Indonesia between 1970 and 2006 , for example. Again, while climate change will make extreme weather events and natural disasters like flooding and hurricanes more common, the negative effect on global quality of life will be reduced if economies continue to grow. That’s because, as Matthew Kahn from Tufts University has shown, the safest place to suffer a natural disaster is in a rich country. The more money that people and governments have, the more they can both afford and enforce building codes, land use regulations, and public infrastructure like flood defenses that lower death tolls.

Slow growth associated with green gas emissions would help developing nationsKenny 12(Charles Kenny, April 9, 2012, “Not Too Hot to Handle,” Foreign Policy, http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/04/09/not-too-hot-to-handle/) Accessed 7/8/16 BE

Start with the economy. The Stern Review, led by the distinguished British economist Nicholas Stern, is the most comprehensive look to

date at the economics of climate change. It suggests that, in terms of income, greenhouse gasses are a threat to global growth, but hardly an immediate or catastrophic one. Take the impact of climate change on the developing world. The most depressing forecast in terms of developing country growth in Stern’s paper is the "A2 scenario" — one of a series of economic and greenhouse gas emissions forecasts created for the U.N.’s

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). It’s a model that predicts slow global growth and income convergence (poor countries catching up to rich countries). But even under this model, Afghanistan’s GDP per capita climbs sixfold over the next 90 years, India and China ninefold, and Ethiopia’s income increases by a factor of 10. Knock off a third for the most pessimistic simulation of the economic impact of climate change suggested by the Stern report, and people in those countries are still markedly better off — four times as rich for Afghanistan, a little more than six times as rich for Ethiopia. It’s worth emphasizing that the Stern report suggests that the costs of dramatically reducing greenhouse-gas emissions is closer to 1 (or maybe 2) percent of world GDP

— in the region of $600 billion to $1.2 trillion today. The economic case for responding to climate change by pricing carbon and investing in alternate energy sources is a slam dunk. But for all the likelihood that the world will be a poorer, denuded place than it would be if we responded rapidly to reduce greenhouse gases, the global economy is probably not going to collapse over the next century even if we are idiotic enough to delay our response to climate change by a few years. For all the flooding, the drought, and the skyrocketing bills for air conditioning, the economy would keep on expanding, according to the data that Stern uses.

Irreversible Climate change irreversible for centuries, the notion that we can stop CO2 emissions is unrealisticRomm 13(Joseph Romm, March 18, 2013, “The Dangerous Myth That Climate Change Is Reversible,” Energy Collective, http://www.theenergycollective.com/josephromm/199981/dangerous-myth-climate-change-reversible) Accessed 7/8/16 BE

Memo to Nocera: As a NOAA-led paper explained 4 years ago, climate change is “largely irreversible for 1000 years,” with permanent Dust Bowls in Southwest and around the globe (if we don’t slash emissions ASAP). This notion that we can reverse climate change by cutting emissions is one of the most commonly held myths — and one of the most dangerous, as explained in this 2007 MIT study, “Understanding Public Complacency About Climate Change:

Adults’ mental models of climate change violate conservation of matter.” The fact is that, as RealClimate has explained, we would need “an immediate cut of around 60 to 70% globally and continued further cuts over time” merely to stabilize atmospheric concentrations of CO2 – and that would still leave us with a radiative imbalance that would lead to “an additional 0.3 to 0.8ºC warming over the 21st Century.”

And that assumes no major carbon cycle feedbacks kick in, which seems highly unlikely. We’d have to drop total global emissions to zero now and for the rest of the century just to lower concentrations enough to stop temperatures from rising. Again, even in this implausible scenario, we still aren’t talking about reversing climate change, just stopping it — or, more technically, stopping the temperature rise. The great ice sheets might well continue to disintegrate, albeit slowly. This doesn’t mean climate change is unstoppable —

only that we are stuck with whatever climate change we cause before we get desperate and go all WWII on emissions. That’s why delay is so dangerous and immoral. I’ll discuss this further below the jump.

Hegemony

Unsustainable We are entering a multi-polar phase – US in a hegemonic decline Murray and Herrington in 2014 (Robert W, Vice-President, Research at the Frontier Centre for Public Policy, an Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Alberta, a Senior Fellow of Security and Defence Policy at the Atlantic Institute for Market Studies, and a Research Fellow at the University of Alberta’s European Union Centre of Excellence; Luke M, Editor-At-Large for E-IR and Assistant Reviews Editor for Special Operations Journal; “Russia, Ukraine, and the Testing of American Hegemony;” E-International Relations, world’s leading open access website for students and scholars of international politics; March 6, 2014; http://www.e-ir.info/2014/03/06/russia-ukraine-and-the-testing-of-american-hegemony/)

The crisis in Ukraine, like several before it, has provoked another wave of criticism about the Obama Administration’s handling of US foreign policy, with a number of pundits and critics arguing that Russia’s invasion of

Crimea and handling of the Ukraine crisis are directly related to America’s decline. We do not always agree on the matter of the United States’ alleged decline—or President Obama’s role in that process—but the narratives dominating discussion on the crisis in Ukraine have inspired us to clarify a few issues. Rather, we are intervening in the narrative that has quickly emerged about the power position of the US in the international system and how this might relate to Russia’s behavior, and more, about the options available to the US, the EU, or perhaps even NATO in working to resolve the crisis. There have been various calls for US action and, while we approach the situation from different lenses (one from a structural realist, the other from a hegemonic stability theory), we see value in discussing the theoretical implications of the current situation. Many pundits, and even some scholars and military thinkers, favor greater action by the Obama Administration in the Ukraine. The world is unipolar, they assert, so the US must be capable of defending the norms and principles of international law, peace and security, and even weaker states in the face of aggression. This logic applies beyond Ukraine, with similar calls for American interventionism in Syria, Central African Republic, etc. The fact remains that it has become a common assumption that because the system is unipolar and the US is the world’s lone superpower, it has the ability to intervene in every crisis at every corner of the globe. And if the US can intervene, it should. Because President Obama has failed to meet these challenges head-on—from the “green movement” in Iran, to the Arab Spring, and on to Libya, Syria, and Ukraine—many of his critics accuse him of orchestrating a foreign policy of retreat. Or worse still, that his aloofness in world politics means that he has no coherent foreign policy to speak of at all. Indeed, last August, Frida Ghitis said the Obama Administration’s foreign policy was in “tailspin.” The problems with these arguments—that President Obama is not doing enough to meet these crises, or that the US ought to do more because it can—are many, but they fundamentally misunderstand unipolarity (or polarity in general) on one hand, hegemony on the other, and the relationship between the two—a problem itself derived from the neo-Reaganite/neoconservative misunderstanding of hegemony and hegemonic stability. Being the only superpower in a unipolar system (i.e., the hegemon) does not automatically afford the US the ability to act in every crisis, especially if doing so requires acting alone. Unilateralism has costs. Not only is the cost of action itself increased by acting alone (resources cannot be pooled), but it can cost political capital for a hegemon to act unilaterally if doing so is seen as illegitimate by a sufficiently large proportion of other powers in the system. A unipolar structure does not somehow erode or

overcome the perceptions of states trying to ensure their relative power position in the international system. The hegemon must calculate, like other states, what will best serve its interests and what actions may be too costly , whether those costs are political, military, economic, or some combination of the above. Unpolarity describes the distribution of power in the international system, informing us that the hegemon is the only superpower. Unipolarity does not mean that there are no other great powers in the system. The hegemon, even in a unipolar structure, is constrained and must negotiate outcomes in international politics with those great powers and their respective spheres of influence, including alliances and power blocs. And you can be sure those powers still have their own interests which will

often diverge from those of the hegemon. In the current context, an American hegemon will still face opposition from states and blocs that do not share norms or interests with the US. Great powers do not sacrifice their own aspirations and interests because the system is unipolar; they just need to be creative in finding ways to achieve their goals, especially if they are at odds with those of the hegemon. The other important variable is the

perception of the hegemon’s ability to project its influence and protect its interests abroad. Systemic structure does not last forever and the international distribution of power is ever-changing. While the system remains

unipolar, the ability of the US to behave as a hegemon has declined. When other great powers sense that they have greater latitude to act without threat of reprisal from the hegemon, they will seek to maximize their own power position in the system. The ongoing situation in Ukraine is a good example of this. The “unipolar moment” ushered in by the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the end of the Cold War more or less persists today. Several, however, contend that the world may be entering a “post-American,” multipolar phase, in which US hegemony will decline, and the emergence of new superpowers capable of dominating world politics will be constrained by a realignment of the balance of power. Rising powers, ranging from Brazil, Russia, India, and China, to Japan, the EU, and on eventually to Iran, the narrative goes, will become new centers of power capable of augmenting the international distribution of power in a way that constrains US adventurism. Stemming from a classical understanding of balance of power theory, this narrative holds that a hegemonic actor cannot emerge in an international system characterized by bipolarity or multipolarity, but this mistakenly conflates hegemony with unipolarity. This brings us to a vital point: unipolarity does not equal hegemony. These are simply not the same thing. This can be better visualized in some ways in terms of the “agent-structure problem” in IR. Hegemons are actors (agents), and polarity is a feature of the system (structure). Hegemony is exercised then, by a single state capable of manipulating the polar features of the international system to suit its own interests, such that institutions like the “balance of power,” for instance, become tools of the hegemon. The diplomatically-able hegemon can thus manipulate the international distribution of power according to its own interests and resources. When discussing decline, it is necessary to distinguish between the analytically distinct kinds of decline a state may experience. On one hand, there is relative decline. States experience relative decline when they fail to compete with their neighbors, or otherwise fall behind in important areas of competition. On the other hand, there is absolute decline, which is a markedly different process. Some of President Obama’s harshest critics have accused him of orchestrating America’s absolute decline by comparing it to, for example, the Roman Empire. States die, though as Waltz reminds us, quite rarely. Yugoslavia and many failed states may have experienced absolute decline, or the utter collapse of government (and perhaps even national identity), but one would be hard-pressed to

make a case that the US is on the verge of total collapse. There is a third form of decline, however, unique to hegemonic actors like the United States. According to hegemonic stability theory (HST), a world leader can only maintain the ability to ensure international stability for a limited time (approximately 70 to

100 years). At the end of that period, the world leader experiences a process of hegemonic decline. Aspects of relative or absolute decline could easily accompany this process, but hegemonic decline is unique. Typically occurring in the leading state’s military and economic sectors, hegemonic decline frequently results from what Yale historian Paul Kennedy calls “imperial overstretch,” and ultimately entails a retreat from global commitments. With a proper understanding of decline in mind, there is a compelling case to be made that the US may in fact be

experiencing hegemonic decline. If American foreign policy really is in retreat, then declinist rhetoric may be justified. After all, this pull back is characteristic of hegemonic decline. This might further explain why the

Obama Administration has had difficulty acting in Syria or Ukraine. An ailing hegemon—even in a unipolar system—simply cannot stand up to the great/emerging powers seeking to alter the balance of power in every situation. Add to that the fact that US resources in the region have been minimized as a result of the end of the wars in Iraq and

Afghanistan, and we can see why America’s strategic interests are limited. Ultimately, it may be difficult to argue against the fact that American hegemony has been in decline and will continue to do so as time goes on. The US’ hegemonic decline has profound implications moving forward. Though the US may still have a preponderance of power, it no longer has the ability to unilaterally deter or compel the actions of other great powers.

US strength is in decline in an increasingly multipolar world Hiro in 2009 (Dilip, Author, journalist & commentator, published 35 books contributed to another 18; “After Empire: The Birth of a Multipolar World;” Nation Books; Yale Global Online; 2009; http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/after-empire-birth-multipolar-world)

THE fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 turned out to be a preamble to the disintegration of the Soviet Union two years later. The

Washington -led alliance felt elated, and rightly so. A New World Order had arrived, declared U.S. President George H. W. Bush, in which “the nations of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in peace.” There was not much of peace though. Between the collapse of the Berlin Wall and President George W. Bush’s invasion of Iraq in 2003, the unrivalled United States mounted 10 large

scale military interventions – one every 15 months – a world record. [1] Of these, only two involved reversing

aggression, as in the Iraqi-occupied Kuwait in 1991, or self-defense, as with the Taliban-administered Afghanistan a decade later. Most of the Pentagon’s campaigns – ranging from Iraqi Kurdistan, Somalia and Haiti, to Bosnia and Serbia – occurred under the rubric of “humanitarian intervention”, sanctified by the United Nations Security Council. The Sole Superpower had acquired such a halo that it encountered little resistance in turning the UN Security Council into a virtual extension of its State Department. But the wheel turned when the Pentagon found itself in a quagmire in Iraq. France’s president, Jacques Chirac, loudly trumpeted that he stood

vindicated. The leader of the hitherto squeamish Russia, President Vladimir Putin, issued a document asserting that “The myth about the uni-polar world fell apart once and for all in Iraq.” Out of this concert was born the concept of the balance of power, which became the guiding principle of international relations. Along with this emerged the concept of competitive co-existence. That is, big powers learnt to co-exist peacefully while competing with one another commercially and politically. As an increasing number of intellectuals in America and elsewhere began to grasp this trajectory of history, the initial euphoria in the West – aptly captured in the title of Francis Fukuyama,

End of History and the Last Man (1992) – began to evaporate. They started realizing that the uncontested supremacy of the United States in all important aspects of civilization – economics, politics, military and culture – was not destined to last for eon. For instance, as the 1990s gave way to the 21st century, it became apparent that there was no evidence to support the thesis that a majority of those living in non-democratic countries viewed liberal, Western democracy as the

ultimate form of governance. Attempting to put America at the head of a newly minted column of diehard democracies stems from a failure to acknowledge a cold fact: The United States is on a downward slide. It is not just the habitual Cassandras and diehard detractors of the U.S. who are relishing the prospect of America’s inexorably declining power and influence. Such a judgment has been made by the official documents published by the U.S. government. The relative strength and potential leverage of the U.S. were in decline in an increasingly multi-polar world, it concluded. All these developments will cumulatively reduce the power and influence of the United States, which enjoyed the status of the Sole Superpower for almost two decades, and help level the playing field for China, the European Union, Russia,. India and Brazil.

US power is constrained in the now multipolar world Subacchi in 2015 (Paola, Research Director of International Economics at Chatham House and Professor of Economics at the University of Bologna; “American Leadership in a Multipolar World;” Project Syndicate, publishes and syndicates commentary and analysis on topics including global affairs, economics, finance, and development; April 10, 2015; https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-united-states-global-governance-by-paola-subacchi-2015-04)

Giving up the spotlight is never easy. The United States, like many aging celebrities, is struggling to share the stage with new faces, especially China. The upcoming meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the

World Bank – two institutions dominated by the US and its Western allies – provide an ideal opportunity to change that. The US must come to terms with the reality that the world has changed. The longer the US remains in a state of denial, the more damage it will do to its interests and its global influence, which remains substantial, if more constrained than before. Baltic Air Policing detachment NATO After Brexit In the run-up to the Alliance’s Warsaw summit, John Andrews assesses the views of Wolfgang Ischinger, Yuriko Koike, Javier Solana, and others on the three main challenges it

faces. The world no longer adheres to the static Cold War order, with two blocs locked in open but guarded confrontation. Nor does it work according to the Pax Americana that dominated in the decade after the Soviet Union’s collapse, when the US briefly emerged as the sole superpower. Today’s world is underpinned by a multipolar order, which emerged from the rise of developing

economies – most notably China – as major actors in trade and finance. The US – not to mention the other G-7 countries – now must

compete and cooperate not only with China, but also with India, Brazil, and others through expanded forums like the G-20. To this end, the US must show leadership and adaptability. The US seems to be stuck in the Bretton Woods system, the rules-based order – underpinned by the IMF and the World Bank, with the US dollar at its heart – that emerged after World War II. The Bretton Woods system institutionalized America’s geopolitical supremacy, leaving the old imperial power, the UK, to step aside – a step that it took graciously, if a little desperately, given its grave postwar economic situation. Over the years, however, the Bretton Woods system, with its mix of liberal multilateralism and market-oriented economic policies, has come to symbolize the Anglo-American dominance of the global economy that much of the world now criticizes, especially since the global financial crisis. In particular, the Washington Consensus – the set of free-market principles that influences the policies of the IMF, the World Bank, the US, and the UK – has generated considerable resentment,

especially after the Asian financial crisis of the 1990s. The result could be a world of fragmented blocs – an outcome that would undermine not only global prosperity, but also cooperation on shared challenges.

SustainableHegemony is sustainable and resilientBabones, 15 [Salvatore Babones, Associate Professor at the University of Sydney, PhD in Sociology and Social Policy, Fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, 6-11-2015, American Hegemony Is Here to Stay: U.S. hegemony is now as firm as or firmer than it has ever been, and will remain so for a long time to come, The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/american-hegemony-here-stay-13089?page=2]

IS RETREAT from global hegemony in America’s national interest? No idea has percolated more widely over the past decade—and none is

more bogus. The United States is not headed for the skids and there is no reason it should be. The truth is that America can and should seek to remain the world’s top dog. The idea of American hegemony is

as old as Benjamin Franklin, but has its practical roots in World War II. The United States emerged from that war as the dominant economic, political and technological power. The only major combatant to avoid serious damage to its infrastructure, its housing

stock or its demographic profile, the United States ended the war with the greatest naval order of battle ever seen in the history of the world. It became the postwar home of the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. And, of course, the United States had the bomb. America was, in every sense of the word, a hegemon. “Hegemony” is a word used by social scientists to describe leadership within a system of competing states. The Greek historian Thucydides used the term to characterize the position of Athens in the Greek world in the middle of the fifth century BC. Athens had the greatest fleet in the Mediterranean; it was the home of Socrates and Plato, Sophocles and Aeschylus; it crowned its central Acropolis with the solid-marble temple to Athena known to history as the Parthenon. Athens had a powerful rival in Sparta, but no one doubted that Athens was the hegemon of the time until Sparta defeated it in a bitter twenty-seven-year war. America’s only global rival in the twentieth century was the

Soviet Union. The Soviet Union never produced more than about half of America’s total national output. Its nominal allies in Eastern Europe were in fact restive occupied countries, as were many of its constituent republics. Its client states overseas were at best partners of convenience, and at worst expensive drains on its limited

resources. The Soviet Union had the power to resist American hegemony, but not to displace it. It had the bomb and an impressive space program, but little else. When the Soviet Union finally disintegrated in 1991, American hegemony was complete. The United States sat at the top of the international system, facing no serious rivals for global leadership. This “unipolar moment” lasted a mere decade. September 11, 2001, signaled the emergence of a new kind of threat to global stability, and the ensuing rise of China and reemergence of Russia put paid to the era of unchallenged American leadership. Now, America’s internal politics have deadlocked and the U.S. government shrinks from playing the role of global policeman. In the second decade of the twenty-first century,

American hegemony is widely perceived to be in terminal decline. Or so the story goes. In fact, reports of the passing of U.S. hegemony are greatly exaggerated . America’s costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were relatively minor affairs considered in long-term perspective. The strategic challenge posed by China has also been exaggerated.

Together with its inner circle of unshakable English-speaking allies, the United States possesses near-total control of the world’s seas, skies, airwaves and cyberspace, while American universities, think tanks and journals dominate the world of ideas. Put aside all the alarmist punditry. American hegemony is now as firm as or firmer than

it has ever been, and will remain so for a long time to come. THE MASSIVE federal deficit, negative credit-agency reports, repeated debt-ceiling crises and the 2013 government shutdown all created the impression that the U.S. government is bankrupt, or close to it. The U.S. economy imports half a trillion dollars a year more than it exports. Among the American population, poverty rates are high and ordinary workers’ wages have been stagnant (in real terms) for decades. Washington seems to be paralyzed by perpetual gridlock. On top of all this, strategic exhaustion after two costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq has substantially degraded U.S. military capabilities. Then, at the very moment the military needed to regroup, rebuild and rearm, its budget was hit by sequestration. If economic power forms the long-term foundation for political and military power, it would

seem that America is in terminal decline. But policy analysts tend to have short memories. Cycles of hegemony run in centuries, not decades (or seasons). When the United Kingdom finally defeated Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815, its national resources were completely exhausted. Britain’s public-debt-to-GDP ratio was over 250 percent, and early nineteenth-century governments lacked access to the full range of fiscal and financial tools that are available today. Yet the British Century was only just beginning. The Pax Britannica and the elevation of Queen Victoria to become empress of India were just around the corner. This is not to argue that the U.S. government should ramp up taxes and spending, but it does illustrate the fact that it has enormous potential fiscal

resources available to it, should it choose to use them. Deficits come and go. America’s fiscal capacity in 2015 is stupendously greater than Great Britain’s was in 1815. Financially, there is every reason to think that America’s century lies in the future, not in the past. The same is true of the supposed exhaustion of the U.S. military. On the one hand, thirteen years of continuous warfare have reduced the readiness of many U.S. combat units, particularly in the army. On

the other hand, U.S. troops are now far more experienced in actual combat than the forces of any other major military in the world. In any future conflict, the advantage given by this experience would likely outweigh any decline in effectiveness due to deferred maintenance and training . Constant deployment may place an unpleasant and unfair burden on U.S. service personnel and their families, but it does not necessarily diminish the capability of the U.S. military. On the contrary, it may enhance it. America’s limited wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were hardly the final throes of a passing hegemon. They are more akin to Britain’s bloody but relatively inconsequential conflicts in Afghanistan and Crimea in the middle of the nineteenth century. Brutal wars like these repeatedly punctured, but never burst, British hegemony. In fact, Britain engaged in costly and sometimes disastrous conflicts throughout the century-long Pax Britannica. British hegemony did not come to an end until the country faced Germany head-on in World War I. Even then, Britain ultimately prevailed (with American help). Its empire reached its maximum extent not before World War I but immediately after, in 1922.

Hegemony is sustainable—no transitionsBremmer, 15 – [Ian Bremmer, American political scientist specializing in U.S. foreign policy, states in transition, and global political risk. PhD and M.A. from Stanford University in Political Science, 5-28-2015, These Are the 5 Reasons Why the U.S. Remains the World’s Only Superpower, Time, http://time.com/3899972/us-superpower-status-military/]

A ‘superpower’ is a country that wields enough military, political and economic might to convince nations in all parts of the world to do things they otherwise wouldn’t. Pundits have rushed to label China the next

superpower—and so have many ordinary Americans—but the rumors of America’s decline have been greatly exaggerated. In the key categories of power, the U.S. will remain dominant for the foreseeable future. These facts show why America is still the world’s only superpower, and why that won’t change anytime soon. 1. Economics China’s economy is growing at an impressive rate. But it’s not just the size of an economy that matters—it’s also the quality. According to the World Bank, GDP per capita in the US was $53,042 in 2013; in China it was just $6,807. In other words, little of China’s dramatic economic growth is finding its way into the pockets of Chinese consumers—the byproduct of an

economy driven by massive state-owned enterprises rather than private industry. China’s headline growth may be higher, but it’s the U.S. economy that’s allowing its citizens to grow along with it. And crucially, the American economy remains the bedrock of the global financial system. Over 80% of all financial transactions worldwide are conducted in dollars, as are 87% of foreign currency market transactions. As long as the world continues to place such faith in America’s currency and overall economic stability, the U.S. economy remains the one to beat. America’s military superiority remains unrivaled—full stop. The US accounts for 37% of global military spending, and spends more than four times what China, the world’s No. 2 spender, does on its military.

The U.S. dominates across land, sea, air and space. America’s Middle East misadventures gave the U.S. military a black eye, but the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan speak more to the changing nature of warfare than declining U.S. military superiority. Terrorists and guerilla fighters give conventional military powers fits by design. The U.S. must ultimately learn to scale down to better meet those challenges. Nevertheless, while conventional military strength might not

deter terrorists, it still does a terrific job of deterring hostile nations. Political power comes in many dimensions. For the U.S., foreign aid is an effective way to cement its political clout globally. In 2013, the U.S. doled out $32.7 billion in financial assistance; second was the UK at $19 billion. Turns out that money buys strong political cooperation from countries in need. But in

order to have political power abroad, you must first have stability at home. The U.S. has the oldest working national constitution in the world, as well as strong institutions and rule of law to accompany it. While far from perfect, the governing document created by America’s founding fathers has evolved along with its people. The numbers show the enduring attraction of this system: 45 million people living in the U.S. today were born in a foreign country. That is more than four times higher than

the next highest country. For many people around the world, America remains the ideal place to start a new life. Of the 9 largest tech companies in the world, 8 are based in the U.S. Give the growing importance of the technology sector, that’s a big deal. For decades America worried about energy dependency, yet today America is the world’s No. 1 producer of oil and natural gas, in large part due to the development of hydraulic fracturing, a product of public research and private

energy. America’s research universities and scientific institutions are best in class, allowing the nation to focus its ingenuity where it’s needed most. And America is spending the money to keep its comparative advantage intact: 30% of all research and development dollars are spent in the U.S.

Heg Solves WarUS Leadership solidifies international peace – Current policies prove retrenchment incentivizes great power warsBresler, 15 [ Robert J. Bresler, Penn State Harrisburg professor emeritus of public policy, 6-24-2015, Obama-led US withdrawal has destabilized the world, Lancaster Online, http://lancasteronline.com/opinion/columnists/obama-led-us-withdrawal-has-destabilized-the-world/article_1c73c828-19d4-11e5-ab00-d32898937e9a.html]

American leadership need not mean involvement in endless wars. Past history gives us examples. The Marshall Plan allowed worn-torn allied governments to provide their people with political stability and economic development. NATO was an effort to build Western European unity, end the quarrels that had produced two world wars, and deter Soviet aggression. The United Nations, disappointing in many ways, was a vehicle for broad international efforts against disease, illiteracy and regional wars. The International Monetary Fund, World Bank and the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs were designed to facilitate international trade, prevent

currency wars and assist in economic development. These initiatives prevented another great power war , achieved a large degree of European reconciliation, and eased the transition for post-colonial countries in Africa and Asia. None would have happened without strong and persistent American leadership. The U.S. negotiated a series of defense treaties with more than 35 nations, designed to deter aggression, that also eased their burden of self-defense and allowed them to place more resources into the reconstruction of their economies. In the Middle East, the Arab States and Israel saw the U.S. as an honest broker,

assisting in the negotiation of peace treaties between Israel and Egypt and Israel and Jordan. During the Obama administration there has been a steady American retreat from world leadership . NATO is far less effective. Allies such as Israel, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt, the Baltic States and Iraq are no longer confident of American support. Hence,

China, Russia and Iran are asserting hegemonic claims. The world is now torn by devolution and fractionalization. The forces of

global and regional cooperation are in disrepair. The United Nations stands helpless against Russian aggression, civil war in Syria and Libya and atrocities by the Islamic State across the Middle East and North Africa ; the European Union is facing possible revolts and threats of secession by the United Kingdom and Greece and waning allegiance in much of Europe; and NATO offers Ukraine no more than its good wishes as Russian President Vladimir Putin’s military swallows the country bit by bit. Our allies are far from steadfast. Their governments are weaker, and vivid world leaders are hard to find among them. Putin, the insane leaders of the Islamic State and the Iranian mullahs have put fear in the hearts of our allies. Why are these second- and third-rate powers able to intimidate their neighbors far more effectively than did the far more powerful Soviet Union? Our democratic allies in Europe, lacking a clear sense of direction, are ruled by unstable coalitions. Even Germany, perhaps the

strongest of our European allies, refuses to confront Putin in his efforts to destabilize Ukraine. When the Obama administration made concession after concession to the Iranians over its nuclear program, our negotiating partners in Europe lost any interest in taking serious steps to keep Iran out of the nuclear club. In the Middle East tribalism and religious fanaticism have left Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen virtually ungovernable. Iraq, left to its won devices by Obama’s withdrawal after American troops sacrificed so much to establish a nascent democracy, is now falling apart. In Egypt, a military regime is trying to forcibly contain the boiling pot that is the

Muslim Brotherhood. Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf States, feeling abandoned by Obama’s rush to a nuclear agreement with Iran, are sensing the quicksand beneath their feet. Warlordism and radical Islam plague the economically depressed countries of sub-Saharan Africa. A combination of devolution and chaos

becomes normal state of affairs absent a strong centripetal leadership. In the last half of the 20th century, America provided that force with persuasion, assistance, assurance and trust. As the Obama administration allows the U.S. to slip into the shadows world politics, the danger of war increases.

US Primacy prevents Great Power Wars – Anything else escalates and goes nuclearIkenberry, 14 – [Gilford John Ikenberry is a theorist of international relations and United States foreign policy, and a professor of Politics and International Affairs in the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution,

May/June 2014, The Illusion of Geopolitics The Enduring Power of the Liberal Order, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.org/articles/china/2014-04-17/illusion-geopolitics]

Mead also mischaracterizes the thrust of U.S. foreign policy. Since the end of the Cold War, he argues, the United States has ignored geopolitical issues involving territory and spheres of influence and instead adopted a Pollyannaish emphasis on building the global order. But this is a false dichotomy. The United States does not focus on issues of global order, such as arms control and trade, because it assumes that geopolitical conflict is

gone forever; it undertakes such efforts precisely because it wants to manage great-power competition.

Order building is not premised on the end of geopolitics; it is about how to answer the big questions of geopolitics. Indeed, the construction of a U.S.-led global order did not begin with the end of the Cold War; it won the Cold War. In

the nearly 70 years since World War II, Washington has undertaken sustained efforts to build a far-flung system of multilateral institutions, alliances, trade agreements, and political partnerships . This project has helped draw countries into the United States’ orbit. It has helped strengthen global norms and rules that undercut the legitimacy of nineteenth-century-style spheres of influence, bids for regional domination, and territorial grabs. And it has given the United States the capacities, partnerships, and principles to confront today’s great-power spoilers and revisionists, such as they are. Alliances, partnerships,

multilateralism, democracy -- these are the tools of U.S. leadership, and they are winning, not losing, the twenty-first-century struggles over geopolitics and the world order. THE GENTLE GIANT In 1904, the English geographer Halford Mackinder wrote that the great power that controlled the heartland of Eurasia would command “the World-Island” and thus the world itself. For Mead, Eurasia has returned as the great prize of geopolitics. Across the far reaches of this supercontinent, he

argues, China, Iran, and Russia are seeking to establish their spheres of influence and challenge U.S. interests, slowly but relentlessly attempting to dominate Eurasia and thereby threaten the United States and the rest of the world. This vision misses a deeper reality. In matters of geopolitics (not to mention demographics, politics, and ideas), the United States has a decisive advantage over China, Iran, and Russia. Although the United States will no doubt come down from the peak of hegemony that it occupied during the unipolar era, its power is still unrivaled. Its wealth and technological advantages remain far out of the reach of China and Russia, to say nothing of Iran. Its recovering economy, now bolstered by massive new natural gas resources, allows it to maintain a global military presence and credible security commitments. Indeed, Washington enjoys a

unique ability to win friends and influence states. According to a study led by the political scientist Brett Ashley Leeds, the United States boasts military partnerships with more than 60 countries, whereas Russia counts eight formal allies and China has just one (North Korea). As one British diplomat told me several years ago,

“China doesn’t seem to do alliances.” But the United States does, and they pay a double dividend: not only do alliances provide a global platform for the projection of U.S. power, but they also distribute the burden of providing security. The military capabilities

aggregated in this U.S.-led alliance system outweigh anything China or Russia might generate for decades to come. Then there are the nuclear weapons. These arms, which the United States, China, and Russia all possess (and Iran is seeking), help the United States in two ways. First, thanks to the logic of mutual assured destruction, they radically reduce the likelihood of great-power war. Such upheavals have provided opportunities for past great

powers, including the United States in World War II, to entrench their own international orders. The atomic age has robbed China and Russia of this opportunity. Second, nuclear weapons also make China and Russia more secure, giving them assurance that the United States will never invade. That’s a good thing, because it reduces the likelihood that they will resort to desperate moves, born of insecurity, that risk war and undermine the liberal order. Geography reinforces the United States’ other advantages. As the only great power not surrounded by other great powers, the country has appeared less threatening to other states and was able to rise dramatically over the course of the last century without triggering a war. After the Cold War, when the United States was the world’s sole superpower, other global powers, oceans away, did not even attempt to balance against it. In fact, the United States’ geographic position has led other countries to worry more about abandonment than domination. Allies in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East have sought to draw the United States into playing a greater role in their regions. The result is what the historian Geir Lundestad has called an “empire by invitation.” The United States’ geographic advantage is on full display in Asia. Most countries there see China as a greater potential danger -- due to its

proximity, if nothing else -- than the United States. Except for the United States, every major power in the world lives in a crowded geopolitical neighborhood where shifts in power routinely provoke counterbalancing -- including by one another. China is discovering this dynamic today as surrounding

states react to its rise by modernizing their militaries and reinforcing their alliances. Russia has known it for decades, and has faced it most recently in Ukraine, which in recent years has increased its military spending and sought closer ties to the EU. Geographic isolation has also given the United States reason to champion universal principles that allow it to access various regions of the world. The country has long promoted the open-door policy and the principle of self-determination and opposed colonialism -- less out of a sense of idealism than due to the practical realities of keeping Europe, Asia, and the Middle East open for trade and diplomacy. In the late 1930s, the main question facing the United States was how

large a geopolitical space, or “grand area,” it would need to exist as a great power in a world of empires, regional blocs, and spheres of influence. World War II made the answer clear: the country’s prosperity and security depended on access to every region. And in the ensuing decades, with some important and damaging exceptions, such as Vietnam, the United States has

embraced postimperial principles. It was during these postwar years that geopolitics and order building converged. A liberal international framework was the answer that statesmen such as Dean Acheson, George Kennan, and George Marshall offered to the challenge of Soviet expansionism. The system they built strengthened and enriched the United States and its allies, to the detriment of its illiberal opponents. It also stabilized the world economy and established mechanisms for tackling global problems. The end of the Cold War has not changed the logic behind this project. Fortunately, the liberal principles that Washington has pushed enjoy near-universal appeal, because they have tended to be a good fit with the modernizing forces of economic growth and social advancement. As the historian Charles Maier has put it, the United States surfed the wave of twentieth-century modernization. But some have argued that this congruence between the American project and the forces of modernity has weakened in recent years. The 2008 financial crisis, the thinking goes, marked a world-historical turning point, at which the United States lost its vanguard role in facilitating economic advancement. Yet

even if that were true, it hardly follows that China and Russia have replaced the United States as the standard-bearers of the global economy. Even Mead does not argue that China, Iran, or Russia offers the world a new model of modernity. If these illiberal powers really do threaten Washington and the rest of the liberal capitalist world, then they will need to find and ride the next great wave of modernization. They are unlikely to do that.

Heg Doesn’t Solve WarHeg doesn’t solve war, the liberal international order doesIkenberry, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, ‘11

[John G., Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. He is also Co-Director of Princeton’s Center for International Security Studies Ikenberry is also a Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul, Korea, Democracy Journal, “A World of Our Making”, http://www.democracyjournal.org/21/a-world-of-our-making-1.php?page=all, Date Accessed: 7/1/15]

There are four reasons to think that some type of updated and reorganized liberal international order will persist. First, the old and traditional mechanism for overturning international order—great-power war—is no longer likely to occur. Already, the contemporary world has experienced the longest period of great-power

peace in the long history of the state system. This absence of great-power war is no doubt due to several factors not present in earlier eras, namely nuclear deterrence and the dominance of liberal democracies. Nuclear weapons—and the deterrence they generate—give great powers some confidence that they will not be dominated or invaded by other major states. They make war among major states less rational and there-fore less likely. This removal of great-power war as a tool of overturning international order tends to reinforce the status quo. The United States was lucky to have emerged as a global power in the nuclear age, because rival great powers are put at a disadvantage if they seek to overturn the American-led system. The cost-benefit calculation of rival would-be hegemonic powers is altered in favor of working for change within the system. But, again, the fact that great-power deterrence also sets limits on the projection of American power presumably makes the existing international order more tolerable. It removes a type of behavior in the system—war, invasion, and conquest between great powers—that historically provided the motive for seeking to overturn order. If the violent over-turning of international order is removed, a bias for continuity is introduced into the system.

Second, the character of liberal international order itself—with or without American hegemonic leadership—reinforces continuity. The complex interdependence that is unleashed in an open and loosely rule-based order generates expanding realms of exchange and investment that result in a growing array of firms, interest groups, and other sorts of political stakeholders who seek to preserve the stability and openness of the syste m. Beyond this, the liberal order is also relatively easy to join. In the post-Cold War decades, countries in different regions of the world have made democratic transitions and connected themselves to various parts of this system. East European countries and states within the old Soviet empire have joined NATO. East Asian countries, including

China, have joined the World Trade Organization (WTO). Through its many multilateral institutions, the liberal international order facilitates integration and offers support for states that are making transitions toward liberal democracy. Many countries have also experienced growth and rising incomes within this order. Comparing international orders is tricky, but the current liberal international order, seen in comparative perspective, does appear to have unique

characteristics that encourage integration and discourage opposition and resistance. Third, the states that are rising today do not constitute a potential united opposition bloc to the existing order. There are so-called rising states in various regions of the world. China, India, Brazil, and South Africa are perhaps most prominent. Russia is also sometimes included in this

grouping of rising states. These states are all capitalist and most are democratic. They all gain from trade and integration within the world capitalist system. They all either are members of the WTO or seek membership in it. But they also have very diverse geopolitical and regional interests and agendas. They do not constitute either an economic bloc or a geopolitical one. Their ideologies and histories are distinct. They share an interest in gaining access to the leading institutions that govern the international system. Sometimes this creates competition among them for influence and access. But it also orients their struggles toward the reform and

reorganization of governing institutions, not to a united effort to overturn the underlying order. Fourth, all the great powers have alignments of interests that will continue to bring them together to negotiate and cooperate over the management of the system. All the great powers—old and rising—are status-quo powers . All are beneficiaries of an open world economy and the various services that the liberal international order provides for capitalist trading states. All worry about religious radicalism and failed states. Great powers such as Russia and China do have different geopolitical interests in various key trouble spots, such as Iran and South Asia, and so disagreement and noncooperation over sanctions relating to nonproliferation and other security issues will not disappear. But the opportunities for managing differences with frameworks of great-power cooperation exist and will grow. Overall, the forces for continuity are formidable. Of course, there are many forces operating in the

world that can generate upheaval and discontinuity. The collapse of the global financial system and an economic depression that triggers

massive protectionism are possibilities. Terrorism and other forms of transnational violence can also trigger political panic and turmoil that would lead governments to shut down borders and reimpose restrictions on the movement of goods and people. But in the face of these seismic events in world politics, there are deep forces that keep the system anchored and stable.

Unipolar hegemony statistically causes more warMontiero 12--Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University Nuno, Unrest Assured, International Security, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Winter 2011/12), http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Unrest_Assured.pdf

How well, then, does the argument that unipolar systems are peaceful account for the first two decades of unipolarity since the end of the Cold War? Table 1 presents a list of great powers divided into three periods: 1816 to 1945, multipolarity; 1946 to 1989, bipolarity; and since

1990, unipolarity.46 Table 2 presents summary data about the incidence of war during each of these periods. Unipolarity is the most conoict prone of all the systems, according to at least two important criteria: the percentage of years that great powers spend at war and the incidence of war involving great powers. In multipolarity, 18

percent of great power years were spent at war. In bipolarity, the ratio is 16 percent. In unipolarity, however, a remarkable 59 percent of great power years until now were spent at war. This is by far the highest percentage in all three systems. Furthermore, during periods of multipolarity and bipolarity, the probability that war involving a great power would break out in any given year was, respectively, 4.2 percent and 3.4 percent. Under unipolarity, it is 18.2 percent—or more than four times higher.47 These figures provide no evidence that unipolarity is peaceful.48 In sum, the argument that unipolarity makes for peace is heavily weighted toward interactions among the most powerful states in the system. This should come as no surprise given that Wohlforth makes a structural argument: peace flows from the unipolar structure of international politics, not from any particular characteristic of the unipole.49 Structural analyses of the international system are usually centered on interactions between great powers.50 As Waltz writes, “The theory, like the story, of international politics is written in terms of the great powers of an era.”51 In the sections that follow, however, I show that in the case of unipolarity, an investigation of its peacefulness must consider potential causes of conflict beyond interactions between the most important states in the system.

Economy

Econ Decline Causes WarEmpirics support economic decline correlates to great power war.Clark 2010 [Sean; doctoral candidate and lecturer in the department of political science at Dalhousie University; “Deadly decay: Great power decline and cataclysmic war”; Sage Publications, Ltd; Spring 2010; International Journal Vol. 65, No. 2, Annual John W. Holmes issue on Canadian foreign policy (Spring 2010), pp. 475-494]

Third, the hypothesis regarding the importance of relative power decline and its relationship to the outbreak of great power war has been strongly confirmed. Eleven of 16 cases (68.8 percent) witnessed conflict instigation by a power undergoing relative decline. This relationship is particularly strong

during periods of power parity. Of the five cases relevant to this condition, conflict was instigated four times by decliners, or 80 percent of the time. Military gambles thus appear more easily welcomed when there is no preponderant hegemon to thwart a challenger's hostile ambitions. Even so, relative decline also matters in conditions of outright system dominance by one particular state. In these cases, it was the decliner who attacked 63.6 percent of the time (that is, in seven of 11 cases). From this it can be concluded that regardless of international polarity or structure, nations undergoing relative decline consider war to be a viable alternative to enduring continued losses. This gives real reason to be extremely wary of any state undergoing relative decline. There is a good chance it may strike. There remain, however, exceptions to this tendency for decliners to attack. These require explanation, for risers still account for roughly 30 percent of war instigation (five of 16 cases)—a number that holds under conditions of both power parity and outright dominance. Why might this be? When looking at the system dominance sample, two cases, round two of the Thirty Years' War and the Dutch War of Louis XIV, are straightforward, as both were instigated by the system hegemon, France. Here, the surfeit of French power permitted the conduct of wars of predation with little need for caution. Given that France was not just the relative riser, but also the system leader, the country enjoyed the luxury of tremendous policy freedom. This was likewise the case for the colonial theatre of the Seven Years’ War. Although the struggle was characterized by near-parity in domestic economic strength, in the far-flung imperial periphery it was a dramatically different tale. Great Britain's holdings in the Americas vastly outstripped the tiny French colony of New France. Little surprise that fighting began here rather than in Europe, as the British enjoyed a vast advantage in local resources and mobilization potential. Again, clear system leadership brings policy freedom.

Econ controls every other facet of deterrence – solves multiple hot spots for war Gelb 2010

(Leslie, CFR president emeritus. “GDP Now Matters More Than Force”, Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec, ebsco)

Today, the United States continues to be the world's power balancer of choice. It is the only regional balancer against China in Asia, Russia in eastern Europe , and Iran in the Middle East . Although Americans rarely

think about this role and foreign leaders often deny it for internal political reasons, the fact is that Americans and non-Americans alike require these services. Even Russian leaders today look to Washington to check China. And Chinese leaders surely realize that they need the U.S. Navy and Air Force to guard the world's sea and trading lanes. Washington should not be embarrassed to remind others of the costs and risks of the United States' security role when it comes to economic transactions. That applies, for example, to Afghan and Iraqi decisions about contracts for their natural

resources, and to Beijing on many counts. U.S. forces maintain a stable world order that decidedly benefits China's economic growth, and to date, Beijing has been getting a free ride. A NEW APPROACH In this environment, the first-tier foreign policy goals

of the United States should be a strong economy and the ability to deploy effective counters to threats at the lowest possible cost. Second-

tier goals, which are always more controversial, include retaining the military power to remain the world's power balancer, promoting freer trade, maintaining technological advantages (including cyberwarfare capabilities), reducing risks from various environmental and

health challenges, developing alternative energy supplies, and advancing U.S. values such as democracy and human rights. Wherever possible, second-tier goals should reinforce first-tier ones: for example, it makes sense to err on the side of freer trade to help boost the economy and to invest in greater energy independence to reduce dependence on the tumultuous Middle East. But no overall approach should dictate how to pursue these goals in each and every situation. Specific applications depend on, among other things, the culture and politics of the target countries. An overarching vision helps leaders consider how to use their power to achieve their goals. This is what gives policy direction, purpose, and thrust--and this is what is often missing from U.S. policy. The organizing principle of U.S. foreign policy should be to use power to solve common problems. The good old days of being able to command others by making military or economic threats are largely gone. Even the weakest nations can resist the strongest ones or drive up the costs for submission. Now, U.S. power derives mainly from others' knowing that they cannot solve their problems without the United States and that they will have to heed U.S. interests to achieve common goals. Power by services rendered has largely replaced power by command. No matter the decline in U.S.

power, most nations do not doubt that the United States is the indispensable leader in solving major international problems. This

problem-solving capacity creates opportunities for U.S. leadership in everything from trade talks to military-conflict resolution to international agreements on global warming. Only Washington can help the nations bordering the South China Sea forge a formula for sharing the region's resources. Only Washington has a chance of pushing the Israelis and the Palestinians toward peace. Only Washington can bargain to increase the low value of a Chinese currency exchange . rate that disadvantages almost every nation's trade with China. But it is clear to Americans and non-Americans alike that Washington lacks the power to solve or manage difficult problems alone; the indispensable leader must work with indispensable partners. To attract the necessary partners, Washington must do the very thing that habitually afflicts U.S. leaders with political hives: compromise. This does not mean multilateralism for its own sake, nor does it mean abandoning vital national interests. The Obama administration has been criticized for softening UN economic sanctions against Iran in order to please China and Russia. Had the United States not compromised, however, it would have faced vetoes and enacted no new sanctions at all. U.S. presidents are often in a strong position to bargain while preserving essential U.S. interests, but they have to do a better job of selling such unavoidable compromises to the U.S. public. U.S. policymakers must also be patient. The weakest of nations today can resist and delay. Pressing prematurely for decisions--an unfortunate hallmark of U.S. style--results in failure, the prime enemy of power. Success breeds power, and failure breeds weakness. Even when various domestic constituencies shout for quick action, Washington's leaders must learn to buy time in order to allow for U.S. power--and the power of U.S.-led coalitions--to take effect abroad. Patience is especially valuable in the economic arena, where there are far more players than in the military and diplomatic realms. To corral all these players takes time. Military power can work quickly, like a storm; economic power grabs slowly, like the tide. It needs time to erode the shoreline, but it surely does nibble away. To be sure, U.S. presidents need to preserve the United States' core role as the world's military and diplomatic balancer--for its own sake; and because it strengthens U.S. interests in

economic transactions. But economics has to be the main driver for current policy, as nations calculate power more in terms of GDP than military might . U.S. GDP will be the lure and the whip in the international affairs of the twenty-first century. U.S. interests abroad cannot be adequately protected or advanced without an economic reawakening at home.

Economic growth outweighs – collapse makes it impossible to confront any global challenge and makes nuclear war more likelyO’Hanlon 2012

(Michael, Brookings Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence co-director. “The real national security threat: America's debt”, 7-3, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jul/03/opinion/la-oe-ohanlon-fiscal-reform-20120703)

Alas, globalization and automation trends of the last generation have increasingly called the American dream into question for the working classes. Another decade of underinvestment in what is required to remedy this situation will make an isolationist or populist president far more likely because much of the country will question whether an internationalist role makes sense for America — especially if it costs us

well over half a trillion dollars in defense spending annually yet seems correlated with more job losses. Lastly, American economic weakness undercuts U.S. leadership abroad . Other countries sense our weakness and wonder about our purport 7ed decline. If this perception becomes more widespread, and the case that we are in decline becomes more persuasive, countries

will begin to take actions that reflect their skepticism about America's future. Allies and friends will doubt our commitment and may pursue nuclear weapons for their own security, for example;

adversaries will sense opportunity and be less restrained in throwing around their weight in their own

neighborhoods. The crucial Persian Gulf and Western Pacific regions will likely become less stable. Major war will become more likely . When running for president last time, Obama eloquently articulated big foreign policy visions: healing America's breach with the Muslim world, controlling global climate change, dramatically curbing global poverty through development aid, moving toward a world free of nuclear weapons. These were, and remain, worthy if elusive goals. However, for Obama or his successor, there is now a much more urgent big-picture issue: restoring U.S. economic strength. Nothing else is really possible if that fundamental prerequisite to effective foreign policy is not reestablished.

Econ Decline Doesn’t Cause WarGreat powers can turn around global economic issues—the Great Recession proves.Drezner 2014 [Daniel; American professor of international politics at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University; “The System Worked: Global Economic Governance during the Great Recession”; Project Muse; January 2014; World Politics, Volume 66, Number 1, pp.123-164]

Global economic governance did what was necessary during the Great Recession—but why did the system

work? The precrisis observations about sclerotic international institutions and a looming power transition did not seem too far off the mark. How did these actors manage to produce the necessary policy outputs and reforms to stave off systemic collapse? It is impossible to provide a definitive answer in the space

provided, but a preliminary evaluation is warranted. The most commonly provided answer is that the shared sense of crisis spurred the major economies into joint action—and when the immediate crisis subsided, so did the degree of policy coordination. This is not a compelling argument, however. The same crisis mentality did not lead to sustained cooperation during the Great Depression. [End Page 152] Significant postwar economic crises—such as the end of the Bretton Woods regime, the oil shocks of the 1970s, and the breakdown of the European exchange rate mechanism in the early 1990s—also failed

to spur meaningful great power cooperation. What caused powerful actors to think of the 2008 crisis as a “shared” one? A more sophisticated version of this argument stems from open economy politics.110 It argues that globalization has locked in powerful interests that give strong preference to an open global economy. These interests then pressured governments into taking necessary actions at the national and global levels so as not to interfere with the global supply chain. The problem with this explanation is that there are too many instances in which powerful interests either lost or compromised their positions. Neither Germany’s government nor German business interests were predisposed toward Keynesian macroeconomic policies in late 2008. Neither China’s government nor its exporting interests preferred allowing the renminbi to appreciate in 2010. Large financial firms were firmly opposed to the Basel III banking accord. European governments resisted the dilution of their influence in the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. There are too many instances of

policy coordination—rather than a harmony of preferences—for a strictly interest-based approach to explain post-2008 outcomes. A fuller answer requires additional research, but some tentative answers can be proffered here. The distribution of power and the role of economic ideas are among the primary conceptual building blocks of international political economy—and both of these factors offer a partial explanation for the performance of global economic governance.111 Comparing the current situation with the analogous moment during the Great Depression along both of these dimensions, we can discern why events have unfolded differently this time around. Looking at the distribution of power, for example, the interwar period was truly a moment of great power transition. At the start of the Great Depression, the United Kingdom’s lack of financial muscle badly hampered its leadership efforts. Even as it was trying to maintain the gold standard, Great Britain possessed only 4 percent of the world’s gold reserves.112

Comprehensive study proves no relationship between economic decline and war.Miller 2K

[Morris, Adjunct Professor at the University of Ottawa's Faculty of Administration, Interdisciplinary Science Review, v 25 n4]

The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that exacerbates poverty and

growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted

to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war.

According to a study under- taken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis

in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis – as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth – bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and semi-democracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).

Economic collapse doesn’t cause war Bazzi et al. 2011

(Samuel, UCSD economics department. “Economic Shocks and Conflict: The (Absence of?) Evidence from Commodity Prices”, November 2011, http://www.chrisblattman.com/documents/research/2011.EconomicShocksAndConflict.pdf?9d7bd4)

VI. Discussion and conclusions A. Implications for our theories of political instability and conflict The state is not a prize?—Warlord politics and the state prize

logic lie at the center of the most influential models of conflict, state development, and political transitions in economics and political science. Yet we see no evidence for this idea in economic shocks, even when looking at the friendliest cases: fragile and unconstrained states dominated by extractive commodity revenues. Indeed, we see the opposite correlation: if anything, higher rents from commodity prices weakly 22 lower the risk and length of conflict. Perhaps shocks are the wrong test. Stocks of resources could matter more than price shocks (especially if shocks are transitory). But combined with emerging evidence that war onset is no more likely even with rapid increases in known oil reserves (Humphreys 2005; Cotet and Tsui 2010) we regard the

state prize logic of war with skepticism.17 Our main political economy models may need a new engine. Naturally, an absence of evidence cannot be taken for evidence of absence. Many of our conflict onset and ending results include sizeable positive and negative effects.18 Even so, commodity price shocks are highly influential in income and should provide a rich source of identifiable variation in instability. It is difficult to find a better-measured, more abundant, and

plausibly exogenous independent variable than price volatility. Moreover, other time-varying variables, like rainfall and foreign aid, exhibit robust correlations with conflict in spite of suffering similar empirical drawbacks and generally smaller sample sizes (Miguel et al. 2004; Nielsen et al. 2011). Thus we take the absence of evidence seriously. Do resource revenues drive state capacity?—State prize models assume that rising revenues raise the value of the capturing the state, but have ignored or downplayed the effect of revenues on self-defense. We saw that a growing empirical political science literature takes just such a revenue-centered approach, illustrating that resource boom times permit both payoffs and repression, and that stocks of lootable or extractive resources can bring political order and stability. This countervailing effect is most likely with transitory shocks, as current revenues are affected while long term value is not. Our findings are partly consistent with this state capacity effect. For example, conflict intensity is most sensitive to changes in the extractive commodities rather than the annual agricultural crops that affect household incomes more directly. The relationship only holds for conflict intensity, however, and is somewhat fragile. We do not see a large, consistent or robust decline in conflict or coup risk when prices fall. A reasonable interpretation is that the state prize and state capacity effects are either small or tend to cancel one another out. Opportunity cost: Victory by default?—Finally, the inverse relationship between prices and war intensity is consistent with opportunity cost accounts, but not exclusively so. As we noted above, the relationship between intensity and extractive commodity prices is more consistent with the state capacity view. Moreover, we shouldn’t mistake an inverse relation between individual aggression and incomes as evidence for the opportunity cost mechanism. The same correlation is consistent with psychological theories of stress and aggression (Berkowitz 1993) and sociological and political theories of relative deprivation and anomie (Merton 1938; Gurr 1971). Microempirical work will be needed to distinguish between these mechanisms.

Other reasons for a null result.—Ultimately, however, the fact that commodity price shocks have no discernible effect on new conflict onsets, but some effect on ongoing conflict, suggests that political stability might be less sensitive to income or temporary shocks than generally believed. One possibility is that successfully mounting an insurgency is no easy task. It comes with considerable risk, costs, and coordination challenges. Another possibility is that the counterfactual is still conflict onset. In poor and fragile nations, income

shocks of one type or another are ubiquitous. If a nation is so fragile that a change in prices could lead to war, then other shocks may trigger war even in the absence of a price shock. (# rekt) The same argument has been made in debunking the myth that price shocks led to fiscal collapse and low growth in developing nations in the 1980s.19 B. A general problem of publication bias?

More generally, these findings should heighten our concern with publication bias in the conflict literature. Our results run against a number of published results on commodity shocks and conflict, mainly because of select samples, misspecification, and sensitivity to model assumptions, and, most importantly,

alternative measures of instability . Across the social and hard sciences, there is a concern that the majority of published research findings

are false (e.g. Gerber et al. 2001). Ioannidis (2005) demonstrates that a published finding is less likely to be true when there is a greater number and lesser pre-selection of tested relationships; there is greater flexibility in designs, definitions, outcomes, and models; and when more teams are involved in the chase of statistical significance. The cross-national study of conflict is an extreme case of all these . Most worryingly,

almost no paper looks at alternative dependent variables or publishes systematic robustness checks . Hegre and Sambanis (2006) have shown that the majority of published conflict results are fragile, though they focus on timeinvariant regressors and not the time-varying shocks that have grown in popularity. We are also concerned there is a “file drawer problem” (Rosenthal 1979). Consider this decision rule: scholars that discover robust results that fit a theoretical intuition pursue the results; but if results are not robust the scholar (or referees) worry about problems with the data or empirical strategy, and identify additional work to be done. If further analysis produces a robust result, it is published. If not, back to

the file drawer. In the aggregate, the consequences are dire: a lower threshold of evidence for initially significant results than ambiguous ones.20

Terror

Yes Nuke TerrorISIS planning to use chemical or nuclear weapons—have material and expertiseCarsltrom and Lagan 15- correspondents for The Times (Gregg and Bernard, “Dirty bomb threat escalates as Isis stockpiles radioactive chemicals”, The Times, 6/10/15, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/middleeast/article4465397.ece)

Islamic State has scavenged radioactive material and chemicals from research facilities and hospitals, heightening fears that it is trying to build a large "dirty" bomb and weapons of mass destruction. Nato is deeply worried about the hoarding of radioactive material taken by Isis fighters from facilities that it has captured in Syria and Iraq, Australia's foreign minister said. "The insurgents did not just clear out the cash from local banks," Julie Bishop told The

Australian. The warning came as it emerged that Israel has set off radioactive bombs in the Negev desert, to simulate a terrorist attack. No terrorist group has yet detonated a dirty bomb, a mix of conventional explosives and radioactive materials that could

easily be obtained from medical facilities or industry. However, Isis claimed in its propaganda magazine last month that it was trying to acquire a nuclear weapon. Israeli officials acknowledged yesterday that they were concerned about such an attack. "The nuclear threat is perhaps the greatest threat to Israel," Major-General Nimrod Sheffer, head of the army's planning directorate, said at an annual security conference. Scientists at the Negev nuclear research centre, near Dimona, detonated their own dirty bombs last year as part of a four-year study, the Israeli newspaper Haaretz disclosed this week. They built 20 devices, the largest of which contained 25kg of explosives, laced with technetium-99m, an isotope that is commonly used in medical imaging. Six were detonated in a mocked-up shopping mall to simulate an attack on a commercial area. The researchers used

drones and sensors to monitor the aftermath. The study found that the devices would cause few deaths because only a small

amount of radiation would spread beyond the centre of the explosion. The impact would be largely economic: the site would have to be cordoned off while the radiation dissipated. Technetium-99m has a relatively short half-life of six hours, but other common medical isotopes take weeks or even months to decay. The tests also examined what would happen if a dirty bomb were left in a public place but not detonated. The scientists conducted six tests using radioactive material mixed with water in the ventilation system of a twostorey building. They found that such an attack would be ineffective, because air-conditioning filters would

absorb most of the radiation. Ms Bishop noted that by capturing territory, Isis had gained access to chemicals and radioactive material normally held by governments. In June last year, when Isis captured Mosul in northern Iraq, the

militants took nearly 40kg of uranium from the university. "Terrorist groups have seized control of nuclear material at the sites that came out of the control of the state," Mohamed Ali Alhakim, Iraq's UN ambassador, told the United Nations. He warned that such materials "can be used in manufacturing weapons of mass destruction". Australia has deployed jet fighters to the Middle East to take part in attacks on Isis forces and has also sent military

instructors to train Iraqi forces. Ms Bishop said her claim that Isis may also be developing chemical weapons was based on reports from Australia's departments of Defence and Foreign Affairs. In a speech last week Ms Bishop said that groups such as Isis were prepared to use any means to advance their cause. Conventional wisdom, Ms Bishop said,

holds that the desire of such forces to weaponise chemical agents were largely aspirational. However, Isis's use of chlorine and its recruitment of highly trained professionals - including some from the West - revealed its far more serious efforts to develop chemical weapons, she said. Isis "was likely to have among its tens of thousands of recruits

the technical expertise necessary to further refine precursor materials and build chemical weapons", Ms Bishop said, adding that the Australia Group - a bloc of about 40 nations established to minimise the spread of chemical and biological weapons - was sufficiently concerned to have dedicated a session to Isis at a meeting in Perth last week. In 2013 Moshe Yaalon, the Israeli defence minister, claimed at a meeting in Canada that Iran was looking into using terrorists to attack Western targets with dirty bombs. Israel has never acknowledged having a nuclear weapons programme, but is believed to possess 80 to 100 nuclear warheads.

Terrorists can steal Pakistani nukes or bio-weaponsJalalzai 14- Security & Intelligence Analyst/Researcher/Writer on Counter/Cyber Terrorism and Violent Extremism, author of Nuclear Jihad in South Asia (Musa Khan, “Bioterrorism threat to South Asia”, Daily

Times, 10/9/14, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/opinion/09-Oct-2014/bioterrorism-threat-to-south-asia)//WK

The threat of nuclear weapons theft and bioterrorism in South Asia once again came under discussion in the international press on how terrorist organisations in both Pakistan and India are trying to retrieve biotechnology and nuclear weapons, and use them against civilians and the security forces. The recent border skirmishes

between Pakistan and India, the cloud of civil war in Afghanistan and the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)

terrorist organisation in the Persian Gulf and the Arab world further justified the possibilities of the complex threat of chemical and biological terrorism. As Pakistan and Afghanistan have been the victims of terrorism and

Talibanisation during the last three decades, the establishment of ISIS networks in South Asia may possibly change the traditional concept of terrorism and insurgency in the region . There is a general perception that extremist organisations in South Asia could use some advanced technologies against civilian populations. If control over these weapons is weak, the possibility of theft increases. The problem of nuclear and

biological terrorism deserves special attention from all South Asian states, including Afghanistan. As nuclear weapons, missile technologies and bio-weapons proliferate, there is a grave danger that some of them might fall into the

hands of the Pakistani Taliban (TTP), ISIS and Indian and Afghani extremist groups. In South and Central Asia, some states, including Pakistan, have started responding to the threat of nuclear and biological terrorism with technical means. Each state has its own approach towards the threat perception. The more recent focus on global terrorism issues is also now sharpening the focus on non-proliferation activities that do not necessarily apply at the level of the state. There are speculations that non-state actors might possibly

engage in these activities. The Islamic State that controls parts of Iraq and Syria has established its network in Afghanistan and Pakistan as the region is already dominated by violent terrorist groups . The New York Times recently reported that as many as 1,000 Turks joined the ISIS network. The CIA estimated last week that the group had anywhere

from 20,000 to 31,500 fighters in Iraq and Syria. South Asian states are facing the threat of terrorism and violent extremism. The unending civil war in Afghanistan and Pakistan has destabilised the whole region. Terrorism in Afghanistan affects Pakistan and Iran, its heat touches the Iranian border while the flames are clearly seen in China and Russia as well. As South Asian states have been embroiled in protracted conflicts for decades, the lack of proper strategies to counter the TTP, ISIS and Indian extremism,

and the clash of interests, have further aggravated the problem. Extremist and terrorist groups in this region are striving to retrieve nuclear and biological weapons and use them against the government or civilian population. The issue is further complicated as some secret reports have revealed the use of nuclear and biological weapons inside Russia. In November 1995, Chechen separatists put a crude bomb in Moscow's Izmailovsky Park. The debate about bioterrorism is not entirely new in the region because both Pakistan and India have developed these weapons to use them in a future war. On December 3, 1984, the worst chemical disaster occurred in the city of Bhopal in India, causing the deaths of thousands of people. If a nuclear war were to break out in South Asia, experts believe that it is most likely to happen in India and Pakistan. This kind of war would have dire

consequences. In the Seoul Summit, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh warned that South Asia is under threat. Two incidents in Karachi and another in Balochistan proved that terrorists were trying to retrieve nuclear weapons to use them against military or nuclear installations. The Indian government has recognised the threat from bioweapons as real and imminent. Both the ministry of defence and ministry of home affairs placed high priority on this issue.

India understands that Pakistan-based terrorist groups may possibly use these weapons in Kashmir in the near future. Pakistan too has expressed deep concern about the use of these weapons against its security forces either by the Taliban or Baloch insurgents. The emergence of recent polio and bird flu cases in Pakistan is the primary warning of danger. The nucleation of my debate on nuclear terrorism is that, once the TTP or other terrorist group steals biological and nuclear weapons, they will use them against the military and nuclear installations. National security experts in the UK and US believe that the most likely way terrorists will obtain a nuclear bomb will not be to steal or purchase a fully operational device but to buy fissile material and construct their own. In South

Asia, every state has applied its own classified security measures for nuclear weapons security. In Pakistan, a nuclear weapons security regime involves human, physical and technical means. However, there is a general perception that, notwithstanding these technical measures, there is a danger that nuclear materials may possibly get into the hands of terrorist organisations. The future of illicit trade of nuclear

materials in South Asia by non-state actors and terrorists may further jeopardise the security of the region. The problem of this trade appears to be growing worse as technologies proliferate. With the global spread of technologies and rapid illegal sale of uranium and plutonium, traffickers could find it easier to ply their dangerous trade. Generally speaking, the absence of available reports in official data does not negate the fact the terrorist and extremist organisations interact in the smuggling of nuclear materials . India and Pakistan understand the sensitivity of the protection of these weapons. By analysing the threat of chemical and bioterrorism in South Asia, I do not want to exaggerate or distort facts. This analysis is a warning to Pakistan and India that as ISIS has arrived in the region and the TTP and Mujahideen-e-Hind have announced their allegiance to the terrorist groups, there must be concordance over responding to this violent threat.

No Nuke TerrorNo nuclear terrorism—conventional methods are preferredStepanova 14

Ekaterina, lead researcher and Head of the Peace and Conflict Studies Unit at the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Moscow. “HGP - Handbooks of Global Policy : Handbook of Global Security Policy.” March 2014. Pp 136-137. ProQuest.

The rise of “global terrorism” with universalist goals, increased attention to the possibility of the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by terrorists (Ranstorp and Normark, 2009). Although the specific challenges posed by what should be more accurately referred to as “unconventional” or “CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear) terrorism” should by no means be ignored, the level of attention to the potential use of WMD by terrorists appears to greatly outmatch the real scale of the threat (Pikayev and Stepanova, 2008). The main feature of terrorism as a form of political violence is that it seeks to create asymmetrical, disproportionately large political effect through the use of limited means. Consequently, weapons, explosives, means of delivery employed even in high-profile attacks

as in New York and Washington (2001), Madrid (2004), or London (2005) tend to be relatively available, inexpensive and not particularly sophisticated. When it comes to inflicting mass casualties and/or mass destruction, the main terrorist method remains conventional bombings. Less frequently, “unconventional” use of conventional means is involved (e.g. flying the hijacked civil aviation airliners into the World Trade Center and Pentagon buildings on September 11, 2001). Of only three mass-casualty terrorist attacks involving unconventional weapons since the 1970s, only one – the Aum Shinrikyo attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995 – actually aimed at mass casualties, but even that attack by a religious cult, whose unique fascination with unconventional weapons is very atypical for terrorist groups, resulted in less damage and disruption than most high-profile conventional terrorist attacks (Parachini,

2001). In sum, massive conventional attacks are incomparably more widespread, consistently more deadly and have caused more damage than unconventional attacks. In the future, terrorists may be more likely to experiment with targets (e.g. by increasingly targeting critical infrastructure such as transport, energy, water systems,

information and communication networks) than with weapons and materials, including unconventional means.

No nuclear terrorism—no facilities or expertise to create a bomb, and there are too many fail-safes on a stolen one Kelley 14

Maria, masters in Terrorism Intelligence with an emphasis on analyzing intelligence. “Terrorism and the growing threat of weapons of mass destruction : Al-Shabaab.” Pp 30-32. 2014. ProQuest.

The use of a nuclear weapon is significantly different than any other weapon of mass destruction for several reasons: the materials must be placed in only one of two ways inside the explosive device; manufacturing the materials 30 requires a significant amount of effort, skill, and equipment; only a few nations are confirmed to possess operational nuclear weapons; and deploying a nuclear weapon would be extremely difficult to deploy covertly. Energy for a nuclear weapon can be produced by either fission or fusion. Fission bombs are what are commonly referred to as atomic bombs (A-bombs) and fusion are commonly referred to as hydrogen bombs (H-bombs). There are two types of fission delivery device: gun-type and implosion device. In a gun-type device, "a high explosive is used to blow one subcritical piece of fissionable material from one end of the tube into another subcritical piece held at the opposite end of the tube" (FAS 1998). In an implosion device, a "high explosive is detonated inwardly" to create an implosion wave (FAS 1998). This wave "compresses the sphere of fissionable material" which then creates a larger explosion (FAS 1998). Fusion bombs are more complex but they are more powerful than a fission bomb. Fusion bombs require "heavy isotopes of hydrogen, deuterium, and tritium to release large numbers of neutrons" (NuclearWeaponArchive.org 2007). This occurs in two increments described as primary and secondary fusion stages. In the first, the "fusile...material is compressed by the energy released" and in the second, "the intense temperatures and pressures

generated by a fission explosion overcome the strong electrical repulsion that would otherwise keep the positively charged nuclei of the fusion fuel from reacting" (FAS 1998). In essence, the nuclear activity from the primary stage heats and compresses the nuclear material encasing the secondary fusion section of the weapon. The main isotopes needed for a nuclear weapon are uranium-235 (U-235) and plutonium-239 (Pu-239) although there are several less common isotopes that can be used but they are less effective

(NuclearWeaponArchive.org. 2007, FAS 1998). While these materials can be found in nature, they must be enriched to a very particular percentage to be suitable for a nuclear bomb. Therefore, after the material is mined, there are three ways to enrich the material to weapon-grade levels: gaseous diffusion, by gas centrifuge, or laser separation.

There are three ways in which a terrorist organization or individual could obtain weapon-grade nuclear material: enrichment of the material in their own facilities, theft of already prepared nuclear material, or illegal purchase of bomb-ready nuclear material. Because the weapon is delivered to its target via a nuclear warhead, exposure to the weapon will occur if individuals are within the weapon's damage radius: there is also fallout which are

the toxic fumes left after the explosion which can be carried as far as the wind will take the contaminated air. The level of expertise required for manipulating or creating nuclear materials is beyond common knowledge or simple Google searching. Elaborate facilities are required for enriching materials and building the bomb itself for delivery to its target. Additional facilities would then be required for the building of the ultimate delivery system. The images of what occurred at Hiroshima and Nagasaki gives a terrorist the illusion of the 'mother of all attacks'. Long lasting attention would be obtained around the globe if an organization were to successfully conduct a nuclear strike (Allison 2011). Detonation of a nuclear device would not just physically destroy infrastructure and result in mass casualties and deaths, it would also destroy all confidence in the government of the attacked country (Allison 2011, Berard 1985). Terrorists face numerous challenges and

hurdles in deploying nuclear weapons of this magnitude. Level of expertise required, the necessary equipment and laboratories, and the ability to conceal the nuclear warhead prior to deploying pose significant barriers. It has been noted that in the event that a terrorist is able to obtain a nuclear weapon by any means, because these weapons are immense they are difficult to move from one place to another

(RAND 1999). In addition, if terrorists obtained an already fabricated and detonation-capable nuclear weapon, many are "equipped with permissive action links (PALS) or other protective mechanisms designed to prevent accidental or unauthorized detonation" (RAND 1999). There are also some that have "tamper-proof seals that will disable the weapon if unauthorized personnel attempt to disassemble it" (RAND 1999). The report cited in this research provides many other hurdles to the acquisition and deployment of nuclear weapons by terrorist organizations.

Yes BioterrorYes bioterror—bioweapons are relatively easy to make or stealKelley 14

Maria, masters in Terrorism Intelligence with an emphasis on analyzing intelligence. “Terrorism and the growing threat of weapons of mass destruction : Al-Shabaab.” Pp 26-27. 2014. ProQuest.

There are twenty viral pathogens that are considered to have the potential for bioterrorism : “Variola major (Smallpox), Lassa fever, Ebola, Marburg, Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever, Machupo, Rift Valley fever, Monkeypox, Sin Nombre (Without Name), Junin, Tickborne encephalitis, Eastern equine encephalitis, Yellow fever, encephalitis, Hantaan, Western equine

encephalitis, Venezuelan Nipah, Chikun-Gunya fever (CHIK), Dengue fever, and Omsk fever” (Bokan 2003). Most viral pathogens are only hosted by humans, and due its viral characteristics, they are very stable and can remain active for extended periods of time outside of its host. 26 Transmission can occur via bodily fluids, objects, or excessive periods of close face to-face contact (Global Focus: Open Source Intelligence 2012). The latter can be achieved by releasing the virus in an enclosed public venue. Theft or purchase would be the most likely way of acquiring the pathogens already transformed and weaponized. Otherwise, it is possible to manufacture these bioweapons, the probability will depend on the means to do so. Fungal pathogens include Coccidioides immitis (Valley Fever/San Joaquin Valley Fever/Posadas’ disease— Note: NOT the same as Rift Valley fever) and Coccidioides

posadasii (those outside of California) (DHS 2009). These pathogens cause infections that are difficult to treat and no vaccinations are available to protect against them (DHS 2009). These pathogens can be found in soil and the prime

method of delivery would be by aerosol (Deresinski 2003). “They are highly infectious when aerosolized and sporulate easily in culture” (Federal Register 2002). Because materials are available in the environment, the only obstacle left would be extracting and multiplying the product. The necessary equipment “can be acquired legitimately for vaccine development on the open market” leaving only the issue of financing (Spiers 2010). Depending on the

group, this can either halt acquisition or simply not have any impact at all. Some pathogens can be obtained from sick or dead animals and then inject it into livestock for natural replication (Spiers 2010).

Once the pathogen is obtain, such as using the method last described, only an intermediate biology background or education can transform the blood of the infected animal into a deadly serum (Spiers 2010). It has been noted

that even breweries can be converted in just hours into a full producing laboratory (Spiers 2010). “Crude but viable methods to produce small quantities of [botulinum] toxin, have been found in terrorist training manuals” (Global Focus: Open Source Intelligence 2012). Clearly this demonstrates that the level of expertise required is not exclusive to doctors, biochemists, microbiologists.

A biological-terrorist attack threat is ginormous – laundry list of reasonsVicinanzo 15

/23 April 2015, Amanda Vicinanzo is an Editorial Assistant at Homeland Security Today. She earned her M.A. in Statecraft and National Security Affairs from the Institute of World Politics in Washington, DC. Biological Terrorist Attack On US An 'Urgent And Serious Threat', http://www.hstoday.us/briefings/daily-news-analysis/single-article/biological-terrorist-attack-on-us-an-urgent-and-serious-threat/0ce6ebf3524d83c537b1f4f0cc578547.html, spark/

In the wake of the recent Ebola crisis, the House Committee on Homeland Security’s Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness,

Response and Communications convened a hearing Wednesday to examine US preparedness for a bioterrorist attack. “The risk of a biological terrorist attack to America is an urgent and serious threat. A bioattack could cause illness and even kill hundreds of thousands of people, overwhelm our public health capabilities,

and create significant economic, societal and political consequences,” said subcommittee chairman Martha

McSally (R-Ariz). “Our nation’s capacity to prevent, respond to, and mitigate the impacts of biological terror incidents is a top national security priority.” Bioterrorist threat from ISIL and other terrorist organizations In her opening statement, McSally expressed concern over the possibility that the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and other

jihadi terrorist organizations could conduct a biological attack on American soil. “ISIL is better resourced, more brutal, and more organized than any terrorist group to date,” McSally said. “We know that they have an interest in using chemical and biological weapons.” Last year, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper warned the Syrian government might have advanced beyond the research and development stage and may have a restricted capacity

to manufacture weaponized disease agents. Counterterrorism officials have worried for years since the conflict in Syria began that ISIL may be able to get a hold of these biological weapons . Moreover, last

year, a laptop belonging to a Tunisian jihadist reportedly recovered from an ISIL hideout in Syria contained a hidden trove of secret plans, including instructions for weaponizing the bubonic plague and a document discussing the advantages of a biological attack. “The advantage of biological weapons is that they do not cost a lot of money, while the human casualties can be huge,” stated a document found on the laptop. In October, jihadists and supporters of ISIL stepped up discussions on jihadist social media websites about the possibility and ease of using Ebola, as well as other virulent pathogens and poisons, as weapons against the US and the West , according to reports by the Middle East Media Research Institute. Jim Talent, former Senator from Missouri and former vice-chair of The

Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, testified that the threat of a bioattack is “one of the greatest and gravest” facing the nation. Talent said that at the end of 2008, the 9/11

Commission issued the report, World at Risk, which addressed the threat posed by nuclear and biological weapons. Talent and former Sen. Bob Graham (D-Fla.) gave the biothreat greater emphasis, knowing that terrorists have acquired bio-weapons in the past, and that it’s likely easier for them to secure a bio-weapon than a nuclear weapon. The report stated, “We accept the validity of current intelligence estimates about the current rudimentary nature of terrorist capabilities in the area of biological weapons but caution that the terrorists are trying to upgrade their capabilities and could do so by recruiting skilled scientists. In this regard, the biological threat is greater than the nuclear; the acquisition of deadly pathogens, and their weaponization and dissemination in aerosol form, would entail fewer technical hurdles than the theft of production of weapons-grade uranium or plutonium and its assembly into an improvised nuclear device.” In addition, bio-weapons can be easily transported, stockpiled, can cause more deaths than a tactical nuclear weapon , and, depending on the biological agent used, the terrorists could launch an attack and escape the area before the authorities even knew that an attack had occurred, according to Talent. And he's not alone.

Seasoned and veteran counterterrorism officials agree that jihadi organizations appear to have a greater interest in acquiring and using biological and radiological weapons, and that Al Qaeda is known to have experimented with trying to weaponize a number of highly virulent pathogens . In 2005, Homeland

Security Today first reported that Al Qaeda had worked on plans to send squads of "bio-martyrs" who would deliberately infect themselves with a human transmittable strain of bird flu once such a strain become a human contagion or a human transmissible form clandestinely bio-engineering to be easily passed between humans, and then to spread the virus as widely around the world as they could by traveling on one international flight after another, officials said at the time. During the height of the Ebola outbreak, intelligence surfaced indicating that jihadi organizations were discussing doing the same thing with the Ebola virus.

With a long enough period of sanctuary where terrorists can plan, recruit and get together the necessary lab facilities and experts, they can isolate and weaponize . According to Talent, there are now areas, including in Iraq and Syria, where jihadists have the time and sanctuary to develop these weapons. Although an attack using biological agents or weapons is a low probability, high consequence event, “When you keep running risk and the risk continues to

grow, even gradually, eventually the bullet is in the chamber,” Talent said. On August 14, 2013, Homeland Security Today Editor-in-Chief Anthony Kimery and former CIA WMD counterterrorism unit chief Charles Faddis appeared in "Biopocalypse," an episode of the

SyFy Channel TV series, "Joe Rogan Questions Everything." The segment dealt with bio-terrorism, designer-hybrid pathogenic threats and unregulated DIY-bio genetics labs from out of which could emerge unregulated designer/hybrid pathogens. US response to Ebola outbreak highlights lack of bio preparedness The recent Ebola outbreak—the deadliest in history—has claimed the lives of over 10,000 and infected over 26,000, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). With no cure and a mortality rate as high as 90 percent, the Ebola epidemic serves as a grim reminder that even with the advent of modern medicine, the spread of deadly infectious diseases is not relegated to history. The World Health Organization (WHO) has been criticized for its slow response in the early months of the outbreak. Recently, WHO admitted to boggling the Ebola response, and released a list of lessons

learned as well as suggested reforms for moving forward. "The Ebola outbreak that started in December 2013 became a public health, humanitarian and socioeconomic crisis with a devastating impact on families, communities and affected countries,” WHO said in a statement. “It also served as a reminder that the world, including WHO, is ill-prepared for a large and sustained disease outbreak .” Like WHO, the United States also mishandled the Ebola outbreak, calling into question US bio preparedness, both for terrorism and pandemics or other emerging infectious diseases. McSally stated that bureaucracy, as well as a leadership vacuum, prevented an effective response

to the crisis. “Even after the Ebola response we cannot seem to identify the federal official who has the responsibility and authority to coordinate the dozen or so senior officials with responsibility for biological preparedness and defense,” McSally said. “It’s just baffling.” Earlier this month, Homeland Security Today reported that the post-9/11 Commission Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense arrived at the consensus that the government does not have a good answer to the question of who would be in charge if America was beset by a biological or chemical weapons attack. "The federal government has stated that a public health disaster or pandemic is one of the top strategic threats our country faces,"

said Dr. Kenneth Bernard, a former biodefense official in the Clinton and Bush administrations. "Yet, we were still largely unprepared for the Ebola outbreak this year. We're not managing our leadership properly ." Panel co-chair Tom Ridge said a “leadership vacuum” plagues response efforts – especially the response to a large-scale, mass casualty biological or chemical attack, which most public health and emergency public health authorities agree the US isn't prepared for

handling or mitigating. "Biological and chemical threats are among the most sinister our nation faces,"

Ridge said. "Terrorist groups have voiced their desire to obtain and use biological and chemical weapons. The Ebola crisis revealed significant gaps in US public health and medical preparedness. We must consider our current ability to defend against such threats and provide for the health and welfare of our citizens." The Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense plans to issue recommendations for changes to US law and policy later this year. In addition to lack of leadership, the US has also failed to effectively manage and oversee its inventory of pandemic preparedness supplies, including protective equipment and antiviral drugs. In October,

Homeland Security Today reported that by failing to implement controls to monitor its stockpiles, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) cannot be certain whether it has too little, too much or ineffective supplies for its personnel, especially those who will be needed on the front lines of a large-scale mass casualty attack or event. For example, the stockpile contained 4,982 bottles of hand sanitizer, 84 percent of which is expired, and the Transportation Security Administration’s stock of pandemic protective equipment included about 200,000 respirators that are beyond the 5-year usability guaranteed by the manufacturer. The glut in supplies means millions of dollars wasted on unnecessary drugs and equipment that need to be replaced in order to be continuously prepared. During a House

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform hearing, Rep. John Mica (R-Fla.) said, "We spent millions of dollars for a pandemic ... We don't know the inventory, we don't know who's got it, and we don't know who's gonna get it.” Moreover, according to Talent, the lack of sufficient medical countermeasures (MCMs) in our Strategic National Stockpile, and the lack of a system to quickly develop and produce MCMs during a crisis is the number one concern in US preparedness

for a bio attack. Talent stated, “The recent Ebola virus outbreak highlighted that unless countermeasures are immediately available, including diagnostics tests that can be used by clinicians who are evaluating suspected cases, therapeutics to treat cases and vaccines to protect health care workers and others at risk, we are left with fairly primitive means to respond to and contain such events.” However, “The list of bio-threat agents for which we should have diagnostics tests, therapeutics and vaccines for

is about a dozen. To date, our stockpile contains countermeasures for only three or four ,” Talent said. Public health and emergency preparedness As the largest port of entry in the US, New York City activated “a highly detailed, coordinated and expensive multiagency and multijurisdictional effort” in response to increasing cases of Ebola in West Africa last year. Preparedness efforts included development of detailed plans for disease surveillance by the health department, investigation of hundreds of suspect cases, extensive staff training at each of its eleven hospitals to be prepared to receive and screen individuals potentially exposed to the disease, and the designation and readying of Bellevue Hospital as the primary New York City Ebola treatment center. New York City also engaged the community by distributing over 100,000 “Am I at Risk?” palm cards and holding over 115 public events to discuss public health concerns. Marisa Raphael, deputy commissioner of the Office of Emergency Planning and Response for the NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, testified that federal funding played a critical role in the success of

the city’s response to the Ebola crisis. Raphael also stated, “The greatest danger to our progress is the decline in federal emergency preparedness funding.” Homeland Security Today reported just last week that, as Western counterterrorism and intelligence officials worry about the increasing potential for an Islamist jihadist group or inspired individual to carry out a chemical, biological or radiological mass casualty attack in the United States, combined federal, state and local public health spending has fallen below pre-recession levels at $75.4 billion in 2013 -- or $239 per person ($218 adjusted for inflation) compared to $241 per person in 2009, according the new Trust for America’s Health (TFAH) report, Investing in America's Health: A State-by-State Look at Public Health Funding and Key Health Facts. Adjusting for inflation, TFAH said, “public health spending was 10 percent lower in 2013 than in 2009. Public health and emergency preparedness funding for New York City has decreased 35 percent from its peak in Fiscal Year 2005, which has led to a 47 percent reduction in our public health preparedness and response workforce. Raphael said, “The erosion of a skilled, dedicated workforce including epidemiologists, laboratory technicians, and preparedness planners threatens to compromise our ability to detect and respond to disease outbreaks.” As Homeland Security Today earlier reported, the federal

funding cuts have not affected New York alone. “We cannot afford to let our guard down. We must remain vigilant in preparing for any potential mass casualty event. Yet, year after year, we see less and less funds going to the people who and departments that are responsible for preparing for a public health emergency,” TFAH Deputy Director Rich Hamburg told Homeland Security Today. Although New York demonstrated a high level of public health and emergency preparedness during the Ebola crisis, other large US cities remain vastly unprepared. Many do not access to the amount of funding or resources granted to New York. But beyond New York, hospitals in most major metropolitan cities are inadequately prepared for a surge of people infected with a highly contagious pathogen, a problem

Homeland Security Today has reported since 2004. University of Arizona College of Medicine Interim Dean Dr. Chuck Cairns said at the hearing that Tucson and Phoenix could not respond to a biological threat such as Ebola the way a city like New York can “I don’t think Tucson and Phoenix would have that same experience or resources," he said. “Generally speaking, federal budgets designed to support public health and health care system preparedness and response capabilities must be increased and sustained, this is as true for New York City as it is for localities nationwide, particularly dense urban centers ,” said Raphael.

No BioterrorNo bioterror—can’t weaponized the agentGBD 14, publishes the latest news and insights pertaining to health threats from pathogens, emerging infectious diseases and CBRN agents, (Global Biodefense, May 20, 2014, “Capabilities Analysis of Bioterrorism: Roadblocks Facing Non-State Actors’ Use of Bioweapons”, http://globalbiodefense.com/2014/05/20/bioterrorism-roadblocks-facing-non-state-actors-use-of-bioweapons/)

Once a non-state actor has made it past the first hurdle and acquired an agent, the real work begins. Weaponizing an agent through cultivation (the process of growing biological pathogens) and dissemination (spreading the pathogen to individuals for disease transmission) are two of the most technically demanding and failure-prone components of bioterrorism. While terrorists with financial resources can gain access to laboratory equipment for weaponizing, as it is technically “dual-use”, this does not guarantee proficiency using it. Dual use refers to the fact that the equipment needed for creating bioweapons is the same equipment needed to help isolate pathogens for vaccine or treatment research. Figure 3 provides a clear view of how dual use can work to the bioterrorist’s advantage

(Thompson, 2006). All the laboratory equipment is commercially available, albeit pricey. After purchasing the equipment (glassware, desktop fermenter, and standard nutrient media) and obtaining the pathogen, the ability to isolate and grow the

pathogen comes into play. Viruses are the most difficult in that they cannot live outside a living cell, but require fertilized eggs in which to grow. Just as Aum Shinrikyo attempted to isolate toxin strains of botulism from soil, they ran into the necessity for technical knowledge needed to isolate large quantities via enrichment materials (Thompson, 2006; Tucker, 2000).

Purifying toxins is especially difficult. Rosenau noted that, “botulinum toxins are extremely difficult to purify, particularly in

large quantities, and are highly unstable in pure from. Purification entails the separation of the toxin from the cells that create it. The difficulty of producing a sufficiently pure toxin is compounded by the fact that the protein-destroying enzyme is generated at the same time as the toxin. Maintaining the toxicity of the material as it is purified is extremely difficult” (Rosenau, 2001). U.S. government researchers have found that attempts to reach 95% purity (the level to truly cause mass illness) reduces the amount of the toxin to 70-80%

(Rosenau, 2001). Toxins especially degrade quickly when exposed to sunlight and air, which means they can lose their efficacy by a rate of 4% per minute (Rosenau, 2001). The same issue also arises when attempting to isolate a toxic form of anthrax. Anthrax is naturally occurring in soil and does not cause illness (except in livestock and rare cases of humans), but isolating and transforming specific B. anthracis dormant spores into active, aerosolized particles is technically very complex (Zubay, 2005). The spore itself is highly resistant to environmental stresses but is also very unstable in its vegetative state, which requires extensive microbiological knowledge and experience to cultivate spores and not kill them when they are in the vegetative state. Attempts to isolate and grow B. anthracis are also compounded by the knowledge needed to identify the correct strain (Rosenau, 2001; Zubay, 2005). There are several bacillus species, but identifying and growing the correct one requires years of knowledge. Once the correct bacteria is isolated, awaking it from the dormant state becomes progressively challenging, as it requires heat or chemical shock without killing the pathogen (Zubay, 2005; Roseanu, 2001). Bacteria are probably the easiest of the pathogens to isolate and cultivate, but viruses are considerably more difficult. Both Rajneeshees and Aum Shinrikyo had considered obtaining and utilizing viruses

like Ebola (a viral hemorrhagic fever) and HIV (Carus, 2002; Tucker, 2000). Viruses like those that appeal to terrorists are extremely difficult to isolate and grow, as the required host cells must be living . Consider the weaponization

of influenza, which is easier to obtain naturally than any other category A or B agent. Viruses may require genetic engineering, which becomes considerably more taxing on both technical knowledge and equipment . Influenza, while a naturally occurring virus, frequently mutates or has antigenic drifts, which is the reason for new flu vaccines every year. Antigenic shifts are major changes in the virus’s proteins, which make novel influenzas a risk for pandemics, as there is no immunity to such

massive gene segment changes. Zubay has noted that, “key characteristics of good bioterrorist weapons are ease of production and ease of obtaining the pathogens” (Zubay, 2006). Ironically, of all the prospected viruses, influenza meets this criteria. However, it has not been utilized like bacteria as a bioweapon, which may reflect substantial specialized knowledge needed for

such a task. The technical hurdles associated with pathogen cultivation make this one of the greatest

roadblocks for non-state actors with limited resources, technical knowledge, and temporal restrictions. Aum Shinrikyo spent years working on weaponizing their agents, which began to erode morale, monetary resources, and

interest in bioterrorism. (Tucker, 2000). Enemark pointed out that, “it is simply not enough to be able to grow a biological agent that makes people sick. In addition, the agent must be kept alive, it must be of a strain that is lethal to humans” (Enemark, 2006). Professional Expertise The technical knowledge and experience necessary for isolating, cultivating, and weaponizing pathogens for bioweapons is a particular hurdle that has prevented several terrorist organizations from being successful. Given the technical difficulty in housing, cultivating, and weaponizing an agent, the need for persons trained in virology, pathology, or microbiology is crucial. The mental degradation of Aum Shinrikyo members through drug use and paranoia is suggested to have severely reduced their ability continue such technically proficient work (Tucker, 2000). While drug use and paranoia was rampant in Aum, these matters were coupled with general technical hurdles that required substantial scientific experience to solve the issues. Aum’s head microbiologist and bioweapons specialist, Seiichi Endo, was unable to cultivate a lethal strain of botulism, which most likely was a result of his inexperience in microbiology (Rosenau, 2001). Endo was trained as a molecular biologist, not a microbiologist, so as their head of bioweapons he significantly lacked the necessary technical expertise. The Amerithrax attacks highlight the extensive expertise that is needed for large-scale, complex biological attacks. Anthrax, as previously discussed, is extremely volatile and difficult to weaponize, which is why the suspect was believed to be an extremely experienced microbiologist with years of experience not just in the field, but also

with that particular organism. Acquiring a lethal strain of anthrax or botulinum is especially difficult as there are several strains that can be harmless. Only an experienced researcher or laboratory microbiologist would know how to isolate and cultivate the lethal strains. The Rajneeshees were able to easily acquire S. typhirium (arriving on bactrol disks) and grow the bacteria in larger quantities as a result of an experienced laboratory technician who also manufactured it into liquid form (Carus, 2002). The ability to transfer and grow bacteria, especially salmonella, is far easier than that of

botulinum or anthrax, but still requires a basic understanding of the laboratory practices. Knowledge and skills to use the equipment is also a considerable hurdle. Laboratory equipment, especially that needed to isolate and weaponize mass quantities of bacteria or virus, is extremely complex and can be dangerous. Equipment misuse or poor technique can be devastating to the individual working on the experiment. Tucker found that “because of sloppy laboratory practices, members of the Aum Shinrikyo cult reportedly became infected with Q-fever, a rickettsial disease they were prepping as a biological weapon. Even cult leader Shoko Asahara is believed to have acquired the debilitating illness” (Tucker, 2000).

No bioterror—can’t disseminate the agentGBD 14, publishes the latest news and insights pertaining to health threats from pathogens, emerging infectious diseases and CBRN agents, (Global Biodefense, May 20, 2014, “Capabilities Analysis of Bioterrorism: Roadblocks Facing Non-State Actors’ Use of Bioweapons”, http://globalbiodefense.com/2014/05/20/bioterrorism-roadblocks-facing-non-state-actors-use-of-bioweapons/)

Dissemination is considered to be the greatest of hurdles in bioterrorism. Tucker has noted that although “persistent chemical agents such as sulfur mustard and VX nerve gas are readily absorbed through the intact skin, no bacteria or viruses can enter the body by any route unless the skin is already broken. Thus, BW agents must either be ingested or inhaled to cause infection”

(Tucker, 2000). A biological weapon must have a means of transmission, and to be effective, this transmission should reach as many people as possible. Aerosolization There are several routes of dissemination, but

the one most attempted and of most concern to biosecurity experts is aerosolization . Aerosolization is a

means of creating a cloud that contains the infectious agents via microscopic droplets for victims to inhale. Respiratory inhalation is the most dangerous form for both plague and anthrax, which underscores the appeal that aerosolization has for terrorists. Aerosolization also has the capacity to infect large numbers of people over substantial geographical spaces. Calculations found that 100 kilograms of anthrax spread over Washington, D.C., could kill 1-3 million people, versus a one-megaton nuclear warhead, which would kill a maximum of 1.9 million (Carus, 2002). The Amerithrax attacks were a good example of aerosolization in the most rudimentary, non-technical delivery form. The perpetrator did not

develop an aerosolization method, but rather the spores were so finely prepared that they easily traveled in the air. While this route

of dissemination is the most appealing, it also had the largest technical hurdles. For effective inhalation, the particles in an aerosol cloud have to be roughly 1-5 microns (one-millionth of a meter) in size (Carus, 2002). Particles larger than 5 microns will be caught through the respiratory tract filter and often are too heavy to travel, thus they fall quickly and are not as effective voyagers.

Aum Shinrikyo is one particular group that attempted to use aerosolization in the truest technical form (Carus, 2002). By developing delivery systems like sprayers that aerosolize pathogens into a cloud, terrorists can discretely release large amounts of bioweapons into a wide geographical area. Aerosolization, however, is an extremely complicated process. To spread an agent through the air, it must be in either liquid (slurry) or dry form, which in and of itself is an arduous task. Those preparing it must then address both physical issues (to ensure the sprayer nozzles do not become clogged) and biological issues (to ensure that the organisms can survive once aerosolized). An agent in liquid form can be aerosolized using a modified

commercially available sprayer, but problems remain. Most agents die in the spraying process- estimates range as high as 99% (Rosenau, 2001). “In contrast, a dry agent is relatively simple to disseminate, but most experts agree producing it is a dangerous process almost certainly beyond the capabilities of non-state actors” (Carus, 2002). Rosenau also noted that to truly cause massive casualties, an aerosolized cloud, not just sprayed material (like Windex), is needed (Rosenau, 2001). The slurry form of a pathogen can quickly clog spraying canisters or fall to the bottom of the container, rendering it ineffective. Aum Shinrikyo experienced this with their attempts to spread what they believed to be B. anthracis from a rooftop building in Tokyo. The bacteria slurry, which was actually a harmless anthrax strain, was not refrigerated until the very last minute, so the

slurry settled at the bottom (Tucker, 2000). A pathogen in liquid or slurry state is also more difficult to aerosolize, as its size is larger, so it tends to fall more quickly. Rosenau also noted that bacteria tend to die more quickly in a slurry form as they are aerosolized (Rosenau, 2001). Perhaps one of the biggest issues with aerosolization is the fact that the pathogens tend to lose their toxicity not only in the aerosolization process, but also as they enter the atmosphere. Environmental conditions, which will be discussed later, pose serious risks to the viability of pathogens. Overall, aerosolization is the most effective dissemination strategy, but also has the largest number of complications. Aerosolization, while the most appealing as it can lead to higher efficacy if done correctly, poses the largest amount of technical obstacles for non-state actors to

overcome. The delivery system requires substantial technological prowess, but also the form of the pathogen can alter the efficacy of the aerosolization. Dry or slurry format can create problems in the actual delivery device, as well as efficacy for the pathogen to stay within 1-5 microns in size and travel considerable distances.

No bioterror—environmental conditionsGBD 14, publishes the latest news and insights pertaining to health threats from pathogens, emerging infectious diseases and CBRN agents, (Global Biodefense, May 20, 2014, “Capabilities Analysis of Bioterrorism: Roadblocks Facing Non-State Actors’ Use of Bioweapons”, http://globalbiodefense.com/2014/05/20/bioterrorism-roadblocks-facing-non-state-actors-use-of-bioweapons/)

Environmental conditions like sunlight, rain, humidity, temperature, wind, and altitude clearly impact the efficacy of a bioterrorism attempt. Microorganisms are uniquely susceptible to environmental degradation, which makes this component an especially difficult hurdle to account for when planning an attack. Wind Environmental and meteorological conditions are surprisingly a large component of the

successful bioterrorism attacks. Wind speeds and direction present a serious hurdle for aerosolization attempts. Environmental conditions, specifically wind, create large variation in outcomes, which could defeat the organization pursing

them. Aerosolization is the most effective method of dissemination, but beyond its technical hurdles, it is also the most susceptible to environmental conditions. Particles must be between 1-5 microns for effective

inhalation and aerosolization devices. Wind can carry pathogen particles far distances, but it can also greatly diminish the efficacy of dissemination. Rosenau has noted that, “if wind speed is less than 5 mph, the aerosol will be limited in coverage. If wind speed exceeds 30 mph the aerosol disintegrates, loses its integrity, and effects on the target cannot be predicted” (Rosenau, 2001). Wind was a particular issue for Aum Shinrikyo’s attempt to release anthrax from a building rooftop in downtown Tokyo. Their aerosolization attempts were usually from high buildings during the summer months with little wind, strong sunlight, and high amounts of smog and rain (Rosenau, 2001). The role of environmental conditions was further reinforced by the success of their sarin attacks, which were in confined areas with small bursts of wind from subways. Tucker also notes that only under the most stable atmospheric conditions do aerosol clouds stay close to the ground, where they can be dispersed

and inhaled (Tucker, 2000). There is also concern that wind direction may pose risks for the terrorist group. If

specific populations (such as stadiums and public gatherings) are the target, then a change in wind direction could put not only the organization at risk, but also untargeted persons . Heat & Humidity Heat, moisture, and precipitation can also severely impact the ability to release a pathogen into the environment. Most agents are extremely vulnerable to sunlight and heat. Biological agents released in the day,

like those used by Aum Shinrikyo, have significantly higher failure rates. UV radiation is a significant vulnerability for microorganisms, with many unable to survive longer than 30 minutes in sunlight . While anthrax is able to

survive these tough conditions as a result of its induced spore form, humidity in the air may hinder its ability to disperse

(Tucker, 2000). Rainy seasons and environments with relative high humidity levels can prevent microorganisms from aerosolizing. Recent studies analyzing the role of humidity and temperature on the transmission of influenza found that relative humidity (RH) levels played a large role. In high RH (80%), influenza droplets settle too rapidly, making aerosolized transmission exceedingly difficult. Aerosolized transmission was highest at low RH (20-35%) and at some higher RH levels (65%), but not beyond 80%. The lowest transmission occurred at medium and extremely high RH levels. The study also found that transmission efficacy was inversely correlated with temperature. Lower temperatures (5°C) permitted a statistically significant higher rate of transmission compared to 20 °C (Lowen, 2007). Given the role of humidity and temperature on pathogen survival and aerosolized

transmission, finding conducive environmental conditions may be exceedingly difficult. Altitude of Dissemination

Altitude draws upon all of the aforementioned environmental conditions. As Aum Shinrikyo found through their

rooftop dissemination attempt, locations too high may face wind, rain, and smog conditions that render these attempts useless. The oxygen levels of high altitude conditions can also increase the rate of microbial decay, as some bacteria are aerobic, meaning they require oxygen. The biggest concern with high-altitude dissemination attempts is the role of wind and geographical distance . Wind changes can alter the course of

pathogen distribution, but also inhibit its spread. Higher altitude locations will have higher wind speeds, which will break down the aerosol’s integrity. Aum Shinrikyo thought that a higher building would equate to a larger geographical distribution, however, it also heavily contributed to their failure (Thompson, 2006; Rosenau, 2001).