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Jugal Garg IE 598: Games, Markets, and Mathematical Programming
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IE 598: Games, Markets, and Mathematical Programmingjugal.ise.illinois.edu/598/lec1.pdf · •InStuttgart,Germany, after investments into the road network in 1969, the traffic situation

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Page 1: IE 598: Games, Markets, and Mathematical Programmingjugal.ise.illinois.edu/598/lec1.pdf · •InStuttgart,Germany, after investments into the road network in 1969, the traffic situation

Jugal Garg

IE 598: Games, Markets, and Mathematical Programming

Page 2: IE 598: Games, Markets, and Mathematical Programmingjugal.ise.illinois.edu/598/lec1.pdf · •InStuttgart,Germany, after investments into the road network in 1969, the traffic situation

Course webpage Grading Policy Office Hours

Topics Games and Equilibrium Concepts Routing Games and Price of Anarchy Mechanism Design Markets

Page 3: IE 598: Games, Markets, and Mathematical Programmingjugal.ise.illinois.edu/598/lec1.pdf · •InStuttgart,Germany, after investments into the road network in 1969, the traffic situation

Game Theory

Page 4: IE 598: Games, Markets, and Mathematical Programmingjugal.ise.illinois.edu/598/lec1.pdf · •InStuttgart,Germany, after investments into the road network in 1969, the traffic situation

Game Theory

Page 5: IE 598: Games, Markets, and Mathematical Programmingjugal.ise.illinois.edu/598/lec1.pdf · •InStuttgart,Germany, after investments into the road network in 1969, the traffic situation

Game Theory

Analysis/Design of a system whererational agents interact to achieve selfish goals

Page 6: IE 598: Games, Markets, and Mathematical Programmingjugal.ise.illinois.edu/598/lec1.pdf · •InStuttgart,Germany, after investments into the road network in 1969, the traffic situation

Multiple self-interestedagents interacting in the

same environment

Deciding what to do

Q: What to expect? How good is it? Can it be controlled?

Page 7: IE 598: Games, Markets, and Mathematical Programmingjugal.ise.illinois.edu/598/lec1.pdf · •InStuttgart,Germany, after investments into the road network in 1969, the traffic situation

Prisoner’s Dilemma

Two thieves caught for burglaryTwo options: {confess, remain silent}

Page 8: IE 598: Games, Markets, and Mathematical Programmingjugal.ise.illinois.edu/598/lec1.pdf · •InStuttgart,Germany, after investments into the road network in 1969, the traffic situation
Page 9: IE 598: Games, Markets, and Mathematical Programmingjugal.ise.illinois.edu/598/lec1.pdf · •InStuttgart,Germany, after investments into the road network in 1969, the traffic situation

Prisoner’s DilemmaTwo thieves caught for burglary.Two options: {confess, remain silent}

C

S

SC

-5 -5

-1 -1

0 -20

-20 0

Page 10: IE 598: Games, Markets, and Mathematical Programmingjugal.ise.illinois.edu/598/lec1.pdf · •InStuttgart,Germany, after investments into the road network in 1969, the traffic situation

Prisoner’s DilemmaTwo thieves caught for burglary.Two options: {confess, remain silent}

C

S

SC

-5 -5

-1 -1

0 -20

-20 0

Only stable state

Page 11: IE 598: Games, Markets, and Mathematical Programmingjugal.ise.illinois.edu/598/lec1.pdf · •InStuttgart,Germany, after investments into the road network in 1969, the traffic situation

Tragedy of commonsLimited but open resource shared by many

Stable: Over use => Disaster

Bad outcome!

Page 12: IE 598: Games, Markets, and Mathematical Programmingjugal.ise.illinois.edu/598/lec1.pdf · •InStuttgart,Germany, after investments into the road network in 1969, the traffic situation

Rock-Paper-Scissors

Page 13: IE 598: Games, Markets, and Mathematical Programmingjugal.ise.illinois.edu/598/lec1.pdf · •InStuttgart,Germany, after investments into the road network in 1969, the traffic situation

Rock-Paper-Scissors

Page 14: IE 598: Games, Markets, and Mathematical Programmingjugal.ise.illinois.edu/598/lec1.pdf · •InStuttgart,Germany, after investments into the road network in 1969, the traffic situation

Rock-Paper-Scissors

R

P

SR

0 0

-1 1

1 -1

1 -1

No pure stable state!

P

S

0 0

0 0-1 1

-1 1

1 -1

Both playing (1/3,1/3,1/3) is the only stable state. Why?

Page 15: IE 598: Games, Markets, and Mathematical Programmingjugal.ise.illinois.edu/598/lec1.pdf · •InStuttgart,Germany, after investments into the road network in 1969, the traffic situation

Chicken

S

C

S

S

C

C

C S

Page 16: IE 598: Games, Markets, and Mathematical Programmingjugal.ise.illinois.edu/598/lec1.pdf · •InStuttgart,Germany, after investments into the road network in 1969, the traffic situation

Chicken (Traffic Light)

S

C

S

S

C

C

C S

Page 17: IE 598: Games, Markets, and Mathematical Programmingjugal.ise.illinois.edu/598/lec1.pdf · •InStuttgart,Germany, after investments into the road network in 1969, the traffic situation

Routing Games and Price of Anarchy

Page 18: IE 598: Games, Markets, and Mathematical Programmingjugal.ise.illinois.edu/598/lec1.pdf · •InStuttgart,Germany, after investments into the road network in 1969, the traffic situation

Braess’ Paradox

s t

/100 hours

/100 hours1 hour

1 hour

100 commuters50

50

Commute time: 1.5 hours

u

v

Page 19: IE 598: Games, Markets, and Mathematical Programmingjugal.ise.illinois.edu/598/lec1.pdf · •InStuttgart,Germany, after investments into the road network in 1969, the traffic situation

Braess’ Paradox

s t

/100 hours

/100 hours1 hour

1 hour

100 commuters50

50

Commute time: 1.5 hours

0 hours~1 hour

u

v

Page 20: IE 598: Games, Markets, and Mathematical Programmingjugal.ise.illinois.edu/598/lec1.pdf · •InStuttgart,Germany, after investments into the road network in 1969, the traffic situation

Braess’ Paradox

s t

/100 hours

/100 hours1 hour

1 hour

100 commuters

Commute time: 2 hours

0 hours

100

u

v

Page 21: IE 598: Games, Markets, and Mathematical Programmingjugal.ise.illinois.edu/598/lec1.pdf · •InStuttgart,Germany, after investments into the road network in 1969, the traffic situation

Braess’ Paradox

s t

/100 hours

/100 hours1 hour

1 hour

100 commuters

0 hours

100

Price of Anarchy: .

Can’t be worse!

u

v

Page 22: IE 598: Games, Markets, and Mathematical Programmingjugal.ise.illinois.edu/598/lec1.pdf · •InStuttgart,Germany, after investments into the road network in 1969, the traffic situation

• In Stuttgart, Germany, after investments into the road network in 1969, the traffic situation did not improve until a section of newly built road was closed for traffic again.

• In 1990 the temporary closing of 42nd Street in New York City for Earth Day reduced the amount of congestion in the area.

• In 2009, New York experimented with closures of Broadway at Times Square and Herald Square, which resulted in improved traffic flow and permanent pedestrian plazas.…

Source: Wikipedia.org

True Stories

Page 23: IE 598: Games, Markets, and Mathematical Programmingjugal.ise.illinois.edu/598/lec1.pdf · •InStuttgart,Germany, after investments into the road network in 1969, the traffic situation

Mechanism Design

Page 24: IE 598: Games, Markets, and Mathematical Programmingjugal.ise.illinois.edu/598/lec1.pdf · •InStuttgart,Germany, after investments into the road network in 1969, the traffic situation

Single Item Auction

Page 25: IE 598: Games, Markets, and Mathematical Programmingjugal.ise.illinois.edu/598/lec1.pdf · •InStuttgart,Germany, after investments into the road network in 1969, the traffic situation

Vickery Auction Sealed bid auction Highest bidder wins and pays the second highest bid

Properties: Truthful, Incentive Compatible, Welfare Maximization

Page 26: IE 598: Games, Markets, and Mathematical Programmingjugal.ise.illinois.edu/598/lec1.pdf · •InStuttgart,Germany, after investments into the road network in 1969, the traffic situation

Adwords Auction

Page 27: IE 598: Games, Markets, and Mathematical Programmingjugal.ise.illinois.edu/598/lec1.pdf · •InStuttgart,Germany, after investments into the road network in 1969, the traffic situation

Markets

Page 28: IE 598: Games, Markets, and Mathematical Programmingjugal.ise.illinois.edu/598/lec1.pdf · •InStuttgart,Germany, after investments into the road network in 1969, the traffic situation

At equilibrium: Demand = Supply

A Single Good

Pric

e

Quantity∗

∗Equilibrium

Page 29: IE 598: Games, Markets, and Mathematical Programmingjugal.ise.illinois.edu/598/lec1.pdf · •InStuttgart,Germany, after investments into the road network in 1969, the traffic situation

More than one good

Demand of a good now depend on price of other goods

Page 30: IE 598: Games, Markets, and Mathematical Programmingjugal.ise.illinois.edu/598/lec1.pdf · •InStuttgart,Germany, after investments into the road network in 1969, the traffic situation

Markets

Equilibrium: Demand = Supply

BuyersGoods

$10

$5 $25

Buyers have preferences over goods

demand > supply? demand < supply?

Q: Does there exist an equilibrium? If yes, how to compute it?Do buyers have incentive to lie about their preferences?

want best affordable bundle

Page 31: IE 598: Games, Markets, and Mathematical Programmingjugal.ise.illinois.edu/598/lec1.pdf · •InStuttgart,Germany, after investments into the road network in 1969, the traffic situation

Housing Market

$250K

Buyers Houses

Each buyer wants to buy exactly one housewhich maximizes valuation – payment and affordable

Page 32: IE 598: Games, Markets, and Mathematical Programmingjugal.ise.illinois.edu/598/lec1.pdf · •InStuttgart,Germany, after investments into the road network in 1969, the traffic situation

if house is allocated to buyer otherwise

price of house

valuation of buyer for house

Maximize ,

Page 33: IE 598: Games, Markets, and Mathematical Programmingjugal.ise.illinois.edu/598/lec1.pdf · •InStuttgart,Germany, after investments into the road network in 1969, the traffic situation

if house is allocated to buyer otherwise

price of house

valuation of buyer for house

Maximize ,

Page 34: IE 598: Games, Markets, and Mathematical Programmingjugal.ise.illinois.edu/598/lec1.pdf · •InStuttgart,Germany, after investments into the road network in 1969, the traffic situation

Play A Game• Each of you will put $[0, 10] in a pot in a sealed envelope • M ←Total money in the pot • Each will receive ← 2*M/#people

What is the best strategy that maximize your own payoff?

Page 35: IE 598: Games, Markets, and Mathematical Programmingjugal.ise.illinois.edu/598/lec1.pdf · •InStuttgart,Germany, after investments into the road network in 1969, the traffic situation

Next Class • Nash equilibrium concept• Zero-sum games• Minimax theorem and LP duality