Image and intervention, leadership and legitimacy: The dynamics of Euro‐Atlantic engagement with challenges to international peace and security

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Image and intervention, leadership and legitimacy: The dynamics of Euro-Atlantic engagement with challenges to international peace and securityJames Gowa; Fotini Belloubc

a Professor of International Peace and Security, King's College London, b Doctoral degree from theDepartment of War Studies, King's College London, c Research Fellow at the Hellenic Foundation forEuropean and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), Athens

To cite this Article Gow, James and Bellou, Fotini(2003) 'Image and intervention, leadership and legitimacy: The dynamicsof Euro-Atlantic engagement with challenges to international peace and security', Civil Wars, 6: 2, 33 — 52To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/13698240308402532URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13698240308402532

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Image and Intervention, Leadership andLegitimacy: the Dynamics of Euro-Atlantic

Engagement with Challenges toInternational Peace and Security

JAMES GOW and FOTINI BELLOU

In the Cold War it was easy: the United States (US) led and its alliesfollowed, with only relatively minor ripples disturbing the surface of theAtlantic political pond that bounded Western Europe and North America.Of course there were differences and, at times, significant difficulties insome parts of the relationship - Gaullist France was never comfortable thatits equality with the US in Enlightenment philosophical roots, as well as inthe generation of revolutionary, republican, liberal democracy for the world,did not translate into equal power and influence after World War II. But,with one clear exception, whenever there was a major international crisis,the allies would fall into line. The one significant exception was the SuezCrisis of 1956, which led the United Kingdom (UK) and France to similarconclusions regarding the reliability of American engagement, but also tosharply divergent proposals over how to ensure that engagement.

The years since the end of the Cold War have witnessed more variedpatterns in the Euro-Atlantic relationship, with periods of harmony offset byspates of scepticism, mutual recrimination and friction. At some momentsthe more problematic aspects of the relationship have led to predictions ofthe end of the relationship. However, every prediction of doom seems to beoffset by a continuing commitment from both sides to retain the links. But,there may be changes underway in the nature of the relationship, which willaffect and perhaps even determine the patterns of US-Europeanengagement with the various challenges to international peace and securitythat are bound to emerge in the twenty-first century. Our purpose here is toidentify the dynamics that shape the relationship and therefore help todetermine the patterns of the relationship and the nature of engagementunder certain conditions. Our contention is that the essential dynamics areleadership image and legitimacy, which, with the subordinate aspects ofresponsibility and commitment - qualities associated with leadership qualeadership - drive the relationship.

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34 NEO-MEDIEVALISM AND CIVIL WARS

Leadership image is a compound concept comprising three elements.'The first of these is the composite self-image, involving the leader'sperceptions of leadership formulating certain policy preferences; the secondis the projected image, reflecting the impulse of the leader to declare orpursue certain policies in order to cultivate in the eyes of other a particularicon of itself; and finally, the alters' image, entailing the perceptions andexpectations other states and governments concerning the leader's policies.The latter is cardinal since it determines the legitimisation of leadership, theabsence of which obstructs the exertion of leadership and generates doubtsabout the leader's credibility. Legitimacy concerns the relationship betweenleaders and followers and is generally a measure of why those who lead canand should do so and why this position is and should be accepted by thosewho follow.2

While the qualities of leadership are a crucial element in this dynamic,it is important to understand that the iconic element is also an essentialqualification. The image may be of greater or lesser durability, and may incertain circumstances, or from time to time, require complementary actionin the sphere of leadership to maintain it. But, at other points, the imageitself can serve as a basis for legitimacy - and as with other bases - serve tocompensate for weakness regarding performance. For the present purpose,the concepts of leadership image and legitimacy are used for analyticalinsight into a broadly empirical and historical interpretation.

We argue that the greater the degree of legitimacy, the greater theprospects for success - and, contingently, where legitimacy is challenged,the leader will be obliged to take action to restore its image. Indeed, we shallshow that this was the case throughout the Cold War, with the US always inthe role of leader, but that the dynamic was only revealed by the less staticpost-Cold War environment, as well as demonstrating the way in which theinteraction of these two factors has determined intervention andengagement with the challenges and threats since 1990. Later sections ofthis essay will show how the US leadership image and its legitimacy inrelevant affective and political environments drove relations within theEuro-Atlantic community regarding intervention in the former Yugoslavia,the Gulf conflict of 1990 onwards and the post-11 September campaignover Afghanistan, and in the period of international deliberation anddiscourse regarding further prospective action over Iraq.

ESTABLISHING THE IMAGE AND ASSUMING LEGITIMACY INTHE COLD WAR

The American leadership self-image from the early 1940s to the late 1980s


IMAGE AND INTERVENTION 35

gradually evolved. With it, so did the legitimacy of European support.Throughout most of the period, US leadership was not seriously in question- even if there were challenges to the legitimacy of US leadership at certainpoints. Within the span of the Cold War, there were four chief moments: thecommitment to Berlin; the engagements in Korea and Vietnam; and hardlineUS pro-action in the 1980s.

In general, throughout this period the US was acknowledged as leader ofthe West. This was a position that continued unnoticed initially into thepost-Cold War phase, when strong US leadership over the Iraq-Kuwaitconflict, making use of the United Nations (UN) Security Council, assuredlegitimacy in European eyes. However, as the growing conflict in theformer Yugoslavia would prove, legitimacy was not to be taken for granted.Indeed, the early stages of US-European involvement in the Yugoslav warand dissolution served to reveal the importance of image, more than anyissue during the Cold War.

After World War II, Washington saw itself taking the responsibility tosustain a peaceful world order and to foster economic development, bothprompted by global responsibilities to contain communism. In practice, thismeant global engagement in forming military alliances, the most importantof which was the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and economicpartnerships to manage the world economy. Central to this was the creationof an unprecedented nuclear capacity in the service of confronting theSoviet Union globally.

During the Cold War, for the most part, the leader-follower relationshipwas fairly simple and straightforward: Washington led and the alliesfollowed. There were certainly differences between the allies and strong andcareful diplomacy was constantly required to ensure US leadership. But thebasic pattern for the relationship was that the US determined a policy andthe allies would then 'form up' .3 The process of forming up might involvehassles, wrangles and trade-offs, but in the end Washington would more orless have determined the appropriate policy - strengthening its position asleader and ever reinforcing its leadership image.

Even where the pattern was temporarily broken - most notably over theAnglo-French initiative with Israel to intervene over the nationalisation ofthe Suez Canal in 1956 - the outcome served to reinforce Washington'simage as leader. Paris and London had sought to lead, but the US hadopposed their intervention, exerted its influence to make continuation of theintervention untenable (making it clear that the US was hostile and therewas no question that it would give the necessary support) and brought theepisode to an interim conclusion.

While the two European governments drew essentially the same



conclusion from this sorry history - that the US could not be guaranteed asleader of the Western alliance to intervene on its allies' behalf - theyresponded differently in policy terms.

London sought to ensure closeness to Washington and the intimate tyingof UK policy to the US, including the development of an independentnuclear weapons capability that, while closely dependent on the US, wouldbe a means of assuring US support, should it be required, to confront aSoviet attack.

Paris also developed an independent nuclear weapons capability, butrather than binding itself so closely to the US in this sphere, it decided thatthe best way to ensure US engagement was by being wholly independent,creating a situation where Washington could not sway policy over use of theweapons, but would be necessarily implicated, in the Cold War context,should the weapons be used.

Both approaches were predicated on the need to ensure US engagementif the chips were really down and the Soviet Union was threatening tooverwhelm the allies militarily. Despite the previous and very significantsubsequent dissidence of French policy within the Western alliance, theoutcome of Suez and of the later evolution of NATO was that Washingtonwas the unchallenged leader of the alliance. This was true in practice. It waseven more so in terms of image - self- and other-. The US, as leader, wasresponsible for the defence, protection and promotion of the West.

However, perceptions regarding undifferentiated US responsibilities inthe world were challenged to some extent after the Vietnam war. The use offorce in that context was misjudged and shattered a conviction about theindispensability of military might in winning crusades against communism.Nonetheless, an understanding evolved progressively towards a US self-image embracing diffuse views about selective leadership, but confirmingWashington's iconic status as leader. This was generally legitimated by theEuropean followers' acceptance of this arrangement.

In the 1980s, a new aggressive US stance towards communism and theurge for nuclear superiority had only a transient impact, failing to settledomestic ambivalence regarding the merit of extended US responsibilitiesabroad, while demonstrating both some unease in terms of followerattitudes and, in the end, the way in which America's image as leader wasmaintained and enhanced.

The prevalent characteristic in the American post-Cold War leadershipself-image was a conviction that the US found itself in the privilegedposition of exerting a leadership role based on the peace dividend it hadtaken credit for creating. However, it was not certain whether leadershipwas to be exerted primarily in cooperation with other states and institutions



with responsibilities and decision-making shared, or in a more unilateralmode whereby Washington had the inherent prerogative of prescribing itspreferred course of action for others to follow. In practice, these oppositesserved to create and dictate the dynamic of US leadership self-imageand leadership style in the post-Cold War period, as the US engagedwith partners in seeking to manage challenges to international peaceand security.

REVEALING THE IMAGE: THE END OF THE COLD WAR AND AFTER

The end of the Cold War and the US-led military operations against Iraq in1991 revealed the alternating current which drove Washington's approach.Whereas the Cold War created something of an emerging crisis in the USself-image, the Gulf war tended to reverse any self-doubt by generatingqualified domestic euphoria about the merits of US leadership. This wasnonetheless mobilised by elder Bush administration rhetoric regarding theindispensability of US leadership in the new era.

The clear-cut character of Iraq's interstate aggression, denounced by theUN Security Council, provided the momentum for Washington to exerciseinternational leadership, under the aegis of the UN, crucially, as Moscowwould not block UN resolutions on military intervention.4 Washington'sability to mobilise international action towards peace and regional stabilityinvolving the collaboration of over 30 nations, including its European alliesand certain Middle Eastern states, had a therapeutic effect on the US self-image. Having experienced two crucial victories President George H. W.Bush was in a position to argue that 'There are those who say that now wecan turn away from the world, that we have no special role, no special place.But we are the United States of America, the leader of the West that hasbecome the leader of the World.'5

Although this statement indicated the success of US leadership, it wasnot clear whether this dictum meant the end of restraint on US moralleadership, particularly regarding the promotion of democracy in the world,or empirically, Washington's unfettered ability to orchestrate and to definethe rules of world affairs. Bush had combined both elements, insofar as hisadvocacy of US leadership against Iraq had a justifiable Wilsonianrationale, while it was wedded to conservative realism, requiring the bluntpursuit of the state's vital interests.6

The restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty permitted Washington topromote a model of US leadership predicated on partnership and collectiveaction. Crucially, this was in a mode determined by Washington. AsSecretary of State James Baker later asserted, 'To put it simply: We led, we



had partners, and together we succeeded. US leadership of collectiveengagement avoids the dangerous extremes of fallacious omnipotence ormisplaced multilateralism.'7 In other words, military intervention againstIraq had shown that the US could still assume a leading role in addressingthreats to international peace and security, yet share some of the burden.8

The success regarding Iraq, however, while confirming the image of theUS as leader to itself and to others, in reality only served to disguise thelatent problems of leadership and image that emerged after the ending of theCold War had removed the old certainties about America's role. It was lesscertain that this US-led model of action could be assumed to work in thefuture, since as Robert Hunter wisely observed at the time, 'it is unlikelythat next time only costs and responsibilities will be shared and not also thepower of decision'.9

In other words, it was doubtful that the United States would be whollyprepared to share the prerogatives of setting the agenda of internationalaction and it was certain that, as far as the US found itself genuinely able toshare decisions, there would be tough times and tears along the way.

In practice, the US elite was less prepared to share than it might havebeen. The US was viewing its own image of its leadership role and that ofits followers as though the conditions of the Cold War still applied.However, there was an emerging disparity between this image and theunderlying substance of Washington's relationship with its Europeanpartners. America's European allies voiced an inclination to increaseEuropean responsibility on defence issues in the context of the thenEuropean Community (EC) and their discussion on the need to coordinateaccordingly their actions under a Common Foreign and Security Policy(CFSP).10 The image remained on the US retina, but the legitimacy itappeared to suggest was already being corroded in reality by changingEuropean attitudes and perceptions.

Leadership, far more than during the Cold War, was becomingsomething for which Washington would have to work constantly, both at theinternational and domestic levels. This was something that President Bushrecognised, but before long he had been replaced by a new President,William J. Clinton, who was already heading for a rocky ride in terms ofinternational leadership:

Leadership cannot be simply asserted or demanded; it must bedemonstrated. Leadership requires formulating worthy goals,persuading others of their virtue, and contributing one's share of thecommon effort and then some. Leadership takes time; it takespatience; it takes work."



However, the domestic euphoria, cultivated primarily by scholarlydiscussion on the dividends of US leadership, rather failed to grasp theimportance of the US working to mobilise followers, especially at theinternational level. There was an emphasis on how US leadership should bemore effectively pursued, rather than on whether - and how - Washingtoncould mobilise followers and maintain the legitimacy of the its Euro-Atlantic leadership.

During the Bush I administration, the political elite judged it preferableand perhaps essential to pursue US leadership in a context whereWashington could capitalise effectively its comparative military advantagesin order to mobilise followers.12 Compounding this kind of US leadershipwas a crucial element which the Bush presidency had grasped before itsdemise, but which was rather missed later. In particular, as the outgoingacting Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleburger, argued in early 1993,President Bush had understood better than his critics that:

the end of the Cold War has meant [that] the United States can nolonger dominate either adversaries or allies as we did in a bipolarframework. If we want to get our way - and to get others to share ourburdens, as the American people surely desire - we will increasinglyhave to take the views and interests of others into account (...) Inother words, we will have to practice [sic] the art of compromise and,thus of diplomacy.13

This underscored the kind of leadership the United States could exercise inthe new era. In particular, by being flexible and ready to grasp the needs andinterests of its allies, it seemed more likely that Washington couldeffectively lever its comparative (military) advantages and sustain itsinfluential position and image accordingly.

In other words, the importance of US military primacy in logistics,information systems, intelligence and communication capabilities canindeed be multiplied in the eyes of its followers and thus be used as a powerasset in the service of US leadership, insofar as this US comparativeadvantage is bound to apply in a mode of action that also serves the interestsof followers, that is the US's allies. So long as other states deem this USpower asset vital - or, at least, very useful - US leadership leverage is notthreatened, nor is the US leadership image seriously challenged intheir eyes.

However, this sensitive strategic balance that President Bush hadappreciated was rather missed by the US elite during the Clintonadministration. Instead, a cluster of conflicting voices emerged regardingUS leadership. While the political debate on US leadership in the context of



peacekeeping was certainly affected by the Yugoslav crisis, the differentvoices among the political elite focused more on the way in which aleadership policy should be pursued with minimal costs for Washington. Forthis reason, US leadership was treated as a policy objective rather than ameans of policy.14 In the meantime the question of whether internationalconsensus could be built on such a US predilection was missed until early1995 when leadership began to be equated with credibility.'5

TARNISHING AND RESTORING THE IMAGE: THE ALLIANCE INQUESTION OVER BOSNIA

Throughout the period from the end of the Gulf hostilities to the point in thesecond half of 1995 when Washington clearly exerted genuine leadershipover the intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) by taking realresponsibility and making genuine commitments, there was considerablemisunderstanding and even bitterness in the Euro-Atlantic relationship asthe importance of image attached to leadership emerged. Throughout thisperiod, Washington sought to operate as though the necessities andstrictures of the Cold War still applied. It acted according to its self-imageof leadership, which included the assumption that the Europeans wouldfollow the US icon. The darker and more complex reality was that theEuropeans, however misguidedly and confusingly at times, had takeninitiatives and exercised a degree of regional leadership themselvesregarding the Yugoslav war. They had done so with the blessing of the Bushadministration, which had benignly foregone active and strong leadershipover this crisis. In this situation, it was possible for the image of theleader to be retained, while de facto authority was transferred to others, whowould engage with the particular challenges posed to international peaceand security.

To some extent this was a parallel situation to that in an emergingconstitutional monarchy, where the monarch retains the iconic position ofleader, but the power to act is passed to the emerging representatives ofparliament. However, there was bound to be a constitutional crisis if themonarch were later to reclaim the role of leader, but without earning theadherence of his or her putative followers. This is something akin to whathappened in the Euro-Atlantic relationship regarding the intervention in theformer Yugoslavia.

The transition from the Bush administration to the Clinton presidencyrevealed a deficit in the American leadership image. Although the Bushadministration policy preference to remain detached from anyresponsibilities in Yugoslavia's troubles was cautiously pursued in order to



avoid disrupting international efforts regarding international engagement inBosnia, the Clinton administration chose to disrupt the fragile coherencecreated around the promotion of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan and effectivelyto destroy it, while arguing for a new policy - known as 'lift and strike' [i.e.lifting the UN arms embargo on former Yugoslavia and authorising NATOair strikes]. In doing so, it was assuming that its partners and allies wouldrespond to US leadership automatically - that is, in line with Washington'simage of itself as leader, as would have happened during the Cold War andwithout reference to the views of those it expected to follow its lead inEurope and at the UN.

However, that self-image did not correspond with realities and wasnot shared by the key European powers. As a result, international coherencewas far from being achieved. Instead, there followed two years of bitterargument and the greatest trough in US-UK relations since the Suez crisis.

Washington aspired to playing a leadership role. Crucially, however, itsunderstanding of leadership - its leadership self-image - involved far lesscommitment than that anticipated by its allies. There was an assumption thata leadership policy could be pursued without having to assume majorresponsibilities. The deficit between leadership expectations and leadershippractice evolved into strong European disillusionment, which increasinglytarnished the Clinton administration's image, both at the international anddomestic levels. There were various arguments regarding the use of force -formal concerns, its practicability and its desirability - that were oftenconducted through the proxy forms of NATO (the American position) andthe UN (the European position), even though in fact the same countrieswere the key actors in each organisation.

European disillusionment developed into strong resentment asWashington's alternative, the 'lift and strike' prescription, was stillpredicated on an allocation of responsibilities among allies and partnersfrom which America intended to remain detached in crucial ways - notably,in terms of any significant commitment of ground forces.

The US promotion of 'lift and strike' ran against existing Europeanefforts, while advocating action which detached Washington from majorresponsibilities in Bosnia at the same time as dictating greater commitmentsfor its allies. This behaviour damaged European confidence in USleadership and even began to threaten to tear the alliance apart. In terms ofleadership and legitimacy, the US seemed unable to offer leadership andappeared to be ready to squander legitimacy in order to push a policy thatran counter to the allies' wishes and interests. Moreover, the attempt to leadwithout demonstrating the qualities of leadership, relying instead on alargely outdated self-image, only served to de-legitimise the US as leader,



badly tarnishing its image. If the US wanted to lead over Bosnia, it wouldhave to take considerably greater responsibility in the internationalengagement - and it would have to restore its image as leader.

Washington's one significant attempt to prevail on 'lift and strike' and toexert leadership by withdrawing from implementation of the UN armsembargo against the Yugoslav region failed, as it was really more of aclumsy attempt at bullying. The US decision to withdraw from enforcingthe arms embargo in November 1994, intended to push NATO policy infavour of 'lift and strike', ultimately showed the margins within which theunderstanding favouring an exertion of leadership without assuming itsrisks and undertaking its responsibilities could function. In reality, the USdecision crystallised Allied disenchantment and forced Washington's hand.

The Clinton administration's predilection for a risk-averse policy onBiH, while expecting its allies to follow Washington's preferencesregarding international action, harmed the US leadership image. Theprojection of a set of policy preferences demonstrating a US tendency toabstain from responsibilities but sustain its influential would-be leader'svoice within the alliance simply could not work. The US's influentialposition within the alliance had started to be questioned by its allies and itwas the Clinton administration which had to go into reverse in order to finda modus operandi with its allies.

For key European governments, Washington's policy had repudiatedUN-NATO cooperation over the former Yugoslavia and importantly hadbelittled an earlier NATO decision to enforce UN Security Councilresolutions. For the UK, the decision was 'a worry because this [the armsembargo] is a mandatory resolution of the Security Council and [itsenforcement] an agreed policy of the alliance'.16

One particular manifestation of that de-legitimisation was France's viewthat the US decision reinforced its long-time argument for a change in theUS-led NATO command structures, as US commanders could 'be caught indilemmas of conflicting orders'.17 Regret and disenchantment was expressedby the German ambassador to NATO, who asserted that Washington's desireto take a particular path regarding Bosnia irrespective of its allies' interestsand concerns had blurred what had hitherto been decided and held jointly.18

This was compounded by political and press discourse in Europe. The USapproach was portrayed as 'a grotesque error', in which with 'blithe disregardfor his allies' fears, Clinton ha[d] attacked the foundation on which the post-war transatlantic alliance ha[d] stood'.19 London was particularly frustratedthat despite its traditional closeness to Washington, as well as its attempts tomaintain harmony within NATO, it had not really been informed of the USdecision to withdraw from enforcing of the arms embargo prior to its



enactment, nor of the practical effects on Operation 'Sharp Guard'.20 Thissignificantly impaired the 'US-UK special relationship' within the alliance, apoint that was also highlighted by the US press.21

Most of all there was concern particularly from Britain and France (thesingle largest contributors) about the safety of their troops on the groundand the conditions for their withdrawal, in the event of Washington's 'liftand strike' policy being adopted. As London and Paris made clear, therecould only be 'leave, lift and strike': maintaining European troops in anacutely vulnerable position was unacceptable. Yet, it was equally clear inthat circumstance, that there was no easy option for pursuing either 'leave,lift and strike', nor the American last two-thirds of that formula.

No change in policy could be carried out immediately and in the gapbetween announcing a change and implementing it, it was clear that Serbianforces (if no others) would do two things: speed up any action before 'lift' or'strike' could be implemented, thus neutralising its effect, in some degree atleast (and if European troops were left on the ground, leaving them entangledand vulnerable); and make sure that any harm from the Serbian perspectivewould be presented to the world as the 'ethnic cleansing' of the Serbs. Thiswould damn Washington or the West for doing exactly what the Serbianforces themselves were accused of, and for which the action had been takenin the first place. That this would be a simplistic and unfair equating of thetwo positions would not have diminished the propaganda effect the Serbianside would gain around the world, particularly among those sections ofWestern societies that tend to believe the worst of their own governments.22

There were three focal points around which discourse on US leadershipregarding BiH began to repair the damage done to leadership image duringthe first year of the Clinton administration. Each of these points illustratesthe administration's concerns regarding the detrimental effect of its previouspolicies on its world leadership image. The three key issues are: theFebruary Ultimatum, establishing (and enforcing) a military exclusion zone(MEZ) around Sarajevo; the Washington Agreement in March, creating theCroat-Muslim 'Federation for Bosnia-Herzegovina'; and, most importantly,the Commitment to a NATO Extraction Force announced in December1994, pledging full US engagement in any extraction operation. The keyrationale guiding US decision-making was restoration of its image as leaderin the eyes of its allies and on the domestic front.

The NATO Ultimatum on Sarajevo following the marketplace bombingon 5 February 1994 underscored the essential need for allied unity, whichcould be effectively attained through greater US involvement ininternational action over BiH.



The Washington Agreement constituted a step towards abandoningWashington's previous position of effective detachment from internationaldiplomacy on BiH about which its key allies had been so critical (as well asan implicit acknowledgement of the Franco-British arguments regarding thepractical problems in lifting the arms embargo and on the more complexcharacter of the conflict).

US policy shifts in December 1994, including the administration'spledge to participate in a potential NATO operation to help the UnitedNations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) withdraw, engaged the US furtherin international action on BiH and was driven by the primary objective topaper over the cracks which had emerged in the alliance and heal thewounds created. By this stage, fostering coherence in NATO under USleadership had become a priority for the administration. US commitmentsand pledges marked the prelude to a later proactive leadership policy, whichthe administration was compelled to launch by mid-1995 in order to end thewar and thus largely revitalise its much-wounded leadership image.

The European allies rightly regarded the US pledge as a step towardsgreater US involvement in BiH. The essence therefore of the US pledge tokey European allies was that Washington could no longer push for policiesthat could put allied forces in peril without committing its own forces toshare the consequences. The Clinton administration's about-face of late1994 was a symbolically important act of leadership. The administration,having felt strongly the devastating consequences of its previous policypositions on its influential status within the alliance, risked a pledge thatcould reassert its relationship — and its leverage - over the allies. Whereasfor the administration the December decision was meant to paper over thecracks it had helped create within the alliance, for key European allies, thecommitment primarily meant reassurance regarding greater USinvolvement in BiH - including troops on the ground, if the UNPROFORpresence proved untenable.

However, the risk of having to deploy ground troops, which grew duringspring 1995 as strategic conditions in BiH shifted following air strikesordered by the British UNPROFOR commander at the beginning of May,23

brought about a recognition that a different, more proactive route might bebetter. This analysis was summarised by Robert Kagan:

If we are going to risk the lives of our troops in a retreat, why not doso to restore American credibility and leadership, so grievouslydamaged, and to rescue a people from further slaughter?24

This type of reasoning underlay the White House's decision in summer1995 to launch a leadership policy to end the war by orchestrating a peace



settlement and committing to its implementation. This understanding forcedWashington to assume responsibility for ending the war and to exerciseeffective US leadership in summer 1995, which culminated in restoration ofits leadership image, both in the eyes of its domestic critics and its allies.

The administration's resolve to orchestrate a peace settlement in BiHand its decision to contribute ground troops for its implementation were thetwo moves with which the White House extricated itself from the stigma ofan absent global leader. The detrimental situation the administration facedin early summer 1995 forced the White House into assuming a serious,proactive leadership role (diplomatically and militarily) to end the war inBiH. The administration's policy options had been reduced to deploying UStroops to help in a UN withdrawal (retreat), a humiliating contingency forthe White House, or contributing US troops to enforce a peace in BiH thathad first to be orchestrated - a contingency that might save the tradition ofUS leadership. Clinton had no alternative to risking his presidency andexercising leadership since 'US inaction at that time was impossible'.25

Thus, the White House mobilised international action around USpreferences to bring the parties to a peaceful settlement. Moreover, theadministration's decision to contribute ground troops to the peaceimplementation force organised by the alliance, despite strong domesticconstraints, was the greatest demonstration that the US decision to assumecommitments in BiH was driven by the understanding that the US leader-image was at stake.

Despite a key concern that 'the US leadership image might never fullyrecover in European minds after Bosnia', the European allies' interestsconverged around US leadership.26 They largely followed the US lead,sidelining their concerns regarding aspects of the US stance, since newlyfound pragmatism, resolve and commitment were welcome ingredients of arenewed US leadership that mobilised comprehensive international actionover BiH. The Dayton peace talks and eventual accords evolved into thesignifier of US leadership, not only because of the administration'sdetermination to act, but also because 'it rested on shared politicalobjectives and risk- and burden-sharing'.27

THE PATTERNS OF IMAGE: LEADERSHIP AND LEGITIMACY -KOSOVO, THE 'WAR ON TERROR' AND THE RETURN TO IRAQ

From Dayton to the time of writing, the variations and vulnerabilities in theEuro-Atlantic leadership image and legitimacy interaction confirm thepatterns from the Cold War and its immediate aftermath and from theengagement over Bosnia, while adding new refractions of them. In that past,



there had been three patterns: a legitimised leadership image underpinnedby responsibility and action, in the context of structural conflict; alegitimised image under non-structural conditions; and the vagaries ofassumed leadership, variable responsibility and commitment to action, inconditions of flux. These patterns were repeated with variations through thethree further cases of Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq.28

The engagement over Kosovo had many of the same characteristics as theend of hostilities in Bosnia and the period of peace implementation thatfollowed, during which the US had reaffirmed and strengthened its image inEuropean eyes by making an indefinite commitment to ensure peaceimplementation. Kosovo was first a matter of seeking to deter ethnic cleansingby Serbian forces, then its focus became the ending of the ethnic cleansingcampaign, and finally it became another round of peace implementation.Throughout the early stages of attempted deterrence, the US maintained andpolished the image restored by Dayton. The US worked closely with its crucialEuropean allies and partners, even giving France and the UK, and the EU,opportunities to lead diplomatically while working closely with Washington.

In all of this, while the focus was on a plan to get an agreement thatwould include deployment of a NATO-led force to remove the possibility ofSerbian ethnic cleansing operations, the US, albeit somewhat shy aboutdeclaring its commitment in public, was prepared to deploy up to 6,000troops as part of a peace force in Kosovo - and after this failed and armedhostilities followed, this is a commitment it honoured.

Legitimacy challenges appeared when attempts to deter failed andNATO began an armed air campaign to stop Serbian forces. The problemswere focused primarily on targeting, with major political divisions shapedby a tendency in Washington to hit more targets of more types - leadingthrough armed action - and the views of several European allies that certaincategories of target - for example, bridges - should not be included. Therewas a clear challenge to the legitimacy of US leadership, compensated bythe collectively judged necessity of maintaining NATO as a body andpreserving its credibility. These differences were finally brought to an endby the success of the campaign - a success that came as a bit of a surpriseat the time it happened and so left some issues unresolved.

The 11 September 2001 attacks on New York and Washington createdconditions of unambiguity and necessity for action equivalent to those of theGulf in 1990-91 and, even, in some ways, it seemed to those of the ColdWar. In terms of the Gulf, the surprise and immediacy of events meant thatthere was no structural bodice to the conflict. Yet, the nature of the conflictbetween Al Qaeda and the West, above all the US, shared features of theCold War condition: implacable, mutually irreconcilable ideological



positions supplemented by the preparedness to use armed force. Thedifference was that while the Soviets might have believed that conflict wasinevitable, they always had something to lose and that meant compromisewas a possibility. The suicide/mass murders of September 11 and other AlQaeda attacks were clearly beyond any forms of negotiation, compromiseor even deterrence. When it came to Washington's response to the attacks,there was never much doubt politically about the support it would receive.This meant that the US could shape a response almost entirely on its ownmilitary terms, having gained almost immediate backing from both the UNSecurity Council and its NATO allies.

Those military terms, however, were set on very different terms to theengagement over Kosovo. Where the US had shown a commitment to be aresponsible primus inter pares, prepared both to lead and to take action, butsharing decisions with others, the dissatisfaction that this approach had causedin some parts of the American establishment meant that Afghanistan wouldbe very different. This was take it or leave it - more in line with the Cold Warframework where the US decided on policy and its allies formed up, withsome negotiation and compromise along the way. Once Washington's policywas decided on, however, where there was space for others to contribute, theycould do so, but the terms were fixed - no changes permitted.

The self-image of the leader was so strong that other-images no longermattered, it seemed. There was no space for the followers to makecomment, let alone to dissent, and hence the seeds were sown for legitimacyproblems, even if legitimacy seemed unimpeachable for the moment.

The iconic impact of the twin towers collapsing and the US mobilisingin response made the leader's position and image unassailable overAfghanistan, yet the narrow approach to leadership opened the way forproblems of legitimacy when the security policy agenda returned to Iraq, 12years after Saddam Hussein's forces had invaded Kuwait. Although Iraqwas constrained by a variety of international pressures, mostly under theauthority of the UN Security Council, it became clear to major Westerngovernments in spring 2002 that those restraints - such as a crumblingregime of economic and political sanctions - had not contained Baghdadsufficiently. On top of this, two particular developments rang alarm bells.

The first was the discovery that Iraq was at a very advanced stage inattempts to develop a nuclear weapons capability and was determinedlyactive internationally in trying to secure that which it needed to completethe programme - primarily weapons-grade plutonium.

The second was the presence of senior Al Qaeda figures in Baghdad andIraqi support for Al Qaeda training camps in the Kurdish north-eastern partsof the country.



However, while Western capitals were apprised of these developments,ideas of how to approach the threats involved differed sharply. WhileWashington sought to treat Iraq as a follow-on to the still incompletemission in Afghanistan, taking exactly the same narrow and assumptiveapproach to leadership, based on a self-image that almost seemed obliviousinitially to the views of others, those others had different perspectives.

While Canberra was closely in line with Washington, London, the nextclosest ally, immediately sought to broaden the US administration's horizonsand to overcome the immediately evident problems of legitimacy, whileremaining unconvinced of the nightmare scenario was yet in place - thatSaddam's macho-attachment to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) wouldcome together with Al Qaeda's irreconcilables. As London noted thatSaddam's efforts were worrying enough in themselves, Paris and othercapitals also shared that concern, but considered other approaches to be moreviable, preferring to reinforce the existing containment policy, particularly byusing American pressure to secure the return of UN weapons inspectors, somedestruction of WMD capabilities, and the creation of conditions in whichSaddam's rush towards the nuclear finishing line could be impeded.

While these different views reflected assessments of the threats and themost appropriate responses to them, they also reflected attitudes towardsWashington and resentments arising from the manner in which Afghanistanhad been handled to the exclusion of others in decision-making and thealmost exclusion of others in execution.

The US self-image had once again slipped considerably out of line withthe image of it held by others. As had been the case with Bosnia during thefirst two years of the Clinton administration, so with Iraq the younger BushWhite House had fixed on a policy that sought legitimacy on a somewhatarrogant presumption of self-importance and offered no space initially forfriends and allies, many of whom judged the US approach to be inappropriateor, at best, in need of refinement. As a result, while Washington realised theadvantages - including domestic legitimacy - of seeking backing through theUN Security Council, that process provided a key forum in which legitimacyfractures were exposed and would have to be remedied.

The decisively militarised US response to Iraq brought a new dimensionof 'irresponsibility' into attributes of would-be leadership. Where Bosniahad shown a 'smoke-but-don't inhale/strong on prescription but weak onaction' facet to assumed leadership and image, Iraq appeared to haveproduced a new variant, where desperate guzzling of hard substances andanti-social action undermined by seemingly weak reflection renderedgreater damage to the legitimacy of US leadership than anything perhapssince World War II.



Not only was image not enough to carry support, it had become clearthat, after the considerable dismissal of allies and partners overAfghanistan, following the frictions that had peppered the Kosovointervention, the leader's image was not merely tarnished as had been thecase, but had become negative.

This left the US in a similar position to the one it had been in earlier inBosnia - the leader-image had to be restored - but there was also a notablecontrast. Whereas that Bosnian period had required preparedness to assumeresponsibility and take action to restore the image, over Iraq the problem forthe US was to demonstrate responsibility by complementing a commitmentto action that was perceived by some as overwrought, with necessarymoderation in its staunchness on using armed force if necessary and payingattention to others. By changing its initial course and following the path ofUN Security Council authority, Washington managed to temper the sharplynegative anti-leader image that had emerged and established sufficientlegitimacy among the followers to permit not only military operational butalso strategic success.

Through the post-Bosnia years, patterns of leadership image and legitimacyvaried. With Kosovo, there was an attempt more or less to repeat the Bosniamodel, but with symptoms of assumed image and effect. With Afghanistan andthe post-9/11 'War on Terror' there seemed almost to be a return to the ColdWar model of structured automaticity on one hand, but with challenges tolegitimacy from narrow and assertive assumptions of leadership, which wereantiphonal with the attitudes of followers, on the other.

This reflected inferences drawn in Washington about leadership andaction following Kosovo that could only translate into legitimacy becauseof the necessity for action in the situation. However, that pattern of would-be leadership and action became a recipe for the severe challenges thatconstituted a genuine crisis of legitimacy, where the image of the leader wasnot so much tarnished by a mismatch between assertions of leadership andpreparedness to join with others in legitimated action, but damaged byexcessive zeal to lead through taking action.29

The assumption was that America's image as leader would be sufficientto ensure that others would follow, creating a new form of 'irresponsible'leadership and the strongest of challenges to legitimacy.

CONCLUSION

The period since World War II has offered three patterns to the relationshipbetween the US and its European allies. During the Cold War the more orless fixed structure of the East-West conflict created a necessity matched by



US responsibility and action - especially in assisting the reconstruction ofWestern Europe after World War II - in which the image of America asleader emerged and apparently became embedded; to a large extent, imageand empirical were one, and were broadly legitimised.

In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, the simplicity of theproblem presented by Iraq and the necessity of confronting Baghdad'stransgression of international rules, coupled with determined US leadershipthrough the UN Security Council, made for a superficially similar situationto that of the Cold War - US leadership legitimised - but without theimperative created by longer-term structural conflict, as had been the caseduring the Cold War.

Lastly, as the Cold War era slipped away, Bosnia offered a case in whichthe image was revealed as the crucial element in the leadership-legitimacyrelationship, emphasising that image alone cannot produce legitimacy andthat responsible action in harmony with followers contributes significantlyto a positive and usually effective collective action.30 Similar aspects to therelationship emerged in the three cases that came after Bosnia.

The somewhat automatic character of the Cold War leader-followerrelationship could not continue into the post-Cold War era. While thecircumstances surrounding the Iraq-Kuwait issue and strong US diplomacysupporting action appeared to confirm that the relationship remainedunchanged, the realities were otherwise. The necessities of the Cold War -and perhaps the necessities of the Gulf - had automatically legitimised theUS-European security relationship.

However, the underlying trend was a lesser degree of automaticity and aconsiderably greater degree of optionality over decisions to engage withthreats to international peace and security. This was confirmed by the elderBush administration's willingness to cede leadership to hubristic and morestrongly impelled Europeans during the first year and half of the Yugoslavwar. However, with that degree of optionality, the image and character ofUS leadership had to change.

Because Washington's self-image continued to be that of the Cold Warwhen the newly elected Clinton administration sought a new direction forinternational engagement, it very quickly became clear that the image was notenough. The essence of the European allies' understanding was that as long asthe leading member of the alliance did not respect NATO's decisions,preferring to take an independent line at the expense of its allies' concerns(without even the pretence of claiming a vital national interest), then respectfor the alliance itself could only wane, its raison d'etre would be questioned bythe allies, and with that questioning, US leadership would be de-legitimised,thus destroying Washington's primary vehicle of influence in Europe.



De-legitimisation and the end of NATO returned sharply as a theme overIraq. This came in the wake of Kosovo and Afghanistan. Kosovo hadechoed Bosnia, but with assumed image and impact. Afghanistan and thepost-9/11 'War on Terror' recalled the Cold War model of structuralconflict, but with challenges to legitimacy derived from assertive andnarrow assumptions of leadership, which themselves were a product ofWashington's Kosovo experience. The latent questions of legitimacy underthe surface of the campaign in Afghanistan became a genuine crisis oflegitimacy regarding Iraq, where qualities that had helped restore theleader's image over Bosnia were the cause of a new version of'irresponsible' leadership, provoking an acute challenge to legitimacy.

Leadership image and legitimacy are the dynamics of Euro-Atlanticintervention. Western engagement more narrowly, and internationalengagement more broadly, will be incoherent and confused where US actionis predicated on assumptions deriving from its self-image as leader that donot correspond with the of followers' image of the leader, and will remainso where the US is not prepared to shoulder responsibilities concomitantwith leadership - whether taking responsible action, or showing responsiblerestraint, or where it assumes responsibilities without appropriate referenceto the need to legitimate its position through European and wider support -and, because this is vital in terms of US domestic legitimisation of policyand action by the American public.

NOTES

1. This concept, and its compound character, was first introduced in Fotini Bellou, 'AmericanLeadership Image and the Yugoslav Crisis 1991-1997', PhD Thesis, King's College London,2000.

2. This concept is explored in James Gow, Legitimacy and the Military: the Yugoslav Crisis(London: Pinter 1992).

3. Jenonne Walker, 'Keeping America in Europe' Foreign Policy 83 (Summer 1991) p.129.4. In fact, Moscow was 'committed to the anti-Saddam cause'. Lawrence Freedman and Efraim

Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, 2nd edn. (London, Boston: Faber 1994) p.126.5. Emphasis added. President George Bush, 'State of the Union Address', Washington DC, 28

Jan. 1992, cited in U.S. Department of State Dispatch, 3/5 (3 Feb. 1992), p.74.6. The importance of this combination is addressed in David Hendrickson, 'The Renovation of

American Foreign Policy', Foreign Affairs 71/2 (1992) pp.56-7. For a critical view of USinterests; to prevent a change in oil prices; to restore world order; to prevent future Iraqiaggression; and inter alia to reassure a regional balance of power, see Charles William Maynes,'Dateline Washington: A Necessary War?', Foreign Policy 82 (Spring 1991) pp.159-77.

7. Secretary of State, James Baker, 'A Summons to Leadership', speech before the ChicagoCouncil of Foreign Relations, Chicago, Illinois, 21 April 1992, cited in US Department ofState Dispatch 3/17 (27 April 1992) p.323.

8. For a criticism on the concept of (American) leadership in the Gulf War see Cooper et al.,'Bound to Follow? Leadership and Followership in the Gulf Conflict', Political ScienceQuarterly 106/3 (1991) pp.391-410.


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5 2 NEO-MEDIEVALISM AND CIVIL WARS

9. Hunter served as US ambassador to NATO. Robert Hunter, 'Starting at Zero: US ForeignPolicy for the 1990s', in Brad Roberts (ed.) US Foreign Policy After the Cold War (London:Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press 1992) p. 15.

10. This European stance was expressed in the Summit of European Council (Maastricht) in1991. There is an immense amount of discussion on this issue. For arguments relevant to thisanalysis see Simon Duke, The New European Security Disorder (Oxford: St Martin's Press1994), esp. pp. 165-199; and Phil Williams, Paul Hammond and Michael Brenner, 'AtlantisLost, Paradise Regained? The United States and Western Europe After the End of the ColdWar', International Affairs 69/1 (1993) pp.1-17.

11. President Bush, address to Congress, Washington DC, 28 Jan. 1993, cited in 'America's Rolein the World', US Department of State Dispatch 4/2 (11 Feb. 1993) p.13.

12. In the context of military intervention, these were most notably in information processing,logistics, communications, intelligence and other weapons systems.

13. Secretary Eagleburger, address before the Council of Foreign Relations, Washington DC, 7Jan. 1993, cited in 'Charting the Course: US Foreign Policy in a Time of Transition', USDepartment of State Dispatch 4/2 (11 Jan. 1993) p.18.

14. For a discussion on US leadership as a means in American foreign policy, see Richard Haas,'Paradigm Lost', Foreign Affairs 741/1 (Jan.-Feb. 1995) pp.43-58.

15. Warren Christopher, 'America's Leadership, America's Opportunity', Foreign Policy 98(Spring 1995) p.7; and Bob Dole 'Shaping America's Global Future', Ibid. p. 105.

16. Statement by Douglas Hurd cited in Joseph Fitchett, 'Allies Are Worried After US Calls OffPolicing of Embargo on Arms to Bosnia', International Herald Tribune, 12-13 Nov. 1994.

17. Ibid.18. See Franz-Joseph Meirs, NATO's Peacekeeping Dilemma, Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen

Politik, No.94 (Bonn: Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft Fur Auswartige Politik,eV., 1996) p.25.

19. George Brock, 'Clinton's contempt for NATO', The Sunday Times, 13 Nov. 1994.20. The US ambassador to Britain, Admiral W.J. Crowe Jr., had reportedly found it difficult at

the time to explain to John Major even the way the decision would be carried out or theextent of its real impact on intelligence sharing. See John Darton, 'An Envoy, Crowe, the OldSailor, Navigates Rough Sea', The New York Times, 28 Nov. 1994.

21. Roger Cohen, 'Bosnia Atlantic Unity An Oxymoron', The New York Times, 27 Nov. 1994.22. These issues are discussed more fully in, James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will;

International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War (London: Hurst 1997).23. Ibid.24. Robert Kagan, 'The Risk of US Inaction', The New York Times, 18 July 1995.25. Interview with a senior Washington Post analyst, Washington DC, 24 March 1997.26. This view was presented by a US diplomat significantly involved in Dayton peace

implementation in the context of Halki International Seminars, Halki, Greece, 5 Sept. 1998.27. Pauline Neville-Jones, 'Dayton, IFOR and Alliance Relations in Bosnia', Survival 38/4

(Winter 1996-97) p.61.28. The following section is based in part on James Gow, The Serbian Project and Its

Adversaries: A Strategy of War Crimes (London: Hurst 2003) regarding Kosovo and oninterviews and discussions with government officials and others in London, Washington DC,Paris and Brussels regarding post-September 11 engagements.

29. As Zbigniew Brzezinski recently argued, 'The world has moved from surprise at theunilateral raising of the Iraq issue, to concern at a solitary war to general uneasiness at thepriorities of the Bush administration'. Zbigniew Brzezinski and James Harding, 'Iraq Crisis:Legitimacy of American Leadership eroded', Financial Times, 4 March 2003.

30. For the importance of legitimacy in international leadership especially when 'forming' newinternational practices in crisis management, see fotini Bellou, Direct and IndirectLeadership: The Case of the US and Bosnia, ELIAMEP Occasional Papers, OPO2 OA(Athens: ELIAMEP 2002)


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Image and intervention, leadership and legitimacy: The dynamics of Euro‐Atlantic engagement with challenges to international peace and security

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