CIS December 2017 Summary Points • Approaching the 2016 election, immigration policy polarized opinion by partisan identity more than at any other time in contemporary history. • Election surveys suggest that immigration policy opinion was responsible for moving crossover voters to Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election, improving his performance over Mitt Romney in 2012. • Contrary to the post-election conclusions of Romney advisers, Romney would likely have done better, not worse, by campaigning more vigorously for immigration control. • Women were more likely to be moved to vote for Trump as a result of immigration policy opinion than men. Working class men were more likely to support Trump than Romney, but the difference is not as- sociated with immigration policy per se. • Voters at higher levels of education voted for Trump over Romney when they were more conservative on immigration. • Democratic voters supported Trump more than Romney when they were more conservative on immigration. • Trump did worse than Romney among some groups who held liberal immigration views, including high- er income Republicans. Introduction As a policy issue, immigration played an unusually prominent role in the 2016 election, one that issues do not regularly play in presidential contests. Donald Trump made immigration a central theme of his campaign, rais- ing the subject frequently at major rallies and in widely covered speeches. It was one topic of consistent message discipline in an organization that many called untidy and haphazard. Just as important, the media has also paid a great deal of attention to his pledges on immigration. To be sure, many stories have been written identifying the president’s views on infrastructure, taxes, and other issues, but immigra- tion triggers intense reactions among both supporters and opponents. Wall building, border security, and ending DACA draw large and opinionated audiences, whereas road building, the solvency of Social Security, and trade policy do not. Immigration Policy Opinion and the 2016 Presidential Vote Issue relevance in the Trump-Clinton election By James G. Gimpel 1629 K Street, NW, Suite 600 • Washington, DC 20006 • (202) 466-8185 • [email protected] • www.cis.org James G. Gimpel is a professor of government at the University of Maryland, College Park.
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Immigration Policy Opinion and the 2016 Presidential Vote
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Center for Immigration Studies
1629 K Street, NW, Suite 600, Washington, DC 20006 • Phone 202.466.8185 • Fax 202.466.8076 • www.cis.org
African American and Hispanic VotersBynowitisnosecretthatAfricanAmericansexpressmanyofthesamereservationsaboutimmigrationthatnative-bornwhitesdo.18Giventhistruth,weshouldnotbesurprisedthatahard-linestanceonimmigrationwonTrumpsomevotesinunusualplaces.AmongblackvotersthereisgreaterevidenceofTrumpsupportathigherlevelsofrestrictiveopinionin2016(75percent)thanin2012(32percent).Thesearenottrivialdifferencesasabout20percentofAfricanAmericanrespondentsexpressedoppositiontoimmigrationata7or8ontheeight-pointscalein2016.Ifthree-fourthsofthoserespondentsvotedforTrump,black support amongthat group would have been atabout 15 percent, compared toonly about 8 percent for blackvotersoverall.19Blackswithreser-vationsaboutimmigrationcanbesaidtohavecontributedmodestlytotheTrumpvictory,whileblackssupportive of open immigrationwereaboutashostiletoTrumpastheyhadbeentoRomney.
As indicated above and in otherresearch,Latinosarenotuniform-lypro-immigrationandareespe-cially divided on undocumentedimmigration.20 The DemocracyFundsurvey indicates thatabout23 percent of Hispanic respon-dents can be placed in the threemost conservative categories onthe immigration scale. Estimatesfromthisanalysisalso show thatthis subgroup was supportive ofTrump, slightly more than theywereofRomney(seeFigure6).
Ontheotherhand,Latinosonthegenerousendoftheopinionscaleare decidedly pro-Clinton, simi-lartoAfricanAmericans.Trumpseemstohavealienatedmorepro-immigration Latinos than Rom-neydid,whilewinninga slightlylargershareofthemostconserva-tiveLatinos.ForalloftheTrumpemphasis on immigration andwall-building,thenetchangewassurprisingly small. Across elec-tions,LatinosupportforRepubli-cansrisesorfallsmarginallywhensupportforGOPcandidatesrisesor falls among the broader elec-torateofwhichtheyareapart.To
Figure 6. Probability of African Americans & Hispanics Vot-ing for Romney (2012) & Trump (2016) by Immigration
Strong and Weak PartisansDespitethepartisandivideonimmigrationidentifiedabove,wedoseestrongRepublicansandstrongDemocratssupport-ingTrumpathigherlevelswhentheyarefavorabletoimmigrationrestrictionthanwhentheyarenot.FromFigure7,forexample,anestimated26percentofDemocraticrestrictionistsvotedforTrump,comparedtoonlyaround11percentwhosupportedRomneyfouryearsearlier.
Summary and ConclusionsIntheaboveanalysisIhavetakenstockofseveralwaysinwhichopiniononimmigrationshapedvotingbehaviorinthe2016election.Thiscontestwasassociatedwithanunprecedentedlevelofpartisandivisiononmanytopics,includingthesubjectofimmigration.ThepartisandividebothprecededtheTrumpcampaignasavisibletrendinavailablepolls,andwasheight-enedbyit,asthecampaignwasaninformationsourcedrivingopinion-holdingontheissue.ThePewResearchCenter’slatestreport(2017)suggeststhatthispolarizationhasonlybeensustainedoraugmented10monthsintothepresident’sfirstterm.22
Table A2. Odds Ratios Associated with Clinton-Trump Voting in the 2016 November Election
Source:DemocracyFundVoterStudyGroupSurveybyYouGov,releasedJune2017.Dependent variable: 0=Clinton vote; 1=Trump vote; third party voters have beenexcluded.CellentriesareoddsratiosshowingbyhowmuchtheoddsofvotingforDonaldTrumpincrease/decreaseforeachoneunitchangeinx,holdingothervariablesconstant.Statisticalsignificancelevels:1p≤.052p≤.01.Example:Foreachadditionalincreaseontheimmigrationrestrictionopinionscale,theoddsofvotingforRomneyincreaseby1.52,andforTrumpby2.03,holdingallothervariablesconstant.
End Notes1SeeBradfordS.JonesandDanielleJ.Martin,“Path-to-CitizenshiporDeportation?HowEliteCuesShapedOpiniononIm-migrationinthe2010USHouseElections”,Political Behavior,39:1:177-204,2017;andChristopherP.Muste,“TheDynam-icsofImmigrationOpinionintheUnitedStates,1992-2012”,Public Opinion Quarterly77:1:398-416,2013.
6This scale is also highly correlatedwith other indicators of immigration policy opinion, such as the desire to see theRepublicanandDemocraticpartiesadoptmorerestrictivepositionsonimmigration.
8Forexample,see:JonWard,“MittRomneyCampaignManagerMattRhoadesLamentsHard-RightShiftOnImmigration”,HuffingtonPost,December3,2012,accessedOctober16,2017;andJeffZeleny,“RomneyCampaignManagerSaysHeRe-gretsImmigrationStance”,The New York Times,December3,2012,accessedOctober17,2017.
11Forexamplepost-electionstoriesaboutTrumpandLatinovoting,see:KevinDrum,“TrumpReallyDidWin28%oftheLatinoVote”,Mother Jones,March6,2017,accessedOctober18,2017; MarcelaValdes,“‘We’reLookingataNewDivideWithintheHispanicCommunity’”,The New York Times,November16,2015,accessedOctober18,2017;ThomasB.Edsall,“TheDemocrats’ImmigrationProblem”,The New York Times,February16,2017,accessedOctober18,2017;andAlejandraMatos,“OntheElPasoborder,Trump’sappealwithLatinosdefiesexpectations”,The Washington Post,December9,2016,accessedOctober18,2017.
12Grace Sparks, “PollstersCan’tAgreeOnHowLatinosVoted In 2016”,HuffingtonPost,December 12, 2016, accessedOctober18,2017.
13 See, for example: “LatinosWillNeverVoteForARepublican,AndOtherMythsAboutHispanicsFrom2016”,NPR’s“MorningEdition”,December22,2016,accessedOctober18,2017;FranciscoNavas,“WhatHispanicpeoplethinkofTrump:USLatinosgiveawiderangeofanswers”,The Guardian,January23,2017,accessedOctober18,2017;and,BrittnyMejia.“Despitescornandcriticism,theseLatinovotersdon’tregretvotingforTrump”,Los Angeles Times,January17,2017,accessedOctober18,2017.
14AngelSaavedraCisneros,ed.,Latino Identity and Political Attitudes,London,UK:PalgraveMacmillan,2017.
15JustinGest,The New Minority: White Working Class Politics in an Age of Immigration and Inequality,NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2016.JeffManzaandNedCrowley,“WorkingClassHero?InterrogatingtheSocialBasesof theRiseofDonaldTrump”,The Forum,15(1),pp.3-28,2017.ShannonM.MonnatandDavidL.Brown,“MorethanaRuralRevolt:
LandscapesofDespairandthe2016PresidentialElections”,Journal of Rural Studies55:227-236,2017.L.Collingwood,T.Reny, andA.A.Valenzuela, “Flipping forTrump: Immigration,NotEconomics,ExplainsShifts inWhiteWorkingClassVotes”,July7,2017.ShadTurney,FrankLevy,JackCitrin,andNeilO’Brian,“WaitingforTrump:TheMovetotheRightofWhiteWorking-ClassMen,1968-2016”,The California Journal of Politics and Policy,UCBerkeley,InstituteofGovernmentalStudies,2017.AccessedOctober17,2017.
17In2012,Obamawon55percentofwomenandRomney44percentaccordingtoexitpolling;see“PresidentExitPolls”,The New York Times,undated.AccessedOctober18,2017.
18VincentL.Hutchings andCaraWong, “Racism,GroupPosition andAttitudes about Immigration amongBlacks andWhites”,Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race11:2419-442,2014.
20AngelSaavedraCisneros,ed.,Latino Identity and Political Attitudes,London,UK:PalgraveMacmillan,2017.MarkHugoLopez,RichMorin,andPaulTaylor,Illegal Immigration Backlash Worries, Divides Latinos,Washington,D.C.:PewHispanicCenter,October28,2010.S.M.Rouse,B.C.Wilkinson,andJ.C.Garand,“DividedLoyalties?UnderstandingVariationinLatinoAttitudesTowardImmigration”,Social Science Quarterly,91:3:856-882,2010.
21ZoltanHajnalandMichaelU.Rivera,“Immigration,Latinos,andWhitePartisanPolitics:TheNewDemocraticDefection”,American Journal of Political Science,58:4773-789,2014.
23PeterBeinart,“HowtheDemocratsLosttheirWayonImmigration”,The Atlantic,July/August2017.AccessedOctober18,2017.ThomasB.Edsall,“TheDemocrats’ImmigrationProblem”,The New York Times,February16,2017.AccessedOctober18,2017.WilliamA.Galston,“ThePopulistMoment”,The Journal of Democracy,28:2:21-33,2017.
24D.SunshineHillygusandToddG.Shields,The Persuadable Voter: Wedge Issues in Presidential Campaigns,Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress,2009.
25ShadTurney,FrankLevy,JackCitrin,andNeilO’Brian,“WaitingforTrump:TheMovetotheRightofWhiteWorking-ClassMen,1968-2016”,The California Journal of Politics and Policy,Berkeley,Calif.:UCBerkeley,InstituteofGovernmentalStudies,2017.AccessedOctober17,2017.