-
Cambridge University Press and The Classical Association are
collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
The Classical Quarterly.
http://www.jstor.org
Imagination in Plotinus Author(s): E. W. Warren Source: The
Classical Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Nov., 1966), pp.
277-285Published by: on behalf of Cambridge University Press The
Classical AssociationStable URL:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/637473Accessed: 26-02-2015 20:03
UTC
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the
Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars,
researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of contentin a trusted digital archive. We use information
technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new
forms of scholarship.For more information about JSTOR, please
contact [email protected].
This content downloaded from 181.118.153.129 on Thu, 26 Feb 2015
20:03:50 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
-
IMAGINATION IN PLOTINUS
'The higher and the lower powers of the soul meet in the
imaginative faculty (qav-Taula or 0avaa7TLKdv), which is the
psychical organ of memory and self-consciousness."
WHITTAKER, following Siebeck,z pointed out the important role
Plotinus assigns to the functions of imagination in psychic life.
Imagination is the terminus ad quem of all properly human conscious
experience ;3 it is that faculty of man without which there can be
no conscious experience.4 The sensitive soul is an imaginative soul
below which there is Nature, or vegetative soul, which acts without
being conscious. When the functions of reason are added to
sensation to produce a rational human being, there is conscious
discursive thought as well as conscious sensation; and since the
sensitive soul cannot be responsible for the imaging of rational
concepts, Plotinus asserts the existence of a conceptual
imagination.s
The distinctive characteristic of man is his conscious
apprehension of dis- cursive thought, which makes him a conscious
reasoner. Discursive thought it- self, without imagination,
possesses a kind of consciousness of its activities, but Plotinus
does not discuss this kind of consciousness-without-an-image very
often.6 Conscious rational activity, which is the truly human
experience, en- compasses both tavo-r7TpKdv and qav7raartKdv. The
special power of imagination is avyrAq7bLs proper,7 an apprehensive
power, which lays hold of what is not itself (the object), in order
to make it part of itself (as an image). NVous in knowing itself is
self-conscious, while &davota knows the otov rTvroL, which are
innate potentialities waiting to be illuminated by NVous. Each
decline in cognitive power is the result of a progressive
separation of knower and known until doaLs is reached.
The separation of knower and known is complete in the
unconscious know- ledge of O;avus; for, as an immaterial power, the
last of the real beings, it vivifies the world and fashions it, but
c;avs does not realize that it acts; there is no longer any
cognitive connexion, any cognitive link between knower and
known.8
'For which reason nature does not know, but only produces. For
what it has it gives without deliberation9 to what follows after
it, and giving to the I Whittaker, The Neo-Platonists, p. 52. 2 Von
Kleist in 1883 in his valuable
Plotinische Studien also recognized the impor- tance of
Oav-raata in Plotinus, but he seems to have relied on Siebeck for
his inspira- tion, p. 87, footnote i.
3 Except Stdvota, however, which pos- sesses its own
consciousness independent of imagination, I. 4. 10o.
4 Br6hier remarks with regard to the Stoics: 'La psych6, par
opposition
' la physis, est bien la psych6 en g6n6ral; or, une de ses
caract6ristiques est la representation, fonc- tion consciente. La
fonction consciente est
donc ins6parable de la fonction vitale.' Chry- sippe, 166-7, n.
2.
s See my previous article, 'Memory in Plotinus', C.Q. N.s. xv
(1965), 252 if. 6
1.4. Io and 4. 6. 3.
7 virlAirls
is a power common to sensa- tion and imagination, but sensations
become conscious only when apprehended in the imagination. Thus,
conscious sensation in- volves the apprehensive power employed in
both.
8 See Aristotle, E.N. IIo2b 9 See 4. 4. 37, where choice appears
as an
indicator of consciousness.
This content downloaded from 181.118.153.129 on Thu, 26 Feb 2015
20:03:50 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
-
278 E. W. WARREN
body and to the matter is its activity.... Wherefore nature has
no imagina- tion either. But thought is superior to imagination;
the latter is between the impression of nature and thought. Nature'
has no conscious apprehension of anything nor any understanding,
but imagination has an understanding of what is brought before
it.'2
In order to bridge the gap between the soul and its object,
Plotinus introduces the concept of conscious apprehension.
The realm of conscious experience encompasses both animal and
human life. Plotinus says very little about animal life below man,
and assertions about its characteristics are derived largely from
knowledge about the nature of the sensitive soul.3 Human sensation
requires the apprehension of a rd0oso and the production of an
image. After the specific sense powers have split up the object
into tactile parts, visual parts, and so on, there must be a
process of unification in the OvX7/. The end product of this
unification is an image in imagination. Consciousness is assured;
for the sentient, by possessing a psychic content, the image, is
able to distinguish itself from the object that it knows in the
space- time world.
When the sensitive and rational functions are combined into one
soul, a new conceptual imagination performs a function analogous to
that of sensible imagination. There is no longer the need to unify
what is known, because the concept has not been split up by the
individual senses as the sense object has been; the need is rather
to divide what is more unified.
'For just as in pictorial imagination, reason4 in motion or the
motion from it is a dividing [the setting of limits]. Or, if this
reason were one and identical, it would not be in motion, but it
would endure without change.'5 Plotinus makes clear that the
imagination is the true point of contact between
man and his orientations irp's -5 rvw KaiL irp0 70 Kd7ow when he
explains that
sensible imagination intellectualizes (unifies), otovy voEpdv,
and that conceptual imagination sensifies (divides), otov
alaOryrdv. The sensible image has to be immaterial and so more
unified than the sensible object; the conceptual image has to be
less unified than the vdro'a or else it would be vdro'~a. The
conceptual image is a down-grading of the concept so that it can
meet sense knowledge.
Conceptual imagination is the agent of human consciousness; and,
although imagination is an active power, in two of his most
striking passages, 4. 3. 29 and I. 4. I0, Plotinus likens it to a
reflecting mirror. Conceptual imagination, introduced in the Fourth
Ennead largely to explain discursive memory, is dis- cussed in its
own right at I. 4. Io, where its importance for conscious life can
be clearly seen.6
An imaging power is necessary in human psychic life because the
human soul is a kind of half-way house, p~EOdpov ov'aa, present
both to intelligence and
Dicta Sapientis Graeci II, paragraph 64 (Plotini Opera,
Henry-Schwyzer, ii, p. 89). supports this interpretation.
2 4- 4. 13, lines 7-9 and I I-15. This in- teresting section
shows the close connexion of imagination, consciousness, and
d'vi-irAibT. Since
ov'r is without consciousness, Plotinus
denies to it the power of imagination. See 3. 8. 4, where bv'atc
possesses otov avva'aOrlaot
and a kind of understanding. Lines 22-25 show that it is the
understanding of sleep as compared to that of waking!
3 On animal life, for example, I. I. II; 5. 2. 2; 6. 7. 9-
4 Atdyog, compare infra, pp. 281-2. s 3. 6. 18, lines 33-35. 6
See infra, pp. 283-4.
This content downloaded from 181.118.153.129 on Thu, 26 Feb 2015
20:03:50 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
-
IMAGINATION IN PLOTINUS 279 to sensation. Since the soul no
longer possesses its objects, it must possess images.
'The imagination itself does not consist in the having but in
what it sees and in what it is made to become like.... Because the
imagination has all things secondhand and so not perfectly, it
becomes all things; and, since it lies on the border and is
situated in such a place, it is borne towards both."
It is precisely the possession of and knowing through images
that distinguishes human knowledge from the knowledge of Vous; for
the human being possesses images rather than the objects themselves
and, consequently, can never have truth but only opinion.z This is
a common theme for Plotinus, as the following passages
illustrate:
'..., but we will say that it (the living being in itself) is
the intelligible
(that which is thought of) and that the NVous has outside of
itself the things that it sees. Thus, Nous has images and not the
truth, if the truth is there.'3
'If this is true (namely, that Nous contemplates and has its
objects before dividing itself), it is necessary that contemplation
and the object of contem- plation be the same, and intelligence be
the same as the intelligible. For, indeed, if they are not the
same, there will be no truth. For he who possesses being will have
an impression other than being, which is not truth.'4 Aside from a
few passages about conceptual imagination, Plotinus usually
supposes that the imaging power primarily involves the sensitive
soul. He comes closest to defining imagination in the Sixth Ennead,
8. 3, lines Io-I2:
'But as for ourselves we call imagination, strictly speaking,
what is awakened from the passive impression of the body ... .'
The notion of the imagination as the recipient of a blow is not
an isolated one, for it occurs elsewhere in the Enneads. The most
specific mention is at I. 8. 15, lines 18-19:
'Imagination is brought about by the irrational part (of the
soul) being struck from outside. But (the soul) receives the blow
on account of its divisible nature.'s
Further, the imagination is also evoked by disturbances in the
body; or reason, seeing a wrong committed, may evoke an image which
in turn stimulates the body to action. Imagination, then, is an
intimate link which holds the various operations of the human soul
together.
4- 4 4 3, lines 7-8 and 0o-12. 2 It has been asserted that
Plotinus' iden- tification of subject and object in Nous was
designed, among other things, to meet objec- tions of sceptics. Any
knowledge of another being was bound to involve a representational
psychology, which leads to the question: how do I know that my
concept corresponds to the reality which is known? For discussion
of this question see the works of G. Boas, 'A Source of Plotinian
Mysticism', Journal of Philosophy xviii (1921), pp. 326-32, and
P. E. More, Hellenistic Philosophies, p. 245. 3 3. 9. 1, lines
7-9. This passage is part of
an interpretation of Timaeus 39e and is not a statement of his
own view.
4 5. 3. 5, lines 21-25. s Note the similarity (or borrowing)
in
Augustine, '. .. nihil est aliud illa imaginatio, mi Nebridi,
quam plaga inflicta per sensus, ...', Epist. 7. 3. Br6hier says of
the Stoics, 'La repr6sentation sensible ... est l'image du r6el
produite dans l'ame par l'action d'un objet ext6rieur' (Chrysippe,
pp. 81-82).
This content downloaded from 181.118.153.129 on Thu, 26 Feb 2015
20:03:50 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
-
280 E. W. WARREN
SENSITIVE IMAGINATION Plotinus develops his theory of sensitive
imagination largely in conjunction
with a discussion of sensation and of memory. 4. 3. 23, after
establishing that the principle of sensation and of impulse in the
human animal is active in the brain, asserts that reason is above
these powers. Reason, however, has nothing in common with the
body,
-ri S aoca-rt od'33a/oi KOLvOOWv; consequently, there must be
some line of communication between reason and sensation.
Communication is accomplished by imagination.
'. . what had nothing in common with the body had to
communicate, at all costs, with that [the receptive power of
intellectual imagination] which was a form of soul, a soul capable
of making conscious apprehensions from reason [that is, capable of
apprehending concepts].'I
As we know from I. 4. io and 4- 3. 30 the power apprehensive of
reason is conceptual imagination.
Plotinus does not establish the relationship between conceptual
and sensible imaginations in 4. 3- 23 nor does he even indicate
that what apprehends S&avoq4- UEas does not also apprehend
alerO-qr4. He ignores here the doctrine of the two- fold
imagination because it is not integral to his discussion.
Furthermore, as he says later, the duality of our nature generally
escapes us.2
Imagination, because it provides a link between reason and
sensation, is quasi-intellectual, otov voEpdv. As we know from his
discussion of memory, imagination is a power and activity of the
soul alone, whereas sensation, to be an active power of the soul,
needs organs. Sensible imagination, however, must be inoperative
when there are no sensations to provide images, except in so far as
that imagination is responsible for sense memories. In the Orphic
dis- cussions of the soul's journey after death there is granted at
times a kind of memory of things here. Such a memory would have to
be a d!v-raurpa of the sensible imagination.
Imagination is on a higher level than the sense power, since it
is one step closer to the unity granted to intellectual thought. As
he says,
'The power of sensation of the soul must be the power not of
apprehending sensible objects but rather of apprehending
consciously the impressions that arise in the living being from
sensation. For these impressions already are intelligibles.'S
Plotinus goes on to insist on the quasi-intellectual character of
imagination
when he further clarifies his notion of sensible image. He
denies emphatically that it is material in any way and affirms that
the manner of apprehension- which produces the image-is like
thought, otov vd'rqts. Specifically he says that the images are not
magnitudes.4 The image in effect is the result of sensible KploLs
and d'JVTA7-L&.
Imagination is established as the terminus of sensation in three
major pas- sages :s
4. 3. 23, lines 29-31. 2 4. 3- 31. 3 I. 1. 7, lines 9-12. 4 4.
3. 26. s The statement at 4. 3. 26, &AAa i pt~ v
AEKTEOV ELs OXuyjv A'YELV oaa 8t" a wpa-ras, means that all
bodily activities are under the purview of the soul, but it does
not mean that all bodily activities reach the imagina- tion. See on
this point 4. 4. 8.
This content downloaded from 181.118.153.129 on Thu, 26 Feb 2015
20:03:50 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
-
IMAGINATION IN PLOTINUS 281
'For this is that in which sensation terminates, and when the
sensation is no longer present, the visual image is present to it
[imagination]."'
'The affection is there [in the body], but knowledge is in the
sensitive soul which lies close by and perceives and makes a report
to that power in which sensations terminate.'2
'How could one say that the sense objects are different if the
sense images did not terminate in one place ?'3
Imagination is integral to the functions of both sensation and
memory. The sensory power has its natural completion in the
production of an image, and the memory functions through the
emergence in the imagination of the Oav~raapa.4 The
sensitive-memorative soul is naturally imaginative, providing the
duality of the image and the object imaged necessary for the
conscious life; for, according to Plotinus, the conscious life is
only possible where there is a 'following along with',
TrapaKo0ov0dEv, where the soul by its images parallels the object
known.
CONCEPTUAL IMAGINATION
That Plotinus is going to develop a doctrine of a double
imagination be- comes apparent in 4. 3. 29, where he specifically
denies a common apprehen- sive power which will apprehend both
sensibles and intelligibles. Sensible memory having been
established, Plotinus explains his doctrine of conceptual memory in
4. 3- 30. It is a discussion not without difficulties.
In lines 1-5 Plotinus presents the Aristotelian theory that an
image follows upon every thought.
'What power will be responsible for remembering concepts ? Will
imagina- tion [be responsible for] these, too ? Now if upon every
thought there follows an image-which is a copy, as it were, of the
thought-and if this image endures, then remembrance of knowledge
could arise in such a way.'
He does not explicitly reject Aristotle's theory but passes on
to the one which he will hold.s
The Aristotelian theory is not acceptable to Plotinus, for he
denies that an image follows each thought. He affirms that there
may be dianoetic thoughts without images and thought processes
unconscious to man. The images of thoughts are needed for their
conscious apprehension by the human being. Once there is
consciousness of a thought, that thought may be apprehended again
by the memorative function of the imagination. Imagination has a
new dimension now: that of providing for the consciousness of the
thinking process.
1 4- 3- 29, lines 24-26. papLa is formed in the pattern of
a~uoritpa, sense image. It does not mean visual object.
2 4* 4. 19, lines 4-7. 3 4. 7. 6, lines Io-II. See Aristotle,
De
Anima 426bx7-19. * How closely connected are the explana-
tions of memory and sensation can be under- stood from the
frequent use of d~vracaLa and the infrequent use of atir8rOpa. The
doctrine
of sensation is often explained within the context of a
discussion of memory. d'qvraacpa, while properly meaning a memory
image, frequently functions as sense image.
s Guitton apparently accepts this state- ment as genuinely
Plotinian. 'La pens6e aussi est toujours accompagn6e d'une image,
v6ritable reflet du raisonnement,...' (Le Temps et l'tternit6, p.
70).
This content downloaded from 181.118.153.129 on Thu, 26 Feb 2015
20:03:50 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
-
282 E. W. WARREN
The need of an imagination to guarantee consciousness appears to
be foreign to Aristotle's thought.'
The remainder of 4. 3. 30 is taken up with the Plotinian
view.
'Perhaps it [memory] is a receiving into the imagination of the
logos which follows along with the concept. For, on the one hand,
the concept is indivisible, and it is hidden within like something
which has not yet come outside; but the logos, which has unfolded
[the concept] and brought it from the realm of the concept into the
imagination, shows it as in a mirror, and thus arises the conscious
apprehension ofthe concept, a resting and a memory. Therefore, the
soul being in constant motion with regard to thought, it is when
the soul is in that state [namely, the viewing of the picture in
the mirror], that we have conscious apprehension. For thought is
one thing, and the conscious apprehension of that thought is
another; we always think but we do not always apprehend that we
think. This is true because the recep- tive power receives not only
thoughts but also sensations on the other side.' The chief
difficulty with the text is the translation of the term Adyos.
Clark
follows Br6hier in translating, laformule verbale. Harder has
Begriff (Wort) ; Mac- Kenna, 'verbal formula'; and Guthrie,
'reason'. It seems to us that no one phrase can indicate the entire
meaning of AdTyos here;
and if one is forced to attempt a translation, Brehier's is the
most acceptable.2
The nuance is lost of the notion of Advyos as a representation
of a higher level of reality on a lower level, a nuance closely
connected with the contrast Plotinus is drawing between
0av-racrta-ElKWV and q!av-raota-Adyos. The image in con- ceptual
imagination is not a picture, whereas that of sensation is.3
Conscious apprehension in imagination arrests the motion of
soul-thought and shapes it into a stable image. This is the manner
in which we know that we think. Thinking is one thing, knowing that
we think is another. This condition is brought about because we
know through images; consequently, there must be a power to bring
the two together. This power, as this passage shows, is a'v-i1A-r
s.
The chief problem raised by the doctrine of the two imaginations
is the unity of man. For how can there be two imaginations and yet
a unitary ex- perience ?4 Plotinus objects,
'For it would not happen that one part [of the soul] remembers
intelligibles I See Beare, Greek Theories of Elementary
Cognition, Part III, where the common sense is described as
providing for consciousness, namely being aware that you are
aware
2 The close connexion between discursive thought and verbal
expression is shown in 4. 3. I8. 3 See Clark, Essays in Honor of
Irving Singer, pp. 306-7, for an interesting note about
non-pictorial images.
4 'Nun giebt es ja aber zwei kavTTao-LKd,- folglich auch von
jedem wahrnehmungs- und denkinhalte ein doppeltes bewusstsein? Die
frage wird c. 31 dahin entschieden, dass dem allerdings so sei,
dass aber ftir gewohn- lich die #av-raala des h6heren #avTaatTLKov,
die obmacht habe, die des niederen ihr nur
wie ein schatten folge; zuweilen kaime es freilich zwischen den
beiden #avraolat zu einem widerstreite, dann werde uns auch die
andere fUr sich deutlich, wir merkten aber nicht, dass ihr subjekt
ein anderes sei, weil wir (wer sind denn aber eigentlich wir ?) ja
iiberhaupt die doppelheit der seelen in uns nicht merkten' (von
Kleist, Plotinische Studien, p. 72, n. 2). I differ from von Kleist
on one point: he interprets TVoi
-rq- KpEPoTTVOS, lines Io-I I, as the higher imagination. This
makes Plotinus more of an intellectualist than he is. Earlier
Vacherot also said, 'Partout oui se produit l'imagination
intellectuelle, elle 6clipse l'imagination sensible; . . .'
(Histoire critique de l'tcole d'Alexandrie, p. 553). The statement
O"Tav pv Uavp4wv-qV 47 ETEpa Tr &yEpaL
This content downloaded from 181.118.153.129 on Thu, 26 Feb 2015
20:03:50 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
-
IMAGINATION IN PLOTINUS 283
and the other sensibles; for in such a manner there would be two
living beings [persons'] who had nothing in common with each
other.'2
Plotinus answers in this way: when both souls are in harmony,
there is one image; the image of the stronger soul rules the image
of the other, the weaker following along. This much of the doctrine
seems clear. The following lines, however, are most difficult.
Translation amounts to interpretation.
'But whenever there is conflict and disharmony, also the other
soul shines forth in itself, escaping notice in another [the other
imagination], because the double character of the souls escapes us.
For both souls come into unity and one soul hovers above. The
higher soul has seen all things and when it departs it keeps some
things but some of the other soul it abandons.'3
The difficulty in the text is the uncertainty attached to -
e~rpa. Examination shows the impossibility of assuming that the
expression consistently refers to one of the souls. His doctrine is
briefly as follows: even when the souls are in dis- agreement, they
still are a unity but they do not produce a common image. Plotinus
is not ruling out here the possibility that the conceptual
imagination might be dominant over the sensible. When there is
conflict, the soul has to identify itself with either the higher or
the lower.
Plotinus probably would hold that man usually identifies himself
with the lower soul; however, he surely cannot hold that man can
never reject the sensible imagination and pursue the conscious
thoughts of dianoetic imagina- tion. When he stated earlier in this
section that the stronger imagination dominates, he was indicating
that it was possible for either soul to be the stronger one; it is
for the individual soul to determine its own course. The
imagination that becomes clear in itself does not engage the
attention of the soul; the other imagination provides for our
conscious experience as men.
This interpretation denies that the stronger soul is also the
higher soul; it may be either soul. It denies that conflict
produces the inevitable conquest of the higher by the lower or the
lower by the higher.4
Another important text concerning conceptual imagination is I.
4. 10, which also is very important for the doctrine of
consciousness. d ivr7lArA arises when the concept is thrown back
upon itself, as if reflected in a mirror.
emphasizes the agreement of the two souls, higher and lower. It
is quite possible for both higher and lower to be in agreement
about sensible affairs. In such a case the stronger soul would be
the sensible soul.
Von Kleist rightly asks 'Who are we ?' For Plotinus 'we' are
that part with which we have become identified. The other part,
dKOcaviq 1E' avsrT, is unnoticed by us. Suppose we identify
ourselves with Ltdvota, is there then a conscious bavTrartLKdv
alaOB/pq dv ? Should we identify ourselves very brutishly with our
sensitive soul alone, we know that &tdvota remains conscious to
itself. Why not the same for the sensitive imagination? Plotinus'
answer probably is that Stavoca ~ ' a;ir-s does not need an
imagination for conscious experience. The conscious 3tavota
possesses 10' a-zjqS the
otov 7Tro0L. For thoughts or sensation to be conscious to man
there must be apprehension in the imagination. Were we to identify
our- selves with Stavota in opposition to any sensible experience,
kdme es zu einem wider- streite, the sensible imagination would
func- tion but without ever reaching the attention of man; for the
man has now identified his attention with reason and the conceptual
imagination. Our psychic unity is a focus of attention.
Following Clark, op. cit., p. 308, n. 34- The use of the word
'person' is modern but corresponds to Plotinus' meaning rather
well.
2 4. 3 3 3, lines 5-8. 3 Ibid., lines 13-18. 4 See 6. 4. 17.
This content downloaded from 181.118.153.129 on Thu, 26 Feb 2015
20:03:50 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
-
284 E. W. WARREN
If the mirror-activity of imagination is disturbed in any way,
then there is no image, but there is thought without an image. Here
the term for consciousness is lapaKo0ovO86v, 'follow along with'.
The metaphor of the mirror expresses precisely what Plotinus has in
mind for human 7rapaKoAoV'Op8ts, a following along of the reason
with itself.
The human being is conscious only when an image is present, an
image either of a sensible or of an intelligible object.
Imagination is like a mirror, reflecting the activities of soul
above and below it; consequently, it is like a faithful companion,
following wherever its friend leads. Our imagination, which is our
consciousness of objects, is always separate in being from the
object of awareness, and so our conscious life sharply separates
the knower and the known.
The importance of iv AlhbLs and its function together with the
imagination in guaranteeing conscious life becomes clear after
Plotinus has declared that there may be thought without an image of
that thought.
'When we contemplate and act, one might discover many beautiful
activities, contemplations, and actions that we do while we are
awake and that we do not accompany with consciousness. It is not
necessary that a reader be conscious that he is reading and
especially then when he is reading with concentration. Nor need the
courageous man be conscious that he is courageous and that he acts
in so far as he acts in virtue of courage. And there are countless
other instances. So that consciousness seems to make the activities
themselves of which there is consciousness weaker. But when these
acts are all alone [isolated from consciousness], then they are
pure, even more active and alive; and indeed, if the wise man is in
such a state, life exists to a higher degree, not spread out in the
sensible world but gathered up in the same place and in
itself."
There are two points which must be carefully noted: first, that
Plotinus is extolling the loss of consciousness in the human being
(-tazis), and second that the kind of consciousness which the wise
man is fleeing is that which is dis- persed in sensation, KEXVluVOV
EIL
aOG'qUcLv. Plotinus is emphatically not assert-
ing that the wise man, as soon as he estranges himself from his
bodily life, is unconscious on the level at which he is psychically
active. Acute attentiveness produces a kind of unconsciousness and
provides the psychic force which separates the higher man from his
sensible connexions.
We have seen before that imagination degrades rational activity,
just as it raises sensible activity. Plotinus shows in this passage
the psychological reasons for the loss of consciousness to the
human being when he contemplates the highest forms of Nous. Human
consciousness is largely dependent upon images in imagination.
Deprived of images man, as a human being, is unconscious to
himself.
The state of unconsciousness, 'v 7 'rocovTrcp 7adL, in which
life really exists,
is one where there is no longer any need of conscious life, for
life is now self- conscious. It is precisely the need of the image
in the human soul that marks its decline in cognitive power. Remove
the image and become what is known! and then you are unconscious to
man, the imaginative creature, but you are self-conscious as your
true, noetic self.
x 1. 4. Io, lines 2 x--end.
This content downloaded from 181.118.153.129 on Thu, 26 Feb 2015
20:03:50 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
-
IMAGINATION IN PLOTINUS 285
Conceptual Cvwr1Ar bos occurs as a function of memory in 4. 3-
29, but it is
clear from his general observations in that passage and in I. 4.
Io that Jv-rA7hv%~ must occur if there is to be human
consciousness, not just memory, of the otov -rtmo. Curiously enough
Plotinus never asserts that the sensitive imagination makes an
apprehension of a memory-image. dvrAqvtL must occur for concep-
tual memory but he is not clear about sense memory.'
The sensitive soul is really defined by its antileptic ability.
The rational human soul, however, involves not only dvwr1A'b
of sense objects through the organs with the production of an
image but also dvr1A7lr of concepts and their presence in the
higher imagination as Adoyo. The human soul reaches out in two
directions, through sensation to sense objects and through reason
to noetic objects, but the common centre of both that allows for
integrated human experience is the antileptic imagination.
Imagination on the sensory side seems to be conceived as rather
passive, as a receptacle of impressions which are apprehended by
the sense power but which become contents of consciousness in
virtue of the imagination's image. Conceptual imagination, however,
is clearly active. Traditionally imagination had been regarded as
passive. The active imagination is Plotinus' peculiar
contribution.
It would be difficult to emphasize too much the importance of
correctly grasping the role of the imagination in Plotinus. Only by
ascertaining its relations to sense objects and to concepts can we
see how human consciousness functions. His discussion of human
imagination, then, is a chief source of knowledge about the
Plotinian concept of consciousness; and it is probably not too much
to claim that an adequate understanding of Plotinus demands an
appreciation of his notion of consciousness.
San Diego State College E. W. WARREN
I It should be remembered that in 4. 3- 29 Plotinus asserts that
the sense images become memory images after the sensation is past,
the ataO77pa becomes a Obavraatla.
This content downloaded from 181.118.153.129 on Thu, 26 Feb 2015
20:03:50 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Article Contentsp. [277]p. 278p. 279p. 280p. 281p. 282p. 283p.
284p. 285
Issue Table of ContentsClassical Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 2
(Nov., 1966), pp. 1-4+193-351+i-ivVolume Information [pp.
349-iv]Front Matter [pp. 1-4]Basic Greek Values in Euripides'
Hecuba and Hercules Furens [pp. 193-219]Some Problems of Text and
Interpretation in the Bacchae. II [pp. 220-242]Polybius 1. 2. 7-8
and 1. 3. 3 [pp. 243-247]Notes on Two Passages in Polybius Book I
[p. 248]Diodorus Siculus and Fighting in Relays [pp.
249-255]Thinking and Sense-Perception in Empedocles: Mysticism or
Materialism? [pp. 256-276]Imagination in Plotinus [pp.
277-285]Conspectus Traditionum [pp. 286-290]Some Observations on
Final Clauses in Hellenistic Attic Prose Inscriptions [pp.
291-297]The Enclosing Word Order in the Latin Hexameter. II [pp.
298-320]Elections under Tiberius [pp. 321-332]The Manuscript
Tradition of the Thebaid [pp. 333-346]On the Transmission of the
Bacchae [p. 347]Back Matter