Impact Defense Compilation - HSS 2014

HSS Impact Defense File

Arctic War

1NC Arctic War

No risk of Arctic War in the squo – cooperation and diplomacyBukkvoll 11Tor Bukkvoll, Visiting fellow at The Leverhulme Program on the Changing Character of War, University of Oxford, 9/22/11, (“Prospects for peace and cooperation in the Arctic”, http://valdaiclub.com/russia_and_the_world/31960.html)//AW On a related note, one must also keep in mind that while there is nothing inevitable about a deterioration of relations in the Arctic , the fact that it can or will be avoided should also not be taken for granted. The chances for building peaceful relations in the Arctic are good, but it will demand serious focus, a great deal of dialogue and willingness to compromise from the states involved. Regional cooperation arrangements such as the Arctic and Barents Councils can also play an important role in this regard. Despite the reasons for conflict discussed above, the conditions for conflict resolution through peaceful means are probably more promising in the Arctic than in many other regions where similar conflicts exist. First, all the states concerned , to varying degrees, are relatively economically developed and politically stable . They are therefore likely to be more predictable in their policies than less economically developed and politically stable states. Second, a comprehensive basis of agreements and normative acts for regulating bilateral relations in the area already exist s. Third, civilian cooperation among the Arctic states is expanding on issues such as maritime search and rescue and environmental monitoring, to mention just two. Such cooperation could also be expected to have a spillover effect into the security realm. Fourth, in military terms the most significant players in the Arctic – the US A and Russia – face much greater security challenges elsewhere in the world. The USA is concerned by the rise of China’s military capacity, their continued ability to be a significant military player if the Pacific, and the defense of U.S. interests in a number of hot spots in the developing world. Russia is concerned by the significant potential for political upheaval along its southern and eastern borders, in addition to also keeping an eye on China’s rising military might. Thus, both countries could be expected to work particularly hard to avoid the Arctic becoming yet another area of instability . Fifth, to some extent the Arctic five share a common interest in limiting non-Arctic states’ access to the region . On the one hand this could lead to greater cooperation among the Arctic five on limiting outside influence , but on the other hand it could also lead to conflict between them should differences of opinion arise about what the role of “outsiders” should be or whether some should be given priority over others.

2NC Arctic War

The Arctic is safe – no miscalc, intentions are benignRybachenkov 13 (Vladimir, Counselor for nuclear affairs at the Russian embassy in Washington, Lecturere at Carnagie-Plowshare, “The Arctic: region of multilateral cooperation or platform for military tension?”, http://english.ruvr.ru/2013_04_03/The-Arctic-region-of-multilateral-cooperation-or-platform-for-military-tension/) Some western media have recently been highlighting the view that military conflicts in the struggle to secure the Arctic 's natural resources are inevitable . Russia is carefully monitoring developments in polar region and considers the general situation in the area to be positive, stable and , on the whole, predictable , based on the assumption that there are no immediate issues that might call for a military solution . This assessment has recently been confirmed in a report by the Stockholm Institute for Peace Research (SIPRI), which refuted recent conjecture about a polar arms race. ¶ It is commonly recognised that there are currently three major factors determining the Arctic situation; Firstly, the end to military and political confrontation from the Cold War when the Arctic was almost exclusively seen in the context of flight trajectories for strategic nuclear weapons as well a route for nuclear submarine patrols. Now the threat of a global nuclear war is substantially reduced , with US–Russian arms control treaties being a key element in the gradual movement towards a world without nuclear weapons. Impartial assessment of the arms control proces s shows that both countries' nuclear potentials have steadily diminished over the last 20 years . The START 1 treaty resulted in the removal of about 40% of the nuclear weapons deployed in Russia and the USA while the 2010 New START treaty provided for their further fourfold reduction. Substantial efforts have also been made by both countries to reduce the likelihood of accidental nuclear launches due to unauthorised actions or misunderstandings: strategic nuclear bombers were taken off full time alert and “Open ocean targeting" was mutually agreed, meaning that in the event of an accidental launch, the missile would be diverted to land in the open ocean . Two other factors were contributing to the opening up of new opportunities in the Arctic: the emergence of new technologies and rapid thawing of the Arctic ice, both rendering natural resources and shipping routes more accessible. It should also be noted that the ice-cap depletion also has a military dimension, namely the gradual increase of US multipurpose nuclear submarines and the deployment of missile defence AEGIS warships in the Northern Seas may be considered by Russia as a threat to its national security. Russia was the first Arctic state to adopt , in 2008, a long term policy report in response to the new realities , it pointed to the Arctic region as a, “strategic resource base for the country" which would require the development of a new social and economic infrastructure as well as an upgrading of military presence in the region to safeguard the Arctic territory. The document however underlined that there was no question of militarising the Arctic and expressed the importance of sub-regional and international cooperation to form a favourable social, cultural and economic space. ¶ All other Arctic states have adopted similar strategies with the key common point being a statement that the national interests of each Arctic state can only be met through multilateral cooperation. ¶ A “race" for territory, energy and seafood has been curtailed by historical decisions taken at the 2008 Ilulissat (Greenland) meeting when five Arctic coastal states

declared that their basic framework for future cooperation, territorial delimitation, resolution of disputes and competing claims would be the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS ).

No risk of war – empirics are conclusiveHong 11Nong, Postdoctoral fellow with the China Institute, University of Alberta, Deputy Director at the Research Centre for Oceans Law and Policy, National Institute for the South China Sea Studies, ‘Arctic Energy: Pathway to Conflict or Cooperation in the High North?’, http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=310:arctic-energy-pathway-to-conflict-or-cooperation-in-the-high-north&catid=116:content0411&Itemid=375 While there are disagreements between the Arctic states on maritime boundaries, there are still reasons to believe that these disagreements can be resolved amicably . The prospect for conflicts relating to unresolved boundary disputes seems remote . The existing vehicles for dispute resolution and cooperation in the region, UNCLOS and the Arctic Council, will also help to reduce tensions. Joint management of resource fields is another option that might come into play as countries involved in a dispute might see more advantage in approaching the disagreement this way rather than losing a claim in an international tribunal. Cooperation between Norway and Iceland regarding the development of the Dreki field could serve as a model for similar arrangements in the future. Another example is the continental shelf dispute concerning an area rich in natural gas between Russia and Norway i n the Barents Sea . Both countries dispute the other's interpretation of where their borders extend into the offshore EEZ . While it is possible that there could be a conflict between the two countries over this area, it seems highly unlikely given the potential costs versus the potential benefits. Geopolitical issues are not exclusively conflicts over interests, although such concerns tend to dominate. They can also reflect cooperative, multilateral initiatives by which a state pursues its interests vis-à-vis others. Such cooperative ventures are often considered desirable and even unavoidable when a state is seeking a result that cannot be achieved unilaterally . At the same time, cooperation frequently establishes a level of governance – in some cases formally, in others less formally – by which mutual understanding can clarify intentions and help to build trust. Recognizing and respecting each others rights constitutes the legal basis for cooperation between Arctic and non- Arctic states . In accordance with UNCLOS and other relevant international laws, Arctic states have sovereign rights and jurisdiction in their respective areas in the region, while non-Arctic states also enjoy rights of scientific research and navigation. To develop a partnership of cooperation, Arctic and non-Arctic states should, first and foremost, recognize and respect each other's rights under the international law. Examples between Arctic and non-Arctic states are there. On 22 November 2010, the Sovcomflot Group (SCF) and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) signed a strategic long-term cooperation agreement. The parties agreed to develop a long-term partnership in the sphere of seaborne energy solutions, with the SCF fleet serving the continually growing Chinese imports of hydrocarbons. Taking into account the significant experience gained by Sovcomflot in developing the transportation of hydrocarbons in the Arctic seas, SCF and CNPC agreed upon the format for coordination in utilizing the transportation potential of the Northern Sea Route along Russia’s Arctic coast, both for delivering transit shipments of hydrocarbons and for the transportation of oil and gas from Russia’s developing Arctic offshore fields to China. A new fleet of tankers designed to operate in ice as well as additional heavy-duty ice breakers will be built to that end. South Korea´s Samsung Industries is looking into filling the technological gap to make it possible to deliver Arctic natural gas across the

pacific ocean to East Asia. Russia is building massive duel-bowed oil tankers that are set to come into use as soon as next year. While traveling forward, the ships move as they normally would through open water. But when the vessels move backward, they can act as ice-breakers. Construction is underway on two 70,000-tonne ships and two more 125,000 tonne ships and there are rumors that another five are on order.

China-US War

1NC No US-China WarUS-China war won’t escalateDobbins, 2012 (James Dobbins, directs the International Security and Defense Policy Center at the RAND Corporation, previously served as American Ambassador to the European Community and Assistant Secretary of State, August/September 2012, “War with China,” Survival, Vol. 54, No. 4, p. 7-24)

It is important to begin any such analysis by recognising that China is seeking neither territorial aggrandisement nor ideological sway over its neighbour s . It shows no interest in matching US military expenditures,

achieving a comparable global reach , or assuming defence commitments beyond its immediate periphery. Such intentions might change, but if so, the United States would probably receive considerable warning, given the lead times needed to develop such capabilities. Despite cautious and pragmatic Chinese policies, the risk of conflict with the United States remains, and this risk will grow in consequence and perhaps in probability as China’s strength increases. Among the sources of conflict most likely to occasion a China–US military clash over the next 30 years, listed in descending order of probability, are changes in the status of North Korea and Taiwan, Sino-American confrontation in cyberspace, and disputes arising from China’s uneasy relationships with Japan and India. All these sources are on China’s immediate periphery, where Chinese security interests and capabilities seem likely to remain

focused. It is important to stress that a China–US military conflict is not probable in any of these cases, but that judgement is based on the view that the United States will retain the capacity to deter behaviour that could lead to such a clash throughout this period.

2NC No US-China War

Recent Summit solved military relationsRudd ‘13[Kevin Rudd, former prime minister of Australia, “A subtle defrosting in China’s chilly war with America” Financial Times, June 10, 2013, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/594776d2-d1ba-11e2-9336-00144feab7de.html#axzz2WXapvlZM]High quality global journalism requires investment. Please share this article with others using the link below, do not cut & paste the article. See

our Ts&Cs and Copyright Policy for more detail. ¶ In Beijing analysts still struggle to define the precise state of the China-US relationship. As one said to me recently: “Bu shi rezhan, bu shi lengzhan; er shi liangzhan.” Or, in the Queen’s English: “It’s not a hot war, it’s not a cold war; it’s more like a chilly war.”¶ The problem for leaders, diplomats and analysts is that the relationship defies simple definition. Variants range from “strategic engagement”, “strategic co-operation” and “strategic competition” to “China as a responsible global

stakeholder”.¶ The problem with these ideas is that they mean very little to the Chinese . The phrase that hits home in both capitals these days is “strategic trust deficit” – a gap between China and the US which, if left unchecked, could destabilise the entire Asia-Pacific region.¶ Such a deficit is potentially disastrous for both parties. We see it in the world of cyber espionage and cyber warfare; in escalating tensions in the East and South China Seas, where hundreds of naval and air assets are deployed; in escalating tensions on the Korean

peninsula; and in the UN Security Council stalemate over Syria.¶ That is why the working summit between presidents Barack Obama of the US and Xi Jinping of China at the weekend was so important . There had been no high-level political mechanism for the two sides to manage these and other apparently intractable challenges facing the regional and global order.¶ With this summit, with more to follow, we at last have the capacity to build such a mechanism. The fact is, unless the Chinese president himself (simultaneously chairman of the Central Military Commission and general secretary of the Communist party) engages personally in negotiations with his US counterpart, China’s political system is geared to the defence of the status quo. In the US, the secretaries both of state and defence are able to make some strategic calls in negotiations. But their Chinese counterparts are not even among the 250 most senior officials in the party hierarchy. Only the president, in consultation with the other six

members of the Politburo Standing Committee, can make the genuinely big calls.¶ Despite opposition in both capitals, both presidents decided to depart from the diplomatic conventions that have governed relations for the past 40 years and convened a working summit, free of the pomp normally associated with state visits . This is a success in its own right. More importantly, both camps are privately delighted by the tone, depth and content of this first engagement, with

neither expecting a laundry list of deliverables. Nobody present saw this as the “cyber summit” described in the US media.¶ So, what are the outcomes? First, the agreement to establish a regular military-to-military dialogue is critical . It could contribute to rules of the road on cyber security ; crisis management for the Korean peninsula ; the

management of incidents at sea and in the air as well as creating a mechanism to develop basic confidence and security-building measures for the region.¶ Second, the summit represented the first systematic engagement and calibration between the two nations on the future of North Korea, including their reported public commitment to prevent Pyongyang acquiring nuclear weapons. Third, there was agreement on climate change, perhaps reflecting the start of a commitment to make the global rules-based order more effective.¶ No one should expect Chinese policy to change quickly. Much could go wrong. But, without a programme of working bilateral summitry, there is little prospect of getting much of strategic importance right. After 20 years of drift in the relationship – following the elimination of the Soviet threat, which for the previous 20 years provided the underlying rationale for co-operation

– this meeting could mark the start of a new period of detente . We were headed towards strategic competition – or worse. We may now have the capacity to build sufficient trust in the relationship, creating a framework to manage the growing complexity of bilateral, regional and global challenges the nations face.¶ It could even lead to what Mr Xi himself described as “a new model of great power relations” for the future, one that does not mindlessly replicate the bloody history of the rise and fall of great powers in centuries past.

2NC No Oil War

China oil wars won’t happen Victor 07 (David G. Victor – professor at the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies and director of the School’s new Laboratory on International Law and Regulation, The National Interest, 2007, “What Resource Wars?” http://irps.ucsd.edu/dgvictor/publications/Faculty_Victor_Article_2007_What%20Resource%20Wars_The%20National%20Interest.pdf)

Among the needed resources, oil has been the most visible. Indeed, Chinese state-owned oil companies are dotting Africa, Central Asia and the Persian Gulf with projects aimed to export oil back home. The overseas arm of India's state oil company has followed a similar strategy-unable to compete head-to-head with the major Western companies, it focuses instead on areas where human- rights abuses and bad governance keep be major oil companies at bay

and where India's foreign policy can open doors. To a lesser extent, Malaysia engages in the same behavior. The American threat industry rarely sounds the alarm over Indian and Malaysian efforts, though, in part because those firms have less capital so splash around and mainly because their stories just don't compare with fear of the rising dragon. These efforts to lock up resources by going out fit well with the standard narrative for resource wars--a

zero-sum struggle for vital supplies. But ? To be sure, the struggle over resources has yielded a wide array of commercial conflicts as companies duel for con- tracts and ownership. State-owned China National Offshore Oil Corporation's (CNOOC) failed

bid to acquire U.S.-based Unocal-and with it Unocals valuable oil and gas supplies in Asia-is a recent example. But that is hardly unique to re- sources-similar conflicts with tinges of national security arise in the control over ports, aircraft engines, databases laden with private information and a growing array of advanced technologies for which civilian and military functions are hard to distinguish.

These disputes win and lose some friendships and contracts, but they do not unleash violence. Most

importantly, China's going-out strategy is unlikely to spur resource wars because it simply does not work , a

lesson the Chinese are learning. Oil is a fungible commodity , and when it is sourced far from China it is better to sell (and buy) the oil on the world market. The best estimates suggest that only about one-tenth of the oil produced overseas by Chinese investments (so-called "equity oil") actually makes it back to the country. So, thus far, the largest beneficiaries of China's strategy are the rest of the world’s oil consumers-first and foremost the Unit- ed States-who gain because China subsidize: production. . Until recently, the strategy of going out for oil looked like a good bet for China's interests. But,

despite threat-industry fear-mongering, we need not worry that it will continue over the long term because Chinese enterprises are already poised to follow a new strategy that is less likely to engender conflict . The past strategy rested on a trifecta of passing fads. One fad was the special access that Chinese state enterprises had to cheap capital from the government and by retaining their earnings. The ability to direct that spigot to political projects is diminishing as China engages in reforms that expose state enterprises to the real cost of capital and as the Chinese state and its enterprises look for better commercial returns on the money they invest. Second, nearly all the equity-oil investments overseas have occurred since the late 1990s, as prices have been rising. Each has looked much smarter than the last because of the surging value of oil in the ground. But that trend is slowing in many places because the cost of discovering and developing oil resources is rising.

Competitiveness

1NC Competitiveness High Competitiveness resilient and high – structural factors Krishnadev Calamur 13 is an editor at NPR in DC, NPR, “U.S. Competitiveness Up, Ranking Fifth, Survey Says”, 9/4/2013, http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2013/09/04/218902510/u-s-competitiveness-up-ranking-fifth-survey-says

U.S. competitiveness among global economies suffered after the 2008 global economic crisis. Four years after the crisis, the U.S. slipped in the World Economic Forum's annual competitiveness ranking. This year it's back up a bit: The U.S. rose to fifth position overall from seventh last year, in the forum's latest survey, which was released Wednesday. Here's what the survey says about the U.S., the world's largest economy: "Overall, many structural features continue to make the US economy extremely productive. US companies are highly sophisticated and innovative, supported by an excellent university system that collaborates admirably with the business sector in R&D. Combined with flexible labor markets and the scale opportunities afforded by the sheer size of its domestic economy — the largest in the world by far — these qualities continue to make the United States very competitive.

Cyber

1NC No Cyber ImpactZero Threat of Cyber Attack – their ev is hypeSinger, 12 (Peter – Director 21st Century Defense Initiative, November, “The Cyber Terror Bogeyman” Armed Forces Journal, http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2012/11/cyber-terror-singer)

About 31,300. That is roughly the number of magazine and journal articles written so far that discuss the phenomenon of cyber terrorism.

Zero. That is the number of people that who been hurt or killed by cyber terrorism at the time this went to press. In many

ways, cyber terrorism is like the Discovery Channel’s “Shark Week,” when we obsess about shark attacks despite the fact that you are roughly 15,000 times more likely to be hurt or killed in an accident involving a toilet. But by looking at how terror groups actually use the

Internet, rather than fixating on nightmare scenarios, we can properly prioritize and focus our efforts. Part of the problem is the way we talk about the issue. The FBI defines cyber terrorism as a “premeditated, politically motivated attack against information, computer systems, computer programs and data which results in violence against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.” A key word there is “violence,” yet many discussions sweep all sorts of nonviolent online mischief into the “terror” bin. Various reports lump together everything from Defense Secretary Leon Panetta’s recent statements that a terror group might launch a “digital Pearl Harbor” to Stuxnet-like sabotage (ahem, committed by state forces) to hacktivism, WikiLeaks and credit card fraud. As one congressional staffer put it, the way we use a term like cyber terrorism “has as much clarity as cybersecurity — that is, none at

all.” Another part of the problem is that we often mix up our fears with the actual state of affairs . Last year, Deputy

Defense Secretary William Lynn, the Pentagon’s lead official for cybersecurity, spoke to the top experts in the field at the RSA Conference in San Francisco. “It is possible for a terrorist group to develop cyber-attack tools on their own or to buy them on the black market,” Lynn warned.

“A couple dozen talented programmers wearing flip-flops and drinking Red Bull can do a lot of damage.” The deputy defense secretary was conflating fear and reality, not just about what stimulant-drinking programmers are actually hired to do, but also what is needed to pull off an attack that causes meaningful violence. The requirements go well beyond finding top cyber experts. Taking down hydroelectric generators, or designing malware like Stuxnet that causes nuclear centrifuges to spin

out of sequence doesn’t just require the skills and means to get into a computer system. It’s also knowing what to do once you are in. To cause true damage requires an understanding of the devices themselves and how they run, the engineering and physics behind the target. The Stuxnet case, for example, involved not just cyber experts well beyond a few wearing flip-flops, but also experts in areas that ranged from intelligence and surveillance to nuclear physics to the engineering of a specific kind of Siemens-brand industrial equipment. It also required expensive tests, not only of the software, but on working versions of the target hardware as well. As George R. Lucas Jr., a professor at the U.S. Naval Academy, put it, conducting a truly mass-scale action using cyber means “simply outstrips the intellectual, organizational and personnel capacities of even the most well-funded and well-organized terrorist organization, as well as those of even the most sophisticated

international criminal enterprises.” Lucas said the threat of cyber terrorism has been vastly overblown.

2NC No Cyber ImpactRedundancy solves anywayRid 12 (Thomas, writer for Foreign Policy, “Think Again: Cyberwar,” March, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles /2012/02/27/cyberwar)

Just because there's more malware , however, doesn't mean that attacks are becoming easier . In fact, potentially damaging or life-threatening cyberattacks should be more difficult to pull off. Why? Sensitive systems generally have built-in redundancy and safety systems , meaning an attacker's likely objective will not be to shut down a system, since merely forcing the shutdown of one control system, say a power plant, could trigger a

backup and cause operators to start looking for the bug. To work as an effective weapon, malware would have to influence an active process -- but not bring it to a screeching halt. If the malicious activity extends over a lengthy

period, it has to remain stealthy. That's a more difficult trick than hitting the virtual off-button. Take Stuxnet, the

worm that sabotaged Iran's nuclear program in 2010. It didn't just crudely shut down the centrifuges at the Natanz nuclear facility; rather, the worm subtly manipulated the system. Stuxnet stealthily infiltrated the plant's networks, then hopped onto the protected control systems, intercepted input values from sensors, recorded these data, and then provided the legitimate controller code with pre-recorded fake input signals, according to researchers who have studied the worm. Its objective was not just to fool operators in a control room, but also to circumvent digital safety and monitoring systems so it could secretly manipulate the actual processes.

Building and deploying Stuxnet required extremely detailed intelligence about the systems it was supposed to compromise, and the same will be true for other dangerous cyberweapons . Yes, "convergence,"

standardization, and sloppy defense of control-systems software could increase the risk of generic attacks , but the same trend has also caused defenses against the most coveted targets to improve steadily and has made reprogramming highly specific installations on legacy systems more complex, not less.

Deforestation

1NC Deforestation

Alt cause – Brazilian deregulation of the Amazon means deforestation is inevitable Purdom and Nokes 14 - Associate Dean for Innovation and New Programs, Associate Professor of Law AND JD/MELP ’15 (Rebecca and Kelly, “Brazil repeals forest code and deforestation accelerates”, Vermont Law School, 2014, http://watchlist.vermontlaw.edu/brazil-repeals-forest-code-and-deforestation-accelerates/)//KGBrazil’s iconic Amazon forest provides an essential natural defense against global warming by capturing world-wide carbon dioxide emissions. Once dubbed the “lungs of the earth” by Vice President and climate change activist Albert Gore, and perpetually under attack by illegal logging and a host of other concerns, Brazil’s forests have benefitted from regulations that recognized the importance of protecting the world’s largest equatorial forest. Instead of strengthening forest protection in light of their critical role in climate change protection, the Brazilian forests came under even graver danger with a 2012 revision of the 1965 Forest Code, which greatly reduced protections in place for over 70 years . Despite Presidential vetoes of the most egregious provisions in the 2012 revisions , the nearly wholesale dismantling of forest and ecosystem protections still stand as current Brazilian law. The impacts of the revised code are only just becoming clear, as deforestation rates shot up a whopping 28% in the period of August 2012 to July 2013 . The revised law provides amnesty for illegal loggers who unlawfully cleared land prior to July 2008. These lawbreakers now only need to recover 50% of the cleared lands, down from the required 80% under the old law. Some small landholders are not required to recover at all. Perhaps most shockingly, these criminals are now exonerated from any outstanding penalties resulting from their unlawful deforestation over the last half decade. In a country still struggling to enforce the rule of law in outlying areas, the last half decade of illegal behavior has just been retroactively forgiven, incentivizing even more illegal logging under the weakened forest code. The problems with the forest code’s revisions go beyond cutting down trees. The revised code also weakens stream-buffer protections, removes hilltops under 100 meters from protected status, eliminates intermittent stream protections, and decreases safeguards for mangrove forests . It also fosters an environment of deregulation, an atmosphere championed by the country’s powerful agricultural and energy lobbies. In 2013 controversial revisions to the country’s mining laws were introduced, paralleling revisions to the Forest Code. In light of other disturbing actions including increased sugarcane ethanol production, the construction of the highly contested Belo Monte dam on the Amazon’s Xingu River, and scheduled deep water oil drilling off the country’s southeast coast Brazil’s recent forest code revisions herald dark times for environmental regulation across multiple fronts.

Disease

1NC No ExtinctionDiseases won’t cause extinction – burnout or variationYork, 6/4/2014 (Ian, head of the Influenza Molecular Virology and Vaccines team in the Immunology and Pathogenesis Branch, Influenza Division at the CDC, former assistant professor in immunology/virology/molecular biology (MSU), former RA Professor in antiviral and antitumor immunity (UMass Medical School), Research Fellow (Harvard), Ph.D., Virology (McMaster), M.Sc., Immunology (Guelph), “Why Don't Diseases Completely Wipe Out Species?” 6/4, http://www.quora.com/Why-dont-diseases-completely-wipe-out-species#THUR)

But mostly diseases don't drive species extinct . There are several reasons for that. For one, the most dangerous diseases are those that spread from one individual to another. If the disease is highly lethal, then the population drops, and it becomes less likely that individuals will contact each other during the infectious phase.

Highly contagious diseases tend to burn themselves out that way. Probably the main reason is variation . Within the host and the pathogen population there will be a wide range of variants. Some hosts may be

naturally resistant. Some pathogens will be less virulent. And either alone or in combination, you end

up with infected individuals who survive . We see this in HIV , for example. There is a small fraction of humans who are naturally resistant or altogether immune to HIV, either because of their CCR5 allele or their MHC Class I

type. And there are a handful of people who were infected with defective versions of HIV that didn't progress to disease. We can see indications of this sort of thing happening in the past, because our genomes contain many instances of pathogen resistance genes that have spread through the whole population . Those all started off

as rare mutations that conferred a strong selection advantage to the carriers, meaning that the specific infectious diseases were serious threats to the species.

And, international actors checkWayne, 2014 (Alex, syndicated columnist on US health policy, “Global Effort Signed to Halt Spread of Infectious Disease,” Bloomber, 2/13, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-13/global-effort-signed-to-halt-spread-of-infectious-disease.html#THUR)

The U.S. won commitments from 25 countries and the W orld H ealth O rganization to work together on systems to better detect and combat outbreaks of infectious disease s such as H7N9 avian flu and Ebola virus. The

Obama administration plans to spend $40 million in 10 countries this year to upgrade laboratories and communications networks so outbreaks can be controlled more quickly , Thomas Frieden, director of the Centers for Disease

Control and Prevention, said today in an interview. President Barack Obama will seek another $45 million next year to expand the program. Infectious diseases account for about 1 in 4 deaths worldwide, according to the U.S. National Institutes of Health. While diseases such as Ebola and Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome haven’t posed a

threat to the U.S., lapses in other countries may allow an outbreak to spread rapidly, Frieden said. “No country can protect itself solely within its borders,” Frieden said. “We’re all only as safe as the weakest link out there. This is an effort to essentially make the U.S. safer and make the world safer , to improve countries’ capacity to better find, stop and prevent health threats .” Frieden and

Kathleen Sebelius, the U.S. health secretary, held a videoconference today with the partners in the effort. While no other country made a specific financial commitment today, Frieden said,

all the nations at the conference including China, Russia, France and the U.K. agreed to “ accelerate progress and address not just the health sector but include security in health in new ways .” First Consensus

“ For the first time , really, we have a consensus on not only what are the threats, but what do we have to do to address them, ” he said. As an example, Frieden said Turkey’s government agreed to host a WHO office to respond to outbreaks in its region. The agreement will also target emerging infections such as M iddle E ast

R espiratory S yndrome. The 10 countries in line for the U.S. investment, which will be funded by the CDC and the Department of Defense, weren’t identified. The CDC plans to build on test projects last year in Uganda and Vietnam, where the agency helped the two nations’ health officials improve systems to detect and combat outbreaks of dangerous pathogens that include drug-resistant tuberculosis, Ebola virus and exotic flu strains. In Uganda, CDC officials helped the country’s Ministry of Health upgrade laboratories where tissue samples would be

tested in the event of an outbreak, and developed a system for local doctors to report cases of illness by text message, according to an

article published in the CDC’s journal Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report. Uganda now is able to quickly transport tissue samples from rural outbreaks to a high-security lab in the capital, Kampala, by motorcycle courier and overnight mail, Frieden said. A mobile phone network-connected

printer then texts lab results back to rural hospitals, he said. “Ultimately every country in the world should have this kind of

system,” Frieden said. The $ 40 million , he said, “ is certainly enough to make a good start.”

2NC No ExtinctionDiseases won’t cause extinction – humans will outgrow diseaseNational Geographic, 2004 (“Our Friend, The Plague: Can Germs Keep Us Healthy?” September 8, http://www.promedpersonnel.com/whatsnew.asp?intCategoryID=73&intArticleID=443)

Disease organisms can, in fact, become less virulent over time . When it was first recognized in Europe around 1495,

syphilis killed its human hosts within months. The quick progression of the disease – from infection to death – limited the ability of syphilis to spread. So a new form evolved, one that gave carriers years to infect others. For the same reason, the common cold has become less dangerous. Milder strains of the virus – spread by people out and about, touching things, and shaking hands – have an evolutionary advantage over more debilitating strains. You can’t spread a cold very easily if you’re

incapable of rolling out of bed. This process has already weakened all but one virulent strain of malaria : Plasmodium falciparum succeeds in part because bedridden victims of the disease are more vulnerable to mosquitoes that carry and transmit the parasite. To mitigate malaria, the secret is to improve housing conditions. If people put screens on doors and windows, and use bed nets, it creates an evolutionary incentive for Plasmodium falciparum to become milder and self-limiting. Immobilized people protected by nets and screens can’t easily spread the parasite, so evolution would favor forms that let infected people walk around and get bitten by mosquitoes. There are also a few high-tech tricks for nudging microbes in the right evolutionary direction. One company, called MedImmune, has created a flu vaccine using a modified influenza virus that thrives at 77 degrees Fahrenheit instead of 98.6 degrees Fahrenheit, the normal human body temperature. The vaccine can be sprayed in a person’s nose, where the virus survives in the cool nasal passages but not in the hot lungs or elsewhere in the body. The immune system produces antibodies that make the person better prepared for most normal, nasty influenza bugs.

Maybe someday we’ll barely notice when we get colonized by disease organisms. We’ll have co-opted them. They’ll be like in-laws, a little annoying but tolerable. If a friend sees us sniffling, we’ll just say, Oh, it’s nothing – just a touch of the plague.

Lethal diseases burn out fast, pandemic is unlikely Morse, 2004 (Stephen S. director of the Center for Public Helth Preparedness, at the Mailman School of Public Health of Columbia University, and a faculty member in the epidemiology department, An ActionBioscience,org original interview, “Emerging and Reemerging Infectious Diseases: A Global Problem, http://www.actionbioscience.org/newfrontiers/morse.html)ActionBioscience.org: How do infectious diseases become pandemic? Morse: A pandemic is a very big epidemic. It requires a number of things.

There are many infections that get introduced from time to time in the human population and, like Ebola, burn themselves out because they kill too quickly or they don’t have a way to get from person to person. They are a terrible tragedy, but also, in a sense, it is a lucky thing that they don’t have an efficient means of transmission . In some cases, we may inadvertently create pathways to allow transmission of infections that may be poorly transmissible, for example, spreading HIV through needle sharing, the blood supply, and, of course, initially through the commercial sex trade. The disease is not easily transmitted, but we provided, without realizing it, means for it to spread. It is now pandemic in spite of its relatively inefficient transmission. We also get complacent and do not take steps to prevent its spread.

Virus burnout solves the impactThe Guardian, 2003 (“Second Sight”, September 25, http://technology.guardian.co.uk/online/story/0,3605,1048929,00.html)

The parallel with the natural world is illustrative. Take the case of everyone's favourite evil virus, Ebola . This is so virulent that it kills up to 90% of infected hosts within one to two weeks. There is no known cure. So how come the entire population hasn't dropped dead from haemorrhaging, shock or renal failure? The "organism" is just too deadly: it kills too quickly and has too short an incubation period, so the pool of infected people doesn't grow .

SARS changed everything – created effective mechanisms and political will for multilateral cooperation to survey, contain and treat diseaseRoos, 2013 (Robert, medical editor, master's degree in science journalism (Minnesota), fellow at the Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy, “Experts: SARS Sparked Global Cooperation to Fight Disease,” Minnesota Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy, 4/15, http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2013/04/experts-sars-sparked-global-cooperation-fight-disease#THUR)

A new set of journal articles related to the 10th anniversary of the SARS epidemic in 2003 says the episode did much to boost recognition of the need for coordinated international and national responses to emerging infectious diseases. The

articles and commentaries in Emerging Infectious Diseases reflect on the effects of SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome), which arose in China in late 2002 and spread to more than 30 countries in early 2003, sickening about 8,000 people and killing around 800. The outbreak was first publicized by the World Health Organization (WHO) on Mar 12, 2003. Among the reports is one describing two new SARS-like coronaviruses—close relatives of the SARS coronavirus—found in bats in China. The new viruses are more distant relatives of the novel human coronavirus that has caused illnesses in 17 people, with 11 deaths, in the past year. All of

the cases had connections to the Middle East. Publication of the articles comes as the world is contending with still another emerging pathogen, the novel H7N9 influenza virus in China, which has infected at least 64 people and killed 14 in recent weeks. Surveillance

and response In a "synopsis" piece, a team led by Christopher R. Braden, MD, of the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reports on progress in global surveillance and response capacity in the 10 years since SARS emerged. They review the milestones of the epidemic, from its silent emergence in southern China in November 2002 to its spread to Hong Kong and, boosted by a

"superspreader," from there to many other countries. They say the SARS epidemic powerfully stimulated international cooperation to fight emerging diseases . "Perhaps the most important legacy of SARS is the recognition of the critical need for a multilateral response, led by WHO, in the event of a rapidly moving but ultimately containable global

epidemic," they write. "The central role of WHO in coordinating the laboratory network that identified the etiologic agent and

shared reagents, the epidemiology network that characterized the spread and identified the most effective control measures, and the policy

and communications network that incorporated rapidly changing knowledge into measured travel advisories was critical for the control of the epidemic and a credit to WHO. " The SARS epidemic dramatically reduced global travel and business, showing how disruptive a new pathogen

could be, Braden and colleagues observe. Those effects stimulated pandemic flu planning and surveillance, a greater focus on global health security, and improved laboratory and surveillance networks. Further , the episode spurred efforts to update the International Health Regulations, which had not been revised since 1969, the article says. The regulations took effect in 2007. However, fewer than 20% of the 194 WHO countries that accepted the regulations had complied with

their core requirements by the June 2012 deadline, according to Braden and colleagues. Another effect of SARS was to spur the establishment of new national public health agencies in Canada (the Public Health Agency of Canada, or PHAC) and the United Kingdom (the Health Protection Agency), the authors say. In a related perspective article, a team led by Jeffrey P. Koplan, MD, MPH, of Emory

University, a former CDC director, says the value of national public health institutes was one of the major lessons of

SARS. Koplan is joined by authors from the PHAC and its counterparts in Hong Kong and China. They note that more than 80 national public health institutes are now linked through the International Association of National Public Health Institutes, which promotes the establishment of new institutes and helps strengthen existing ones.

Economy

1NC No Econ ImpactRoyal concludes negRoyal 10 (Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer) CONCLUSION The logic of ECST supports arguments for greater economic interdependence to reduce the likelihood of conflict . This chapter does not argue against the utility of signalling theory. It does, however, suggest that when considering the occurrence of and conditions created by economic crises, ECST logic is dubious as an organising principle for security policymakers. The discussion pulls together some distinct areas of research that have not yet featured prominently in the ECST literature. Studies associating economic interdependence, economic crises and the potential for external conflict indicate that global interdependence is not necessarily a conflict suppressing process and may be conflict-enhancing at certain points. Furthermore, the conditions created by economic crises decrease the willingness of states to send economic costly signals , even though such signals may be most effective during an economic crisis. These two points warrant further consideration in the debate over ECST and, more broadly, theories linking interdependence and peace. The debate takes on particular importance for policymakers when considering the increasingly important US-China relationship and the long-term prospects for peace in the Asia-Pacific. Recent US policy towards China, such as the ‘responsible stakeholder’ approach, assumes that greater interdependence with China should decrease the likelihood for conflict. Some have even suggested that the economic relationship is necessary to ensure strategic competition does not lead to major war (see, e.g., Kastner, 2006). If US or Chinese policymakers do indeed intend to rely on economic interdependence to reduce the likelihood of conflict, much more study is required to understand how and when interdependence impacts the security and the defence behaviour of states. This chapter contributes some thoughts to that larger debate. NOTES I. Notable counterarguments include Barbieri (1996). Gowa (I994), and Levy and Ali I998 . 2.‘ Offi<):ial statements have focused on this explanation as well. See, for example, Bernanke (2009). 3. For a dissenting study. see Elbadawi and Hegre (2008). 4. Note that Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2001) argue that states will have a greater incentive to arm against those with which it is interdependent to hedge against coercion. This argument could be extended to include protectionism in extreme cases. Creseenzi (2005) both challenges and agrees with Copeland’s theory by suggesting that a more important indicator is the exit costs involved in terminating an economic relationship. which could be a function of the availability of alternatives. 5. There is also substantial research to indicate that periods of strong economic growth are also positively correlated with a rise in the likelihood of conflict . Pollins (2008) and Pollins and Schweller (I999) provide excellent insights into this body of literature.

No impact to economic decline

Thirlwell ‘10—MPhil in economics from Oxford U, postgraduate qualifications in applied finance from Macquarie U, program director in International Economy for the Lowy Institute for International Policy (Mark, September 2010, “The Return of Geo-economics: Globalisation and National Security”, Lowy Institute for International Policy, google scholar,)

Summing up the evidence, then, I would judge that while empirical support for the Pax Mercatoria is not conclusive, nevertheless it’s still strongly supportive of the general idea that international integration is good for peace, all else equal. Since there is also even stronger evidence

that peace is good for trade, this raises the possibility of a nice virtuous circle: globalisation (trade) promotes peace , which in turn promotes more globalisation. In this kind of world, we should not worry too much about the big power shifts described in the previous section, since they are taking place against a backdrop of greater economic integration which

should help smooth the whole process. Instead of ending this section on that optimistic note, however, it’s worth thinking about some reasons

why the Pax Mercatoria might nevertheless turn out to be a poor , or at least overly optimistic, guide to our future . The first is captured by that all important get-out-of-gaol-free card, ‘all else equal’. It’s quite possible that the peace-promoting effects of international commerce will end up being swamped by other factors, just as they were in 1914. Second, perhaps the theory itself is wrong. Certainly, a realist like John Mearsheimer would seem to have little time for the optimistic consequences of the rise of new powers implied by the theory. Here’s Mearsheimer on how the US should view China’s economic progress, for example: ‘ . . . the United States has a profound interest in seeing Chinese economic growth slow considerably in the years ahead . . . A wealthy China would not be a status quo power but an aggressive state determined to achieve regional hegemony.’ 62 Such pessimistic (or are they tragic?) views of the world would also seem to run

the risk of being self-fulfilling prophecies if they end up guiding actual policy. Finally, there is the risk that the shift to a multipolar world might indirectly undermine some of the supports needed to deliver globalisation . Here I am thinking about

some simple variant on the idea of hegemonic stability theory (HST) – the proposition that the global economy needs a leader (or

‘hegemon’) that is both able and willing to provide the sorts of international public goods that are required for its

smooth functioning: open markets (liberal or ‘free’ trade), a smoothly functioning monetary regime, liberal capital

flows, and a lender of last resort function. 63 Charles Kindleberger argued that ‘the 1929 depression was so wide, so deep,

and so long because the international economic system was rendered unstable by British inability and US

unwillingness to assume responsibility for stabilizing it’, drawing on the failures of the Great Depression to make the original case for

HST: ‘ . . . the international economic and monetary system needs leadership , a country that is prepared . . . to set standards of conduct for other countries and to seek to get others to follow them, to take on an undue share of the burdens of the system, and in particular to take on its support in adversity...’ 64 Kindleberger’s assessment appears to capture a rough

empirical regularity: As Findlay and O’Rourke remind us, ‘periods of sustained expansion in world trade have tended to

coincided with the infrastructure of law and order necessary to keep trade routes open being provided by a dominant “hegemon”

or imperial power’. 65 Thus periods of globalisation have typically been associated with periods of hegemonic or

imperial power, such as the Pax Mongolica, the Pax Britannica and, most recently, the Pax Americana (Figure 9). The risk, then, is that by reducing the economic clout of the U nited States, it is possible that the shift to a multipolar world economy might undermine either the willingness or the ability (or both) of Washington to continue to supply the

international public goods needed to sustain a (relatively) smoothly functioning world economy. 66 That in turn

could undermine the potential virtuous circle identified above.

Econ decline won’t cause war – the 2008 crash disproves their claim.Drezner ’12 (Daniel W. Drezner is professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, and a blogger for the Washington Post. He has previously held positions with University of Chicago, Civic Education Project, the RAND Corporation, and the US Department of the Treasury. “THE IRONY OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: THE SYSTEM WORKED” – This publication is part of the International Institutions and Global Governance program – October 2012 – http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/IIGG_WorkingPaper9_Drezner.pdf)

The final outcome addresses a dog that hasn’t barked: the effect of the Great Recession on crossborder conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.19 Whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict, there were genuine concerns that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fuel impressions of surge in global public disorder. The aggregate data suggests otherwise, however. A fundamental conclusion from a recent report by the Institute for Economics and Peace is that “the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007.”20 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis—as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict; the secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed.

Global econ is resilientFSB ’14 (The Financial Stability Board (FSB) is an international body that monitors and makes recommendations about the global financial system – “FSB Plenary meets in London” – 31 March 2014http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/press/pr_140331.htm)The global economy has been improving, and monetary policy in the US is in the early stages of a

normalisation process, after an extended period of exceptional accommodation. A comprehensive programme of regulatory reforms and supervisory actions since the crisis has made the global financial system more resilient . Currently, European authorities are putting in place a comprehensive set of measures to strengthen further the region's financial

system. Emerging markets have coped relatively well to date with occasional bouts of turbulence, in part

reflecting the positive impact of both past and more recent reforms.

2NC No Econ ImpactEconomic decline doesn’t cause warJervis,’11 (Robert, Professor PolSci Columbia, December, “Force in Our Times” Survival, Vol 25 No 4, p 403-425)Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be

one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties,

which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor

economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything

seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as

outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkabl e .

No impactBarnett 9 (Thomas, Senior Strategic Researcher – Naval War College, “The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis”, Asset Protection Network, 8-25, http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx)

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk

of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape. No ne of the more than three-dozen

ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession . Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of

the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most

familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to

one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends . And with the

U nited S tates effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our

involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest , both leading up to and following the onset of the

economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates

off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn , occasionally pressing the

Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training

local forces. So, to sum up : No significant uptick in mass violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban riots last

year in places like Greece, Moldova and Latvia?); The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts (in all the usual places); Not a single

state-on-state war directly caused (and no great-power -on-great-power crises even triggered ); No great

improvement or disruption in great-power cooperation regarding the emergence of new nuclear powers (despite all that diplomacy); A modest scaling back of international policing efforts by the system's acknowledged Leviathan power (inevitable given the strain); and No serious efforts by any rising great power to challenge that Leviathan or supplant its role. (The worst things we can cite are Moscow's occasional deployments of strategic assets to the Western hemisphere and its weak efforts to outbid the United States on basing rights in Kyrgyzstan; but the best include China and India stepping up their aid and investments in Afghanistan and Iraq.) Sure, we've finally seen global defense spending surpass the previous world record set in the late 1980s, but even that's likely to wane given the stress on public budgets created by all this unprecedented "stimulus" spending. If anything, the friendly cooperation on such stimulus packaging was the most notable

great-power dynamic caused by the crisis. Can we say that the world has suffered a distinct shift to political radicalism as a

result of the economic crisis? Indeed, no. The world's major economies remain governed by center-left or center-right political

factions that remain decidedly friendly to both markets and trade. In the short run, there were attempts across the board to insulate

economies from immediate damage (in effect, as much protectionism as allowed under current trade rules), but there was no great slide into "trade wars." Instead, the W orld T rade O rganization is functioning as it was designed to function, and regional

efforts toward free-trade agreements have not slowed. Can we say Islamic radicalism was inflamed by the economic crisis? If it was, that

shift was clearly overwhelmed by the Islamic world's growing disenchantment with the brutality displayed by violent

extremist groups such as al-Qaida. And looking forward, austere economic times are just as likely to breed connecting evangelicalism as disconnecting fundamentalism. At the end of the day, the economic crisis did not prove to be sufficiently frightening to provoke major economies into establishing global regulatory schemes, even as it has sparked a spirited -- and much needed, as I argued last week -- discussion of the continuing viability of the U.S. dollar as the world's primary reserve currency. Naturally, plenty of experts and pundits have attached great significance to this debate, seeing in it the beginning of "economic warfare" and the like between "fading" America and "rising" China. And yet, in a world of globally integrated production chains and interconnected financial markets, such "diverging interests" hardly constitute signposts for wars up ahead. Frankly, I don't welcome a world in which America's fiscal profligacy goes undisciplined, so bring it on -- please! Add it all up and it's fair to say that this global financial crisis has proven the great resilience of America's post-World War II international liberal

trade order. Do I expect to read any analyses along those lines in the blogosphere any time soon? Absolutely not. I expect the fantastic

fear-mongering to proceed apace. That's what the Internet is for.

2NC Econ Resilient Global Econ resilient. Checks are improving.Drezner ‘12Daniel W. Drezner is professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, and a blogger for the Washington Post. He has previously held positions with University of Chicago, Civic Education Project, the RAND Corporation, and the US Department of the Treasury. “THE IRONY OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: THE SYSTEM WORKED” – This publication is part of the International Institutions and Global Governance program – October 2012 – http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/IIGG_WorkingPaper9_Drezner.pdfThe 2008 financial crisis posed the biggest challenge to the global economy since the Great Depression

and provided a severe “stress test” for global economic governance. A review of economic outcomes, policy

outputs, and institutional resilience reveals that these regimes performed well during the acute phase of the crisis, ensuring the continuation of an open global economy. Even though some policy outcomes have been less

than optimal, international institutions and frameworks performed contrary to expectations. Simply put, the system worked. During the first ten months of the Great Recession, global stock market capitalization plummeted lower as a percentage of its precrisis level than during the first ten months of the Great Depression.1 Housing prices in the United States declined more than twice as much as they did during the Great Depression.2 The global decline in asset values led to aggregate losses of $27 trillion in 2008—a halfyear’s worth of global economic output.3 Global unemployment increased by an estimated fourteen million people in 2008 alone.4 Nearly four years after the crisis, concerns about systemic risk still continue.5 The demand for global economic governance structures to perform effectively is at its greatest during crises. An open global economy lessens the stagnation that comes from a financial crisis, preventing a downturn from metastasizing into another Great Depression. One of the primary purposes of multilateral economic institutions is to provide global public goods—such as keeping barriers to cross-border exchange low. Even if states are the primary actors in world politics, they rely on a bevy of acronym-laden institutions—the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Trade Organization (WTO), Bank for International Settlements (BIS), and Group of Twenty (G20)—to coordinate action on the global scale. International institutions can be the policymaker’s pacifier. In an anarchic world, these structures reduce uncertainty for all participating actors. When they function well, they facilitate communication and foster shared understanding between policy principals. When they function poorly, a lack of trust and a surfeit of uncertainty stymies responsible authorities from

cooperating. Since the Great Recession began, there has been no shortage of scorn for the state of global economic governance among pundits and scholars.6 Nevertheless, a closer look at the global response to the financial crisis reveals a more optimistic picture. Despite initial shocks that were more severe than the 1929

financial crisis, national policy elites and multilateral economic institutions responded quickly and robustly. Whether one

looks at economic outcomes, policy outputs, or institutional resilience, global economic governance structures have either

reinforced or improved upon the status quo since the collapse of the subprime mortgage bubble. To be sure, there remain areas

where governance has either faltered or failed, but on the whole, the global regime worked.

Global economy is resilient – financial crisis proves.I.C.A. ‘14ICA is Interarab Cambist Association. This is a professional association involving foreign exchange dealers in countries from North Africa, Gulf and Middle East – “THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM EMERGES FROM THE CRISIS: PLUS ÇA CHANGE…” – March 22nd – http://www.icaconference.com/newsThe global economic crisis was early on a seen as a transformative period with the potential to revamp the global currency system, undermine the dynamics of global trade, reform financial regulation, and challenge economic integration. Seven years later, important changes have indeed materialized but the system has almost

manifested unexpected resilience and continuity. The calls for replacing the US Dollar as the global reserve currency have faded, the Euro-zone has not only held together but grown, and the globalization narrative is continuing.

Economy resilient – debt ceiling and gridlock prove even if crises hinder growth, they don’t prevent itPerez 13{Tom, US Secretary of Labor, former law professor (Maryland), M.A. Public Policy (Harvard), Ph.D. in Law (Harvard), “The Resilience of the American Economy,” US Department of Labor, 11/8, http://social.dol.gov/blog/the-resilience-of-the-american-economy/#THUR}The American economy is resilient . October’s jobs report demonstrates continued steady growth , with

the addition of 212,000 total private sector jobs in October. The unemployment rate, which fell in September to a nearly-five year low

of 7.2 percent, remains essentially unchanged at 7.3 percent, while American manufacturers added 19,000 jobs in

the month of October. But while American businesses continue to add jobs — 7.8 million over the last 44 months of private

sector job growth — they do so in spite of Congress , not because of it. October’s job growth was undoubtedly restrained by the brinksmanship and uncertainty created by the federal government shutdown and the near-default on the nation’s debt. The American economy is resilient, but it is not immune to manufactured crises. We see signs that suggest the shutdown had a discouraging effect on America’s continued recovery. We remain concerned about the drop in the labor force participation rate, and American workers on temporary

layoffs rose by nearly 448,000, the largest monthly increase in the history of that series of data. The American people deserve leadership that focuses on growing the economy — not holding it hostage. Let’s keep our eye on the ball by passing immigration reform, which has bipartisan support and would inject a trillion dollars into the economy, and investing in infrastructure upgrades that would create thousands of middle class jobs right now. Instead of erecting political roadblocks, let’s work together to pave bipartisan roads to full

recovery. Today’s employment numbers are a reminder that while the economy continues to grow and create new jobs , it remains on uncertain footing. Too many Americans still find the rungs on the ladder of opportunity beyond their reach. We need to move forward with common-sense proposals that will create jobs, strengthen the middle class, reduce our deficit and expand opportunity for American families. The president and I stand ready to work with Congress to do just that.

2014 economy particularly resilientMantell 14{Ruth, syndicated economic reporter, “Leading Data Signal ‘Resilient’ Economy in 2014,” Market Watch via Wall Street Journal, 2/20, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/leading-data-signal-resilient-economy-in-2014-2014-02-20#THUR}

The economy will likely “ remain resilient ” in the first half of 2014, with underlying conditions improving ,

the Conference Board said Thursday as it reported monthly growth and stable trends for its gauge of leading economic indicators. The LEI rose 0.3% in January, following no change in December, signaling an economy “that is expanding moderately , although the pace is somewhat held back by persistent and severe inclement weather,” said Ken Goldstein , a board

economist. Effects from the harsh winter have also shown up in recent data on retail sales and housing . Unfortunately, the poor weather makes it tough for

economists to clearly identify trends underlying month-to-month economic volatility. Some of the economic activity that has been delayed by poor weather, such as home construction, could spring back in coming months . Elsewhere Thursday, reports were mixed on how poor weather is impacting manufacturers. A gauge from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia

signaled that a sharp drop in February for its regional manufacturing gauge was largely due to winter storms. Meanwhile, a separate barometer that covers U.S. manufacturing showed that growth picked up this month to the highest level since 2010, indicating a rebound from the winter slowdown. The LEI is a weighted gauge of 10

indicators designed to signal business cycle peaks and troughs. Among the 10 indicators tracked by the Conference Board’s index, five made positive contributions in January, led by the interest rate spread. The largest negative contribution came

from building permits. Meanwhile, core capital goods orders — these are the sort of big-ticket investments companies make when they are confident about their future — were neutral last month. “If the economy is going to move on to a faster track in 2014 compared to last year, consumer demand and especially investment

will need to pick up significantly from their current trends,” Goldstein said. On a brighter note, trends for the LEI reflect stability .

Over the six months through January, the LEI rose 3.1%, close to a gain of 3.2% for the six-month period that ended in December.

AT: Diversionary War Diversionary war theory is falseBoehmer ‘7 (Charles, political science professor at the University of Texas, Politics & Policy, 35:4, “The Effects of Economic Crisis, Domestic Discord, and State Efficacy on the Decision to Initiate Interstate Conflict”)This article examines the contemporaneous effect of low economic growth and domestic instability on the threat of regime change and/ or

involvement in external militarized conflicts. Many studies of diversionary conflict argue that lower rates of economic

growth should heighten the risk of international conflict. Yet we know that militarized interstate conflicts, and especially wars, are generally rare events whereas lower rates of growth are not. Additionally, a growing body of literature shows that regime changes are also associated with lower rates of economic growth. The question then becomes which event, militarized interstate conflict or regime change,

is the most likely to occur with domestic discord and lower rates of economic growth? Diversionary theory claims that leaders seek to divert attention away from domestic problems such as a bad economy or political scandals, or to garner increased support prior to elections. Leaders then supposedly externalize discontented domestic sentiments onto other nations, sometimes as scapegoats based on the similar in-group/out-group dynamic found in the research of Coser (1956) and Simmel (1955), where foreign countries are blamed for domestic problems. This process is said to involve a “rally-round-the-flag” effect, where a leader can expect a short-term boost in popularity with the threat or use of force (Blechman, Kaplan, and Hall 1978; Mueller 1973). Scholarship on diversionary conflict has focused most often on the American case1 but recent studies have sought to identify this possible behavior in other countries.2 The Falklands War is often a popular example of diversionary conflict (Levy and Vakili 1992). Argentina was reeling from hyperinflation and rampant unemployment associated with the Latin American debt crisis. It is plausible that a success in the Falklands War may have helped to rally support for the governing Galtieri regime, although Argentina lost the war and the ruling regime lost power. How many other attempts to use diversionary tactics, if they indeed occur, can be seen to generate a similar outcome? The goal of this article is to provide an assessment of the extent to

which diversionary strategy is a threat to peace. Is this a colorful theory kept alive by academics that has little bearing up on real events , or is this a real problem that policy makers should be concerned with? If it is a strategy readily available to leaders, then it is important to know what domestic factors trigger this gambit. Moreover, to know that requires an understanding of the

context in external conflict, which occurs relative to regime changes. Theories of diversionary conflict usually emphasize the potential benefits of diversionary tactics, although few pay equal attention to the prospective costs associated with such behavior. It is not contentious to claim that leaders typically seek to remain in office. However, whether they can successfully manipulate public opinion regularly during periods of domestic unpopularity through their states’

participation in foreign militarized conflicts—especially outside of the American case—is a question open for debate. Furthermore, there appears to be a logical disconnect between diversionary theories and extant studies of domestic conflict and regime change. Lower rates of economic growth are purported to increase the risk of both militarized interstate conflicts (and internal conflicts) as well as regime changes

(Bloomberg and Hess 2002). This implies that if leaders do , in fact, undertake diversionary conflicts, many may still be thrown from the seat of power —especially if the outcome is defeat to a foreign enemy. Diversionary conflict would thus

seem to be a risky gambit (Smith 1996). Scholars such as MacFie (1938) and Blainey (1988) have nevertheless questioned the validity of the diversionary thesis . As noted by Levy (1989), this perspective is rarely formulated as a cohesive and comprehensive

theory, and there has been little or no knowledge cumulation. Later analyses do not necessarily build on past studies and the discrepancies

between inquiries are often difficult to unravel. “Studies have used a variety of research designs, different dependent

variables (uses of force, major uses of force, militarized disputes), different estimation techniques, and different data sets covering different time periods and different states” (Bennett and Nordstrom 2000, 39). To these problems, we should add a lack of theoretical precision and incomplete model specification. By a lack of theoretical precision, I am referring to the linkages between economic conditions and domestic strife that remain unclear in some studies (Miller 1995; Russett 1990). Consequently, extant studies are to a degree incommensurate; they offer a step in the right direction but do not provide robust cross-national explanations and tests of economic growth and interstate conflict. Yet a few studies have attempted to provide deductive explanations about when and how diversionary tactics might be employed. Using a Bayesian updating game, Richards and others (1993) theorize that while the use of force would appear to offer leaders a means to boost their popularity,

a poorly performing economy acts as a signal to a leader’s constituents about his or her competence. Hence, attempts to use diversion are likely to fail either because incompetent leaders wil l likewise fail in foreign policy or people will recognize the gambit for what it is . Instead, these two models conclude that diversion is likely to be undertaken particularly by risk-acceptant leaders. This stress on a heightened risk of removal from office is also apparent in the work of Bueno de Mesquita and others (1999), and Downs and Rocke (1994), where leaders may “gamble for resurrection,” although the diversionary scenario in the former study is only a partial extension of their theory on selectorates, winning coalitions, and leader survival. Again, how often do leaders fail in the process or are removed from positions of power before they can even initiate diversionary tactics? A few studies focusing on leader

tenure have examined the removal of leaders following war, although almost no study in the diversionary literature has looked at the effects of domestic problems on the relative risks of regime change, interstate conflict, or both events occurring in the same year.3

Low growth makes politicians cautious—they don’t want to risk war because it makes them vulnerableBoehmer ‘7 (Charles, political science professor at the University of Texas, Politics & Policy, 35:4, “The Effects of Economic Crisis, Domestic Discord, and State Efficacy on the Decision to Initiate Interstate Conflict”)

Economic Growth and Fatal MIDs The theory presented earlier predicts that lower rates of growth suppress participation in foreign conflicts , particularly concerning conflict initiation and escalation to combat. To sustain combat, states need to be militarily prepared and not open up a second front when they are already fighting, or may fear, domestic opposition. A good example would be when the various Afghani resistance fighters expelled the Soviet Union from their territory, but the Taliban crumbled when it had to face the combined forces of the United States and Northern Alliance insurrection.

Yet the coefficient for GDP growth and MID initiations was negative but insignificant. However, considering that there are many reasons why states fight, the logic presented earlier should hold especially in regard to the risk of participating in more severe conflicts. Threats to use military force may be safe to make and may be made with both external and internal actors in mind, but in the end may remain mere cheap talk that does not risk escalation if there is a chance to back down. Chiozza and Goemans (2004b) found that secure leaders were more likely

to become involved in war than insecure leaders, supporting the theory and evidence presented here. We should find that leaders who face domestic opposition and a poor ly performing economy shy away from situations that could escalate to combat if doing so would compromise their ability to retain power .

AT: US Econ k2 Global Econ

U.S. isn’t key to the global economyML 6 (Merrill Lynch, “US Downturn Won’t Derail World Economy”, 9-18, http://www.ml.com/index.asp?id=7695_7696_8149_63464_70786_71164)A sharp slowdown in the U.S. economy in 2007 is unlikely to drag the rest of the global economy down with it, according to a research report by Merrill Lynch’s (NYSE: MER) global economic team. The good news is that there are strong sources of growth outside the U.S. that should prove resilient to a consumer-led U.S. slowdown. Merrill Lynch economists expect U.S. GDP growth to slow to 1.9 percent in 2007 from 3.4 percent in 2006, but non-U.S. growth to decline by only half a

percent (5.2 percent versus 5.7 percent). Behind this decoupling is higher non-U.S. domestic demand, a rise in intraregional trade and supportive macroeconomic policies in many of the world’s economies. Although some

countries appear very vulnerable to a U.S. slowdown, one in five is actually on course for faster GDP growth in 2007. Asia, Japan and India appear well placed to decouple from the U nited S tates, though Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore are more likely to be

impacted. European countries could feel the pinch, but rising domestic demand in the core countries should help the region weather the storm

much better than in previous U.S. downturns. In the Americas, Canada will probably be hit, but Brazil is set to decouple.

Environment

1NC No Environment Impact

Ecosystem collapse won’t cause human extinction Raudsepp-Hearne et al., 10 (Ciarra, PhD in the Department of Geography, Elena M. Bennett is an assistant professor in the Department of Natural Resource Sciences and McGill School of Environment, Graham K. MacDonald is a doctoral student in the Department of Natural Resource Sciences, and Laura Pfeifer is a master’s student in the Department of Natural Resource Sciences and the McGill School of Environment, all at McGill University, in Montreal, Quebec. Garry D. Peterson is a researcher at the Stockholm Resilience Centre and the Department of Physical Geography and Quaternary Geology, at Stockholm University. Maria Tengö is currently a researcher at the Department ofSystems Ecology and the Stockholm Resilience Centre, Stockholm University. Tim Holland currentlyworks for SNV Netherlands Development Organisation in Hanoi, Vietnam. Karina Benessaiah is currently a doctoral student in the Department of Geographical Sciences and Urban Planning at Arizona State University. September 2010; “Untangling the Environmentalist’s Paradox: Why Is Human Well-being Increasing as Ecosystem Services Degrade?”; http://www.aibs.org/bioscience-press-releases/resources/Raudsepp-Hearne.pdf)Although many people expect ecosystem degradation to have a negative impact on human well-being, this measure ¶ appears to be increasing even as provision of ecosystem ¶ services declines . From George Perkins Marsh’s Man and¶ Nature in 1864 to today (Daily 1997), scientists have described¶ how the deterioration of the many services provided¶ by

nature, such as food, climate regulation, and recreational¶ areas, is endangering human well-being. However, the Millennium ¶ Ecosystem Assessment (MA), a comprehensive study of¶ the world’s resources, found that declines in the majority of ¶ ecosystem services assessed have been accompanied by steady ¶ gains in human well-being at the global scale (MA 2005). We¶ argue that to understand this apparent paradox, we need to¶ better understand the ways in which ecosystem services are¶ important for human well-being, and also whether human¶ well-being can continue to rise in the future despite projected¶ continued declines in ecosystem services. In this article, we¶ summarize the roots of the paradox and assess evidence¶ relating to alternative explanations

of the conflicting trends¶ in ecosystem services and human well-being.¶ The environmentalist’s expectation could be articulated ¶ as: “Ecological degradation and simplification will be followed by a decline in the provision of ecosystem services, leading to a decline in human well-being.” Supporters¶ of this hypothesis cite evidence of unsustainable¶ rates of resource consumption, which in the past have had¶ severe impacts on human well-being, even causing the collapse¶ of civilizations (e.g., Diamond 2005). Analyses of the¶ global ecological footprint have suggested that since 1980,¶ humanity’s footprint has

exceeded the amount of resources¶ that can be sustainably produced by Earth (Wackernagel¶ et al. 2002). Although the risk of local and regional societies ¶ collapsing as a result of ecological degradation is much ¶ reduced by globalization and trade , the environmentalist’s ¶ expectation remains: Depletion of ecosystem services translates¶ into fewer benefits for humans, and therefore lower¶ net human well-being than would be possible under better¶ ecological management.¶ By focusing on ecosystem services—the benefits that¶ humans obtain from ecosystems—the MA set out specifically¶ to identify and assess the links between ecosystems

and¶ human well-being (MA 2005). The MA assessed ecosystem ¶ services in four categories: (1) provisioning services, such ¶ as food, water, and forest products; (2) regulating services, which modulate changes in climate and regulate floods, ¶ disease, waste, and water quality; (3) cultural services, which ¶ comprise recreational, aesthetic, and spiritual benefits; and ¶ (4) supporting services, such as soil formation, photosynthesis, ¶ and nutrient cycling (MA 2003). Approximately 60%¶ (15 of 24) of the ecosystem services assessed by the MA were¶ found to be in decline. Most of the declining services were¶ regulating and supporting services, whereas the majority of¶ expanding ecosystem services were provisioning services,¶ such as crops, livestock, and fish aquaculture (table 1). At the¶ same time, consumption of

more than 80% of the assessed¶ services was found to be increasing, across all categories. In¶ other words, the use of most ecosystem services is increasing ¶ at the same time that Earth’s capacity to provide these ¶ services is decreasing.¶ The MA conceptual framework encapsulated the environmentalist’s¶ expectation, suggesting tight feedbacks between¶

ecosystem services and human well-being. However, the ¶ assessment found that aggregate human well-being grew ¶

steadily over the past 50 years, in part because of the rapid ¶ conversion of ecosystems to meet human

demand for food, ¶ fiber, and fuel (figure 1; MA 2005). The MA defined human¶ well-being with five components: basic materials, health,¶ security, good social relations, and freedom of choice and¶ actions, where freedom of choice and actions is expected to¶ emerge from the other components of well-being. Although¶ the MA investigated each of the five components of well-being¶ at some scales and in relation¶ to some ecosystem services,¶ the assessment of global¶ trends in human well-being¶ relied on the human development¶ index (HDI) because of¶ a lack of other data. The HDI¶ is an aggregate measure of¶ life expectancy, literacy, educational¶ attainment, and per¶ capita GDP (gross domestic¶ product) that does not capture¶ all five components of¶ well-being (Anand and Sen¶ 1992).¶

2NC No Environment Impact

Ecosystems are resilient and recover quicklyMcDermott, 9 (Mat, Editor for Business and Energy sections; Master Degree from NYU’s Center for Global Affairs in environment and energy policy. May, 27, 2009: “Good News: Most Ecosystems Can Recover in One Lifetime from Human-Induced or Natural Disturbance”; http://www.treehugger.com/natural-sciences/good-news-most-ecosystems-can-recover-in-one-lifetime-from-human-induced-or-natural-disturbance.html)There's a reason the phrase "let nature take its course" exists: New research done at the Yale University

School of Forestry & Environmental Science reinforces the idea that ecosystems are quiet resilient and can rebound from pollution and environmental degradation . Published in the journal PLoS ONE, the study shows that most damaged ecosystems worldwide can recover within a single lifetime , if the source of pollution is removed and restoration work done. The analysis found that on average forest ecosystems can recover in 42 years, while in takes only about 10 years for the ocean bottom to recover. If an area has seen multiple , interactive disturbances, it can take on average 56 years for recovery. In general, most ecosystems take longer to recover from human-induced disturbances than from natural events, such as hurricanes.¶ To reach these recovery averages, the researchers looked at data from peer-reviewed studies over the past 100 years on the rate of ecosystem

recovery once the source of pollution was removed.¶ Interestingly, the researchers found that it appears that the rate at which an ecosystem recovers may be independent of its degraded condition : Aquatic systems may recover more quickly than, say, a forest, because the species and organisms that live in that ecosystem turn over more rapidly than in the forest.¶ As to what

this all means, Oswald Schmitz, professor of ecology at Yale and report co-author, says that this analysis shows that an increased effort to restore damaged ecosystems is justified, and that:¶ Restoration could become a more important tool in the management portfolio of conservation organizations that are entrusted to protect habitats on landscapes.¶ We recognize that humankind has and will continue to actively domesticate

nature to meet its own needs. The message of our paper is that recovery is possible and can be rapid for many ecosystems, giving much hope for a transition to sustainable management of global ecosystem

AT: Invisible Threshold

No invisible threshold – new technology allows us to revive extinct speciesRidley 12 (Matt, 2007 Davis Award winner for the History of Science, “Reversing extinction”; March 13, http://www.rationaloptimist.com/blog/reversing-extinction.aspx)

The fruit of a narrow-leaved campion , buried in permafrost by a ground squirrel 32,000 years ago on the banks of the Kolyma river in Siberia, has been coaxed into growing into a new plant , which then successfully set seed itself in a Moscow laboratory. Although this plant species was not extinct, inch by inch scientists seem to be closing in on the outrageous goal of bringing a species back from the dead . I don't expect to live to see a herd of resurrected mammoths roaming the Siberian steppe, but I think my grandchildren just might. The mammoth is the best candidate for resurrection mainly because flash-frozen ones with well-preserved tissues are regularly found in the Siberian permafrost. Occasionally these have been fresh enough to tempt scientists to cook and eat them, usually with disappointing results. Just last week a Chinese paleontologist in Canada, Xing Lida, filmed himself frying and eating what he said was a small mammoth steak. Cells from such carcasses have been recovered, encouraging a rivalry between Japanese and Russian scientists to be the first to revive one of these huge, elephant-like mammals by cloning. Four years ago the mammoth genome was sequenced, so we at least now know the genetic recipe.

The news of the resurrected flower does, apparently, remove one obstacle. After 32,000 years the plant's DNA had not been so damaged by natural radioactivity in the soil as to make it unviable, which is a surprise. Mammoth carcasses are often much younger - the youngest, on Wrangel Island, being about 4,700 years old, contemporary with the

Pharoahs. So the DNA should be in even better shape. However, plants are much better at cloning themselves from any old cutting. Coaxing an elephant cell into becoming an embryo is not at all easy; though, as Dolly the sheep showed, not impossible. To do the same for a mammoth cell would be harder still. And then there is the problem of how to get the embryo to grow. Implanting it into the womb of an Indian elephant (its closest living relative) is the best bet, but experiments with implanting rare embryos into other species' wombs have been mostly unsuccessful. For example, a rare form of wild ox, the gaur, was going to have its embryos reared in cattle wombs, but it did not work. So do not book the Siberian mammoth safari trip just yet. Equally, don't bet against it eventually coming off. Which other species might follow? One that only recently went extinct (last seen in 1936) is the marsupial carnivore called the thylacine, or "Tasmanian tiger". A few years ago, genes from a dead thylacine were injected into a mouse and "expressed" in its tissue. The great auk, the dodo and other creatures that died out before the invention of refrigeration are going to be much harder to revive. Perhaps fortunately, Neanderthals, dead for 28,000 years, unfrozen and not very closely related to their likely surrogate parent (you and me), would be harder still, though their DNA sequence is now known. And as for the dinosaurs - 65 million years dead - forget it. Although come to think of it, re-engineering a chicken until it looks like a dinosaur cannot be

ruled out, once people learn to play genetics well enough. The real significance of the Siberian flower , though, is that it makes future extinctions potentially reversible . So long as we can flash-freeze seeds and tissues from threatened species (a disused mine in a frozen mountain in Spitsbergen already holds a seedbank of rare plant varieties), then we can give posterity the chance to resurrect them. Combine this with the news that extinction rates , at least of birds and mammals, have been falling in recent decades, and there are grounds for a glimmer of ecological optimism. The great spasm of extinction caused by humans - mainly when we spread our rats, weeds and bugs to oceanic islands - may be coming to an end. Far more significant than the reversal of extinction, however , is the revival of wild ecosystems . Ecologists are finding that wild habitats can be put back together more easily than they thought . A marine reserve off Mexico is now teeming with large fish again. Yellowstone Park's ecological revival following the introduction of the wolf is remarkable: by cutting the numbers of elk, wolves have brought back aspen trees and long grass and hence beavers, rodents and hawks. In Costa Rica, a rainforest rich in tree species is now thriving on what was, in 1993, exhausted farmland. Once a canopy of sun-loving trees was planted, hundreds of other tree species moved in naturally. One commentator says: "The accepted belief is that once destroyed, tropical rainforests

could never be restored. But is that really the case or just a myth?" Environmentalists will worry that such optimism breeds complacency about habitat destruction. But it might instead breed ambition to restore habitats and revive rare species . Over the past 50 years, agricultural yields have risen and, in real terms, food prices have fallen, with the result that marginal land has been released from growing food worldwide. Forest cover has increased in most of Europe and North America; nature reserves have expanded even in the tropics. So here's an image of the future. With much of the world's meat grown, brain-free and legless, in factories, and much of its fruit and vegetables in multi-storey urban farms lit with cheap fusion power, there will again be vast steppes, savannahs, prairies and rain forests, teeming with herds of wild game. Perhaps even a few woolly mammoths among them.

Famine

1NC FamineAlt causes to food supply and prices – political instability, lack of natural resources and infrastructure, bad communication and information technology FAO 13 - Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (“The State of Food Insecurity in the World: The multiple dimensions of food security”, 2013, http://www.fao.org/docrep/018/i3434e/i3434e.pdf)//KGProgress in reducing hunger reflects country and regional specificities in terms of economic conditions, infrastructure, the organization of food production, the presence of social provisions and political and institutional stability . In Western Asia, the worsening undernourishment trend appears to be mostly related to food price inflation and political instability. In Northern Africa, where progress has been slow, the same factors are relevant. Lack of natural resources , especially good-quality cropland and renewable water resources, also limit the regions’ food production potential . Meeting the food needs of these regions’ rapidly growing populations has been possible only through importing large quantities of cereals. Some of these cereal imports are financed by petroleum exports; simply put, these regions export hydrocarbons and import carbohydrates to ensure their food security. Both food and energy are made more affordable domestically through large, untargeted subsidies. The regions’ dependency on food imports and oil exports make them susceptible to price swings on world commodity markets. The most precarious food security situations arise in countries where proceeds from hydrocarbon exports have slowed or stalled, food subsidies are circumscribed by growing fiscal deficits or civil unrest has disrupted domestic food chains. While at the global level there has been an overall reduction in the number of undernourished between 1990–92 and 2011–13 (Figure 4), different rates of progress across regions have led to changes in the distribution of undernourished people in the world. Most of the world’s undernourished people are still to be found in Southern Asia, closely followed by sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Asia. The regional share has declined most in Eastern Asia and South-Eastern Asia, and to a lesser extent in Latin America and the Caribbean and in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Meanwhile, the share has increased in Southern Asia, in sub-Saharan Africa and in Western Asia and Northern Africa. Many countries have experienced higher economic growth over the last few years, a key reason for progress in hunger reduction. Still, growth does not reach its potential, owing to structural constraints . Arguably the most important is the often woefully inadequate infrastructure that plagues vast areas of rural Africa. Much improved communication and broader access to information technology may, to some extent, have help ed overcome traditional infrastructure constraints , and promoted market integration. Also encouraging is the pick-up in agricultural productivity growth, buttressed by increased public investment, incentives generated by higher food prices and renewed interest of private investors in agriculture. In some countries, remittance inflows from migrants have helped spur domestic growth. Remittances have increased smallscale investment, which was particularly beneficial to growth where food production and distribution still rely on smallscale and local networks. This holds in particular for sub- Saharan African countries, where a combination of higher crop yields and increased livestock production have led to a reduction of undernourishment.

Some degree of food insecurity inevitable Harsch ‘3(Ernest, Africa Recovery, May, http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol17no1/171food1.htm)To many around the world, the image of famine in Africa is closely linked to drought and, in some countries, war. But even when there is no drought or other acute crisis, about 200 million Africans

suffer from chronic hunger, UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Director-General Jacques Diouf noted during a recent visit to Senegal. The reasons are multiple: low farm productivity, grinding poverty, the ravages of HIV/AIDS and unstable domestic and international agricultural markets. "Food insecurity in Africa has structural causes ," Mr. Annan emphasizes. "Most African farmers cultivate small plots of land that do not produce enough to meet the needs of their families. The problem is compounded by the farmers' lack of bargaining power and lack of access to land, finance and technology." Because small-scale farmers and other rural Africans have so few food stocks and little income, a period of drought can quickly trigger famine conditions . This is especially true for rural women, who are among the poorest of the poor and who account for the bulk of food production in Africa.

No impact – large swings in prices don’t trickle down FAO 13 - Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (“The State of Food Insecurity in the World: The multiple dimensions of food security”, 2013, http://www.fao.org/docrep/018/i3434e/i3434e.pdf)//KGThe evolution of the prevalence of undernourishment estimates capture trends in chronic hunger. Because of the characteristics of the data on which it is based, the prevalence of undernourishment indicator does not reflect acute, short-term changes in malnutrition resulting from short-term changes in the economic environment. The large swings in primary food prices observed since 2008, often measured by the FAO Food Price Index (FPI), are a prominent example of such short-term shocks. Price and income swings affect the food security of poor and hungry people more than the steady trend in the prevalence of undernourishment suggests. But recent data on global and regional food consumer price indices (food CPIs) suggest that food price hikes at the primary commodity level generally have little effect on consumer prices and that the swings in consumer prices were much more muted than those faced by agricultural producers or recorded in international trade. Overall, the new data on food prices at the consumer level give rise to two basic findings. The first is that increases in the FPI translate into higher consumer prices only to a very limited degree and with a time lag of a few months. The lag in transmission from international prices (as captured by the FPI) to consumer prices (food CPI) is explained, in large measure, by the time needed to harvest, ship and then process primary products into final food items for consumers. The lag is highlighted if the two indicators are plotted on different scales (Figure 5, left). The limited transmission is explained by a combination of factors that determine vertical price transmission in every food economy, in cluding mark-ups for transportation, processing and marketing, and by any subsidies at the consumer level. The limited nature of this price transmission is well illustrated by plotting both indicators on the same scale (Figure 5, right). The second finding is that regional differences in price transmission are surprisingly small. This means that, even in regions characterized by short supply chains and high levels of subsistence production, changes in producer prices of primary products have only a limited effect on final consumer prices (Figure 6). The only noticeable exception is Eastern Africa, where price transmission is high and consumers have been exposed more fully to swings in prices of primary food products. This is also the case for lowincome, food-importing countries, in which poor consumers may allocate more than 75 percent of their expenditure to food; in these countries, increases in producer prices can significantly reduce the ability of consumers to meet their food needs.

Alt cause – honeybeesAP 08 (“Honey Bee Crisis could lead to higher food prices”, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/politics/sns-ap-sick-bees,0,622176.story)WASHINGTON — Food prices could rise even more unless the mysterious decline in honey bees is solved, farmers and businessmen told lawmakers Thursday. "No bees, no crops," North Carolina grower Robert D. Edwards told a House Agriculture subcommittee. Edwards said he had to cut his cucumber acreage in half because of the lack of bees available to rent. About three-quarters of flowering plants rely on birds, bees and other pollinators to help them reproduce. Bee pollination is responsible for $15 billion annually in crop value. I n 2006, beekeepers began reporting losing 30 percent to 90 percent of their hives. This phenomenon has become known as Colony Collapse Disorder. Scientists do not know how many bees have died; beekeepers have lost 36 percent of their managed colonies this year. It was 31 percent for 2007, said Edward B. Knipling, administrator of the Agriculture Department's Agricultural Research Service. "If there are no bees, there is no way for our nation's farmers to continue to grow the high quality, nutritious food s our country relies on," said Democratic Rep. Dennis Cardoza of California, chairman of the horticulture and organic agriculture panel. "This is a crisis we cannot afford to ignore."

Alt cause – Population growthVon Braun, 08 – Director General of the International Food Policy Research Institute (Joachim, April 2008“High Food Prices: What should be done?”, http://www.ifpri.org/pubs/bp/bp001.asp)At the same time, the growing world population is demanding more and different kinds of food. Rapid economic growth in many developing countries has pushed up consumers' purchasing power, generated rising demand for food, and shifted food demand away from traditional staples and toward higher-value foods like meat and milk. This dietary shift is leading to increased demand for grains used to feed livestock.

Alt cause – GM crops cause mass crop failure and famineHo 1/21/07 (Mae-Wan Ho, PhD, director of the London-based Institute for Science in Society (ISIS), “Making the World GM-Free and Sustainable,” http://www.westonaprice.org/farming/gm-free-sustainable.html)Genetically modified (GM) crops epitomize industrial monoculture , with its worst features exaggerated . They are part and parcel of the "environmental bubble economy," built on the over-exploitation of natural resources, which has destroyed the environment, depleted water and fossil fuels and accelerated global warming. As a result, world grain yields have been falling for six of the seven past years. Expanding the cultivation of GM crops at this time is a recipe for global bio-devastation, massive crop failures and global famine. GM crops are a dangerous diversion from the urgent task of getting our food system sustainable in order to really feed the world.

2NC Alt Cause

Multiple alternate causes to food prices Teslik 08 – Assistant Editor at Council on Foreign Relations (Lee Hudson, “Food Prices”, 6/30/2008, http://www.cfr.org/publication/16662/food_prices.html) Before considering factors like supply and demand within food markets, it is important to understand the umbrella factors influencing costs of production and, even more broadly, the currencies with which and economies within which food is traded. Energy Prices. Rising energy prices have direct causal implications for the food market. Fuel is used in several aspects of the agricultural production process , including fertilization, processing, and transportation. The percentage of total agricultural input expenditures directed toward energy costs has risen significantly in recent years. A briefing from the U.S. Department of Agriculture notes that the U.S. agricultural industry’s total expenditures on fuel and oil are forecast to rise 12.6 percent in 2008, following a rise of 11.5 percent in 2007. These costs are typically passed along to customers and are reflected in global spot prices (i.e. the current price a commodity trades for at market). The input costs of electricity have also risen, furthering the burden. Though it isn’t itself an energy product, fertilizer is an energy-intensive expense, particularly when substantial transport costs are borne by local farmers—so that expense, too, is reflected in the final price of foodstuffs. (Beyond direct causation, energy prices are also correlated to food prices, in the sense that many of the same factors pushing up energy prices—population trends, for instance, or market speculation—also affect food prices.) Currencies/Inflation. When food is traded internationally—particularly on commodities exchanges or futures markets—it is often denominated in U.S. dollars. In recent years, the valuation of the dollar has fallen with respect to many other major world currencies . This means that even if food prices stayed steady with respect to a basket of currencies, their price in dollars would have risen. Of course, food prices have not stayed steady—they have risen across the board—but if you examine international food prices in dollar terms, it is worth noting that the decline of the dollar accentuates any apparent price increase. Demand Demand for most kinds of food has risen in the past decade. This trend can be attributed to several factors: Population trends. The world’s population has grown a little more than 12 percent in the past decade. Virtually nobody argues that this trend alone accounts for rising food prices—agricultural production has, in many cases, become more efficient, offsetting the needs of a larger population—and some analysts say population growth hasn’t had any impact whatsoever on food prices. The shortcomings of a Malthusian food-price argument are most obvious in the very recent past. Richard Posner, a professor of law and economics at the University of Chicago, argues this point on his blog. He notes that in 2007 the food price index used by the FAO rose 40 percent, as compared to 9 percent in 2006—clearly a much faster rate than global population growth for that year, which measured a little over 1 percent. Nonetheless, experts say population trends , distinct from sheer growth rates, have had a major impact on food prices . For instance, the past decade has seen the rapid growth of a global middle class. This, Posner says, has led to changing tastes, and increasing demand for food that is less efficient to produce. Specifically, he cites an increased demand for meats. Livestock require farmland for grazing (land that could be used to grow other food), and also compete directly with humans for food resources like maize. The production of one serving of meat, economists say, is vastly less efficient than the production of one serving of corn or rice. Biofuels. Experts say government policies that provide incentives for farmers to use crops to produce energy, rather than food, have exacerbated food shortages. Specifically, many economists fault U.S. policies

diverting maize crops to the production of ethanol and other biofuels. The effects of ramped-up U.S. ethanol production—which President Bush called for as part of an initiative to make the United States “energy independent”—was highlighted in a 2007 Foreign Affairs article by C. Ford Runge and Benjamin Senauer. Runge and Senauer write that the push to increase ethanol production has spawned ethanol subsidies in many countries, not just the United States. Brazil, they note, produced 45.2 percent of the world’s ethanol in 2005 (from sugar cane), and the United States 44.5 percent (from corn). Europe also produces biodiesel, mostly from oilseeds. In all cases, the result is the diversion of food products from global food markets, accentuating demand, pinching supply, and pushing up prices. Joachim von Braun, the director general of IFPRI, writes in an April 2008 briefing (PDF) that 30 percent of all maize produced in the United States (by far the largest maize producer in the world) will be diverted to biofuel production in 2008. This raises prices not only for people buying maize directly, but also for those buying maize products (cornflakes) or meat from livestock that feed on maize (cattle). Speculation. Many analysts point to speculative trading practices as a factor influencing rising food prices. In May 2008 testimony (PDF) before the U.S. Senate’s Committee on Homeland Security, Michael W. Masters, the managing partner of the hedge fund Masters Capital Management, explained the dynamic. Masters says institutional investors like hedge funds and pension funds started pouring money into commodities futures markets in the early 2000s, pushing up futures contracts and, in turn, spot prices. Spot traders often use futures markets as a benchmark for what price they are willing to pay, so even if futures contracts are inflated by an external factor like a flood of interest from pension funds, this still tends to result in a bump for spot prices. Still, much debate remains about the extent to which speculation in futures markets in fact pushes up food prices. “In general we [economists] think futures markets are a good reflection of what’s likely to happen in the real future,” says IFPRI’s Orden. Orden acknowledges that more capital has flowed into agricultural commodities markets in recent years, but says that he “tends to think these markets are pretty efficient and that you shouldn’t look for a scapegoat in speculators.” Supply Even as demand for agricultural products has risen, several factors have pinched global supply. These include: Development/urbanization. During the past half decade, global economic growth has featured expansion throughout emerging markets, even as developed economies in the United States, Europe, and Japan have cooled. The economies of China, India, Russia, numerous countries in Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe, and a handful of achievers in the Middle East and Africa have experienced strong economic growth rates. This is particularly true in Asian cities, where industrial and service sector development has clustered. The result has often been a boost for per capita earnings but a drag on domestic agriculture, as discussed in this backgrounder on African agriculture. Farmland has in many cases been repurposed for urban or industrial development projects . Governments have not, typically, been as eager to invest in modernizing farm equipment or irrigation techniques as they have been to sink money into urban development. All this has put a n increased burden on developing-world farmers , precisely as they dwindle in number and supply capacity . Production capacity in other parts of the world has increased by leaps and bounds as efficiency has increased, and, as previously noted, total global production exceeds global demand. But urbanization opens markets up to other factors—transportation costs and risks, for instance, which are particularly high in less accessible parts of the developing world—and prevent the smooth functioning of trade, even where there are willing buyers and sellers. Weather. Some of the factors leading to recent price increases have been weather-related factors that tightened supply in specific markets. In 2008, for instance, two major weather events worked in concert to squeeze Asian rice production—Cyclone Nargis, which led to massive flooding and the destruction of rice harvests in Myanmar; and a major

drought in parts of Australia. Estimates indicate Myanmar’s flooding instantly destroyed a substantial portion of Myanmar’s harvest, limiting the country’s ability to export rice. Meanwhile, Australia’s drought wiped out 98 percent of the country’s rice harvest in 2008, forcing Canberra to turn to imports and further straining Asia’s rice market. Trade policy. Agricultural trade barriers have long been faulted for gumming up trade negotiations, including the Doha round of World Trade Organization talks. But in the midst of the recent food pinch, a different kind of trade barrier has emerged as a problem—export bans. As discussed before (in the instance of the Philippines meeting difficulty in its efforts to import rice), several exporters have tightened the reins in light of domestic supply concerns. According to the UN’s World Food Program, over forty countries have imposed some form of export ban in an effort to increase domestic food security. India, for instance, imposed bans on exporting some forms of rice and oil in June 2008—a move that took food off the market, led to stockpiling, and brought a spike in prices. China, Kazakhstan, and Indonesia, among other countries, have introduced similar bans. The distorting effects of these barriers are particularly troubling in the developing world, where a much larger percentage of average household income is spent on food. The African Development Bank warned in May 2008 that similar moves among African countries could rapidly exacerbate food concerns on the African continent. A group of West African countries, meanwhile, sought to mitigate the negative effects of export bans by exempting one another. Food aid policy and other policies. Experts say flaws in food aid policies have limited its effectiveness and in some cases exacerbated price pressures on food. CFR Senior Fellow Laurie Garrett discusses some of these factors in a recent working paper. Garrett cites illogical aid policies such as grants for irrigation and mechanization of crop production that the Asian Development Bank plans to give to Bangladesh, a densely populated country without “a spare millimeter of arable land.” Garrett also criticizes food aid policies (U.S. aid policies are one example) that mandate food aid to be doled out in the form of crops grown by U.S. farmers, rather than cash. The rub, she says, is that food grown in the United States is far more expensive , both to produce and to transport , than food grown in recipient countries. Such a policy guarantees that the dollar value of donations goes much less far than it would if aid were directed to funds that could be spent in local markets. Other experts note additional policies that limit supply. In a recent interview with CFR.org, Paul Collier, an economics professor at Oxford University, cites European bans on genetically modified crops as a prime example.

Hegemony

1NC No ImpactNo impact to hegFettweis, 11 (Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO)

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true.

During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990 .51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s

responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United S tates cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races , and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished . The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during

the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words,

even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior,

then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained U nited S tates suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending . Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

The USA is incapable of projecting leadership beyond its own hemisphereMearsheimer 10 (John, Professor of Political Science at University of Chicago, “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia”, 2010, http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/3/4/381.full, N.O)

When people talk about hegemony these days, they are usually referring to the United States, which they describe as a global hegemon . I do not like this terminology, however, because it is virtually impossible for any stat e—including the United States—to achieve global hegemony. The main obstacle to world domination is the difficulty of projecting power over huge distances, especially across enormous bodies of water

like the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean s. The best outcome that a great power can hope for is to achieve regional hegemony , and possibly control another region that is close by and easily accessible over land. The United States , which dominates the Western Hemisphere, is the only regional hegemon in modern history . Five other great powers have tried to dominate their region—Napoleonic France, Imperial Germany, Imperial Japan, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union—but none have succeeded.

2NC No Impact

Heg collapse doesn’t cause global nuclear war – conflicts would be small and managableHaas, 8 (Richard Haas (president of the Council on Foreign Relations, former director of policy planning for the Department of State, former vice president and director of foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution, the Sol M. Linowitz visiting professor of international studies at Hamilton College, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a lecturer in public policy at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, and a research associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies) April 2008 “Ask the Expert: What Comes After Unipolarity?” http://www.cfr.org/publication/16063/ask_the_expert.html)Does a non polar world increase or reduce the chances of another world war? Will nuclear deterrence continue to prevent a large scale conflict? Sivananda Rajaram, UK Richard Haass: I believe the chance of a world war , i.e., one involving the

major powers of the day, is remote and likely to stay that way . This reflects more than anything else the absence of disputes or goals that

could lead to such a conflict. Nuclear deterrence might be a contributing factor in the sense that no conceivable dispute among the major powers would justify any use of nuclear weapons, but again, I believe the fundamental reason great power relations are relatively good is that all hold a stake in sustaining an international order that supports trade and financial flows and avoids large-scale conflict . The danger in a nonpolar world is not global conflict as we feared during the Cold War but smaller but still highly costly conflicts involving terrorist groups, militias, rogue states, etc.

Military superiority doesn’t translate into winning warsKeating, 13 (Joshua, associate editor at Foreign Policy, 3/18, “Why can't America win a war these days?”, Foreign Policy, http://ideas.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/03/18/why_cant_america_win_a_war_these_days) With the 10th

anniversary of the invasion of Iraq this week, it seems a worthwhile time to reflect on the fact that for all its obvious military advantages over every country on the planet, the U nited S tates doesn't seem particularly good at winning wars anymore. In her book-length study, Who Wins: Predicting Strategic Success and Failure in Armed Conflict, University of North Carolina political scientist Patricia

L. Sullivan writes: "The U nited S tates failed to achieve its primary political objectives in approximately 30 percent of its major military operation between 1946 and 2002. In almost every one of these failues, the U nited S tates chose to terminate its military intervenion short of victory despite the fact that it retained an overwhelming physical capacity to sustain military operations. The U.S. withdrawal from Somalia after the death of sixteen Army Rangers may appear to be an

extreme case, but it is consistent with a pattern in which the U nited S tates experienced higher-than-expected costs and withdrew its troops short of attaining intervention objectives, despite the fact that its military was , at most,

only marginally degraded in the conflict. The United States' unsuccessful intervention in Vietnam is, of course, the quintessential example. "

Sullivan argues that the most important factor in predicting whether a country will be successful in initiating military conflict is not its relative military might or prosperity compared to its opponent, or even it's "resolve" to keep up the fight in the face of high casualties, but the goals and expectations it has going into the conflict. She writest that superior firepower is less of an advantage the more

the attacker's war aims require its opponents to change its behavior: Powerful states do not lose small wars simply because they have less cost tolerance than their weak adversaries. The extent to which a physically weaker actor's cost-tolerance advantage can affect armed conflict outcomes is largely a function of the degree to which the stronger actor has war aims that require the weak actor to change its behavior. The balance of military capabilities between the belligerents is expected to be the most important determinant of outcomes when the objects at stake can be seized and held with physical force alone. The defender's tolerance for costs becomes more significant when a challenger pursues political objectives that require a change in target behavior. Operation Desert Storm was an example of the first type of objective. Despite Saddam Hussein's warning to the United States that "yours is a society which cannot accept 10,000 dead in one battle," the war was over must faster than even U.S. miltary planners expected. The expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait was a goal that could be accomplished through brute force alone, and the U.S. military advantage was

decisive. This was true of Saddam's initial ouster in 2003 as well. But, Sullivan argues, following the ouster of Iraq , the second Bush

administration vastly overestimated the usefulness of its firepower advantage in supporting the new Iraqi government

against a growing domestic insurgency.The book's conclusions aren't exactly shocking in the post-Iraq era -- the field of counterinsurgency studies is devoted largely to the question of how to affect a population's behavior in situations where firepower isn't an advantage -- but judging by the news out of Mali, it's not clear that militarily-superior western power have exactly learned the lesson.

Iran

1NC No Iran war No Iranian lashoutBoroujerdi 7 (Mehrzad, Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Middle Eastern Studies Program, “Iranian Nuclear Miasma”, Syracuse Law Review, 57 Syracuse L. Rev. 619, Lexis)The potential for groupthink miscalculations is also thwarted by the existence of multiple consensus-based decision bodies within the overall multilayered structure . 18 While this complex process can sometimes make Iranian

policy confusing and contradictory, it does not necessarily lend itself to high risk behavior . Even if one agent makes a hasty decision

or issues an aggressive policy statement , it may be immediately contradicted by another authority. 19 Individual

leaders also have difficulty muting [*623] criticism within the regime and forcing all agents to agree on one course of action. While miscalculations and hasty

behavior may be the rule at the micro-level, at the macro-level hasty action is checked by the competing nodes of

power . While this structure could admittedly be problematic with regard to the nuclear program depending on what form of command and control

system to control accidents and illicit transfer is established, it makes the prospect of Iran engaging in a boldly offensive or

miscalculated action less realistic .

2NC No Iran War Iran isn’t a threatLuttwak, 7 (Luttwak, senior associate – CSIS, professor – Georgetown and Berkeley, 5/26/’7(Edward, “The middle of nowhere,” Prospect Magazine)Now the Mussolini syndrome is at work over Iran. All the symptoms are present, including tabulated lists of Iran’s warships,

despite the fact that most are over 30 years old ; of combat aircraft , many of which (F-4s, Mirages, F-5s, F-14s) have not flown in years for lack of spare parts ; and of divisions and brigades that are so only in name. There are awed descriptions of the

Pasdaran revolutionary guards, inevitably described as “elite,” who do indeed strut around as if they have won many a war, but who have actually fought only one— against Iraq , which they lost. As for Iran’s claim to have defeated Israel by Hizbullah

proxy in last year’s affray, the publicity was excellent but the substance went the other way, with roughly 25 per cent of the best-trained men dead, which explains the tomb-like silence and immobility of the once rumbustious Hizbullah ever since the ceasefire. Then there is the new

light cavalry of Iranian terror ism that is invoked to frighten us if all else fails. The usual middle east experts now explain that if we annoy the ayatollahs,

they will unleash terrorists who will devastate our lives, even though 30 years of “death to America” invocations and vast sums spent on maintaining a special

international terrorism department have produced only one major bombing in Saudi Arabia , in 1996, and two in the most

permissive environment of Buenos Aires, in 1992 and 1994, along with some assassinations of exiles in Europe. It is true enough that if Iran’s nuclear

installations are bombed in some overnight raid, there is likely to be some retaliation, but we live in fortunate times in which we have only the

irritant of terrorism instead of world wars to worry about—and Iran’s added contribution is not

likely to leave much of an impression. There may be good reasons for not attacking Iran’s nuclear sites—including the very slow and

uncertain progress of its uranium enrichment effort—but its ability to strike back is not one of them. Even the seemingly fragile tanker traffic down the Gulf and

through the straits of Hormuz is not as vulnerable as it seems—Iran and Iraq have both tried to attack it many times without much success, and this time the US navy stands ready to destroy any airstrip or jetty from which attacks are launched. As for the claim that the “Iranians” are united in patriotic support for the nuclear programme, no such nationality even exists. Out of Iran’s population of 70m or so, 51 per cent are ethnically Persian, 24 per cent are Turks (“Azeris” is the regime’s term), with other minorities comprising the

remaining quarter. Many of Iran’s 16-17m Turks are in revolt against Persian cultural imperialism; its 5-6m Kurds have started a serious insurgency ; the Arab minority detonates bombs in Ahvaz; and Baluch tribesmen attack

gendarmes and revolutionary guards. If some 40 per cent of the British population were engaged in separatist struggles of varying intensity, nobody

would claim that it was firmly united around the London government. On top of this, many of the Persian majority oppose the theocratic regime , either because they have become post-Islamic in reaction to its many prohibitions, or because they are Sufis, whom the regime now persecutes almost as much as the small Baha’i minority. So let us have no more reports from Tehran stressing the country’s national

unity. Persian nationalism is a minority position in a country where half the population is not even Persian. In

our times, multinational states either decentralise or break up more or less violently; Iran is not decentralising, so its future seems highly predictable, while in the present not much cohesion under attack is to be expected.

The U.S. can credibly deter IranPosen 06 (Barry, Ford International Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, AlterNet, March 30, http://www.alternet.org/audits/34219/)Some worry that Iran would be unconvinced by an American deterrent, choosing instead to gamble that the United States would not make good on its commitments to weak Middle Eastern states -- but the consequences of losing a gamble against a vastly superior nuclear power like the U nited S tates are grave, and they do not require much imagination to grasp.

1NC No Iran ProlifNo impact to Iran Proliferation—credible U.S. and Israel deterrence, leadership is rational, won’t give weapons to terroristsCarpenter, 12 (Ted Galen – senior fellow at the Cato Institute, April 12, “The Pernicious Myth That Iran Can’t Be Deterred”, CATO Institute, http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/pernicious-myth-iran-cant-be-deterred)Rumblings about possible war with Iran have grown louder in Washington and other Western capitals in the past few months. Speculation has centered on the likelihood that Israel will launch preemptive air strikes against Iran’s nuclear installations, but there is also considerable talk that the United States might join in such strikes or even take on the primary mission to make certain that the key sites are destroyed. Most advocates of military action against Iran contend that the system of international economic sanctions against the clerical regime is not halting progress on the country’s nuclear program and that the world simply cannot tolerate a nuclear-armed Iran. President Obama has stated repeatedly that it would be “unacceptable” for Tehran to have nuclear weapons, and Mitt Romney, the President’s likely opponent in the November election, says flatly that he will never allow the emergence of a nuclear Iran on his watch. The reason that a growing number of politicians and pundits embrace the war option, even though most of them concede that such a step could create

dangerous instability in an already turbulent region, is that they explicitly or implicitly believe that Iran is undeterrable. The typical allegation is that if Iran builds nuclear weapons, it will use them — certainly against Israel, and possibly against the United States or its NATO allies. Most

realists dispute that notion, pointing out that the U nited S tates has several thousand nuclear weapons and successfully deterred such difficult actors as the Soviet Union and Maoist China. They also note that Israel has between 150 and 300 nuclear weapons — an extremely credible deterrent . None of that matters, hawks contend, because the Iran ian leadership is not rational and, therefore, the normal logic of deterrence does not apply. Several war advocates stress Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s obsession with the return of the “12th Imam,” an event in Islamic lore that is to be accompanied by an apocalypse. Clifford May, the head of the neo-conservative Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, argues that “more than a few of Iran’s rulers hold the theological conviction that the return of the Mahdi, the savior, can be brought about only by an apocalypse.” He goes on to cite ultra-hawkish Middle East scholar Bernard Lewis, who asserts that for those who

share Ahmadinejad’s vision, “mutually assured destruction is not a deterrent. It’s an inducement.” There are several problems with that thesis. First, Ahmadinejad is hardly the most powerful figure in the Iranian political system. That’s why the all-too-

frequent comparisons of Ahmadinejad to Adolf Hitler are especially absurd. The real power in Iran is held by the

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his inner circle of senior clerics. And members of that leadership elite have publicly rebuked

Ahmadinejad for devoting too much time and energy to the issue of the 12th Imam. Second, the return of the Mahdi in the midst of an

apocalypse is scarcely a unique religious myth. Most major religions have an “end of the world” mystic scenario

involving a savior. Christianity, for example, has the Book of Revelations, with the appearance of the four horsemen of the Apocalypse, Armageddon, and the second coming of Jesus Christ. Given the influence of Christianity among American political leaders, foreign critics could make the case that the United States cannot be trusted with nuclear weapons, because a devout Christian leader who believed Revelations would be tempted to bring about

Armageddon. The reality is that leaders in any political system usually prefer to enjoy the riches and other perks of this life rather than seek to bring about prematurely the speculative benefits of a next life. There is no credible evidence

that the Iranian leadership deviates from that norm. And those leaders certainly know that a nuclear attack on Israel, the U nited S tates, or Washington’s NATO allies would trigger a devastating counter-attack that would end

their rule and obliterate Iran as a functioning society. It is appropriate to demand that hawks produce evidence — not

just allegations — that deterrence is inapplicable because Iranian leaders are suicidal . But one will search

in vain for such evidence in the thirty-three years that the clerical regime has held power. There is, in fact, an abundance of counter-evidence. Meir Dagan, the former head of Israel’s Mossad intelligence agency , has stated that he considers Iran’s leaders — including Ahmadinejad — “very rational”. Tehran’s behavior over the years

confirms that assessment. During the early stages of the Iraq-Iran war in the 1980s, the Ayatollah Khomeini said that he would “never

make peace” with Saddam Hussein. But when the war dragged on for years and the correlation of forces turned against Iran, the country’s military leaders

persuaded Khomeini and the clerical elite to conclude a compromise peace. That’s hardly the behavior of an irrational, suicidal political system. Indeed, there is strong evidence that Iranian leaders understand that there

are red lines that they dare not cross. One of the specters that Western hawks create is that Iran would transfer nuclear weapons to non-state

terrorist groups. But Iran has had chemical weapons in its arsenal since the days of the Shah. There is not a shred of evidence that Tehran

has passed on such weapons to any of its political clients , including Hezbollah and Hamas . Given the visceral hatred those organizations harbor toward Israel, it is nearly certain that they would have used chemical weapons against Israeli targets if Iran had ever put them in their hands.

Again, it certainly appears that deterrence neutralized any temptation Tehran might have had to engage in reckless conduct . A more rational fear than the notion that Iran would commit suicide by launching a nuclear attack against adversaries who have vast

nuclear arsenals, or even that Iran would court a similar fate by supplying terrorist groups with nukes, is the thesis that Tehran would exploit a nuclear shield to then bully its neighbors. But even that fear is greatly exaggerated . As Cato Institute scholar Justin Logan points out

in the April issue of The American Conservative, Iran’s conventional forces are weak and the country’s power projection capabilities are meager . A nuclear Iran likely would be capable of deterring a US attack on its homeland — attacks that the United States has a

habit of launching against non-nuclear adversaries like Serbia, Iraq and Libya — but such a capability would not translate into Iranian

domination of the M iddle E ast. That nightmare scenario is only a little less overwrought than the other theories about the “Iranian threat.”

They won’t proliferate—long timeframe, no evidence they’re making moves, we would detect it, forceful international response, no covert uranium enrichment plants, no decision from leaders to develop weaponsKahl, 12 (Colin H. Kahl – Associate Professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, March/April, “Not Time to Attack Iran: Why War Should Be a Last Resort”, Foreign Affairs, ProQuest)Kroenig argues that there is an urgent need to attack Iran's nuclear infrastructure soon, since Tehran could "produce its first nuclear weapon within six months of

deciding to do so." Yet that last phrase is crucial. The I nternational A tomic E nergy A gency (iaea) has documented Iran ian efforts to

achieve the capacity to develop nuclear weapons at some point, but there is no hard evidence that Supreme Leader

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has yet made the final decision to develop them. In arguing for a six-month horizon, Kroenig also misleadingly

conflates hypothetical timelines to produce weaponsgrade uranium with the time actually required to construct a bomb. According to 2010 Senate

testimony by James Cartwright, then vice chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staa, and recent statements by the former heads of Israel's national intelligence

and defense intelligence agencies, even if Iran could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a bomb in six months, it would take it at least a year to produce a testable nuclear device and considerably longer to make a deliverable weapon. And David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security (and the source of Kroenig's six-month

estimate), recently told Agence France-Presse that there is a " low probability " that the Iranians would actually develop

a bomb over the next year even if they had the capability to do so. Because there is no evidence that Iran has built additional covert enrichment plants since the Natanz and Qom sites were outed in 2002 and 2009, respectively, any near-term move by

Tehran to produce weapons-grade uranium would have to rely on its declared facilities. The iaea would thus detect such activity with su/cient time for the international community to mount a forceful response . As a result, the

Iranians are unlikely to commit to building nuclear weapons until they can do so much more quickly or out of sight, which could be years oa. Kroenig is also inconsistent about the timetable for an attack. In some places, he suggests that strikes should begin now, whereas in others, he argues that the United States should attack only if Iran takes certain actions-such as expelling iaea inspectors, beginning the enrichment of weapons-grade uranium, or installing large numbers of advanced centrifuges, any one of which would signal that it had decided to build a bomb. Kroenig is likely right that these developments-

and perhaps others, such as the discovery of new covert enrichment sites-would create a decision point for the use of force. But the Iranians have not taken these steps yet, and as Kroenig acknowledges, "Washington has a very good chance " of detecting them if they do.

2NC No Iran Prolif

Prefer our ev—their authors continuously inflate threatsInnocent, 11 (Foreign policy analyst – Cato, member – IISS, 12/7/’11, Malou, http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/ignore-the-hawks-on-iran-too/)

More credible voices suggest otherwise. The nonprofit Arms Control Association (ACA) observed that the most-recent IAEA report

suggests “[I]t remains apparent that a nuclear-armed Iran is still not imminent nor is it inevitable.” Iran was engaged in

nuclear weapons development activities until it stopped in 2003, and as Cato’s Justin Logan observes, the IAEA ’s own report shows there is

no definitive evidence of Iran’s diversion of fissile material. When Pletka was called out for her “less than a year” prediction, she turned up her nose and snapped: Quibblers will suggest that there are important “ifs” in both these assessments. And yes, the key “if” is “if” Iran decides to build a bomb. So, I suppose when I said “less than a year away from having a nuclear weapon,” I should have added, “if they want one.” But… isn’t that the point? Do we want to leave

this decision up to Khamenei? Confronted with ambiguous information, and forced to infer intentions, hawks evince the very same

arrogance and overconfidence that helped open the door for Iranian influence in the region in the first place by toppling Saddam Hussein’s regime (Pletka advocated repeatedly for this leading up to the 2003 invasion). Pletka and others who years ago

had the gall to argue that Iraq “will end when it ends” are today worthy of being ignored on Iran.

No Iran prolif – security estimates overblown*Hymans, 13 (Professor IR USC, 2/18, Jacques, “Iran Is Still Botching the Bomb” Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139013/jacques-e-c-hymans/iran-is-still-botching-the-bomb)

At the end of January, Israeli intelligence officials quietly indicated that they have downgraded their assessments of Iran's ability to build a nuclear bomb. This is surprising because less than six months ago, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned from the tribune of the United Nations that the Iranian nuclear D-Day might

come as early as 2013. Now, Israel believes that Iran will not have its first nuclear device before 2015 or 20 16 . The news comes as a

great relief. But it also raises questions. This was a serious intelligence failure, one that has led some of Israel's own officials to wonder aloud, "Did we cry wolf too early?" Indeed, Israel has consistently overestimated Iran's nuclear program for decades . In 1992, then Foreign Minister Shimon Peres announced that Iran was on pace to have the bomb by 1999. Israel's

many subsequent estimates have become increasingly frenzied but have been consistently wrong. U.S. intelligence agencies have been only slightly less alarmist, and they, too, have had to extend their timelines repeatedly. Overestimating Iran's nuclear potential might not seem like a big problem. However, similar, unfounded fears were the basis for President George W. Bush's preemptive attack against Iraq and its nonexistent weapons of mass destruction. Israel and the United States need to make sure that this kind of human and foreign policy disaster does not happen again. What explains Israel's most recent intelligence failure? Israeli officials have suggested that Iran decided to downshift its nuclear program in response to international sanctions and Israel's hawkish posture. But that theory falls apart when judged against Tehran's own recent aggressiveness. In the past few months, Iran has blocked the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from gaining access to suspect facilities, stalled on diplomatic meetings, and announced a "successful" space shot and the intention to build higher-quality centrifuges. These are not the actions of a state that is purposely slowing down its nuclear program. Even more to the point, if Tehran were really intent on curbing its nuclear work, an explicit announcement of the new policy could be highly beneficial for the country: many states would praise it, sanctions might be lifted, and an Israeli or U.S. military attack would become much less likely. But Iran has not advertised the downshift, and its only modest concession of late has been to convert some of its 20 percent enriched uranium to reactor fuel. It is doubtful that the Iranians would decide to slow down their nuclear program without asking for anything in return. A second hypothesis is that Israeli intelligence estimates have been manipulated for political purposes. This possibility is hard to verify, but it cannot be dismissed out of hand. Preventing the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran is Netanyahu's signature foreign policy stance, and he had an acute interest in keeping the anti-Iran pot boiling in the run-up to last month's parliamentary elections, which he nearly lost. Now, with the elections over, perhaps Israeli intelligence officials feel freer to convey a more honest assessment of Iran's status. This theory of pre-election spin is not very satisfying, however, because it fails to explain why Israeli governments of all political orientations have been making exaggerated claims

about Iran for 20 years -- to say nothing of the United States' own overly dire predictions. The most plausible reason for the consistent pattern of overstatement is that Israeli and U.S. models of

Iranian proliferation are flawed . Sure enough, Israeli officials have acknowledged that they did not anticipate the high number of technical problems Iranian scientists have run into recently . Some of those mishaps may have been the product of

Israeli or U.S. efforts at sabotage. For instance, the 2010 Stuxnet computer virus attack on Iran's nuclear facilities reportedly went well. But the long-term impact of such operations is usually small -- or nonexistent: the IAEA and

other reputable sources have dismissed the highly publicized claims of a major recent explosion at Iran's Fordow uranium-enrichment plant, for instance. Rather than being hampered by James Bond exploits, Iran's nuclear program has probably suffered much more from Keystone Kops-like blunders: mistaken

technical choices and poor implementation by the Iranian nuclear establishment . There is ample reason to believe that

such slipups have been the main cause of Iran's extremely slow pace of nuclear progress all along . The country is

rife with other botched projects, especially in the chaotic public sector. It is unlikely that the Iranian nuclear program is immune to these problems. This is not a knock against the quality of Iranian scientists and engineers, but

rather against the organizational structures in which they are trapped. In such an environment, where top-down mismanagement and political agendas are abundant, even easy technical steps often lead to dead ends and pitfalls . Iran is not the only state with a dysfunctional nuclear weapons program. As I argued in a 2012 Foreign Affairs article, since the 1970s, most states seeking entry into the nuclear weapons club have run their weapons programs poorly, leading to a marked slowdown in global proliferation . The cause of this mismanagement is the poor quality of the would-be proliferator's state

institutions. Libya and North Korea are two classic examples. Libya essentially made no progress, even after 30 years of trying. North Korea has gotten somewhere -- but only after 50 years, and with many high-profile embarrassments along the way. Iran, whose nuclear weapons drive began in the mid-1980s, seems to be following a similar trajectory. Considering Iran in the broader context of the proliferation slowdown, it becomes clear that

the technical problems it has encountered are more than unpredictable accidents -- they are structurally determined . Since U.S. and Israeli intelligence services have failed to appreciate the weakness of Iran's nuclear weapons program, they

have not adjusted their analytical models accordingly . Thus, there is reason to be skeptical about Israel's

updated estimate of an Iranian bomb in the next two or three years. The new date is probably just the product of another ad hoc readjustment, but what is needed is a fundamental rethinking. As the little shepherd boy learned, crying wolf too early and too often destroys one's

credibility and leaves one vulnerable and alone. In order to rebuild public trust in their analysis, Jerusalem and Washington need to explain the assumptions on which their scary estimates are based, provide alternative estimates that are also consistent with the data they have gathered, and give a clear indication of the chance that their estimates are wrong and will have to be revised again. The Iranian nuclear effort is highly provocative. The potential for

war is real. That is why Israel and the U nited S tates need to avoid peddling unrealistic, worse -than-worst- case scenarios .

No centrifuge acquisition – media reports are a hoaxButt, 13 (Research Professor at James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2-20, Yousaf- Former Scientist at Federation of American Scientists, Physicist at High-Energy Astrophysics Division at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics, , “Iran centrifuge magnet story technically questionable” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/iran-centrifuge-magnet-story-technically-questionable)

Last week, the Washington Post reported that "purchase orders obtained by nuclear researchers show an attempt by Iranian agents to buy 100,000 … ring-shaped magnets" and that such "highly specialized magnets used in centrifuge machines … [are] a sign that the country may be planning a major expansion of its nuclear program." As evidence, the Post's Joby Warrick cited a report authored by David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security PDF (ISIS); dated Feb. 13, the report says that an Iranian firm, Jahan Tech Rooyan Pars Co., made an inquiry "posted on a Chinese commercial website … to buy 100,000 ring magnets." As Warrick goes on to

explain: "it is unclear whether the attempt succeeded." There are serious deficiencies in both the Washington Post story and the assertions in the ISIS report. Given that issues of war and peace may hang on the veracity of such claims, the assertions warrant careful scrutiny. The magnets in question have many uses besides centrifuges and are not only, as Warrick describes them, "highly specialized magnets used in centrifuge machines." Such ceramic ring magnets are everyday items and have been used in loudspeakers, for example, for more than half a century. The ISIS report neglects to explain the many other applications for such ceramic ring magnets and jumps to the conclusion that the inquiry is surely related to Iran's nuclear program. Why ISIS does not offer alternate and more plausible applications of these unspecialized magnets is a puzzle. Such magnets are used in a

variety of electronic equipment. For instance, one vendor outlines some of the various possible uses in speakers, direct current brushless motors, and magnetic resonance imaging equipment. This is not the first time ring magnets have surfaced in allegations related to centrifuge applications. Almost exactly a decade ago, as the United States was preparing to invade Iraq, then-director of the International Atomic Energy Agency Mohamed ElBaradei said that reports regarding similar ring magnets in Iraq were unrelated to centrifuges: With respect to reports about Iraq's efforts to import high-strength permanent magnets -- or to achieve the capability for producing such magnets -- for

use in a centrifuge enrichment programme, I should note that, since 1998, Iraq has purchased high-strength magnets for various uses. Iraq has declared inventories of magnets of twelve different designs. The IAEA has verified that previously acquired magnets have been used for missile guidance systems, industrial machinery, electricity meters, and field telephones . Through visits to research and production sites, reviews of engineering drawings and analyses of sample magnets,

IAEA experts familiar with the use of such magnets in centrifuge enrichment have verified that none of the magnets that Iraq has declared could be used directly for a centrifuge magnetic bearing. Robert Kelley, a nuclear engineer and former IAEA chief inspector and deputy leader of the agency's Iraq Action Team, told me last week that, between 2002 and 2003, his group "tracked similar ring magnets that Iraq was trying to procure (openly in insecure channels) and found they were for field telephones …. We got started with an ‘intelligence tip' and ran it to ground. Nothing whatsoever to do with centrifuges." The Iraq Survey Group also weighed in on this issue, saying PDF it "has not uncovered information indicating that the magnet production capability being pursued by Iraq beginning in 2000 was intended to support a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment program. … The declared use of the magnet production lines were for production of ring magnets in the Saham Saddam Missile and for field telephones." A pair of ring magnets is used in the top suspension bearing of the IR-1 gas centrifuges. As others have already noted, it seems to make little sense to order ceramic magnets that are, as ISIS describes, "almost exactly" the right dimensions. If one is intending to purchase 100,000 ceramic ring magnets for critical high-speed centrifuge applications, why not order them exactly the right size? Ceramics are almost impossible to machine due to their brittle nature and are generally ordered to the precise specifications desired. Albright's suggestion in the ISIS report PDF that "some minor re-design would be necessary of the top end cap and top magnetic bearing of the IR-1 [centrifuge] design but these are seen as fairly trivial" could be correct. But why would a purchaser wish to redesign, re-machine, and re-test tens of thousands of centrifuges, instead of ordering the correctly sized part in the first place? Although ISIS redacted measurements in the English translation of the inquiry to purchase the 100,000 magnets, it did not redact them from the original shown on the last page of the ISIS report PDF. The original clearly states that the magnets have "BHmax Min 3MGo"; MGo is shorthand for mega-Gauss Oersted, a measure of the magnetic energy stored in the magnets. (B and H are, respectively, the magnetic flux density and the magnetic field strength.) This value is substantially less than the 10 MGo trigger level given for centrifuge applications in Annex 3 of the Notifications of Exports to Iraq mandated by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1051 (1996). Although magnets with an energy product of 3 MGO could be consistent with applications in suspension bearings of the older IR-1 centrifuges, they are also consistent with a host of other applications. Curiously, the inquiry to the China-based company that is shown on the last page of the ISIS report PDF is very casual and overt. The alleged inquiry states, "Dear Sir We are a great factory in south of Iran and for our new project we need 100.000 pcs Ferrite Barium strontium ring magnet . … we would like buy from you [sic] company. We should be glad if you supply this magnet for us." Presumably, an attempt to source 100,000 parts related to Iran's controversial and often secretive nuclear program would not be conducted quite so openly. Not only would such an overt attempt at sourcing the ring magnets be inconsistent with the secrecy surrounding Iran's nuclear program; it would also be at odds with procurement best-practices, for several reasons. First, such a large order would likely drive up the market price and perhaps even signal to the supplier to choke off the supply, in hopes of obtaining a better price later. Also, before indicating that such a huge order may be in the works, a serious engineering operation would likely obtain a few sample magnets to formally qualify them. Such an order would, more reasonably, be directed to the manufacturer or direct supplier (in this case, apparently, a rather small Indian firm, Ferrito Plastronics), rather than to a Chinese middleman. Obtaining 100,000 ceramic ring magnets without sample qualification would be highly risky and unprofessional. It would be inconsistent with Iran's generally excellent record in systems management and engineering PDF involving a range of technologies and industries. Both the Washington Post story and the ISIS report on which it is based repeatedly call the inquiry a "purchase order" or "order." This is a mischaracterization. The evidence presented (Figures 3 and 4 in the ISIS report) merely shows a web inquiry as to whether the supplier has any interest in discussing the question further. There is no mention of money, delivery dates, or letters of credit. All of these items would be part of a formal purchase order. The apparent manufacturer or supplier of the magnets in question, Ferrito Plastronics, is evidently a "tiny firm in a dark alley in Chennai's electronic spare parts hub on Meeran Sahib Street." According to the Times of India, "the Chennai firm does supply magnets. But these, avers company proprietor Bala Subramanian, are the ones used in loudspeakers, coils, and medical equipment. Besides these, there are decorative magnets for

fridges." The proprietor states that his monthly turnover is slightly less than $2,000. Such a firm would seem unlikely to be the optimal source for 100,000 high-quality centrifuge ring magnets. Although the purpose of the alleged inquiry is subject to interpretation, it seems unlikely to be related to Iran's nuclear program. Assuming that the request to buy 100,000 magnets is genuine, it would be consistent with, for instance, an Iranian loudspeaker company interested in obtaining such ceramic ring magnets . That is just one possible hypothesis, of course, but it seems a better explanation of the alleged inquiry than the suggestion of an overt attempt by Iran's nuclear program to source 100,000 of the wrong-sized ceramic ring magnets from a tiny Indian company via a Chinese

middleman. It is worth noting that the best Western intelligence concludes that no nuclear weapons work is going on in Iran right now, and that Iran is not an imminent nuclear threat . James Clapper, the US director of

national intelligence , has confirmed PDF that he has "a high level of confidence" that no nuclear weaponization

work is underway in Iran . Outgoing Defense Secretary Leon Panetta has also weighed in: "Are [Iranians] trying to

develop a nuclear weapon? No ." And in an interview for a 2011 article in the New Yorker, ElBaradei said PDF that he did not see "a shred of evidence" that Iran was pursuing the bomb after 2003 , adding, "I don't believe Iran is a clear and present danger. All I see is the hype about the threat posed by Iran." Given these expert assessments, reporters and editors should raise the bar for the

evidence underpinning stories of alleged Iranian nuclear weapons-related work . This Washington Post article is the second in

about three months to make serious unsubstantiated claims regarding Iran's nuclear program. In the previous story, the Associated Press used flimsy evidence to suggest that Iran may be working on a nuclear bomb. Clearly,

the media reporting on Iran's controversial nuclear program have a duty to do a better job of vetting evidence and sources. Similarly, non-governmental organizations that are supposed to supply unbiased expert advice should strive to provide professional analyses that lay out all possible explanations and do not jump to unwarranted conclusions. We have all been witness to what may happen when a fictional threat is spun up over non-existent weapons of mass destruction -- the result isn't pretty.

When news reports cast thin evidence in hyperbolic terms, the public is invited to run rampant with speculation about Iran's nuclear program. At a time when military action is apparently being seriously contemplated, the international community needs to look past trivialities, focus on the facts, and find realistic opportunities for ending the Iranian nuclear standoff.

No prolif risk – just fear-mongeringMueller, 12 (Professor PolSci Ohio State, 11-19, John, “History and Nuclear Rationality” http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/history-nuclear-rationality)

We seem to be at it again. Just about the entire foreign-policy establishment has taken it as a central article of faith that nuclear proliferation is a dire security threat and that all possible measures, including even war if necessary, must be taken to keep Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. Concern is justified, but the experience of two-thirds of a century suggests that if Iran does obtain the weapons, it will use them in the same way others have: to stoke the national ego and to deter real or imagined threats. For the mostpart, the few countries to which the weapons have proliferated have found them a notable waste of time, money, effort and scientific talent. They haven’t even found much benefit in rattling them from time to time. This was the case even when the weapons were taken on by large countries with seemingly deranged leaders. Thus, when he got nukes, the Soviet Union’s Stalin was plotting to “transform nature” by planting lots of trees and China’s Mao had recently launched a campaign to remake his society that

created a famine killing tens of millions. It was simplicity and spook on steroids. It is scarcely ever observed that nuclear proliferation has thus far had consequences that are substantially benign. This suggests that simplicity and spook continue to prevail up there at that foreign-policy summit . Send in the chimps.

Naval Power

1NC No Naval Power ImpactSea power solves nothing Goure 10—Vice President, Lexington Institute, PhD (Daniel, 2 July 2010, Can The Case Be Made For Naval Power?, http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/can-the-case-be-made-for-naval-power-?a=1&c=1171)This is no longer the case. The U.S. faces no great maritime challengers . While China appears to be toying with the idea of building a serious Navy this is many years off. Right now it appears to be designi ng a military to keep others, including the U nited S tates, away, out of the Western Pacific and Asian littorals. But even if it were seeking to build a large Navy, many analysts argue that other than Taiwan it is difficult to see a reason why Washington and Beijing would ever come to blows. Our former adversary, Russia, would have a challenge fighting the U.S. Coast Guard, much less the U.S. Navy. After that, there are no other navies of consequence . Yes, there are some scenarios under which Iran might attempt to close the Persian Gulf to oil exports, but how much naval power would really be required to reopen the waterway? Actually, the U.S. Navy would probably need more mine countermeasures capabilities than it currently possesses. More broadly, it appears that the nature of the security challenges confronting the U.S. has changed dramatically over the past several decades. There are only a few places where even large-scale conventional conflict can be considered possible. None of these would be primarily maritime in character although U.S. naval forces could make a significant contribution by employing its offensive and defensive capabilities over land. For example, the administration’s current plan is to rely on sea-based Aegis missile defenses to protect regional allies and U.S. forces until a land-based variant of that system can be developed and deployed. The sea ways , sometimes called the global commons , are predominantly free of dangers . The exception to this is the chronic but relatively low level of piracy in some parts of the world. So, the classic reasons for which nations build navies, to protect its own shores and its commerce or to place the shores and commerce of other states in jeopardy, seem relatively unimportant in today ’s world.

No challengers to the Navy – we’re too far aheadTillman 9 (Barrett Tillman, Historian specializing in naval and aviation topics, 2009. U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings Magazine, “Fear and Loathing in the Post-Naval Era,” http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/story.asp?STORY_ID=1896)

In attempting to justify a Cold War force structure, many military pundits cling to the military stature of China as

proof of a possible large conventional-war scenario against a pseudo-peer rival. Since only China possesses anything remotely approaching the prospect of challenging American hegemony —and only in Asian waters—Beijing ergo becomes the "threat" that justifies maintaining the Cold War force structure. China's development of the DF-21 long-range

antiship ballistic missil e, presumably intended for American carriers, has drawn much attention. Yet even granting the

perfection of such a weapon, the most obvious question goes begging: why would China use it? Why would Beijing start a war with its number-two trading partner—a war that would ruin both economies?10 Furthermore, the U.S. Navy owns nearly as many major combatants as Russia and China combined . In tonnage, we hold a 2.6 to 1 advantage over them. No other coalition —actual or imagined—even comes close.

But we need to ask ourselves: does that matter? In today's world the most urgent naval threat consists not of ships, subs, or aircraft, but of mines-and pirates.11

2NC No Naval Power ImpactNaval power does not solve conflict – prefer our empirical evidence that it leads to war not prevent it Robert S. Ross is Professor of Political Science at Boston College and Associate of the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University. His current research focuses on Chinese security policy, East Asian security, and U.S.-China relations, International Security, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Fall 2009), pp. 46–81 , “China’s Naval Nationalism” , The financial restraints on naval power have not always prevailed on a land power ’s strategic choices. Naval nationalism has frequently encouraged conti- nental powers to seek battle-capable surface ºeets. Naval nationalism is one manifestation of “prestige strategies,” whereby governments seek interna- tional success to bolster their domestic popularity. Prestige-seeking govern- ments sometimes provoke war in the pursuit of a popular military victory.10 But governments also can seek greater prestige by developing defense policies and acquiring weaponry that do not provoke war but nonetheless destabilize great power relations. Naval nationalism is one example of a potentially de- stabilizing prestige strategy. During the nineteenth century, with the emergence of European popular nationalism, naval nationalism became a prominent prestige strategy and a critical source of maritime rivalries. Napoleon’s acquisition of capital ships and his challenge to Britain’s maritime superiority and presence in North Africa were the ªrst steps toward realizing his maritime ambition to oust the British from India and reºected his insatiable need for military successes to sustain his domestic nationalist legitimacy.11 Nationalism drove the French na- val buildup in the 1860s, when there was popular widespread support for en- hancing French prestige and grandeur through possession of large capital ships. Louis Napoleon’s legitimacy depended on his satisfying this nationalist desire, and he personally participated in developing France’s naval policy. In six years, France’s naval budget grew by more than 30 percent and strained the country’s ªnances. French naval nationalism reemerged in the 1880s, when widespread interest in enhancing France’s prestige demanded large colonial possessions and a large navy to protect them.12 Naval nationalism drove German development of the dreadnought and the Anglo-German arms race in the early twentieth century. Tirpitz’s “risk ºeet” was not subjected to rigorous military analysis before it was developed, and it was resisted by many German military ofªcers. Nevertheless, Tirpitz se- cured funding for the dreadnoughts because Kaiser Wilhelm II valued the German Navy as the personal ºotilla of a world leader and as the foremost ex- pression of Germany’s power and mission to achieve its “place in the sun.” Just as the “Greeks and the Romans each had their time, the Spaniards had theirs and the French also”; now it was Germany’s turn.13 Thus, not only did Germany devote insufªcient resources to its ground forces, but the kaiser ’s preoccupation with capital ships prevented it from developing adequately its submarine force until 1916.14 Russia’s drive into the North Paciªc in the late nineteenth and early twenti- eth centuries and its war with Japan in the North Paciªc in 1904–05 reºected the impact of nationalism on Russian defense policy. Russian leaders, includ- ing Czar Nicholas II, were acutely aware of Russian vulnerability to Japanese naval supremacy; they believed it was imperative for Russia to avoid war. Russia’s belligerence reºected excessive conªdence in Russian cultural superi- ority over Asians and its resistance to suggesting weakness or humiliation in the face of Japanese pressure, especially in the context of early twentieth- century domestic political instability.15 Soviet maritime policy in the late twen- tieth century similarly reºected naval nationalism . The Soviet Union began development of a large surface ºeet in 1972, just as its ground forces incurred the cost of a second front with China.16 It laid the keel of its ªrst aircraft carrier in 1983, just as it was entering into a comprehensive arms race with the United States and its economy began

to stagnate. Yet the Soviet Union was not a trad- ing country, and it relied on domestic sources of energy. Russian nationalism and the intrinsic militant ideology ingrained in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union led to a maritime policy that aimed to establish the superiority of the country’s communist political and economic system.17 Nationalism drove Japan’s simultaneous pursuit of continental and mari- time empires in East Asia in the early twentieth century. The Meiji effort to cre- ate a national identity fostered a nationalist culture that sought validation for Japan through empire and forced industrialization. Once unleashed, this na- tionalism dictated Japan’s security agenda and, in the context of economic de- pression and social instability, became the foundation of the government’s legitimacy. Japan thus pursued a relentless expansionist agenda even as it en- countered growing economic difªculties and diminished resources.18 Ulti- mately, naval nationalism led to Japan’s pursuit in the 1930s of an East Asian maritime empire even as its ground forces occupied China and maintained a continental empire.

The Navy is ineffective at deterring conflicts Farley 7 (Roberts, Assistant Professor @ the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce, "The False Decline of U.S. Navy," Oct 23, http://prospect.org/cs/articles?article=the_false_decline_of_the_us_navy, We live in strange times. While the United States is responsible for close to 50 percent of aggregate world military expenditure, and maintains close alliances with almost all of the other major military powers, a community of defense analysts continues to insist that we need to spend more. In the November issue of The Atlantic, Robert Kaplan asserts that United States hegemony is under the threat of “elegant decline,” and

points to what conventional analysts might suggest is the most secure element of American power; the United States Navy. Despite the fact that the U.S. Navy remains several orders of magnitude more powerful than its nearest rival, Kaplan says that we must beware; if we allow the size of our Navy to further decline, we risk repeating the experience of the United Kingdom

in the years before World War I. Unfortunately, since no actual evidence of U.S. naval decline exists, Kaplan is forced to rely on obfuscation, distortion, and tendentious historical analogies to make his case. The centerpiece of Kaplan’s argument is a comparison of the current U.S. Navy to the British Royal Navy at the end of the 19th century. The decline of the Royal Navy heralded the collapse of British hegemony, and the decline of the U.S. Navy threatens a similar fate for the United States. The only problem with this argument is that similarities between the 21st century United States and the 19th century United Kingdom are more imagined than real. It’s true that the relative strength of the Royal Navy declined at the end of the 19th century, but this was due entirely the rise of the United States and Germany. But the absolute strength of the Royal Navy increased in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, as the United Kingdom strove to maintain naval dominance over two countries that possessed larger economies and larger industrial bases than that of Great Britain. In other words, the position of the Royal Navy declined because the position of the United Kingdom declined; in spite of this decline, the Royal Navy continued to dominate the seas against all comers until 1941. Britain’s relative economic decline preceded its naval decline, although the efforts to keep up with Germany, the United States, and later Japan did serious damage to the British economy. The United States faces a situation which is in no way similar. Returning to the present, Kaplan takes note of the growth of several foreign navies, including the Indian, Chinese, and Japanese. He points out that the Japanese Navy has a large number of destroyers and a growing number of submarines. He warns that India “may soon have the world’s third largest navy” without giving any indication of why that matters. Most serious of all, he describes the threat of a growing Chinese Navy and claims that, just as the Battle of Wounded Knee opened a new age for American imperialism, the conquest of Taiwan could transform China into an expansionist, imperial power. The curious historical analogies aside, Kaplan is careful to make no direct comparisons between the growing navies of foreign countries and the actual strength of the United States Navy.

There’s a good reason for this oversight; there is no comparison between the U.S. Navy and any navy afloat today. The United States Navy currently operates eleven aircraft carriers. The oldest and least capable is faster , one third larger, and carries three times the aircraft of Admiral Kuznetsov, the largest carrier in the Russia n Navy. Unlike China’s only aircraft carrier , the former Russian Varyag, American carriers have engines and are capable of self-propulsion. The only carrier in Indian service is fifty years old and a quarter the size of its American counterparts. No navy besides the United States’ has more than one aircraft carrier capable of

flying modern fixed wing aircraft. The U nited S tates enjoys similar dominance in surface combat vessels and submarines, operating twenty-two cruisers, fifty destroyers, fifty-five nuclear attack submarines, and ten amphibious assault ships (vessels

roughly equivalent to most foreign aircraft carriers). In every category the U.S. Navy combines presumptive numerical superiority with a significant ship-to-ship advantage over any foreign navy. This situation is unlikely to

change anytime soon. The French Navy and the Royal Navy will each expand to two aircraft carriers over the next decade. The most ambitious plans ascribed to the People’s Liberation Army Navy call for no more than three aircraft carriers by 2020, and even that strains credulity, given China’s inexperience with carrier operations and the construction of large military vessels. While a crash construction program might conceivably give the Chinese the ability to achieve local

dominance (at great cost and for a short time), the United States Navy will continue to dominate the world’s oceans and littorals for at least the next fifty years. In order to try to show that the U.S. Navy is insufficient in the face of future threats, Kaplan argues that we on are our way to “a 150 ship navy” that will be overwhelmed by the demands of warfighting and global economic maintenance. He suggests that the “1,000 Ship Navy” proposal, an international plan to streamline cooperation between the world’s navies on maritime maintenance issues such as piracy, interdiction of drug and human smuggling, and disaster relief, is an effort at “elegant decline,” and declares that the dominance of the United States Navy cannot be maintained through collaboration with others. It’s true that a 600 ship navy can do more than the current 250-plus ship force of the current U.S. Navy, but

Kaplan’s playing a game of bait and switch. The Navy has fewer ships than it did two decades ago, but the ships it has are far more capable than those of the 1980s. Because of the collapse of its competitors, the Navy is relatively more capable of fighting and winning wars now than it was during the Reagan administration. Broadly speaking, navies have two missions; warfighting, and maritime maintenance. Kaplan wants to confuse the maritime maintenance mission (which can be done in collaboration with others) with the warfighting mission (which need not be). A navy can require the cooperation of others for the maintenance mission, while still possessing utter military superiority over any one navy or any plausible combination of navies on the high seas. Indeed, this is the situation that the United States Navy currently enjoys. It cannot be everywhere all at once, and does require the cooperation of regional navies for fighting piracy and smuggling. At the same time, the U.S. Navy

can destroy any (and probably all, at the same time) naval challengers. To conflate these two missions is equal parts silly and dishonest. The Navy has arrived at an ideal compromise between the two, keeping its fighting supremacy while leading and facilitating cooperation around the world on maritime issues. This compromise has allowed the Navy to build

positive relationships with the navies of the world, a fact that Kaplan ignores. While asserting the dangers posed by a variety of foreign navies, Kaplan makes a distortion depressingly common to those who warn of the decline of American hegemony; he forgets that the U nited S tates has allies. While Kaplan can plausibly argue that growth in Russian or Chinese naval strength threatens the United States, the same cannot reasonably be said of Japan, India, France, or the United Kingdom. With the exception of China and Russia, all of the most powerful navies in the world belong to American allies. United States cooperation with the navies of NATO, India, and Japan has tightened, rather than waned in the last ten years, and the United States also retains warm relations with third tier navies such as

those of South Korea, Australia, and Malaysia. In any conceivable naval confrontation the U nited S tates will have friends, just as the Royal Navy had friends in 1914 and 1941. Robert Kaplan wants to warn the American people of the dangers of impending

naval decline. Unfortunately, he’s almost entirely wrong on the facts. While the reach of the United States Navy may have declined in an absolute sense, its capacity to fight and win naval wars has , if anything, increased since the end of the Cold War. That the U nited S tates continues to embed itself in a deep set of cooperative arrangements with other naval powers only reinforces the dominance of the U.S. Navy on the high seas. Analysts who want to argue for greater U.S. military spending are best advised to concentrate on the fiascos in Iraq and Afghanistan.

2NC – No ChallengersNaval primacy inevitable – US will adapt and is too far aheadHarris 8 (Stuart, BEc (Sydney) and PhD (The Australian National University), is Professor in the Department of International Relations at the Australian National University, “China's "new" diplomacy: tactical or fundamental change?”, Google Books, pg 20)The U nited S tates also keeps a close eye on Chinas military modernization. It believes that by 2020 "China will be, by any measure, a first rate military power."6 It will therefore take whatever steps it sees as necessary to maintain its military superiority, notably in the seas in and around the region. Nor is this superiority being challenged directly by China . That Chinas concept for sea-denial capability is limited to the seas around Taiwan and against Chinas eastern coast has been acknowledged by the United States.7 Outside of that, although President Hu Jintao has spoken of the need to develop Chinas naval capabilities , overwhelming U.S. naval superiority will remain for a long time.

Marine Biodiversity/Hotspots

1NC No ImpactMarine ecosystems are resilientKennedy, 2002 (Victor Kennedy, PhD Environmental Science and Dir. Cooperative Oxford Lab., 2002, “Coastal and Marine Ecosystems and Global Climate Change,” Pew, http://www.pewclimate.org/projects/marine.cfm)

There is evidence that marine organisms and ecosystems are resilient to environmental change. Steele (1991) hypothesized that

the biological components of marine systems are tightly coupled to physical factors, allowing them to respond quickly to rapid environmental change and thus rendering them ecologically adaptable . Some species also have wide genetic variability throughout their range, which may allow for adaptation to climate change.

Hotspots thesis flawed – there are no tipping points and regional ecosystems aren’t key to global ones.Brook, 2013 (Barry, Professor at the University of Adelaide, leading environmental scientist, holding the Sir Hubert Wilkins Chair of Climate Change at the School of Earth and Environmental Sciences, and is also Director of Climate Science at the University of Adelaide’s Environment Institute, author of 3 books and over 250 scholarly articles, Corey Bradshaw is an Associate Professor at the University of Adelaide and a joint appointee at the South Australian Research and Development Institute, Brave New Climate, March 4, 2013, "Worrying about global tipping points distracts from real planetary threats", http://bravenewclimate.com/2013/03/04/ecological-tipping-points/)

Barry Brook We argue that at the global -scale, ecological “tipping points” and threshold-like “planetary boundaries” are improbable . Instead, shifts in the Earth’s biosphere follow a gradual, smooth pattern . This means that it might be impossible to define scientifically specific, critical levels of biodiversity loss or land-use change. This has important

consequences for both science and policy. Humans are causing changes in ecosystems across Earth to such a degree that there is now broad agreement that we live in an epoch of our own making: the Anthropocene. But the question of just how these changes will play out — and especially whether we might be approaching a planetary tipping point with abrupt, global-scale consequences — has remained unsettled. A tipping point occurs when an ecosystem attribute, such as species abundance or carbon sequestration, responds abruptly and possibly irreversibly to a human pressure, such as land-use or climate change. Many local- and regional-

level ecosystems, such as lakes,forests and grasslands, behave this way. Recently however, there have been several efforts to define ecological tipping points at the global scale. At a local scale, there are definitely warning signs that an ecosystem is about to “tip”. For the terrestrial biosphere, tipping points might be expected if ecosystems across Earth respond in similar ways to human pressures and these pressures are uniform, or if there are strong connections between continents that allow for rapid diffusion of impacts across the planet.

These criteria are, however, unlikely to be met in the real world . First, ecosystems on different continents are not strongly connected . Organisms are limited in their movement by oceans and mountain ranges, as well as by climatic factors, and while ecosystem change in one region can affect the global circulation of, for

example, greenhouse gases, this signal is likely to be weak in comparison with inputs from fossil fuel combustion and deforestation. Second, the responses of ecosystems to human pressures like climate change or land- use change depend on local circumstances and will therefore differ between locations . From a planetary

perspective, this diversity in ecosystem responses creates a n essentially gradual pattern of change, without any identifiable tipping points . This puts into question attempts to define critical levels of land-use change or biodiversity loss scientifically.

Why does this matter? Well, one concern we have is that an undue focus on planetary tipping points may distract from the vast ecological transformations that have already occurred. After all, as much as four-fifths of the biosphere is today characterised by ecosystems that locally, over the span of centuries and millennia, have undergone human-driven regime shifts of one or more kinds. Recognising this reality and seeking appropriate conservation efforts at local and regional levels might be a more fruitful way forward for ecology and global change science. Corey Bradshaw (see also notes published here on ConservationBytes.com) Let’s not get too distracted by the title of the this article – Does the terrestrial biosphere have planetary tipping points? – or the potential for a false controversy. It’s important to be clear that the planet is indeed ill, and it’s largely due to us. Species are going extinct faster than they would have otherwise. The planet’s climate system is being severely disrupted; so is the carbon cycle. Ecosystem services are on the decline. But – and it’s a big “but” – we have to be wary of claiming the end of the world as we know it, or people will shut down and continue blindly with their growth and consumption obsession. We as scientists also have to be extremely careful not to pull concepts and numbers out of thin air without empirical support. Specifically,

I’m referring to the latest “craze” in environmental science writing – the idea of “planetary tipping points” and the related “planetary boundaries”. It’s really the stuff of Hollywood disaster blockbusters – the world suddenly shifts into a new “state” where some major aspect of how the world functions does an immediate about-face. Don’t get me wrong: there are plenty of localised examples of such tipping points, often characterised by something we call “hysteresis”. Brook defines hysterisis as: a situation where the current state of an ecosystem is dependent not only on its environment but also on its history, with the return path to the original state being very different from the original development that led to the altered state. Also, at some range of the driver, there can exist two or more alternative states and “tipping point” as: the critical point

at which strong nonlinearities appear in the relationship between ecosystem attributes and drivers; once a tipping point threshold is crossed, the change to a new state is typically rapid and might be irreversible or exhibit hysteresis. Some of these examples include state shifts that have happened (or mostly likely will) to the cryosphere, ocean thermohaline circulation, atmospheric circulation, and marine ecosystems, and there are many other fine-scale examples of ecological systems

shifting to new (apparently) stable states. However, claiming that we are approaching a major planetary boundary for our ecosystems (including human society), where we witness such transitions simultaneously across the globe, is simply not upheld by evidence. Regional tipping points are unlikely to translate into planet-wide state shifts. The main reason is that our ecosystems aren’t that connected at global scales . The paper provides a framework against which one can test the existence or probability of a planetary tipping point for any particular ecosystem function or state. To date, the application of the idea has floundered because of a lack of specified criteria that would allow the terrestrial biosphere to “tip”. From a more sociological viewpoint, the claim of imminent shift to some worse state also risks alienating people from addressing the real problems (foxes), or as Brook and colleagues summarise: framing global change in the dichotomous terms implied by the notion of a global tipping point could lead to complacency on the “safe” side of the point and fatalism about catastrophic or irrevocable effects on the other. In other words, let’s be empirical about these sorts of politically charged statements instead of crying “Wolf!” while the hordes of foxes steal most of the flock.

2NC No ImpactResilient for two reasons:

1. Biological component – tightly couple components allow rapid responses2. Variability –allows for adaptation – That’s Kennedy

Ecosystems resilient and will recover – BO Spill proves Garvin, 2010 (Internally quoting Luis A. Soto, a deep-sea biologist with advanced degrees from Florida State University and the University of Miami who teaches at the National Autonomous University of Mexico. By Glenn Garvin – reporter for McClathy news – “Ixtoc: The Gulf's other massive oil spill no longer apparent” – McClatchy Newspapers – June 12, 2010 – ev is modified for gendered language – http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/06/12/95793/ixtoc-the-gulfs-other-massive.html#storylink=cpy)

But if the BP spill seems to be repeating one truth already demonstrated in the Ixtoc spill ... that human technology is no

match for a high-pressure undersea oil blowout ... scientists are hoping that it may eventually confirm another: that

the environment has a stunning capacity to heal itself from (hu)manmade insults. "The environment is amazingly resilient, more so than most people understand ,'' says Luis A. Soto, a deep-sea biologist with advanced degrees from Florida State University and the University of Miami who teaches at the National Autonomous University of Mexico. "To be honest, considering the magnitude of the spill, we thought the Ixtoc spill was going to have catastrophic effects for decades ... But within a couple of years, almost everything was close to 100 percent normal again.''

Oceans species are resilient.Lomborg, 2001 (Bjorn, adjunct professor at the Copenhagen Business School, director of the Copenhagen Consensus Centre and a

former director of the Environmental Assessment Institute in Copenhagen. Skeptical Environmentalist, pg 189)

But the oceans are so incredibly big that our impact on them has been astoundingly insignificant - the oceans contain more than 1,000 billion billion liters of water.1407 The UN's overall evaluation of the oceans concludes: " The open sea is still relatively clean . Low levels of lead, synthetic organic compounds and

artificial radionuclides, though widely detectable , are biologically insignificant. Oil slicks and litter are common along sea lanes, but are, at present, a minor consequence to communities of organisms living in open-ocean waters."1408 It actually turns out that the very lumps of oil that Heyerdahl was so worried about are now much fewer in number. It is estimated that in 1985 about 60 percent of the marine sources of oil pollution came from the routine tanker transport operation, while 20 percent came from regular oil spills of the kind we see on TV. and about 15 percent come from natural oil seepage at the bottom of the sea and from sediment erosion.1*09

Hot spot thesis wrong multiple warrants1. Tipping points improbable2. Shifts follow a pattern3. Ecosystems are not strongly connected4. Organism movement is limited5. Human Pressures allow for gradual change – that’s Brook

Hotspots theory wrong – redundancy means species are unlikely to live solely in one regional hotspot.Maser, 1992 (Chris Maser, internationally recognized expert in forest ecology and governmental consultant, 1992, Global Imperative: Harmonizing Culture and Nature, p. 40)

Redundancy means that more than one species can perform similar functions. It’s a type of ecological insurance policy, which strengthens the ability of the system to retain the integrity of its basic relationships. The insurance of redundancy means that the loss of a species or two is not likely to result in such severe functional disruptions of the ecosystem so as to cause its collapse because other species can make up for the functional loss.

Military Readiness

1NC No ImpactNo impact – we’ve survived periods of low readinessNSN, 8 (National Security Network 8 (May 13, http://www.nsnetwork.org/node/850)

Our military is second to none, but eight years of negligence, lack of accountability , and a reckless war in Iraq have left our ground forces facing shortfalls in both recruitment and readiness . Every service is out of balance and ill-prepared. We need a new strategy to give the military the tools it needs for the challenges we face today. And we need leadership that meets our obligations to the men and women who put their lives on the line. Overview The U.S. military is a fighting force second to none. It didn’t get that way by accident – it took decades of careful stewardship by civilian as well as military leaders in the Pentagon, the White House, and on Capitol Hill. But eight years of Administration recklessness, and a lack of oversight from conservatives

on Capitol Hill, have put the military under enormous strain. Active-duty generals at the highest levels have said that “the current demand for our forces is not sustainable… We can’t sustain the all-volunteer force at the pace that we are going on right

now” (Army Chief of Staff George Casey, April 2008); that in terms of readiness, many brigades being sent back to Afghanistan and Iraq were “not where they need to be” (Army Vice-Chief of Staff Richard Cody, SASC subcommittee

hearing, April 14, 2008); and that “we cannot now meet extra force requirements in places like Afghanistan” (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mullen on National Public Radio, April 2008). Readiness and Response: Two-thirds of the Army – virtually all of the brigades not currently deployed to Afghanistan or Iraq – are rated “not combat ready.” The dramatic equipment

shortages of a few years ago have been improved but not completely remedied. Recruitment and Retention: These conditions of service, and the strains they place on military family members, have hindered Army efforts (and to a

lesser extent those of the Marine Corps) to recruit and retain the requisite number and quantity of service members. The Army has been forced to lower its educational and moral standards and allow an increasing number of felons into its ranks . It is also struggling to keep junior officers, the brains of the force, who represent the height of the military’s investment in its people – and whose willingness to stay on represents a crucial judgment on Administration policies. The Marine Corps, America’s emergency 911 force, is under similar strain. The Commandant of the Marine Corps said in February 2008 that the Marines will not be able to maintain a long term presence in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The National Guard and Reserve are already suffering from severe shortages of equipment and available combat personnel. In many states, the Army National Guard would struggle to respond to a natural or man-made disaster – just as the Kansas National Guard struggled to respond to the severe tornados last year. How, and whether, we rebuild our military in the wake of the fiasco in Iraq will likely shape it for the next generation.

Too much of our military posture is left over from the Cold War. Our forces are being ground down by low-tech insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the most immediate threat confronting the U.S. is a terrorist network that possesses no tanks or aircraft. We must learn the lessons of Iraq and dramatically transform our military into a 21st century fighting force ready to confront the threats of today and tomorrow.

2NC No ImpactReadiness is overratedGeorge 99 (James, Former Congressional Professional Staff Member for National Security Affairs, “Is Military Readiness Overrated?”, Cato Institute, 5-27, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=5445)

Military readiness promises to be a major issue when Congress marks up a defense bill later this year. Some members of Congress are already using readiness as a reason to increase funding in the emergency spending bill for the war in Yugoslavia. Most experts cite the initial stages of the Korean

War and the Hollow Force of the late 1970s as cautionary examples of being ill-prepared. A closer look at both those examples, however, shows that they really had little to do with readiness . Moreover, the current crisis in Yugoslavia illustrates once again why

readiness may be overrated and the funds better spent elsewhere. Although often used as a generic term for all military

capabilities, readiness--defined as the ability to respond with appropriate force with little or no warning--is only one of four pillars of military preparedness . The other pillars are force structure, modernization and sustainability . Thus, an effective military force depends on much more than just readiness . Interestingly, the two favorite examples cited by readiness alarmists fail to prove their case. The performance of Task Force Smith, an ill-prepared battalion quickly sent to the front and fairly easily routed by the North Koreans during the initial days of the Korean War, is often cited as the worst case. "No More Task Force Smiths" has become a mantra for the Army. However, critics of Task Force Smith fail to point out that U.S. commanders made the most basic of military mistakes--including grossly underestimating the enemy and sending TFS to an exposed position. When such blunders occur, the end result will be the same whether it is an ill-trained

Task Force Smith in Korea or well-trained Marines in Beirut or elite Rangers in Somalia. Moreover, critics also fail to mention that barely a month later the U nited S tates stabilized the situation in South Korea, and in another month the Marines conducted their famous Inchon Landing. In fact, without the Chinese intervention, the United States would have won the Korean War a few months after it began. Not

bad for a U.S. force that was supposedly ill-prepared. Similarly, the Hollow Force of the late 1970s was not primarily a readiness problem but a combination of many factors--including a military characterized by low morale after Vietnam, serious drug and racial problems, the erroneous induction of too many mentally

substandard recruits and low pay eroded further by high inflation. At the same time, major structural changes were transforming the U.S. military, including the introduction of women into the regular forces, the switch from a draft to an all-volunteer force and the initiation of the Total Force Concept that placed more reliance on the Reserves. Given all of that turbulence, no wonder we had a Hollow Force. Often overlooked, however, is how quickly those problems were solved. In some cases, solutions were found without spending a dime. For example, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Thomas Hayward instituted his "Not in my Navy" program of zero tolerance for drugs. The drug problem was solved almost overnight. The induction of too many mentally substandard recruits by mistake which had lowered standards, was identified and corrected. That correction solved most other personnel problems (and should be a warning to people who want to lower standards today). Some members of Congress are now using the crisis in Yugoslavia to get more funds for readiness by arguing that the military is now stretched "too thin." (Congress doubled President Clinton's request for $6 billion in emergency spending for the war.) In fact, the situation is quite the opposite. Leaving aside the question of whether the United States should even be involved in Yugoslavia, the new Clinton Doctrine, which does not plan to use ground troops ( a position that is supported by many Republicans), limits the stress placed on the military. Those decisions are all deliberate political actions that have absolutely nothing to do with readiness. Under a well-conceived strategy, even a modestly capable force will probably perform well; but under a poorly conceived strategy, even a force with the highest degree of readiness

will probably have serious problems. The experiences of Task Force Smith and the Hollow Force, as well as the invocation of a Clinton Doctrine that eschews the use of ground forces, have major implications. More forces, for example, could be placed in the reserves and scarce funds spent elsewhere . In addition, the military could switch to what Sen. John McCain (R- Ariz.) has called "Tiered Readiness:" a few forces would be kept on expensive ready status and be augmented by reserve forces that could be mobilized if a substantial threat to U.S. security arose. Military readiness is certainly important, and no one is suggesting a return to the truly shallow force

of the late 1940s or the Hollow Force of the 1970s. But a close look at those forces shows that their difficulties involved much more than just poor readiness .

Natural Disasters

1NC No Tsunamis ImpactAff exaggerates the risk and death toll from future tsunamis in the Indian Ocean.S.E.E.D. ’14 (Schlumberger Excellence in Education Development (SEED) is a volunteer-based, nonprofit education program focused on underserved communities. The Earth — A Living Planet: “More Earthquakes, But Why No Tsunamis?” – http://www.planetseed.com/relatedarticle/more-earthquakes-why-no-tsunamis)

On December 26, 2004, an earthquake-generated tsunami devastated many countries surrounding the Indian Ocean. It caused more casualties than any other tsunami in recorded history. In the following months, many more moderate to strong earthquakes have taken place in the region. The surviving residents have understandably been very frightened each time the ground shakes. Fearing another tsunami, they flee to higher

ground. Yet, for the most part, the tsunamis did not materialize. Those that did were small and insignificant, resulting in very little damage . The country of Indonesia was especially hard hit by the December earthquake, which measured 9.0 on the Richter scale. The resulting tsunami created further devastation. The combined death toll was over 200,000 people.

Just three months later, on March 28, 2005, a quake with a magnitude of 8.7 struck the region again, killing more

than a thousand people and destroying several hundred buildings. A tsunami alert went out, and residents fled inland. This time, however,

any resulting tsunami-driven surges of water were hardly noticeable. A three-meter (nine feet) tsunami did some damage to a nearby port, and surges as high as one meter (three feet) were observed in some places along the coast of Sumatra. In contrast, the December tsunamis measured as high as 10.5 m (34 feet) when they reached shore.

Overfishing

1NC Fish ResilientFish stocks resilient to status quo levels of overfishingHilborn, 2010 (Ray, professor of aquatic and fishery sciences at the University of Washington. “Apocalypse Forestalled: Why All the World’s Fisheries Aren’t Collapsing” – The Science Chronicles – November – http://www.atsea.org/doc/Hilborn%202010%20Science%20Chronicles%202010-11-1.pdf)About 30 percent of the stocks would currently be classified as overfished — but, generally, fishing pressure has been reduced enough that all but 17 percent of stocks would be expected to recover to above overfished thresholds if current fishing pressure continues. In the United

States, there was clear evidence for the rebuilding of marine ecosystems and stock biomass. The idea that 70 percent of the world’s fish stocks are overfished or collapsed and that the rate of overfishing is accelerating (Pauly 2007) was shown by

Worm et al. (2009) and FAO (2009) to be untrue. The Science paper coming out of the NCEAS group also showed that the success in reducing fishing pressure had been achieved by a broad range of traditional fisheries management tools — including catch-and-effort limitation, gear restrictions and temporary closed areas. Marine protected areas were an insignificant factor in the success achieved. The database

generated by the NCEAS group and subsequent analysis has shown that many of the assumptions fueling the standard apocalyptic scenarios painted by the gloom-and-doom proponents are untrue: For instance, the widespread notion that fishermen (fisherpeople) generally sequentially deplete food webs (Pauly et al. 1998) — starting

with the predators and working their way down — is simply not supported by data. Declining trophic level of fishery landings is just as often a result of new fisheries developing rather than old ones collapsing (Essington et al. 2006). Catch data also show that fishing patterns are driven by economics, with trophic level a poor predictor of exploitation history (Sethi et al. 2010). Furthermore, the mean trophic

level of marine ecosystems is unrelated to (or even negatively correlated with) the trophic level of fishery landings (Branch et al. 2010). And the oft-cited assessment that the large fish of the oceans were collapsed by 1980 (Myers and Worm 2003) is totally inconsistent with the database we have assembled — for instance, world tuna stocks in total are at present well above the level that would produce maximum sustained yield, except bluefin tuna and some other billfish that are depleted (Hutchings 2010).

2NC Fish ResilientFish stocks resilient. Won’t be a horror story, they’ll recover quickly.Dean, 2012 (Cornelia, Guest Lecturer in Environmental Studies @ the Center for Environmental Studies at Brown University. She is also a writer for the New York Times. This card is internally quoting Ray Hilborn is a professor of aquatic and fishry sciences at the University of Washington. “How Well, and How Poorly, We Harvest Ocean Life” – New York Times – April 16, 2012 – http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/17/science/overfishing-book-review-how-well-and-poorly-we-harvest-ocean-life.html)

To hear some other people tell it, many depleted stocks are recovering nicely. Ray Hilborn, a fisheries scientist at the University of Washington, wades into this disagreement in his new book and comes out with a lucid explication of a highly tangled issue. Each

argument, he concludes, has some truth on its side. “It depends on where you look,” he writes. “You can paint horror story after horror story if you want. You can paint success after success.” He navigates the path between horror and success through scores of questions and answers, nearly all of which demonstrate how difficult it is to sort this issue out. Take the most basic question: What is overfishing? There are several answers, the book tells us. There is “yield overfishing,” in which people take so many fish that they leave too few to spawn or catch too many fish before they are grown. Then there is “economic overfishing,” in which economic benefits are less than they could be. If too many boats chase too few fish, for example, the struggle to make a good catch leads to overspending on boats, fuel and so on. (There is also “ecological overfishing,” but that is something we must live with as long as we want to eat fish, Dr. Hilborn says. Fishing by

definition alters the marine environment.) Dr. Hilborn tells us of fisheries that succeed — like the halibut industry in Alaska —

and fish stocks managed into difficulty, and then out again, like the pollock of the Bering Sea. And he gets into the issue

of trawling, in which boats drop weighted nets to the bottom and drag them along, scraping up everything in their path. Critics liken trawling to harvesting timber by clear-cutting. For Dr. Hilborn, this analogy is not always apt, since in some areas the creatures rapidly repopulate the ocean floor.

Aff exaggerates – stocks are resilient in the face of over-fishingHilborn, 2011 (Ray, professor of aquatic and fishery sciences at the University of Washington. New York Times – “Let Us Eat Fish” – April 14, 2011 – http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/15/opinion/15hilborn.html?_r=2&ref=opinion&)

Over the last decade the public has been bombarded by apocalyptic predictions about the future of fish stocks — in 2006, for instance, an article in the journal Science projected that all fish stocks could be gone by 2048. Subsequent research, including a paper I co-wrote in Science in 2009 with Boris Worm, the lead author of the 2006 paper, has

shown that such warnings were exaggerated. Much of the earlier research pointed to declines in catches and concluded that therefore fish stocks must be in trouble. But there is little correlation between how many fish are caught and how many actually exist; over the

past decade, for example, fish catches in the United States have dropped because regulators have lowered the allowable catch. On average, fish stocks worldwide appear to be stable, and in the United States they are rebuilding, in many cases at a rapid rate.

Resource Wars

1NC No Resource Wars (Generic)

No resource wars – abundance more likely to cause conflict Salehyan 2007 – Idean Salehyan Professor of Political Science at the University of North Texas. “The New Myth About Climate Change Corrupt, tyrannical governments—not changes in the Earth’s climate—will be to blame for the coming resource wars.”, Foreign Policy.com, August 14, 2007 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2007/08/13/the_new_myth_about_climate_change)//JS First, aside from a few anecdotes, there is little systematic empirical evidence that resource scarcity and changing

environmental conditions lead to conflict. In fact, several studies have shown that an abundance of natural resources is more likely to contribute to conflict. Moreover, even as the planet has warmed, the number of civil wars and insurgencies has decreased dramatically. Data collected by researchers at Uppsala University and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo shows a steep decline in the number of armed conflicts around the world. Between 1989 and 2002, some 100 armed conflicts came to an end, including the wars in Mozambique, Nicaragua,

and Cambodia. If global warming causes conflict, we should not be witnessing this downward trend. Furthermore, if famine and drought led to the crisis in Darfur, why have scores of environmental catastrophes failed to set off armed conflict elsewhere? For instance, the U.N. World Food Programme warns that 5 million people in Malawi have been experiencing chronic food shortages for several year s. But famine-wracked Malawi has yet to experience a major civil war. Similarly, the Asian tsunami in 2004 killed hundreds of thousands of people, generated millions of environmental refugees, and l ed to severe shortages of shelter, food, clean water, and electricity. Yet the tsunami, one of the most extreme catastrophes in recent history, did not lead to an outbreak of resource wars . Clearly then, there is much more to armed conflict than resource scarcity and natural disasters.

War causes resource scarcity – not the other way aroundAllouche 11 – fellow at the Institute of Development Studies at Brighton, UK (Jeremy, "The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global trade" Food Policy, Volume 36, Supplement 1)

Armed conflict is the main cause of emergency food insecurity in the world today (FAO, 2000) and, hunger is routinely used as a weapon or a political tool during conflicts. In Ethiopia for example, the government attempted to deny food to rebel forces and their supporters – livestock, farms and food stores in Tigre and Eritrea were systematically bombed

(Keller, 1992, p. 620). More generally, it has been estimated that approximately 24 million people in 28 countries across the world are hungry and in need of humanitarian assistance due to war (Messer et al., 2001). The most affected people are usually refugees and internally displaced persons of which women and children are a large majority. The impact of armed conflict on food production and food availability is important especially in the African context where most people earn at least

a part of their livelihood through agriculture or livestock keeping. One study estimated that food production in 13 war- torn countries of Sub-Saharan Africa during 1970–1994 was on average 12.3% lower in war years compared to peace adjusted values (Messer et al., 1998). In another study covering all developing countries the FAO estimated that from 1970 to 1997 conflict induced losses of agricultural output totalled $121 billion in real terms (or an average of $4.3 billion annually) (FAO, 2000). These impacts are not just on food production but there is also a devastating human dimension in terms of hunger and malnutrition. So far the emphasis has been on the impacts of armed conflict on food security but there is also an important post-conflict

dimension. A number of studies have shown how violent conflict in Africa plays a decisive role in the creation of conditions leading to famine ([De Waal, 1990], [De Waal, 1993] and [Macrae and Zwi, 1994]), and point to the changing nature of the relationship between conflict and vulnerability to famine. As highlighted by a recent FAO study (2008), food shortages linked to conflict set the stage for years of long-term food emergencies, continuing well after fighting has

ceased. These situations can be characterized as chronic entitlement failures where communities, households and individuals who have had their assets stripped through conflict, lack the income and livelihood resources to access food and assure their food security, even where food is available (see Macrae and Zwi, 1994). The impact of war on water is also a serious issue. Ensuring safe water and decent sanitation for civilians in conflict zones is crucial in the sense that diseases have an even large impact in terms of mortality than military casualties during conflicts. The provision

of water and sanitation is of utmost priority in post-conflict states. Unsafe water equates directly with poor health, but the lack of adequate public revenues, government capacity, and investor interest often results in failure to re-establish access to basic infrastructural services

(Allouche, 2010). Overall, it seems clear that perceived resource scarcity is not an adequate explanation for war at the international level. At the national level, water and food insecurity are relatively important factors in the causes of civil wars. At the local level, water scarcity and food insecurity may lead to local political instability and sometimes violent forms of conflict. Armed conflict creates situation of emergency food and water insecurity and has a long-term impact on

post-conflict societies. In the near future, it seems that despite climate change, international resource wars are unlikely and resource allocation will be settled through diplomatic negotiation and perhaps most importantly international trade as will be discussed in the next section.

Resource scarcity doesn’t lead to war Bier 11 (David Bier – immigration policy expert, November 28th, 2011, “Steven Pinker: Resource Scarcity Doesn’t Cause Wars”, Global Warming.org, http://www.globalwarming.org/2011/11/28/steven-pinker-resource-scarcity-doesnt-cause-wars/)//JSOnce again it seems to me that the appropriate response is “maybe, but maybe not.” Though climate change can cause plenty of misery… it will not necessarily lead

to armed conflict. The political scientists who track war and peace , such as Halvard Buhaug, Idean Salehyan, Ole Theisen, and Nils

Gleditsch, are skeptical of the popular idea that people fight wars over scarce resources. Hunger and resource shortages are tragically common in sub-Saharan countries such as Malawi, Zambia, and Tanzania, but wars involving them are not.

Hurricanes, floods, droughts, and tsunamis (such as the disastrous one in the Indian Ocean in 2004) do not generally lead to conflict. The American dust bowl in the 1930s, to take another example, caused plenty of deprivation but no civil war. And while temperatures have been rising

steadily in Africa during the past fifteen years, civil wars and war deaths have been falling. Pressures on access to land and water can certainly cause local skirmishes, but a genuine war requires that hostile forces be organized and armed, and that depends

more on the influence of bad governments , closed economies, and militant ideologies than on the sheer availability of land and water . Certainly any connection to terrorism is in the imagination of the terror warriors: terrorists tend to be

underemployed lower-middle-class men, not subsistence farmers. As for genocide, the Sudanese government finds it convenient to blame violence in Darfur on desertification, distracting the world from its own role in tolerating or encouraging the ethnic cleansing. In a regression analysis on armed conflicts from 1980 to 1992, Theisen found that conflict was more likely if a country was poor, populous, politically unstable, and abundant in oil, but not if it had suffered from droughts,

water shortages, or mild land degradation. (Severe land degradation did have a small effect.) Reviewing analyses that examined a large number (N) of countries rather than cherry-picking one or toe, he concluded, “Those who foresee doom, because of the relationship between

resource scarcity and violent internal conflict, have very little support from the large-N literature.”

2NC No Resource Wars (Generic) No risk of resource wars Victor 2007 (David G. Victor – professor at the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies and director of the School’s new Laboratory on International Law and Regulation, The National Interest, 2007, “What Resource Wars?” http://irps.ucsd.edu/dgvictor/publications/Faculty_Victor_Article_2007_What%20Resource%20Wars_The%20National%20Interest.pdf)

Rising energy prices and mounting concerns about environmental depletion have animated fears that the world may be

headed for a spate of "resource wars" - hot conflicts triggered by a struggle to grab valuable resources. Such fears come in many stripes, but the threat industry has sounded the alarm bells especially loudly

in three areas. First is the rise of China, which is poorly endowed with many of the resources it needs - such as oil, gas, timber and most minerals - and has already "gone out" to the world with the goal of securing what it wants. Violent conflicts may follow as the country shunts others aside. A second potential path down the road to resource wars starts with all the money now flowing into poorly governed but resource-rich countries. Money can fund civil wars and other hostilities, even leaking into the hands of terrorists. And third is global climate change, which could multiply stresses on natural resources and trigger water wars, catalyze the

spread of disease or bring about mass migrations. Most of this is bunk, and nearly all of it has focused on the wrong lessons for policy. Classic resource wars are good material for Hollywood screenwriters. They rarely occur in the real world. To be sure, resource money can magnify and prolong some conflicts, but the root causes of those hostilities usually lie elsewhere . Fixing them

requires focusing on the underlying institutions that govern how resources are used and largely determine whether stress explodes into violence. When conflicts do arise, the weak link isn't a dearth in resources but a dearth in governance . Feeding the dragon Resource wars are largely back in vogue within the US threat industry because of China's spectacular rise . Brazil, India, Malaysia and many others that used to sit on the periphery

of the world economy are also arcing upward. This growth is fueling a surge in world demand for raw materials. Inevitably, these countries have looked overseas for what they need, which has animated fears of a coming clash with China and other growing powers over access to natural resources. Within the next three years, China will be the world's largest consumer of energy. Yet, it's not just oil wells that are working harder to fuel China, so too are chainsaws. Chinese net imports of timber nearly doubled from 2000 to 2005. The country also uses about one-third of the world's steel (around 360 million tons), or three times its 2000 consumption. Even in coal resources, in which China is famously well-endowed, China became a net importer in 2007. Across the board, the combination of low efficiency, rapid growth and an emphasis on heavy industry - typical in the early stages of industrial growth - have combined to make the country a voracious consumer and polluter of natural resources. America, England and nearly every other industrialized country went through a similar pattern, though with a human population that was much smaller than today's resource-hungry developing world

Resource scarcity will solve itself Sharp 07 (Travis Sharp – fellow at Center for a New American Security – PhD. Student Princeton University – Woodrow Wilson school of Public and International Affairs, The Center for Arms-Control and Non – proliferation, July – September 2007, “Resource Conflict in the 21st Century”, http://armscontrolcenter.org/issues/securityspending/articles/resource_conflict_twenty_first_century/)//JS

Scholars have developed two separate visions of resource depletion. The Cornucopian model offers a n optimistic approach to dealing with non-renewable resources. Relying on the virtues of the free market, the Cornucopian model asserts that , ceteris paribus, as

resources become scarce and supply decreases, prices will increase and prolong total depletion. In the time between initial price increases and total depletion, hu mans will make technological advances that ameliorate the crisis . Essentially, the Cornucopian model is a prescription for procrastination - we will wait until the situation is critical before we start working on solutions.

The Malthusian model takes the opposite view of resource depletion. Emerging from the writings of English economist Thomas Malthus, this theory suggests that population growth will place an undue burden on resources and ultimately lead to a cataclysmic clash over scarce commodities. Advocates of the Malthusian worldview support immediate action to prevent the apocalypse coming as a result of world resource depletion.

1NC No Food War Their neo-Malthusian claims are false – food scarcity doesn’t cause war Allouche 11 – fellow at the Institute of Development Studies at Brighton, UK (Jeremy, "The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global trade" Food Policy, Volume 36, Supplement 1)The question of resource scarcity has led to many debates on whether scarcity (whether of food or water) will lead to conflict and war. The underlining reasoning behind most of these discourses over food and water wars comes from the Malthusian belief that there is an imbalance between the economic availability of natural resources and population growth since while food production grows linearly, population increases

exponentially. Following this reasoning, neo-Malthusians claim that finite natural resources place a strict limit on the growth of human population and aggregate consumption; if these limits are exceeded, social breakdown, conflict and wars result. Nonetheless, it seems that most empirical studies do not support any of these neo-Malthusian arguments . Technological change and greater inputs of capital have dramatically

increased labour productivity in agriculture. More generally, the neo-Malthusian view has suffered because during the last two centuries humankind has breached many resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable. Lessons from history: alarmist scenarios, resource wars and international relations In a so-called age of uncertainty, a number of alarmist scenarios have linked the increasing use of water resources and food insecurity with wars . The idea of water wars (perhaps more than food wars) is a dominant discourse in the media (see for example Smith, 2009), NGOs (International Alert, 2007) and within international organizations (UNEP, 2007). In 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon declared that ‘water scarcity threatens economic and social gains and is a potent fuel for wars and conflict’ (Lewis, 2007). Of course, this type of discourse has an instrumental purpose; security and conflict are here used for raising water/food as key policy priorities at the international level. In the Middle East, presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers have also used this bellicose rhetoric. Boutrous Boutros-Gali said; ‘the next war

in the Middle East will be over water, not politics’ (Boutros Boutros-Gali in Butts, 1997, p. 65). The question is not whether the sharing of transboundary water sparks political tension and alarmist declaration, but rather to what extent water has been a principal factor in international conflicts. The evidence seems quite weak .

Whether by president Sadat in Egypt or King Hussein in Jordan, none of these declarations have been

followed up by military action . The governance of transboundary water has gained increased attention these last decades. This

has a direct impact on the global food system as water allocation agreements determine the amount of water that can used for irrigated

agriculture. The likelihood of conflicts over water is an important parameter to consider in assessing the stability, sustainability and resilience of global food systems. None of the various and extensive databases on the causes of war show water as a casus belli . Using the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set and supplementary data from the University of Alabama on water conflicts, Hewitt, Wolf and Hammer found only seven disputes where water seems to have been at least a partial cause for conflict (Wolf, 1998, p. 251). In fact, about 80% of the incidents relating to water were limited purely to governmental rhetoric intended for the electorate (Otchet, 2001, p. 18). As shown in The Basins At Risk (BAR) water event database, more than two-thirds of over 1800 water-related ‘events’ fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale (Yoffe et al., 2003). Indeed, if one takes into account a much longer period, the following figures clearly demonstrate this argument. According to studies by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), organized political bodies signed between the year 805 and 1984 more than 3600 water-related treaties, and approximately 300 treaties dealing with water management or allocations in international basins have been negotiated since 1945 ([FAO, 1978] and [FAO, 1984]). The fear around water wars have been driven by a Malthusian outlook which equates scarcity with violence, conflict and war. There is however no direct correlation between water scarcity and transboundary conflict. Most specialists now tend to agree that the major issue is not scarcity per se but rather the allocation of water resources between the different riparian states (see for example [Allouche, 2005], [Allouche, 2007] and [Rouyer, 2000]). Water rich countries have been involved in a number of disputes with other relatively water rich countries (see for example India/Pakistan or Brazil/Argentina). The perception of each state’s estimated water needs really constitutes the core issue in transboundary water relations. Indeed, whether this scarcity exists or not in reality, perceptions of the amount of available water shapes people’s attitude towards the environment (Ohlsson, 1999). In fact, some water experts have argued that scarcity drives the process of

co-operation among riparians ([Dinar and Dinar, 2005] and [Brochmann and Gleditsch, 2006]). In terms of international relations, the threat of water wars due to increasing scarcity does not make much sense in the light of the recent historical record. Overall, the water war rationale expects conflict to occur over water, and appears to suggest that violence is a viable means of securing national water supplies, an argument

which is highly contestable. The debates over the likely impacts of climate change have again popularised the idea of water wars. The argument runs that climate change will precipitate worsening ecological conditions contributing to resource scarcities, social breakdown, institutional failure, mass migrations and in turn cause greater political instability and conflict ([Brauch, 2002] and Pervis and Busby, 2004 Pervis, Nigel, Busby, Joshua, 2004. The Security Implications of Climate Change for the UN System. Environmental Change and Security Project Report 10, pp. 67–73.[Pervis and Busby, 2004]). In a report for the US Department of Defense, Schwartz and Randall (2003) speculate about the consequences of a worst-case climate change scenario arguing that water shortages will lead to aggressive wars (Schwartz and Randall, 2003, p.

15). Despite growing concern that climate change will lead to instability and violent conflict, the evidence base to substantiate the connections is thin ([Barnett and Adger, 2007] and [Kevane and Gray, 2008]).

No resource wars – abundance more likely to cause conflict Salehyan 2007 – Idean Salehyan Professor of Political Science at the University of North Texas. “The New Myth About Climate Change Corrupt, tyrannical governments—not changes in the Earth’s climate—will be to blame for the coming resource wars.”, Foreign Policy.com, August 14, 2007 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2007/08/13/the_new_myth_about_climate_change)//JS First, aside from a few anecdotes, there is little systematic empirical evidence that resource scarcity and changing

environmental conditions lead to conflict. In fact, several studies have shown that an abundance of natural resources is more likely to contribute to conflict. Moreover, even as the planet has warmed, the number of civil wars and insurgencies has decreased dramatically. Data collected by researchers at Uppsala University and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo shows a steep decline in the number of armed conflicts around the world. Between 1989 and 2002, some 100 armed conflicts came to an end, including the wars in Mozambique, Nicaragua,

and Cambodia. If global warming causes conflict, we should not be witnessing this downward trend. Furthermore, if famine and drought led to the crisis in Darfur, why have scores of environmental catastrophes failed to set off armed conflict elsewhere? For instance, the U.N. World Food Programme warns that 5 million people in Malawi have been experiencing chronic food shortages for several year s. But famine-wracked Malawi has yet to experience a major civil war. Similarly, the Asian tsunami in 2004 killed hundreds of thousands of people, generated millions of environmental refugees, and l ed to severe shortages of shelter, food, clean water, and electricity. Yet the tsunami, one of the most extreme catastrophes in recent history, did not lead to an outbreak of resource wars . Clearly then, there is much more to armed conflict than resource scarcity and natural disasters.

1NC No Oil War

Resource wars not going to happen – especially over oil Tetrais 2012 (Bruno Tetrais – senior researcher at fellow foundation for Strategic Research, Summer 2012, The Washington Quarterly, “The Demise of Ares: The End of War as we know it?”, http://csis.org/files/publication/twq12SummerTertrais.pdf) Future resource wars are unlikely . There are fewer and fewer conquest wars. Between the Westphalia peace and the end of World War II, nearly half of conflicts were fought over territory. Since the end of the Cold War, it has been less than 30 percent.61 The invasion of Kuwaita nationwide bank robberymay go

down in history as being the last great resource war. The U.S.-led intervention of 1991 was partly driven by the need to maintain the free

flow of oil, but not by the temptation to capture it. (Nor was the 2003 war against Iraq motivated by oil.) As for the current tensions between the two Sudans over oil, they are the remnants of a civil war and an offshoot of a botched secession process, not a desire to control new

resources. China’s and India’s energy needs are sometimes seen with apprehension: in light of growing oil and gas scarcity, is there not a risk of military clashes over the control of such resources ? This seemingly consensual idea rests on two fallacies. One is that there is such a thing as oil and gas scarcity , a notion challenged by many energy experts.62 As prices rise, previously untapped

reserves and non-conventional hydrocarbons become economically attractive. The other is that spilling blood is a rational way to access resources. As shown by the work of historians and political scientists such as Quincy Wright, the economic rationale for war has always been overstated. And because of globalization, it has become cheaper to buy than to steal. We no longer live in the world of 1941 , when fear of lacking oil and raw materials was a key motivation for Japan’s decision to go to war . In an era of liberalizing trade, many natural resources are fungible goods. (Here, Beijing behaves as any other actor: 90 percent of the oil its companies produce

outside of China goes to the global market, not to the domestic one.)63 There may be clashes or conflicts in regions in maritime resource-rich areas

such as the South China and East China seas or the Mediterranean, but they will be driven by nationalist passions, not the desperate hunger for hydrocarbons.

1NC No Water WarTheir evidence is hypeKatz, Enviro Studies Prof at Tel Aviv, ’11 (David, February, “Hydro-Political Hyperbole: Examining Incentives for Overemphasizing the Risks of Water Wars” Global Environmental Politics, Vol 11 No 1, ProjectMuse) Incentives to Stress a Water War Scenario Incentives Presented in Existing Literature Observers have noted that various actors may have incentives to stress or even exaggerate the risks of water wars. Lonergan notes, for instance, that in “many cases, the comments are little more than media hype; in others, statements have been made for political reasons.”49 Beyond mere acknowledgement of the possibility of such incentives, however, little research has attempted to understand what these incentives are and how they may differ between actors. An understanding of the different motivations of various groups of actors to stress the possibility of imminent water wars can help explain the continued seemingly disproportionate popularity of such messages and help to evaluate such warnings more critically. Mueller offers a general explanation for a focus on violence in public discourse by postulating that, following the end of the Cold War, policy-makers, the press, and various analysts seek to fill a “catastrophe quota.”50 According to this theory, various actors seek out new areas of potential violence to justify fears that had become commonplace during the Cold War period. Simon, while not specifically addressing environmental conflict, suggests four possible reasons for academic researchers to offer what he claimed were overly gloomy scenarios resulting from resource scarcity.51 The first reason is that international funding organizations are eager to fund research dealing with crises, but not work that produces good news. The second is that bad news sells more newspapers and books. The third is a psychological predisposition to focus on bad news or worst-case scenarios. The fourth is a belief that sounding alarm bells can mobilize action to improve environmental issues. Haas offers two reasons why “exaggerated beliefs about resource scarcity and their possible threats to environmental security persist.” The first is “the absence of any consensual mechanism for reconciling inter-discourse (or interparadigm) disputes.” This, Haas argues, allows for ideological disputes to continue [End Page 18] unresolved. “The second reason is the elective affinity between environmental and security discourses on the one hand, and other dominant discourses in social discussions . . . on the other hand. Consequently self-interested political actors can borrow from discourses that are similar in their ontology and structure and that justify pre-existing political ambitions .”52 Trottier, addressing the risks of water wars specifically, suggests that certain private-sector actors in the water industry may stress the risks of water wars in order to promote water-related infrastructure.53

Tech solvesBBC News ‘4 October 19, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/3747724.stm New technology can help, however, especially by cleaning up pollution and so making more water useable, an d in agriculture, where water use can be made far more efficient. Drought-resistant plants can also help. Drip irrigation drastically cuts the amount of water needed, low-pressure sprinklers are an improvement, and even building simple earth walls to trap rainfall is helpful. Some countries are now treating waste water so that it can be used - and drunk - several times over. Desalinisation makes sea water available , but takes huge quantities of energy and leaves vast amounts of brine. The optimists say "virtual water" may save the day - the water contained in crops which can be exported from water-rich countries to arid ones.

Russia

1NC No Ukraine/Russia ImpactNo US-Russia escalation over Former Soviet States – Ukraine proves.Apps, 4/11/2014 This evidence is internally quoting Dmitri Gorenburg, Russia analyst at the Centre for Naval Analyses. Peter Apps is political risk correspondent for Reuter’s for Europe, the Middle East and Africa, covering a range of stories on the interplay between politics, economics and markets. – “West struggles as Russia moves to dominate old USSR” – Reuter’s – April 11th, 2014 – http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/04/11/uk-ukraine-crisis-strategy-analysis-idUKBREA3A0FQ20140411)"This is a timely wake-up call," said Michael Leigh, former deputy head of external relations for the European Commission and now senior

adviser to the German Marshall Fund. "With the West scarcely responding to Crimea, Putin may feel he has nothing to lose for further annexation. "A couple of tough winters is a price worth paying." A Russian move into eastern

Ukraine would almost certainly spark at least limited military conflict between Russia and Ukraine. How the West would react to that is currently very far from clear. In Washington, President Barack Obama faces calls to arm

Ukraine and step up training and other military links. But there is little real enthusiasm for direct involvement , much less a nuclear face-off with Moscow. If a Russian invasion did spark a mess y insurgency, the West might

find itself gradually dragged into providing at least some covert support to Kiev or any other Western-leaning government in a

similar position. But it would almost certainly remain extremely limited . On April 1, NATO announced what it called "concrete measures" to boost Ukraine's ability to defend itself. In reality, however, these appeared limited to ill-defined "capacity building"

measures and boosting the size of NATO's liaison office in the capital. "It's not that the West couldn't stop it - a couple of brigades of NATO troops would almost certainly deter an invasion," says Dmitri Gorenburg, Russia analyst at the Centre for Naval Analyses, a

U.S. government-funded body that advises the military. "But that isn't going to happen. When it comes to pushing back Russia's actions in the former Soviet Union, there is no strategy and there is no appetite ."

2NC No Ukraine/Russia ImpactThe Advantage exaggerates – Putin doesn’t have imperial ambitions and the regional wars won’t escalate.Hallinan, 2014 (Conn Hallinan is a columnist for Foreign Policy In Focus. A retired lecturer in journalism at the University of California, Santa Cruz., he previously was an editor of People's World when it was a West Coast publication. “Marching on Moscow” – Foreign Policy in Focus – June 3rd – http://fpif.org/marching-moscow/)

Misrepresentations of the situation abound. Putin is not trying to recreate the old Soviet Empire, as some Western news sources have suggested. Meanwhile, although the overthrow of Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych was certainly a coup—what else do you call an armed uprising that causes an elected president to flee? — it wasn’t just ex-Nazis and fascists who caused it, as some Russian officials have claimed. The revolt reflected genuine mass anger at corruption in the Yanukovych government. Nonetheless, two of the groups that spearheaded the coup—and who currently control seven ministries in the Western Ukraine government—openly admire those who fought with Waffen-SS divisions during World War II. The Germans killed some 25 million Russians during that war—so if the Russians today act a bit cranky about people who hold celebrations honoring the vilest divisions of an evil army, one can hardly fault them. The Americans and the Europeans, for their parts, have long had their eye on Ukraine, though their interests diverge due to their differing economic relations with Russia. The EU gets 30 percent of its energy needs from Russia; for countries like Finland and Slovakia, that figure climbs to 100 percent. The EU had $370 billion in trade with Russia in 2012, compared to a modest $26 billion for the United States. Moreover, several large European energy giants, including BP, Austria’s OMV, ENI, Royal Dutch Shell, and Norway’s Statoil, are heavily invested in Russian gas and oil. All told, its oil and gas combined make Russia the largest energy exporter in the world. For Europe, Russia also provides a growing consumer market of 144 million people, with retail spending growing 20 percent a year between 2000 and 2012. The Americans aim to expand NATO and open up a market of 46 million people in the heart of Eastern Europe. For that, they need to get the 28 members of the NATO alliance to finally pull their own weight. The United States currently foots 75 percent of NATO’s bills, and is caught between a shrinking military budget at home and a strategy of expanding the United States’ military presence in Asia, the so-called Asian “pivot.” NATO members are supposed to spend 2 percent of their Gross Domestic Product on the military, but very few countries—Britain, Estonia, and Greece among them—actually clear that bar. Nor is there any groundswell to do so in European economies still plagued with low growth and high unemployment. In other words: Yes, get the Russkies, but not at our expense. At least in its rhetoric, NATO is pushing hard. U.S. general and

NATO commander Gen. Phillip Breedlove recently called for beefing up NATO forces on the Russian border. But for all the talk about a new Russian threat, NATO is not going to war over Ukraine, anymore than it did over Georgia in 2008. A few neoconservatives and hawks, like U.S. Senator John McCain, might make noises about intervention, but it will be a very lonely venture if they try.

Economic interdependence checks escalation and US-Russia rivalryLawless, 2014 (Jill Lawless Special Reporter for the Associated Press, “East Vs West Ukraine Conflict Not a New Cold War”, ABC News, 3-17-2014, http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/east-west-ukraine-conflict-cold-war-22939847)

NATO planes monitor Ukraine's border. East and West fight for influence and trade angry warnings. Russian troops conduct massive war games as tensions rise. With its brinksmanship, bellicose rhetoric, threats and counter-threats, the crisis over Moscow's takeover of Ukraine's

Crimean Peninsula seems to have whisked the world back to the Cold War, when the United States and the Soviet Union squared

off in a high-stakes standoff that divided the world into two opposing camps. But this is not Cold War 2.0 . Communism has long ceased to be the

feared enemy. The ideological certainties of that era are gone. And Russia and the West are locked in economic interdependency . Here is a look at how the Ukraine crisis may have turned into an East-West standoff — but not a Cold War. ENTWINED ECONOMIES The

West's economic and diplomatic pressure may harken back to an age of isolated blocs. And measures such as visa bans, financial sanctions and threats to boycott the G-8 summit that Russia is slated to host all certainly seem intended to isolate Moscow. But the economies of Russia and the West have become entwined since

the Berlin Wall fell 25 years ago — meaning it would be hard to go back to the hermetic "us-versus-them" world of the Cold

War. U.S. brands including McDonald's and Pepsi have a big presence in Russia, and the European Union does far more trade with the

country than the U.S. The Europeans are less eager than Washington to take punitive economic measures, in part

because European companies from German engineering firm Siemens to British oil giant BP have major Russian investments.

And Russia supplies almost a third of Europe's natural gas. But economic rupture could hurt Russia even more. Russia relies heavily on income from oil and gas , which make up more than two-thirds of the country's exports.

Around half of Russia's exports, mainly natural gas, oil and other raw materials, heads to the EU. And rich Russians rely on places like London for a place to stash their cash in homes, businesses and discreet, stable banks — so much so that some British people refer to their capital as "Londongrad." "London is more important to Russians than Russians are to London," said Yolande Barnes, head of global

research at real estate agent Savills. She says Russians buy about 2.5 percent of prime London properties. "If Russians disappeared, I think London would barely

blink." MILITARY LIMITS Rhetoric such as "dangerous escalation" and "brink of disaster " — as well as talk of boosting military

defenses in Europe — echo Cold War tensions. But Western leaders show little appetite for a military response .

NATO did deploy two surveillance planes to fly over Poland and Romania on Wednesday to monitor Ukraine, and the U.S. sent additional fighter jets to Lithuania and Poland to boost air patrols. Russia is in military control of Crimea but has not moved into other areas of Ukraine, aside from seizing a gas distribution facility just

outside of Crimea's border. The crisis could still escalate. Adrian Basora, a former U.S. ambassador to the Czech Republic, said that if Russia sent troops into eastern Ukraine, it could trigger an escalation that might pull NATO troops into eastern Europe. He acknowledged that would be "an extremely

dangerous situation." But even that is unlikely to turn into a global confrontation . Crucially, China — the rising global power of

the 21st century — has shown no desire to take sides. Chinese President Xi Jinping, who has discussed the crisis with U.S. President Barack Obama, has merely urged calm and restraint. It is true that Putin has launched a huge military modernization program. And Russia's defense minister said last month that it was seeking to expand its worldwide presence by seeking permission for navy ships to use ports in Algeria, Cyprus, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Cuba, Seychelles, Vietnam and

Singapore. Still, Matthew Clements, editor of Jane's Intelligence Review, said Russia's "ability to undertake operations across the globe is fairly limited." "This is not a reformation of the Soviet Red Army," he said. CLASH OF CULTURES In one area the Cold War comparison may be apt: a mutual lack of comprehension and trust. The Ukraine crisis has revealed that Russia and the West remain far apart — not just politically and diplomatically, but culturally and temperamentally. Putin has stoked a brand of macho nationalism increasingly at odds with liberal Europeans, who have reacted with anger to the jailing of punk protesters Pussy Riot and Russia's ban on homosexual "propaganda." Attempts to isolate Russia further may boost support for Putin — whose poll ratings have soared due to his tough stance on Ukraine — and make rapprochement harder. But historians see fundamental differences. "Two things characterized the Cold War. First of all there was an ideological divide which was kind of black and white — 'You're either with us or against us,'" said Margot Light, professor

emeritus of international relations at the London School of Economics. "That really doesn't exist anymore. "And the Cold War started off as European, but it

became global. And again, this isn't it. I think neither Russia nor the United States have that kind of global reach any longer."

No US-Russia war over Former Soviet States – US and NATO won’t get involved.Apps – April 11th 2014 – Peter Apps is political risk correspondent for Reuter’s for Europe, the Middle East and Africa, covering a range of stories on the interplay between politics, economics and markets. – “West struggles as Russia moves to dominate old USSR” – Reuter’s – April 11th, 2014 – http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/04/11/uk-ukraine-crisis-strategy-analysis-idUKBREA3A0FQ20140411NATO says tens of thousands of Russian troops are massed on the border with Ukraine for a potential invasion, yet Western states still lack a strategy to stop Moscow from intervening in its former Soviet neighbours. With military action to protect non-NATO states effectively ruled out , current and former

officials say sanctions and isolation provide the best - and perhaps only - way to pressure Moscow. Ramping up the pressure on the rich and powerful around President Vladimir Putin, they say, might in time push him towards a much more conciliatory approach. But that, they concede, could prove a long game, and some both in and outside government worry that a more isolated Russia may simply become both more nationalist and self-sufficient. Putting Putin under more pressure, they worry, may give him even more incentive to

take a populist, more aggressive approach. Ultimately, Moscow's commitment to rebuild the former USSR as its own

unilateral sphere of influence may outstrip the determination of Washington and its European allies to stop it.

No US-Russia escalation – M.A.D. and US disinterest checkClark ‘14Christopher Clark, General Editor at Urban Times, Former Deputy Editor of The Cape Town Globalist, Urban Times, 3-5, http://urbantimes.co/2014/03/5-reasons-why-the-ukrainian-crisis-is-unlikely-to-lead-to-world-war-iii/5 Reasons Why The Ukrainian Crisis Won't Lead To World War III 1. The US Has Not Even Threatened To Use Its Military It is telling that over the past couple of days the possibility of the US deploying its army in Ukraine has not been threatened as an option. Despite Secretary of State John Kerry’s assertion that “all options are on the table”, it

appears that an attempted political and economic isolation of Russia will be the favoured method of punishing Putin’s indiscretions in Crimea. In a statement to the press, a senior US official indicated that military options were not currently being considered: “Right now, I think we are focused on political, diplomatic and economic options. Frankly our goal is to uphold the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine, not to have a military escalation … I don’t think we’re focused right now on the notion of some U.S. military

intervention. I don’t think that necessarily would be a way to de-escalate the situation.” 2. Western Governments Would have Little Success In Selling Military Intervention Both David Cameron and Barack Obama will have learnt from

their failure to win support for military strikes on Syria . Despite Bashar al-Assad crossing Obama’s “red line” by using chemical weapons against his own people, the UK parliament voted against possible military strikes. The US Congress narrowly avoided voting on what would have been an extremely divisive issue after a deal was brokered with the Russians to pursue a diplomatic solution It is likely that

a potential military intervention in Ukraine would receive equally scant public and political support in both countries. 3. Putin Would Not Have Invaded Had He Thought Military Retaliation Was Likely Vladamir Putin has proven time and time again to be a master strategist when it comes to international affairs. Last year’s foreign policy victories over the US on Snowden and Syria proved this to be the case. If the immediate deployment of NATO troops to protect the Ukraine was likely, the invasion of Crimea would have been a reckless and potentially suicidal act on Moscow’s part, regardless of its significant interests in the Ukraine. The West’s inability to act against Assad in Syria will have fed into Russian confidence in acting in such a heavy handed manner in the Ukraine. Moreover, US and European impotence during the 2008 invasion of Georgia will have provided further assurances of Moscow’s impunity in carrying out regional relations as it sees fit. Once more, Forbes magazine’s most powerful man has defied the West. Putin has acted strongly and decisively, placing the ball firmly in the court of Obama and his allies. 4. David Vs. Goliath Without the assurance of western military intervention backing them up, Ukraine’s fledgling government will be very reluctant to act alone against the Russian forces currently occupying the Crimean Peninsula. Despite the government calling up all army reservists and Ukrainians volunteering for military service in their droves, the size and fire-power of the Ukrainian army is dwarfed by that of its powerful neighbour. Ukrainian forces dispatched to Crimea in the past few days have already begun to

surrender and in some cases switch allegiance to the pro-Russian local authorities. 5. M utually A ssured D estruction The threat of nuclear war will make direct conflict between the US and Russia extremely unlikely The Cold War

military doctrine which has so far ensured no two nuclear powers have engaged in a full scale military conflict will remain a significant deterrent in the Ukrainian case . Despite enduring a bitter military rivalry and arms race which

lasted for over 4 decades, the US and Soviet Union never engaged in direct confrontation with each other as each

side was aware of the potentially catastrophic consequences of nuclear war . With both the US and Russia holding considerable military nuclear capabilities , the possibility of direct military confrontation is very low .

No escalating war – US and NATO won’t go to the mat for Former Soviet States.Apps – April 11th 2014 – Peter Apps is political risk correspondent for Reuter’s for Europe, the Middle East and Africa, covering a range of stories on the interplay between politics, economics and markets. – “West struggles as Russia moves to dominate old USSR” – Reuter’s – April 11th, 2014 – http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/04/11/uk-ukraine-crisis-strategy-analysis-idUKBREA3A0FQ20140411Experts say Moscow has been infiltrating its neighbours ever more deeply, building its influence amongst

security forces, government officials and politicians. That, some say, allows it to stir up instability in locations like eastern

Ukraine and create both confusion and potential preconditions to invade. "What we're seeing here is a new form of warfare and part of a concerted strategy," said Chris Donnelly, a former senior adviser to NATO on Russia and now director of the Institute for Statecraft in London. "Either we stand up to it or we let it happen. So far the response has been totally inadequate." With Russia's annexation of Ukraine's Crimea peninsula now largely seen an irreversible fait accompli, many now see more confrontation over the years to come. In a March 18 speech following the Crimea intervention, Putin made it clear he would be willing to use force to safeguard the interests of Russian-speaking minorities. The breakup of the USSR left some 25 million ethnic Russians outside the borders of the Russian Federation, concentrated in places like Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Central Asian and Baltic states and breakaway enclaves in Georgia and Moldova. Tens of millions more - classified in their old Soviet passports as ethnic Ukrainians, Belarussians or others - speak Russian as their first language.

There may be little Western states can do to stop Moscow reabsorbing into the Russian Federation three

breakaway statelets its military already occupies - Moldova's Transdniestria region and Georgia's South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Nor is there political will to stop Russia going further if truly determined to do so. The only true red line, some say, is that attacking the NATO member Baltic states would trigger NATO's self defence clause and a wider war with the alliance and its nuclear super power the

United States. "LITTLE WEST CAN DO" "We are in new territory," said one Western official on condition of anonymity. "Realistically there is little the West can do to prevent Putin invading Ukraine or other non-NATO former Soviet states except for applying diplomatic and economic pressure. The priority now is to deter any aggression against NATO."

Economics will check escalationEl Erian ‘14

Mohamed A. El-Erian is the former CEO/co-CIO of PIMCO, the global investment management firm. He is chief economic advisor at Allianz and member of its International Executive Committee, chair of President Obama's Global Development Council and author of the NYT/WSJ bestseller "When Markets Collide." Foreign Policy named him one of the world's "Top 100 Global Thinkers" for 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012., 3-17-2014 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mohamed-a-elerian/economy-ukraine-crisis_b_4975866.htmlCan good old-fashioned economic self-interest provide temporary relief for what now seems to be an intractable crisis in the

Ukraine? The answer is yes it can; and, more importantly, may well eventually and temporarily do so. . .by incentivizing a de-escalation of mounting tensions, but failing to durably resolve underlying problems that will likely re-emerge down the road. The crisis in Ukraine pits multiple parties against each other, both domestic and foreign. Each of them is operating with a different set of internal and external constraints, along with contrasting interpretations of the past and present -- and of course, the future. As recent developments vividly illustrate, none of the parties involved is strong enough to impose its will and interpretation of events on the others. Because of this complex reality, the crisis has already taken quite a few surprising and precarious turns, including this weekend's referendum. Concurrently, various attempts to find some "circuit breaker" -- no matter how

imperfect, small and temporary -- have proven frustratingly ineffective. Over the next few weeks, however, another reality is likely to gradually impose itself -- and this one in which rational economic considerations could gradually dominate geo-political ones. In a rational content, it would only be a matter of time before it becomes abundantly clear to all major parties involved -- yes all, internal and external -- that the path that the Ukrainian crisis is currently on is detrimental to both their individual

and collective economic interests. Indeed, the actual and prospective economic losses are likely to be so large as to seriously overwhelm any real or perceived geo-political victory . Ukraine itself is in the worst position of all. The country is on the verge of significant economic and financial disruptions. Already, it urgently needs tens of billions of dollars just to stabilize its shaky finances, limit shortages, avoid crippling inflation and sidestep international default. Capital flight is a problem notwithstanding controls. Reports of people standing in line to take money out of ATMs are adding to the general anxiety. Ukraine's urgent need for large exceptional external assistance does not stop at immediate stabilization requirements. The country will require even more funding and debt relief to support the implementation of multi-year reforms aimed at generating high growth and adequate job creation. As messy as the Ukrainian situation sounds -- and it is very messy -- its standalone systemic implications could theoretically be contained from both a regional and global perspective. After all, with a GDP of around $175 billion, its economy is small on the global stage. Other than a conduit for Europe's energy supplies from Russia, it does not influence important global supply chains and demand patterns. And its role in international capital markets is very small. This would be good news for the rest of the world, especially as Ukraine's internal social and political divisions are unlikely to be resolved in a durable fashion any time soon. However, having said that, Ukraine is indeed systemic for a simple yet powerful reason: its messy political crisis entangles Russia, western European countries and the United States. To this point, these external parties have not been able to trigger a circuit breaker, let alone negotiate a longer-term compromise or, even better, a durable resolution. Neither the calls between Presidents Obama and Putin nor the face-to-face negotiations among their foreign ministers and the United Nation meetings have yielded anything substantive. Instead, the rhetoric continues to heat up; and the stakes keep on getting bigger. This weekend's referendum in Crimea was yet another step away from de-escalation, as was the understandable tone and content of last week's G-7 statement that included strong legal and moral condemnation of Russia together with the west's reminder that it has suspended "participation in any activities related to preparation" of the G-8 meeting scheduled to be held in Russia. Needless to say, Russia's response was equally harsh. And the cycle goes on. . . Indeed, wherever you look, the momentum would seem to call for a further escalation of the crisis. But, importantly, there may be an important and rational twist out there that could become more apparent and relevant over time: Neither Russia nor the West can avoid the serious economic damage that would accompany a

continued deterioration at the current rate. "Neither Russia nor the West can avoid the serious economic damage that would accompany a continued deterioration at the current rate." Consider the Russian situation. The minute President Putin moved on Ukraine, international markets immediately jacked up the risk premiums on the Russian sovereign bonds, quasi-sovereigns (such as Gazprom), banks and companies; and it has kept the at these elevated levels. The result is higher borrowing costs for all Russian entities, along with more limited access to international capital. Markets also put immediate pressure on the Russian ruble, making it the second worse performing currency in the world this year -- and this despite the central bank using tens of billions of dollars in international reserves to soften the blow. The financial pressures will likely be amplified by the prospects of higher capital outflows and lower inward flows of foreign direct investments. As a result, and in addition to the hit to economic growth, ordinary Russians would be paying higher prices for a wide range of imported

goods in their consumption basket. Given that Russia is the eighth largest economy in the world (with a $2 trillion GDP) and is quite integrated in the global financial system, Russians are not the only ones that would suffer from a further escalation of the Ukrainian crisis. The rest of the world would be impacted, starting with Europe.

Europe accounts for almost 40 percent of Russia's trade. As such, western firms would feel pain from the reduction in Russian sales while others would be impacted by possible disruptions in supplies from Russia. And the last thing that Europe needs right now is less demand and higher input uncertainties. Already, the region's emergence from recession is proving both muted and tentative. Meanwhile, the fall in prices of Russian financial instruments has already translated into mark-to-market losses for global investors and international banks. If the selloff continues -- which will happen if the Ukrainian geo-political crisis continues to escalate -- it is only a matter of time before this contaminates the

financial standing of some western entities, starting with banks that are heavily exposed to Russia. The economic consequences for both Europe and Russia would be significantly worse if a complete breakdown in the dialogue on Ukraine were to lead to generalized trade and financial sanctions and boycotts, including a disruption in Russian energy supplies to the West and in Russian banks' access to international payments and settlement services. Such an outcome would send Europe and Russia into recession and, most likely, reignite global financial instability. Of all the major parties, the U.S. is in the best relative shape. Its direct economic and financial linkages to Russia and Ukraine

are limited. Its domestic demand component is a much more effective stabilizer. And its financial institutions are less exposed. Yet even the U nited S tates cannot totally

sidestep the adverse contagion emanating from eastern and western Europe. It would likely experience

some economic collateral damage from the combination of recessions in Europe and Russia and renewed global financial market turmoil. As recognition mounts of

these "lose-lose" dynamics , look for economic interests to gradually serve as an incentive to push each of the major parties to a messy compromise -- one that is far from optimal but still attractive because it avoids a much worse outcome in the short-term. And while such a compromise,

as rational as it seems, is far from guaranteed, it would become a more possible outcome over the next few weeks.

Economics check Russian aggression – stock markets after the Ukraine affair prove.Cowen ‘14

Tyler Cowen, Professor of Economics at George Mason University, “Crimea Through a Game-Theory Lens”, New York Times, 3-15, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/16/business/crimea-through-a-game-theory-lens.html?hpw&rref=business&action=click&module=Search&region=searchResults%230&version=&url=http%3A%2F%2Fquery.nytimes.com%2Fsearch%2Fsitesearch%2F%3Faction%3Dclick%26region%3DMasthead%26pgtype%3DHomepage%26module%3DSearchSubmit%26contentCollection%3DHomepage%26t%3Dqry407%23%2FCowen%2Fsince1851%2Fallresults%2F1%2Fallauthors%2Fnewest%2F&_r=0It’s worth viewing the crisis in Ukraine through the prism of game theory , too, as applied on several fronts: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE From the standpoint of game theory as developed by Thomas C. Schelling, a 2005 Nobel laureate in economic science, the conflict can be seen as a case study in nuclear deterrence. That’s because, after the Soviet Union split into many pieces in the 1990s, a newly independent Ukraine gave up its portion of the old Soviet nuclear arsenal. In part, it did so in exchange for a memorandum supporting its territorial integrity, signed by both Russia and the United States. Eliminating its nuclear weapons may have seemed a good deal for Ukraine at the time, and it can be argued that the world became a safer place. Yet if Ukraine were a nuclear power today, it would surely have a far greater ability to deter Russian military action. TIPPING POINTS Long before Malcolm Gladwell popularized the concept, Mr. Schelling created an elegant model of tipping points in his groundbreaking work “Micromotives and Macrobehavior.” The theory applies to war, as well as to marketing, neighborhood segregation and other domestic issues. In this case, the idea of negotiated settlements to political conflicts may be fraying, and the trouble in Crimea may disturb it further, moving the world toward a very dangerous tipping point. First, some background: With notable exceptions in the former Yugoslavia and in disputed territories in parts of Russia and places like Georgia, the shift to new governments after the breakup of the Soviet Union was mostly peaceful. Borders were redrawn in an orderly way, and political deals were made by leaders assessing their rational self-interest. In a recent blog post, Jay Ulfelder, a political scientist, noted that for the last 25 years the world has seen less violent conflict than might have been expected, given local conditions. Lately, though, peaceful settlements have been harder to find. This change may just reflect random noise in the data, but a more disturbing alternative is that conflict is now more likely. Why? The point from game theory is this: The more peacefully that disputes are resolved, the more that peaceful resolution is expected. That expectation, in turn, makes peace easier to achieve and maintain. But the reverse is also true: As peaceful settlement becomes less common, trust declines, international norms shift and conflict becomes more likely. So there is an unfavorable tipping point. In the formal terminology of game theory, there are “multiple equilibria” (peaceful expectations versus expectations of conflict), and each event in a conflict raises the risk that peaceful situations can unravel. We’ve seen this periodically in history, as in the time leading up to World War I. There is a significant

possibility that we are seeing a tipping point away from peaceful conflict resolution now. MARKET DETERRENCE A more reassuring kind of deterrence has to do with the response of Russian markets to the crisis. Russia is a far more globalized economy than it was during the Soviet era. On the first market day after the Crimean takeover, the reaction was a plunging ruble, and a decline in the Russian stock market of more than 10 percent . Russia’s central bank raised interest rate s to 7 percent from 5.5 percent to protect the ruble’s

value. Such market reactions penalize Russian decision makers, who also know that a broader conflict would endanger Russia’s oil and gas revenue, which makes up about 70 percent of its export income . In this case, market forces provide a relatively safe form of deterrence . Unlike governmental sanctions, market-led penalties limit the risk of direct political retaliation , making it harder for the Russian government to turn falling market prices into a story of victimization by outside powers.

1NC No Miscalc/Accidents ImpactNo miscalc, over-reaction, or accidental war – 100’s of incidents disprove their thesis.Quinlan, 2009 (Sir Michael, Consulting Senior Fellow – International Institute for Strategic Studies and Former Permanent Under-Secretary of State – UK Ministry of Defense, Thinking About Nuclear Weapons: Principles, Problems, Prospects, p. 63-69)Even if initial nuclear use did not quickly end the fighting, the supposition of inexorable momentum in a developing exchange, with each side rushing to overreaction amid confusion and uncertainty, is implausible. It fails to consider what the situation of the decision-makers would really be. Neither side could want escalation . Both would be appalled at what was going on. Both would be desperately looking for signs that the other was ready to call a halt. Both, given the capacity for evasion or concealment which drive modern delivery platforms and vehicles can possess, could have in reserve significant forces invulnerable enough not to entail use-or-lose pressures. (It may be more open to question, as noted earlier, whether newer nuclear weapon possessors can be immediately in that position; but it is within reach of any substantial state with advanced technological capabilities and attaining it is certain to be a high priority in the development of forces.) As a result, neither side can have any predisposition to suppose, in an ambiguous situation of fearful risk, that the right course when in doubt is to go on copiously launching weapons. And none of this analysis rests on any presumption of highly subtle or pre-concerted rationality. The rationality required is plain. The argument is reinforced if we consider the possible reasoning of an aggressor at a more dispassionate level. Any substantial nuclear armoury can inflict destruction outweighing any possible prize that aggression could hope to seize. A state attacking the possessor of such an armoury must therefore be doing so (once given that it cannot count upon destroying the armoury pre-emptively) on a judgment that the possessor would be found lacking in the will to use it. If the attacker possessor used nuclear weapons, whether first or in response to the aggressor’s own first use, this judgment would begin to look dangerously precarious. There must be at least a substantial probability of the aggressor leaders’ concluding that their initial judgment had been mistaken—that the risks were after all greater than whatever prize they had been seeking, and that for their own country’s survival they must call off the aggression. Deterrence planning such as that of NATO was directed in the first place to preventing the initial misjudgment and in the second, if it were nevertheless made, to compelling such a reappraisal. The former aim had to have primacy, because it could not be taken for granted that the latter was certain to work. But there was no ground for assuming in advance, for all possible scenarios, that the chance of its working must be negligible. An aggressor state would itself be at huge risk if nuclear war developed, as its leaders would know. It may be argued that a policy which abandons hope of physically defeating the enemy and simply hopes to get him to desist is pure gamble, a matter of who blinks first; and that the political and moral nature of most likely aggressors, almost ex hypothesi, makes them less likely to blink. One response to this is to ask what is the alternative—it can be only surrender. But a more hopeful answer lies in the fact that the criticism is posed in a political vacuum. Real-life conflict would have a political context. The context which concerned NATO during the Cold War, for example, was one of defending vital interests against a postulated aggressor whose own vital interests would not be engaged or would be less engaged. Certainty is not possible, but a clear asymmetry of vital interest is a legitimate basis for expecting an asymmetry, credible to both sides, of resolve in conflict. That places upon statesmen, as page 23 has noted, the key task in deterrence of building up in advance a clear and shared grasp of where limits lie. That was plainly achieved in cold-war Europe. If vital interests have been defused in a way that is clear, and also clearly not overlapping or incompatible with those of the adversary; a credible basis has been laid for the likelihood of greater resolve in resistance. It was also sometimes suggested by critics that whatever might be indicated by theoretical discussion of political will and interests, the military environment of nuclear warfare —particularly difficulties of communication and control—would drive escalation with overwhelming probability to the limit. But it is obscure why matters should be regarded as inevitably so for every possible level and setting of action. Even if the history of war suggested (as it scarcely does) that military decision-makers are mostly apt to work on the principle ‘When in doubt, lash out’, the nuclear revolution creates an utterly new situation. The pervasive reality, always plain to both sides during the cold war, is ‘if this goes on to the end, we are all ruined’. Given that inexorable escalation would mean catastrophe for both, it would be perverse to suppose them permanently incapable of framing arrangements which avoid it. As page 16 has noted, NATO gave its military commanders no widespread delegated authority, in peace or war, to launch nuclear weapons without specific political direction. Many types of weapon moreover had physical safeguards such as PALS incorporated to reinforce organizational ones. There were multiple communication and control systems for passing information, orders, and prohibitions. Such systems could not be totally guaranteed against disruption if at a fairly intense level at strategic exchange—which was only one of many possible levels of conflict— an adversary judged it to be in his interest to weaken political control. It was far from clear why he necessarily should so judge. Even then, however, it remained possible to operate on a general tail-safe presumption: no authorization, no use. That was the basis on which NATO operated. If it is feared that the arrangements which a nuclear-weapon possessor has in place do not meet such standards in some respects, the logical course is to continue to improve them rather than to assume escalation to be certain and uncontrollable, with all the enormous inferences that would have to flow from such an assumption. The likelihood of escalation can never be 100 per cent, and never zero. Where between those two extremes it may lie can never be precisely calculable in advance; and even were it so calculable, it would not be uniquely fixed—it would stand to vary hugely with circumstances. That there should be any risk at all of escalation to widespread nuclear war must be deeply disturbing, and decision-makers would always have to weigh it most anxiously. But a pair of key truths about it need to be recognized. The first is that the risk of escalation to large-scale nuclear war is inescapably present in any significant armed conflict between nuclear-capable powers, whoever may have started the conflict and whoever may first have used any particular category of weapon. The initiator of the conflict will always have physically available to him options for applying more force if he meets effective resistance. If the risk of escalation, whatever its degree of probability, is to be regarded as absolutely unacceptable, the necessary inference is that a state attacked by a substantial nuclear power must forgo military resistance. It must surrender, even if it has a nuclear armory of its own. But the companion truth is that, as page 47 has noted, the risk of escalation is an inescapable burden also upon the aggressor. The exploitation of that burden is the crucial route, if conflict does break out, for managing it to a tolerable outcome—the only route, indeed, intermediate between surrender and holocaust, and so the necessary basis for deterrence beforehand. The working nut of plans to exploit escalation risk most effectively in deterring potential aggression entails further and complex issues. It is for example plainly desirable, wherever geography, politics, and available resources so permit without triggering arms races, to make provisions and dispositions that are likely to place the onus of making the bigger and more evidently dangerous steps in escalation upon the aggressor who wishes to maintain his attack, rather than upon the defender. The customary shorthand fur this desirable posture used to be ‘escalation dominance’.) These issues are not further discussed here. But addressing them needs to start from acknowledgement that there are in any event no certainties or absolutes available, no options guaranteed to be risk-free and cost-free. Deterrence is not possible without escalation risk; and its presence can point to no automatic policy conclusion save for those who espouse outright pacifism and accept its consequences.

Accident and Miscalculation Ensuring the safety and security of nuclear weapons plainly needs to be taken most seriously. Detailed

information is understandably not published, but such direct evidence as there is suggests that it always has been so taken in every possessor state, with the inevitable occasional failures to follow strict procedures dealt with rigorously. Critics have nevertheless from time to time argued that the possibility of accident involving nuclear weapons is so substantial that it must weigh heavily in the entire evaluation of whether war-prevention structures entailing their existence should be tolerated at all. Two sorts of scenario are usually in question. The first is that of a single grave event involving an unintended nuclear explosion—a technical disaster at a storage site, for example, or the accidental or unauthorized launch of a delivery system with a live nuclear warhead. The second is that of some event—perhaps such an explosion or launch, or some other mishap such as malfunction or misinterpretation of radar signals or computer systems—initiating a sequence of response and counter-response that culminated in a nuclear exchange which no one had truly intended. No event that is physically possible can be said to be of absolutely zero probability (just as at an opposite extremer it is absurd to claim, as has been heard from distinguished figures, that nuclear-weapon use can be guaranteed to happen within some finite future span despite not having happened for over sixty years.) But human affairs cannot be managed to the standard of either zero or total probability. We have to assess levels

between those theoretical limits and weigh the reality and implications against other factors, in security planning as in everyday life There have certainly been, across the decades since 1945, many known accidents involving nuclear weapons, from transporters skidding off roads to bomber aircraft crashing with or accidentally dropping the weapons they carried (in past days when

such carriage was a frequent feature of readiness arrangements it no longer is). A few of these accidents may have released into the nearby environment highly toxic material. None however has entailed a nuclear detonation . Some commentators suggest that this reflects bizarrely good fortune amid such massive activity and deployment

over so many years. A more rational deduction from the facts of this long experience would however be that the probability of any accident triggering a nuclear explosion is extremely low. It might be further nested that the mechanisms needed to set of such an explosion are technically demanding, and that in a large number of ways the past sixty years have seen extensive improvements in safety arrangements for both the design and the handling of weapons. It is undoubtedly possible to see respects in which, after the cold war, some of the factors bearing upon risk may be new or more adverse; but some are now plainly less so. The years which the world has come through entirely without accidental or unauthorized detonation have included early decades in which knowledge was sketchier, precautions were less developed, and weapon designs were less ultra-safe than they later became, as well as substantial periods in which weapon numbers were larger, deployments immure widespread arid diverse, movements more frequent, and several aspects of doctrine and readiness arrangements more tense. Similar considerations apply to the hypothesis of nuclear war being mistakenly triggered by false alarm.

Critics again point to the fact, as it is understood, of numerous occasions when initial steps in alert sequences for US nuclear forces were embarked upon, or at least called for, by indicators mistaken or misconstrued. In none of these instances, it is accepted, did matters get at all near to nuclear launch—extraordinary good fortune again, critics have suggested. But the rival and more logical inference from hundreds of events stretching over sixty years of experience presents itself once more: that the probability of initial misinterpretation leading far towards mistaken launch is remote . Precisely because any nuclear weapon processor recognizes the vast gravity of any launch, release sequences have many steps , and

human decision is repeatedly interposed as well as capping the sequences. To convey that because a first step was prompted the world somehow came close to accidental nuclear war is wild hyperbole , rather like asserting, when a tennis champion

has lost his opening service game, that he was nearly beaten in straight sets. History anyway scarcely offers any ready example

of major war started by accident even before the nuclear revolution imposed an order-of-magnitude increase of caution. In was occasion conjectured that nuclear war might be triggered by the real but accidental or unauthorized launch of a strategic nuclear-weapon delivery system in the direction of a potential adversary. No such

launch is known to have occurred in over sixty years. The probability of it is therefore very low . But even if it did happen, the further hypothesis of it initiating a general nuclear exchange is far-fetched . It fails to consider the real situation of decision-makers, as pages 63-4 have

brought out. The notion that cosmic holocaust might be mistakenly precipitated in this way belongs to science fiction.

2NC No Miscalc/ Accidents ImpactNo risk of Russia warBall ‘5 (Desmond, Professor – Strategic Defence Studies Centre at Australian National University, “The Probabilities of ‘On the Beach’ Assessing Armageddon Scenarios in the 21st Century, May, http://www.manningclark.org.au/papers/se05_ball.html)The prospects of a nuclear war between the US and Russia must now be deemed fairly remote. There are now no geostrategic issues that warrant nuclear competition and no inclination in either Washington or Moscow to provoke such issues. US and Russian strategic forces have been taken off day-to-day alert and their ICBMs 'de-targeted' , greatly reducing the possibilities of war by accident, inadvertence or miscalculation. On the other hand, while the US-Russia strategic competition is in abeyance, there are several aspects of current US nuclear weapons policy which are profoundly disturbing. In December 2001 President George W. Bush officially announced that the US was withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972, one of the mainstays of strategic nuclear arms control during the Cold War, with effect from June 2002, and was proceeding to develop and deploy an extensive range of both theatre missile defence (TMD) and national missile defence (NMD) systems. The first anti-missile missile in the NMD system, designed initially to defend against limited missile attacks from China and North Korea, was installed at Fort Greely in Alaska in July 2004. The initial system, consisting of 16 interceptor missiles at Fort Greely and four at Vandenberg Air Force in California, is expected to be operational by the end of 2005. The Bush Administration is also considering withdrawal from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and resuming nuclear testing. (The last US nuclear test was on 23 September 1992). In particular, some key Administration officials believe that testing is necessary to develop a 'new generation' of nuclear weapons, including low-yield, 'bunker-busting', earth-penetrating weapons specifically designed to destroy very hard and deeply buried targets (such as underground command and control centres and leadership bunkers).

Media wrong – US-Russia hotline still working even after Ukraine spats. Solves miscalc. Lubold ‘14Gordon Lubold is a national security reporter for Foreign Policy. Before arriving at Foreign Policy Magazine, he was a senior advisor at the United States Institute of Peace in Washington, where he wrote on national security and foreign policy. Prior to his arrival at USIP, he was a defense reporter for Politico. Prior to that, he was the Pentagon and national security correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor – “Hagel's Hotline to the Kremlin” – Passport – a website run by Foreign Policy Magazine – APRIL 29, 2014 –http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/04/29/hagel_and_shoygu_will_the_talking_helpAlthough media reports indicated that Moscow had suspended high-level discussions with Washington, the White House said the two countries were still in contact. Obama and Putin haven't spoken since

April 14, however, which has largely left it to Hagel and Secretary of State John Kerry to keep the lines open. During Hagel's call with Shoygu Monday, their second since the crisis began, Defense Department officials said that Hagel pressed for concrete details about Russia's intentions toward eastern Ukraine, where Moscow has massed tens of thousands of troops. Shoygu assured

Hagel that Russia had no plans to invade, the officials said. "The call between Minister Shoygu and Hagel was not two people talking past each other," said a senior defense official, who described Monday's 45-minute conversation as civil, candid and forthright, but also

"terse at times." "It was noteworthy that while they did not agree on everything, they did agree to continue talking, and that's not insignificant," the official said. Last week, Gen. Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, spoke for a second time with his counterpart, Gen. Valery Gerasimov, the chief of the General Staff of the Russian military, to convey his concerns about what Dempsey described as Russia's "aggressive military behavior." That included an incident that occurred with the USS Donald Cook earlier this month in which a Russian fighter jet buzzed the American destroyer in the Black Sea about a dozen times. The two agreed to "keep an open line of communication," according to a later readout of the call. And despite

an official suspension of the military relationship with the Russian military, Gen. Philip Breedlove, the supreme allied commander in Europe, has also been in close touch with his own counterparts there. The mil-to-mil relationships

between the U.S. and countries like Egypt and Pakistan have always been hugely important for top military leaders, and those in uniform have taken great pride in maintaining them even when diplomatic ties were strained or non-existent. "Relationships between militaries (both uniformed and defense ministers) become even more important when

diplomatic, economic, and political relations fray," Jim Stavridis, the retired Navy admiral who last served as supreme allied commander in Europe, wrote in an email. "While they will not always advance the situation, they almost always have the effect of preventing things from

getting catastrophically worse." Generally speaking, the channel allows commanders and military chiefs to prevent a crisis and engage in an "exchange of information" that is typically seen by both sides as separate and apart from the political dialogue between two countries.

No accidental launchWilliscroft ‘10 (Six patrols on the John Marshall as a Sonar Technician, and four on the Von Steuben as an officer – a total of twenty-two submerged months. Navigator and Ops Officer on Ortolan & Pigeon – Submarine Rescue & Saturation Diving ships. Watch and Diving Officer on Oceanographer and Surveyor. “Accidental Nuclear War” http://www.argee.net/Thrawn%20Rickle/Thrawn%20Rickle%2032.htm)

Is there a realistic chance that we could have a nuclear war by accident? Could a ballistic submarine commander launch his missiles without specific presidential authorization? Could a few men conspire and successfully bypass built-in safety systems to launch nuclear weapons? The key word here is “realistic.” In the strictest sense, yes, these things are possible. But are they realistically possible? This question can best be answered by examining two interrelated questions. Is there a way to launch a nuclear weapon by accident? Can a specific accidental series of events take place—no matter how remote—that will result in the inevitable launch or detonation of a nuclear weapon? Can one individual working by himself or several individuals working in collusion bring about the deliberate launch or detonation of a nuclear weapon? We are protected from accidental launching of nuclear weapons by mechanical safeguards, and by carefully structured and controlled mandatory

procedures that are always employed when working around nuclear weapons. Launching a nuclear weapon takes the specific simultaneous action of several designated individuals. System designers ensured that conditions necessary for a launch could not happen accidentally. For example, to launch a missile from a ballistic missile submarine, two individuals must insert keys into separate slots on separate decks within a few seconds of each other. Barring this, the system cannot physically launch a missile . There are additional safeguards built into the system that control computer hardware and software, and personnel controls that we will discuss later, but—in the final analysis—without the keys inserted as described, there can be no launch—it’s not physically possible.

Because the time window for key insertion is less than that required for one individual to accomplish , it is physically impossible for a missile to be launched accidentally by one individual. Any launch must be deliberate . One can postulate a scenario wherein a technician bypasses these safeguards in order to effect a launch by himself. Technically, this is possible, but such a launch would be deliberate, not accidental. We will examine measures designed to prevent this in a later

column. Maintenance procedures on nuclear weapons are very tightly controlled. In effect always is the “two-man rule.” This rule prohibits any individual from accessing nuclear weapons or their launch vehicles alone. Aside from obvious qualification requirements, two individuals must be present. No matter how familiar the two technicians may be with a specific system, each step in a maintenance procedure is first read by one technician, repeated by the second, acknowledged by the first (or corrected, if necessary), performed by the second, examined by the first, checked off by the first, and acknowledged by the second . This makes maintenance slow, but absolutely assures that no errors happen. Exactly the same procedure is followed every time an access cover is

removed, a screw is turned, a weapon is moved, or a controlling publication is updated. Nothing, absolutely nothing is done without following the written guides exactly , always under two-man control. This even applies to guards. Where nuclear

weapons are concerned, a minimum of two guards—always fully in sight of each other—stand duty. There is no realistic scenario wherein a nuclear missile can be accidentally launched...ever...under any circumstances...period !

Accidental war unlikelyFarley ‘13

(Robert, assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce – University of Kentucky, April 5, “North Korea and the Fallacy of Accidental Wars”, The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2013/04/05/north-korea-and-the-fallacy-of-accidental-wars/?all=true)

Accidental wars rarely happen. Historians have demonstrate d that most wars initially deemed “accidental,”

(perhaps most notably the First World War), have in actuality resulted from deliberative state policy , even if the circumstances of the war were unplanned. While war seems discordant, it actually requires a great deal of coop eration and coordination. Fundamentally, two parties have to agree to conduct a war ; otherwise, you have either a punitive raid or an armed surrender negotiation.

Science Leadership

1NC No Science Leadership Impact

Science diplomacy fails, scientists and policy makers can’t work togetherMarlow 12 (Jeffery, Writer for wired.com, “The Promise and Pitfalls of Democracy”, Wired.com, 12/11/12, http://www.wired.com/2012/12/the-promise-and-pitfalls-of-science-diplomacy/, CTC)On July 17th, 1975, Alexei Leonov and Tom Stafford did something extraordinary: they shared a meal of canned beef tongue and black bread. It may not have been the most delicious culinary experience the men had ever had, but the setting of the meal was slightly more noteworthy: outer space, where two spacecraft had docked and were orbiting the earth at nearly 18,000 miles per hour. The two men and their crews conducted scientific observations, exchanged gifts, and spoke intermittently in English, Russian, and “Oklahomski,” the Soviet commander’s description of Stafford’s drawl. Far below Leonov and Stafford, their political leaders – Leonid Brezhnev and Gerald Ford, respectively – were embroiled in the maneuverings of the Cold War. Diplomatic tensions ran deep, but with the Space Race to the Moon in the rearview mirror, joint missions seemed to operate above the fray of political discourse. The Apollo-Soyuz episode was a unique moment in American space exploration history, a pivot from antagonism and competition to measured cooperation that previewed a similar move toward engagement in the political arena over a decade later. Indeed, crosstalk between members of supposedly clashing countries is a common feature of the scientific enterprise. These sorts of collaborations may not directly solve the issues at the heart of tense diplomatic situations, but they do get parties on either side talking. The very neutrality of the subject matter – the pursuit of “truth” – may actually help the process, allowing

mistrust to thaw and preconceptions to crumble while engaging in a shared aim. This notion of science as a diplomatic tool – its use as an entry point to a recalcitrant society that simultaneously breaks down politically steeped preconceptions and offers tangible benefits –

is a promising mode of development and a constructive brand of international relations. The Obama Administration understands the value of science diplomacy; last month, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced the expansion of the Science Envoy program, appointing Barbara Schaal of Washington University in St. Louis, Bernard Amadei of the University of Colorado, and Susan Hockfield of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to the position. These prominent scientists represent the third class of envoys – the program began

in 2009 and has sponsored visits to nearly 20 countries. The philosophy behind the envoy program is noble, but its current directive is a bit vague. As noted in the State Department’s official release, “the science envoys travel in their capacity as private citizens and advise the White House, the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. scientific community about the insights they gain from their travels and

interactions.” A recent assessment of the program by envoy Elias Zerhouni noted the challenge of following through on initiatives predicated on the personal credibility and contacts of the individual envoys. Leveraging the networks of world-renowned scientists within the framework of a coherent policy of international relations is difficult,

particularly when funding for longer-term projects is uncertain. The trust of international partners requires a predictable political and financial environment. When President Obama launched the program during a speech in Cairo, he said that the envoys would “collaborate on programs that develop new sources of energy, create green jobs, digitize records, clean water, and grow new crops.” Whether these programs are mandated by the executive branch or are the responsibility of the envoys is unclear. A more explicit structure could allow science diplomats to be more effective, building on the strong record of science as an invaluable tool in the soft power arsenal.

Alt-Cause: Science leadership is impossible as long as fracking is prevalent in the U.S.Magill 13 (Bobby Magill is an award-winning science, environment and energy journalist who is currently the senior science writer covering energy and climate change for Climate Central in New York City. My work has appeared in Popular Mechanics, Scientific American, Bloomberg News, the Guardian, Huffington Post, Salon, USA Today, High Country News, New West.net, and daily newspapers throughout Colorado, “Fracking hurts US climate change credibility, say scientists”, The Guardian via Climate Central, http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/oct/11/fracking-us-climate-credibility-shale-gas, N.O.)

“ As we produce more, we burn more, and we send more CO2 per person into the atmosphere than almost any other country,” said Susan Brantley, geosciences professor and director of the Earth and Environmental Systems Institute at Pennsylvania State University. “We are blanketing our world with greenhouse gas, warming the planet.” Several years ago

in Pennsylvania, scientists were talking about carbon sequestration in shale formations deep underground, she said. “However, since 2005, we have been fracking shales and have drilled 6,000 shale gas wells,” she said. “This extraordinary rate of development is good for our country in terms of jobs and energy prices, but bad in that we are not worrying as much about the greenhouse gas problem as we are about exploiting gas with hydrofracking. “ It is hard for us to have credibility in global discussions of greenhouse gas unless we can use this new source of gas a transitional fuel that bridges us from hydrocarbons to renewable, non-carbon fuels,” she said. Even among advocates for greenhouse gas emissions reductions, there is disagreement about what the U.S. role as chief oil and gas producer means for America’s

credibility on climate change. “ Those who already see the U.S. as a major bad actor will continue to do so, and cite this hydrocarbon boom as further evidence,” said Armond Cohen, executive director of the Boston-based Clean Air Task

Force. “By contrast, if the U.S. took a more progressive global stance on overall emissions control, increased domestic production would be probably irrelevant; the world would be relieved to see U.S. leadership.”

China’s STEM related degrees statistics prove China is the leader for the long run Friedman, 14 (Lauren, Senior Health Reporter at Business Insider and has written for many places including Scientific American Scientific American Mind, 3 Charts That China’s Scientific Dominance Over The US is a Done Deal, Business Insider, June 19, 2014, http://www.businessinsider.com/chinas-scientific-dominance-is-a-done-deal-2014-6, TS)

While China and the U.S. currently award science and engineering degrees to an equivalent proportion of their populations, China has sharply increased the number of graduates in these fields — and the U.S. does not seem poised to catch up anytime soon. Chinese students also receive more American doctoral degrees in science and engineering than any other foreign students . Between 1987 and 2010, there was a threefold increase in the number of Chinese students in these programs (from 15,000 to 43,000).

2NC No Science Leadership Impact

No impact to science diplomacy – cooperation is limited to science Dickson 9 | David Dickson was the founding director of SciDev.Net and spent many years at Nature, as its Washington correspondent and later as news editor. He also worked on the staffs of Science and New Scientist, specializing in reporting on science policy. He started a career in journalism as a sub-editor, following a degree in mathematics, The limits of science diplomacy, 6/27/14, http://www.scidev.net/global/capacity-building/editorials/the-limits-of-science-diplomacy.html, Accessed 6/27/14, CCHS-AY

Using science for diplomatic purposes has obvious attractions and several benefits. But there are limits to what it

can achieve. The scientific community has a deserved reputation for its international perspective — scientists often ignore national boundaries and interest s when it comes to exchanging ideas or collaborating on global problems. So it is not surprising that science attracts the interest of politicians keen to open channels of communication with other states. Signing agreements on

scientific and technological cooperation is often the first step for countries wanting to forge closer working relationships. More significantly, scientists have formed key links behind-the-scenes when more overt dialogue has been impossible. At the height of the Cold War, for example, scientific organisations provided a conduit for discussing nuclear weapons control.

Only so much science can do Recently, the Obama administration has given this field a new push, in its desire to pursue "soft diplomacy" in regions such as the Middle East. Scientific agreements have been at the forefront of the administration's activities in countries such as Iraq and Pakistan. But — as emerged from a meeting entitled New Frontiers in Science Diplomacy, held in London this week (1–2 June)

— using science for diplomatic purposes is not as straightforward as it seems. Some scientific collaboration clearly

demonstrates what countries can achieve by working together. For example, a new synchrotron under construction in

Jordan is rapidly becoming a symbol of the potential for teamwork in the Middle East. But whether scientific cooperation can become a precursor for political collaboration is less evident. For example, despite hopes that the Middle East synchrotron would help bring peace to the region, several countries have been reluctant to support it until the Palestine problem is resolved. Indeed, one speaker at the London meeting (organised by the UK's Royal Society and the American Association for the Advancement of Science)

even suggested that the changes scientific innovations bring inevitably lead to turbulence and upheaval. In such a context, viewing science as a driver for peace may be wishful thinking. Conflicting ethos Perhaps the most contentious area discussed at the meeting was how science diplomacy can frame developed countries' efforts to help build scientific capacity in the developing world.

There is little to quarrel with in collaborative efforts that are put forward with a genuine desire for partnership. Indeed, partnership — whether between individuals, institutions or countries — is the new buzzword in the "science for

development" community. But true partnership requires transparent relations between partners who are prepared to meet as equals. And that goes against diplomats' implicit role: to promote and defend their own countries' interests. John Beddington, the British government's chief scientific adviser, may have been a bit harsh when he told the meeting that a diplomat is someone who is "sent abroad to lie for his country". But he touched a raw nerve. Worlds apart yet co-dependent The truth is that science and politics make an uneasy alliance. Both need the other. Politicians need science to achieve their goals, whether social, economic or —

unfortunately — military; scientists need political support to fund their research. But they also occupy different universes. Politics is , at root, about exercising power by one means or another. Science is — or should be — about pursuing robust knowledge that can be put to useful purposes . A strategy for promoting science diplomacy that respects these differences deserves support. Particularly so if it focuses on ways to leverage political and financial backing for science's more humanitarian

goals, such as tackling climate change or reducing world poverty. But a commitment to science diplomacy that ignores the differences — acting for example as if science can substitute politics (or perhaps more worryingly, vice versa), is dangerous . The Obama administration's commitment to "soft power" is already faltering. It faces challenges ranging

from North Korea's nuclear weapons test to domestic opposition to limits on oil consumption. A taste of reality may be no bad thing. David Dickson Director, SciDev.Net

Science diplomacy isn’t a substitution for regular diplomacyDickson 10 (David, Director of SciDev.net, “Science in diplomacy: ‘On tap but not on top’ ”, SciDev.net, 28/6/2010, http://scidevnet.wordpress.com/2010/06/28/the-place-of-science-in-diplomacy-%E2%80%9Con-tap-but-not-on-top%E2%80%9D/, CTC)

There’s a general consensus in both the scientific and political worlds that the principle of science diplomacy, at least in the

somewhat restricted sense of the need to get more and better science into international negotiations, is a desirable objective. There

is less agreement, however, on how far the concept can – or indeed should – be extended to embrace broader goals

and objectives, in particular attempts to use science to achieve political or diplomatic goals at the international

level. Science, despite its international characteristics, is no substitute for effective diplomacy . Any more than diplomatic initiatives necessarily lead to good science. These seem to have been the broad conclusions to emerge from a three-day meeting at Wilton Park in Sussex, UK, organised by the British Foreign Office and the Royal Society, and attended by scientists, government officials and politicians from 17 countries around the world. The definition of science diplomacy varied widely among participants. Some saw it as a subcategory of “public diplomacy”, or what US diplomats have recently been promoting as “soft power” (“the carrot rather than the stick approach”, as a participant described it). Others preferred to see it as a core element of the broader concept of “innovation diplomacy”, covering the politics of engagement in the familiar fields of international scientific exchange and technology transfer, but raising these to a higher level as a diplomatic objective. Whatever definition is used, three particular aspects of the debate became the focus of attention during the Wilton Park meeting: how science can inform the diplomatic process; how diplomacy can assist science in achieving its objectives; and, finally, how science can provide a channel for quasi-diplomatic exchanges by forming an apparently neutral bridge between countries. There was little disagreement on the first of these. Indeed for many, given the increasing number of international issues with a scientific dimension that politicians have to deal with, this is essentially what the core of science diplomacy should be about. Chris Whitty, for example, chief scientist at the UK’s Department for International Development, described how knowledge about the threat raised by the spread of the highly damaging plant disease stem rust had been an important input by researchers into discussions by politicians and diplomats over strategies for persuading Afghan farmers to shift from the production of opium to wheat. Others pointed out that the scientific community had played a major role in drawing attention to issues such as the links between chlorofluorocarbons in the atmosphere and the growth of the ozone hole, or between carbon dioxide emissions and climate change. Each has made essential contributions to policy decisions. Acknowledging this role for science has some important implications. No-one dissented when Rohinton Medhora, from Canada’s International Development Research Centre, complained of the lack of adequate scientific expertise in the embassies of many countries of the developed and developing world alike. Nor – perhaps predictably – was there any major disagreement that diplomatic initiatives can both help and occasionally hinder the process of science. On the positive side, such diplomacy can play a significant role in facilitating science exchange and the launch of international science projects, both essential for the development of modern science. Europe’s framework programme of research programmes was quoted as a successful advantage of the first of these. Examples of the second range from the establishment of the European Organisation of Nuclear Research (usually known as CERN) in Switzerland after the Second World War, to current efforts to build a large new nuclear fusion facility (ITER). Less positively, increasing restrictions on entry to certain countries, and in particular the United States after the 9/11 attacks in New York and elsewhere, have significantly impeded scientific exchange programmes. Here the challenge for diplomats was seen as helping to find ways

to ease the burdens of such restrictions. The broadest gaps in understanding the potential of scientific diplomacy lay in the third category, namely the use of science as a channel of international diplomacy, either as a way of helping to forge

consensus on contentious issues, or as a catalyst for peace in situations of conflict. On the first of these, some pointed to recent climate change negotiations, and in particular the work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, as a good example, of the way that the

scientific community can provide a strong rationale for joint international action. But others referred to the failure of the Copenhagen climate summit last December to come up with a meaningful agreement on action as a demonstration of the

limitations of this way of thinking. It was argued that this failure had been partly due to a misplaced belief that scientific consensus would be sufficient to generate a commitment to collective action , without taking into account the political impact that scientific ideas would have. Another example that received considerable attention was the current construction of a synchrotron facility SESAME in Jordan, a project that is already is bringing together researchers in a range of scientific disciplines from various countries in the Middle East (including Israel, Egypt and Palestine, as well as both Greece and Turkey). The promoters of SESAME hope that – as with the building of CERN 60 years ago, and its operation as a research centre involving, for example, physicists from both Russia and the United States – SESAME will become a symbol of what regional collaboration can achieve. In that sense, it would become what one participant described as a “beacon of hope” for the region. But others cautioned that, however successful SESAME may turn out to be in purely scientific terms, its potential impact on the Middle East peace process should not be exaggerated. Political conflicts have deep roots that cannot easily be papered over, however open-minded scientists may be to professional colleagues coming from other political contexts. Indeed, there was even a warning that in the developing world, high profile scientific projects, particular those with explicit political backing, could end up doing damage by inadvertently favouring one social group over another. Scientists should be wary of having their prestige used in this way; those who did so could come over as patronising, appearing unaware of political realities. Similarly, those who hold science in esteem as a practice committed to promoting the causes of peace and development were reminded of the need to take into account how advances in science – whether nuclear physics or genetic technology – have also led to new types of weaponry. Nor did science automatically lead to the

reduction of global inequalities. “Science for diplomacy” therefore ended up with a highly mixed review. The consensus seemed to be that science can prepare the ground for diplomatic initiatives – and benefit from diplomatic agreements

– but cannot provide the solutions to either. “On tap but not on top” seems as relevant in international settings as it does in purely national ones. With all the caution that even this formulation still requires.

The positive effects of scientific diplomacy are contestable; the potential to backlash is always present, results are unpredictable, and scientists have limited ability to influence politicsSmith 14 (Frank, Professor at the Centre of International Security Studies at the University of Sydney, “Advancing science diplomacy: Indonesia and the US Naval Medical Research Unit”, Sage Journals , June 17, 2014, http://sss.sagepub.com/content/early/2014/06/16/0306312714535864.full N.O.)

Finally, the mechanisms through which science diplomacy creates international cooperation are underspecified, providing little confidence that it will not backfire . Science diplomacy is related to public diplomacy, but merely citing public opinion polls about the popularity of science and technology does not explain how this attraction is leveraged to build

goodwill abroad. While their products might be popular, are scientists and technicians typically movers and shakers of mass public opinion? Maybe, but this seems unlikely when they are compared with celebrities or

other public figures, especially if we consider variation in the public understanding of science and efficacy of

science communication. In addition, like propaganda, public diplomacy that aims to improve mass public opinion can have the opposite effect and inadvertently undermine trust (Goldsmith and Horiuchi, 2009).

2NC Alt CauseUS Science leadership fallen behind and already structurally destined to fall regardless of oceansLowrey 14 (Anne, political and economic writer for the New York Times, “U.S. Dominance in Science Faces Asian Challenge”, New York Times, February 13 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/14/us/us-dominance-in-science-faces-asian-challenge.html?_r=0, N.O.)At the same time, the share of research done by Asian countries grew to 34 percent from 25 percent, with China’s share alone growing to 15

percent from 2 percent in 2000. As a result, the Asian economies now perform a larger share of global research and development than the United States does. China carries out about as much high-tech manufacturing as the United States does , the report found. But the report also highlights some important market sectors where the United States appears to be falling behind. For instance, emerging economies invested about $100 billion in clean energy in 2012, with China alone investing more than $60 billion. The United States spent only $29 billion . More worryingly, the report finds that the United States might be lagging in the research and development spending that scientists say is the most important fuel for future innovation .

Extension – China Rise InevitableChinese scientists paid more than Americans—more incentive and more scientists=more success Friedman, 14 (Lauren, Senior Health Reporter at Business Insider and has written for many places including Scientific American Scientific American Mind, 3 Charts That China’s Scientific Dominance Over The US is a Done Deal, Business Insider, June 19, 2014, http://www.businessinsider.com/chinas-scientific-dominance-is-a-done-deal-2014-6, TS)

People who pursue science in China have much better earning potential than their counterparts in the U.S. Chinese scientists are paid better than their highly educated peers , while in the U.S., the reverse is true . U.S. lawyers , for example, go to school for less time than Ph.D. scientists, but make much more money . "When talented youth face alternative career options, everything else being equal, more Chinese would be attracted to science than Americans," because of the pay the researchers write. The PNAS researchers identify " four factors [ that] favor China's continuing rise in science: a large population and human capital base, a labor market favoring academic meritocracy, a large diaspora of Chinese-origin scientists, and a centralized government willing to invest in science. "Still, scientists in the United States have some serious advantages, since, as the researchers note, "China's science faces potential difficulties due to political interference and scientific fraud."

Softpower

1NC No Softpower ImpactSoft power doesn’t work – it won’t shift minds of nations that weren’t already inclined. Adegbite, 2011 (Saheed Adegbite, completed his MA in International Studies and Diplomacy at The Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy, the University of London in 2011. He currently works as a Senior Officer with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). “How crucial is soft power to the successful conduct of diplomacy?” – International Relations and Diplomacy – Sunday, 13 March 2011 – http://thenewdiplomats.blogspot.com/2011/03/how-crucial-is-soft-power-to-successful.html)

One difficulty in attempting to decide conclusively that soft power is crucial is in the vague way it is measured by many. As defined soft power is the ability to get someone to do what they would not otherwise do by attraction. As such this can only be measured where we have established firstly the context that the other party wouldn’t have done it anyway. If I ask or persuade my daughter to jump, I can only claim to my soft power being crucial with the assurance that she doesn’t love jumping. The context of

measuring goes also into determining if there are already shared values or cultures which serve in themselves to facilitate. The power relationship is therefore always changing and how crucial soft power is in diplomatic negotiation is also

fluid. One recent phenomenon that underlines soft power essence especially in the last two decades is the proliferation of non-state actors including NGO’s and their growing importance in diplomacy in general. As a result of this there are a growing number of new issues that face nations and their foreign services such as Climate Change, Human rights, HIV and their securitization which has minimum to do with hard power alone. States consistently have to weld soft power for legitimacy in these issues closely adopting what is in essence important stages of

implementation i.e. In conclusion therefore, soft power in isolation does not seem to dominate in its importance in diplomacy. The contemporary political landscape means it is growing in importance with need however for economic military power to implement it. The limitations remain though in it cannot be a replacement for good policy and contradiction can be counterproductive along

with the fact that ‘bounce’ can create competition. The degree to which soft power has played a role positively in any diplomatic negotiation remains dependent on the nature of the power relationship, shared values and culture amongst other things.

2NC No Softpower ImpactUS soft power resilientCox, 2012 (Michael, Professor IR London School of Economics, December, “Power Shifts, Economic Change and the Decline of the West?” International Relations, Vol 26 No 4, p 369-388, SagePub)If China has a real problem in projecting a positive and confident picture of itself or of the world it would like to build, the same can hardly be

said of the United States. 92 The US may have lost good deal of standing in the world because of the Iraq War;

meanwhile the West has clearly suffered a setback because of the economic crisis. However, the first was partially vitiated by the election of Obama in 2008, and the second has not led to anybody serious proposing an alternative.

Moreover, the ‘West’ for all its faults – growing inequality, ethical standards in decline and all the rest – still looks a more attractive proposition than anything else on offer. As a recent study has shown, ‘soft power’ is almost entirely the preserve of Western, or more precisely democratic, countries with the U nited S tates still leading a league table that includes most West European countries as well as two countries from Asia – Japan and South Korea. China on the other hand comes in 20th, just ahead of

Brazil at 21st, followed by India at 27th and Russia 28th out of a total of 30 countries assessed. 93 There are several reasons why the West continues to score well in terms of soft power, the most obvious being that Western countries have a pluralist political culture where having dissident views, will not, by and large, end up with one spending a rather long term in prison or worse. But another reason – clearly connected – has to do with its open system of higher education. Here, even the much-maligned U nited S tates continues to have great magnetic pull, nowhere more so than in China itself, judging by the enormous number of Chinese students who every year seek a place in US institutions of higher learning. Many of them may in the end return to China. However, they clearly believe that getting an education in a US college will improve their job prospects in an increasingly tough Chinese job market. 94 Nor is this temporary ‘brain drain’ a mere accident of history. Indeed, one of the more obvious signs of continued Western and American strength is its university sector. 95 Other countries and continents obviously have universities. But very few of them rank especially high in international terms. 96 The BRIC countries in particular seem to face almost insuperable difficulties in raising standards. Brazil and India for example have no universities in the top 100, Russia only

one and China a mere five – three of these being in Hong Kong. The United States, in 2011, meanwhile remained home to 8 of the top 10 ranked universities in the world, 37 of the top 50 and 58 of the top 100. Even the United Kingdom does well, having 17 ranked universities compared to a total of 13 in the whole of Asia. 97

Soft power doesn’t shape foreign policy decisions of others.Ellwood, 2014 (David Ellwood is an Associate Professor of International History at University of Bologna and Adjunct Professor in European-American Relations at Johns Hopkins University, SAIS Bologna Center – “‘Soft power’ is a flawed tool in foreign policy, but a valuable form of global leadership” – The London School of Economic’s daily blog on American Politics and Policy – Jan 18th – http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2014/01/18/soft-power-is-a-flawed-tool-in-foreign-policy-but-a-valuable-form-of-global-leadership/)

Leaving aside its glibness and air of casuistry, the ‘soft power’ concept is fundamentally flawed at just the point where Nye insists on its usefulness: as a tool of foreign policy . The more states attempt consciously to project the force of example they see in their nations and its ways, the more the rest will see manipulation and propaganda. Two US analysts who commented on the prospects for British foreign policy in a new book, Influencing Tomorrow: Future Challenges for British Foreign Policy, were happy to say that ‘the BBC may be a more effective tool of British foreign policy than the Royal Navy

or the British Army’. But they also warned against the temptations and risks of leverage: ‘when you reach for the tool of soft power, you find it evaporates in your hand’. In the American case in particular, the temptation seems to be to try to mobilize the charismatic nature of so many successful American inventions and people as though they are resources at the disposal of the state. But they are not; they are the values and products of that society in the most diffuse sense, and its creative industries in particular, with all their talent for absorbing and re-configuring the inventions of the world then re-launching them for a global market.

Soft power doesn’t work; relations more complexKrepon, 2013 (Michael Krepon – co-founder of the Stimson Center, a nonprofit and nonpartisan international security think tank – Politico “Obama's ambition-free foreign policy” – 8-14-2013 http://www.politico.com/story/2013/08/obamas-ambition-free-foreign-policy-95490.html)Remember when American presidents set out to do big things in the world? That was when denizens of the Oval Office had one powerful

attribute: ambition. And that’s exactly what President Barack Obama is lacking today: a desire to shape world events to America’s liking, and a willingness to take big risks to make that happen . No wonder he is making little progress on the enormous foreign policy and national security challenges facing the United States. The less ambition an administration has, the harder achieving anything becomes. While trying to tackle hard problems can make them more complicated, not tackling at least some of them in a serious way increases the likelihood that they will get worse. Success will come, if at all, against long odds. Without trying, failure is guaranteed. For the president, significant diplomatic accomplishments seem nowhere in sight. Instead, the terrain looks barren or smoldering with problems from hell in Syria, Egypt and elsewhere, a Putinized Russia, and a China that is asserting territorial claims in troubling ways. This unwelcome landscape helps explain the modesty of the Obama administration’s foreign policy and national security aims. If one is unlikely to make serious progress on very hard problems, and if Sisyphean efforts might well complicate matters further, why try? One good reason is that, without ambition, firefighting becomes the default position, as was evident during Hillary Clinton’s tenure as secretary of state. She either didn’t seek or wasn’t given the lead on the Middle East, China, Russia, and nonproliferation portfolios. It’s perfectly acceptable for the White House to hold on to every one of them, but what’s the point of doing so in order to pursue modest initiatives? Administrations that make their mark on the world have great ambition at rare junctures of dramatic change and opportunity. It’s the Obama administration’s lot to operate in a changing international environment that seems devoid of opportunity. Some problems from hell might burn themselves out and others must be handled with care, especially after expending so much blood and treasure in Iraq and Afghanistan. Wars that are poorly conceived, planned and executed are unlikely to end well,

and have a properly chastening effect. The George W. Bush administration’s use of hard power and the Obama administration’s use of soft power have not increased U.S. persuasiveness abroad . So, what is an

administration to do when no hard and consequential problem seems ripe for diplomatic accomplishment? Diplomatic risk-taking is a high wire act, with only four potential wire-walkers: the president, vice president, the secretary of state, and the national security advisor. Secretary of State John Kerry, unlike his predecessor, has been cleared by the White House to walk the high wire. He has decided that a renewed effort to seek an Israeli-Palestinian settlement is worth the effort and that failure to try is likely to have dire consequences. His ambitious and draining efforts stand in stark contrast to the administration’s apparent lack of ambition on other hard national security problems. The Obama administration can’t be blamed for its lack of ambition in dealing with Vladimir Putin, whose choices continue to mortgage Russia’s future. Opportunities for a strategic opening with Beijing offer more hope. The most promising avenue of increasing strategic cooperation with China lies in space, rather than on nuclear issues. A collaborative space initiative and a code of conduct setting or strengthening norms for responsible space-faring nations could have strategic import. But so far, there are no takers for high-wire walking between Washington and Beijing. Pakistan has a new prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, who wants to increase trade and otherwise normalize relations with India. He and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh have appointed trusted individuals for back-channel talks, eliciting the usual qualms from the usual quarters. Spoilers are at work, creating incidents along disputed borders. Washington has no place getting in front of this process, but does not even appear to be in the rear-view mirror, prodding or offering incentives from behind the scenes. North Korea has a new, young leader who has started out by making poor decisions. Washington has chosen not to see whether he

might embark on a different course. Instead of seeking direct dealings with Kim Jong-un, the Obama administration seems content with multilateral approaches that offer little prospect for gain. The most glaring absence of ambition at present appears to be in the run-up to nuclear negotiations with a newly elected Iranian President Hassan Rouhani. A window of opportunity for significant deal making may well be narrow, but it is now open. This window will shut quickly if the Obama administration approaches the renewal of talks with an abundance of timidity, as if the next move depends on how Tehran reacts to its last cautious gambit. Sanctions, no matter how harsh, are a means to an end. Like sanctions, the threat of military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities will not help produce a satisfactory diplomatic settlement unless an ambitious U.S. initiative is forthcoming. Many seasoned diplomats, including high-ranking nonproliferation officials who have recently departed from the Obama administration, have called for a more ambitious negotiating approach. They are not known for throwing caution to the wind, and have good reason to be skeptical of success. And yet, they still advise an ambitious offer at this juncture. If the effort is made, success may well remain elusive. If an ambitious proposal is not offered, failure seems assured, with consequences to follow. What ever happened to the audacity of hope?

South China Sea

1NC No SCS ImpactUS-China tension over SCS won’t escalate – history proves. Taylor ’14 (Brendan – Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian and PhD – National Australian University, “The South China Sea is Not a Flashpoint,” The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2014, Volume 34, Issue 1, Taylor & Francis)

Finally, the capacity of Beijing and Washington to navigate crises in their bilateral relationship further

suggests that the S outh China Sea is not a flashpoint . Over t he past two or more decades, the U nited S tates

and China have gone to great lengths to manage bilateral tensions and prevent them from spiraling out of control . A recent example occurred in May 2012, when the two arrived at a mutually acceptable solution after the blind Chinese activist Chen Guangcheng sought refuge at the U.S. embassy in Beijing.48

In the S outh China Sea, two major , modern Sino–U.S. crises have been successfully managed. The first occurred in April 2001, when a U.S. EP-3 conducting routine surveillance in airspace above the S outh

C hina Sea collided with a Chinese J-8 jet fighter and was forced to make an emergency landing on Hainan

Island. To be sure, efforts to address this crisis did not initially proceed particularly smoothly, as Chinese officials

refused to answer incoming calls from the U.S. Embassy. Ultimately, however, those most intimately involved in the crisis—

such as then-Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral Dennis Blair—have written subsequently how top U.S. officials “ made every effort to exercise prudence and restraint while they collected more information about the nature of the incident.”

They have also acknowledged that their Chinese counterparts “made a series of grudging concessions that

ultimately resulted in success…after they decided that it was important to overall Sino–U.S. relations to solve the incident.”49 Again in March 2009 , while diplomatic tensions between Beijing and Washington heightened in the immediate aftermath of an incident involving the harassment of the USNS Impeccable by five Chinese vessels, good sense also prevailed as senior U.S. and Chinese officials issued statements maintaining that such incidents would not become the norm and pledging deeper cooperation to ensure so .50 Added to these examples of effective crisis management, it is also worth noting that Washington reportedly facilitated a compromise to the April 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff .51

2NC No SCS ImpactEconomic interdependence checks serious China-ASEAN fights over SCS.Chaibi, 2013 (Abraham Chaibi – Author at Politics in Spires and Summer Associate at Institute for Defense Analyses – “The outlook for

continuing stability in the South China Sea” – Politics in Spires – March 4, 2013 – http://politicsinspires.org/the-outlook-for-continuing-stability-in-the-south-china-sea/)East Asia’s rapid economic and military development has captured global attention, but pundits are quick to point to the South China Sea, North Korea, and Taiwan as potential obstacles to the region’s continued growth. Analysis of news coverage demonstrates that regional economies

and tensions have been growing in tandem. The South China Sea has historically been of particular interest because of the number of conflicting claims on the islands and sea-lanes it encompasses. China, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Taiwan, among others, have often engaged in bilateral disagreements with resulting

spikes in diplomatic tension and even military confrontation. Of note, these conflicts have never escalated to a full-scale regional war . Direct extrapolation suggests that previous restraint in military interactions implies the nations involved do not consider the potential benefits sufficient to justify an upset to the balance of power. However, contemporary changes in economic and security conditions complicate the issue. While current tensions appear unlikely to lead to a full-scale military conflict, the diversion of national resources needed to maintain the status quo is substantial. Institutional changes to increase transparency; clarify US treaties with ASEAN nations; and increase states’ internal enforcement of international agreements, although initially costly, would allow the neighbouring states to redirect these resources to long-term growth. Historically, China has been involved in a majority of the military conflicts in the South China Sea. A 1947 Chinese map delineates China’s controversial claim to approximately 80% of the sea. China aggressively used its navy to conclude a dispute with Vietnam in the Battle of the Paracel Islands in 1974 and then in 1988 during the Johnson South Reef Skirmish for the Spratly Islands. Conflict was narrowly averted in 1995 when the Philippines chose not to shell fort-like Chinese military structures on Mischief Reef (China maintained they were only intended as shelter for fisherman); however, the Philippines continues to assert that this is an example of “creeping occupation”. This form of venting tensions, while far short of total war, is extremely costly over the long run; the combination of of resources, energy, and lives expended to establish a claim to the islands creates a significant and avoidable opportunity cost. These skirmishes are not merely an imprint of the 20th century but continue today as witnessed by the Chinese establishment of the Sansha garrison-city in 2012 and the Sino-Philippines stand-off in

the Scarborough Shoal. What then is the evidence suggesting a continued reluctance to engage in full-scale military confrontation? Although in the past conflict has often arisen between economically interdependent nations (viz. the previous peak of global trade in 1914), the China-ASEAN relationship is one of fundamental interdependence of production , visible in the prevalence of international supply chaining in manufacturing

processes, rather than solely trade and labour movement[i]. The burgeoning economic interdependence and growth of

neighbouring states contributes a major incentive to prevent a conflagration. $5.3 trillion of trade, of which approximately 20% is US, transits the South China Sea annually and any interruption would not only severely restrict regional trade revenues, but would also very likely guarantee US military intervention[ii]. The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is becoming increasingly interconnected and 2015 will mark a key turning point with the opening of internal ASEAN borders for free movement of labor. The ASEAN bloc has also concluded a number of reconciliation agreements with China. Regarding security, both the 2002 Code of Conduct and the 2011 Guidelines to the Code of Conduct are intended to help coordinate diplomacy and maintain peace in South China Sea disputes. Economically China has been ASEAN’s largest trading partner since 2009, and at its opening in 2010 the ASEAN-China free trade area (ACFTA) became the largest in the world by population. These arrangements come at a time when growing estimates of the value of the natural resources contained in the South China Sea are generating pressures associated with ensuring energy security.

China won’t escalate SCS conflicts.Taylor ‘14Brendan – Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian and PhD – National Australian University, “The South China Sea is Not a Flashpoint,” The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2014, Volume 34, Issue 1, Taylor & Francis

But doubts remain over whether Beijing truly regards the S outh C hina Sea as a “core interest.” Michael Swaine reports that his investigation of Chinese official sources “failed to unearth a single example of a PRC official or an official PRC document or media source that publicly and explicitly identifies the S outh C hina S ea as a PRC ‘core interest.’”25 By contrast, Chinese officials have not exhibited such reticence when referring publicly to Taiwan or Tibet in such terms. Nor has Beijing shown any reluctance to threaten or to actually use military force in relation to these. During the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait Crisis,

Beijing twice fired ballistic missiles into waters off Taiwan in an effort to intimidate voters in advance of the island’s first democratic presidential election.26 China went further in March 2005 when the National People’s Congress passed an “anti-secession law” requiring the use of “non-peaceful means” against Taiwan in the event its leaders sought to establish formal independence from the mainland.27

Explicit threats and promises of this nature are absent in official Chinese statements on the S outh China Sea even when, as in May 2012, the normally smooth-talking Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ying ambiguously warned the Philippines “not to misjudge the situation” and not to “escalate tensions without considering consequences” at the

height of the Scarborough Shoal standoff.28 Indeed, although Beijing appears eager to demonstrate its growing naval capabilities by conducting military exercises in the South China Sea—as in March 2013 when it controversially conducted

exercises within 50 miles of the Malaysian coastline—it is striking that Chinese efforts to actually exercise jurisdiction in this region continue to be confined, by and large, to the use of civil maritime law enforcement vessels .29

We control uniqueness. No South China Sea war unless China’s fired-upon. Du ’14 (Roger Yu Du is an analyst at Global Risk Insights. Global Risk Insights provides the web’s best political risk analysis for businesses and investors. Our contributors are some of the brightest minds in economics, politics, finance, and international relations. GRI has been referenced by leading publications, including The Wall Street Journal, The New Yorker and Christian Science Monitor. “China territorial deadlocks hurt regional trade” – Global Risk Insights – June 7, 2014 – http://globalriskinsights.com/2014/06/07/china-territorial-deadlocks-hurt-regional-trade/)

Since 2007, China has been in frequent territorial disputes with the Philippines, Japan, Malaysia and Vietnam, which eventually led to some level of military standoff in the South China and East China Seas. In November 2013, China set up its East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone that covers the disputed Diaoyu Island with Japan, justifying its

military presence in the area. Several close encounters between Chinese and Japanese planes ensued. In May 2014, China Oilfield

Services Limited, a Chinese state-owned company, deployed its oil rig in the contested waters, which eventually triggered riots against China in Vietnam. It seems that China is getting more assertive about its territorial claims and not shying away from

competition. Although tensions have escalated, it is unlikely that they will lead to larger scale military confrontations or even war in the next decade. Most of the East Asian states have important domestic mandates that would require a relatively peaceful international environment. China is gradually restructuring its domestic economy. According to some analysts, it would

take over ten years for China to complete a series of reforms to evade the middle-income trap. In the meantime, Southeast Asian countries are China’s potential export markets and sources of cheap labor, while Japan and South Korea could

provide China with investments and technology. Unless fired upon , it is unwise to wage a war that would benefit so little compared with what China could achieve after its successful economic transformation.

China-ASEAN spats haven’t escalated over the SCS. The reason is economic interdependence.Weismman ‘10Mikael Weissmann – Associated Researcher at Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Researcher at FOI, Lecturer at Stockholm University “THE SOUTH CHINA SEA CONFLICT AND SINO-ASEAN RELATIONS: A STUDY IN CONFLICT PREVENTION AND PEACE BUILDING” – ASIAN PERSPECTIVE, Vol. 34, No. 3, 2010, pp. 35-69. Available at: http://www.ui.se/upl/files/49747.pdfWhen applying the peace continuum to the SCS conflict, it becomes clear that the conflict has been transformed since the early 1990s, when it was best characterized as a very fragile, unstable peace. At the time, military forces were seizing claims and a conflict between the Philippines and China over the Mischief Reef in 1995 stopped short of military

conflict mainly because of the unequal power of the two. Since then the conflict has moved toward a more stable peace. Despite tensions and unresolved underlying incompatibilities in the SCS, war is considered most unlikely as the SCS conflict cannot be separated from the overarching Sino-ASEAN relations. Since the early 1990s,

peaceful relations between China and ASEAN have been institutionalized, and there has been a strong regional integration process that links the two and makes them economically interdependent. Thus, as a

manifestation of the latter, the conflict is tilting toward a stable peace where war is very unlikely , rather than toward an unstable peace.

Economic ties will prevent conflict over the SCS.Galiano ‘11Emilia Galiano, m.a. candidate at Johns Hopkins university, “The People's Republic of China: an Alternative Model?”, BC Journal, June 11, http://bcjournal.org/volume-14/the-peoples-republic-of-china.html?printerFriendly=trueAccording to Mearsheimer, every great power aims at becoming a regional hegemon since this is the only condition that will guarantee its security.8 to be able to achieve this goal, states will develop their economic and military capabilities to the fullest possible extent. According to Mearsheimer: “In the anarchic world of international politics it is better to be godzilla than Bambi.”9 Both the United States and China would compete for regional hegemony in the Asia Pacific region, according to this view. Moreover, a future clash between them will be almost inevitable: China will pursue assertive policies to reform the system, while the united

States will aim for the maintenance of the status quo. Nevertheless, this perspective cannot account for the rising economic interdependence between these two countries , nor for the increasing disengagement of the United States from the region, and thus the increasing reliance on Japan and China in dealing with security issues in Asia-Pacific. The participation of China in the talks regarding the North Korean nuclear crisis is one

prominent example. Another perspective applied to the Chinese case is the balance of power theory, which forecasts that, given the insecurity of living in an anarchic environment and the presence of superior powers in the system, a country can choose between balancing or bandwagoning—that is, to look for reliable allies to counter the predominant countries in the system or side with the latter against the weakest.10 the predictions resulting from the application of this perspective to Asia would be as follows: on the one hand, China would balance the superior power of the united States, looking for allies in the region and upgrading its defense systems; on the other hand, as China rises, other countries, both in the region and in the global system, should increasingly balance Chinese rising power, if they feel it is a

threat. Nevertheless, these predictions can be countered by some arguments drawn from liberal theorists. Again,

the rising interdependence and cooperation between the united States and China cannot really be explained by the balancing theory : if China did seek to balance a more powerful America, which it saw as a threat, it would surely not engage in trade, finance its domestic debt, or cooperate on security issues. It is true that East Asian countries, especially Japan and South Korea, are balancing Chinese power and bandwagoning with the United States by modernizing their defense apparatuses and regularly

carrying out military exercises with American troops. Yet it is also true that these same countries have pursued economic cooperation, which leads to ever increasing economic flows in terms of trade and FDI, with a country they should perceive as threatening. This economic integration has led to the creation of a China-ASEAN free trade area, the Chiang Mai Initiative, and projects for a potentially wider free trade area that includes Japan and South Korea. Economic cooperation pursued both by the People’s Republic of China and other countries in the region has been accompanied by a cooperative attitude towards security issues and a moderate stance on territorial disputes on the part of all the parties involved.11 Although I do not want to spend too much time here describing the situation in the east and South China Seas, suffice it to say that governments are trying to avoid confrontational attitudes; some steps towards a resolution of the dispute have been taken, including the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in 2002 and a 2008 agreement on the joint exploration of the seabed near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Incidents are still

possible, however, as demonstrated by the recent issue concerning a Chinese fishing boat near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Balance of power theory, offensive realism, and hegemonic stability theory are insufficient to explain China’s behavior in the international arena and the responses of other stakeholders in the system. Put differently, this behavior would be explained only if one could assume that economic objectives can be separated from strategic and security issues. This assumption is not possible in a realist framework , in which economic

growth, security, and power are closely interrelated: in such a framework, economic integration is only possible if it does not lead to an excessive dependence, if it serves vital interests of the state, and if the trade partner is not perceived as a threat.12 relative gains from trade and security externalities arising from economic integration can help sustain this argument: on the one hand, countries will only engage in trade if the partner’s relative gains are not excessively high; on the other, trade will mainly occur between allies who will invest gains from trade in mutual security.13 taking either of these approaches, how can the rising economic ties binding countries in the Asian region and in the world to China be explained? If China is perceived as a threat because of its assertive interests, why are these countries not balancing the rising Chinese power by cutting these economic ties?14 Liberal theory could provide a

more moderate perspective: China has not pursued aggressive objectives because it has been integrated into the global economy. According to institutionalism, becoming part of international institutions and regimes facilitated cooperation and understanding with rival countries. This strand of liberalism considers that issues concerning anarchy and security can be overcome through cooperation, which is possible within international institutions where information is easier to acquire and

transaction costs are lower. Moreover, considering interdependence liberalism, greater economic interdependence would highly increase the costs of a possible conflict . Now that China’s economy is growing at double-digit rates thanks to huge flows of FDI and the exports of cheap, labor-intensive

goods, why would it try to disrupt and challenge the system? Economic growth also fosters the emergence of domestic social groups, who profit from economic reforms and greater openness and will favor even more liberalization and integration with the global economy. However, while liberals criticize realists by pointing out the importance of institutions and economic incentives resulting from increased integration, realists in turn criticize liberals as being too utopian and not seeing that China’s real intentions are aggressive in the long run. According to realist scholars, the supposed attitudinal change in China’s foreign policy is nothing but a “Charm offensive.”15 this last critique highlights the problematic fact that deciphering a country’s intentions is indeed difficult—the more so given that China in particular still has some strong territorial claims, feels victimized, and is ruled by a party seeking to legitimize itself internally, partly by drawing on nationalistic ideology. Moreover, it is important to note that at the regional level China is not really binding itself to a given set of values or procedures, as all the regional forums it participates in are discussion forums. This makes drawing conclusions about the efficacy of these institutions difficult. Before considering the last perspective, constructivism, I would like to summarize the issues treated up to this point by citing the opinion of a constructivist scholar.

Legro, in an article published in 2007, points out that both realism and liberalism are overly deterministic in that they do not leave room for considering the effects of unpredictable events.16 More than predicting future behavior, constructivists explain China’s present increased integration and moderate attitude within international organizations. They focus on the concept of socialization: China’s exposure

to Western values, decision-making processes, and behavioral procedures have completely changed the set of incentives the country faces. In the end, this is what “the ASEAN Way” is all about—integrating the People’s Republic of China in a regional framework, and thereby encouraging the country to share a set of common values and views regarding regional security and the promotion of economic development.17 Liberalization of its domestic economy and integration into the international system have indeed contributed to the development of new ideas regarding China’s foreign policy, such as the “new Security Concept” and the preference for multilateralism, in order to attain a common, comprehensive, and cooperative kind of security.18 Constructivism might seem appealing given its ability to explain why China has adopted a more moderate foreign policy stance, which is no longer guided by the exportation of Communist revolution, and why the countries in the region have not engaged in balancing behavior. Nevertheless, this perspective fails to deliver a comprehensive interpretation of China’s economic and security objectives. In particular, it fails to explain the prioritization of the

goal of economic growth, which is arguably the single most important determinant of the country’s foreign policy, both now and in the future. The prioritization of economic growth has been included in the CCP’s domestic agenda in order to ensure the country’s development and the party’s survival; it has not only produced an agenda of gradual domestic political reforms, but also a new attitude in the international arena— one guided by the need to ensure a stable and peaceful environment to allow for the country’s continued economic prosperity. This development can hardly be linked to a this is mainly concerned with international relations and how complex regimes, based on specific values, together with socialization dynamics can shape a country’s behavior. By focusing on the prioritization of economic objectives and the CCP’s survival, I am adopting a different level of analysis from one of nation-states as main actors to one that focuses on nation states as domestic actors and looks at their incentives and preferences. Such a change in the level of analysis allows perception into what makes

China’s foreign policy choices so unusual and not ascribable to any particular theory or perspective. It also introduces the next section about the domestic situation. The prioritization of economic development is linked to the lack of political reforms and the prospects of survival for the CCP.

Space Travel

1NC No SpaceHuman space travel is a pipe dreamReichhardt 14 - senior editor at Air & Space (Tony, “To Mars! (But Not the Way We’re Going)”, AirSpace Mag, 6-25-14, http://www.airspacemag.com/daily-planet/mars-not-way-were-going-180951855/)//KGNASA will need more money Without a significant boost in the space agency’s budget, we should forget about Mars, says the panel. Sending humans to the Red Planet will cost on the order of hundreds of billions of dollars , and even though this will be amortized over decades, the nation should be prepared to pay that cost. Americans should also understand that people will likely die carrying out such an ambitious mission. Spaceflight is popular, but only up to a point This wasn’t the typical committee of ex-NASA officials and aerospace engineers, repeating the same tired arguments. The panel included historians, economists (co-chair Mitch Daniels is a former head of the U.S. government budget office), and in Roger Tourangeau, one of the leading academic experts on public opinion. As a result, their analysis of public support for spaceflight goes far beyond counting Twitter followers and Facebook likes, or relying on quickie polls to show that people “like space.” Basically, Americans want a human spaceflight program, but it’s far from a priority. “At any given time, a relatively small proportion of the U.S. public pays close attention to space exploration,” the committee wrote. Furthermore, “most Americans do not favor increased spending on space exploration”—which seems a serious problem, given the need to increase NASA’s budget. But, said Daniels in a press briefing timed for the report’s release, this may not be a showstopper. If the public won’t demand more spending, neither is it likely to object if leaders invest more in space, especially if NASA can show tangible results. The United States can’t go it alone If NASA aims to send people to Mars, the program will have to be international, and other nations will have to contribute well above the amounts they’ve historically invested in human spaceflight. China should be included. NASA needs an overhaul NASA facilities that are obsolete or don’t contribute to the mission should be closed. (This, of course, requires wise management by Congress, whose political patronage sometimes keeps NASA programs alive beyond the point of usefulness.) If the report’s conclusions sound blunt, they’re meant to. As Daniels told reporters, “We recognize that many of our recommendations will be seen by many as unrealistic—to which we would only observe that, absent changes along the lines we are recommending, the goal of reaching Mars in any meaningful timeframe is itself unrealistic.” In fact, in discussing their recommendations, the panel members make a point of saying “if the nation wants to do this.” The clear implication is that we may well drop the baton, and that government-funded human spaceflight —on the scale of Apollo or even the International Space Station—will simply fizzle out. Failure is definitely an option. Either way, the Committee on Human Spaceflight has laid out our choices. From here on, we won’t need more reports on what to do in space. Those who control NASA’s future should just read this one, and follow its advice.

2NC No Space

Tons of reasons why space travel won’t happen anytime soon – technical issues, risk to astronaut health, and lack of necessity Watson 10 – writer for USA Today (Traci, “Obama plan to land on asteroid may be unrealistic for 2025”, USA Today, 6-21-10, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/science/space/2010-06-20-asteroid-obama-nasa-plan_N.htm)//KGThat doesn't mean it would be easy. Although experts agree it could be done, here are four asteroid-size reasons why life won't imitate art. •Astronauts can't hop on a space shuttle to get there. In Armageddon, Willis' character and his crew blast off in two modified space shuttles to reach the killer asteroid. But NASA has long planned to retire the shuttles within the next year. And even if they weren't all headed to museums, they're useless as asteroid transporters. The shuttles were built only to circle Earth, says Dan Adamo, a former mission control engineer who has studied human missions to asteroids. They don't carry the fuel to jump into deep space, and their heat shields aren't designed to withstand the extra-high temperatures of returning from a destination other than the Earth's orbit. What's needed instead is a giant rocket on the scale of the monstrous Saturn V — taller than Big Ben — that propelled man to the moon in the 1960s and 1970s. Such a project is "a difficult challenge" that will cost in the multiple billions of dollars, says Ray Colladay, a member of NASA's advisory council. NASA spent more than $52 billion in 2010 dollars to develop and build the Saturn V. Building a 21st-century version can be done but will require a sharp increase in the NASA budget later this decade, some space experts say. "That's the issue everybody wants to duck right now, because it's uncomfortable to face that," Colladay says. NASA would also need to build a spaceship where the astronauts can live and store all the oxygen, food and water needed for a long voyage. One option is to launch a small space pod carrying the crew, then, once safely in space, unleash an inflatable habitat, Leshin says. NASA has little practice with such a blow-up spacecraft. •The trip takes a long, long time. Willis and company arrive at their target asteroid in a few days, if not a few hours. Admittedly, it's streaking toward Earth at the time. NASA would prefer to go to one before it gets to that stage. Studies by Adamo, former astronaut Thomas Jones and others show that a round trip to a target asteroid would typically take five to six months. That assumes NASA shoots for one of the 40 or so asteroids that come closest to the Earth's path in the 2020s and 2030s and relies on spacecraft similar to those NASA had designed for Bush's moon mission. Another problem during the journey — the crew would spend months "cooking" in space radiation, says NASA's Dave Korsmeyer, who has compiled a list of the most accessible asteroids. Shuttle passengers are somewhat screened from such radiation by Earth's magnetic field. Astronauts who leave Earth's orbit have no such protection. Space radiation raises the risk of cancer and in extreme cases causes nausea and vomiting, says Walter Schimmerling, former program scientist of NASA's space radiation program. The astronauts might need to take drugs to prevent the ill effects of radiation. Then there's the "prolonged isolation and confinement" that the crew will have to endure, says Jason Kring of Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. "This crew will be more on their own than any other crew in history." If there's an emergency halfway into the trip, the astronauts would not be able to get home in a few days, as the Apollo 13 crew did. Instead it would take weeks, if not months. •Humans can't walk or drive on an asteroid. Once they land on the asteroid "the size of Texas," the heroes of Armageddon run over the spiky terrain, except when they're steering two tank-like vehicles. In reality, even the biggest asteroids have practically no gravity. So anything in contact with the surface could easily drift away. "You don't land on an asteroid," says former Apollo astronaut Rusty Schweickart, a longtime advocate of

asteroid studies. "You pull up to one and dock with it. ... And getting away from it, all you have to do is sneeze and you're gone." He envisions a spaceship hovering next to the asteroid and occasionally firing its thrusters to stay in place. Astronauts wouldn't walk on an asteroid. They would drift next to it, moving themselves along with their gloved hands. To keep from floating into space, crewmembers could anchor a network of safety ropes to the asteroid's surface, but "that has its own risks, because we don't understand how strong the surfaces of asteroids are and whether (they) would hold an astronaut in place," says Daniel Scheeres, a planetary scientist at the University of Colorado. The minimal gravity also means that any dust the astronauts stir up will hang in a suspended cloud for a long time. Because there's no weather on an asteroid, there's no erosion to smooth the dust particles. "It's all going to stay pretty razor-sharp. ... It's not the most friendly stuff in the universe," Korsmeyer says. Keeping humans safe as they explore an asteroid "is going to be really tricky." •Humanity doesn't hang in the balance. In Armageddon, NASA must send a crew to an asteroid or life on Earth will be wiped out. "Even the bacteria," says the NASA chief, played by Billy Bob Thornton. In the real world, that irrefutable motivation is absent. By 2025, Obama's target date, there will have been four presidential elections. Any could result in the mission's cancellation, just as Obama canceled Bush's moon plan. "The politics of this is far more challenging than the engineering," Colladay says. The Obama administration has promised to increase NASA's budget by $6 billion over the next five years, but priorities may change. The Bush administration, for example, in 2007 cut long-term funding for its own moon program by $1.2 billion. As the deficit looms larger, "especially as the November elections come along ... I would just not be surprised if enthusiasm for some big human spaceflight mission ends," says Marcia Smith, founder of spacepolicyonline.com. As it is, the extra $6 billion Obama has promised NASA is inadequate for all the tasks the agency is supposed to tackle, Jones says. "The declaration that we're going to deep space is not matched by budget reality," he says.

Terrorism (Conventional)

1NC No Terrorism ImpactNo terrorism—no linkages, experts, your evidence is alarmism, data, John Mueller political scientist at Ohio State and co-author of Terror, Security, and Money: Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of

Homeland Security “Has the threat from terrorism been exaggerated?” The Commentator 1/8/14 http://www.thecommentator.com/article/4579/has_the_threat_from_terrorism_be en_exaggerated

Two years after the raid on Osama bin Laden’s hideaway, terrorism alarmists remain in peak form explaining that

although al-Qaeda has been weakened it still manages to present a grave threat. Various well-honed techniques are

applied to support this contention. One is to espy and assess various “linkages” or “connections” of “ties” or “threads” between and

among a range of disparate terrorists or terrorist groups , most of which appear rather gossamer and of only limited consequence on closer examination . Another is to exaggerate the importance and effectiveness of the

“affiliated groups” linked to al-Qaeda central. In particular, alarmists point to the al-Qaeda affiliate in chaotic Yemen, ominously hailing it

as the “deadliest” and the “most aggressive” of these and a “major threat.” Yet its chief efforts at international terrorism have

failed abysmally : an underwear bomb and laser printer bombs on cargo planes. With that track record, the group may pose a problem or concern, but it scarcely presents a “major threat” outside of war zones. More generally, “al-Qaeda is its own worst enemy ,” as Robert Grenier, a former top CIA counterterrorism official, notes.

“Where they have succeeded initially, they very quickly discredit themselves.” Any terrorist threat within

the developed world seems even less impressive. The Boston terrorists of 2013 were the first in the United States since

9/11 in which Islamist terrorists actually were able to assemble and detonate bombs -- albeit very primitive ones . But

except for that, they do not seem to have been more competent than most of their predecessors. Amazingly,

they apparently thought they could somehow get away with their deed even though they chose to set their bombs off

at the most-photographed spot on the planet at the time. Moreover, they had no coherent plan of escape and, as commonly

found, no ability to explain how killing a few random people would advance their cause. While the scope of

the tragedy in Boston should not be minimized, it should also be noted that if the terrorists’ aim was to kill a large number of people, their bombs failed miserably . As recent cases in Colorado and Connecticut sadly demonstrate, far more fatalities have

been inflicted by gunmen. Before Boston, some 16 people had been killed by Islamist terrorists in the United States in the

years since 2001, and all of these were murdered by people who were essentially acting alone. By contrast, in the 1970s , organized terrorists inflicted hundreds of attacks, mostly bombings, in the United States, killing 72. As concern about organized attacks has diminished, fear of “lone wolf” attacks has grown in recent years, and one official assessment contends that “lone offenders currently present

the greatest threat.” This is a reasonable observation, but those concerned should keep in mind that, as analyst Max Abrahms has noted,

while lone wolves may be difficult to police, they have carried out only two of the 1,900 most deadly terrorist attacks over the last four decades . The key question, at least outside of war zones, is not, “are we safer?” but “how safe are we?” At

current rates, an American’s chance of becoming a victim of terrorism in the U.S., even with 9/11 in the calculation, is about 1 in 3.5 million per year . In comparison, that same American stands a 1 in 22,000 yearly chance of becoming

a homicide victim, a 1 in 8,000 chance of perishing in an auto accident, and a 1 in 500 chance of dying from cancer. These calculations are based, of course, on historical data . However, alarmists who would reject such history need to explain why they think terrorists will suddenly become vastly more competent in the future. But no one seems to be making that

argument. Indeed, notes one reporter, U.S. officials now say that al-Qaeda has become less capable of a large attack like 9/11. But she also says that they made this disclosure only on condition of anonymity out of fear that “publicly identifying themselves could

make them a target” of terrorists. In contrast, one terrorism specialist, Peter Bergen, has observed in heroic full attribution mode that,

“The last terror attack (in the West) was seven years ago in London,” that there “haven’t been any major attacks in the U.S. ,” and that “they are recruiting no-hopers and dead-enders.”

AT: Energy Terror

No impact to energy terror – reserves and diffuse productionMatthew Hulbert 11/26/12 (Lead Analyst for European Energy Review and consultant to numerous governments and institutional investors, most recently as Senior Research Fellow at Clingendael International Energy Programme, “A Terrorist Guide To Energy Carnage” http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewhulbert/2012/11/16/a-terrorist-guide-to-energy-carnage/)Well, the bad news for you guys is that you’re against the clock. This is a very hard time to be a terrorist with global

ambitions in the energy world. We’ve added 200bn barrels of potential reserves oil over the past few years from unconventional plays, with gas reserves believed to be up to 28, 0000 trillion cubic feet. Obviously what’s in the ground and what’s produced are two very different

things, but if oil and gas production increases, markets will not just become far more fungible and deep, but coming from every point on the compass . Resources are no longer the preserve of the Gulf, but span Latin America, East Africa, Australasia, Russia, the Caspian

and especially North America. You’ll have no clue what you should be blowing up, and more’s the point, it won’t have much impact if you do . You’ll merely highlight AQ’s increasing structural irrelevance to the energy world .

No impact and attacks inevitableMatthew Hulbert 11/26/12 (Lead Analyst for European Energy Review and consultant to numerous governments and institutional investors, most recently as Senior Research Fellow at Clingendael International Energy Programme, “A Terrorist Guide To Energy Carnage” http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewhulbert/2012/11/16/a-terrorist-guide-to-energy-carnage/)If that’s the threat, then fear not NATO, the actual risk of it happening isn’t nearly so grim. Obviously if AQ managed

to pull any of this off the impacts would be profound, but capabilities appear down, and imagination, limited. Saudi Arabia and Qatar both take hydrocarbon security very seriously (at least against perceived external threats), and the U.S. 5th fleet maintains a strong presence off Bahrain. European naval deployments over in the Gulf of Aden could also quickly shift geographical focus if needed. Do keep tabs on it, but you need to think more broadly about what role you can play on day to day terrorist problems. Global jihad is

the flashy end of the business, but local insurgency gripes tend to be the standard fayre.¶ Now, don’t get us wrong, the ‘energy security experts’ who think every bomb and minor attack on pipelines in strange places matter couldn’t be more wrong.

The market has already priced it in – be it in Yemen, Iraq – or Sudan. Sure, ‘stranded’ energy isn’t free, but neither is security provision. Everything you do should be based on cost-benefit analysis, accepting you can’t lock down every piece of energy infrastructure (not even close), and

accept that the commercial energy world is exclusively predicated on a risk vs. reward basis. That means being bright – very bright – about locating where insurgency strikes actually matter for market and political dynamics to be of genuine use.

Terrorism (Nuclear)

1NC No Nuke Terror

No risk of nuclear terrorism – technically impossibleMichael, 12 (Professor Nuclear Counterprolif and Deterrence at Air Force Counterprolif Center, ’12 (George, March, “Strategic Nuclear Terrorism and the Risk of State Decapitation” Defence Studies, Vol 12 Issue 1, p 67-105, T&F Online)Despite the alarming prospect of nuclear terrorism, the obstacles to obtaining such capabilities are formidable . There are several pathways that terrorists could take to acquire a nuclear device. Seizing an intact nuclear weapon would be the most direct method. However,

neither nuclear weapons n or nuclear tech nology has prolif erat ed to the degree that some observers once feared. Although nuclear weapons have been around for over 65 years, the so-called nuclear club stands at only nine members. 72 Terrorists could attempt to purloin a weapon

from a nuclear stockpile; however, absconding with a nuclear weapon would be problematical because of tight security measures at installations.¶ Alternatively, a terrorist group could attempt to acquire a bomb through an illicit transaction, but there is no real well-developed black market for illicit nuclear materials . Still, the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons around the world presents the risk of theft and diversion. 73 In 1997, the Russian General, Alexander Lebed, alleged that 84 ‘suitcase’ bombs were missing from the Russian military arsenal, but later recanted his statements. 74 American officials generally remain unconvinced of Lebed’s story insofar as they were never mentioned in any Soviet war plans.

75 Presumably, the financial requirements for a transaction involving nuclear weapons wo uld be very high , as states have spent millions and billions of dollars to obtain their arsenals . 76 Furthermore, transferring such sums of money could raise red flags , which would present opportunities for authorities to uncover the plot .

When pursuing nuclear transactions, terrorist groups would be vulnerable to sting operations. 77¶ Even if terrorists acquired an intact nuclear weapon, the group would still have to bypass or defeat various safeguards, such as permissive action links (PALs) , and safing, arming, fusing, and firing (SAFF ) procedures . Both US and Russian nuclear weapons are outfitted with complicated physical and electronic locking mechanisms . 78 Nuclear weapons in other countries are usually stored partially disassembled, which would make purloining a fully functional weapon very challenging. 79¶ Failing to acquire a nuclear weapon, a terrorist group could endeavor to fabricate its own Improvised Nuclear Device (IND). For years, the US government has explored the possibility of a clandestine group fabricating a nuclear weapon. The so-called Nth Country Experiment examined the technical problems facing a nation that endeavored to build a small stockpile of nuclear weapons. Launched in 1964, the experiment sought to determine whether a minimal team –in this case, two young American physicists with PhDs and without nuclear-weapons design knowledge –could design a workable nuclear weapon with a militarily significant yield. After three man-years of effort, the two novices succeeded in a hypothetical test of their device. 80 In 1977, the US Office of Technology Assessment concluded that a small terrorist group could develop and detonate a crude nuclear device without access to classified material and without access to a great deal of technological equipment. Modest machine shop facilities could be contracted for purposes of constructing the device. 81¶ Numerous experts

have weighed in on the workability of constructing an IND. Hans Bethe, the Nobel laureate who worked on the Manhattan Project, once calculated that a minimum of six highly-trained persons representing the right expertise would be required to fabricate a nuclear device. 82 A hypothetical scenario developed by Peter Zimmerman, a former chief scientist for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Jeffrey G. Lewis, the former executive director of the Managing the Atom Project at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs,

concluded that a team of 19 persons could build a nuclear device in the United States for about $10 million. 83¶ The most crucial step in the IND pathway is acquiring enough fissile material for the weapon . According to some estimates, roughly 25 kilo gram s of weapons- grade uranium or 8 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium would be required to support a self- sustaining fission chain reaction. 84 It would be virtually impossible for a terrorist group to create its own fissile material. Enriching uranium, or producing plutonium in a nuclear reactor, is far beyond the scope of any terrorist organization. 85 However, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which maintains a database, confirmed 1,562 incidents

of smuggling encompassing trade in nuclear materials or radioactive sources. Fifteen incidents involved HEU or plutonium. 86 Be that as it may, according to the IAEA, the total of all known thefts of HEU around the world between 1993 and 2006 a mounted to less than eight kilo gram s , far short of the estimated minimum 25 kilograms necessary for a crude improvised nuclear device. 87 An amount of fissile material adequate for a workable nuclear device would be difficult to procure from one source or in one transaction. However, terrorists could settle on less demanding standards. According to an article in Scientific American, a nuclear device could be fabricated with as little as 60 kilograms of HEU (defined as concentrated to levels of 20 percent for more of the uranium 235 isotope). 88 Although enriching uranium is well nigh impossible for terrorist groups, approximately 1,800 tons of HEU was created during the Cold War, mostly by the United States and the Soviet Union. 89 Collective efforts, such as the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, the G-8 Partnership against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, have done much to secure nuclear weapons and fissile materials, but the job is far from complete. 90 And other problems are on the horizon. For instance, the number of nuclear reactors is projected to double by the end of the century, though many, if not most, will be fueled with low-enriched uranium (LEU). With this development, comes the risk of diversion as HEU and plutonium stockpiles will be plentiful in civilian sectors. 91¶ Plutonium is more available around the world than HEU and smuggling plutonium would be

relatively easy insofar as it commonly comes in two-pound bars or gravel-like pellets. 92 Constructing an IND from plutonium, though, would be much more challenging insofar as it would require the more sophisticated implosion-style design that

would require highly trained engineers working in well-equipped labs . 93 But, if an implosion device does not detonate precisely as intended, then it would probably be more akin to a radiological dispersion device, rather than a mushroom. Theoretically, plutonium could be used in a gun-assembly weapon, but the detonation would probably result in an unimpressive fizzle, rather than a substantial explosion with a yield no greater than 10 to 20 tons of TNT, which would still be much greater than one

from a conventional explosive. 94¶ But even assuming that fissile material could be acquired, the terrorist group would still need the technical expertise to complete the required steps to assemble a nuclear device . Most experts believe that constructing a gun-assembly weapon would pose no significant technological barriers. 95 Luis Alvarez once asserted that a fairly high-level nuclear explosion could be occasioned

just by dropping one piece of weapons-grade uranium onto another. He may, however, have exaggerated the ease with which terrorists could fabricate a nuclear device. 96¶ In sum, the hurdles that a terrorist group would have to overcome to build or acquire a nuclear bomb are very high . If states that aspire to obtain nuclear capability face serious difficulties, it would follow that it would be even more challenging for terrorist groups with far few er resources and a without a secure geographic area in which to undertake such a project . The difficulty of developing a viable nuclear weapon is illustrated by the case of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, which after 20 years of effort and over ten billion dollars spent, failed to produce a functional bomb by the time the country was defeated in the 1991 Gulf War. 97 Nevertheless, the quality of a nuclear device for a non-state entity would presumably be much lower as it would not be necessary to meet the same quality standards of states when fabricating their nuclear weapons. Nor would

the device have to be weaponized and mated with a delivery system.¶ In order to be successful, terrorists must succeed at each stage of the plot . With clandestine activities, the probability of security leaks increases with the number of persons involved. 98 The plot would require not only highly competent technicians, but also unflinching loyalty and discipline from the participants. A strong central authority would be necessary to coordinate the numerous operatives involved in the acquisition and delivery of the weapon. Substantial funding to procure the materials with which to build a bomb would be necessary, unless a weapon was conveyed to the group by a state or some criminal entity. 99 Finally, a network of competent and dedicated operatives would be required to arrange the transport of the weapon across national borders without detection, which could be challenging considering heightened security measures, including gamma ray detectors. 100

Such a combination of steps spread throughout each stage of the plot would be daunting. 101¶ As Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier once pointed out, in setting the parameters of nuclear terrorism, the laws of physics are both kind and cruel. In a sense, they are kind insofar as the essential ingredients for a bomb are very difficult to produce . However, they are also cruel in the sense that while it is not easy to make a nuclear bomb, it is not as difficult as believed once the essential ingredients are in hand. 102 Furthermore, as more and more countries undergo industrialization concomitant with the diffusion of technology and expertise, the hurdles for acquiring these ingredients are now more likely to be surmounted, though HEU is still hard to procure illicitly. In a global economy, dual-use technologies circulate around the world along with the scientific personnel who design and use them. 103 And although both the US and Russian governments have substantially reduced their arsenals since the end of the Cold War, many warheads remain. 104 Consequently, there are still many nuclear weapons that could fall into the wrong hands.

2NC No Nuke Terror

No risk of WMD terrorism – don’t have the resources or focusMueller and Stewart, 12 (Professor PolSci Ohio State, and Stewart, Professor Infrastructure Performance at U of Newcastle, ’12, John- Senior Research Scientist Mershon Center for International Security Studies, Mark- Australian Research Council Professorial Fellow, Summer, “The Terrorism Delusion: America’s Overwrought Response to September 11” International Security, Vol 37 No 1, ProjectMuse)Few of the sleepless, it seems, found much solace in the fact that an al-Qaida computer seized in Afghanistan in 2001 indicated

that the group’s budget for research on w eapons of m ass d estruction (almost all of it focused on primitive chemical

weapons work) was $2,000 to $4,000.49 In the wake of the killing of Osama bin Laden, officials now have many more al-Qaida computers, and nothing in their content appears to suggest that the group had the time or inclination , let alone the money, to set up and staff a uranium-seizing operation , as well as a fancy, super- high- tech nology facility to fabricate a bomb . This is a process that requires trusting corrupted foreign collaborators and other criminals, obtaining and transporting highly guarded material , setting up a machine shop staffed with top scientists and technicians, and rolling the heavy, cumbersome, and untested finished product in to position to be detonated by a skilled crew —all while attracting no attention from outsiders .50¶ If the miscreants in the American cases have been unable to create and set off even the simplest conventional bombs, it stands to reason that none of them were very close to creating , or having anything to do with, nuclear weapons —or for that matter biological, radiological, or chemical ones. In fact, with perhaps one exception, none seems to have even dreamed of the prospect ; and the exception is

José Padilla (case 2), who apparently mused at one point about creating a dirty bomb—a device that would disperse radiation—or even possibly an atomic one. His idea about isotope separation was to put uranium into a pail and then to make himself into a human centrifuge by swinging the pail around in great arcs.51 [End

Page 98]¶ Even if a weapon were made abroad and then brought in to the U nited S tates, its detonation would require individuals in-country with the capacity to receive and handle the complicated weapons and then to set them off . Thus far, the talent pool appears , to put mildly, very thin.

Theoretical possibilities are irrelevant – there are too many difficult steps which make it functionally impossible Chapman 12 (Stephen, editorial writer for Chicago Tribune, “CHAPMAN: Nuclear terrorism unlikely,” May 22, http://www.oaoa.com/articles/chapman-87719-nuclear-terrorism.html)A layperson may figure it’s only a matter of time before the unimaginable comes to pass. Harvard’s Graham Allison, in his book “Nuclear Terrorism,” concludes, “On

the current course, nuclear terrorism is inevitable.” But remember: Afxter Sept. 11, 2001, we all thought more attacks were a certainty. Yet al-Qaida and its ideological kin have proved unable to mount a second strike. Given their inability to do something simple — say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb — it’s reasonable to ask whether they have a chance at something much more ambitious . Far from being plausible, argued Ohio State University

professor John Mueller in a presentation at the University of Chicago, “the likelihood that a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small.” The events required to make that happen comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile material , perhaps from Russia’s inventory of

decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would have already gone missing. Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not maintained quickly become what one expert calls “radioactive scrap metal.” If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally

— for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some

government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. Then comes the task of building a bomb. It’s not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced equipment — plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause. Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil .

Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time — but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. This , like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know what’s going on ,

multiplying the chance someone will blab , back out or screw up . That has heartening implications. If al-Qaida embarks on the

project, it has only a minuscule chance of seeing it bear fruit. Given the formidable odds, it probably won’t bother . None of this means we should stop trying to minimize the risk by securing nuclear stockpiles, monitoring terrorist communications and improving port screening. But it offers good

reason to think that in this war, it appears, the worst eventuality is one that will never happen.

Warming

1NC No Warming Impact

Warming inevitable and doesn’t cause extinction Ridley 6/19/14, (Matt Ridley is the author of The Rational Optimist, a columnist for the Times (London) and a member of the House of Lords. He spoke at Ideacity in Toronto on June 18., “PCC commissioned models to see if global warming would reach dangerous levels this century. Consensus is ‘no’” , [ http://tinyurl.com/mgyn8ln ] , //hss-RJ)The debate over climate change is horribly polarized. From the way it is conducted, you would think that only two positions are possible: that the whole thing is a hoax or that catastrophe is inevitable. In fact there is room for lots of intermediate positions, including the view I hold, which is that man-made climate change is real but not likely to do much harm, let alone prove to be the greatest crisis facing humankind this century. After more than 25 years reporting and commenting on this topic for various media organizations, and having started out alarmed, that’s where I have ended up. But it is not just I that hold this view. I share it with a very large international organization, sponsored by the United Nations and supported by virtually all the world’s governments: the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ( IPCC) itself. The IPCC commissioned four different models of what might happen to the world economy, society and technology in the 21st century and what each would mean for the climate, given a certain assumption about the atmosphere’s “sensitivity” to carbon dioxide. Three of the models show a moderate, slow and mild warming, the hottest of which leaves the planet just 2 degrees Centigrade warmer than today in 2081-2100. The coolest comes out just 0.8 degrees warmer. Now two degrees is the threshold at which warming starts to turn dangerous, according to the scientific consensus. That is to say, in three of the four scenarios considered by the IPCC , by the time my children’s children are elderly, the earth will still not have experienced any harmful warming , let alone catastrophe. But what about the fourth scenario? This is known as RCP8.5, and it produces 3.5 degrees of warming in 2081-2100. Curious to know what assumptions lay behind this model, I decided to look up the original papers describing the creation of this scenario. Frankly, I was gobsmacked. It is a world that is very, very implausible. For a start, this is a world of “continuously increasing global population ” so that there are 12 billion on the planet. This is more than a billion more than the United Nations expects, and flies in the face of the fact that the world population growth rate has been falling for 50 years and is on course to reach zero – i.e., stable population – in around 2070. More people mean more emissions. Second, the world is assumed in the RCP8.5 scenario to be burning an astonishing 10 times as much coal as today, producing 50% of its primary energy from coal, compared with about 30% today. Indeed, because oil is assumed to have become scarce, a lot of liquid fuel would then be derived from coal. Nuclear and renewable technologies contribute little, because of a “slow pace of innovation” and hence “fossil fuel technologies continue to dominate the primary energy portfolio over the entire time horizon of the RCP8.5 scenario.” Energy efficiency has improved very little. These are highly unlikely assumptions. With abundant natural gas displacing coal on a huge scale in the United States today, with the price of solar power plummeting, with nuclear power experiencing a revival, with gigantic methane-hydrate gas resources being discovered on the seabed, with energy efficiency rocketing upwards, and with population growth rates continuing to fall fast in virtually every country in the world, the one thing we can say about RCP8.5 is that it is very, very implausible. Notice, however, that even so, it is not a world of catastrophic pain. The per capita income of the average human being in 2100 is three times what it is now. Poverty would be history. So it’s hardly Armageddon . But there’s an even more startling fact. We now have many different studies of

climate sensitivity based on observational data and they all converge on the conclusion that it is much lower than assumed by the IPCC in these models. It has to be, otherwise global temperatures would have risen much faster than they have over the past 50 years. As Ross McKitrick noted on this page earlier this week, temperatures have not risen at all now for more than 17 years. With these much more realistic estimates of sensitivity (known as “transient climate response”), even RCP8.5 cannot produce dangerous warming. It manages just 2.1C of warming by 2081-2100. That is to say, even if you pile crazy assumption upon crazy assumption till you have an edifice of vanishingly small probability, you cannot even manage to make climate change cause minor damage in the time of our grandchildren, let alone catastrophe. That’s not me saying this – it’s the IPCC itself. But what strikes me as truly fascinating about these scenarios is that they tell us that globalization, innovation and economic growth are unambiguously good for the environment. At the other end of the scale from RCP8.5 is a much more cheerful scenario called RCP2.6. In this happy world, climate change is not a problem at all in 2100, because carbon dioxide emissions have plummeted thanks to the rapid development of cheap nuclear and solar, plus a surge in energy efficiency. The RCP2.6 world is much, much richer. The average person has an income about 15 times today’s in real terms, so that most people are far richer than Americans are today. And it achieves this by free trade, massive globalization, and lots of investment in new technology. All the things the green movement keeps saying it opposes because they will wreck the planet. The answer to climate change is, and always has been, innovation. To worry now in 2014 about a very small, highly implausible set of circumstances in 2100 that just might, if climate sensitivity is much higher than the evidence suggests, produce a marginal damage to the world economy, makes no sense. Think of all the innovation that happened between 1914 and 2000. Do we really think there will be less in this century? As for how to deal with that small risk, well there are several possible options. You could encourage innovation and trade. You could put a modest but growing tax on carbon to nudge innovators in the right direction. You could offer prizes for low-carbon technologies. All of these might make a little sense. But the one thing you should not do is pour public subsidy into supporting old-fashioned existing technologies that produce more carbon dioxide per unit of energy even than coal (bio-energy), or into ones that produce expensive energy (existing solar), or that have very low energy density and so require huge areas of land (wind). The IPCC produced two reports last year. One said that the cost of climate change is likely to be less than 2% of GDP by the end of this century. The other said that the cost of decarbonizing the world economy with renewable energy is likely to be 4% of GDP. Why do something that you know will do more harm than good?

Asia pollution offsets any US action – global warming is inevitableKnappenberger 12 – Mr. Paul Knappenberger is the Assistant Director of the Cato Institute’s Center for the Study of Science. He holds an M.S. degree in Environmental Sciences (1990) from the University of Virginia as well as a B.A. degree in Environmental Sciences (1986) from the same institution.His over 20 years of experience as a climate researcher have included 10 years with the Virginia State Climatology Office and 13 years with New Hope Environmental Services, Inc. June 7th, 2012, "Asian Air Pollution Warms U.S More than Our GHG Emissions (More futility for U.S. EPA)" www.masterresource.org/2012/06/asian-air-pollution-warming/“The whims of foreign nations, not to mention Mother Nature, can completely offset any climate changes induced by U.S. greenhouse gas

emissions reductions…. So, what’s the point of forcing Americans into different energy choices?”¶ A new study provides evidence that air pollution emanating from Asia will warm the U.S. as much or more than warming from U.S. greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The implication? Efforts by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (and otherwise) to mitigate anthropogenic climate change is moot . ¶ If the future temperature rise in the U.S. is subject to the whims of Asian environmental and energy policy, then what sense does it make for Americans to have their energy choices regulated by efforts aimed at mitigating future temperature increases across the country—efforts which will have less of an impact on temperatures than the policies enacted across Asia?¶ Maybe the EPA should reconsider the perceived effectiveness of its greenhouse gas emission regulations —at least when it comes to impacting temperatures across the U.S.¶ New Study¶ A new study just published in the scientific journal Geophysical Research Letters is authored by a team led by Haiyan Teng from the National Center for Atmospheric Research, in Boulder, Colorado. The paper is titled “Potential Impacts of Asian Carbon Aerosols on Future US Warming.”¶ Skipping the details of this climate modeling study and cutting to the chase, here is

the abstract of the paper:¶ This study uses an atmosphere-ocean fully coupled climate model to investigate possible remote impacts of Asian carbonaceous aerosols on US climate change. We took a 21st century mitigation scenario as a reference, and carried out three sets of sensitivity experiments in which the prescribed carbonaceous aerosol concentrations over

a selected Asian domain are increased by a factor of two, six, and ten respectively during the period of 2005–2024.¶ The resulting enhancement of atmospheric solar absorption (only the direct effect of aerosols is included) over Asia induces tropospheric heating anomalies that force large-scale circulation changes which, averaged over the twenty-year period, add as much as an additional 0.4°C warming over the eastern US during winter and over most of the US during summer. Such remote impacts are confirmed by an atmosphere stand-alone experiment with specified heating anomalies over Asia that represent the direct effect of the carbon aerosols.¶ Usually, when considering the climate impact from carbon aerosol emissions (primarily in the form of black

carbon, or soot), the effect is thought to be largely contained to the local or regional scale because the atmospheric lifetime of these particulates is only on the order of a week (before they are rained out). Since Asia lies on the far side of the Pacific Ocean—a distance which requires about a week for air masses to navigate—we usually aren’t overly concerned about the quality of Asian air or the

quantity of junk that they emit into it. By the time it gets here, it has largely been naturally scrubbed clean.¶ But in the Teng et al. study, the

authors find that, according to their climate model, the local heating of the atmosphere by the Asian carbon aerosols (which are quite good at absorbing sunlight) can impart changes to the character of the larger-scale atmospheric circulation patterns . And these changes to the broader atmospheric flow produce an effect on the weather patterns in the U.S. and thus induce a change in the climate here characterized by “0.4°C [surface air temperature] warming on average over the eastern US during winter and over almost the entire US during summer” averaged over the 2005–2024 period.¶ While most of the summer warming doesn’t start to kick in until Asian carbonaceous aerosol emissions are upped in the model to 10 times what they are today, the winter warming over the eastern half of the country is large (several tenths of a °C) even at twice the current rate of Asian emissions.¶ Now let’s revisit just how much “global warming” that stringent U.S. greenhouse gas emissions reductions may avoid averaged across the country.¶ In my Master Resource post “Climate Impacts of Waxman-Markey (the IPCC-based arithmetic of no gain)” I

calculated that a more than 80% reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S. by the year 2050 would result in a reduction of global temperatures (from where they otherwise would be) of about 0.05°C. Since the U.S. is projected to warm slightly more than the global average (land warms faster than the oceans), a 0.05°C of global temperature reduction probably amounts to about 0.075°C of temperature “savings” averaged across the U.S., by the year 2050.¶ Comparing the amount of warming in the U.S. saved by reducing our greenhouse gas emissions by some 80% to the amount of warming added in the U.S. by increases in Asian black carbon (soot) aerosol emissions (at least according to Teng et al.) and there is no clear winner. Which points out the anemic effect that U.S. greenhouse gas reductions will have on the climate of the U.S. and just how easily the whims of foreign nations, not to mention Mother Nature, can completely offset any climate changes induced by our greenhouse gas emissions reductions.¶ And even if the traditional form of air pollution (e.g., soot) does not increase across Asia (a slim chance of that), greenhouse

gases emitted there certainly will. For example, at the current growth rate, new greenhouse gas emissions from China will completely subsume an 80% reduction in U.S. greenhouse gas emission in just over a decade. Once again, pointing out that a reduction in domestic greenhouse gases is for naught, at least when it comes to mitigating climate change.¶ So, what’s the

point, really, of forcing Americans into different energy choices? As I have repeatedly pointed out, nothing we do here (when it comes to greenhouse gas emissions) will make any difference either domestically, or globally, when it comes to influences on the climate. What the powers-that-be behind emissions reduction schemes in the U.S. are hoping for is that 1) it doesn’t hurt us too much, and 2) that China and other large developing nations will follow our lead.¶ Both outcomes seem dubious at time scales that make a difference.

No impact – warming promotes plant growth and species can adapt, IPCC exaggerates Carter et al. 14, Dr. Craig D. Idso is founder and chairman of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change. Since 1998, he has been the editor and chief contributor to the online magazine CO2 Science. He is the author of several books, including The Many Benefits of Atmospheric CO2 Enrichment (2011) and CO2 , Global Warming and Coral Reefs (2009). He earned a Ph.D. in geography from Arizona State University (ASU), where he lectured in meteorology and was a faculty researcher in the Office of Climatology. Dr. Sherwood B. Idso is president of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change. Previously he was a Research Physicist

with the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Agricultural Research Service at the U.S. Water Conservation Laboratory in Phoenix, Arizona. He is the author or co-author of over 500 scientific publications including the books Carbon Dioxide: Friend or Foe? (1982) and Carbon Dioxide and Global Change: Earth in Transition (1989). He served as an Adjunct Professor in the Departments of Geology, Geography, and Botany and Microbiology at Arizona State University. He earned a Ph.D. in soil science from the University of Minnesota. Dr. Robert M. Carter is a stratigrapher and marine geologist with degrees from the University of Otago (New Zealand) and University of Cambridge (England). He is the author of Climate: The Counter Consensus (2010) and Taxing Air: Facts and Fallacies About Climate Change (2013). Carter's professional service includes terms as head of the Geology Department, James Cook University, chairman of the Earth Sciences Panel of the Australian Research Council, chairman of the national Marine Science and Technologies Committee, and director of the Australian Office of the Ocean Drilling Program. He is currently an Emeritus Fellow of the Institute of Public Affairs (Melbourne). Dr. S. Fred Singer is one of the most distinguished atmospheric physicists in the U.S. He established and served as the first director of the U.S. Weather Satellite Service, now part of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and earned a U.S. Department of Commerce Gold Medal Award for his technical leadership. He is coauthor, with Dennis T. Avery, of Unstoppable Global Warming Every 1,500 Years (2007, second ed. 2008) and many other books. Dr. Singer served as professor of environmental sciences at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA (1971-94), and is founder and chairman of the nonprofit Science and Environmental Policy Project. He earned a Ph.D. in physics from Princeton University. Barnes, David J. Australian Institute of Marine Science (retired) Australia Botkin, Daniel B. University of Miami University of California Santa Barbara USA Cloyd, Raymond A. Kansas State University USA Crockford, Susan University of Victoria, B.C. Canada Cui, Weihong Chinese Academy of Sciences China DeGroot, Kees Shell International (retired) The Netherlands Dillon, Robert G. Physician USA Dunn, John Dale Physician USA Ellestad, Ole Henrik Research Council of Norway (retired) Norway Goldberg, Fred Swedish Polar Institute Sweden Goldman, Barry Australian Museum Lizard Island Research Station (retired) Australia Hoese, H. Dickson Consulting Marine Biologist USA Jødal, Morten Independent Scientist Norway Khandekar, Madhav Environment Canada (retired) Canada Kutilek, Miroslav Czech Technical University (emeritus) Czech Republic Leavitt, Steven W. University of Arizona Laboratory of Tree-Ring Research USA Maccabee, Howard Doctors for Disaster Preparedness USA Marohasy, Jennifer Central Queensland University Australia Ollier, Cliff University of Western Australia Australia Petch, Jim University of Manchester Trican Manchester Metropolitan University (retired) United Kingdom Reginato, Robert J. Agricultural Research Service U.S. Department of Agriculture USA Reiter, Paul Laboratoire Insectes et Maladies Infectieuses Institut Pasteur France Segalstad, Tom Resource and Environmental Geology University of Oslo Norway Sharp, Gary Independent Consultant Center for Climate/ Ocean Resources Study USA Starck, Walter Independent Marine Biologist Australia Stockwell, David Central Queensland University Australia Taylor, Mitchell Lakehead University Canada Weber, Gerd Independent Meteorologist Germany Wilson, Bastow University of Otago New Zealand Wust, Raphael James Cook University Australia, (“Climate Change Reconsidered II: Biological Impacts”, http://www.nipccreport.org/reports/ccr2b/pdf/Summary-for-Policymakers.pdf, 3/31/2014) Kerwin5. Impact on Terrestrial Animals IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report claimed “new evidence suggests that climate-driven extinctions and range retractions are already widespread” and the “projected impacts on biodiversity are significant and of key relevance, since global losses in biodiversity are irreversible (very high confidence)” (IPCC, 2007). However, as shown in the first volume of the Climate Change Reconsidered II series, Physical Science, there is a growing divide between IPCC’s climate model simulations and real-world observations of global warmth. The species-modeling research IPCC almost exclusively relies on to make these predictions depends on climate models known to exaggerate future global warming and extreme weather events. Even assuming IPCC climate models were unbiased and reasonably accurate at regional scales, the “climate envelope” models used by IPCC are deeply flawed due to assumptions about the immobility of species that are routinely contradicted by real-world observations. IPCC also improperly characterizes the adaptive responses (e.g., range shifts, phenotypic or genetic adaptations) of many species as supporting their model-based extinction claims, when in reality such adaptive responses provide documentary evidence of species resilience. Chapter 5 begins with a review and analysis of IPCC-based species extinction claims, highlighting many of the problems inherent in the models on which such claims are based. The model projections are then evaluated against real-world observations of various animal species and their response to what IPCC has called the unprecedented rise in atmospheric CO2 and temperature of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Results of that evaluation reveal that although there likely will be some changes in species population dynamics, few (if any) likely will be driven even close to extinction . In a number of instances, real-world data indicate warmer temperatures and higher atmospheric CO2 concentrations will be highly beneficial , favor ing a proliferation of species . IPCC continues to ignore such positive externalities of rising temperature and atmospheric CO2. Key findings from Chapter 5 appear in Figure 8. 6. Impact on Aquatic Life IPCC postulates that human interference in the climate will significantly harm aquatic life by causing temperatures of the world’s water bodies to rise and through the absorption of CO2 from the atmosphere into water, thereby lowering the pH of

freshwater and ocean water (a process referred to as “acidification”). In both scenarios, IPCC projects marine and freshwater species will be negatively impacted and will experience future declines, which, in some instances, may be so severe as to cause species extinctions. In contrast, the material presented in Chapter 6, representing the findings of hundreds of peerreviewed research analyses, suggests a much better future is in store for Earth’s aquatic life. Many laboratory and field studies demonstrate growth and developmental improvements in response to higher temperatures and reduced water pH levels . Other research illustrates the capability of both marine and freshwater species to tolerate and adapt to the rising temperature and pH decline of the planet’s water bodies. When these observations are considered, the pessimistic projections of IPCC give way to considerable optimism with respect to the future of the planet’s marine life. The key findings of this chapter, which challenge the alarming and negative projections of IPCC, are presented in Figure 10. 7. Impact on Human Health Carbon dioxide ( CO2) is invisible, odorless, nontoxic, and does not seriously affect human health until the CO2 content of the air reaches approximately 15,000 ppm, more than 37 times greater than the current concentration of atmospheric CO2 (Luft et al., 1974). There is no reason to be concerned about any direct adverse human health consequences of the ongoing rise in the air’s CO2 content now or in the future, as even extreme model projections do not indicate anthropogenic activities will raise the air’s CO2 concentration above 1,000 to 2,000 ppm. Nevertheless, IPCC contends rising CO2 concentrations are causing several indirect threats to human health, which they project will worsen as the air’s CO2 concentration rises in the future. In a draft Technical Summary of its upcoming report, Working Group II claims, “The health of human populations is sensitive to shifts in weather patterns and other aspects of climate change [very high confidence] and “There is emerging evidence of non-linearities in response (such as greater-thanexpected mortality due to heat waves) as climates become more extreme” (IPCC, 2013b). Research reviewed in CCR-IIb, however, shows IPCC’s view of the impacts of rising temperatures and atmospheric CO2 on human health is simply wrong. Numerous peer-reviewed studies demonstrate a warmer planet is beneficial to humanity, as warmer temperatures in all parts of the world lead to decreases in temperature- related mortality . The key findings of this chapter are presented in Figure 11. The medical literature shows warmer temperatures and a smaller difference between daily high and low temperatures, as occurred during the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, reduce mortality rates due to cardiovascular and respiratory disease and stroke occurrence . Similarly, the research is quite clear that climate has exerted only a minimal influence on recent trends in vector-borne diseases such as malaria, dengue fever, and tick-borne diseases. Other factors, many of them related to economic and technological setbacks or progress and not to weather, are far more important in determining the transmission and prevalence of such diseases. Finally, and perhaps surprisingly, IPCC entirely overlooks the positive effects of rising levels of atmospheric CO2 on human health. Carbon dioxide fertilization has been shown to enhance certain health-promoting substances in plants , such as antioxidants, vitamin C, and fatty acids, and promote the growth of plants such as St. John’s wort used for the treatment of a variety of illnesses. In this way, global warming portends great health benefits for humans. IPCC makes no mention of these benefits.

2NC No Warming Impact

No impact – warming will take centuries and adaptation solvesMendelsohn 9 – Robert O. Mendelsohn 9, the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and Economic Growth,” online: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdfThese statements are largely alarmist and misleading . Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention,

society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences . The science and economics of climate change is quite clear that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences . The severe impacts predicted by alarmists require a century (or two in the case of Stern 2006) of no mitigation . Many of the predicted impacts assume there will be no or little adaptation. The net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be small regardless. Most of the more severe impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold and many of these “potential ” impacts will never occur because people will adapt. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long ‐ range climate risks . What is needed are long‐run balanced responses.

Warming rates are slowing and it’s not anthropogenicCarter et al. 14, Dr. Craig D. Idso is founder and chairman of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change. Since 1998, he has been the editor and chief contributor to the online magazine CO2 Science. He is the author of several books, including The Many Benefits of Atmospheric CO2 Enrichment (2011) and CO2 , Global Warming and Coral Reefs (2009). He earned a Ph.D. in geography from Arizona State University (ASU), where he lectured in meteorology and was a faculty researcher in the Office of Climatology. Dr. Sherwood B. Idso is president of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change. Previously he was a Research Physicist with the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Agricultural Research Service at the U.S. Water Conservation Laboratory in Phoenix, Arizona. He is the author or co-author of over 500 scientific publications including the books Carbon Dioxide: Friend or Foe? (1982) and Carbon Dioxide and Global Change: Earth in Transition (1989). He served as an Adjunct Professor in the Departments of Geology, Geography, and Botany and Microbiology at Arizona State University. He earned a Ph.D. in soil science from the University of Minnesota. Dr. Robert M. Carter is a stratigrapher and marine geologist with degrees from the University of Otago (New Zealand) and University of Cambridge (England). He is the author of Climate: The Counter Consensus (2010) and Taxing Air: Facts and Fallacies About Climate Change (2013). Carter's professional service includes terms as head of the Geology Department, James Cook University, chairman of the Earth Sciences Panel of the Australian Research Council, chairman of the national Marine Science and Technologies Committee, and director of the Australian Office of the Ocean Drilling Program. He is currently an Emeritus Fellow of the Institute of Public Affairs (Melbourne). Dr. S. Fred Singer is one of the most distinguished atmospheric physicists in the U.S. He established and served as the first director of the U.S. Weather Satellite Service, now part of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and earned a U.S. Department of Commerce Gold Medal Award for his technical leadership. He is coauthor, with Dennis T. Avery, of Unstoppable Global Warming Every 1,500 Years (2007, second ed. 2008) and many other books. Dr. Singer served as professor of environmental sciences at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA (1971-94), and is founder and chairman of the nonprofit Science and Environmental Policy Project. He earned a Ph.D. in physics from Princeton University. Barnes, David J. Australian Institute of Marine Science (retired) Australia Botkin, Daniel B. University of Miami University of California Santa Barbara USA Cloyd, Raymond A. Kansas State University USA Crockford, Susan University of Victoria, B.C. Canada Cui, Weihong Chinese Academy of Sciences China DeGroot, Kees Shell International (retired) The Netherlands Dillon, Robert G. Physician USA Dunn, John Dale Physician USA Ellestad, Ole Henrik Research Council of Norway (retired) Norway Goldberg, Fred Swedish Polar Institute Sweden Goldman, Barry Australian Museum Lizard Island Research Station (retired) Australia Hoese, H. Dickson Consulting Marine Biologist USA Jødal, Morten Independent Scientist Norway Khandekar, Madhav Environment Canada (retired) Canada Kutilek, Miroslav Czech Technical University (emeritus) Czech Republic Leavitt, Steven W. University of Arizona Laboratory of Tree-Ring Research USA Maccabee, Howard Doctors for Disaster Preparedness USA Marohasy, Jennifer Central Queensland University Australia Ollier, Cliff University of Western Australia Australia Petch, Jim University of Manchester Trican Manchester Metropolitan University (retired) United Kingdom Reginato, Robert J. Agricultural Research Service U.S. Department of Agriculture USA Reiter, Paul Laboratoire Insectes et Maladies Infectieuses Institut Pasteur France Segalstad, Tom Resource and Environmental Geology University of Oslo Norway Sharp, Gary Independent Consultant Center for Climate/ Ocean Resources Study USA Starck, Walter Independent Marine Biologist Australia Stockwell, David Central Queensland University Australia

Taylor, Mitchell Lakehead University Canada Weber, Gerd Independent Meteorologist Germany Wilson, Bastow University of Otago New Zealand Wust, Raphael James Cook University Australia, (“Climate Change Reconsidered II: Biological Impacts”, http://www.nipccreport.org/reports/ccr2b/pdf/Summary-for-Policymakers.pdf, 3/31/2014) Kerwin• Global climate models are unable to make accurate projections of climate even 10 years ahead , let alone the 100-year period that has been adopted by policy planners. The output of such models should therefore not be used to guide public policy formulation. • Neither the rate nor the magnitude of the reported late twentieth century surface warming (1979–2000) lay outside the range of normal natural variability, nor were they in any way unusual compared to earlier episodes in Earth’s climatic history. • Solar forcing of temperature change is likely more important than is currently recognized. • No unambiguous evidence exists of dangerous interference in the global climate caused by human-related CO2 emissions. In particular, the cryosphere is not melting at an enhanced rate; sea-level rise is not accelerating; and no systematic changes have been documented in evaporation or rainfall or in the magnitude or intensity of extreme meteorological events. • Any human global climate signal is so small as to be nearly indiscernible against the background variability of the natural climate system . Climate change is always occurring. • A phase of temperature stasis or cooling has succeeded the mild warming of the twentieth century. Similar periods of warming and cooling due to natural variability are certain to occur in the future irrespective of human emissions of greenhouse gases.

Warming inevitable and temperature rises are negligible – reject their inaccurate models Michaels and Knappenberger 11/19/13, (*Chip Knappenberger is the assistant director of the Center for the Study of Science at the Cato Institute, and coordinates the scientific and outreach activities for the Center. He has over 20 years of experience in climate research and public outreach, including 10 years with the Virginia State Climatology Office and 15 years as the Research Coordinator for New Hope Environmental Services, Inc, **Patrick J. Michaels is the director of the Center for the Study of Science at the Cato Institute. Michaels is a past president of the American Association of State Climatologists and was program chair for the Committee on Applied Climatology of the American Meteorological Society. He was a research professor of Environmental Sciences at University of Virginia for thirty years. Michaels was a contributing author and is a reviewer of the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Chanage, which was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2007, “With or Without a “Pause” Climate Models Still Project Too Much Warming”, [ http://www.cato.org/blog/or-without-pause-climate-models-still-project-too-much-warming ] //hss-RJ)A new paper just hit the scientific literature that argues that the apparent pause in the rise in global average surface temperatures during the past 16 years was really just a slowdown. As you may imagine, this paper, by Kevin Cowtan and Robert Way is being hotly discussed in the global warming blogs, with reaction ranging from a warm embrace by the global-warming-is-going-to-be-bad-for-us crowd to revulsion from the human-activities-have-no-effect-on-the-climate claque. The lukewarmers (a school we take some credit for establishing) seem to be taking the results in stride. After all, the “pause” as curious as it is/was, is not central to the primary argument that, yes, human activities are pressuring the planet to warm, but that t he rate of warming is going to be much slower than is being projected by the collection of global climate models (upon which mainstream projections of future climate change—and the resulting climate alarm (i.e., calls for emission regulations, etc.)—are based). Under the adjustments to the observed global temperature history put together by Cowtan and Way, the models fare a bit better than they do with the unadjusted temperature record. That is, the observed temperature trend over the past 34 years (the period of record analyzed by Cowtan and Way) is a tiny bit closer to the average trend from the collection of climate models

used in the new report from the U.N.’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) than is the old temperature record. Specifically, while the trend in observed global temperatures from 1979-2012 as calculated by Cowtan and Way is 0.17°C/decade, it is 0.16°C/decade in the temperature record compiled by the U.K. Hadley Center (the record that Cowtan and Way adjusted). Because of the sampling errors associated with trend estimation, these values are not significantly different from one another. Whether the 0.17°C/decade is significantly different from the climate model average simulated trend during that period of 0.23°C/decade is discussed extensively below. But, suffice it to say that an insignificant difference of 0.01°C/decade in the global trend measured over more than 30 years is pretty small beer and doesn’t give model apologists very much to get happy over. Instead, the attention is being deflected to “The Pause”—the leveling off of global surface temperatures during the past 16 years (give or take). Here, the new results from Cowtan and Way show that during the period 1997-2012, instead of a statistically insignificant rise at a rate of 0.05°C/decade as is contained in the “old” temperature record, the rise becomes a statistically significant 0.12°C/decade. “The Pause” is transformed into “The Slowdown” and alarmists rejoice because global warming hasn’t stopped after all. (If the logic sounds backwards, it does to us as well, if you were worried about catastrophic global warming, wouldn’t you rejoice at findings that indicate that future climate change was going to be only modest, more so than results to the contrary?) The science behind the new Cowtan and Way research is still being digested by the community of climate scientists and other interested parties alike. The main idea is that the existing compilations of the global average temperature are very data-sparse in the high latitudes. And since the Arctic (more so than the Antarctic) is warming faster than the global average, the lack of data there may mean that the global average temperature trend may be underestimated. Cowtan and Way developed a methodology which relied on other limited sources of temperature information from the Arctic (such as floating buoys and satellite observations) to try to make an estimate of how the surface temperature was behaving in regions lacking more traditional temperature observations (the authors released an informative video explaining their research which may better help you understand what they did). They found that the warming in the data-sparse regions was progressing faster than the global average (especially during the past couple of years) and that when they included the data that they derived for these regions in the computation of the global average temperature, they found the global trend was higher than previously reported—just how much higher depended on the period over which the trend was calculated. As we showed, the trend more than doubled over the period from 1997-2012, but barely increased at all over the longer period 1979-2012. Figure 1 shows the impact on the global average temperature trend for all trend lengths between 10 and 35 years (incorporating our educated guess as to what the 2013 temperature anomaly will be), and compares that to the distribution of climate model simulations of the same period. Statistically speaking, instead of there being a clear inconsistency (i.e., the observed trend value falls outside of the range which encompasses 95% of all modeled trends) between the observations and the climate mode simulations for lengths ranging generally from 11 to 28 years and a marginal inconsistency (i.e., the observed trend value falls outside of the range which encompasses 90% of all modeled trends) for most of the other lengths, now the observations track closely the marginal inconsistency line, although trends of length 17, 19, 20, 21 remain clearly inconsistent with the collection of modeled trends. Still, throughout the entirely of the 35-yr period (ending in 2013), the observed trend lies far below the model average simulated trend (additional information on the impact of the new Cowtan and Way adjustments on modeled/observed temperature comparison can be found here). The Cowtan and Way analysis is an attempt at using additional types of temperature information , or extracting “information” from records that have already told their stories, to fill in the missing data in the Arctic. There are concerns about the appropriateness of both the data sources and the methodologies applied to them . A major one is in the applicability of satellite data at such high latitudes . The nature of the satellite’s orbit forces it to look “sideways” in order to sample polar regions. In fact, the orbit is such that the highest latitude areas cannot be

seen at all . This is compounded by the fact that cold regions can develop substantial “inversions” of near-ground temperature, in which temperature actually rises with height such that there is not a straightforward relationship between the surface temperature and the temperature of the lower atmosphere where the satellites measure the temperature. If the nature of this complex relationship is not constant in time, an error is introduced into the Cowtan and Way analysis. Another unresolved problem comes up when extrapolating land-based weather station data far into the Arctic Ocean. While land temperatures can bounce around a lot, the fact that much of the ocean is partially ice-covered for many months . Under “well-mixed” conditions, this forces the near-surface temperature to be constrained to values near the freezing point of salt water , whether or not the associated land station is much warmer or colder. You can run this experiment yourself by filling a glass with a mix of ice and water and then making sure it is well mixed. The water surface temperature must hover around 33°F until all the ice melts. Given that the near-surface temperature is close to the water temperature, the limitations of land data become obvious. Considering all of the above, we advise caution with regard to Cowtan and Way’s findings. While adding high arctic data should increase the observed trend, the nature of the data means that the amount of additional rise is subject to further revision. As they themselves note, there’s quite a bit more work to be done this area. In the meantime, their results have tentatively breathed a small hint of life back into the climate models, basically buying them a bit more time—time for either the observed temperatures to start rising rapidly as current models expect, or, time for the modelers to try to fix/improve cloud processes, oceanic processes, and other process of variability (both natural and anthropogenic) that lie behind what would be the clearly overheated projections. We’ve also taken a look at how “sensitive” the results are to the length of the ongoing pause/slowdown. Our educated guess is that the “bit” of time that the Cowtan and Way findings bought the models is only a few years long, and it is a fact, not a guess, that each additional year at the current rate of lukewarming increases the disconnection between the models and reality.

2NC IPCC Indicts

IPCC report is nothing but alarmism – they can’t explain why ice caps are expanding and warming has haltedDaily Mail 13, this article is citing Dr Richard Lindzen, an MIT climate professor, (“MIT scientist ridicules IPCC climate change report, calls findings 'hilarious incoherence' ”, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2438434/MIT-scientist-ridicules-IPCC-climate-change-report-calls-findings-hilarious-incoherence.html, 9/23/2013) KerwinNot all experts agree with the latest United Nations report on global warming, some are even amused by its findings. A climate scientist from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology ( MIT) has come out blasting the report for blaming humans for a global warming trend that appears to have cooled in recent decades – and then glossing over the warming slowdown. ‘I think that the latest IPCC report has truly sunk to level of hilarious incoherence,’ Dr. Richard Lindzen told Climate Depot – a site known for questioning the theory of global warming. Dr Linzen’s amusement from the lack of correlation between predictions and actual conditions . ‘They are proclaiming increased confidence in their models as the discrepancies between their models and observations increase,’ Dr Linzen continued. The UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change asserted in the report that it is 95 per cent sure humans’ use of fossil fuels is the cause of global warming. The report also provided what Dr Linzen felt was a shoddy explanation for the lack of warming over the past 17 years. ‘Their excuse for the absence of warming over the past 17 years is that the heat is hiding in the deep ocean,’ the amused scientist said. ‘However, this is simply an admission that the models fail to simulate the exchanges of heat between the surface layers and the deeper oceans .’ This slapdash explanation for the lack of warming, Dr Linzen stressed, is proof the IPCC knows little about what is actually happening. ‘They now, somewhat obscurely, admit that their crucial assumption was totally unjustified,’ said the amused scientist. Dr Linzen’s derision of the IPCC report comes amid evidence that warming hasn’t occurred over the past 17 years, and that polar ice caps are even expanding . Despite strong evidence that global warming may be on hold, the IPCC still insisted that the report’s findings should alarm anyone denying the theory. The report found support among American politicians. Chief among them, Secretary of State John Kerry. ‘Those who deny the science or choose excuses over action are playing with fire,’ Secretary of State John Kerry said shortly after the report’s release. ‘Once again, the science grows clearer, the case grows more compelling and the costs of inaction grow beyond anything that anyone with conscience or common sense should be willing to even contemplate,’ he added.

Their consensus claims are lies – all of their data is wrongTol 6/6, Richard Tol is a professor of economics at the University of Sussex, and a professor of the economics of climate change at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. He is a member of the Academia Europaea. He was a contributer for the IPCC before he withdrew due to their exaggeration. He has a PhD from VU University Amsterdam. (“The claim of a 97% consensus on global warming does not stand up Consensus is irrelevant in science. There are plenty of examples in history where everyone agreed and everyone was wrong”, http://www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2014/jun/06/97-consensus-global-warming, 6/6/2014) KerwinDana Nuccitelli writes that I “accidentally confirm the results of last year’s 97% global warming consensus study”. Nothing could be further from the truth. I show that the 97% consensus claim does not stand up. At best, Nuccitelli, John Cook and colleagues may have accidentally stumbled on the right number. Cook and co selected

some 12,000 papers from the scientific literature to test whether these papers support the hypothesis that humans played a substantial role in the observed warming of the Earth. 12,000 is a strange number. The climate literature is much larger. The number of papers on the detection and attribution of climate change is much, much smaller. Cook’s sample is not representative. Any conclusion they draw is not about “the literature” but rather about the papers they happened to find. Most of the papers they studied are not about climate change and its causes, but many were taken as evidence nonetheless. Papers on carbon taxes naturally assume that carbon dioxide emissions cause global warming – but assumptions are not conclusions. Cook’s claim of an increasing consensus over time is entirely due to an increase of the number of irrelevant papers that Cook and co mistook for evidence. The abstracts of the 12,000 papers were rated, twice, by 24 volunteers. Twelve rapidly dropped out, leaving an enormous task for the rest. This shows. There are patterns in the data that suggest that raters may have fallen asleep with their nose on the keyboard. In July 2013, Mr Cook claimed to have data that showed this is not the case. In May 2014, he claimed that data never existed. The data is also ridden with error. By Cook’s own calculations, 7% of the ratings are wrong. Spot checks suggest a much larger number of errors, up to one-third. Cook tried to validate the results by having authors rate their own papers. In almost two out of three cases, the author disagreed with Cook’s team about the message of the paper in question. Attempts to obtain Cook’s data for independent verification have been in vain. Cook sometimes claims that the raters are interviewees who are entitled to privacy – but the raters were never asked any personal detail. At other times, Cook claims that the raters are not interviewees but interviewers. The 97% consensus paper rests on yet another claim: the raters are incidental, it is the rated papers that matter. If you measure temperature, you make sure that your thermometers are all properly and consistently calibrated. Unfortunately, although he does have the data, Cook does not test whether the raters judge the same paper in the same way. Consensus is irrelevant in science. There are plenty of examples in history where everyone agreed and everyone was wrong. Cook’s consensus is also irrelevant in policy. They try to show that climate change is real and human-made. It is does not follow whether and by how much greenhouse gas emissions should be reduced. The debate on climate policy is polarised, often using discussions about climate science as a proxy. People who want to argue that climate researchers are secretive and incompetent only have to point to the 97% consensus paper. On 29 May, the Committee on Science, Space and Technology of the US House of Representatives examined the procedures of the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Having been active in the IPCC since 1994, serving in various roles in all its three working groups, most recently as a convening lead author for the fifth assessment report of working group II, my testimony to the committee briefly reiterated some of the mistakes made in the fifth assessment report but focused on the structural faults in the IPCC, notably the selection of authors and staff, the weaknesses in the review process, and the competition for attention between chapters. I highlighted that the IPCC is a natural monopoly that is largely unregulated. I recommended that its assessment reports be replaced by an assessment journal. In an article on 2 June, Nuccitelli ignores the subject matter of the hearing, focusing instead on a brief interaction about the 97% consensus paper co-authored by… Nuccitelli. He unfortunately missed the gist of my criticism of his work. Successive literature reviews, including the ones by the IPCC, have time and again established that there has been substantial climate change over the last one and a half centuries and that humans caused a large share of that climate change. There is disagreement, of course, particularly on the extent to which humans contributed to the observed warming. This is part and parcel of a healthy scientific debate. There is widespread agreement, though, that climate change is real and human-made. I believe Nuccitelli and colleagues are wrong about a number of issues. Mistakenly thinking that agreement on the basic facts of climate change would induce agreement on climate policy, Nuccitelli

and colleagues tried to quantify the consensus, and failed. In his defence, Nuccitelli argues that I do not dispute their main result. Nuccitelli fundamentally misunderstands research. Science is not a set of results. Science is a method. If the method is wrong, the results are worthless. Nuccitelli’s pieces are two of a series of articles published in the Guardian impugning my character and my work. Nuccitelli falsely accuses me of journal shopping, a despicable practice. The theologist Michael Rosenberger has described climate protection as a new religion, based on a fear for the apocalypse, with dogmas, heretics and inquisitors like Nuccitelli. I prefer my politics secular and my science sound.

Government agendas contradict science and promote misallocation of fundingGreen 10/28, Kesten Green is a senior lecturer at the University of South Australia in Adelaide and is director of the major website on forecasting methods, www.ForecastingPrinciples.com. J. Scott Armstrong teaches at the University of Pennsylvania and has published 12 peer-reviewed articles on forecasting. Willie Soon of Salem, Massachusetts is a solar and climate scientist who has been frequently published in the peer-reviewed literature. (“The Science Fiction of IPCC Climate Models”, http://news.heartland.org/newspaper-article/2013/10/28/science-fiction-ipcc-climate-models, 10/28/2013) KerwinGovernment Agendas Contradict Science Is it surprising the government would support an alarm lacking scientific support? Not really. In our study of situations analogous to the current alarm over global warming, we identified 26 earlier movements based on scenarios of manmade disaster, including the global cooling alarm in the 1960s to 1970s. None of them was based on scientific forecasts. And yet, governments imposed costly policies in response to 23 of them. In no case did the forecast of major harm come true. There is no support from scientific forecasting for an upward trend in temperatures, or a downward trend. Without support from scientific forecasts, the global warming alarm is baseless and should be ignored. Government programs, subsidies, taxes, and regulations proposed as responses to the global warming alarm result in misallocations of valuable resources. They lead to inflated energy prices, declining international competitiveness, disappearing industries and jobs, and threats to health and welfare. Humanity can do better with the old, simple, tried-and-true no-trend climate forecasting model. This traditional method is also consistent with scientific forecasting principles.

AT: Biodiversity Impact

No Impact to biodiversity – adaptation and evolution solvesCarter et al. 14, Dr. Craig D. Idso is founder and chairman of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change. Since 1998, he has been the editor and chief contributor to the online magazine CO2 Science. He is the author of several books, including The Many Benefits of Atmospheric CO2 Enrichment (2011) and CO2 , Global Warming and Coral Reefs (2009). He earned a Ph.D. in geography from Arizona State University (ASU), where he lectured in meteorology and was a faculty researcher in the Office of Climatology. Dr. Sherwood B. Idso is president of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change. Previously he was a Research Physicist with the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Agricultural Research Service at the U.S. Water Conservation Laboratory in Phoenix, Arizona. He is the author or co-author of over 500 scientific publications including the books Carbon Dioxide: Friend or Foe? (1982) and Carbon Dioxide and Global Change: Earth in Transition (1989). He served as an Adjunct Professor in the Departments of Geology, Geography, and Botany and Microbiology at Arizona State University. He earned a Ph.D. in soil science from the University of Minnesota. Dr. Robert M. Carter is a stratigrapher and marine geologist with degrees from the University of Otago (New Zealand) and University of Cambridge (England). He is the author of Climate: The Counter Consensus (2010) and Taxing Air: Facts and Fallacies About Climate Change (2013). Carter's professional service includes terms as head of the Geology Department, James Cook University, chairman of the Earth Sciences Panel of the Australian Research Council, chairman of the national Marine Science and Technologies Committee, and director of the Australian Office of the Ocean Drilling Program. He is currently an Emeritus Fellow of the Institute of Public Affairs (Melbourne). Dr. S. Fred Singer is one of the most distinguished atmospheric physicists in the U.S. He established and served as the first director of the U.S. Weather Satellite Service, now part of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and earned a U.S. Department of Commerce Gold Medal Award for his technical leadership. He is coauthor, with Dennis T. Avery, of Unstoppable Global Warming Every 1,500 Years (2007, second ed. 2008) and many other books. Dr. Singer served as professor of environmental sciences at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA (1971-94), and is founder and chairman of the nonprofit Science and Environmental Policy Project. He earned a Ph.D. in physics from Princeton University. Barnes, David J. Australian Institute of Marine Science (retired) Australia Botkin, Daniel B. University of Miami University of California Santa Barbara USA Cloyd, Raymond A. Kansas State University USA Crockford, Susan University of Victoria, B.C. Canada Cui, Weihong Chinese Academy of Sciences China DeGroot, Kees Shell International (retired) The Netherlands Dillon, Robert G. Physician USA Dunn, John Dale Physician USA Ellestad, Ole Henrik Research Council of Norway (retired) Norway Goldberg, Fred Swedish Polar Institute Sweden Goldman, Barry Australian Museum Lizard Island Research Station (retired) Australia Hoese, H. Dickson Consulting Marine Biologist USA Jødal, Morten Independent Scientist Norway Khandekar, Madhav Environment Canada (retired) Canada Kutilek, Miroslav Czech Technical University (emeritus) Czech Republic Leavitt, Steven W. University of Arizona Laboratory of Tree-Ring Research USA Maccabee, Howard Doctors for Disaster Preparedness USA Marohasy, Jennifer Central Queensland University Australia Ollier, Cliff University of Western Australia Australia Petch, Jim University of Manchester Trican Manchester Metropolitan University (retired) United Kingdom Reginato, Robert J. Agricultural Research Service U.S. Department of Agriculture USA Reiter, Paul Laboratoire Insectes et Maladies Infectieuses Institut Pasteur France Segalstad, Tom Resource and Environmental Geology University of Oslo Norway Sharp, Gary Independent Consultant Center for Climate/ Ocean Resources Study USA Starck, Walter Independent Marine Biologist Australia Stockwell, David Central Queensland University Australia Taylor, Mitchell Lakehead University Canada Weber, Gerd Independent Meteorologist Germany Wilson, Bastow University of Otago New Zealand Wust, Raphael James Cook University Australia, (“Climate Change Reconsidered II: Biological Impacts”, http://www.nipccreport.org/reports/ccr2b/pdf/Summary-for-Policymakers.pdf, 3/31/2014) Kerwin• IPCC’s forecast of future species extinction relies on a narrow view of the literature that is highly selective and based almost entirely on model projections as opposed to real-world observations; the latter often contradict the former. • Numerous shortcomings are inherent in the models utilized in predicting the impact of climate on the health and distributions of animal species. Assumptions and limitations make them unreliable. • Research suggests amphibian populations will suffer little, if any, harm from projected CO2- induced global warming , and they may even benefit from it. • Although some changes in bird populations and their habitat areas have been documented in the literature, linking such changes to CO2-induced global warming remains elusive. Also, when there have been changes, they often are positive, as many species have adapted and are thriving in response to rising temperatures of the modern era. • Polar bears have survived historic changes in climate that have exceeded those of the twentieth century or are forecast by computer models to occur in the future. In addition, some populations of polar bears appear to be stable despite rising temperatures and summer sea ice declines. The biggest threat they face is not from global warming but hunting by humans, which historically has taken a huge toll on polar bear populations. • The net effect of climate change on the spread of parasitic and vector-borne diseases is complex and at this time appears difficult to predict. Rising temperatures increase the mortality rates as well as the development rates of many

parasites of veterinary importance, and temperature is only one of many variables that influence the range of viruses and other sources of diseases. • Existing published research indicates rising temperatures likely will not increase, and may decrease, plant damage from leaf-eating herbivores, as rising atmospheric CO2 boosts the production of certain defensive compounds in plants that are detrimental to animal pests. • Empirical data on many other animal species, including butterflies, other insects, reptiles, and other mammals, indicate global warming and its myriad ecological effects tend to foster the expansion and proliferation of animal habitats, ranges, and populations, or otherwise have no observable impacts one way or the other. • Multiple lines of evidence indicate animal species are adapting, and in some cases evolving, to cope with climate change of the modern era, as expected by Darwinian evolution and wellestablished ecological concepts.

AT: Health Impact

Warming boots agriculture productivity and human health – solves medicinal biodiversityCarter et al. 14, Dr. Craig D. Idso is founder and chairman of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change. Since 1998, he has been the editor and chief contributor to the online magazine CO2 Science. He is the author of several books, including The Many Benefits of Atmospheric CO2 Enrichment (2011) and CO2 , Global Warming and Coral Reefs (2009). He earned a Ph.D. in geography from Arizona State University (ASU), where he lectured in meteorology and was a faculty researcher in the Office of Climatology. Dr. Sherwood B. Idso is president of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change. Previously he was a Research Physicist with the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Agricultural Research Service at the U.S. Water Conservation Laboratory in Phoenix, Arizona. He is the author or co-author of over 500 scientific publications including the books Carbon Dioxide: Friend or Foe? (1982) and Carbon Dioxide and Global Change: Earth in Transition (1989). He served as an Adjunct Professor in the Departments of Geology, Geography, and Botany and Microbiology at Arizona State University. He earned a Ph.D. in soil science from the University of Minnesota. Dr. Robert M. Carter is a stratigrapher and marine geologist with degrees from the University of Otago (New Zealand) and University of Cambridge (England). He is the author of Climate: The Counter Consensus (2010) and Taxing Air: Facts and Fallacies About Climate Change (2013). Carter's professional service includes terms as head of the Geology Department, James Cook University, chairman of the Earth Sciences Panel of the Australian Research Council, chairman of the national Marine Science and Technologies Committee, and director of the Australian Office of the Ocean Drilling Program. He is currently an Emeritus Fellow of the Institute of Public Affairs (Melbourne). Dr. S. Fred Singer is one of the most distinguished atmospheric physicists in the U.S. He established and served as the first director of the U.S. Weather Satellite Service, now part of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and earned a U.S. Department of Commerce Gold Medal Award for his technical leadership. He is coauthor, with Dennis T. Avery, of Unstoppable Global Warming Every 1,500 Years (2007, second ed. 2008) and many other books. Dr. Singer served as professor of environmental sciences at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA (1971-94), and is founder and chairman of the nonprofit Science and Environmental Policy Project. He earned a Ph.D. in physics from Princeton University. Barnes, David J. Australian Institute of Marine Science (retired) Australia Botkin, Daniel B. University of Miami University of California Santa Barbara USA Cloyd, Raymond A. Kansas State University USA Crockford, Susan University of Victoria, B.C. Canada Cui, Weihong Chinese Academy of Sciences China DeGroot, Kees Shell International (retired) The Netherlands Dillon, Robert G. Physician USA Dunn, John Dale Physician USA Ellestad, Ole Henrik Research Council of Norway (retired) Norway Goldberg, Fred Swedish Polar Institute Sweden Goldman, Barry Australian Museum Lizard Island Research Station (retired) Australia Hoese, H. Dickson Consulting Marine Biologist USA Jødal, Morten Independent Scientist Norway Khandekar, Madhav Environment Canada (retired) Canada Kutilek, Miroslav Czech Technical University (emeritus) Czech Republic Leavitt, Steven W. University of Arizona Laboratory of Tree-Ring Research USA Maccabee, Howard Doctors for Disaster Preparedness USA Marohasy, Jennifer Central Queensland University Australia Ollier, Cliff University of Western Australia Australia Petch, Jim University of Manchester Trican Manchester Metropolitan University (retired) United Kingdom Reginato, Robert J. Agricultural Research Service U.S. Department of Agriculture USA Reiter, Paul Laboratoire Insectes et Maladies Infectieuses Institut Pasteur France Segalstad, Tom Resource and Environmental Geology University of Oslo Norway Sharp, Gary Independent Consultant Center for Climate/ Ocean Resources Study USA Starck, Walter Independent Marine Biologist Australia Stockwell, David Central Queensland University Australia Taylor, Mitchell Lakehead University Canada Weber, Gerd Independent Meteorologist Germany Wilson, Bastow University of Otago New Zealand Wust, Raphael James Cook University Australia, (“Climate Change Reconsidered II: Biological Impacts”, http://www.nipccreport.org/reports/ccr2b/pdf/Summary-for-Policymakers.pdf, 3/31/2014) Kerwin• Warmer temperatures lead to a decrease in temperature-related mortality, including deaths associated with cardiovascular disease, respiratory disease, and strokes . The evidence of this benefit comes from research conducted in every major country of the world. • In the United States the average person who died because of cold temperature exposure lost in excess of 10 years of potential life, whereas the average person who died because of hot temperature exposure likely lost no more than a few days or weeks of life. • In the U.S., some 4,600 deaths are delayed each year as people move from cold northeastern states to warm southwestern states. Between 3 and 7% of the gains in longevity experienced over the past three decades was due simply to people moving to warmer states. • Cold-related deaths are far more numerous than heat-related deaths in the United States, Europe, and almost all countries outside the tropics. Coronary and cerebral thrombosis account for about half of all cold-related mortality. • Global warming is reducing the incidence of cardiovascular diseases related to low temperatures and wintry weather by a much greater degree than it increases the incidence of cardiovascular diseases associated with high temperatures and summer heat waves. • A large body of scientific examination and research contradict the claim that malaria will expand across the globe and intensify as a result of CO2-induced warming. • Concerns over large increases in vector-borne diseases such as dengue as a result of rising temperatures are

unfounded and unsupported by the scientific literature, as climatic indices are poor predictors for dengue disease. • While temperature and climate largely determine the geographical distribution of ticks, they are not among the significant factors determining the incidence of tick-borne diseases. • The ongoing rise in the air’s CO2 content is not only raising the productivity of Earth’s common food plants but also significantly increasing the quantity and potency of the many healthpromoting substances found in their tissues, which are the ultimate sources of sustenance for essentially all animals and humans. • Atmospheric CO2 enrichment positively impacts the production of numerous health-promoting substances found in medicinal or “health food” plants, and this phenomenon may have contributed to the increase in human life span that has occurred over the past century or so. • There is little reason to expect any significant CO2-induced increases in human-health-harming substances produced by plants as atmospheric CO2 levels continue to rise.

AT: Oceans Impact

Warming doesn’t affect the ocean AND Adaptation solvesCarter et al. 14, Dr. Craig D. Idso is founder and chairman of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change. Since 1998, he has been the editor and chief contributor to the online magazine CO2 Science. He is the author of several books, including The Many Benefits of Atmospheric CO2 Enrichment (2011) and CO2 , Global Warming and Coral Reefs (2009). He earned a Ph.D. in geography from Arizona State University (ASU), where he lectured in meteorology and was a faculty researcher in the Office of Climatology. Dr. Sherwood B. Idso is president of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change. Previously he was a Research Physicist with the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Agricultural Research Service at the U.S. Water Conservation Laboratory in Phoenix, Arizona. He is the author or co-author of over 500 scientific publications including the books Carbon Dioxide: Friend or Foe? (1982) and Carbon Dioxide and Global Change: Earth in Transition (1989). He served as an Adjunct Professor in the Departments of Geology, Geography, and Botany and Microbiology at Arizona State University. He earned a Ph.D. in soil science from the University of Minnesota. Dr. Robert M. Carter is a stratigrapher and marine geologist with degrees from the University of Otago (New Zealand) and University of Cambridge (England). He is the author of Climate: The Counter Consensus (2010) and Taxing Air: Facts and Fallacies About Climate Change (2013). Carter's professional service includes terms as head of the Geology Department, James Cook University, chairman of the Earth Sciences Panel of the Australian Research Council, chairman of the national Marine Science and Technologies Committee, and director of the Australian Office of the Ocean Drilling Program. He is currently an Emeritus Fellow of the Institute of Public Affairs (Melbourne). Dr. S. Fred Singer is one of the most distinguished atmospheric physicists in the U.S. He established and served as the first director of the U.S. Weather Satellite Service, now part of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and earned a U.S. Department of Commerce Gold Medal Award for his technical leadership. He is coauthor, with Dennis T. Avery, of Unstoppable Global Warming Every 1,500 Years (2007, second ed. 2008) and many other books. Dr. Singer served as professor of environmental sciences at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA (1971-94), and is founder and chairman of the nonprofit Science and Environmental Policy Project. He earned a Ph.D. in physics from Princeton University. Barnes, David J. Australian Institute of Marine Science (retired) Australia Botkin, Daniel B. University of Miami University of California Santa Barbara USA Cloyd, Raymond A. Kansas State University USA Crockford, Susan University of Victoria, B.C. Canada Cui, Weihong Chinese Academy of Sciences China DeGroot, Kees Shell International (retired) The Netherlands Dillon, Robert G. Physician USA Dunn, John Dale Physician USA Ellestad, Ole Henrik Research Council of Norway (retired) Norway Goldberg, Fred Swedish Polar Institute Sweden Goldman, Barry Australian Museum Lizard Island Research Station (retired) Australia Hoese, H. Dickson Consulting Marine Biologist USA Jødal, Morten Independent Scientist Norway Khandekar, Madhav Environment Canada (retired) Canada Kutilek, Miroslav Czech Technical University (emeritus) Czech Republic Leavitt, Steven W. University of Arizona Laboratory of Tree-Ring Research USA Maccabee, Howard Doctors for Disaster Preparedness USA Marohasy, Jennifer Central Queensland University Australia Ollier, Cliff University of Western Australia Australia Petch, Jim University of Manchester Trican Manchester Metropolitan University (retired) United Kingdom Reginato, Robert J. Agricultural Research Service U.S. Department of Agriculture USA Reiter, Paul Laboratoire Insectes et Maladies Infectieuses Institut Pasteur France Segalstad, Tom Resource and Environmental Geology University of Oslo Norway Sharp, Gary Independent Consultant Center for Climate/ Ocean Resources Study USA Starck, Walter Independent Marine Biologist Australia Stockwell, David Central Queensland University Australia Taylor, Mitchell Lakehead University Canada Weber, Gerd Independent Meteorologist Germany Wilson, Bastow University of Otago New Zealand Wust, Raphael James Cook University Australia, (“Climate Change Reconsidered II: Biological Impacts”, http://www.nipccreport.org/reports/ccr2b/pdf/Summary-for-Policymakers.pdf, 3/31/2014) Kerwin• Multiple studies from multiple ocean regions confirm ocean productivity tends to increase with temperature. Subjects of this research include phytoplankton and macroalgae, corals, crustaceans, and fish. • Rising seawater temperature is conducive to enhanced coral calcification, leading some experts to forecast coral calcification will increase by about 35% beyond pre-industrial levels by 2100, and no extinction of coral reefs will occur in the future. • Many aquatic species demonstrate the capability to adjust their individual critical thermal maximum (the upper temperature at which the onset of behavioral incapacitation occurs) upwards in response to temperature increases of the amount forecast by IPCC. • Aquatic life has survived decadal, centennial, and millennial-scale climate oscillations that have persisted for millions of years . Evidence indicates they are well-equipped to adapt to forecasted increases in temperature , if necessary. • Caution should be applied when interpreting results from laboratory-based studies of lower seawater pH levels. Such studies often are incapable, or fall far short, of mimicking conditions in the real world, and thus they frequently yield results quite different than what is observed in nature. • Rising atmospheric CO2

levels do not pose a significant threat to aquatic life. Many aquatic species have shown considerable tolerance to declining pH values predicted for the next few centuries, and many have demonstrated a likelihood of positive responses in empirical studies. • The projected decline in ocean pH levels in the year 2100 (as compared to preindustrial times) may be significantly overstated, amounting to only half of the 0.4 value IPCC predicts. • The natural variability of oceanic pH is often much greater than the change in pH levels forecast by IPCC. • Natural fluctuations in pH may have a large impact on the development of resilience in marine populations, as heterogeneity in the environment with regard to pH and pCO2 exposure may result in populations that are acclimatized to variable pH or extremes in pH. • For those aquatic species showing negative responses to pH declines in experimental studies, there are adequate reasons to conclude such responses will be largely mitigated through phenotypic adaptation or evolution during the many decades to centuries the pH concentration is projected to fall.

Oceans have been warming way before C02 emissions began to rise – no risk of anthropogenic ocean warming – we control the most accurate data Morano 10/8/2013, (Marc Morano is the executive director and chief correspondent of ClimateDepot.com, a project of the Committee for a Constructive Tomorrow (CFACT), B.A in political science from George Mason University , “Study finds global ocean warming has decelerated 50% over the past 50 years — 2012 paper published in Nature Climate Change”, [ http://www.climatedepot.com/2013/10/08/study-finds-global-ocean-warming-has-decelerated-50-over-the-past-50-years-2012-paper-published-in-nature-climate-change/ ] , //hss-RJ)The currently-favored excuse du jour for no statistically-significant global warming over the past 20 years is that the oceans “ate the man-made global warming.” However, a 2012 paper published in Nature Climate Change torpedoes this notion, finding the global oceans started warming at least 135 years ago just after the Little Ice Age , on or before the historic voyage of the HMS Challenger in the 1870′s. More importantly, the study finds that ocean warming has decelerated 50% over the past 50 years . If, as claimed, man- made greenhouse gases are causing the oceans to warm, the opposite would have been expected, namely an acceleration of ocean warming over the past 50 years, beginning in the ~1950′s. The fact that the oceans were warming long before CO2 levels significantly increased, and at a higher rate before 50 years ago, clearly demonstrates ocean warming is a natural recovery from the Little Ice Age, and not due to man-made CO2. The paper is corroborated by a recent paper finding the oceans have warmed only 0.09C over the past 55 years, a rate of 0.0016C per decade, and a 36% deceleration from the rate of 0.0025 per decade over the past 134 years found by this study. Further, climate alarmists claim that the “missing heat” is hiding below 1,500 meters deep , but this paper finds the oceans have instead cooled below 1,500 meters over the past 134 years [see third figure below]. In addition , if man-made CO2 was warming the oceans, there should have been an acceleration of steric sea level rise over the past 50 years due to thermal expansion, but no acceleration of sea level rise has been found over the past 203 years . Related: An additional 60+ links that torpedo the “oceans ate my global warming” theory New Comparison of Ocean Temperatures Reveals Rise over the Last Century Ocean robots used in Scripps-led study that traces ocean warming to late 19th century A new study contrasting ocean temperature readings of the 1870s with temperatures of the modern seas reveals an upward trend of global ocean warming spanning at least 100 years. The research led by Scripps Institution of Oceanography at UC San Diego physical oceanographer Dean Roemmich

shows a .33-degree Celsius (.59-degree Fahrenheit) average increase in the upper portions of the ocean to 700 meters (2,300 feet) depth. The increase was largest at the ocean surface, .59-degree Celsius (1.1-degree Fahrenheit), decreasing to .12-degree Celsius (.22-degree Fahrenheit) at 900 meters (2,950 feet) depth. The report is the first global comparison of temperature between the historic voyage of HMS Challenger (1872-1876) and modern data obtained by ocean-probing robots now continuously reporting temperatures via the global Argo program. Scientists have previously determined that nearly 90 percent of the [alleged, "missing"] excess heat added to Earth’s climate system since the 1960s has been stored in the oceans. The new study , published in the April 1 advance online edition of Nature Climate Change and coauthored by John Gould of the United Kingdom-based National Oceanography Centre and John Gilson of Scripps Oceanography, pushes the ocean warming trend back much earlier . “The significance of the study is not only that we see a temperature difference that indicates warming on a global scale, but that the magnitude of the temperature change since the 1870s is twice that observed over the past 50 years,” said Roemmich, co-chairman of the International Argo Steering Team. “This implies that the time scale for the warming of the ocean is not just the last 50 years but at least the last 100 years.” Although the Challenger data set covers only some 300 temperature soundings (measurements from the sea surface down to the deep ocean) around the world, the information sets a baseline for temperature change in the world’s oceans, which are now sampled continuously through Argo’s unprecedented global coverage . Nearly 3,500 free-drifting profiling Argo floats each collect a temperature profile every 10 days. Roemmich believes the new findings, a piece of a larger puzzle of understanding the earth’s climate, help scientists to understand the longer record of sea-level rise, because the expansion of seawater due to warming is a significant contributor to rising sea level. Moreover, the 100-year timescale of ocean warming implies that the Earth’s climate system as a whole has been gaining heat for at least that long. Launched in 2000, th e Argo program collects more than 100,000 temperature-salinity profiles per year across the world’s oceans. To date, more than 1,000 research papers have been published using Argo’s data set.