Illicit Trafficking of Vehicles Across Beit Bridge Border Post · hijacking and car theft networks within South Africa also influenced the increase of cross-border smuggling of vehicles

Introduction

Over the past decade, trafficking in stolen or illicitlyacquired vehicles across South African borders hasbecome a concern for police officials, not only inSouth Africa, but also within the Southern AfricanDevelopment Community (SADC) as a whole. Thispaper focuses on the illicit movement of vehiclesthrough the South African land border into Zimbabwethrough Beit Bridge border post. Beforemoving to Beit Bridge, we begin with abrief overview of vehicle traffickingacross South Africa’s borders.

Illicit cross-border trafficking in motorvehicles refers to vehicles that are stolen,hijacked or fraudulently moved from onecountry to another for use or sale, eitherin the country that the vehicle crossesinto, or for transportation to a thirdcountry where it is to be used or sold.Trafficking in luxury cars appears to bethe most common form of cross-bordervehicle smuggling from South Africa.There are also known cases of trucks thatare stolen or hijacked and moved fromone country to another.1

The networks involved in this form of crime comprisenationals from two or more countries. Thesenetworks, through their contacts in the differentcountries, are not only able to source stolen orhijacked vehicles, facilitate border crossings and gainaccess to buyer markets, but can also ensure that thevehicle can be reregistered in the country where it isto be sold or used. The vast majority of stolen orhijacked vehicles have end users based within theSADC region, but there are reports of such vehiclesbeing smuggled into East Africa and some even beingshipped to markets as far away as Europe.2

South Africa is the major source of vehicles that aresmuggled within the SADC region; according toInterpol statistics, the country accounts for between96% and 98% of all vehicles acquired illicitly within theregion. These statistics are supported by the 1997 joint

operation codenamed V4, which involved securityagencies from Botswana, South Africa, Zambia andZimbabwe. During a 12-day period, the V4 operationsrecovered some 1,576 stolen vehicles of which a totalof 1,464 were stolen in South Africa.3 The SouthAfrican Police Services (SAPS) estimate thatapproximately 50% of all stolen or hijacked vehicles inSouth Africa are smuggled out of the country.4 Interpolfirst identified the smuggling of vehicles within the

SADC region during the latter part of the1980s when these vehicles were used asa form of currency and exchanged forcash, diamonds, and gold.5

There is some evidence of vehiclesmuggling across South Africa’s bordersprior to the 1990s but, by all accounts, itappears that volumes have increasedenormously in the past 15 years. Prior tothe 1990s, South African military andpolice control of the borders, and thelack of freedom of movement of peoplebetween South Africa and its neighbours,made trade in illicit vehicles difficultwithout the necessary co-operation ofthe security forces. After 1994, a number

of factors, including the opening up of borders and anincrease in trade and the movement of people,considerably reduced the risks associated with thetrade in illicit vehicles.

The growth and emergence of highly organisedhijacking and car theft networks within South Africaalso influenced the increase of cross-border smugglingof vehicles in the 1990s. These networks ensured thata large supply of illicitly acquired vehicles wasavailable to service not only the domestic market, butalso the regional, and to a lesser extent, the overseasmarkets.

The growth in drug trafficking within South Africa andthe region has also fuelled the smuggling of vehicles.There are reports not only of vehicles being used as acurrency to purchase drugs, but also of networks ofNigerian and Pakistani origin being linked to bothregional drug and illicit vehicle trafficking.6

The growth andemergence of highlyorganised hijacking

and car theftnetworks withinSouth Africa alsoinfluenced the

increase of cross-border smuggling of

vehicles in the1990s

Illicit trafficking of vehicles across Beit Bridge border post • page 1

Paper 109 • June 2005

Illicit trafficking of vehicles acrossBeit Bridge border postJenni Irish

ISS Paper 109 • June 2005Price: R10.00

A variety of methods are used to smuggle vehiclesacross South African borders. In some instances, 4x4luxury vehicles are driven across the long borderswithout going through an official border post. Onsome borders between South Africa and itsneighbours, the border line is only defined by a longstretch of cattle fencing that can easily be cut orbroken down to allow vehicles to cross.

In other cases, the vehicles are smuggled through theborder post itself using a variety of methods. Onemethod involves the fraudulent removal of vehiclesfrom South Africa with the permission of the owner ofthe vehicle. Once the vehicle has crossed the borderit is reported stolen or hijacked in South Africa. Thisform of crime often involves bank and insurance fraudwhere the owner will claim insurance for the ‘theft’.7

Another method of smuggling vehicles across theborders involves the use of duplicate papers. In suchcases, a vehicle will be stolen or hijacked and thentaken out of the country using duplicate papers thatdo not belong to the said vehicle. The duplicatepapers used actually belong to a vehicle of the samemodel and make as the one being smuggled out of thecountry, and often belong to anothervehicle that has either been scrapped ordisassembled. This form of crime oftentakes a fairly experienced eye to detect.This is especially the case when theengine and chassis numbers have beentampered with and the original numbersare difficult to detect.

Stolen or hijacked vehicles can bereregistered using contacts in the LicensingDepartment with relative ease, and thesefalse registration papers can be used tosmuggle the vehicles across the borders.There are also known cases where peoplefrom a neighbouring country may order astolen vehicle in advance. In such cases,the vehicle may be pre-registered in a neighbouringcountry before or immediately after it is hijacked orstolen. The stolen vehicle then crosses the border usingthe new registration papers of the country from which itwas ordered.

Where vehicles are being smuggled through borderposts, as opposed to across border lines, it is commonpractice to use export permits or temporary importpermits. In these circumstances, the networks rely onweaknesses identified in systems in place at borderposts, lack of compliance with procedures at borderposts, or compliant officials stationed at these posts.

Smuggling trucks across the borders is far lesscommon than motor vehicles. The vast majority oftrucks are stolen or hijacked for their cargo. However,during 1995 when the hijacking of trucks first rose toprominence, there were unconfirmed reports bysome transport companies that the trucks were being


Paper 109• June 2005

smuggled out of the country. In late 2004 similarreports emerged, and in a recent interview conductedat Beit Bridge with a transport company, it was allegedthat trucks were being stolen and then transported toZambia and the DRC where there are markets forstolen trucks.8

A person working for a prominent trucking companytold us that in the past, when the trucks were hijacked,the empty container and the horse and trailer wereusually recovered. However, now it is increasinglyreported that the horse part, particularly those that areMercedes or Volvos, is never found. The same personreferred to a recent incident during which one of theirtrucks had been stolen. A few months later, during apolice raid on an illegal trucking operation inJohannesburg, the horse and trailer had beendiscovered. The truck had been spray-painted and thedouble-axle had been converted to a single-axle.

The employee of the trucking company stated that theonly explanation for this conversion could be that thetruck was either destined for a neighbouring country orwas being illegally used to transport goods across theborders into the neighbouring countries. The rationale

behind his thinking is that in many SADCcountries, double axle trucks are notallowed on the roads.9

There have also been unconfirmedreports that stolen cars have beensmuggled out of South Africa intoZimbabwe in container trucks. The carsare hidden at the back of a containerbehind licit commodities packed at thefront of the container.10 Police at BeitBridge border post stated that they hadnever come across such a case, but thatit was possible that this was taking placealthough it was not likely to bewidespread.

Illicit movement of vehicles intoZimbabwe

The Beit Bridge border post and the 200 km of Nabobfence offer the only direct access to Zimbabwe fromSouth Africa. Unlike some of the other borders, whichconsist of no more than a cattle fence, the Zimbabweborder with South Africa is separated not only by thehigh-security Nabob fence but also by the LimpopoRiver that runs alongside it.

The Limpopo River and the existence of the Nabobfence make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, forvehicles to cross illegally into Zimbabwe through theborder. According to the Beit Bridge border police andthe SANDF, there have only been a few isolated cases of4x4 vehicles crossing into Zimbabwe using the border.These isolated cases occurred during extremely dryperiods when the Limpopo River was very low.11 Themajority of stolen vehicles smuggled from South Africa

The majority ofstolen vehiclessmuggled fromSouth Africa to

Zimbabwe make useof the Beit Bridgeborder post or arediverted through

Botswana orMozambique


to Zimbabwe make use of either the Beit Bridge borderpost or are diverted through Botswana or Mozambique.

Approximately 1,000 light vehicles and between 600and a 1,000 trucks travel through the Beit Bridgeborder post each day. This volume increases duringcertain peak periods such as month-ends and theChristmas holiday period.

Many of the networks involved in the smuggling ofvehicles across the border post are highlysophisticated. The general modus operandi involves aperson who drives the vehicle up to the border area.Once in the area, a new driver will take the vehiclethrough the border. This change over of drivers oftenoccurs because the new drivers not only have betterknowledge of the functioning of the border, but alsohave contacts on the Zimbabwean side of the border.

A small group of people based in the Musina area areknown to drive stolen vehicles across the border intoZimbabwe. These drivers are often termed jockeys,although according to interviews with communitymembers in Musina they are also known locally asMakintsa, which has loosely come to mean ‘oneinvolved in stolen vehicles’. A jockey couldwork for one or more crime networks andhas knowledge and experience of thefunctioning of the border post.

In the past couple of years, a groupknown as the ‘Maguma Guma’ haverisen to prominence at the border post.‘Maguma Guma’ in Shona means ‘to getsomething the easy way’12. TheseMaguma Guma are of Zimbabweanorigin and are involved in a variety ofcriminal activities ranging from pettytheft to facilitating the illegal crossing ofpeople and goods through the borderpost. The Maguma Guma is comprisedmainly of young men who residepredominantly on the Zimbabwean side of the borderbut move easily between the two countries. Some ofthe Maguma Guma operations are highly organisedwith people based in Bulawayo and Harare who toutfor them. Some Musina community crime forumsclaim that members of the Maguma Guma now hirethemselves out as jockeys to drive stolen or hijackedvehicles through the border post into Zimbabwe.

Vehicles being smuggled across the Beit Bridge borderwill often stop at particular locations in the border area,either to finalise details or change drivers before crossinginto Zimbabwe. Some of the stolen vehicles will stop atthese locations until the border officials that are knownto the network are on duty at the border post. There areat least four known locations that have been identifiedby police and community members, and which are usedby car smuggling networks as ‘safe locations’ where thestolen vehicles can stop. These locations include localmotels and petrol stations. Two of these locations have

been raided by the police on at least one occasion, butongoing policing of these locations relies on the policereceiving accurate information on exactly when the stolenvehicles will be at the locations.13

Policing of the Beit Bridge border

In order to better understand the policing of vehiclesthat move through Beit Bridge it is important to firstunderstand how the border post itself functions and therole and functions of different authorities stationed atthe border post. This section looks generally at policingand controls in place at Beit Bridge. The followingsection will look more specifically at the policing ofvehicle smuggling at Beit Bridge.

The Beit Bridge border post, like most border posts inSouth Africa, has undergone a number of significantchanges during the past decade. Prior to the end ofapartheid, the major priority at the border waspreventing the border and border crossing from beingused by insurgents opposed to the apartheidgovernment. The police and military dominated bordercontrol. Since the demise of apartheid, priorities have

changed. There is now greater emphasison the facilitation of the flow of trade andpeople. Civilian agencies, particularlyCustoms and Immigration, have begun toplay a far more prominent border controlfunction than they did under apartheid.

The Beit Bridge border post isadministered and policed by personnelfrom a number of different departments.The three primary departmentsresponsible for policing the border arethe SAPS, Customs & Excise and HomeAffairs. Both the Department of Healthand the Department of Agriculture alsohave a presence at the border post withmandates specific to health issues andthe control of Foot and Mouth disease.

The National Intelligence Agency (NIA) has a singleofficial based at the border post.

The SANDF is responsible for patrolling and securingthe border. In terms of current planning, the SANDFwill withdraw from this function by 2009 and thesecurity of the border will then become theresponsibility of the SAPS.

The Home Affairs Department’s role at the border post isto deal with the movement of people across the border.

Customs and Excise have four divisions responsible foradministering the Beit Bridge border post:

• The Passenger division; • The Cargo Division, which handles all imports and

exports; • The Operational and Administrative support

division; and


The Beit Bridgeborder is

administered andpoliced by

personnel from anumber of different

departments



• The Compliance Division, which includes anti-smuggling and business intelligence functions.

Until recently, the SAPS had three divisions based atthe border post:

• The Border Police, who were responsible for theoverall policing of the border post;

• The Bomb Disposal Unit; and• The Vehicles Identification Unit. This unit was

comprised of two sections, the VehicleIdentification Investigation section and the VehicleIdentification Safe Guard section. The latter wasresponsible for vehicles that are impounded andrelated matters. The Investigation section wasresponsible for recovering and investigating stolenvehicles.

A new pilot project is currently being introduced atthree border posts, one of which is Beit Bridge. Thepilot projects were agreed to by the South AfricanCabinet in 2004 and are in the process of beingimplemented. Beit Bridge has now been reclassified ahigh priority point of entry and, under this newclassification, the Protection and Security ServicesDivision will take over from the borderpolice with an expanded personnel base.The new policing structure will involve asingle command structure whereby allthe previous divisions will be absorbedinto the Protection and Security ServicesDivision. This Division will then report tothe Component Head: Port of EntryPolicing and Security.

While the pilot project is still in theprocess of being implemented, a newProtection and Security ServicesDivision Head has been appointed forthe Beit Bridge border post and itappears that some of the border policepersonnel are in the process of beingintegrated into this new Division. The Division willalso be beefed up with more than 230 additionalmembers who are currently in the process ofcompleting their training. These additional personnelwill increase the existing capacity of the border policefrom ten members per shift to approximately 60police per shift.

Beit Bridge has a Border Control Improvement Projectin place, which Customs and Excise is responsible foroverseeing. The first phase of the project has alreadybeen implemented and involved the refurbishment ofsome buildings and the construction of a number ofnew buildings.

There is no single department with overall authorityfor the Beit Bridge border post, and the differentdepartments often have diverse priorities. Monthlymeetings occur at the border and involve the differentgovernment departments. Chairing of these meetings

rotates between the different governmentdepartments. Line managers of the differentdepartments meet weekly, although attendance atthese meeting often fluctuates and not alldepartments are present each week.

The departments also participate in joint operationsthat, in many instances, involve not only thedepartments and the divisions stationed at the borderpost, but also draw in the SANDF and police structuresoutside of the border post. These operations focus onall forms of criminal activities and, more often thannot, involve the establishment of 24-hour roadblocksand check points around the border area.

Customs and Excise have also initiated three-monthlyplanning exercises between the different departmentsduring which each department presents its currenthigh-risk priorities. However, these different prioritiesoften do not match or overlap.

Despite the existence of these various forums, co-operation remains mainly dependent on individualsfrom the different departments and their will to worktogether with their colleagues in other departments.

These individuals are motivated by theirrespective departments’ own priorities,which do not always correspond withthose of their colleagues’ departments.There is, in other words, no overallborder control function, only differentagencies with different, sometimescompeting, mandates, Indeed, a recentsecurity assessment conducted by theNIA apparently argued for a singleauthority structure at the border.

Not all the departments stationed at theborder have investigative capacity.Customs has the capacity to investigatethe smuggling of goods. The police, whoshould be the primary investigation

agency, lack the capacity to conduct generalinvestigations into smuggling and only have a limitedinvestigation capacity based at the border itself.

The Customs Anti Smuggling Unit was establishedunder the Compliance Division in December 2002,and has the capacity to investigate the smuggling ofgoods at the border post. The Anti Smuggling Unit hasa staffing capacity of 36 people but there are currentlyfive vacancies at the Unit.

For their part, the police at the border only have thecapacity to investigate vehicles entering or leaving theborder post. SAPS members stationed at the bordercomprise only Border police officials and a specialvehicle detection section. There are no SAPSinvestigators stationed at the border to addressgeneral smuggling and, as a result, crimes not relatedto the trade in illicit vehicles are investigated by theCID based at the local police station in Musina. In

…co-operationremains mainlydependent on

individuals from thedifferent

departments andtheir will to worktogether with theircolleagues in other

departments

such cases, the police at the border will open adocket, which is then forwarded to the Musina policestation. If the case then appears to involve organisedcrime activities, the case will be forwarded to theSAPS Organised Crime Unit.

The Beit Bridge border handles extremely largevolumes of traffic and is considered the busiest landborder in Southern Africa. Congestion at the borderpost caused a major headache for the variousdepartments stationed at the border. In the past, theborder experienced serious problems when trucksentered the control area, which resulted in severeblockages at the border post. Vetting of paper workrequired before the trucks are allowed to pass acrossthe border can take some time to process, and trucksparked in the control area while this paper work wasbeing processed clogged up the control area.

This congestion not only made access to the controlarea difficult but also made policing of the controlarea extremely difficult. Of late, Customs and Excisehas introduced new systems to address thiscongestion. Trucks are only allowed to enter thecontrol area once all the paper work is completed.This has alleviated the congestionsignificantly by reducing the amount oftime the truck spends in the control area.Beit Bridge’s anti-congestion system isnow being looked at by othercommercial land borders as a possiblebest practice example of improving flowsthrough the border.

To prevent smuggling, vehicles must besearched. Yet searching vehicles has tobe balanced against the need not todisrupt trade. Presently, onlyapproximately 3% of cargo that passesthrough the border is physicallysearched. The searching of cargo isdependent on risk profiles developed bythe anti-smuggling unit. There is no scanner in placeat the border, though if one were to be installed, itwould allow border control officials to profile morevehicles. The scanner itself would not conclusivelyestablish whether smuggling was taking place or not,but it would alert the customs to irregularities in thecargo, which could lead to further physical searches.

Recently, Customs officials on the Zimbabwean side ofthe Beit Bridge border post installed a scanner.However, this scanner is only utilised for goods exitingZimbabwe and is located approximately five kilometresfrom the border post. According to one of the policeofficials interviewed, goods can be loaded and off-loaded between the point of scanning and the border. Physical security at the border post is a source offrustration for many of the officials stationed at BeitBridge. The border, over the past ten years, hasexpanded dramatically and new buildings andstructures have been added to the existing



infrastructure. The different departments are, intheory, housed in one building but the officials cannotmove from one department to the other withoutleaving the building. The design of the building alsomakes visibility by the officials extremely difficult. BothCustoms and the police complained that they have noclear line of sight from one side of the border to theother. This makes it difficult to observe what is comingtoward the border and what (or who) is going across it.

The situation is further complicated by the fact thatthere is no division between incoming and outgoingtraffic within the border area itself. Commercial andprivate traffic join the same queue. Of even moreconcern is the fact that exporters and importers canalso mingle. Access to the controlled area of theborder is not sufficiently controlled. People can moveacross the border from Zimbabwe without beingdetected and then enter the controlled area. SAPSofficials say that they have had vehicles being brokeninto while at the border post and that, during the busyperiod, criminals even join the queues and pick thepockets of travellers. Control of the border is madeeven more difficult due to the fact that some of thestaff members live within the border area itself.

Currently, there are 20 houses within thecontrol area that accommodate some ofthe staff working at the border. Both thepolice and Customs officials cited this asa problem when controlling access to theborder. A police official stated: ‘Thesestaff have visitors and how do we stopthis? A person may say that they arecoming to visit a border official but arereally there for other reasons and we willnever know.’

Being a 24-hour border post, trafficpasses through Beit Bridge at night andthe lighting at the border is insufficient.Officials from both the police andCustoms indicated that poor lighting at

the border made it difficult to police the border afterdark effectively.

Who exactly is responsible for controlling access to theborder control area is not well defined. At one pointthere was a pilot project at Beit Bridge where thepolice were tasked with securing access and exit, aswell as the periphery of the border control area.According to a border police official this project waslater abandoned because the border police did nothave the necessary staff capacity to perform thisfunction. Subsequently, in terms of the LogicalOrganisational Process (LOP), which attempted todefine roles and division of labour at the border postclearly, the function of securing the border control areafell to Customs and Excise. Currently, the situation isblurred and no one appears to have full control,although, in terms of the new pilot project, the SAPSwill now have the capacity to perform this function. Aborder police official stated: ‘With ten people per shift

Who exactly isresponsible for

controlling access tothe border control

area is not welldefined

it was impossible for us to perform this function. Oncewe receive the additional personnel according to thenew pilot project, this will now become possible.’

Another problem for Customs is the lack of a securevehicle detention area. One police official cited anincident during March 2005 during which a ‘bakkie’(LDV), that had been detained by Customs,disappeared from the detention area during the night.The official suspected that the bakkie had been stolenback by its owner. Transport companies alsocomplained about items being stolen off their trucksand a trucker referred to what is commonly known as‘midnight spares’ where batteries, lights and other itemswere removed from trucks detained at the border.

Goods entering South Africa through Beit Bridge, thatare being trans-shipped to a third country, must travelfrom the border post to a bonded warehouse. Fromthere, they make their way to an air or sea port. Somegoods whose final destination is South Africa also transitat bonded warehouses. Customs officials worry that thejourney from the border post to the bonded warehouseis unmonitored, and that goods may go missing enroute. Customs officials, as well as someof the import and export agencies,believe that if the bonded warehouseswere located closer to the border, thesituation would be easier to control.Recently a bonded warehouse forsecond-hand cars being exported toZimbabwe was established at Musinabut there is a need to look at additionalwarehousing for other goods.

Goods transported by rail do not stop atBeit Bridge and are therefore notcleared at the border post. The goodsare checked and cleared in Germistoninstead. Customs officials are notsatisfied with this arrangement sincethere are numerous stops betweenGermiston and Beit Bridge where goods can be loadedor off-loaded from the trains after they have beenchecked.

While most goods and vehicles declare themselves atthe border post when crossing directly from SouthAfrica into Zimbabwe, some goods and people aresmuggled across the border. For the SANDF who areresponsible for controlling the border, combating thisform of smuggling is extremely difficult. Illicit bordercrossings are planned in order to smuggle meat,sugar, cigarettes and other contraband items. Duringa four-week period when a special observationexercise was conducted by the SANDF, more than7,384 illegal border crossings were detected.According to the SANDF, people cross at points thatspan almost the entire border and some of thecrossings are highly organised. The smugglers havewell-established communication systems and specificpick-up points at specific times. In fact, the SANDF

indicated that the routes have become so wellorganised that sometimes markers are used to denotespecific crossings. Pieces of red cloth or bottles andtins indicate crossings for smuggled meat, while whitecloth indicates pick-up points for other smuggledcontraband. Red paint on the wire indicates a pointwhere humans can cross.

SANDF officials stated that their effectiveness inpatrolling the border is questionable due to a numberof different factors:

• The SANDF does not have sufficient personnel topatrol the fence or to respond to alarms that areset off by the fence;

• The fence has a number of gates, which are usedby farmers to access the Limpopo River, and theSANDF does not control the keys to these gates;

• The SANDF troops are not sufficiently trained incustoms or immigration protocol;

• The fence itself is not being properly maintainedby the contractors;

• SANDF troops are susceptible to bribes. In oneincident a troop of soldiers had a ‘day pass’ system

in place where illegals paid R30 eachto cross into South Africa.14

Policing the smuggling ofvehicles at the Beit Bridgeborder

As is clear from the previous section,smuggling of vehicles is not the onlyform of crime taking place at the BeitBridge border. The smuggling ofgoods into South Africa, in particularcontraband cigarettes, is a prioritycrime at Beit Bridge. During February2005 more than R12 million worth ofcigarettes was confiscated at BeitBridge and destroyed. Otherproblems faced by customs include

round-tripping, under-evaluation, ghost exports andthe smuggling of stolen goods across the border intoZimbabwe.

It is well known that the economic crisis inZimbabwe has triggered a mass exodus of people.Some estimate that as many as three millionZimbabweans have left their country.15 Controllingillegal immigration is a priority for the Department ofHome Affairs at Beit Bridge. As discussed earlier, thesituation is extremely difficult to control because thevast majority of people are not crossing through theborder post but rather across the rest of the border,which is notoriously difficult to monitor.

It was earlier noted that the SAPS has limitedinvestigative capacity at Beit Bridge. A specialisedcapacity it does have, is to detect the smuggling ofvehicles across the border post. Indeed, it is the leadagency in this regard.



During a four-weekperiod more than

7,384 illegal bordercrossings were

detected

The role of Customs in regard to vehicles relates to theissuing of Temporary Import Permits and DA65s.Customs officials issue Temporary Import Permits forvehicles from Zimbabwe temporarily in South Africaand DA65 permits to South African vehicles takentemporarily into Zimbabwe. Vehicles leaving SouthAfrica with a DA65 will then be required to get aTemporary Import Permit (TIP) on the Zimbabweanside of the border. The role of Customs in the issuing ofDA65 and TIPs appears to be largely an administrativeprocess. The police play the major role by ensuring thatthe vehicle is legally permitted to leave the country.

There are a number of procedures that exist with regardto the policing of vehicles crossing the border at BeitBridge. While some of these procedures are commonto vehicles crossing most border posts in South Africa,there are others that have been implementedspecifically to address problems experienced by thepolice at the Beit Bridge border post.

Vehicles that are still being financed by a bank requireprior permission from the relevant bank beforeleaving South Africa. This takes the form of a letterfrom the bank stating that the driverhas the permission of both the ownerand the bank to remove the vehiclefrom the country.

As the number of stolen or hijackedcars has increased, the banks havebecome extremely strict in this regard.However, despite the banks making itclear that this requirement is spelt outin the contract signed with the bankand appears regularly on bankstatements sent to their relevant clients,there are still a significant number ofpeople who arrive at the border postwithout such letters. Police at the BeitBridge border post have establishedsystems with the different banks; evenif a bank-financed vehicle arrives at the border postwithout such a letter, the police will be able to contactthe relevant bank to verify that the car can leave thecountry. Even in instances where a letter is presentedby the driver at the border post, the police maydouble-check the letter with the relevant bankauthorities if they suspect that the vehicle may bestolen or being fraudulently removed from the country.

In instances where a vehicle is not financed by a bank,and appears to be taken out of the country legally, acopy of the details of the relevant vehicle crossing theborder should appear on the National InformationCentre for Border Control data base. In theory, thisinformation should be able to be accessed by insurancecompanies when following up on stolen vehicles. A system known as UNICODE has also beenintroduced to assist police with identifying stolenvehicles crossing the border. Border officials canaccess the UNICODE system via a handheld device. If

a stolen vehicle presents itself at the border post, itsdetails should show up on the system. A stolenvehicle’s appearance on the UNICODE system isdependent on how often the system is updated andthere can sometimes be as much as a three day delaybefore the vehicle appears on the UNICODE system.The police also have access to NATIS, the NationalTraffic Identification System, on which both SAPS andvehicle licence information is captured. NATIS shouldprovide all details about the vehicle including whetherit is bank financed, listed as stolen or scrapped. Oncea vehicle is reported stolen it should immediatelyappear on the NATIS system. However, there aretimes when there are delays at the local police stationwhere the theft was reported, and the vehicle doesnot appear immediately on the NATIS system.

In addition to these procedures, the police alsoconduct spot checks on vehicles to determinewhether the chassis and engine numbers are the sameas those listed on the documentation and licence disc.Police customarily target vehicles carrying nopassengers and little luggage for spot checks, as well asSouth African-owned vehicles driven by foreigners.

Spot checks are also conducted on thebasis of local knowledge of smugglers’modus operandi and on observation ofdrivers’ behaviour.

The SAPS at Beit Bridge have enteredinto agreements with the local SAPSCrime Intelligence division to co-operate on information regardingorganised crime. On a daily basis,meetings are held between seniorSAPS border officials and CrimeIntelligence. If a driver is arrestedattempting to smuggle a vehicle acrossthe border he or she is handed over toCrime Intelligence for questioning.

In addition to the measures introducedat the border post, there are also Southern AfricanPolice Chief‘s Co-ordinating Committee (SARPCCO)agreements in place that should make it more difficultto register a South Africa vehicle in another SADCcountry. This SARPCCO system requires the driver of avehicle being exported to another SADC country to notonly pay the necessary customs duties, but also toacquire a special SARPCCO clearance certificate fromthe country of origin. This certificate must then beproduced in the country the vehicle is being exportedto, before the vehicle can be registered in that country.In the past, vehicles being exported from South Africacould acquire police clearances from any police station.To prevent corruption in this process, the newSARPCCO agreement will require clearance to beobtained from designated police clearance points thatare SARPCCO-recognised.

A large number of second-hand vehicles from Japandestined for Zimbabwe arrive on the African continent

Police customarilytarget vehicles

carrying nopassengers and little

luggage for spotchecks, as well as

South African-owned vehicles

driven by foreigners





at South African sea ports and then enter Zimbabwethrough Beit Bridge. To address the problem of stolenvehicles originating in South Africa being shippedthrough as part of these consignments, the police willoften check these vehicles. According to police officials,these second-hand vehicles can easily be distinguishedfrom South African-manufactured vehicles because theshapes and vehicle details are different.

Procedures regarding the smuggling of trucks acrossthe border are less easy to manage. In most cases, thedriver is not the owner of the truck and there is nosystem in place to check or verify if permission hasbeen received to remove the truck.

Problems encountered when policing thesmuggling of vehicles

Given all these controls and procedures, it should bedifficult, if not impossible, to smuggle vehicles(especially light motor vehicles) across the Beit Bridgeborder. Nonetheless, border officials acknowledgethat vehicles do still cross into Zimbabwe illicitly.There are a number of reasons why controlling thisform of crime is difficult. Some of theserelate to system weakness and co-ordination. Others relate to humanfactors.

At present, the smuggling of vehiclesacross the border post is perceived to beentirely a police matter. There is littleinter-departmental co-operation in thisregard. For instance, the Customs anti-smuggling unit is not directly involved indetecting vehicle smuggling. It could beargued that there is a need for greaterinter-departmental co-operation in thisregard. Officials from all departmentsshould be trained and given incentivesto detect vehicle smuggling. Customshas attempted to establish quarterlyplanning meetings at which departments identify andshare their respective priorities. But there is perhapsinsufficient cross-training and little incentive for thisinformation-sharing to translate into effective co-operation.

Indeed, the SAPS acknowledge that while they makeevery effort to carry out checks on all vehicles at theborder post, there are occasions, particularly whenthere is a build-up of vehicles at the exit of the borderpost, when a car may manage to slip through withoutbeing properly checked. Early warning signals byCustoms or Immigration personnel of potentialproblems may assist the police to identify a particularvehicle that needs to be investigated.

Significant attention has been paid to risk-profiling forthe smuggling of light vehicles through the border, butthe detection of trucks appears to be dependent onthe police receiving prior information that a stolen

truck is going to be smuggled through the border.There are a number of reasons for this, one of whichis that, unlike light vehicles, truck drivers are notrequired to provide proof of permission from theactual owner of the truck before removing it from thecountry. Given that smuggling of trucks across theborders is nowhere near as extensive as the smugglingof light vehicles, it has received less priority and thereare no developed systems in place to address thisform of crime.

Apart from insufficient co-ordination between thedifferent departments stationed at the border, thereare also weaknesses in the systems used to detectvehicles being smuggled through the border post. TheUNICODE system plays a critical role in detectingvehicles that have been stolen but certain weaknessesin the system have been identified. The UNICODEsystem is not as up-to-date as the NATIS system, anda recently stolen vehicle may not appear on theUNICODE system. Another problem is that thehandheld device linking border control officials to thesystem has a battery lifespan of just four hours. Thereare thus periods when the system is being recharged

and is not in use. In any event, theUNICODE system plays a limited role. Itonly tells border control officials whethera vehicle is recorded as stolen. It doesnot assist in the detection of duplicatevehicle papers, for instance. The policealso have access to the NATIS system,which provides additional details thatare not available on the UNICODEsystem. However, one of the policeofficials who was interviewed stated:

Not all our members are trained andhave access to the system. It alsocosts money to use the system. Weare constantly being told; every timeyou press the button to access thesystem it costs the police money.

This obviously makes us cautious about usingthis system.

The UNICODE system that is currently in use isprivately owned and there are plans to introduce anew system that will be owned by the police. This newsystem will not only provide additional details on thevehicle being checked but will also involve thescanning of the licence disc in the hope of avertingproblems associated with human error, such asincorrect digits being captured onto the system.

The police at the Beit Bridge border post have alsopicked up cases where letters from the banks grantingpermission to move the vehicle across the borderhave been forged or fraudulently acquired. To combatthis problem, Wesbank has recently introduced a newsystem where only a select group of Wesbankpersonnel are eligible to sign these letters. The namesof these personnel have also been forwarded to the

The UNICODEsystem that is

currently in use isprivately owned and

there are plans tointroduce a new

system that will beowned by the police



police at Beit Bridge. However, not all the banks havesimilar systems in place and even in the case ofWesbank, the system relies on the border official toverify the signatures and notice irregularities.

The debate about the functions and responsibilities ofthe different departments operating at the borderpost is related to the function of moving bank-financed vehicles through the border. Customs isresponsible for processing the DA65 document,which allows for the temporary removal of thevehicle from South Africa. In theory, they should beresponsible for checking the related documentation.However, the view of the Banking Council of SouthAfrica and the police is that bank authorisationshould remain the responsibility of the police. This ismost likely based on the banks’ viewpoint that thepolice are more likely to prioritise the crime ofsmuggling vehicles than Customs.

What this means is that a vehicle that is temporarilycrossing into Zimbabwe needs to first obtain theDA65 and then obtain authorisation from the police.Under the current system where the departmentshave different priorities, it is understandable that thisduplication occurs, but if the prioritieswere better understood, this duplicationcould be avoided.

The border police at Beit Bridgecurrently operate on a three-monthlyrotation basis. The rationale for this isthat it prevents or limits the corruption ofofficials at the border post. However, likemost systems, it has its weaknesses: everythree months, new staff unfamiliar withthe operandi of car smugglers must gainvital knowledge from scratch. The newpersonnel arrive with all the theory butwill require some time before they canlearn the practical lessons linked to theillicit trade in vehicles.

The new pilot project at Beit Bridge, which, as statedearlier, will see large numbers of SAPS personneldeployed permanently at the border post, willobviously do away with the rotational system and it isstill too early to say whether this will have a negativeor positive effect on policing at the border. Under thenew system, the number of SAPS personnel on dutyat Beit Bridge will increase from ten to 60 per shift.This may resolve many of the problems linked tocapacity at the border post, if it is implementedsuccessfully. However, one of the challenges that thenew pilot project will pose, and which applies to mostsituations where there is a dramatic increase incapacity, is how to effectively manage this increaseand ensure that new personnel are sufficiently skilledand experienced to perform the required tasks.

Aside from systemic weaknesses, officials interviewedfor this paper identified complicity of border control

officials and corruption as a crucial facilitating factorin the smuggling of vehicles across the Beit Bridgeborder post. This applies not only to the smuggling ofvehicles but to all forms of crimes occurring at theborder post. This corruption also relates to facilitatingpaperwork, and extends to personnel stationed at theexit who assist in facilitating illegal activities either bynot checking or verifying any of the documentation,or by simply ignoring inaccuracies in thedocumentation. According to the police, some carsmuggling networks leave their vehicles in safelocations close to the border and wait until certaincomplicit officials arrive on duty before taking thevehicle through the border.

A number of investigations into corruption have beenconducted by different departments and agencies atthe Beit Bridge border post. According to the police,in the past three years, more than 27 police membershave been transferred away from the Beit Bridgeborder, some as a result of suspicion of corruption.

Some transporters, forwarding and clearing agents, andborder officials have indicated that the investigations andthe current systems in place, such as the rotation of the

police, have significantly reducedcorruption, although it is still a problemthat needs ongoing attention.

A forwarding and clearing agent whowas interviewed stated:

You have a big investigation at theborder and immediately after thatthings improve and people arescared to involve themselves inirregular practice, but if this is notfollowed up and built on, thecorruption gradually seeps back.

The different departments face majorchallenges in addressing corruption

because the money on offer to officials is substantial. Aborder police officer stated that he had been offeredR35,000 to turn a blind eye to a R9 million consignmentof cigarettes being smuggled across the border.

One-Stop border post

Despite all the current challenges facing policing ofthe Beit Bridge border post, the greatest challenge isyet to come.The Beit Bridge border post has beenidentified as one among several that will eventuallybecome a 'One-Stop border post'. This will mean thatpeople and goods travelling between South Africa andZimbabwe will only stop once at a single border post.There will no longer be a Zimbabwean and SouthAfrican border post but rather a single crossing point.The plan is that goods going into Zimbabwe will bechecked by the Zimbabwean authorities, and goodscoming out of Zimbabwe will be checked by SouthAfrican authorities.

The Beit Bridgeborder post has

been identified asone among severalthat will eventually

become a 'One-Stopborder post'



ordinated approach to border control needs to bebacked up by equipping the relevant departmentswith the requisite training and infrastructure.

Endnotes

1 J Irish and K Qhobosheane, South Africa, in P Gastrow(ed), Penetrating State and Business: Organised crime inSouth Africa, volume II, Pretoria, Institute for SecurityStudies, Monograph 89, November 2003, p 75.

2 Ibid, p 76.3 P Gastrow, Organised Crime in the SADC region,

Pretoria, Institute for Security Studies, Monograph 60,August 2001, p 59.

4 Ibid, p 59.5 FJ Msutu, Trends and Patterns of Organised Crime in the

Southern African Region, paper presented at Institute forSecurity Studies regional seminar, “Developinglegislative responses to organised crime” Pretoria 26/27February 2001, p 9.

6 Unpublished research conducted by Injobo Nebandlainto Drug trafficking in the SADC region for the SouthAfrican Institute of International Affairs, 2002/3.

7 Irish & Qhobosheane, op cit, p 77.8 Author’s interview conducted with transport company

owner, Beit Bridge border post, 15 April 2005. 9 Author’s interview with a Johannesburg-based trucking

company, City Deep, 20 February 2005.10 Author’s interview with South African NGO member

working in Zimbabwe.11 Author’s interviews with the SAPS border police

stationed at Beit Bridge and the SANDF Joint TacticalHeadquarter Limpopo, 3 & 4 February 2005.

12 Solidarity Peace Trust, No War In Zimbabwe,Johannesburg, November 2004, p 60.

13 Author’s interview with four youths living in Rwanda, 20February 2005.

14 Solidarity Peace Trust, op cit, p 17.15 Author’s interviews with the SAPS border police

stationed at Beit Bridge and the SANDF Joint TacticalHeadquarter Limpopo, 3 & 4 February 2005.

16 Presentation made by the SANDF Joint TacticalHeadquarters, Limpopo, 4 February 2005.

17 Solidarity Peace Trust, op cit, p 17.

List of abbreviations

LOP Logical Organisational ProcessNATIS National Traffic Identification System NIA National Intelligence AgencySADC Southern African Development CommunitySANDF South African National Defence ForceSARPCCO Southern Africa Regional Police Chiefs Co-

operation OrganisationSAPS South African Police ServiceTIP Temporary Import Permit

With regard to the smuggling of vehicles and thesystems put in place by the SAPS to reduce illegalvehicle crossings, the biggest challenge will be thejurisdiction of the SAPS to operate on theZimbabwean side of the border. A bilateral agreementis required between South Africa and Zimbabwe, thatwill allow the SAPS to operate on the Zimbabweanside of the border if the police are to continue to playa role in vetting vehicles crossing this one-stop border.

Conclusion

There are numerous challenges facing officials at theBeit Bridge border post, many of which involvesmuggling of vehicles and other forms of crimeoccurring at the border. Many of these challenges arenot unique to Beit Bridge and apply equally to otherland borders in South Africa.

One of these challenges relates to the capacity ofdifferent personnel stationed at the border,particularly the SAPS. The new pilot project willincrease the physical presence of the SAPS at theborder post but will not necessarily address theinvestigative capacity of the SAPS. The police are theprimary agency responsible for crime prevention,cross border smuggling and dealing with transnationalcrime syndicates. As such there is a need to build theinvestigative capacity of the SAPS at Beit Bridge.

Another challenge is securing the physicalenvironment of the border control area so as toenable more restricted and controlled access andmovement within this area. The plans developedunder the Beit Bridge Border Improvement Projectneed to address this physical environment as part ofupgrading the border post.

The human factor and complicity of staff stationed atthe border is an ongoing problem at almost all bordercontrol sites and is one of the most difficult issues toaddress. During interviews with both SAPS officialsand Customs, suggestions were made regarding theinstallation of CCTV cameras within the bordercontrol area as one possible means of reducing levelsof corruption.

However the biggest challenge at the border remainsthe lack of alignment and co-ordination between thedifferent departments stationed at the border post.There is an urgent need to develop a more co-ordinated approach to the way different departmentswork and prioritise tasks at the border post. Currently,each department has it own set of priorities, which,more often than not, do not correspond with thepriorities of their colleagues in the other departments.The situation is worsened by a lack of overall authorityat the border post. To address the smuggling ofvehicles (in fact, all forms of crime occurring at theborder) effectively, there is a need for all thedepartments to have a single set of priorities and goalsto which each department contributes. This co-



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About this paperOver the last decade the trafficking in stolen vehicles has become a prominent form of crime within Southern Africa.Vehicles stolen or hijacked in South Africa are transported across the borders for sale in neighbouring countries.

Since 1994 there have been a number of significant changes to the policing of South African land borders. Anumber of innovative measures were introduced to address the illicit cross border trafficking of vehicles. The BeitBridge border with South Africa is one such land border.

This report examines the policing of the Beit Bridge border post, and discusses measures in place to prevent theillicit cross border vehicle trade and the impact these measures have had on this trade.

About the authorJenni Irish-Qhobosheane works for Injobo Nebandla, which is a consultancy that focuses on conductinginvestigative research within Southern Africa. Injobo Nebandla has worked on various criminal justice relatedprojects and has produced several publications including: Vehicle hijackings in South Africa, Assessing communitycrime prevention initiatives in communities in Kwazulu Natal, Crime in post conflict societies in Southern Africa,and Drug trafficking within South Africa and neighbouring countries.

FunderThis paper and the researchupon which it is based wasmade possible through thegenerous funding of theRoyal Danish Governmentthrough their Embassy inSouth Africa.

© 2005, Institute for Security Studies • ISSN: 1026-0404

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Illicit Trafficking of Vehicles Across Beit Bridge Border Post · hijacking and car theft networks within South Africa also influenced the increase of cross-border smuggling of vehicles

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