ie/v · 2012. 6. 2. · Air prep, an eighteen minute Air Cav LZ examination, and a one minute ku LZ prep, five maneuver battalions (three US and tTdo UVN) were inserted in%:, five

DEPARBSNT OFTI-I.EAiU'ff UNCLASSIF;ED 73 i Headquari;ers 3d Brigade, lOlst brlmme Division (wbfie)

BP0 San Francisco 96383

AVDG-CA-E 25 Junl? 1969

SUi3jEcT : Co&at Operation@ !titer hctim fit?pUrt - S-7 APmz sxow

Comnding Gw5.ral Headquarters lolst Airborne Divisim C~~obile) kr)~ San Francisco 96383

1. Name rrr,d Ty-pe of Operation: Operation APACHE WOW; ReCWZsWCe *, 7k Force.

2, Dates of Operation: 10 May - 7 June 1969,

3. Location: 'I"hfLs operation was conducted in l&m Hoa Db*ict, Thus 'kim Prodma. Map References: Sheets; l:f;O,CKXl 6i&Z It, 11, 111, Iv; Series L7014 t L7015,

4. Control HcAdwarters: ~~~ 3d me, 10bt ki.rtr=me Ditision kirmobile~~

., &port;-hg Officer: Joseph B, Cmy Jr*, Colonel Infantry, Carrrmandingm 3' a

6. Task Organization:

~(-1 mt-1 N J-s Cav . .

A-2-&5 OPCON 18-21May D4?-5& OPCON

+e Contra&

Bde Scty Plat ~326hgr (m) Rcn l-506 A-158 BHB (A% A-2-17 Cav Us8 AHB (DS) 2-319 drty (m) TACP2OTlrss c-2-11 grty &m 58th Set Dog PLat C-2194 Arty (GSR) 3d F'S% C-1-83 Arty (GSR)

AE~FUDED UNCLASSIFIED BV l)OWGRADED AT 3 YEA3 IHTEIW'JS DI3CLASSIFmkFTER 12-i DOD DXR ~ZOO,lO

UNCLASSIF!E:-i

..... ''(';r

DEPAR'OOm OF THE ~ UNCLASSIFIED HeD.dquarters 3d Brigade, 101st Ai.rborne Divi5ion (Airmobile)

!PO San Francisco 96383

J..vrG-CA-E 2~ June 1969

SUBJECT: Combat Operation. After Action Report - SUII'Il1ary APACHE 3NOW

Co~nding General Headquarters lOlst Airborne Division (Airmobile) A~O San Francisco 96383

1. :'lame and Type of Operation: Operation APl~CHE SNOW j Reconnai.ssance in Force.

2. Dates or Operation: 10 May - 7 June 1969.

3. Location: This Operation was conducted in Nam Rca District, Thua Thien Province. Map References: Sheets; 1:50,000 644l. I .. II" III, IV; Series L 7014 &. L 701$.

4. Control H(l.adquarters: Hqs 3d Bde, lOUit Airborne Division (Airmobile).

7. Reporting Officer: Joseph B. Conmy Jr.~ Colonel Infantry, Conrnandinr:;.

6. Tasle Organization:

~-1&1

A-2-506 OPCON 18-21 May

1-$ Cav

D-2-505 OPCON

13de Control

Bcle Scty Plat Rcn 1-506 £\.-2-17 Cav 2-319 Arty (DS) C-2-11 Arty (GSR) C-2-94 Arty (GSR) C-1-83 Arty (GSR)

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED BY

~OF DOD DIR. 5200. 1 R BY ~tfiV7 ON IImtytr;

69ft' (sLI

13-326 Engr (00) A-158 ARB (DS) B..158 ARB (DS) TACP 20 TASS 58th Set Dog Plat 3d FSSE

JXJVmGRADED AT .3 YEAR nrTERVAIS DECLASSIFIED m'ER 12 YErulS DOD DL~ 5200.10

, ,) ( a UNCLASSIFfE[

ie/v J /

i

4tkABsaA-E 25 June 1?69 SUBJECT: Combat Operations hfter AcCiOn %pOpt - SUtlWSy

XFum SNOW UNCLASSIFIED

:1 . i: 24.7 SW - supported 3d Bde by reconnaigaancc, the marking 02 J 1 _'I_. -' prior to insertions, the screening of ground units and along the

,., ~ .'. .: Ji-.t,..;;n border, and by ptipointing enemy mortar and rocket locations, 2% ':iicl 5 for further details).

-. :/” I’\r&jJ-Jery -

/ - units shown in task organizntion provided support

:<~.r~ 2i-l preps, units in contact, H & I: fires, and direct f5.z-o in deiensc 2:: Sx?s underground and sapper attack. (See &cl 7 for further details).

C* 7th 'l2.F - provided 30th preplanned and ixmediate air strikes ~5th air prio;*ity to units in contact, LZ preps, u construction, and j.ntclli,~cncc targets, (See Ino1 3,fo;o f&her detail&

ri, -!fhl. ."JJGCl A-m %-cup - proviiecl airlift for combat assauD- and ::~k%rn ctims f establishment of fire suppmt bases, resupply sortkcs during ,t:.: : 0'1: 2 1-2 $, y! ; and pathfinder control. on both Li: insertions and fire b;lscsu (See ?nci ,$ for further details).

co IQ33tical su,ort - elments of the 1~26 Su

&&ed trv 3d FSSE, DISCC$ 102s-t Abn %.v, ply and Serv&Batt&t.ion, co c 326 Medical %, .

CO D B0ls-t Maintenance % attalion, k 1002 Supply and Service Gmparry, 26th Group tJ/gOL Ptitoon, Laundr-3 and Bath Platoon and Graves &gistration. Section, (See Lx1 h for detailed breakdown on support units, mission rq~iremcnts and services rendered).

8* Iil-tsl ligenCf.2 : See &closure 1 for cqlete details.

Operation APACHE WW confirmed that elements of tht-: bth, 9th, and 29th k,gixxnts were using t.he NOrthem k ShaU VallCy 3s a pI'&lv WC for novment of material and infiltration of troops to enemy units throughOUt I c02?pS~ Using -%dis Research Unit techniques and qui&Ly reacting to information gained through POW interrogation, the 3d Brigmk ;~;:s a-ale La exploit hard intelligence and rondcr the 7th, 8'&,and 9th ~i-Ltaliona of the 29th &gt plus its technical units combat ineffeoti.ve. -.. so identified were sappers of the Kl.2 battalion and the K6 (wcli 806th) ._ --l.II., 6th &qimnt, znd K35 h-by &n (Rock&), These units; after unit

2 UNCLASSIFIED

~A-E 2, Juno 1969 SUBJECT: Conbat Operations .f:lfter h.ction Report - Summary

~ACHE SNOW UNCLASSIFIED

1.8 t iJ?Vi~ Re gt

1-1 kiNN Bn 1V/FO Party 2-1 AF\i'N Bn wifO Pc.::rty ::-l .hR.'fl'! Bn v;/FC P a:rt~~ L!-l i"Rvl\! Bn wjFe Party B2ttcry 11 ARVN Arty (DS) Batt.ery 34 liliVN .h.rty (GSR) 1 LNO Party

3d ARVN Reg!!

1-3 AR'vJ.~ Bu ~ /Fo Party 2-3 ARVN En w/FO Party 3-3 ARVN Bn wlFO Party Battery 12 ilRVN Arty (DS)

:; ,0 2-17 Cay - supported 3d Bele by reconnaissance, the marking 01 ,J::':'':: prior to insertions, the screening of ground units and along the

J'J :,;.::<.:n border, and by pinpointing enemy mortar and rocket locations. , . ~v i~ncl 5 for .further detaUs). .

0" "'~rtillery - units shown in task organization prcn..-j.ded support /c/ ~.J(; preps, u..'1its in contact, H & I fires, and diroct fire in defense ):~ b2S':;S "J.."1derground and s8pper' attack. (See Incl 7 for further details).

c& 7th TAF - provided both prep1anned and ilmnediate air str:ikes Hi th 3ir prio~ity to units in contact~ LZ preps~ 12 construction~ and intclli3cncc t<:lrget·s", (See Incl 8.f.tn: :f".rlher details).

de l60th hYn Grcup - provided airlift for combat assaults and ~,:xtr(}ctians, est.ablishment of fire support basos, resupply sorties durinG t:~) OP(]l~~!'tj.O;!3 and pathfiJlder control on both LZ insertions and fi.re bases. (See 7::ncl 4 for further det<Jils).

Co Logistical Support - provided by 3d FSSE, DISCOM, lOlst Abn Div) elements of the 1:26 Suppply and Service Battalion, Co C 326 Medical Bn, Co D 80Ist Maintenance Battalion, Det 1002 Supply and Service Company, 26th Group w/pOL Platoon, Laundry and Bath Platoon and Graves Registration. Section. (Soe Inc1 4 for detailed breakdown on support units, mission rOCI'Jiremcnts a.nd services rendered).

8. Intalligence: See Inclosure 1 for complete details.

Operation APACHE SJCJvl Confirmed thot elemonts of the 6th, 9th, and 29th Regiments were usin~ the Northern /.;. Shau Valley as a prim.ary LOC for movement of material and infiltration of troops to enemy units through()ut I Corps. Using Radio Resoarch Unit, techniques and quickly reClcting to Ll1formation gained through POW interrogation~ the 3d Brigode ,las ob1e to p:xploit hard intelligence :lnd render the 7th, 8th ,31.1d 9th b.?ttalioTl8 of the 29th Rcgt plus its technical units combat ineffeotive. i:L30 identified were sappers of the Kl2 battalion and the K6 (AKA 806th) ~~;n, 6th Rog;..mcnt, and K35 .b.rty Bn (Rocket). These units; after unit

2 UNCLASSIFIED

.4VDG&I:,.-E 25 June 1969 SUBJFGT: Combat Operations After Action &port - Summary

APiiC!B SNOW UNCLASSIFIED

identification and lomtior, had hem confimcd, wore constantly identification and lomtior, had hem confimcd, wore constantly huL?dcd IJ-- '7~~2 Air, i~rtillery, huL?dcd IJ-- '7~~2 Air, i~rtillery, and pr:mqit by 3d Brigade ground and pr:mqit by 3d Brigade ground fOiT.cS. fOiT.cS. This klvariably resulted ir, the capture of a POW WhGSC This klvariably resulted ir, the capture of a POW WhGSC

interrogation resulted in valuable information gainod~ i4. interrogation resulted in valuable information gainod~ i4.

90 Mission:

-3d Bde and 1st AW'Y 3eg-t; conduct combined air-mobile assmlts into the Northern k Shau Valley in conjunction with the 9th Warines and the 3d iXJiJ hq$ to destroy NVA/VC forces, block enemy routes of egress into Lc?OSJ interdict enemy LGC, and to loca-tt and destroy enemy caches.

3.2 . . Concept of Operation:

a3 - Prior to Baay, 10 I4ay 69, the is-t and 3d ARm %gts and the >I+ &iszcic 101 established three i~~~-tualljr suppor%ing fire baSeS at .,..

i'R Sr*:ldJ_oy (‘ij3278122), FB kirborne (YD355070) and FB Currahee (YC3P?P4P)e Oil ll.~II3~;, following a fifty minute rT.K -&--til:i~rji p:ap,

Air prep, an eighteen minute Air Cav LZ examination, and a one minute ku LZ prep,

five maneuver battalions (three US and tTdo UVN) were inserted in%:, five separate U's along the Laotian border overlooking the Northern -4 Sha.1 Valley-, After searching and clearing the immediate LZ area, all L'S b2 ttalio~s began e,&,erisive mF operations to the East arlci i~OdleClS"c

to;-yard tile ValItey f'loore i&f&r the insertion of the maneuver battalions had -tye;yL co;ilpieted at 200 harry, tj;e z-l(-) L!CN BE cambat, assaulted C!..t, i.jYl Ti 6~~~ I4mtab (X3253090) and secured FB Tiger for the jllsertiarl ,-,;.; 3izt.tei-y 12 SVN iktjJ,~ery (10~~). ‘DE 3-5 C~V secured zoute 547 and ---, . 2 1;"2 &es Blaze (QQ4203), Bastogz (1YD62~~P5), and km.non (yD475028), i>L~:~;~e S)J? -js the al!. weather route to SC used for resupplly of U.&t3

:~~rkL:lg -in, the valley and along its ridge lines,

be Operations Narrative: On BJ)ay, 1Q May 1969, utili&,ng lift Ship from tlx 158th and 1Olst mB's, the l-J%6 hf at 073OH, 3487 hf at 08OlI-I, and 2-501 lnf at loOlH, were combat assaulted into LZrs -~i-~lzit-~ X3129 49, YC320988, and YD288015~rcsp&tively. The 44 i,;RW \,A lnf bat'i;alion at 102@I and 2-l ARV'N.Inf Bn(-> at 13OOki combat assaulted into LZ*s ;;t YD2~004.2 and yD253OPO. The LZ for the 4-l ARVN was hot a3 t,;:o lii‘& t/ shins began to receive ~11 ar;ns fire upon exiting the LZ. Sporadic firkg continued until approximately 13oaY. At Tiger IJIountain, one CIi 47 was downed on the LZ by small ar7ns fire. mere were negative casual-ties. The 1Osmm Howitzer being carried was undamaged and the CH 47 XG extracted 1Tiths;r.t further incident. The enemy apparently had no ndvancc kno-wledge of the prtia-ry LZ's and as a result, were umbll: to effect a dcter?&nod or effective dcfcnse.

i&t 110220H May 69, FB Sxstogm received i; pobe by an unknown size cne,my force. ~~pprrJx5zately 10 RW rounds and a substantial amount of small a. c?rns fire were directed into the perimeter, At the initial RPG fire,

3 UNCLASSIFIED

4 ‘.-L, SD 1L.f!-!Y 1 .- L

J.. VDG~.'~L.-E SUBJECT:

25 June 1969 Combat Operations .tifter Action Report - Sum.rnary iu-J.i.CHE SNOVI

identificat.ion and locetion had been confirmed, "Here constantly hO~'1dcd trJ ThC il.ir, l>.rtillery, and pursuit by 3d Brignde ground fo:cces. 'fhis invari<1bly resulted iI'. the cc:p-cure of a POW whoso interrogation resulted in valuable inform.:ltion e3inedd' ,- "

9. Mission:

UNCLASSIFIED

. 3d Bdo nnd 1st ilRVN Regt conduct combined airmobile assaults into tho Northern 1-. Stwu Valley in conjunction with the 9th Harines md tho 3d iJ?VN Rofrb to destroy NVA/VC forces, block enemy routes of egress into Laos, interdict enamy LOC, and to locate .:lnd destroy en~ caches.

18., Concept of Operation:

a:l Prior to D-Day, 10 I1ay 69, the 1st and 3d JlRVN Regts and the .:,.:'d B::'iSLlde 101 est,.,ablished three mutually supporting fire base::: at l,'B Br'cldley (YD278122), FB kLrborne (YD355070) and FE Gurrahee (YC399949). On J) . ..])oy J follo1-ling a fif'ty minute Tl~C ~ir prep, an eighteen minute A.rtillcr,/ 'p~i,'2P, idr Cdv LZ eXamination, Wld a on(=) minute bRA LZ prop, five m~ncuvcr battalions (three US and two lJ'tilN) uere inserted int.o five separnte LZ' s along the Laotian border overlooking the Northern A Shall V~\lleyc hfter searchine and clonring the immediate L2 aren, nll liS b::tt.:'tliollS began extensive RlF oporCltions to the East and Nor"thenst to,.,ard t:10 Vnllcy floor. l~fi:.er the insertion of the maneuyer battalions h3d bC8;:1 completed at :iliao hours, the 2-1( .... ) l~t{VN Bn combat assaulted [lto~) Tig(~r I'1ountain (YD253090) and secured FB Tiger for the insertio!l (ll'.' 3at'i:-ery 12 ilRVN il.rtiliery (105rrnn). The 3-5 Cav secured Route 547 and FL~o Bases Blaze (YD5l.J4203), Bastogno (l'D620095), and Cannon (YD475028). H01J'GO 547 is the al~~ weather route to bc uscd for resupply of units Horking in the valley and al:mg its ridge lines.

b. Opero.Jviop.s IlJarrative: On D...D~lYJ 10 Hay 1969, utilizing lift ships from tl'lc 158th and lOlst ARBt s, the 1-506 Inf at 073oH, 3-187 Inf at 08011-1, and 2-501 Inf at 1001H, were combat nssaulted into 1Z' s vicinity YC312949, YC320988, and YD288015.respoctively. The 4-1 iRVN Inf battnlion at l020H and 2-1 AAVN, Inf Bn(-) i.1t 1300H combat assatLlted into L2 t s .:;t YD250042 and YD253090. The LZ for the 4-1 ARv'N l'ms hot as t.ho l-if't Ghi?s began to receive small arms fire upon exiting the L2. Spor~dic firing continued until approximately 1300lf. At Tiger 11ountain, one CH 47 1~'as dmmed on the L2 by small arms fire. There were negative c2sualties. The 105mm Howitzer bei11.g carried '{as unda:n.aged and the CH 47 .ias extracted vlitha;,t further incident. The enemy apparently had no ndvClncc knowledge of the primary 12 1 s and as a result, were unable to effect (J determined or effective defense •

.,i"t 110220H Hoy 69, FB Bc.stogne received Q probe by an unknown size enemy f8rcc. i .. p-pr:,xirn.ately 10 RPG rounds and a substantial amount of sm.111 orms fire 'Here directed into the perimeter. At the initial RPG fire,

3 UNCLASSIFIED

(&iIi: lUi iQ is

On 1~00@3 May 69, the 3-l i&W Inf Bn combat nssaciltod into F mmhr 6 at ~1?70~. %z LZ was cold with negative snemy contact. At fi2%, 3 Cc, 3.-187 Infantry began to receive heavy small arms and machine gun fire fr0r.i YC325982. '&is action marked t'nc beginning of the ten day 5.21^;fytE for ihg Ap Bia Xinintai..n, Due to the continuous and heav fight- d.l,':'..I :.r- to tilt capture of Hill 937, a separate Inclosure, Inclosure 9, has I) _ E-12 :j L-c;> 2 I-L d p For aXL further details on the battle for DOng AP Bin j.i;,;;&i;~ refer to Inclo.xrc 9.

i3 * ;ryg 1-8 x,?y 69, the battle for Dong -9 %-a raged as heavy ground r"igh-?,&g cgztmcd, The 3487th Infantry fought its way South to tk-,c x!3.t~qV~ crest of Hill 937, while thci I-S06th Infantry assaulted T:20r-Lh~m~d u; the slope, k-i tixe, cnmy fire frm heavily fortified ~~~kez5 slsxed the mmentum of the l+Z6th I~fmtry assaLLt. The 3-187 ix-ring pushed Pxther +xward the top,&egm W-receive fire from b3th ;r'lz.nks 2s ",h,e cnmy was reinforced. with little daylight remaining, the dccis5.m ms mde to com'bat assault txo additional bat4iaki.on.s into the bcttle to stem the flow of enemy reinforcements and add combat Ixsc, -LO what would be the final assault on HZ.3. 937. i&t I.83W, k-2-506 I17Q-Ji-i tlq- was lifted from Phong Dien -TV ?I3 &rrahee by C3-i b7 then co$mt ;3ss;::_'.A. "Ld ?---)s to ?tic-tity YC320989 at r&i,ch tint they became OPCON to 3-187,

t UNCLASSIFIED

J.~V .J..X}...c.L~-E

SUBJEDT: Cmi1ro t Opcr.Jtions b.ftcr il.ction Report - Summary 1;£ i..;', qE SNOW

25 June 1.9b~

UNCLASSIFIEL

iu'")J~ and nIl orGJnic KG;tpon3 to :L-:.cludc 90nn tcmk guns were employed to counte:::' the Ljttack. OrlC RPtj. : ""'·~ld st~riGd a fire which caused .m e.,"'()losic:1 in tlJ.,~ ~',SP of C-l··.8! il.rtillcIY (175r.l:1). This explosion r£sulted in 33 US ·i'J~, of '-ihich onlJ'" 18 ~"GCiUircd medevac. Tho mooGv::c wns complete at 0445 hours 11 Mny.

On IllOOoR May 69, the 3-1 iiliVN Inf Bn combat nssaulted into LZ number 6 at YD1970440 The LZ Hns cold 'With ncgotive enemy contact. At Jb25H" B Co 3~137 Infantry began to receive heavy small arms and machine gun fire ircm YC325982. This 2ction mnrked the begirming of the ten dny ",)::ttls for Dong .b.p Bia Hountai.."1. Due to the continuous and heavy fight:i.ng .).'>_"r to tho cnpture of Hill 937, a separate Inclosure, Inclosure 9, has ')~:'1:' )rcp.::r(~d. For all further details on t.~e battle for Dong Ap Bin

: .. I':l;_l::,;).Ln refer to Inclosure 9.

~' ... h:-;y \)9 l'esulted in only minar c::>nt.Jct with the CXC6p~on of the 1-506 :':.'1..2 ].,.1137 Inf;ntry BCl.ttalions who 'Wcr...! e."'ljoincd in the oottle for

iJ,):('l.~:; ~l.p Die", Thc 2-501 Infantry Battalion ~nd nllied units continued t~) ?..li" alon;.{ the border •

.. t. 130335I-!. Hny 69, FB Airborne recievcd a hc[:vy en~'Tly ground attack. ;:)df'PCrS of -t,ho K12 Bnttalion, in conjunction with the C3 Company, K6 ~&~t~lion, 6th NVA R~giment ~ttacked the D.Jsc in a three pronged attack; fro;n th-=: 1-niJ E and S. The CO of A-2-501 employoo every weapon at l::~s disposal to include J:~~, Spooky ~nd do; roct fire artillery from ::;~2u3.l.i (lo5r.lt!l) and C-2-11 (155rr:rn) as tho TJerimetcr was assaulted .. ~- '2-319 ;~rtillerJ sustai n.ed both c2sual tics t'J pers::>nnel and on8 105 gu.1 ':10.:':: dcstr<Jycd and one druil2.gcd while C-2-11 ia.rtillery sustained one 15S"-;'.;'~ [{Qh hoavily damaged. at 053oH, after the attack had been rcpulsGd, 31 NVA KIi. (Be) were found and 1 PW wns captured. US losses were 21 l\I1\. t:nd 52 \'ilL.. (See Inclosures 7 and 13 for fuy..:,her detDils). The 2-50l Inf(-) 1fClS extr~cted from various PZt s (YD28403l) at l030H and completed at FB ~· .. irborne c:.t 122o.tt. The 2-501 I!'f thon beg.:m extensive RIF's in the ,ricinity of FB idrborne to pursue a.'1G destruy the K6 Bnttalion, 6th Wii .. Rcgiri1ent known to be in the area.

DLi.r.-.'"lG 18 Nuy 69, the battle for Dong .'P Bia rnged as heavy ground figh'c,inG CSl.!1tinucd. The 3-187th Infantry fought its way South to t~c itilitary crest of Hill 937, while t!w 1-506th Infantry assaulted

7:J orthuard u~: the slope. In t:L,te, enemy fire fr~ heavily fortified DUnkC:::'S sl~ivcd the mOOlentum of the l-506th Inf::mtry assault. The 3-187 h=:ving pushed further tmwrd the top,/'begnn ·to'l."ecoive fire from both f12nks (1[; the cner.l:y W3S reinforced. viith little daylight remaining, the decision ... .JS made to combat assault· t"t';o additional battalj.ons into ti1C h::ttle to stem the flow of enemy reinforcements and add combat muss to Hhat would be the final assault on Hill 937. l"t 18300. A-2··506 J:rd,::mtry ".;D.S lifted from Phong Dien t.o ?B Currahee by CH 47 th~n comb:Jt 2.SS::'.:.ltcd to vicinity YC320989 at imich time they became OPCON to 3-187 II

4 UNCLASSIFIED

On 39 I&-J 63, the Z-501 Infantry(-) at 15131 and the 2-3 r,RV!J z:t :?27)! were combat aSSaUlted frcm PZ vici-nit hAti U's at X332922 2nd YC33897b.

y YD36~81 rtSld My Chanh resp+zctivciy hth LZ*s wrc cold and the remaindw

of the) dq 'GKIS spent in preparation fx the assault on Dong '1~ Dia scheduled for the next day, %e 3-r kv which had been protidiq security for engineer worksites along rxte 547, became OPCON to the 2d Br&ade. HEI&II~ becn rclicvcd of providin Cannon, the elaents of the 3rd 8

security for FB*s BastGgnc, Blaze and rigade were -then able "k~ more

ef'ft:ctively marsh&l. their resources for the assault on &Cl 937,

Qr: 3; I.&- 69, the 30187th Infantry with h-2-506 OPCOL'II, 2-501 Infantry, &SOS &Gantry and 2-j iJim successf'ully assaulted and drove the 7th ;inc: 8th 31:s of the 29th NVA Regjment from their mountain stronghold atop df- .r' 29 Bi2 Pfutaj.n, L 1 -4 (See J&l 9 fur cwmslete detaU.&

; ;’ .,- - Llj:r;.;;.i-gC 21 May 69, the 3-187 Infan+~ became OPCON to the 2d Bde l(>&"i, &n D iv, 1410 in turn returned the 2-506 k-fantry to 3rd sde cmtroir The time period 21 May 69 - 7 June was characterized by decreasing enq contact and ever increasing discoveries of ene caches, The 2-36 Infantry began their portion of Operation APA I-Z T SKN 3;' regainin.~ A-Z&~ Infantry which had been CFXE to 3-187 Itiantry for the final two days of the battle for Done i;i-7 %a Mountain. The ->a tt&a li Or: CP companies B, C and D(a) mo7ed frzz Ca.m~ Groans, Thong Uen &strict Eea&uari;ers ComplEtj.oil Of thfl? C-A u

and the An Lo @rkl..e to B &ze by CK 47. Upoil (7 move to FB Raze, the Battalion CP and .E Co(N)

wx'uat assault& to 35 Airbor:i.e. hJ"Et~, combat assaulted f'rom Pz

k-2406, upon Amlease by the 3-27 (YC32798~/ to LZ FB Mrborne.

'tie 2&CQ Infantry began RLF operations from vicinity Dong lip %,a3 dong the bng So Qdge, heading for the Valley floor. The l-504 Infantry 'I---a,?,-- LJt$,L:li extensive search and clear Rl@ qxrations from Bong kp Ra Ecuntcin &x.~Lfi tcr,mrd ??I krrahee. mGv& -to PZ

On 5 &E %9, the b-1 MVN Batklion vicinity D278066 and extracted to La vang. The move ws

corrrolate 2-t; 13sfrI. A

1 ... V w..t.,;.110~

SUBJl<Y:1': 4::> ,June .L~O::i

{'r,f"',."'''1t. 0 t' i'ft .l-l· '('-'pr r~ ~'-"'ry ""'oJ • • lJ',.< _ per<.l ~ons.n. Gr He 1.1 or. H"" U \# - '-'WILHlil

10..~ ACHE SlJO'v1 UNCLASSIFIE[

On 19 E2.Y 69, th~ 2-501 Infcmt~y(-) st l5lSH nnc the 2-3 J).RVN .:!t 1327H were combat assaulted from PZ vicinit~r YD363081 a'1d My Chnnh respectively into LZI S o.t YC332922 2.nd YC338971+. i3~th LZ' S 'Here cold c:md the remainder of tho dny HD.S sPQnt in preparation for the;; ~ssnult on Dong "p Bia scheduled for the next day. ~ne 3-5 Cay wrich had been providing security for enei..'1eer i-Torksi tes along route 547, became OPCON to the 2d Br:;,.gade. Hav.L~~ been relioved of providing security for FB's Bastvgnc, Blaze and Carmon, the clements of the 3rd Brignde 'Vlere then C1ble to more ci'f~ctively mJrshall their resources for the assault on Hill 937.

On 2C Eay 69, the 3-IB7th Infantry with ~1o-2-506 OPCON, 2-501 Infantry, 1.-506 Infcmtry and 2-3 iJtVN successfully assnulted and drove the 7th ~mcl 8th Bns of the 29th NVa Regiment from their mountain stronghold atop [j . .::<; " .. p Bi2 }buntain. (See Incl 9 for complete detaUs).

:.:.r:fc:;:',iv8 21 M(JY 69, the 3-187 Infantry becmne OPCON to the 2d Bde lClst ~· .. bn Div, w"ho in turn returned the 2-506 Ir.rantry to 3rd Bde control. The t:iJne period 21 May 69 - 7 June was characterized by decreas:Ll1g enemy contact and ever increasing discoveries of enemy caches 4 The 2-506 Infantry began their portio:l of Operation APACHE SNm1 GY' regaining A-2-5C6 Infantry which had been orCON to 3-187 Infantry for the fin21 two days of the bat.tle for Dong ~ Bia Mountain. The ~~ttalion CP, companies B, C and D(_) ma7ed fr~m Camp Evans, Phong Dien District Headquarters and the An Lo Br:;'dge to FB Blaze by CH 47. Upm1 completion of the CH h7 move to FB Blaze, the Battalion CP and E Co(-) co;nbat assaulted to FB AirborJ.e. il.-2-506, u~on release b"j the 3-137 Irtf[mtry, combat assaulted from PZ (YC327982) to 1Z FB Airborne.

On 22. Hay, 69 J....... C .~ D ~';l:C:X11U.~3, of 2-506 moved from FB Blaze and FB CUrr311ee to .v',tj AlrbOrno. V1l t!1 all elements of 2-506 in and arOl.lnd ?B i:..irborne J the battalion began exhaustive searching and iUF operations t;) lacnte INA Warehouse 54., known to be iJl th.e aren. (E'or further inforrr~tion see Inclosure 12).

'Ine 2-501 Infantry began RIF operations from vicinity Dong lip Bia, [llong the Done; So Ridge, heading for the V~lley .floor. The 1-506 Infantry begcn extensive search and clear RIF 0perntions from Dong Ap Bin Nount::in Sou·en tcr";3rd FB Currahee. On 5 June 69, the 4-1 ARVN Battalion movt;d to PZ -vicinity YD278066 and extrncted to La Vang. The move l"~S completG ~t 1315H.

i~t 072400 ju.'1G 69, Operation APACHE SNO\'l was concluded. This combined 211iod operotion saw some of the warts bloodiest and fiercest fought b2'~tles J.[;qinst a determined foe. iJ?ACHE SlW .. i has added another stirring C;1'::~-JCO!' to the history of the 3d Bele, lOlst ·.irborne Division. (For dcc;.-::Llod informati:m re.gardi.l'1g the time perioe. 21 May - 7 June 69 seo :1:r·,,;1..' ,~,~, Y"{' , 0 11 ;:}""..J 12'

....... \.,.0. V .. I ......... _ ...l.. , ...a.....,..,.. ~':'lU I ..

5 UNCLASSIFIED

i- IivlixuxME 25 June 1969 SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report - Suii

APACIB SNOW UNCLASSIFIED

12, Resclta: a, The 3d Erigade tit.h OFCOW units successfbily accompIi.shzcci its mission in Operation ;SJX,'IE SNOW, This multi-battalion ccxnbined Operation was 2 classic campaign which found the enemy, fixed his location, and methodically and devastatingly destroyed him in place. The effect of this was to destroy the combat effectiveness of not only the maneuver battalions of the 29th ENA %&nsnt, but also its central headquarters with organic and attached technical units, forcing the remaining broken elements to retreat across the border into Laos, whfic at the same time preventing them from again. using the Northern A Shau VaUey & eitfler a staging area for attack or as a large scale storage base to outfit future operations.

5, hemy Losses categorized as frilLlows:

(1) KU (EKJ) NW&C

de 3ody to %apons %tio: vs .

69L/281 = 2,&l

ee Emmy to US killed ratio: g

&n/78 = 8,0&l

f, Captu-cd or destroyzd Equipment: US

(1) 337,250 Ids of sir Hmmo (4)

(2) 2,426 rds CS hw (5)

(jj 2,386 rds Mortar bo (6)

6

340

100

37

AWN .

229/400 = 1:1&J

A!RVrrJ

229&l = 7eOL:b

827 RF'G/RLfle Crencdes

32 Mine/BBT

3h,?76 lbs Rice

UNCLASSIFIED

\) Hl)! l~VT:tJ..cA....E 25 June 1969 SUBJECT: Com1:x1t Operations After acti:)n Report - Surilmary

APACHE SNOW UNCLASSIFIED

120 ReS''J.lt~: a c The 3d Brigade with OPCON units successfully accompliahod its mission in Operation ilPilCHE SNOW. This multi-battalion combined Operation Was 2 classic campaign which found the enemy, fixed his location, and methodically and devastatingly destroyed hilrl in place. The eff0ct of this 1-TaS to destroy the combat effectiveness of not only the maneuver b3ttnlions of the 29th NVA Reg:Lment, but also its centrol headquarters with organic and attached technical units, forcing the remaining broken elements to retreat across the border into Laos, While at the s:vne time preventing them from again using the Northern A Sheu Valley ris either a staging area for attack or as a large scale storaGe base to Dutfi t future operations.,.

be. Enemy Losses categorized as fallows: US ARVN

(1) KL\ (BC) NVA/VC 691 229

( 2) KBiJ1. (BC) 16

(3) KBi~ (BC) 102

(4) Captured: FW- 5

IWe 241 340

CS~TC 40 100

Documents (wt in 1bs) 37

c. Friendly Losses: US ARVN

536 WIli. 137 WIll.

d. Body to~'ieapons Ratio: us ARVN

8. Enemy to US killed ratio! US ARVN

691/78 • 8.06:1 229/31 = 7.01:1

f. C<lpturcd or destroyed Equipment: US

(1) 137,250 rds of S11. .b.rnmO

(2) 2,426 rds CS Ammo

(3) 2,)86 rds Mortar .-0 6

()3' III TIS

(4) 827 RPG/Rifle Grene,des

(5) 32 Mine/BBT

(6) 34,776 Ibs Rice

UNCLASSIFIED

(7) 2!4l ~tn~cturc~s

(8) 1205 F or tif ics:l;ions

(10) 4 Radios

(11) 1-25 Iti Eqlosives

(12) Vehicles (trucks) 4

(7) 10 l22rmn Rockets

(2) &OOO rds Cs'd (8) 11,735 lbs rice

(yj 257 ~orti.fications

(10) 306 %ructwes

(11) 14,275 lbs explxzives

(6) 227 Mine/BBT h.2) 40 Vehicles itrucks and dozers)

13. khixistra tion: (See lnclosure 2).

I.5 5 Chemical: Non-Toxic chmical munitions for- the M-79 and lO!%m Howitzer mm ex~lopd on several dif'ferent occasions on 15, i.6, 2nd 1'7 May during the attack on Dong q~ %.a i"lountati~, (2~ grenades, both indivldualIy thrown by the foot soldier and bulk air dropped from W-l.3 aircraft were also used prior to and during assaults (See Inclosures 8 8,~ 9). Although the use of these chcrrrical muni.%ions met with sme early success, the changing tin< patterns along the ridge lines of Dong up %.a Mountain. quickly dissLpaCted the agent. The ~~~~~,

i

rcnlizin,r the effect of CS in a confined area such as a static bunker ; i

defense, ceuntcractcd the use of CS by donninz new Chicom protective masks. %xausc of these factors, the further use of chemical munitions

i i

was suspended after 20 May 69.

16. hCl, ~~ffxirs (Omitted).

17. Psychological Operations (See Inclosure 5).

18. Comnuxications (See inclosure 6).

19. %~incer (Omitted).

20. ~~rtj&xy (See Inclosure 7).

UNCLASSIFIED

Is' 'Q" ,,' b NT If ! 11.VIX}-,cl~...E & 25 J'illO 1969 SUBJECT: Comoo t Operations Hftor ; .. ction Heport - SUlTU1'1D.:r-j"

i1.Pl~CiIE SNOW UNCLASSIFIED

(7) 21.;.1 StlL'..cturc:s

(G) 1205 Fo::.'tific::::tionc . (9) 3 122mm Rockets

C2pturod or de~ t.royed Equipment: l.RVII

(1) 340.000 rds S~l. iJ...'1IDlO "

( 2) 5,000 rds CSW

( "),) \-- 5~oc,0 rds MortC!r

'" .b.;1IffiO

(1+) 540 lifG/Rifle Grenados

(5) 566 Hand Grenades

(6) 227 l1inc/BBT

13 .. ll.drni.i'ustration= (See Inclosure 2).

(10) 4. RodiQS

(11) 125 lbs Explosives

(12) Vehicles (trucks) 4

(7) 10 122mm Rockets

(8) 11,735 Ibs rice

(9 ) 257 Fortif"icati~:ms

(10) 306 Structures

(11) 14,275 Ibs exp10sives

(12) 40 Vehicles '.... ' \vruC!{g

and dozers)

J.5~ Chemical: Non-Toxic chemical mnitions for the M ... 79 and l05mm Hm.;itzcl' Here employed on sever.:!l diffel'ont occ~si:.ms on 15, 16, .Jnd 17 Hny during the attack on Dong .np Bia Mountain. CS grcn:ldes, both indi vic1ually t.hrown by the foot soldier and bulk nir dropped from UH-Jl-I aircraft were also used prior to and during assaults (See Inclosures 8 & 9). .b.lthough the U3e of these chemical munitions met In th same 82 rly success" the changing wind. pa tterns along the ridge lines of Dong .t-.p Bia Mountain quickly dissipated the agent. The NVll., rcnlizin6 tho effect of CS in n confined area such as a static bunker defonse, c:JUntoracted the use of CS by donnine ne'-1 Chicom protective m;:sks. Because of these f",.ctors, tile further use of chemical munitions was su~gended after 20 May 69.

17. Psychological Operations (3ee Inclosure 5).

18. COmTlU:1ications (Sec Inclosure 6).

19. Engineer (Omitted).

20. ;.rtillery (See Inclosure 7) •

. "" .

7

3 ISiS! iCt.I:T UNCLASSIFIED

i,v-DG&A4 UNCL/isslFl 25 June 136$

SUBJXT: Combat %erations A.TACHE SNOW

4Xer Lcti3n Report - Summary

21, Special bipment and Techniques:

fiigger and &ppelillg: Discussion - ipliCH&NOW,

Several times during $erztion aircraft were down in ho&j& terrain where easy ~CCWS WIS

impossible. k-i; timss the only feasible way riggers czGd get to the r?ircraft in order to rig it for extraction was through the use of rappeling techniques from UH-lh helicopters,

Solution - Rc?~' cA,u,ing that this method of entry is not a normal technique for rigger:1 , 9;~ 7infantry security elements, experience shows that as a minitrnun, c? basic course of instruction to include actual helicopter rap/poling is needed in all infantry <and rigger units.

b, Chest Flate Protectors: Discussion -Units of both the l-56 and 2-506 I-nf::ntry battalions employed aircraft crew member ceramic v!?st $&es Tar their point men, %is body armor, while heavy and CmbersoiXt, saved the lives of three men who were struck by 3~ at close rangea

~olxtion - Rc possibT?Aty of adapting this aircraft type body armor to USC by field troop s should be investigated by every inftintry unit engaged in operations where contact is felt to be imminent.

22, Commander's iulalysis:

? bon by Fire - Discussion - At least one Company of each manor% bat-tvalion involved in Operation G'Xl"i;;i; SMOW initiated pre,matura enemy return fire placing the enemy in a poor defens&ve posture through the USC of recon b;: fire, 4 an example, a unit rcconning by fire il.mg its route of advance and using 2-17 Cav Pink teams (1 TC>H 2nd 1 tiship) to screen its advance reduces the possibility of 5ein.g engaged by NVA trail watcfiers, or "Set-piece" ambushes. WUcLng fires" or the use of &tillcry to recon a route of march makes for r&d employment of both blocking fires and close in contact fires with less time lost through h aphazard adjustments and confirmation of ma? lecation.

b, Qak vests: Discussion - The protective or "flak'" vest. SOZXEQJY worn only by troops in either a static security role or convoy &Q, si&ficaXi.y rcducod "uotii the number of KL 8: KL for the US M$talions assaulttilg Dong q &.a Mountain, Clay-more and S'G shrapnel.

Many early casuaities were due to hs this ty-ge projectile does not have the

velocity, r-02: the penetrating power of smaJ.l arms fire except at very close range, 6hc flak vest is an excellent defensive measure. The only drawbacks are its weight which causes heat casualties, and its bulkiness,

S3lu.tlrln - issue "flak" vest as the situation dictates.

t3 UNCLASSIFIED

i .. VOO-CA-E SUBJECT:

U NCLASSIFllif(rJr.t-' '''''II1II' .... 1' ......... ' -"-'Q~'--ii-25 June 1969

C:)mbot Operations J'1.fter i"ctiQn Report - Summary Af l~CHE SNOH

21~ Spcci31 Ecp.iipmont and Techniques:

.1. Rigger und &ppeling: Dj scussion - Several times during Oper.::tion .tJ.Pl~CHE SNOW, oircrCJft were down in host:Lle tor-rain '\-lhere easy access UiJS

impossibleQ il.t times the only fe~lSible 'HCJy riggers c::m1d get to the ,"lircraft in order to rig it for extraction vms through the use of rappeling techniqup.s from UH-IH helicopters.

Solution - Renlizing that this method of entry is not a normal technique for rigger;' \ f);:- infantry security elements, experience shows thnt as a minll~unJ u basic course of instructi0n to include actual helicopter rappolL1g is needed in all L~£untry and rigger units.

b:l Chest Plate Protectors: Discussion - U:nits of both the 1-506 ,:md 2-506 Inf<~ntry Battalions ellJjloyed aircraft crew member cera'llic v,~st l.)lates for their point men. This body nrmor, while heavy and cumbersome, s:..lved the lives of three men vlho were struck by S1~ at close range.

Solution - The possibility of adaptll1g this aircraft type bod~' armor to uso by field t.roops sh(")uld be investigated by every infimtry unit engag~d in operations where contact is felt to be imminent.

~.. 11.8con by Fire - Discussion - .At least one Company of each mnncuvur batt<:tlion involved in Operat ion l.P .... CHE SNOW initiated premature enemy return fire placing the enemy in n poor defensive posture through tho usc of recon bJ fire. JirS an example, a unit rcconning by fire ~long its r~ute of advance nnd using 2-17 Cav Pink teams (1 IDH .::lnd 1 Gunship) to screen its advance reduces the possibility of i~ing engaged b.Y NVA trail watc!1ers" or tiset-piece" .m.bushes. "Wal1dng fires" or the use o:f .i~rtillcry to recon a route of march makes for rapid employment of both blocking fires and close in contact fires with less time lost through haphc::tzC1rd adjustments am confirmation of map location.

bo Flak vests: Discussion - The protective or "flaktt vest: ~ijrmally worn only by troops in either a ::Itntic security role or convoy dutyl signific~ntly reduced both the number of !ali. & ~'iL~ :for the US battalions assaulting Dong ,t,-p Bin Mountain. Many early casualties were due to Claymore and RPG shrapnel. lLs this type projectile does not have the velocit.y, nor the penetrating power of small arms i'ire except at very close range, "(;hc flQk vest is an excellent defensive measure. The only drm-rbD.cks <lre its weight which causes hent c[:sualties, and its bulkiness.

S~lu.t:i_')n - Issue "flak" vest as the situat.ior.. dictCltes.

8 UNCLASSIFIED

Solution o ii s!lort class

hir Cx b>- the ground to explain x~d demmstrate the proper use of

&i..gade 1zvel. commander should bc held ;xriodicaUy at

This class should bc clttcnded by all commanders down i;() C;llC! -~~c~~ur:-jnc L; the cornixxy level.

UNCLASSIFIED

j\V1X~-CJ'~_E

SUBJECT;

UNCLASSIFIED';:; " t! ¥.Fill~I~.iililf .'1;; •• : .: '-' .... 2:~ JUYle: l'X/J

Opor.::! t:i:ms J .. ft,L~r :L.cti:m hcport - Summory (~Uv11J~t t i~l ~:~Cj IE SNOVJ

c. ~: S(; of ltuGk:)ack~;: Discll:i:,j:!)ll - 11hcl1cycr lJossible , it i~) 1 .~:l' b ,0 '.\.. ' !Il-; -.' tll ; . w., -1-.;, i.e

;;(,\r~~rl"t.:<·~·(~~l[~ l'J,r\ CllD 111Cm (jrl~') OJ_ t~ Ul~li. ... "LO (:;~) ~ ..J_~·~n •• e. ..L!.)!;.ul"".l..J

ruc!:GZJ(::~;J ,;:,:c.'I'</:;, " oaly \:l:lT,',;~', smoke ~:rJj ,~; complete bc1:3ic l:.J<:.u J'Q!'

Ol~f3Ql1lC ~";~:~~~~ori3.

S0lLrl,iJ.l - This c,r.~E 1k done if npt)r..1~.i.n::; out out of 2 stX3tic best.:, 'Jr if rCS'L'Ll)PJ_Y is to bu effected daily CIS the: rucksock could be lifted by hp.lic:>pter. The main advantages to going IIlight" are: ability- tQ movIe] qu:Lc;,:ly· :-md quietly, rapid deployment in contoct, 3nd less fdti;).lc~

bo th ph~/sic~l 2.nd mental for t.he lead elements thereby sharpening th;.;i~ " " fn1 ·h ' d' d t t " !fl"' ~- If :~':l'~'~1C!~J~' ~-:~iC: detcctlon skills. c 1TL::Jor lsa v~n age 0 go~ng lellv

. ~3 c-, '_:J3sibi1i ty of f(~ilurc to resupply bcc::mse of poor wea ther sr f":;;(;~:~'

j,; ... 3.;~; Discussion _ Through::mt Operation j~i~CHE SNOVi incidents .:; .. -.>}_·v-.;_~:~: ".,.1.1.. resulted in unnecessary US c:J.suc~lties. The norm,']l r:--.a:mer ~:r ,,~~,cJL~.-::l811t of .l~l-t:l, is through nrtillery cOI1'Ir.1and ch.::mnels to the Fe QccDlIrpanying the ground u.;i t commru1der. It is now appnrent that :L1::::t;)nC~ s ,)CClL~ Hhen the FO is either scp,']r.:rLod frC>Irl his commondcr, or not i'LUly briefed on the entire fluid situQtion.

Soluti:)l1 - '{C) preclude accidental injury to troops, it is felt thot ~~J.1i~ shoulc follcl1 the sarno procedure uS r,unships, i.,e. cont.act the grounc~ c~mrnandcr on his :Ll1tcrnnl c':nnmcmd net, bo briefod on the friendly and CnC!TllY situ2-Gion, and thc.n havo hi:.:; ;lpproClch pattern chocked by the :-rround cO;;ino.ndor to insure it is correct ond th2t he has identified C)

all J.'rio;:dlios before rollinG in on his rocket run.

o. G sc.; of the ll.·~_r Cavalry: Discussi8n - lll':nmd commanders" ulllD~S h:Y'\~in:~ ~..)ri8r e.:;~erionce, arc not n0r1;'l.:11l.;'{ <:nr3:;:'(; of thc 1:L'ti t.::; ti'Jl1S and bOE.>"!:' usc )f the support.ing air cavnlry in i-tO,s role of rec-:m and iJl1!!1cQ:i.::::'Cc c1Qsing of cont{)ct 'I-rlth the cnerty_

Solution ... i .. sh'Jrt class to e:x:p13in and dcm::mstrote the proper use of :hoir CJ.v bJ t.he ground commander should be held ],Jeriodically 2t Brigade level. This class should be .::tt.tonded by all commanders dmvl1 to :::r:d i:-:cluc:i.!lE the company level.

f. S~l:)jJ:Jrting Fires: Discussion - B.::ttGolion cOJ.,lmanders r.!Ust b2 ~~irbGrnc to properly coordinate fire support, ice. ARil., gunships" T .. :l.C ~·>.ir ~md Lco..V'J .:1rtillery. Company CO]i]nnndcrs IiTLlst periodica]~y h~lVe dC:1Q;:-10tr~tcd to them the correct and cffcct.i_vc use of these fires ir: orc1l;:~' -l;,:) re:mo.in cur:::cnt .:lnd Cldept in their clTLj)loyment. Heavy (8 11 & l'?Sr.u'1) .:::rt:L1.lc;r.Y' ~.;ith its mnss destructive .force c,:m be use:d 2g.1inst cmtrcnci:uu C::C ::,

i{l~~)::;j_:,io:1S close to fricndl·" c:lements. • J

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

----------------------------------------------------_.-----UNCLASSIFIED

AVDG-Cll.-E S'UBJbCT:

(" C' ,> \ .- ! '-H- I • ij r . • ... '(/iL 25 June 1969 Combat Operations .h.ftcr l~ction Report - SUlT1I]'lnry .. ..P .. ~CHE SNO~I

to c0I11InJnd, contact, and coord:Ln~te their 8lcments and all suppor'c,j.ng fires CI Company' commanders should pcrioaicnlly attend fire support cODrdin8tL)n clL1ss(;s. He.;:J\ry artillery should be registered end fi.rc;cl ir~ by grou:ld unit FO I S no th.at should the need arise, it Hill be: r8adiJ.Y [lV2 ila ble • ...

/ i

15 Incl l~ In·tc;lli.gcnc::: ,') Fl -; r:f''';- H"" , .;. l"· ~ (.. -- •• -l.j_ .. - U ""';l" iJ ... ,

) ~S8~~~:]. -(, rJrlS

.le P0rcormcl and Adrn.inistration L~,.. 1.);,;istics ,.; ~ P :3';Icholo[::ical Opera tions 5.- Ca Yr1I:HllUCa t~. ons 7 c ~i.rtjJ.lory 50 THe i.ir r ~:J\~'c\)-~ 9 u 13~ ttlc for Dong-i .. p Bia lOo Combat Operations ~l.ft8r i1.ction llo..,Jort, 3-187 In£' lifO CombClt Operations .b.i'ter action Report, 1-506 Inf 120 C8mbc:t Operntions After i~ct.ion Report, 2-506 In! 13. CJmb<.lt Operati;:ms l~ftcr .. ~ction Report, 2-501 1nf Ih. Combat. Operations After Action Report, 158 ABB 15il> C'Jmbat Operations After Acti::>n Report, 2-17 CClV

UNCLASSIFIED

DEi?!&TMENT OF THE AllMY Headq\rarters 3d Brigade, last Airborne Division

AiT) San Francisco 96383

AVDG-CA-D 25 .Jme 1.9

3rd Bde 1Olst Abn Div ATTN: s-3

The following amlysis of the enew situation and supporting i3lfOrs'W *>ion is submitted for inclosuro in the combat After Actions Renort (ApAc: SNOW).

1 Incl

I InteUgence of Dong Ap %.a

AVDG-CA-D

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARNY HI3D.dquarters 3d Brigade, 10lst Airborne Division

AR) San Francisco 96383

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (APACHE SNOH)

TO: CO 3rd Bie lOlst Abn Di v ATTN: S-3

2': ·June 19'

The following analysis of the enenw situation and supporting informa.· .I.,ion is submitted for inclosure in the Combat After Act.ions Renort (AJ:AC: SNO\-I) •

-.r. t,j.L-t-l Y lil ".f..;,;. y' "'.-1 .. £.* V:,/C HARIEt B. ADDISON ' , Captain MI

52

1 Incl

I Intelligence of Dong Ap B.ia

AVDG-CA-D 25 June 1953

SUBJECT: Ccmbnt After Actions Report (APACE SNOW)

1. Terrain: The terrn?n azn?octs of the 3d Pde Area. cf' Operations generally --MB coti'Orined to the original intelligence estimate varying f rotn open vaJ.ley to steep mountains,

32, The Valley; Ths A SHAU Vdlley floor consists of flat open terrain which varies in width from 300 meters(YD363032) to three kilometers near TA BAT. Vegetation includes grass, 2 to 6 feet tall and scattered brush. Foot and vehicle trafficability is excellent, and any portion of the valley floor is condusive to helicopter landings.

be The Transitional Area: Bordering the Northern A SEAU on the wtstorn hills ak depth of one to two kilometers the terrain is covered with matted grass and brush vegetation which impedes foot traffic. The area is laced with numerous trail networkb and trafficability is limited to their use. Tracked vehicles could deploy a3 far north as YD3l.X.

C. The Mountainous Area: Rising abruptly out of the narrow-fingers and uneven contours of the transitional, area, the canopy-covered, Steen slcpes (&to 5s) of the mountainous region form an unbroken barrfer to movement, observation, ,XI~ heXborne oper&&ns, Foot traf'fic is conffnad to trails uld stre3m.beds. Observation and fields of fire were sever3.y li~nited in somt3 al"ftas due to undergrow% and elephant grass. Though no patiicular area of the operational area was reported as impassable, 32-ezs under triple canopy ~eizr stro?ams wczx more difficult due to the amount of tangle foot in the areas where no trails were established, All strem8 encountered were negotiable by foot troopers. Vehicles though not used in operation Apache Snow ~?ouLd be generally limited to Route 54'7, valley floc~r and its long more gradual slofing fingers,

Numerous suitable helicopter landing zones and trails were found in the area. (Overlay :&ll be fwd under sep.erate cover),

2. Weather: Throughout the operational period, the veather was consiycred . B-*.-P e.XCeiIeIlt. GrU Jnd Fog was prevalent in early morning hours in most ravines, usually cleating off around 0800 - 0830 hours,. Also immediately follow%ne thundershowers cumulus clouds developed and remained in the area for a short time. For the most part, thundershowers occured between 1430 hours and 2100 hours drily with clear skies developing after rainfall. Temper- atures were moderate to warm in afternoon prcceeding thundershowe=, Weat her in guleral was excellent for Airmobila Operations,

AVDG-CA-D 25 June 1969

SUBJECT: CombQt After Actions Roport (APAC HE SNOIv)

(INTELLlGillJCE) to CombC'1..t Aft or .\ction il.epnrt. (J\~jAC HE SNm'l)

1. T~~...n: The terrt1.i:1 aspc.~ts of the 3d We Area d.' Operations generally confbrlrled to the origi.nal Int e1ligence estimat e va.rying from open valley to steep mountains.

ac The Valley; The A SHAU Valley floor consists of flat open terrain Hhich varies in width from 300 meters· (YD363032) to three kilometers near TA BAT. Vegetation :includes grass, 2 to 6 feet tall and sC3ttered brush. Foot and vehicle trafficability is excellent, and any portion of the valley floor is condusive to helicopter landings.

bIt The Transitional Area.: Bordering the Northenl A SHAU on the westcm hills at depth of one to two kilometers the terrain is covered wJ.th matted grass and brush vegetation which impedes foot traffic. The area is laced with numerous trail networks and trafficabillty is limited to t heir use. Tracked vehicles could deploy as far north as YD.3ll2.

c. The Mountainou.s Area: Rising abruptly out of the narrow· fingers and uneven ~ontours of the transitiona.l a.rea, the canooy-covered, steen slopes (20%· to 50%) of the mountainous region form an unbroken barrier to movement, observation, ,311d beli borne opernti''\ns. Foot traffic is confined to trails and streambods. Observation and fields of tire were severly limit eel in soml~ areas due to undergro'~-th and elephant grass. Though no particular area of the operational area was reported as impassable, a:-eas under triple canopy ~1ear streams were more difficult due to the amount of ta..l1g1e foot in the areas where no trails were established. All stre1JlllS encolmtered were negotiable by foot troopers. Vehicles though not used in operation Apache Snow '''ouad be general1¥ limited to Route 547, valley fioO%" and its long more gradual slo~ng fingers.

Numerous suitable helicopter landing zones and trails were found in the area. (Overlay ~...nll be fwd under seperate cover).

2. J'{~athe~:_ Throughout the operational period, the "feather was consi~ered . excellent. Ground Fog was prevalent in early morning hours in most ravines, usually clearing off around OSOO - 0830 hours,_ Alao immediately follow:i.nf' thunde rshowers cum ulus clouds developed and remained in the area for a short time. For the most part, thundershowers occured between 1430 hour$ and 2100 hours d..'1.ily with clear skies developing after rainfall. Temperatures Here moderClte to w~rm in afternoon preceeding thundershO"N'e~. Weather in general was excellent for Airmobile. Operations.

--.----~

a, 6th WA Rcgimcnt

(3) BG?rJ Pn - ?ossiblc

c, S5%h kms Group

de 675th Arty Regiment

Though the original estimate of enemy disxsition and commsition I+- not ctinfillrcd .yltogetherp it is believed that, all' elemental WWE opcr~ting in ana of the pknned o~mtiorr except the 9t;h WA Regiment, Cants&s throughout the pcxri.od could have ;utd in all probability were made with elements listed in a, c - e. Contact was established on 10 May lob9 by the 3,&7 and 1/5Cf) Infantry %ttal.ions and was maintained thmwhout the duration of the operation. The sticond dag of the opemtion, the 36 &, I.mth made aprndic contact with snipers that were dug'in as well as tm borne, ‘kb contact continued cmd the fighting increased as the 3,&?7 had enccuntered the two Enenpg Battalions and sections of an NVA Regimenta3i. HeadquarteF3 size unit which ww Later identified throwh documents and Prisoners as the 29th NVA Regiment. The 7th and \Sth Battalions cd element8 of the 2,oth Regt Hqs were located on Dong Ap Eia mountain (YCz289el). A3 the intensity of the fighting increased, the 3/187 wa3 join&d by three (3) additia?al battalions in routing the 29th NVA Regiment. The 29Lh WA Hegtie& was the only new -unit identified in the area, # I f0.r information on Hill 937).

(se0 Inclo3ilre

Elezn&x of the 8O%h Battalion, 6th NVA Rgimmt and the K10 Sapper BattaUon remained active throughout the opertiion.

&. Skew Tactics: The X&h Battalion located North of F'SB Airborne generally remained in a defensive posture of enemey caches and base areas path limit ed recomaissanc e missions. Elements of the 86th did particiDate .:-n a sapper attack on 13 May 69, Remaining element3 of the 6th NVA were nor, contacted during the operation, a defensive role.

The 29th NVA Regbent was deoloyed in The 7th and 0th bttalions were

utilizing concentric knkeL-s on Done Ap Bia (HiU de loyed

P in depth

937 Bunkers were heavily fortified, retnforcod ("A'! Frame) with thick oier head cover and covered with DXU~U~ supporting fires, An intficate series of interconnecting troches enabled the enerqp to reinforce any portion of his perimeter. %~ip~.~ and 2-3 man listing post wert" deployed along all Dossible avenues of approach at sufficient distancefram the enolrgrs* pomter to orwide

J. Enerrt'{ Situation: The origrlmal intelligenco ~~timate carried order of Battle listings of the followin ~ts in the 3d Brigade Are~ of Operation:

Ql. 6t h ~NA Reeimcnt

(1 ) 806th Bn - Confinnc<i

(;2) SOOth En - Fossib1e

(3) 802nd En - Possible

b. 9th NVA Re,iment

c. 559th Trnns Group

d. 675th Arty Regiment

Q. U IT 1- Forces (BA 611)

Though the original estimate of enomy d:is?Osition and comoosition ",ra:s

not coni"ir~cd1..1 together, it is l)eliev(..~ tha.t· all' f'lleJ!lent.s were ore r1.tinr in a:cca of the pl.:mned op€l:'(tt.ion except the 9t,h NVA Regiment. Contacts throughout the period could have and in all probability were made with elements listed in 13., c - e. Contact was established on 10 May 1%9 by the 3/1'd7 and 1/5CX) Infantry Battalions and was maintained thrnUf!hout the duration of the operation. The sdcond d83 of the oper:;;tion, the 3d En, 18?th made sporadic contact with snipers that were dUf. in as well as tree borne. This contact continued and the fighting increased as the 3/187 had encountered the two Ene.t!\Y' Battalions and sections of an NVA Regintmtal. Headquarte:'s size unit which was later identified through document£) and Prisoners as the 29th NV A Regiment. The 7t h and St h Bat talions 9~d elements of the 29th Regt Hq13 were located on Dong Ap Bia mountain (YC;2B9Bl). As the intensity of the fighting increased, the 3/1€f1 was joined by three (3) additiooal battalions in routing the 29th NVA Regiment. The 29til NVA RegilIent was the only new unit identified in the area. (See Inclosure # 1 fo.~ information on Hill 937). Elements of the SOSth Battalion, 6th NVA Rc6iment and the KIO Sapper Battalion remained acti va througoout the operhiion.

4. E'1onw Tactics: The SC6th Battalion located North of FSB Airborne ge1orcJ.J.y remained in a defensive posture of en.aney caches and base areas "rt.th limited recol1.'1aissance missions. Elements of the nC6th did particioote .;cn a sapper attack on 1.3 May 69~ Remaining elements of the 6th NVA were no-::, contacted during the operation. The 29th NVA Regiment was deoloyed in a def~msi ve role. The 7th and 8th futtalions were deployed in depth utilizing concentric bu."lkers on Dong Ap Bia. (Hill 937). Bunkers were hOD.vily fortified, rai..nforcod (!lA" Frame) with thick over hend cover and covered with mutual supporting fire s. An intricate series of interconnecting t rcnches enabled the enerrv to reinforce any portion of his perimeter. Snip"';l"S and 2-.3 man listing post were deployed along all oossible avenues of {lpproach at su.fficient distEnce.from tho enanys I par.i...m9tQr to nrovide

early umniry,:. With the cxcoptian of the battl.e for Dozqq Ap Pia fmm 11-21 May, the moMlo defense tactic was employed by the enemy. In this role, UT, and ARVN units most frequently encountered trailwatchers, small recon parZ.03 and snipers during rcconn~xissance h for-co operations. The enemy elex~ents ~ploying t,his tactic would attempt to infLict matim friendb xsualties initially and break contact immediately. Sapmr attacks increased during the peri& indicating the eneq's hcreased reliance upon this txXc to inflict maximum casualties and deatn:ction cf instKLl&ions 2nd equipment with a mjnimu.m of forces which are highly trained with suicidal motiviation, Direct and indirect fire attacks on Fire Bases PAd night defensive positions alas increased during the reo~fid pCiOd. Fir-e attacks were usually by enemey animrs deplofing harassing txfrmiques with small arms and rocket propelled errmade, Indirect fire attacks were conducted with 6Omm mortar, EQmm mortar, 122~~ rockets, 1ZYm artillery (Tiger Mtn) and infrequently by rocket promlled gmnadea Cnly one indirect fire attack was followed by a ground attack and that occured on 13 May 69 with a combined sapper and ground attack. Mines and booby traps zerc employed in the area of operation generally along m’s that the erxzny suspected 16 and AWN use. Cache sites were heavily boo@7 trapped in a hasty manner appearing to be a last resort of preventing L.6 and Marlin capture of these desperately needed 3upplies and munitions, Command and trip-device claymores were encountered along XX>Crs and nsrt- icuhrgr in defense of Dong Ap Bia, The claymore's were staggered and placed in depth to provide coverage both in front and to sides of bunkem. Grenades, 60 and Nmmmortar rounds with trip devices placed in ordnance containers and left in open areas were al.03 employed,

5. Trtining: bqy individual and unit trxin~ was considard to be excellent. &.r%iculary noteworthy is the excellent marksmnshi~ and conceaXement axployed by e3xmmts of the 29th NVA Regimmt. Detection of individuals and bunkers were extremely difficzalt in the initial chases of the operation aroumi Dong Ap E&a and improved as ordnance was nlaced. in heavy jungle terrain. The excel1 mt marksmmship of the 29th Regt showed a marked improvement over previous contacts with enemy units, training of the Sapper elements remains in a very high state.

The special.

6. l&$.&d. cs : The overall supply posture of enemy foxes was not COW ' sidered good, however the only known shortages were food. Caches of munitions and other supplies indicate the enemy's ability to infiltrate and store large quantities of supplies in Base areas, Thoughnumerous medical supplies were captured in the area it is believed that the energy is experiencing a critical shortage of medical personnel in adrmi.xx&ering treatment,

7. Combat effectiveness and Morale: The overall combat effectiveness of enec;;7elcments contacted was considered to be good and consider3bl.y better thzn the enemya.elanents previously contacted in lotis and alv the rocks% belts, The 7th and 8th BatWions, 2oth WA Refi was considred to be highly effective until after the battle for Dcmg Ap Bia.

&rale of the enemy continues to be mar, The poor state of morale is

early \.laming. With tho oxcoption of the battle for Dong Ap Fia frnm ll-21 May, the momle defense tactic was employed by the enemy. In tr.18 role, LS a.nd ARVN units most frequently encountered trailwatchers, small reeon par'",ies c3l1.d snipers during roconnaissance 1n forco operations. ThEi enenry elements anploying this tactic would at tempt to inflict ~1..'XiroUl!l friendly ~3.Sualties initially and brenk contact imme1iate."ly. Sanoor attacks increased during the period indic:1ting the en~' s increased r.eJj.cU1ce upon this tJ.ctic to inflict oaximum casualties and dcstr'clction of inste~l2.tions ru1d equipnent with a minimum of forces which are hiehly trained with suicidal motiviation. Direct and indirect fire attacks on Fire Bases end night defensive positions alos increased during the renorted period. Fi,re attacks were usuaJ.ly by enaney sni rers deploying harassing t ec!niques with small llnns a..~d rocket propelled gronarle" Indirect fire attacks ,...ere conducted with 60mm mortar, S2mm mortar, 122mm rockets, ]22~ artillery (Tiger Mtn) and infrequently ~J rocket prooelled grenades. Only one indirect fire attack was followed by a ground attack and that occurcd on 13 May 69 with a. combined sapper and ground attack. Hines and booby traps were employed in the area of operation generally alonr roc IS

that the enemy suspected lB and ARVN use. Cache sitE:s were he~vily booby t rJ.pped in a hasty manner appearing to be a last resort of preventing U3 and ARVN capture of these desperately needed supplies and munitions. Comm.and nnd trip-device claymores were encountered along LOG r s and nartic\uary in defense of Dong Ap Bin. The claymore's were staggered and placed in depth to provide coverage both in front and to sides of bunkers. Grenades, 60 and 80mm mortar rounds with trip devices placed in oronance containers and left in open areas were alas anployecl.

5. Training: Enenv individual and unit training was considered to be excellent. Particulary noteworthy is the excellent mark8r.1arlshio and concealeI!lent employed by elezr.mts of the 29th NVA Regiment. Detection of individuals and bunkers were· ext remely difficult in t he initial ohases of the operation aroum Dong Ap Bia and. improved as ordnance was placed in heavy jungle terrain. The excel] ant marksmanship of the 29th Regt showed a marked improvement over previous contacts with enemy units. The special training of the Sapper elements remains in a very high state.

6. logistics: The overall supply posture of enemy forces was not COrli

siderE..'<1 good, however the only lmown shortages were foed. Caches of munitions and other supplies indicate the enemy's ability to infiltrate and store large quantities of supplies in Base areas. Though numerous medical supplies were captured in the area. it is beJieved that the ensD\Y' is experiencing a critical shortage of medical personnel in adminsterin~ tret:!.tment.

7. Combat effectiveness and Morale: The overall combat effectiveness of enemy.·elements contacted was considered to be good and consider~b~y better th2.l1 the ene~ '-e1E1llents previously contacted in lowlands and nJ.onr the rockG-t belts. The 7th and 8th Battalions" 29th NVA ReM- was considred to bo highly effecti vo tmtil after the battl~ for Dmg An Bia.

Horale of the meIIj7 continues to be roor. The poor state of IJorale is

8. I'ntelli~~~~ Opcrztions: UNCLASSIFIED

aii iztanse z.. FAC '855: - :Y : ~.:-xrly FebMiz::,- 1969, 3d Brigade FkC3 bqan

systematic \:il progrim of were! debriefed by S2

the r,otihern A Shau Valley. Pilots personnel after completed missions, and furnsihed

valtlablc data on roads, trails, HLZs and enemy locations.

17, s2 vn - the assist,ant S2 and S2 Air conducted reconntissance of tI:c TAOE in fixed-wing aircmft from the 220th RAC and accompained FAC3 on i2.I. s si. on5 D Hz.nd held photos were taken of HLZ's and enemy locations.

C. A-247 Cav VR - armed helicotier reconnaissance missions were flmm by the 2-1 17 cm in supy?oti of 3d Brigade Operatinns,

2. Airbm:x Pessomel Detector condact,d i;o foc;:,e

- sniffer missions were frecuently er,emey concxxtrations and were a valuable source of

intelligcncc,

FW Interroga-LIc):l z,id :ja~~ent; Readout Ifi! zgction was maintained at the foreward TACP for rapid [email protected] of

- a team fmmthe 3d Brig&e

prisoners znd c,?,ptl:red encq documents,

TDTAE- 720

5 581 140

437250 7462 1367

26002 46511 14460

47; 44

1462 547

UNCLASSIFIED

cont!'ihrt.°-:~ +<, J?J~k of 9uffi~iFm.t. f.nnd 9tuffs~ continued hardships and rer:eated dofc.1.ts l.w Allies.

UNCLASSIFIED

2.. FAC \~; .. :~ :~nrly Febru.2.:::~·,- 1969, 3d Brigade FACs beeran an intense systematic \i{ prograo of the northern A Shau Valley. Pilots wer(~ d(~briefed by 32 personnel after completed missions, and furnsihed valuJ.ble dat.a on roads, trails, HLZs and enemy locations.

b. S2 VH - the assistMt S2 and S2 Air conducted reconnaissa.'1ce of the T AOH in fixed-lving aircraft from the 220th RAC and accompained FACs on n:.s3:i.ons.. I-bnd held photos were taken of HLZ's and enemy locations.

c. A-2-17 Cay VR - armed helicopter reconnai3sance missions WGre flo',vn b;y the 2-17 Cay in SUp~10rt of 3d Brigade Operations.

2. i~irbor':J.(,; Eersonnel Detector - sniffer missions were fre r uent1y conducted to loc.c:te enemey conc,mt.rations and were a valuable source of . t 1'· , ~n e D.gcnc eo

b" Acri::d P~')t.OD-;:·,~'.phy G2 J-ii:c-a.2sets of the Division Imagery InterP'·':1t.:-...tion scctiO.~·l 1~'C l'(] u-t,ili ~c.d jn plenning operations. A,lt hough ne spf.::;ific photo !Q::"~>s-i_0ns -do,,:,r; tL:·"i.:::!., prior phot.o covernge was used.

c. svm a::ld ~I.(:,:. ;·I>.:.;e .- '·:·l,~·(_,ion3 ';.r(:r- fIGI'm daily by- XXIV Corps. It:'::':::r - FrS l~, ) ::uvi the' TF:3 ~~~ l'~O:rC (~wplGycd on forward supnort bases fer ground surve:Ul.:\'1c c3 r:nd cp.':-ly \·m:r.rc~nF,.

d. UoC' ""',,.10..' - :i.ndicLtt cd knovm enemy locatioi.1s and

ct:.S position,

e. Hi Interrogat:..Lon ;)'·~lci ')()('.ument Readout - a team from the 3d Brigade IFW section was maintai..Yled at the forewCI.rd TACP for rapid e..~'Olo1tation of prisoners and c.apt1.:red C!lE.'i?1Y d.ocuments.

9.. 12j:'n.ls_fo~_Q.2'?rQ.t..i.on AD.?ch? Snow~ (10 H~ - 2000H to 7 June 69)

DIC

SA Al~iO

CS AHi"D: a)R1' EPG OTHEHS

G}L\IN (RICE IN LBS) DEH) (J.JBS) DOCm1ENTS (Lffi) VEilICIES BUNKERS STfWCRL'TES

08 ARVN -691 229 5 ()

241 340 40 100

97250 340000 21-+62 5000

827 ~40 15202 108':)) 3471fJ 11735

185 14Z?5 lot J7 4 40

12C5 257 241 30)

~~·~.".'~$.'.( .. t.r?t.-"".'L-\ _. I.J

'IOTAIS 920

5 5$1 140

437250 7402 1367

260CQ 46511 14MO

47~ 44

1462 547

UNCLASSIFIED

Inclosure 1, of' Cunbat M'ter Action Report,(INTEILI~CE) to A?ACHE SNOW.

SUbJECT: IntelLgenee Exploitation of QONG AP BIA" UPOASSIFIED

IIJ'L"RODUCTIGN: Intelligence played a major part in the success of the 3d Drigadc in Operation "APACHE SNOW" and more specifically, intelligence was the major factor that caused a battle for the 937 hill. in the battle of Dong kp 8-a just about every available source of intelligence gathering was exploited,

The mems of gathering t'his information were: Prisoners, scar reuorts, visual reconnaissance and Agent &qx&s.

13ACKGROUND: Ir! mid February, during Operation Ohio Rapids conducted in southem and eastern portion of Base Area lOl,the!3d Battalion, 187th Infantry caflured a prisoner from the 806th Battalion, 6th Regt. During the interrogation of the PW, he stated that hi3 elements received suunlies from a warehouse ccanplex in vicinity of the northern A Shau Valley, The prisoner indicated that his element3 would move for two (2) days to the west and three (3) dnys to the southwhere warehouse 54 was located, Based on this data, exploitation of this area began within the &igade'3 carp= ' ability.

EXPLOITATION: I,mmedi.ately, Air Strikes were planned and flown in the area uf Warehouse 54. These airstrikes received numerous secondary exnlosicms and many secondary fires. Suspecting that the warehouse complex had been Located, additonal air strikes were placed in the area and the area north of warehouse 54. One airsWi.ke further north 7;as 33tiicu32q~1y -reveali.~ and that was the di.scover;y of a large t&l, well used with what apneas& to be spider holes along it running 5.n a Norttiouth direction. About this time, an extensive Visual Reconnaissance Frogram wav initiated. These V'R missions were coordinated and established with Air Force FACls attached to the 3d Bde for direct acir support. The program was sethup to have the FACIs make VRgs of the entire area whiltz Airstrikes were being flown 3.~ the area and when no fighters were available the FAC's would siRt$& recon the area, After each flight into the area, the FAC would renort to S2 and draw all trails, possible landing zones and just generally brief the S2 on his observations in the area. The area of warehouse 54 and the trails leading out of Laos into the Dong Ap Bia were particularly interesting because of the obvious heavy use, after a short pericd, the FACts had established a number of trailnetwoljcs andpossible areas of enemy concentrations. Results of the visual Reconnaissance missions were three fold; First, they were able to

P n&de the s2 with immediate Information

on specific areas of interest, 2 he added to or improved the dat& base of information on the area for future Operations and third,. he becm very familiar with the terrain so when firiendly troops were denloyed in the ama, no difficulty was experienced in providing very close air support,

In late February andearly March of 1969, indications from UPS showed an unusual increase in Spar readings in the upper part of the Va12ey, Concurrently with the beginning of O$.eration Massachusetts Striker, E URS

i UNCLASSIFIED 1

1

Inclosure 1, of Cambnt After Action Report, (INTELLIGENCE) to APACHE SNOW.

S Dl:1JECT: Intelligence Exploitation of "DONG AP BlA" UNCLASS\F\ED

INTRODUCTION: Intelligence played a major part in the success of the 3d Brigade in Operation "APAC 1£ SNOW'I and more specifically, intelligence Vias the major factor that caused a battle for t.he 937 hill. In the battle of Dong Ap Bia jllst about every availahle source of intelli[ence gathering wns exploited,

The meCUlS 0f gathering this information were: Prisoners, soar reoorts, visual reconnaissance and Agent Reports.

Bl"l.CKGROUND: In mid February, during Operation Ohio RaDids conducted in southern and east em portion of Base Area 101, the:3d Battalion, 187th Infantry cap+,ured a prisoner from the 80Sth Battalion, 6th Regt. Durinp: the interrogation of the FW, he stated that his elements received sU\)1""jlies from a warehouse ccmplex in vicinity of the northern A Shau Valley. The prisoner indicated that his elements would move for two (2) days to the west and three (3) dQYS to the south where warehouse 54 was located. Based on this d:,.ta, 0xploitation of this area began within the Brigade I s cap.ability"

E.,.'C?IOI'fATION: Immediately, Air Strikes were planned and flmID in the a.rea I.,)f Warehouse 54. Thsse airstrikes received numerous secondary exnlosions 3Ild many secondary fires. Suspect.ing that the warehouse complex had been located, additou,al air strikes were placed in the area and the a.rea north of warehouse 54. One a,irstrike further north ¥:a.S rorticu1a!"lJly :reveR.lirl? and that vlaS the discovery of a large trail, well used with what apneareci to be s!li-der holes along it running in a North-South direction. About this time, an extensive Visual Recormaissance T'rogram wa~ initia.ted. These VR mis sions were coordinated and established wit hAir Fort:e FAC I S attached to the 3d Bele for direct air support. 'The program was set_up to have the FAC's make VR's of the entire area while Airstrikes were being flown in the area and when no fighters were available the F AC t s would simply rec0n tho area. After each flight :into the area, the FAC would ~el')ort to 82 and draw all trails" possible landing zones and just generally brief the 32 on his observations in the a~a. The area of warehousEF 54 and the trails leading out of laos into the Dong Ap Bia were particularly interesting because of the obvious heavy use. After a short peri<rl, the FAC' s had established a number of trail networks andpossible areas of emeJIW' concentrations. Results of the visual Reconnaissance missions were three fold; First ~ they were Llble to provide the 82 with immediate i.~onnation on specific areas of interest, 2) he added to or improved the data base of infonn...a.tion on the area for future Operations and third, he became very fruniliar with the terrain so when firiendly troops were denloyed in the area, no dif!iculty was experienced in providing very close air support.

In late February andem-ly March of 196 9, indications from URS ahowed an unusual increase in Spar readings in the upper pal'wt of the Valley. C()ncurrentl~; with the beginning of O~eration Massachusetts Striker, !!. URS

UNCLASSIFIED c q ;; ; ;g t. J l 3 i L

UNCLASSlFlED

indicated deployment of a Major North Vietnamese Commvld in the A Shau area and in Base Area 611 in Laos. Three of these commands v:ere identified as Regimental size headquarters, each regiment having under its command three or more battalions, Discovery of parts of a Coaxial cable tended to battress the idea of a mljor cormno facility located scmewhere in the valley, By early May, a I(Rs report had identified a regiment& headouarkers as being 5-8 kilometers west of Dong Ap Bia and was moving easterly,

Photographs and captured documents played a major role in selecting the landing aunes ‘and general axis of advance of the Battalions patiici- paWig in the Combat Assaulting of multiple battalions along the Laotian border. The f3de II and Ass't S2 officer under the guidance af the S2 and S3 selected specific areas for photographs, The study and analysis of these photographs were instrumental, both to the S2/3 and later.to the b Commanders in their planning of assigned missions,

&thou.& Igent reports were plentiful in the early stages of formt&Jt- ing a dat;a base and preparing plans for Apache Snow, the information was general kind not in deflh, The Bde S2 made a liaison visit to the 525th m Det in Hue and directed specific questions concerning the area of interest to the Det OIC. He was able to respond immediately with some oft he information and levied the remaining requirements on his agents,

As the data base grerw or developed, plans werrg made by the 3d Bde to begin Operation Apache Snow to fully explajit the situation, The Operation 'ticked off on 30 &y with a multiple batt.alian CA into selected U's along the Laotian Border, All assaulting elements reported cold Ws and moved out on mx&tiple axi.3 of advance, On the 2d day of Amche Snow the 3d Battalion, lmh met heavy ezxqy resistance frum a well trained, well concealed and dug in eneqy force, The fight continued for the next eight ($1 days with some of the hardest and costliest fighting enter experienced by an WAforce. As the EL1 was finally taken by a four allied battalion force on 21 May 69, a FW captured reveal&t&&the 29th Regt &s with two of its three orgatiic battalions was located on Dong Ap %a. Further interrogation revealed that elements of the 29th Regt on Don& Ap &.a suffered extreme heavy casualties, One FW estimated that over 80 percent of his Company was destroyed,

UNCLASSIFIED

6'etn/Jsrt9 t.. 'O} ''4 L UNCLASSIFIED

indicated deployment of a Major North Vietnamese Conmand in the A Shau area and in Base Area 611 in Laos. Three of these commands ,,:ere identified as Regimental size headqu;').rters, each regiment having under its command three or more battalions. Discovery of parts of a Coaxial cable tended to battress the idea of a major cormno facility located somer..vhere in the valley. By early May, a URS report had identified a regimental: headouar-cers as being 5-8 kilometers west of Dong Ap Bin and was moving easterly.

Photographs and captured documents played a. major role in selecting the landing aones and general axis of advance of the Battalions participating in the Combat Assault:ing of multiple battalions along the Laotian borner. The Bde II and Ass't 52 officer under the guidance of the S2 and 53 selectsd specific cweas for photographs. The study and analysis of these photogra.phs were instrumental, both to the 52/3 and later to the En Ca.rnmanders in their planning of assigned missions.

Although: l.gent reports were plentiful. in the early stages of formulating a dac.a. base and preparing plans for Apache Snow, the infonnation "Tas general dnd not in depth. The Fde 52 made a liaison visit to the 525th HI Det in Hue and directed specific questions concerning the area of interest t.o the Det OIC. He was able to respond immediately with some of t he information and levied the remaining requirements on his agents.

As the data 'base grew or developed, plans were made by the 3d Fde to begin Operation Apache Snow to fully exploit the situation. Tm Operation kicked off on 10 May with a multiple ba.ttalion CA into selected L2' s along the Laotian Border. All assaulting elements reported cold 12's and moved out on multiple a.xi.s of advance. On the 2d day of A'P<-1.che Snow the 3d Battalion, 137th met hea"\'Y eneII\Y resistance from a well trained, well concealed and dug in enelI\Y' force. The fight continued for the next eight (G) days with some of the hardest and costliest fighting ever experienced by an NVA force. As the Hill was finall3' taken by a four allied battalion force on 21 May 69, a PN captured revealed that the 29th Regt H:!s with two of its three organic battalions was located on Deng Ap Bia. Furthet' interrogation revealed that elements of the 29th Regt on Dong Ap Bia suffered extrane heavy casualties. One FW estimated that over 80 percent of his Company was destroyed.

UNCLASSIFIED

~m1Osure 3 (Personnel and Administration) to Co'mbht Operations X%er ACT#LQ~

'{sport, Operation Apache Snow. UNCLASSIFIED

I. U-nits Strengths:

a. Initial:

Officers HFIC! 3h.i3de 38 1st Bn, 506th Inf 37 2d Bn; 506th Inf 43 3d Bn, 187th Inf 43

b. Final:

Officers '13X 3d'Bde 36

1st Bn, 506th Inf 31 2d Bn; 506th Inf 40 3d Bn, 187th Inf 28

c1 Casualties:

Officers K-XC 3d'Bde 1 la-t; En, 506th Inf 13 2d Rn; 506th Inf 8 3d Bn, 187th Inf' 22

Warrant Officers 14

2 2 1

Warraizt ‘bfficcrs 14

1 2

A' l

Wasrant Officers 1 0 0 0

EN

z! 778 629

Elyl

L;!

318

d. Roplnoemonts:

Officers Warrant Officers EN HFiC 3d*Bde 2 0 5 1st Bn, 506th Inf 3 0 164 2d Bn; 506th Inf' 0 81 -m 3d Bn, 187th Inf 1 118

e. Thorn wao an averago of fifty poop10 sn leave and R&R during Operation lpache Snow.

> -. Other Aspects:

a. AG F'unctions: An additional administration load was incurredduo to th :lumorouo casualties and tho correspondence required on each one. Other admini- :tration remained at a normal level,

b . PM0 : The Provost Marshal reports .had no increase in crime during this 4 od. .-.

c. Fimnae: There was no change in financo,functions at the 3d Bde during lis period. ,

cl . Chaplain: The brigado chaplains, as a matter of courx?, visited all its on Q regular schedule, no matter whore they were looatod, in order to ,ld religious scrvicos, The 'chatilains also briefdd rGplacemonts and visited rsonnel of the 3d Bde in hospitals in the mea. During this time the chap-

building project for a Catholic Orphanage in tho local Cr\L j-1 UNCLASSIFIED

-,-:i:'lclostU'e 3 (Personnel and Administration) to Cobbllt Operations At'ter AC1iJ.On

(sport, Operation Apache Snow.

1. Units Strengths:

a. Initial:

Officers HHG 3d'Bee 38 1st En, 506th Inf 37 2d En, 506th Int 44 3d Bn, 187th Inf 43

b. Final:

Officers lIEC 3d'Bda 36 1st Bn, 506th Inf 31 2d Bn, 506th Inf 40 3d 13n, l87th Ini' 28

c. C<:;.sual tien:

Officers HRG 3d'Bde 1 ls't Btl, 506th Inf 13 2d En, 506th Inf 8 3d 13n, 187th Inf 22

d. Replaoements:

Officers HHC 3d'Bds 2 1st Bn, 506th 1nf 3 2d ]n, 506th Int 1 3d Bn, 187th Ini' 9

UNCLASSIFIED

Harrant Officers 14

2 2 1

Warrnnt 'Officers 14

1 2 1

Warrant Officers I o o o

Warrant Officers o o o 1

E1'ol 239 797 786 'i55

EM 234 661 778 629

EM 4

157 92

318

EM 5

164 81

118

e. Thero was an average of fifty people on leave and R&R during Operation \pacho Snow'.

) -. Other Aspects:

a. AG Functions: An additional administration load was incurred duo to tb :lumerouo casual tics and the correspondence required on enoh one. Other admini-1tration remained at a normal level.

b. PMO: Tho Provost Marshal reports.had no increase in crime during this ~·:::'i od.

c. Finunce: There "tias no change in finance 0 fUnotions a~ the 3d Bde durini ~is period.

d. Chaplain: The brigade chaplains, as a mattor of cour.:lO, visited all itD on D. regular schedule, no matter whore they were locatod, in order to ,ld religious services. Tho 'chaplains also briefed replacements and visited rsonnel of the 3d Bda in hospitals in the area. During this time the chap!ins nlso startod a building project :for a Catholic Orphanage in tho local

lst-:',ict" '. ~<j 3 CQPlFt ian; ,,!LL 3-' UNCLASSIFIED

Cc!~ l r .

UNCLASSIFIED Extrnct, After Act ion Reports, Operatim Apache Snow - Logistical, Ha, 3d Ekie

Reference: a. ADMIE!O l-69, Hq, 3d Bde, lOl& Abn Div (AM), dtd :ii Feb 69.

0. OPCRD 3-69, HCI, 3d We, ?Olst Abn Div (AM), dtd 6 May 690

2. Operation Apache Snow was initiated by a Brigade planning ronfer- ence: ADKIN 7-69, dtd 2R Feb 59, initiated the logistical support for the operation*

3* Logistical Task Organization (as of 6 1By 1969):

3d FSSE, DISCOM

Elements, 426th Supply and Service Battalion

Co C, 326th Medical Battalion

Co D, 8Olst Maintenance Battalion

Detachment, 1002d Supplv and Service Campan,

FOL Platoon

Laundry and Bath Platoon

Grave 3 Registration I'

Detachment 2, 571st Ordwnce dcmpmy (Ammo)

17&h Maintenance Ccmpany

287th Explosive Ordnance Detachment

15th Aerial Fort (US@)

4 3 General: Logistical support for this operation cmsisted of support rendered to the 3d Brigade Task Force, to the Ist A..RVU Beplment, and to the 3d AWN Regiment.

5. Preparation: a. In antic+ti.m of expenditures, a buildup of Class IV cvld barrier materia1ws.s effected at Camp Evans.. The stockage level of all other classes of supplies at Camp %Wm cm 6 rJI,?Y 1969 w,i’s sufficient for extended field operations by this Brigade.

b. Levels (Camp Evans)

(1). Ammunition: a seven day level is maintained in the Cramp Zvms SP by the Da Nang Support Conanande

(2). POL: 70,000 gallons of Jp4

r UNCLASSIFIED

f / 4 .-

i, t: ,.’ . [ cm-’ hrT~

C(~)FI ~~i G'ftJltt UNCLASSIFIED Extrnctl After Action Reports, Operati~l Apache Sn~ - Logistical, Ho, 3d :&fe

1. Reference: a. ADHIHO 1-69, Hq, 3d Bele, 101st Abn Div (AM), dtd 28 Feb 69.

b. OPrnD 3-69, He, 3d &1e, i01st Abn Div (AM), dtd 6 May 69.

2.. Operation Apache Snow vlaS :initiated by a Brigade planning ~onference: ADHINO 1-69, dtd 2R Feb 69, initiated the lor.:!istical support for the operation.

3· Logistical Task Organization (an of 6 Hay 1969):

3d FSSE, DISCOM

Elements, 426th Supply and Service Battalion

Co C~ 326th Medical Battalion

Co D, 801st Maintenance Batt~lion

Detachment, 1002d Supplv anct Service Campa~y

POL Platoon

Laundry and Bath Platoon

Graves Registration

Detachment 2, 571 st Ord~nce Campcmy (Ammo)

17Sth Maintenance Canpc'\ny

2B7th Explosive Ordnance Detachment

15th Aerial Port (USAF)

4~ General: Logistical support for this operation consisted of support rendered to the 3d Brigade Task Force, to the 1st A .. ~vr.T Rep':iment, and to the 3d ARVN Regiment. .

5. Preparation: a. In anticip:'1tion of expenditures, a buildup of Class IV and barrier material WG.s effected at Camp Evans •. The stock.a.ge level of all other classes of supplies at Camp Evans on 6 Ma~r 19(:.,9 wet's sufficient for extended field operations by this Brigade.

b. Levels (Camp Evans)

(1). /Immunition: a seven day level is rmintained in the Camp Ev;ms . .\.SP by the Da Nang Support Conmand.

(2). POL: 701 000 gallons of JP4

@r@l.'" Q :'-t 'Tl tiL UNCLASSIFIED'

.,’ . UNCLASSIFIED (3)* Rations: a five day level of C-Rations and LWPs.

cm Facilities: All logistical facilities required to 6support Brigade-sized operations were in place on 6 Kay 1969.

6 l Tactical Conduct: a. Operation Apache Snow cQmnenced on 7 May 1969, (D~-3)0 The 1st AXVN Regiment, the 11th; 12th, and 34th .I'WX Artillery J%ttr?:*l- t and the 3+ Brigade (l/506, 3/lW, 2/501, 3/5, Z/319) moved into positions and conducted CA’3 from D-3 to II+1.

Tne 3d brigade forward ccanmand post was located at FB Dertches- garden. The 1st AWN Regiment forward command post wa3 located at FE Br dlcy. The 11506 FSB was locatcc! at FB Currahee, the 3/187 F% tr;cs located at FR Bertchesgarden, and the 2/5O1 and 2/Y% FSR wasat- FB Airborne. The forward caanmand post of the 3/5 was at FB BLa%, and the forward command post of the Z/319 was nt F3 Eagles Veste

1?69:’ The 3/1R7 wcl3 extracted from the operational area on 21 %v

?* Lofiistical Support: a* The plan for logistical support entailed sl2ng-lEded car?0 movement by CH-47 helicopters from Camp Evans to fire bases. IJpon arrival, cargo ?ms stored or further broken dcrwrl to ~ompnny lo,?ds for resupply to units in the field by UH-1H helicopters.

b. Cargo consi3tSng of mail, personnel, and loads which were deemed uneconcznical to move by CH-47 wore hauled by W-IV directly fram Camp Evans to FSBs .or to the unit in the field.

c. USAF Support: Vo additional munitions or supplies were flm into Camp Xwns Army airfield in direct support of the operation=

d. Ground Line of Ccmmunications: 26th C-S Group continued support et a normal rz.te via ground transportation.

e. Helicopter Support:

(1). UH-1H: Assets of the 15&h MB and the 3d Brigade !W.a- tion Section flew in direct support of committed combat elements.

(2) l CH-47: Assets of the 159th AWl3 flew 1188 sc;lties in support of committed ccanbat elemnts as follows:

33 >Arborne FB Currahee FB Ikrtchesgarden FB E~glss IZest FB Bradley F'; Rakkasan Ti<yer Mt

16 29 168 52 17

1; ’ 18 230 78

:: I4 6 14 19 172 ;i

81 24

2 5 2 67 41 6

TCTAL 47 86 82 654 276

CL I CL III CL V CL IV !ITimTR MISC

6 16 6 2

13

43

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED (3). nations: a five day level of C-Rntions ano L1.R.Ps-

c· Facilitie s: All logistical facilities required to support Brignde-sized operations 'VlCre in place on 6 Hay 1969-

6. Tacticl.l1 Conduct: a. Operation Apnche Snow ccmmenced on 7 May 1969, (D<~3). The 1st A1VN Regiment, the 11th, 12th, and 34th /\RVN Artillery Batt~::·:.' ': nnd the Jr Brigade (1/506, 3/1~7, 2/501, 3/5, 2/319) moved into positions and conducted CA IS frem D-3 to D+1_

The 3d Brigade forward cCil1.Mand post was located at FB Berlchesgarden. Tho 1 st ARVN Regij'ncnt forward command post was located at 1"D Br dlcy. Tre 1/506 FSB was locatee at FB Currahee, tho 3/187 F.';I: '''''c:S located Rt FE Bertchesgarden, and the 2/501 an~ 2/506 FSB was' at, FB Airborne. The fOM-Tnro ccanmand post of the 3/5 was at FB Blaze, ar.d the forwl1rd comnand post of the 2/319 was l't FB Eagles ~lest ..

c· The 3/1 P.7 WclS extrncted from the operational area on 21 Hay 1969·

7· Logistical ~lpport: a. The plan for logistical support entailed sling-loaded carf!o movement by CH-47 helicopters from Camp Evans to fire onscs. Upon arrivn.l, cargo was stored or furtrer broken dOW":l to company lo::ds for resupply to units in the field by UH-1H helicopters-

b. Cargo consist.:i.ng of mail, personnel, and loads which were deelWd uneconcmical to move by CH-47 wore h~uled by Ul1-1H directly fran Camp Evans to FSBs .01' to the unit in the field.

c. USAF Support: No ;"dditionnl munitions or supplies Nere flown into Camp Ev.:lI1s Army Airfield in direct support of the operation.

d. Ground Line of Communications: 26th C.S Group continued support ct a normal r~te via ground transportation.

e. Helicopter Support:

(1). UH-1H: Assets of the 15Bth AHB and the 3d Brigade Avintion Section flew in direct support of committee combat elements.

(2). CH-47: Assets of the 159th AREB flew 11SS sG:--ties in support of corranitted combat elenents as follows:

LCC/l!ION CLI CL TIl CL IV .QkJ[ l'lATER MISC -FD Airborne 16 16 29 16S 52 6 FB Currahee 17 45 1$ 230 78 16 FB Dcrtchesgarden 8 14 14 172 81 6 FB E<:gle s l~e st 4 6 19 7 24 2 FB Bradley 4 FD Rald~san 2 5 2 67 41 13 Tiger Ht 6

TOTAL 47 86 82 654 276 43

UNCLASSIFIED $£6 (j ; ;1 Ii: , ';=' t :! _ '1-.

u i~~,u- - rnc . f. Medical Support: Seventyseven d&t-off missions were flown

in support of the operation. UNCLASSIFIED

60 Maintenance: Maintenn:lcc work order s in direct support of the operation were processed by Co D, 8Olst Maint Bn and the 178th Maint Co.

h. Graves Registration: The remains of 63 1US personnel and G AWN personnel were processed.

i.. Laundry and Bath: Unit standowns were provided to 19 ccanpany- sized units irrrmediately prior to. Rnd follovring Operation Apache Snow. Service consisted of hot showers, DX of ciotning and boots (as needed), ice cream issue, ‘and super contact teams*

j- GLCC MSiJlteLUlce : KMCB 10 was responsible for QL 1 maintenance. Ko significant problems were encountered during the conduct of '-,he operation.,

l! l Problem Areas: a- Anmunition: Serious problems were encountered

1 ~l:th ;'I% items, i.n particular 81 rrpn HE, M-79 HE, and M-26 Fra@nent.?tion ::!"e%il &se The requirement for H83 fires and close in suppoz*t of man- &-WY elements in -close proximity to the Fire Support Bases far exceed- :.d &he hE8 for the period covered. The ASR based upon experience factors or' operations on the costal plains is not representative of the reauire- ments for operations in the A Shau valley and surrounding mountains.

Recommsndation: Consideration should be given to operational missions when AS'% are determined and increased usage should bc forecasted when terrain and security reouirements change*

be Personnel Movements: The turbulence of replacement personnel and normal administrative personnel reouiring transportation forward created a potential problem, ti sort&d by UH-1. Logistics resupply time was not sufficient to resupply units in the field and move personnel simultaneouslyW Maximum utilization of #l-47’s helped solve this problem. Personnel were loaded internally in CH-4'7's along with the ex-

1 ternal loads to achieve maximum utili~tian~

Recommendation: One central location should be established where personnel from all organizations of the Brigade would be shuttled to for- >rard areas on CH-47's* This would better utilize resources by centralizing the requirement, increasing CH-4.7 payloads, and decreasing blade time of UH-7's.

ce Chain Saws: Significant problems were encountered bv the high deadline rate of chain saws when operated by untrained personnel. Parts for deadlined saws were in short supply. The maintenance reouirement to keep c?!ain saws operational is directly correlated to the usagc-fac- tar- A temporary solution Was found b,. 71 establishing a maintenance float cf saws and conducting field location training on proper technicrues of opcrating the chain saw.

3,eco~ncndation: All combat units bo given practical demonstrations mc! instruct ion in the operation and maintenance of chain saws.

UNCLASSIFIED

~(..Y i i 6£1&; lAG f. Hedical Support: Seven'tyseven dust-off missions were flown

in support of the operation. UNCLASSIFIED

g. Maintenance : Mnint~~r;,"nce work orders in direct support of the operation were processed by Co D, $01st }~int TIn and the 178th Maint Co.

h. Gr.:lves Registration: The remtdns of 63 us personnel and 8 A..-qVN personnel \'Tere proce ssed.

i. Laundry an('1 BA.th: Unit standowns were provided to 19 ccmpanysized units ~diately prior to' Rnd follo';ring Operation Apache Snow. Service consisted of hot showers, DX of clothing and boots (as needed), ice cream issue, and super contnct teams.

j. GLOe l-bintenance: NMCB 10 't'TaS responsible for QL 1 maintenance. l'Jo significant problems were encountered during the conduct of t,he operation'J

[~. Problem Areas: a. Ammunition: Serious problems were encountered \;~.'~h ASR items, in particular S1 mn HE, M-79 HE, and M-26 Fragment.~tion : ~:.·er:n de s" The require:nent for H8.t! fire s and close :in support of man(~1.J..7']r elements in close proximity to the Fire Support Bases ff.l.r exceed;.d 'chc i\SR for the period covered. The ASR based upon experience factors 01 o~rations on the costal plains is not representative of the reouirements for operations in the A Shau valley and surrounding mountains.

Hecornr~ndation: Consideration should be given to operational missions when ASRs a:.re determined and increased usa.ge should be forecasted when terrain and security reClUirements change.

b. Per sonnel Movement s : The turbulence of replacement personnel tlnd normal administrative personnel requiring transportation forward croated a potential problem, if sortied by UH-1. Logistics resupply t:ime was not sufficient to resupply units in the field ancl move personnel sii'Tlultaneously. Max5.mum utilization of CH-47r s helped solve this problem. Personnel were loaded internally in CH-47 , s along with the external loads to achieve ma..."Ci..mum utilization.

Recommendation: One central location should be established where personnel fran all organizations. of the Brigade would be shuttled to for~lard areas on CH-47 , s. This '...rould better utilize resources hy centralizing the requirement, incr~asing CH-h.7 payloads, and decreasing blade time of UH-1 t s.

c. Chain Saws: Significc.nt problems were encountered by the high deac1line rate of chain saws when operated by untra.ined personnel. Parts for c.eadlined saws were in short supply. The maintenance reouirement to keep chain saws operational is directly correlatec to the usagefactor. A tor.lporary solution was foune. 'I:l:,r estahlishing a maintenance float of sO' .... s anc conductinf. field location training on proper techniClues of op3rating the chain saw.

:{ccoJ7i1l1cndntion: All conbat units be givcn practical demonstrations nne instruction in the operation and maintenance of c~ain saws.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED . d. Shortage of Air Items: of air items frm ftic bases

Was a serious problem. 'fhen opehing a fire base, supplies flow so rap iU.,- that units tend to drag their feet derigginlr; sorties delivered. At time-s urgentJy needed supplies are unnecessarily delayed or nat, de- livers! dud to air items not being avaaable for ri@$ng.

Rccommc:YMior: Comndcrs at all levels should stress the importance of rcliurn53~ air itom frl>m fire bag&s at the earliest possible moment.

. *,e* Vatcr : Forward elements const&tly in contc7ct and unable to clear ZZt s were operating in areas where water was nd available’ In order to sqply water to these elements, a container which could be kicked out of .e heliccyter without broakixp and one which held an ad- c?.s-:o C.InxO'~ _ -t of water had to be found. The immcdiato solution was to use the 1~5x1 povde~ c&mister. However, servorcl draw backs were . fou:ld which YRC?~ this solution lees than satisfactory* '.Jater trans- pcvted in thsse contc?iners had a particularfy unpleasant taste; many ~L%onnel developed dysentary which was thought to be caused by scme cl.h~S..ic~l residue in the cannisters and the cannisters had to be left J-2 *;qi: opextional area where they can be salvaged by the enemy

SC- :.; L: ~xux?ndation : n light disposable water container, which cdn be kic- LA mt rJf helicopters without breaking should be found. Commanders 2-i; all keels should submit recmendations for a possible solution*

UNCLASSIFIED

, " , , , ,. .,. r / . . , .... ~ .. . ",. ...

t •• ~. ., - _ _. •

UNCLASSIFIED

d. S10rtage of Air IteMs: AackhuRl of air items from fire bases was a sGrious problem. '>'hen opening a fire base) supplies flow so rapi"117'" that units tend to drag their feet cerigging sorties delivere0. At tL~S urgentJy needed supplies are unnecessarily delayed o~ not deliverci dU8 to air items not heing available for riggmg.

Rccamrne~'d.ation: Corrrr:lt:'1noers at all levels should stre.ss the import;mce of returnj.?lt:: air it(:rr:.s from fire 1:>asds at tho earliest possible mcrnent.

',e. ~fatcr: FOr.'l'Tard elements constantly in ContAct and unable to clear LZ's were operat:ing in area s where water was not available. In order to supply water to these elemt::mts, a container wicr could be kicked out of c heliccrtcr wi.thout brcakillP' and one Which "eld an adc ..... ua:~o i.mno:.::-_t of wnter had to be found. The inuncdiato solution was to use the 175rn,-n P<J'tI'rdct' cannister. However, serverLll draw backs were fO'lmd 1'1hich. "':l!l..r:k: this solution l0BS than satisfActory- '1ater transpOl'ted in th2se conte' i.T'lers ha~, a particularly unpleasant taste; many :ret'sonnel ct:;veloped dysentary which was thought to be caused by sane r.he~i.:i.':~3.l !"osicuc in the cannisters and the cannisters ha.d to be left -1..:1 "':''1'::; oper.:;tional area. ".,here they can be salvPf!ed by the enentV·

r . ..;.:; j:n1:ondation :~ A lirht disposahle 'W,:lter container, which can be kic- \ ~'"yC~ :nlt of policopters without breAkinp: should be found. Commanders <\".;. all levels should submit recOttmendations for 8. possible solution.

4~71.J~ GENE H. TOSH Mljor, Infantlj" 5-4

flf/~ k 73- ()S0 (CtJ4 t8~ +

l,TG F~~) ~ 2/ t),.,r 61 1 ~/ F~A~I

Eug e!~ € ~5" :"j _ ~:I:;~ ~ :J:l

Lt Colo::t;l, GS

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Psychological Operations

1, General: During Operation APACHE SNO'JJ, Psychological Operations was confined to Aerial Broadcasts from J.JI-MH helico&ers, aqd mass leaflet drops in support of the 3d (Aimlobile),

Brigade, 1Olst Airborne Division

2. Programs: Aerial Broadcasts used the main WA Chieu Hoi theme interjected with the aspect of unnecessary death in false cause, Mass leaflet drops consisted of an assortment of VIA Chieu Hoi themes: appealin to sense of survival; referring to stamina of American Goons in pursuit of their goals3 and m& fakness*of OIQJ forcres deaU.ng tith NVA W.~'~oi*s

- 30 Results: 'Ihe NVA troops were attacked with Aerial Broadcast and mass leaflet drops. Since vast areas had to be covered in short intervals of time the propaganda medias were considered best suited to effectiveness of such an operation. The material was spread over the areas of hea-&& concentration and reached targets with adequate accuracy*

A total of 5,310,OOO NVA Qxieu Hoi leaflets were disseminated in the 28 days of the operation. A total of &' hours of Aerial Broadcas+;s were also iwluded in support of the operation,,

CONCUSrnii :

&IL-though a &ieu Hoi.* s an& only a slight number of E%&J were taken in t&operation, the effectiveness of Psychological Operations should not be cons5dered a t&al. lo&, All POWs stated that all broadcasts were heard and Leaflets were mc&.ved. However, discipline in the indii&dual unj.t plus 'the fear of fol%ticali officer% pressure in the unit and in home base disrupted -Be mi.nLmal, chances of total success

UNCLASSIFIED

, . .. 4'"' •• '. ... . ' ,"4 • ~~...< : t ...... .' ...

C'bi 4P (UEI<J I i At UNCLASSIFIED

Psychological Operations

1. General: During Operation APACHE SNOW, Psychological Operations was confined to Aerial Broadcasts from UH-lH helico~ters, a~d mass leaflet drops in SUppOl·t of the 3d Brigade, lOlst Airborne Division (Airmobile).

2. Programs: Aerial Broadcasts used the main NVA Chieu Hoi theme interjected "tnth the aspect of unnecessary death in false cause. Mass leaflet drops consisted of an assortment of r~VA Chieu Hoi themes: appealin to sense of survival; referring to stamina of American Troops in pursuit of their goals, and the -fairness· of QVN forces dealing w:lth NVA Chieu i Hoi l s

30 Result.s: The NV}. troops were attacked 'tdth Aerial Broadcast and mass leaflet drops. Since vast areas had to be covered in short intervals of time the propaganda medias were considered best suited to effectiveness of such an operation. The material was spread over the areas of hea\~est concentration and reached targets with adequate accuracy.

A total of 5,310,000 NVA Chieu Hoi leaflets were disseminated in the 28 days of the operation. A total of 47 hrurs of Aerial Broadcasts were <llso included in support of the operation.,.

CONCWSrol'~' :

Although .ng Chieu Hoi I s and -- only a slight number of POW' i s were taken in the operation, the effectiveness of Psychological Operations should not be conside~ed a total 10·ss.. All POW's stated that all broadcasts wore heard and leaflets were recMved. Howeyer. discipline in the individual unit plus the fear of Political Officer's pressure in the unit and in home ba se disrupted the rninilnal chances of total success

UNCLASSIFIED

Inclosure 6 - to Combat kfter Action Report - Opertion Apache Snow

SUBJECT: COM4UbJIC~TIOI EHPIiXME3JT DURIKG OPEJ&.TTON "kF%CHE SIuOW".

1. The folio* FX and Ratt radio nets were employed from Brigade to Divis and Subordinate units in support of operation "kpache Snowff and wrzre effect during the entire operation,

ETS Civision Command Net Division Commard Net Division Intel1 Net Division Spt Net 1 Erigade Comtnati Net Me Comm3n3 Ops/Intell. Lrigade Admin/.Log

Moml FM Secure F&i Nonsecure FM Secure Ratt Secure FiI Nonsecure FM Secure FIb1 Nonsecure

TYPE EgUIPbmU'T AI\:/vRC - 46/K&8 M/VRC - 46 AN/PRc - 7'7/KY-38 kN/VSC - 2/K W-7 AN/VRC - i+6 (see fi, kN/miC - 46/w-B AN/W - 46/kN/~ti,

2. VHF communications were employed extensively throughout the entire oper- ?,t.i nr. . ..I ', and was effective. VHF was employed from the following locations

FROM Porchtesgaden

II rt I? II 11

camp 2lkuls

To CampEvans 173 Currahee II3 EaEl.e Nest FB Blaze CampEvans Camp Eagle FB Rakkasan

MODE VHF VHF VHF

VHF VHF VHF

TYPE EQUIPME%T AM/GRC - 163 AIu/GRC - 163 I;N/GRC - 163 klJ/GRC - 163/Ah/MRc-r' AN/plRC - h9(Sec note AN/&X - 69 AN/MC - 68

3. All other means of camrmunications were employed 1AW tith the Brigade SOE experiencing no major difficulty.

rJOTE!S 1. Radio Set Ar\t/VRC - 49 (Automatic Retrans)nas located at FB Eagles 1Jest to communicate with units operating from the wlley floor of the A Shau VaUi

2. Six (6) channels were strapped dver at Camp Eagle to Camp Evans.

Inclosure 6 - to Combat J..fter Action Report - Opertion Apache Snow

SUBJECT: COlw1tv1UNICA'rIO!£ EHPLOYMENT DURING OPERATION "APACHE SIllOVl".

1. The folloWng FH and Ratt radio nets were employed from Brigade to Divis and Subordinate units in support of operation "Apache Snow" and WEre effect during the entire operation.

l'-JL:;TS :Ci vi sion Command Net Division Commarrl Net Division Intell Net Di vis ion Spt Net 1 Brigad e Corrannnd Net Bde Corrurarrl Ops/lntell Lrigade Admin/log

MODE FM Secure FM Nonsecure FM Secure Ratt Secure FH NO~lsecu re FH Secure FN Nonsecure

TYPE EQUIPNE-iT A h/VRC - 46 /KY-8 AN/VRC - 46 AN/PRe - 77/KY-38 AN/VSC - 2/K W-7 AN/VRC - 46 (see n AN/VRC - 46/K:i.-8 AN/VRC - 46/AN/PI1C

.-

2. VHF communications were employed extensively throughout the entire oper· -:-.+~"0r4, and was effective. VHF was employed from the following locations

FRO!..f TO HODE TYPE EQUIPHENT Berchtesgaden Camp Evans VHF AN/GRC - 163

II F3 Currahee - VHF A~/GRC - 163 It FB Eagle Nest VHF J~N/GRC - 163 " FE Bla~w VHF Al~/GRC - 163/Al\i/MRC-f t! Camp Evans VHF AN/~mC - 69(See note n Camp Eagle VHF AN/MRC - 69

Camp Evans FB Rakkasan VHF J\N!NTtC - 68

3. All other means of conmunications were employed JAW w.. th the Brigade SOI experiencing no major difficulty.

I:{)TES 1. Radio Set AN/VRC - 49 (J1.utomatic Retrans)'Wss located at FE Eagles Nest to cormnunicate with units operating from the valley floor of the A Shau Vall

2. Six (6) channels were strapped 0ver at Camp Eagle to Ca~p Evans.

,," , (~

I

UNCLASSIFIED 3

DEPARTHEHT OF THE ARNY HEADQU,mmRS, ZD E%l%JJION, 319TH ARTILURY

APO SfLN FRlLlxIsco 96393

18 June 1969

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation Apache Snow

Co:Xlanding Officer 3d Brigade, 1Olst Airs&bile Division LTTN: s-3 I20 96383

v UNCLASSIFIED m

1, l%ission: Direct support of the 3d Brigade and controI of artmcrY fires in the 3d Brigade i;rea of Operations.

9 a-e. Concept of Operationsz

a. Organization of the a,rti&ry was as follows:

(1) 2/319th Arty DS 3d Bio (2) E/11 Arty GSR 1Olst kbn Div (3) C2/11 Arty GSR 101st AIn Div (4) Al/B Arty GSR 1Olst ntn Mv [i{ Cl 83 Arty GSR 101st Abn Div

J 77thARAGSR 2/319th Arty

b. Concept of the operation was to previde artillery coverage with ,aJl batteries' for a33 friendly elements as needed.

3. Execution:

a. This Battalion was in DS of the 3d Brigade in the area of operation, the A Shau V&&y, duriq the entire operation, Apache Snow. W Battery was the first battery to support Apache Snow when they mved from Camp Evans to Bertchesgarden on 25 April 1969. On 9 May 1969 ~~A~~ Battery m~ed from FSB Blaze to FSB Currahee, ati on Q May 1969 ~'C" Battery wved from FSB Rakkassan to FSB Airborne, aU roved in suppofi of operation Apache Snow. Part of the Battalion TOC moved to FSB Blaze on 25 April 1969, ard the complete 'IW m~ed to Eaglets Nest on 10 May 1969. On 13 May 1969 %I' Battery 2/319th Artillery came under mrtar and grouni attack from the South ati Southwest grid 35Xl52 2nd from the hili to the East. Personnel loses were as follows: 49 b/IA's and 13 KItIs and 1 died of wounds later, king total of KIAts to 14. Equipment 1osCs were as follows: 1 1Ofdxn Howitzer destroyed ard 1 damaged. Both were replaced the same day, Other equipment loses include:

UNCLASSIFIED

GQt I rt il13 i "ttL UNCLASSIFIED

DEPAATMEI'lJT OF THE ARMY HEADQUAR1ERS, 2D M'ITA1ION, 319TH ARTILLERY

Af'O SJ~ FRlJ'JCI seo 96383

18 Jure 1969

SUBJECT: Combat Ope rat ions J~fter Action Report, Operation Ap~che Soow

CO:;1Taanding Officer 3d Brigade, 101 st l.irroo bile Divi sion j~ TIN : S-:3 i.PO 96383

fEGfW)EO UNCLASSIFIED BY

~ DOD DIR. 5200. 1 R IV ~7 rJHll.hI'o/f1

1. Nission: Direct support of the 3d Brigade and control of artillery fires in the 3d Brigade lJ."ca of Operations.

ConceJ:t, of Operations~

a. Organization of the artil:i.ery was as follows:

( 1) 2/319th IIxty DS 3d B:i€) ( 2) B2/11 Arty GSR 101 st h.bn Div (3) C2/11 Arty GSR 101 st Am Div (4) A1/83 Arty GSR 101 st 141:11 Div (5) Cl/83 liXty GSi 101st Abn Div (6) 4/77th AM GSR 2/319th Arty

b. Concept of the operation Was to previde artillery coverage with all batteries' for all friendly elements as needed.

:3 • Execut ion:

a. This Battalion was in DS of the 3d Brigade in the area of operation, the A Shau Valley, duri~ the entire operation, Apache Sn:>w. "B" Battery was the first battery to support Apache Snow When they m::>ved from Camp Evans to Bertchcsgarden on 25 April 1969. On 9 May 1969 "A" Battery JIOved trom FSB Blaze to FSB Currahee I ani on 8 May 1969 "CII Battery IOOved from FSB Rakkassan to FSB Airborne, all m:>v~ in support of operation Apache Snow. Part of the Battalion TOG moved. to FSB Blaze on 25 April 1969, am the co~ete roc m::>ved to Eaglet s Nest on 10 May 1969. On 13 M~ 1969 "C" Batter,- 2/319th Artillery came under mortar and groum attack from the SJuth a.."¥i Southwest grid 3 5~ 52 ['.nd from the hill to the East. Personnel loses were as follows: 49 WIll's and 13 KIf .. ' s and 1 diEd of woums later I 'tring t ot.al of KIA's to 14. Equipment loses were as follows: 1 105nm Howit zer destroyed am 1 damaged. Both were replaced the same day. Other equipment loses include:

Qil.Fl81!1cTt/ ts 7-1

UNCLASSIFIED

3

UNCLASSIFIED

D/i. Hq 2/319 F1, 1Olst ,1bn Div ;8 June 1969

,SUB LTR: Combat Opns ;, fter ,;ct,inn Report, Apache Snow

(?) Radio Set, Control ,Ir\r/GRk39 3 ea (2) Radio Set, ilN/PRC-4'7 i ea (3) Radio Set, liN/PRC-25 3 ea (4) Container, Insulated, Thermal 1 ea (5) Antenna, RG-232 6 ee (6j Launcher, Grenade 1 ea ('7) Light Set, G eneral Illumination 1 ea (8) Computer, M18 lea (9) Rifle, Ml&l 1 ea (10) Trailer, $ Ton 1 ea (11) Generator Set l-5 kw 1 ea (12) Headset, 144 C/V 7 ea

Operation ,\pache Snow ended 2400 hours 8 June 1969, Ik that time the below list& units in support of Apache Snow were disposed as follows:

(1) (2) (3) t 41 (5) (6) (7) t 8) (9)

Hq T0C at Ea&els Nest Ld319 Arty at FSB Curraheo Si/319 Arty at FSB Bertchesgarden C2/319 ixty at FSB Airborne B2/1 ‘i dirty at FSB Cwr,dW C2/9f+ r&y at FSB Nancy X6/33 Arty at FSB Thor Cl/83 Arty at FSB Blaze Au77 AU at CampEvans

b. Number, type of missions and mnition expenditues for organic batteries foI&w:

TYPE OF MISSION NO OF MiSSIONS

Conftimcd Acquire3 &ant erbattery Preparation Interdiction Special Purpose ARViJ, CID3 Register&ion oti1er

528 1829

62 112

2116 643

ii a2

CS 172

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

HE 1506

1 :7:64 1008

10 583 3850

3% 1818

WP ILL EH FC

250 0 0 0 0 0 3: 0 0 0 0

603 0 0 0

5402 62!: 0 0 0 0 0 1+2 0 0

T 0 0 0 0 0 030 0

SK 0. 0 0 0

21: 0 0 0

40 I’JEJ ysis : The operation was a success fromthe artillery point of view. The effect of H&I fires as a deterrent cannot be detertined since results are norm&Ly unobai.nat9.e. Enemy rocket & g:rc?tlr,d &%a&.~, such as the V,"

UNCLASSIFIED

Is'e'l 11 ,a

UNCLASS\F\ED

nil. Hq 2/319 Fl. 101 st Abn Div

ruB 1TR: Combat Opns /St(:r .~cti()n Report J J~pt~che Snow

( 1) RRCiio Set, Control /1~/GR~-39 (2) Radio Set, AN/PRC-47 (3) Radio Set, .~/PRC-25 (4) Container, Insulated, Thermal (5) Ant enna, RG-29 2 ( 6) Launcher, Grenade ( 7) Light Set, Gener Al I lluminat ion (8) Computer, M18 (9) Rifle, M16h1 (10) Trailer, i Ton

3 1 3 , 6 1 1 1 1 1 1

ea ea ea ea ea £a ea eo. ea ea ea ( 11) Generator Set 1-5 kw

( 12) Headset, 144 e/v 7 ea

~ 8 June 1969

Operation .\pache Snow ended 2400 hours 8 June 1969. l .. t that time the below list c>Ci unit s in support of Apa~he Slow were disposEd c!s follows:

(1) Hq 'IDC at. Eagle's Nest (2) 1.2/319 iJ.-ty at FSB Curraheo (3) B2/3 19 l.rty at FSB Bertchesgar<ien ( 4) C2/319 hrty at FSB Airborne (5) B2/1'; i:irty at FSB Currahee ( 6) C2/94 Arty at FSB Nancy (7) 1.6/33 iJ'ty a.t FSB 'rhor ( 8) e1/a) Arty at r'SB Blaze ( 9 ) 1.4/77 ARt.. at Camp Evans

b. Number, type of missions and amrrunition expenditues for organic batteries follow:

TYPE OF MISSION NO OF H1SSIO;NS CS HE WP ILL HI FG g.nc

Confirmed 528 172 1;06 2!l) 0 0 0 o· Ac quir 00 1829 0 15974 0 0 0 380 0 CO"..lnt erbattery 62 0 1116 0 0 0 0 0 Preparation 112 0 1008 603 0 0 0 0 I nterdict ion 2116 0 10500 0 0 0 0 0 Special Purpose 643 0 38513 542 627 0 0 216 iillVN, CI tG 11 0 3408 0 h2 0 0 0 Register ~t ion 79 0 94S 1 0 0 0 0 0 Other 4)2 0 1818 0 0 30 0 0

4~ :.nalysis: The operation was a suCcess from the artillery point of view. The effect of H&I fires as ~ deterrent ca."1not be determined since results are normnlly unobainable. Enemy rocket and g:-cu.nd attackE, such as the "G"

G¥'b 1Ft OF NT' A , UNCLASSrFrED

r7. "'"'

. ,

B

UNCLASSIFIED

D/i; Hq 2/319 F!! 1Olst Ah Div

'

18 lhus 1969

SJB LTR: Comb& Opns After Ixtiori Report, &x&b tic;

&tkr$,i.ncident, have made it necessary .for,the artmery to rr)$@d @.ClsY. This t$@ of response has ~~-oven to be very effecf;ive against such &tack8 on Fire apport Base3 in the Ekigado IhO.

CPT, I?2 Adjutant

UNCLASSIFIED

, . - "" .' '!".... . ' . • - . .., ~ .

. ,.. , .

cet cf' 0 Zi Q , it tt:! UNCLASSIFIED

nil:. Hq 2/3 19 Ff. 101st J~tn Div la Jun9 1969 .\ .

3JB LTR: Combat Opns After l~ctiori Re}:X)rt .. /,pacht: Show BatterY-incident, hav~ made it necessary for the artillery to respord quickly-. This tyPe of response has proven to be very effective against such attacks on Fire Slpport Bases in the Brigade 1..0.

FOR THE COO/i:.NrER:

Ou£')J]~ ; ~OHN M LINCOLN

CPT, FA Adjltant

UNCLASSIFIED

I 1 I 1 . c.i- ?nc-&j.c:l Ajs Support (Operation Apache Snow) UNCLASSIFIED

1. Xission:

The ession of the 3d We, 101 Ah lJS&J? Tactical Air control parkJ+ to Operation Apache Snow can be divided id:, 5 phases:

ai. Pre-operation reconnaissance, map;>ing, and intelligence gather-in@.

kddsing the (TNb&.r).

Brigade concernin, v f& best use of Tactical Airpower

co Planning and coordinating the Tactical Birpower employment for D&W.

d. controlling airstrikes in support of the ground elements.

e. Visual reconnaissance during the operation.

7 Concept of Operation: i&n enemy routes,

TAC Air tqould be used prior to D-Day to vz cut tiraiJ.s and roads in the A snau VaUey floor,

and prepare LZls for .future use. After D-Day, constant Fxc coverage would provide timediate coverage for units in contact with the ability to rapidly direct already airborne TAC A&+ for additional destructive power on heavily defended enemy emplacements.

a. The pre-operation reconnaissance program was initiated approximately one month prior to D-Day. J-t consisted primarily of working with the Brigade S-2 yin mapping enemy trails and probable enemy Locations. Another important part; of this phaS8 consisted of taking the Brigade and Battalion Comanders and key staff members on flights over the area of operation , thus allowing them to become familiar with their areas before Daay.

b+ The advice of the ALO and FAC*s was sought concerning the most probable areas of enemy concentration, the best locations for LZ!s and the best way of using TAC Air j_n preparing LZ*s, covering the insertions, and supporing troops in contact.

3. Execution:

STATISTIGL SUNURY

Date FAC Sorties Airstrikes &mbs(lbs) iJapalm(lbs)

10 May 27 118,503 29,500 11 : a 119,000 21,000 12 4 16 118;500 16,500 13 6 16 W,O@) EJ,~O 14 1.5

!z s 103,m 16,000 13 99,5+~ 14,000

•

•

2'~C·~:Lct:l Air Support (Operation Apache Snow) UNCLASSIFIED

1. Hission:

The mission of the 3d Bde" 101 Abn TJS.AF Tuctica1 Air Control party to Operation Apache Snovl can be divided into 5 phases:

n. Pre-operation l'econnnissance, mapl1ing, and L.'1telligE:nce GatherinG_

b.. Advising the Brigade concerning the best use of Tactical Airpower (TAC kLr).

c. P1aru:ing and coordinating the Tactical Airpower employment for D-Day.

d. Controlling airstrikes in support of the ground elements •

e. Visual reconnaissance during the operation.

2. Concept of Operation: TAG Air 1-lOuld be used prior to D-Day to VR kl1mffi enemy routes" cut trails and roads in the a Shau IJ alley floor, and prepare LZts for future use. After D-Day, constant FAC coverage would provide ~mnediate coverage for units in contact with the ability to rapidly direct alrea~ airborne TAG Air for additioI~l destructive pOlier on heavily defended enelT\f emplacements.

3. The pre-operation reconnaissance program was initiated appro~tely one month prior to D-Day. It consisted primarily of 'Working with tho Brigadc S-2 in mapping enemy trails and probable enemy 1ocati~ms. Another important part of this phase consisted of taking the Brigade and Batt.aJ..ion Gomll".anders and key staff members on flights over the area of operation, thus allOwing them to become familiar with their areas before D-Da7.

b. The advice of' the AlJJ and FACt s was sought concerning the most probable areas of enemy concentration, the best locations for LZl s and the best way of using TAG A:i.r ~'1 preparing Lzt s, covering the insertions, and supporing troops in contnct.

3. Execution:

Date

10 H;)y 11 12 13 14 15

FAC Sorties

8 6 4 6 4 5

STATISTIC1..L SlJlvIHARY

il.irstr:i.kes

27 14 16 16 15 13

'i-I

.. ft

Eumbs(lbs)

118,500 119,000 118;,500 85,000

103,,000 99,,500

Napalm(1bs)

29,500 21,000 16,500 15,000 16,000 14,000

UNCLASSIFIED

....--.-(w - - -

UNCLASSIFIED Tactical Air Support (Operation Apache snow)

Jhtc FAG Sorties Airstrikes aOmb&ba) Nap&d-d *

16 ;

12 106,000 i2im 17 14 115,000 18 12 Ir&oQo

I;;;=& 19 ; 17 123,ooo i7loaO 20 4 16 81;000 2t;OOO 21 4 ll 5;ooo 22 3 8 Up0 23 3 1s

g:g

24 4 7 96:ooo l?,S@J

25 ! 13 75po 26 4 9 59,ooo 2% 4:m 27 0 0 3 0 28 4 0 0 0 29 4 0 0 0 z: 3 t l.l,ooo 2,000

3&O@ 1 June : 3 13,000 6;co: 2 4 3 22,000 , 0

:, 4 3 10

2 2 10 ii

58,0(30 Lo,000 lS,occ, C 72,OQJ 76,~ 3rd

7 3 7 66,500 0

27 D+ Ill2 Sorties 287 Aixstrtis 1,937,ooo 285&m

NOTE: These fimres include only those airstriketi actually controlled by this TI+CF. They do not ticlude those controlled by the ARW TACP in .SU~~CX% of the P8VN portion of Operation Apache Snow. Nor do they include &clights or Combat skyspots.

NOTE: 27, 28, and 29 May were bad weather days, requiring all TAC Air to be controlled.by Combat skyspot. 27 May through 2 June were also bad weather days, requiring most of the TAC A3.r to be controlled by combat Sk&Spot.

KMBRAMAGE~LS~';ESSMENT TOTALS FOR&.PhCXl3SNOW

Killedby& 102 Secortiary "&plosiona 81 Secondary Fires 52 Forttiicationa 332 Destroyed r/ii.litcuy SXuctures 47 Destroyed Crew-%rvedweapons 4 iG

ositions Destroyed ood %ts 7

UNCLASSIFIED

'! "S'Y"')! ..... __ ._,_ .. - ~

UNCLASSIFIED TacticDl Air Support (Operation Apache Snow)

Date FAC Sorties Airstrikes Bombs(lbs) Napalm(lbs)

16 3 12 106,000 -"", '" # "'~ .J..t:.,vvv 17 5 14 115,000 17,500 18 5 12 48,000 28,000 19 4 17 123,000 17;000 20 4 16 81;000 24;000 21 4 11 92,000 5;000 22 3 8 43,000 1l,OOO 23 3 15 61,,000 17,500 24 4 7 96,000 5,000 25 U 13 75,000 6;000 "I' I, 9 59,000 4,500 cv -27 ° 0 0 0 1)0 '-U 4 0 0 ° 29 4 0 0 0 30 3 2 ll,Ooo 2,000 31 3 4 36,000 0 1 June 2 3 13,000 6,000 2 4 3 22,000 ° 3 4 10 58,000 15,000 h 3 5 40,000 c 5 2 8 72,000 0 6 4 10 76,000 3,000 7 3 7 66,500 0

29 Do.ys ll2 Sorties 287 Airstrikas 1:937,000 285,500

NOTE: These fj.gures include only those airstrikeH actually controlled by this T.b.CP. They do not include those controlled by the ARVN TACP in supp::>rt of the i!RVN portion of Operation Apache Snow. Nor do they include !relights or Combat skyspots.

NOTE: 27, 28, and 29 May were bad weather days, requiring all TAC Air to be controlled' by Combat skyspot. 27 May through 2 June were also bad weather days, requiring most of the TAG Air to be controlle~ by comh:lt sky-spot.

Killed by kir Secondary Explosions Secondary Fj,xes Fortifications Destroyed Military Structures Destl'oyed Crew-Served weapons positions Destroyed Road Guts

OOMB DAMAGE AStiESSMENT TOTALS FOR iJ'.b.CHE SNm.;

102 81 52

332

47

4

7 ¥- ~ \.·,,,1116 AliKE UNCLASSIFIED

Tacticn~. t&r Support (Operation &acho Snm) UNCLASSIFIED

a* *tic Brigade i;u3 did considerable pXarnin end coordineting with the Brigade and division staffs, the %Lst 8 itiTion km, the AWN WI>, and the Direct lair Support Center, llzis involved plannihg the ordnmce load, timing, controlling, ent,ry and oz& routes and altitudezz, and holding locations and altitudes of 32 airstrikes on D&y, rxi.3 planning arid coodins+Wx resulted in an extremely smooth, orderly, effectiva, and accident - free TX Ai.z operation on DJ)ay.

b. LI important part of this TACPtw corrtri?~~+~on to the success of Operation i;pache Snow was the day-to-day controlling of airstrikes in support of the ground corcnanders. Izirstrikes played an ospecialb ~~ortant part in the Battle of &ng lop %a, selda in this or any other conflict has TAC lti been employed so massively as in the hC2.e OX Dong iq Bia,

co -&en not, busy controlI.ing airstrikos the Fomard U..r Controllers conducted extensive visual reconnaissance of the area of operation and possiKLe routes of enemy resupply or retreat, Although the area is not conducive to effective visual reconnaissance due to the thick jungle canopy, on enemy road used for resupply was detected and ' ;~ortially intetiicted,

a. The absolute necessity of gveciso, detailed planxing and coordination for large operations like the prepping of LAGS and the nircxpping of the insertions of Daay, The sidLt$;sneau~ preppFng an6 aircapping of several WS in close prox5mityto each other, in different mtS, controlled by several FX*s from different TAWS and using diffmt ~%qlc-WioS, &d,~tith t&8 irrterW0 Wt~erpfire and multitude of helicopters in the area all comaed to pre8& an excellent opportunity for mid-air collisions, short rounds, or some other disaster. Only by very deteiled planning and coordination was this gotentia3, disaster turned into a smooth, efficient demonstration of air dower.

b. The selection and construction of LZ*s. U. uniti had good Lz's because the s$tes selected were on relatively level terrain that was - origimlly covered by scrub brush or elephant grms. These Lz sites were selected after- several fWS.e attempts were made at constmcj-ng LZls on karst pinnacles or razor-backed ridges coverecl with triple canopy jw?glc. The Daisy Cutter bombs ~yx)B Ibs with fltse extensions) used foiq LZ construction eas33y cleirr out the scrub &ash and elqimnt grc?ss. However, 3.t takes many airstrikes and a great deal of tine to construct an LZ on a jungle-covered mountain top; first; bccsuse the mountain top Is extremely d&ffkult to hit, and secoo~, bccausc mom hits a~ required to klcar out the dense jungle.

b'- 3 UNCLASSIFIED

Tacticnl i~ir Support (Oper~tion i1.p(J.che Snow) UNCLASSIFIED

4. M~~si5:

a. The Brignde ALa did considerable plapxdng and coordinating with the Brig<:lde nnd division staffs, the lOlst Division AW, the AllVN jJJ), and the Direct ii-ir Support Center. This involved planning the ordmmce load, timing, controlling, entry and exit T()1),teB and ~ltitudes, and holding locatio~s and altitudes of 32 airstrikes on D-Day. Ti:.id pl<lnning ~md cocroin!ltion resulted in an extremely smooth, orderly, effective, and accident - free ~C hir operation on D-Day.

b. 1~ impol"tant part of this TACpl s contrib'..ltion to the success of Operntion J~pache Snow was the day-to...ci~y controlling of airstrikes in support of the ground comna.nders. 1d.rstri.kes played an ospecially irnport..-mt purl in the Battle of Dong l~p Bia. Seldan in this or any other conflict h~s TAO ldx been employed so massively as in the Battle of Dong lop Bia.

Co tlllen not busy controlling uirstrikos the Fonmrd ~ir Controllers conducted exiiensi ve visual reconnaissunce of the area of operation ,:md pos~ible routes of enelTC' resupply or rotreat. lU.though the areo is not conducive to effective visual reconnnissance due to the thick jungle canopy, an ene~ road used for resupp~ was detected and . porlially intero.icted.

5. Lessons Learned

a. Thg absolute necessity of preciso, dotailed planrJUlg and coordinati'Jn for large operations like the prepping of LZ's and the oi!-ccpping of the insertions of D-Day. The s:iJm1l.taneous prepping ana oircnpping of several LZ· s in close proximity to each other I in different i.D C s, controlled by several F.hoC t S fr!lm different TAcPl s and uSing different i'roquenciea, along with the 1rrt.ense art:f.llery fire ond multitude of helicopters in the area all combined to present un excellent opportunity for mid-air collisions, short rounds, or some other disaster. Only by ve~' detailed planning and coordination wcs this potential dis~ster turned into a smooth, efficient demonstrQti~n of air )ower.

b. Tho seloction and construction of LZ r s. iUl units had good LZ I S

because the sites selected were on relotively level terrain that was originally covered b,y scrub brush or elephant grass. These LZ sites were selcct.ed after several futUe ;attempts were made at construcing 1Z's on kurst pinnacles or razor-bncked ridges covered with triple cunopy jungle. The Daisy Cutter bombs (lODO lbs with fuse extensi:m.s) used fo1.~ LZ construction easily clear out the scrub b.-u:sh 3nd elcphnnt zrass. However" it takes nu:ny ~irstrikes and a great deal of time to construct an LZ on a jungle-covered mountain top; first; boc.:1uSC the mountain top is extrenl!!ly difficult to hit, and second, bccnuso more hits are required to Clear out the dense jungle. The

e r8 t i F1 raW' 1 T';t cts

b- 3 UNCLASSIFIED

.

UNCLASSIFIED

. ,‘.

axporienccs of this operation seem to indicate that in the future ' t;h8 pmxss of JJ sslec~ion, where TAG f&r constxuction is required, &ould be more of a compromise bctwcen the highest ground, which is naturaUy desirable, and the mora level ground, which is more practical to constn~ct.

: ., .’ . Cl3 Use of fire power to dislodge the enemy f&m deeply &i-d,

henvily protected positions, such aswere encoun%ered on Dow AP By Mountain, ;Gthough the usual ordnance for ;L troops-in-contact airstrike (500 round bombs and napalm) does destroy some fortified positions and produce mazy casualties, it is not suffic$ent to dislodge a determined GWIQ- from ready heavily protected bllnkcrs. It Would seem that the best my to accomplish the task would be for the friendly troops to

back to safe positions and thoroughly cover the enemy pcsitibns I$$: large (at least 1000 pounders) bombs with delay8d (at l.mst ,025 scxncj) fuses. The larger the bomb and the mwe delay, up to 1 second, the better.

UNCLASSIFIED

~ teE I tI\a la \ ...., , - J

Tocticml Jl>ir Support (Operation .o.l.pnche Snow) UNCLASSIFIED

.' . o;xperiencos of this operation seem to indicate that in the future the process of LZ selection, where TAe i1.ir construction is required, should be m~re of a compromise bctlvcen the highest ground, which is naturally desirable, and the more level ground, which is more practical t:) (: onstrlt ct •

c& Usa of fire power to dislodge the enemy £rom deepiybunkered, heavily pro~ected positions, such as' were encountered on Dong ~p Bia Mount nino ll.l though the usual ordrumce .for a troops-in-contact airstrikc (500 pound bombs and napalm) does destroy some fortified positions and produce mony ca~~alties, it is not sufficient to dislodge a determined 6!1eJ'ltj- from really heavily p~t,ected bJ.nkers. It would seem that the best Hay to C1ccomplish the task would be for the friendly troops to Urn",:, back to safe positions and thoroughly cover the enemy positions with Inrge (at least 1000 pounders) bombs with delayed (at least .025 sr;:.;;:md) fuses. The larger the bomb and the more delay, up to 1 second, the better •

.... (;i,~-l;A &;.~ .......... . CHRISTOPHER BOWEN, Major, USAF ~ir Liaison Officer

UNCLASSIFIED