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Identity Formation and Separatism: Theoretical Aspects
Many decolonising states like India adopted federal structures
in an attempt to
manage their diverse populations or to maintain institutional
continuity with
their colonial past. But in case of Russian Federation the logic
of disintegration
was very much prominent. Though it seems different but in fact,
there was
challenge before both the country to keep their territorial
integrity intact. Being
a multi-ethnic country it becomes difficult for both countries
to accommodate
theirs diversity. Hardgrave termed this as ‘dilemmas of
diversity’ (Hardgrave
1993: 56) (sic).
Introduction
In post-1990 world order, regional identities are demanding
their political space either in
the form of secession or autonomy under the present system of
sovereign territorial
nation-state. Their demands for independent statehood are based
on their cultural
distinctiveness. Secessionist movement often turned into violent
confrontation between a
state and an armed grouping seeking to take control over
territory within the state with
the aim of establishing an independent state (Baev 1999). The
notion of regional identity
has its genesis in the subjective feeling of a community of its
separate identity based on
language, religion, and race or shared historical experience
which help in forging
common emotional bonds amongst the people. It is the
complementariness of interests
and identity that help people to constitute and imagine them as
a separate regional
community. Moreover, when the regional identity of a particular
community in a country
comes into confrontation with the notion of national identity of
that country, it goes to the
extent of demanding autonomy and even secession.
Though the demands of autonomous political arrangements and
separatism based on
regional identity are related to the historical and geographical
factors like concentration
of particular ethnic or religious minorities groups in
peripheral geographic space (Toft
2003), they get much more intensified with the growing sense of
deprivation and neglect
as a result of discriminatory, exploitative, and unfavourable
policies of the state. It is in
this context, the principle of Self-determination provides
philosophical and moral ground
for secessionism or separatism. In addition, the issue of
regional identities and separatism
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becomes more complex given the trans-national support to the
movements demanding
autonomy and separation as seen both in cases of Chechnya and
Kashmir.
All these above factors are responsible for the revival of
‘ethno-political identity’ though
there is no direct correlation between any one factor and
separatism. In fact, secessionist
movements are cumulative results of all these factors. These
movements are challenging
the present notion of Westphalian world order by demanding their
own nation-state based
on their titular identity.
In a way, ethno-political revival in the form of various
separatist movements around the
world is widely regarded as a most serious challenge to the
contemporary geo-political
space. In post-Cold War scenario, separatist movements claimed
hundreds of thousands
of lives around the globe and put to serious test the theory and
practice of Sovereignty in
the present world order. While traditional post-Second World War
order tend to support
the status quo with respect to territorial integrity of present
states, the principle of self-
determination have inspired many ethno-nationalist movement to
demand sub-state
autonomy or to the extent of independence. In general, ethnic
identity is based on
“primordial” sentiments and emotions and images of “ancient
hatreds have often
accompanied reports of violence and mayhem in various parts of
world” (Ganguly and
Macduff 2003: 07).
However, when one tries to discover the roots of the any ethnic
conflict then one finds
that there are myriad of issues and problems which are not
necessarily related to ethnicity
as such. In other words, one can say that ethnicity and identity
itself is not the main cause
though it provides the basis for various ethnic conflicts.
Therefore, it is necessary to find
out how politicization of ethnic identity leads to rise of
separatist movements.
Broadly, identity is perceived as socially constructed which is
all about asking, ‘who am
I’? ‘Who you are’? It is about inter-subjective understanding
about each other, or how
one person understands and develops understanding about others
over a period of time.
The word ‘identity’ originated presumably from the Latin word
‘idem’ and ‘idem’
transformed into the word ‘identidem’ from which seems to have
developed into
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‘identity’. Indeed, three things are important to understand the
notion of identity as
Preston (1992) argues; locale (the place where people live),
networks (the way in which
people interact), and lastly memory (the understanding which are
sustained and recreated
over time). It means identities are not fixed but fluid in
nature, it changes over a period of
time. But the core remains unchanged. In the present context,
identity does not only refer
to sameness but also to distinctiveness (Susan et al. 2002).
Identity can also have different levels. In the context of
separatism, it is a general
perception that national identity and regional identity are
antagonistic to each other. In
other words, regional identity becomes irreconcilable with
national identity. Regions start
feeling detached to the national identity, which ultimately
leads to separatism. In a way
‘regional identity’ is perceived as a threat to national
integrity it demands its own nation-
state on the basis of the titular identity which may be confined
to a particular peripheral
region of the concerned country.
Initially, idea of regional identity developed in the favour of
group territorial identities
which can be applied to any “level in the hierarchy of
attachments to territory, from small
group, to a parochial localism, to a broader (but still
sub-state) regionalism, to a
nationalism (which may also be sub-state in area focus), and may
be even to an
internationalism” (Knight 1985: 250). Generally, regional
identity attached with the sub-
state level is called regionalism and regionalism simply means
the awareness of
togetherness among a people of a relatively large area and is
recognizable only when it
represents but a part of a larger whole. The latter in this
context generally being the
territory of the state when regionalism is clearly linked to a
“group’s identity that finds
political expression, then one can refer to a group
politico-territorial identity” (Ibid: 250).
The latter, as a regionalism within the state, may develop into
sectionalism where by
regional political concerns are held to be more important than
those from elsewhere in the
state. Ultimately, if accommodation cannot be reached,
regionalism may seek and
achieve secession, creating a new state according to the wishes
of self-determination of
the people involved.
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Regional identity becomes more entrenched due to its
complementariness of interest and
identity that help people to constitute and to imagine them as a
separate regional
community. It is commonly held that more subjectivity the
identity is grounded in, more
intense is the regional movement. Eventually regions question
the distributive policy of
the state as discriminatory, exploitative, and unfavourable to
the overall well-being of the
concerned regional community. It is from this perceived sense of
deprivation, neglect,
and ‘internal colonialism’, that the people of a particular
region organize themselves into
a movement seeking in most of the cases separation from the
existing state, or in select
instances settling with some autonomy arrangements within the
same state. In this
context, outside support to the cause of regional identity, fuel
the secessionist feeling
among regional groups. So, given the context, over a period of
time, regional identity
becomes in-contradiction with the national identity that leads
to separatism. Nevertheless,
it does not necessarily lead to separatism at first instance but
because of perpetuation of
grave atrocities or sense of deprivation this leads to the
development of secessionist
tendencies. Thus, in order to get the better understanding of
identities, there is a need to
examine major theoretical paradigms in the context of the modern
nation state.
Theoretical Understanding of Identity Formation
There are two views on nation and nationalism. One view believes
that no matter how
many times a country has been conquered, subjugated or even
destroyed by enemies,
there are certain attributes called the “core attributes” that
never change (Goethe 1998:
139). Another view, believes that nationalism is not the
awakening of the nation to self-
consciousness; it invents nations where they do not exist
(Gellner 1964: 169). Here, the
first view is characterized as a primordial view and second view
is characterized as
instrumentalist or constructionist view.
Scholars like Anthony D. Smith in The Ethnic origins of Nations
(1986) argues that
nations are an evolution of “common cultural heritage and
language” of a society which
have been there since the distant past. Therefore, nations are
“historically embedded”.
Smith contradicts Gellner’s idea that modernity and nationalism
are related terms.
According to Gellner, pre-modern societies or feudalistic
societies were characterized by
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“networks of feudal bonds and loyalties”. Whereas, modern day
industrial societies
“promoted social mobility, self-striving and competition”, and
therefore it required a new
foundation of “cultural cohesion”.1 The foundation of this
“cultural cohesion” is based on
the idea of nationalism.
Hence, the development of nationalism catered to the needs of
industrial societies.
Gellner proposed that nationalism is a permanent phenomenon for
all future societies, as
it is impossible to go back to ‘pre-modern society’ (Heywood
2005). Whereas Smith
believes that nationalism did not come to fulfill the needs of
industrial societies, instead,
industrial societies saw the maturity of idea of nationalism.
According to Smith, old
“ethnies” got political meaning in the modern era. Moreover,
Smith (1986)
acknowledged that, although ethnicity is the precursor of
nationalism, modern nations
came into existence only when established ‘ethnies’ were linked
to the emerging doctrine
of political sovereignty.2 Essentially, Smith described ethnic
group as an ‘ethnic
category’. He argues that ethnic group may not be aware of their
own ethnic character
and yet they may still remain part of the group (Smith 1991:
20-1). In his work, he listed
six necessary ethnic attributes: a collective name; a common
myth of descent; a shared
history; a distinctive shared culture, comprising language and
/or religion and / or
institutions and/ or other cultural features; an association
with a specific territory and
finally a sense of ethnic solidarity. For Smith, initially these
features were important but
later the sense of ethnic solidarity is the most important
feature of all (Fowkes 2002: 02).
But Instrumentalists deny this traditional view of ethnicity.
Norwegian theorist, Fredrik
Barth argues that it was the ‘ethnic boundary’ that defined the
group, and not the ‘cultural
stuff that it encloses’ (Ibid). This view was further developed
by Joanne Nagel, who
argues that “ethnic identities are simply ‘constructed out of
the material of language,
religion, culture, appearance or locality and the meaning of
particular ethnic boundaries
are continuously negotiated, revised or revitalized” (Nagel
1994: 154).
1 For detail see: Gellner, Earnest, (1983) Nation and
Nationalism, Oxford: Blackwell Pub. Ltd.
2 For detail see: Heywood, Andrew, 2005.
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Authors like Benedict Anderson and Eric Hobsbawm each present
their own particular
view on how and why different identities exist. Although there
are slight differences
between them as to why identities exist and exactly how they are
formed, both stress
similar points. People realise as part of one group because they
share commonalities with
other people in this group. There are people who consider
themselves part of the same
group as one understands, yet one has never met them, and
probably never will.
Anderson’s described this as an idea of ‘imagined community’.
The argument here is that
a nation though ‘imagined’ does not mean that a nation is false,
unreal or to be
distinguished from ‘true’ (unimagined) communities. Rather
Anderson is proposing that a
nation is constructed from popular processes3 through which
residents share nationality in
common:
It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation
will never know most
of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in
the minds of each
lives the image of their communion (Anderson, 1991: 6; original
emphasis).
In fact, the desire to belong to a community (one that is
essentially imagined) is the cause
of this feeling of unity4. In his Work, Imagined Communities:
Reflection on the Origin
and spread of Nationalism, Anderson (1991) demonstrated the
importance for members
of a place-based community5 to share a common identity.
Identity, according to
Anderson, is like a narrative of people about their own
community, which enables them
to give meaning and adhere to the uncertainties in a rapidly
changing world. Identity is
basically an outcome of people’s narratives (Anderson 1991; Hall
et al. 1992).
In his revised work of 1991, Anderson in the context of
post-colonial countries of Asia
and Africa emphasized the importance of colonial census,
museums, construction of
national memories, biographies and maps in identity formation
(Anderson 1991) what he
called “classificatory grid” constructed by colonial powers.
These established boundaries
3 This understanding both shapes and is shaped by political and
cultural institutions as people ‘imagine’
they share general beliefs, attitudes and recognize a collective
national populace as having similar opinions
and sentiments to their own. 4 When the defining elements of a
group are examined, most cases show that groups form their identity
by
stressing what they are not. 5 Benedict Anderson argued that the
idea of nation is an ‘imagined community’. A nation is an
‘artifact’
created by the growth of print media and modern means of
communication. He pointed out that “nations
exists more as mental images”. They are not “genuine
communities”. A genuine community requires a
minimum level of individual to individual interaction in order
to sustain the notion of common identity.
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and limits and definition for peoples, places, and histories
only made sense in the context
of a national identity. He argues that “maps contribute to the
‘logoization’ of political
space and their innumerable reproductions familiarize people
with the limitations of
national sovereignty and community” (Ibid: xi). On the issue of
Irish Republican Army
and ethno-nationalist factions in the Balkan Wars of the early
1990s, Anderson assesses:
It may well be that we are faced here with a new type of
nationalist: the ‘long-distance
nationalist’ one might perhaps call him. For while technically a
citizen of the state in
which he comfortably lives, but to which he may feel little
attachment, he finds it
tempting to play identity politics by participation (via
propaganda, money, weapons
any way but voting ) in the conflicts of his imagined Heimat now
only fax time away
(1992: 13).
In a way, by emphasizing maps and place based community, his
works try to highlight the
importance of territory in the imagination of particular
community and when citizens of a
particular state feel little attached to it then it leads to the
identity politics. It seems
relevant in the context of separatist movement.
As far as Hobsbawm is concerned, he sees nations from
instrumentalist6 perspective as
‘invented traditions’ which have no roots in history. He did not
accept the argument that
modern nations have developed out of long-established ethnic
communities. Hobsbawm,
argued that “belief in historical continuity and cultural purity
was invariably a myth, and,
what is more, a myth created by nationalism itself” (Heywood
2005). Hobsbawm cites
the example of myth of ‘national language’ created by ruling
classes, though “until the
19th
century, the majority of people had no knowledge of the written
form of their
language and usually spoke a regional dialect that had little in
common with language of
the educated elite (Ibid). Hobsbawm defines nationalism as
“primarily a principle which
holds that the political and national unit should be congruent”
(1990: 9). He argues that
nations are a modern construction and that they are not
unchanging social entities. He
claims that nations have traditionally been understood as
top-down constructions and
argues that they must also be looked at from the bottom up.
6 It developed as a response to the invention of national
anthems and national flags by ruling classes. The
extension of primary education helped to socialize young
population and spread of the idea of ‘nation’.
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Thus in order to understand nationalism what Hobsbawm argues,
“it must also be
analysed from below that is in terms of the assumptions, hopes,
needs, longings and
interests of ordinary people” (Ibid: 10). Hobsbawm views the
development of nations as
“situated at the point of intersection of politics, technology
and social transformation”
(Ibid: 10) and he argues that they must be seen as such. In
nutshell, Anderson and
Hobsbawm see nation as political communities rather that ethnic
communities.
In the light of above interpretations, there is a need to look
at the various separatist
movements which are emerging in the form of “ethno-nationalist
revival” in the post-
Cold War era. In the context of ethno-revivalism, there is a
high level of ethnic
homogeneity which consolidates the identity of a particular
homogeneous group living in
a particular region and develops into a regional identity. In
other words, if a certain
homogeneous group of a particular region imagines itself with
their language, region,
religion as separate from its broader national identity then it
becomes a regional identity
which might or might not lead to secessionism, depending upon
the level of “deprivation
and discrimination” as Gurr (2000) underlines. Sometimes it is
also spurred by regional
leaders.
In a way, the ethno-nationalist project which involves an
interpretation of complex,
though not a mutually exclusive concept of nation, identity,
national consciousness and
nationalism are based on two major premises. First, the desire
for political and cultural
autonomy arises from simultaneous self-awareness and an
awareness of other groups,
essential ingredients for converting an ethnic group into a
nation. It requires the
construction of an ‘other’, a referent, “them” vs. “us”. In this
self-awareness, perceived
history plays a significant role in defining identity through
events which threaten identity.
In the first place, the justification for ethno-nationalism is a
claim for an egalitarian
democratic society where there is a direct control over the
allocation of resources and
their legitimate extraction. As Hoffman states, “If nations are
imagined communities, it is
because we can indeed imagine a community different from the
ones we experience daily
(a hierarchical society), one in which we are all alike and
equal” (Stanley 1993:100). This
aspiration for equality and political control is often grounded
in the feelings certain
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groups have towards the larger society in which they have been
deprived of a status to
which they are entitled.
In the second place, the politics of ethno-nationalism is based
on a linkage between
political movement and ethnic identity. National consciousness
arises from what
Greenfield has termed ressentiment7 or, in the words of Don
Ronan, from the perception
of oppression. Ronan states, “ethnic groups are born and arise
because of the perception
of oppression; if there were no perception of oppression, real
or imagined, there would be
no ethnic self-determination” (Ronan 1979: 20). In a similar
way, Michael Levin suggests
that in certain cases, the claim for nationhood may embody an
“ethno-drama”, a history
of victimization, denial, and genocide (Levin 1993: 02). Under
such a scenario, both
history and identity merge as much as mental constructs as
“demonstrable facts”. Subtle
shifts in identity, therefore, correspond to historical events
and the two are mutually
supporting and consistent, even in the face of contradictory
historiographical facts
(Nagata 1993).
Ethnic identities are, therefore, “contested and constructed
through a complex inter-play
of self-awareness and an awareness of the other within the
context of an “ethno-drama”.
A nation must have its past and possess cultural ancestry” (Van
1994). In essence, it
shows that, there is little agreement about the role of ethnic,
as opposed to political
component of the nation; or about the balance between subjective
elements like will and
memory and more objective elements like territory and language
or about the nature and
role of ethnicity in national identity. So, in defining
‘national identity’, culture8 plays a
crucial role9. This debate of construction of nation and
identity can be seen in the three
7 A psychological state resulting from feelings of envy and
hatred and the impossibility of satisfying them.
8 At one extreme point of view is a cultural nationalist— who
believe that the cultural life of the nation
must be allowed to flourish and develop, but whose only
political demand is for an environment that
provides enough freedom for this to happen. At the other extreme
stand nationalists for whom political self-
determination is central: a nation is a body with a general will
(often understood as an historic purpose) that
must be allowed to govern itself, to control the national
homeland, and if necessary to assert its rights
against other nations (Hutchison, 2005).
9 First, a nation certainly has a territorial homeland, and its
political system may be one of its distinguishing
features, but over and above that it has, or is believed to
have, distinctive cultural traits like a language, a
religion, a national style of art or literature, forms of music
or dance, perhaps a national cuisine, and so
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broad approaches: the Primordialist, the Instrumentalist, and
the Constructivist (Dawisha
2002).
Approaches to Identity Formation
The literature on ethnicity and nationalism presents many
explanations for ethnic
mobilization and separatism. Primordialist scholars concentrate
on cultural factors,
arguing that the simple existence of cultural differences can
bring about ethnic
mobilization, for example living next to Russians (Fredrik 1969,
Geertz 1973). Other
scholars focus on disadvantaged groups and their greater
likelihood to mobilize, stressing
the role of economic disparity between groups (for example,
Benedict R. Anderson 1991,
Ernest Gellner, 1983, Donald L. Horowitz 1985) as in case of the
relative better position
of Kashmiri Pandits vis-à-vis Muslim population or pervasive
historical oppression by a
dominant group over another (Dunlop 1998, Glenny 1992). There
are some authors who
examine other factors that enhance the effectiveness of ethnic
mobilization that include
institutional frameworks such as federalism. This can encourage
increased ethnic
awareness and political activity; (Stepan 2000, Treisman 1997)
economic wealth can spur
political efforts and strengthen ethnic bargaining power
vis-à-vis a dominant group;
(Snyder 2000), a weakened state can inspire elite mobilization
strategies as ethnic
political entrepreneurs seek greater status within the system
(Brass 1991).
While these theories provide insight into ethnic mobilization
and nationalism, there is no
consensus on any of the factors, which can best explain the
separatist ethnic mobilization.
Generally, theories of the separate identity of ethnic groups
derive in large part from how
ethnic groups come to identify themselves as distinct from other
groups that gives rise to
regional identity not necessarily antagonistic to national
identity. Some understanding of
the various scholarly approaches to ethnicity and ethnic
identity is critical to identify the
forces that spur ethnic separatism. What follows is an
assessment of the many approaches
forth. And these are seen as forming an integral whole, so that
a particular type of injustice is perpetrated
when one nation is forced to live under laws or institutions
designed for another nation. Second, nations are
understood as collective agents with their own distinctive aims
and purposes, which are therefore entitled to
self-determination, often in the form of political self-rule
(Miller 2009).
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to ethnic identity and mobilization, in particular linking the
causes of identity with
patterns of negotiation.
Primordial approaches stress differences in identity and
population characteristics,
instrumental-mobilization explanations cast the behaviour of
ethnic groups within the
structures of bargaining, whereas, constructive approach relies
on inter-subjective
understanding of identity and elite mobilization.
The Primordialist Explanation
The Primordialist account of the nation postulates that nations
are real (not imagined)
entities. Nations so defined differ from other territorially
defined units of governance
(like City-States, Empires, and States which are not
nation-state) because their
inhabitants define their identities in cultural terms
exclusively. Primordialists consider
identity as pre-given entity of distinct races, ethnicity,
language, culture, religion etc. It
cannot be constructed (Hass 1997). In fact, it is the fusion of
identity and territory that
makes regional community a self-determining community. It is
this fusion which
rationalizes their claims to autonomy (Dawisha 2002). Primordial
explanations also point
to different levels of cultural differentiation. Some have
argued that the ethnic identity
differentiation is more powerful between various groups that are
more culturally distinct
– that share fewer cultural similarities or patterns.
Huntington, for example, has argued
that religious differences are crucial to identifying the
locations of ethnic violence
(Huntington 1996, Triesman 1997). Actually, the notion of
ethnicity is very much
attached with the Primordialist account of identity.
There have been constant ethnic conflicts between various given
groups for example,
ancient hatred (“ancient animosities”) between the Jewish and
Muslim communities,
historical rivalries between the Serbs and the Croats, age-old
tensions between the Sunni
and Shiite Muslims in the Middle East. But questions emerge why
such conflicts are
perennial in nature? There are some scholars such as Clifford
Geertz (1969) and Fredrik
Barth (1973), who emphasize the ‘politics of differentiation’.
According to them, cultural
differences are the main cause behind any ethnic mobilization
and conflicts. Ethnic
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identification does seem to exist mostly because of one group’s
identification of another
group as different from themselves – the other. This could lead
one to conclude that the
most diverse societies will necessarily be the most
conflicting.
Observations of the world, however, cast some doubt on the
reliability of this conclusion.
Many multicultural states like the United States have managed to
avoid nationalist
movements of secession, despite their considerable diversity.
Moreover, this approach
does not help us isolate the groups that will attempt violent
secession as a strategy, rather
than less violent expressions of ethnic mobilization. In Russia,
only Chechnya, one out of
twenty-one ethnically designated regions, has militarily sought
independence from the
central government.
In sum one can say that pure ethnic differentiation alone cannot
account for the variation
in ethnic mobilization strategies. In case of Kashmir also, only
in 1989 onwards, violent
secessionist movement started though the reason was not only
cultural differentiation but
gross negligence of the democratic rights (Ganguly 2010) of the
people and economic
underdevelopment plus cross-border support (Anant 2009). So, it
is not precisely the
cultural differentiation that is the cause of separatism. In
other words, any secessionist
movement around the world in general and Chechnya and Kashmir in
particular are
products of various complex processes.
Demographic Explanation of Primordialist
One might sharpen the Primordialist argument to account for
demographic
considerations. Perhaps violent mobilization is more likely
among communities that are
concentrated demographically: the greater the demographic number
of one group in a
geographical area, the greater the solidarity and propensity for
dire action. Thus one
might expect those minorities who enjoy a demographic advantage
in their titular
republics, particularly those who maintain a majority, to follow
more separatist strategies
than those who make up smaller percentages within their
republics. Within the post-
Soviet context, however, this has not always been the case. In
the regions that seceded or
tried to secede violently, Chechnya, South Ossetia, Abkhazia,
and Nagorno-Karabakh,
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the titular ethnic groups made up 57.8 percent, 66.2 percent,
17.8 percent, and 76.9
percent, respectively (Toft 2003). Toft argues that an important
demographic standard to
consider is the density of a distinct ethnic population in one
geographic area, rather than
throughout the rest of the country (Toft 2003, Evera 1994:
17-20). To be more precise, a
group whose members are not dispersed across the country but
condensed into a smaller
area might be better able to politicize their identity
differences (Olson 1965).
For example, there are more who live inside Chechnya as opposed
to outside it; therefore,
it is the more likely to witness ethnic mobilization there. As
this study will indicate,
demographic concentration certainly affects how regional leaders
articulate their
demands vis-à-vis the central government, but it does not
determine their actions. In case
of Kashmir, it is clearly visible that the demand of
secessionism is largely because
majority of the people in the Valley carry the same religious
identity, which provides
cohesiveness to their group to demand independence from India
though it is not a sole
cause and there are others reasons as well. But one thing is
clear that they are able to
demand strongly because of the homogeneous nature of population
concentrated in a
particular region which lies in the periphery of the country. In
sum, a group living in a
particular region has different cultural traits from those in
the region and will have more
chance to feel different from others. Daniel Triesman (1997)
finds in his quantitative
examination of ethnic separatism in Russia that Muslim regions
are slightly more likely
to follow separatist strategies than non-Muslim regions.
While Treisman’s analysis and conclusions focus on other
factors, there are however
difficulties linking cultural factors with separatism. The
reason for this is that the Soviet
context makes religious differentiation challenging. The Soviet
federal system
distinguished its ethno-federal regions according to historical
classifications of people
who had inhabited certain areas, not according to religion,
which they hoped to, eradicate
through communist ideology. One consequence of this kind of
classification is that it
does not account for difference within a religion in groups. For
example, the Muslims in
Dagestan are Sufist, whereas the Tatars and Bashkir adhere to
Jadidism. Moreover, the
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de-legitimization of religion in the Soviet period has affected
the identities of Muslim
followers within regions differently.
Finally, religious distinctions help to draw conclusions about
motivations that may not
accurately portray the circumstances of separatism. For example,
the crisis in Chechnya
is often interpreted in Western media as “expression of Islamic
extremist” interests,
influenced by the threat of Wahhabism or Sufism in the area.
While there is some truth to
this, it does not explain early Chechen separatist strategies,
which emerged before
Wahhabism entered the area. In fact, the radicalization of
Chechnya occurred after the
initial conflict in 1992. The religious explanation, although
popular in recent years, does
not provide a comprehensive account of events surrounding
separatism in Russia. Even if
there were a clear link between Islamic radicalism and violent
secession, the region that
harbours the most radical of Islamic movements, Dagestan, has
firmly signalled its
intentions to remain within Russia (although certainly some
Daghestanis actively support
the Chechen cause).
In case of Kashmir, the insurgency started in 1989 was violent
and demanded separation
from India. Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) was one of the
separatist
organisations and tried to make the movement inclusive but once
Hizb-ul-Mujahideen
(HJM) entered into the picture, it became radicalised. Basically
HJM supported by
Pakistani authorities, replaced the broader movement of JKLF
(Anant 2009). When HJM
entered in to the Kashmiri affairs, the Kashmiri Pandit’s exodus
started taking place and
this movement became Islamic in nature.
Hence, simple cultural differentiation does not necessarily
provide sufficient ground for
secession unless or until there are outside forces or other
forces fuelling such kind of
separatist tendencies. It can be argued that religious
differences consolidated the
movement further, which is not possible without any kind of
external or internal support.
Like Russian federation, in Kashmir also, Islam is not the main
reason for demanding
secessionism. The Muslims of Kargil area of Jammu & Kashmir
are not demanding
independence, though they are demanding for the status of Union
Territory along with the
region of Ladakh within the Indian federation (Behra 2007). It
shows that Islamic
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22
radicalisation took place only in the Valley, not in the all
Muslim inhabited areas and that
is due to cross-border support.
Thus, if one is going by the Primordialist argument of cultural
differentiation as the basis
of consolidation of identity then it does not sufficiently
explain the context of Russian
federation and Indian case of Kashmir, though it is one of the
important aspects. The
answer lies in the conception of Instrumentalist School.
Instrumentalist Explanation
Contrary to Primordialist explanation about identity formation,
the Instrumentalist school
emphasizes the political use of ethnic identity to achieve group
goals. Rather than
conceiving ethnic identity and mobilization as static and
unchanging, scholars of
instrumental persuasion focus on the causes of heightened or
diminished ethnic
identification and ethnic mobilization (Brass 1996). According
to the instrumentalist
conception, spiritual and social linkages do not just happen.
They are shaped and
nurtured specifically for political and material advantage.
Elite used to shape and nurture
the identity in their own favour for political mobilization.
Regional elites, Brass (1991)
argues, may find that they can increase their own power through
mobilizing ethnic
movements and making separatist demands. In more or less similar
fashion, Snyder
(2000) argues that democratic reforms in a non-democratic state
actually enhance elite
power-seeking by opening up the political playing field. Aided
by enhanced mobilization
capabilities in the form of free press and free speech, ethnic
nationalism will increase as
ethnic elites ensure their own position in the new political
system. Nationalism uses the
pre-existing, historically inherited proliferation of cultures
or cultural wealth, though it
uses them very selectively, and it most often transforms them
radically (Gellner 1983,
Brass 1991).
Other elite mobilization studies examine the extent to which
regional elites are tied to
political leaders in the central governments, and the extent to
which this affects the
bargaining strategies of the regional elites (Willerton 1992).
In other words, on one hand,
it depends on the clout and linkages of political elite to
organize and mobilize people and
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23
on the other, the success or failure of any elite mobilization
depends on the particular
leader’s relation with the central government. Theorists,
however, disagree on the most
salient factors that might cause groups to attach political
significance to their cultural
identities. This study organizes instrumental approaches into
two key categories: theories
of oppression and theories of mobilization. This study concludes
that the mobilization
approaches promote better accounts of ethnic separatism,
particularly in the post-Soviet
successor states.
In People versus States, Ted Robert Gurr argues that
multicultural democratic states are
much less likely to experience divisive ethnic mobilization or
conflict. Part of the reason
for this, he argues, is that democratic countries are unlikely
to carry out coercive and
repressive anti-minority policies that one might find in regimes
not held accountable to
an active citizenry. Gurr argues that ethnic conflict occurs
because of a lack of outlets for
political participation. Groups that might desire greater
autonomy, or more equal
participation in the political system, can be stymied by
oppressive regimes (Gurr 2000).
This broad institutional contextualization of ethnic separatism,
however, does not account
for the evolution of ethnic rights within the Soviet Union. For
many ethnic minorities
within Russia in 1917, the Soviets offered greater benefits for
their culture, language, and
history than the minorities had ever experienced under the Tsars
10
(Martin 2001).
The democratic oppression argument continues into the current
period of democratic
transition and state building. Echoing Gurr’s sentiments,
popular policy strategies for
ethnic conflict avoidance and resolution promote democratic
decentralization or
federalism. Governments can ignore the interests of ethnic
minorities and thus inhibit
those minorities’ ability to maintain their cultural and
political identity. By creating
institutions by which ethnic groups are guaranteed greater
inclusion into a system,
tyranny by the majority group is avoided, and ethnic minorities
will have fewer
incentives to use violence to attain political autonomy. This
perspective emphasizes the
10
The Bolsheviks actively sought alliances with the ethnic
minorities, co-opting them to fight for the Red
Army in the Russian Civil War. As part of the application of
Communism to ethnic territories, the
Bolsheviks established structures that promoted both native and
Russian literacy, constructed printing
houses that published native language newspapers and books,
built native language schools, and created
written alphabets for languages that had until that time only
been spoken (Martin 2001).
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24
avoidance of violence by mitigating ethnic complaints before
they appear. Democracy
scholars such as Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996) agree with
Gurr that groups need an
outlet for their political aspirations.
If federal democratic institutions are in place, conflicts that
do occur, such as those
between Québec and Canada, can be resolved practically through
institutional
mechanisms11
. The Soviet experience of federalism, being non-democratic, did
not
provide outlets for free participation. When democratization
reforms emerged in the
Soviet Union under Gorbachev, however, the federal structure
began to offer means for
greater minority group participation. After the Soviet Union
collapsed12
and successor
states began building their new institutions, usually retaining
the national territorial
structure that had existed under Soviet rule, separatism grew
out of the politics of
establishing the rules behind those federal structures. Some
argue that within the post-
Soviet context, institutions associated with diminishing ethnic
strife – democratization
and federalism – actually promoted strife (Roeder 1991).
Legacies and Historical Oppression
Gurr also emphasizes historical oppression when analyzing
incentives for minority
groups to follow secessionary strategies. Groups that have been
systematically oppressed
by a regime, he argues, are more likely to attempt to leave that
regime. John Dunlop, in
his assessment of the historical roots of the Chechen conflict
in Russia, argues that
“continued and malicious oppression” of the Chechen people since
the Tsarist period
sowed the seeds of the Chechen wars (Dunlop 1998). The emphasis
on historical
oppression as a rationale for separatism pervades the
international law of self-
determination. While the United Nations Charter rhetorically
supports nations’ rights of
self-determination, it does not do so for all groups evenly;
international law favours
11
In the Canadian case, Quebec held a referendum to determine the
interest for separatism in 1995. Now it
has granted as a special status within Canadian federation.
12
In the case of the Union Republics, this culminated in peaceful
and successful secessionary efforts.
However, within the successor states, the experience was more
mixed, with some regions engaging in
violent separatism, others engaging in high-level, but
non-violent, separatism, and others not demanding
much at all.
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25
groups that have experienced oppression from a repressive
regime13
. The principle of
self-determination in the context of separatism will be
discussed later in this chapter.
A history of repression has affected separatist movements in the
former Soviet Union.
Regional leaders used the Soviet Union’s history of repression
to mobilize their citizenry,
as well as to exact concessions from the newly forming national
governments, which
sought to distance themselves from the illegitimate Soviet
regime. It is difficult to assess
the impact of oppression in the Soviet case itself, because the
Stalinist period targeted
many ethnic groups, including Russians. However, the most
extreme case of oppression
against ethnic groups was the cleansing of the “punished
people,” enforced mass
deportations14
during and after World War II. Although several groups were
singled out
for punishment, only one of those groups subsequently sought
secession from the Soviet
Union. In 1944, the Soviets deported the entire nation of
Chechnya to Central Asia. At
the same time, the Soviets similarly deported the Ingush, the
Balkars, and the Kalmyks.15
In case of Kashmir, there is no such oppression visible but over
period of time,
particularly in post-1989 scenario, there is accusation against
the Indian army about
atrocities done over Kashmiri people. Non-withdrawal of Armed
Forces Special Power
Act (AFSPA) despite demand from every section of Kashmiri
society, fake encounters
and mass-graves issues added colour in their suspicion towards
Indian state. This
ultimately develops a sense of oppression in the mind of youth
in the Valley leading to
the rise of separatist movement in the post-1990 scenario.
13
See UN Charter on self-determination; for the standard of
oppression, “Report of the International
Committee of Jurists Entrusted by the Council of the League of
Nations with the Task of Giving an
Advisory Opinion upon the Legal Aspects of the Åaland Islands
Question,” League of Nations Official
Journal, Special Supp., No. 3, 1920, 5-10. 14
The reverse is also the case in some circumstances: not every
region that engaged in violent secessionist
behaviour experienced such punishment as the , for example South
Ossetia and Abkhazia. As will become
clear in the case studies introduced in later chapters, all
regions referred to their historical experiences as
they sought autonomy or independence from the centre. However,
the extent of that oppression itself did
not determine the demands they made 15
This refers to the groups deported who had autonomous status at
the time of the Soviet dissolution.
Others without such status were also deported, for example, the
Koreans and the Germans.
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26
Economic Oppression
Economic oppression theories explain ethnic mobilization by
pointing to inequalities that
emerge between ethnic groups during modernization and
industrialization processes16
. As
industrialization and modernization occurred, groups moved into
cities and found
common identities through communication in the same language,
class differentiation
according to group, or economic mobilisation according to group.
For example, Benedict
Anderson argues that ethnic differentiation materialises when
groups who do not speak
the majority language are economically marginalised because they
cannot move into the
workforce as easily as those groups who do speak the
language17
. Ethnic groups then find
mechanisms to contend with their economic disadvantage.
According to Donald
Horowitz (1985), ethnic mobilization emerges when ethnic
divisions correspond with
class divisions in society. Ernest Gellner (1983) contends that
economically
disadvantaged minorities turn to ethnic mobilization as a way to
achieve economic
prosperity.
But there are authors who counter the economic oppression
argument. Daniel Treisman
pointed out that economic factors do apply, but that it is the
wealthier groups that will
seek greater levels of separatism and autonomy. Economic
development offers
bargaining power to elites seeking to change their political
circumstances in relationship
to the center, or power to those seeking outright independence
(Treisman 1997, 1999).
However, this argument does not investigate how wealth might
affect violent versus non-
violent strategies (Hale 2000). Many scholars argue that ethnic
groups respond to
perceived state weaknesses in their attempts for greater
political recognition. According
to Gurr (2000) ethnic groups that perceive deterioration in
central state power as an
opportunity for achieving greater political power spur
separatist strategies. These
explanations will be discussed in other chapters respectively,
focusing on how historical
oppression and economic deprivations have played an important
role in developing
secessionist tendencies.
16
for example Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the
Origin and Spread of Nationalism,
Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in
Conflict. 17
Anderson Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and
Spread of Nationalism.
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27
Constructivist Explanation
The constructivist position, on the other hand, sees nothing
that is fixed or predetermined
in the concept of the nation. National identification can change
if and when social
interactions change. A nation in this conception is anything but
immutable. It is wholly
subjective (Dawisha 2002). Alexander Wendt argues that
“structures of human
association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than
material forces and
identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by
these shared ideas rather
than given by nature. Therefore, constructivism rests on the
inter-subjective dimension of
human action”18
(Palan 2000: 578). As soon as actors start interacting with each
other,
privately held beliefs immediately become a ‘distribution of
knowledge’. When two
actors meet for the first time, each side begins to encounter
with private, domestically
rooted beliefs about ‘Self’ and ‘Other’. These beliefs help
actors define the situation and
constitute their interests. That ultimately led to the formation
of identity.
These explanations are useful only when the modernization and
industrialization
processes differentiated ethnic groups along economic or class
lines. For example,
Stalin’s forced industrialization program targeted all groups
with the goal of negating
classes within Russia. The Soviet system of industrialization
combined with the
Bolshevik’s efforts to promote the interests of ethnic
minorities in certain contexts
created conditions limiting the applicability of the
modernization argument. The
Bolshevik system organized ethnic territories to promote the
interests of national
minorities, seeking to bring them up to the level of the
industrialised ethnic groups, such
as the Russians. Modernizing policies such as urbanisation and
increased education were
mandated from above. Consequently, the Soviet industrialization
policy advantaged the
perceived “backward” populations. Even so, by the fall of the
Soviet Union, some
disparity existed among the regional populations.
In sum, on one hand, the Primordialist believes identity as
given and an individual
acquired it by his or her birth which remains unchanged. It
means it is fixed and given.
18
For further discussion see: Ronen, Palan, ‘A world of their
making: an evaluation of the constructivist
critique in International Relations’, Review of International
Studies, Vol. 26, No. 4, 2000, pp. 575-598.
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28
On the other hand, Instrumentalists believe that identity
formation is a result of the
political use of ethnic identity to achieve group goals. It
means identity is constructed by
political elites specifically for political and material
advantage (Gellner 1983, Brass
1991). Constructivists believe that there is nothing fixed or
determined, rather it is
evolved over a period of time because of social interactions.
They differ from
instrumentalists with regard to how social linkages and
connections are created. In other
words, on one hand, instrumentalists believe that social
linkages and connections are
created purposefully for political use; constructivists rather
see it as a natural social
interaction.
But, yet, both schools of thought agree on the core argument:
that nation is not
predetermined; they are instead constructed (Dawisha 2002). In
essence, for
Primordialist, identity is given and pre-determined whereas for
instrumentalists and
constructivists, it is not predetermined, though both have
difference over how identity is
constructed. In the context of secessionism, it becomes
imperative to view the issue of
identity in case of federations, because federations generally
haves multi-ethnic and
multi-cultural societies, where there is a myriad of reasons for
separatism. So identity
must be contextualised in a federal setup. It became more
important due to Chechnya and
Kashmir problems, which are pressing issues for Russian and
Indian federation
respectively.
Contextualizing Secessionism in Federal Political System
Essentially, federalism as a ‘concept’ and federation as a
‘structure of government’ rest
on the division of sovereignty between two levels of government:
the level of territorially
defined units of the federation (of which there must be at least
two) and the central level.
The division of power between the constituent units does not
preclude the
interdependence of the two levels of government; it merely
requires that for at least some
governmental functions neither level is subordinate to the other
(Watts 1970: 11).
Federations, therefore, differ from unitary states in which
sovereignty resides with the
center, regardless of how decentralized that state is. Kenneth
Wheare argues,
“Federations must desire to be united but not to be unitary”
(1963:36). Federations should
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29
also be distinguished from confederations where the constituent
units retain their
sovereignty, and form a union for limited purposes. As both
states Russia and India are
ethnically heterogeneous and issues of provincial design recur
in the political debates
within the two countries, this increases their value as a
subject for comparative political
analysis.
Federation is important to achieve administrative efficiency for
reasons of size or
complexity, especially in territorially large countries like
India and Russia. It was
basically an attempt to reconcile diversity within the structure
of a single country. The
institutionalization of a territorial division of political
power creates conditions for a new
level of political debate to occur, both between the center and
the provincial unit, but also
within the provincial unit. This is why the design of provincial
units is so important. The
nature of this “political space,” in which political
entrepreneurs can command loyalty
from their provincial and state-wide populations, is crucial for
determining the success of
a federal system in a multiethnic state.
Eric Nordlinger contests the effectiveness of federalism as an
ethnic conflict regulation
device. Yet several successful multi-ethnic federations exist.
Switzerland, Canada, and
India are all good examples of this fact. Although there are
many countries where
federations have significantly failed to regulate ethnic
conflict, like Nigeria in 1966 and
Pakistan in 1971—failure was not inevitable. Multi-ethnic
states, per se, are not doomed
to failure; there are always additional factors affecting their
success (Katherene 2007).
There are some authors like Treisman and Stepan who are also
pessimistic about the role
of federation in accommodating various diversities. They argue
that it is possible that
institutional frameworks such as federalism can encourage
increased ethnic awareness
and political activity (Stepan 2000, Treisman 1997). But
generally, lack of outlets for
political participation, level of economic development and the
‘memories of grievances’
lead to the formation of separate identity. Gurr argues that
ethnic conflict occurs because
of a lack of outlets for political participation. Groups that
might desire greater autonomy,
or more equal participation in the political system, can be
stymied by oppressive regimes
(Gurr 2000).
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30
The composition of federal units is a crucial yet contested
feature of federal design,
especially in relation to its status as a method of ethnic
conflict regulation (Horowitz
1985). So, broadly speaking, experience of federal success in
managing diverse groups is
mixed. It is true that the idea of multi-national state was a
valuable end in itself but after
the First World War, the fragmentation of great empires like
Austria-Hungarian punched
a deep hole in the notion that a stable multi-ethnic state could
be sustained. The idea
survived of course, but one could see that subsequent
disintegration of a multi-national
entity over a period of time eroded the very credential to
manage a multi-national state.
But there are examples like Switzerland and India where such
model works; but the dying
days of the Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia illustrated an
alternative and much less
appealing scenario of what may happen at worst, when the model
fails (Coakly 2010).
However, federation is the only best alternative system where
various ethnic identities
can be managed though it depends on others reasons as well.
Detailed discussion will
follow in the next chapters about how Russian and Indian
federations have managed their
vast territorial integrity and diversified population in the
context of their respective
federations. In both the countries, several secessionist
movements are going on and both
countries are trying to co-opt various identities, which are
demanding secessionism and
the basis is not other than the principle of
self-determination.
The Principle of Self-Determination and Separatism
The right to self-determination is all about right of individual
or community to decide
their political future. Precisely it is about the right of
people to “freely determine their
political status and pursue their economic, social and cultural
development” (Puri 2001:
263-264). The self-determination philosophy was espoused by
Wilson19
. Though once
rejected by the colonial powers that dominated geopolitics at
the turn of the 20th century,
it is now apparently the dominant force in modern geo-politics.
Earlier, this principle had
provided philosophical ground for nation-state to fight against
colonial powers (against
imperialism) particularly in Third World countries. In the
post-Cold War era, this
19
Woodrow Wilson was US president, who supported the principle of
self-determination. He was the first
one who viewed self-determination in political context. But his
notion of self-determination was concerned
with the recognizing cultural and autonomy right of the
people.
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31
principle has given ideological and philosophical impetus to
several secessionist
movements (like Kashmir, Chechnya, Basque and so on) around the
world, which are
aimed to achieve their separate homeland based on their
particular identity. In case of
both Chechnya and Kashmir, the right to self-determination is
providing ground for
independence. In fact, it is a legitimizing ideology for ethnic
separatism20
, perhaps a
necessary condition for its emergence (Horowitz 1981).
Generally, separatist movements
that invoke principles of self-determination as their anthem
imply that domination of their
region by another ethnic group is illegitimate. State
organizations and bureaucracies that
are dominated by one or more dominant ethnic groups will
forcefully resist the break-up
of the state (Olzak 2005).
Basically, separatism is built upon a region’s assertion of
ethnic distinctiveness. Its
ideological force rests upon this claim to ethnic
self-determination (for this reason the
study of ethnicity is essential to the analysis of separatism)
(Hechter 1979). Sometimes,
ethnic protests21
are also associated with the issues of separatism or
secessionism. Such
kind of ethnic identity is consolidated over a period of time.
Initially people were defined
by the social group into which they were born, and their
territory could only be
understood in terms of “social relations and the juxtaposition
of social groups (Bohannan
1964: 176). But over a period of time in the West, there is
change in group-to-territory
relationship. Earlier socially cohesive group once defined its
territory; over time
politically bounded territory came to define the people: there
was change in emphasis
20
In most of the cases separatism and secessionism used
interchangeably although there are theoretically
differences exists. Wood argues that political separation and
especially separatism is more vague and
encompassing term, covering all instances of political
alienation which feature a desire for the reduction of
control by a central authority in a specific area. Separatism,
as Lyon has suggested, implies resistance by a
political entity to further incorporation or subordination
within the larger political authority of which it is
already a member. Separatism may be expressed in demands for
provincial rights or local or regional
autonomy in certain spheres of decision-making. Secessionism, by
contrast, is a narrower, more specific
term, referring to a demand for formal withdrawal from a central
political authority by a member unit or
units on the basis of a claim to independent sovereign status
(Wood, 1981; ‘Secession: A Comparative
Analytical Framework Canadian Journal of Political Science 4,
No. 1. 107-134). This study will use both
words interchangeably.
21
Ethnic protests that seek to eradicate and replace existing
geographical and administrative state
boundaries are secession or separatist movements. They differ
from other forms of ethnic movements in
that they involve demands for ‘formal withdrawal from a central
political authority by a member unit or
units on the basis of a claim to independent sovereign status’
(Hechter 1992, p. 267).
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32
from group to territory. Shafer (1995: 97) suggested that people
determined that they
might live in groupings larger than family and tribe, although
they could not comprehend
an international or universal state. Identity and territory
became intimately linked and,
when combined with a third concept, self-determination, the mix
turned out to be volatile
(Ibid). So it is necessity to trace the historical and legal
foundation of self-determination
to get the clear picture.
Historical and Legal Perspective on Self-Determination
For the first time, Woodrow Wilson used the term
self-determination in the political
context but he never meant it for secession. He never referred
for external aspects of self-
determination; in fact, his support was for internal
self-determination, which means
recognizing the cultural and autonomy right of the groups. For
Wilson, the right to self-
determination of people was rooted in the Anglo-American
tradition of civic nationalism:
that means the right of communities to self-government. It had
“nothing to do with the
tradition of collective or ethnic nationalism” (Lynch 2004:
423). In similar fashion, under
UN system, and particularly UN resolution on decolonization,
1960, used the word self-
determination for colonized countries. This resolution
categorically mentions the self-
determination right for all the people of the territory not for
particular nation, though the
resolution supported the emergence of new state but in the
context of decolonization22
(Carley 1996).
However, if one look at the contemporary debate on
self-determination it clubbed both
the two previous views namely the Wilson’s idea of recognizing
cultural and autonomy
right and demand for own new state. That is why in contemporary
self-determination
movement (in the context of post-1990), there are elements of
both; demands for new
state on the basis of their distinctive cultural and autonomous
right (Ibid). In fact, people
who live in a remote corner of a country and “are a majority
locally but a minority in the
larger state” want independence and are prepared to fight for it
(Talbott 2000: 152).
22
In 1960, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1514(XV)
entitled Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples which declares
that: [para. 2]. “All peoples have the right
to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development.”
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33
Most of the writings on self-determination in the 20th
and 21st
century have shown
pessimism about the notion of self-determination as a right for
independence though
these writings recognize the importance of the right to
self-determination but only as a
cultural and autonomy right. In fact, contemporary
self-determination movements are
demanding their own nation-state which has its root in the
treaty of Westphalia (1648).
But it is not possible for every nationality to have its own
nation-state because
ethnographic boundaries hardly coincide with political ones
(Ibid). At the same time, it
will not be concede by any post-colonial state. Wilsons’
secretary of state, Robert
Lansing, revealed that self-determination would likely “breed
discontent, disorder and
rebellion,” and that the phrase itself was “simply loaded with
dynamite” (Ibid: 152).
Talbott (2000) argues that the European countries are moving
away from old Westphalian
notion, which emphasised more on territorial sovereignty to new
Westphalian notion of
nation-state where this notion of territorial sovereignty is
losing its relevance by
implementing common currency and creating porous border between
themselves, while
supporting pooled sovereignty. At the same time they are
granting more autonomy right
to their respective regions like for example, within Spain’s
borders23
. In a way two
parallel things are going on hand in hand in Europe. On one
hand, by creating European
Union, they are trying to give less importance to the notion of
territorial sovereignty. At
the same time, by granting special status to certain
secessionist territory within the
border, they are moving in the direction of a new Westphalian
notion.
Under the UN system, there are both kinds of arguments.
Supporters of self-
determination emphasize on those articles which suit them and
same in the case of those
who are in favour of territorial integrity of the country. Both
principles have been
defended in the name of international peace and security. For
example, the principle of
self-determination was invoked on many occasions during World
War II. It was
proclaimed in the Atlantic Charter (14 August 1941). Later, it
was restated in
23
For example, Catalonia is an entity that calls itself the state
of Catalonia, where Catalan is the official
language and schools teach Spanish as an elective.
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34
Washington declaration of 1942 and Moscow declaration of 1943.
Finally, the Charter
[Article 1(2)] clearly enunciated the principle of
self-determination:
The purposes of the United Nations are: To develop friendly
relations among nations
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and
self-determinations of peoples”
and self-determination is conceived as one among several
possible “measures to
strengthen universal peace.”
Apart from that, there have been a number of UN resolutions and
articles, which talked
about the acceptance of self-determination as a right. It was
further strengthened by the
incorporation of the principle of self-determination as a human
right in the Article 1 of
both international Covenants of Human Rights, namely Covenant on
Civil and Political
Rights and Covenant on Economic-Socio-and Cultural Rights of
Dec, 1966 (Dyke 1969).
Dyke argued that self-determination as a ‘right’ was
incorporated due to the pressure of
new post-colonial state. Earlier most of the countries were in
the favour of self-
determination as ‘principle’ not as ‘right’. But only, in 1960,
by a vote of 89 to 0, with 9
abstentions, the General Assembly adopted its Declaration on the
Granting of
Independence to Colonial countries and Peoples (Ibid: 225). It
was further incorporated
in the Article 1 of both the international covenants of 1966 on
Human Rights. It is an
irony that, this very principle was adopted due to the pressure
of developing countries.
Now these covenants have become the legitimate ground for
self-determination. Due to
the international human rights regime, now no sovereign state
can detached itself from its
obligation to protect human rights. Many writings on
self-termination accept that self-
determination is an essential condition for the genuine
existence of other human rights
and freedoms (Avery 1996). But the problem with this principle
is, exactly who is
entitled to “claim this right – a group, a people, or a nation”
(Carley 1996: V) is not clear.
Thus self-determination still remains ambiguous in nature.
Ambiguity does not end here only; there is idea for external
self-determination and
internal self-determination. Internal self-determination has to
do with control over
domestic affairs, e.g. with the question of freedom from foreign
intervention and with the
question of representative government or majority rule. External
self-determination has to
do with the status of the “self” in relation to other selves; it
means it is attached with the
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question of independence or sovereignty (Dyke 1969: 226). On the
other side, as far as
the principle of territorial integrity is concerned,
particularly in post-World War II era,
territories of post-colonial states became uninfringeable. No
one questioned the
inviolability of existing nation-state’s borders “regardless of
how and when they were
determined24
” (Connor 1994, Carley 1996: V).
Conceding the self-determination right becomes more complex in a
multi-national state.
For multi-national states, granting right to secede to one unit
of its territory will set a
precedent, leading to the balkanization of the country, which
threatens the security at
large. Basically, self-determination is legal and geographical.
It is legal because it
involves many parts of the body of rules and principles of
action which are binding upon
civilized states in their relation with one another (Brierly
1963: 1) and geographical
because it involves people, sense of place, and bounded space.
So territory is important. It
is defined as “space to which identity is attached by a
distinctive group who hold or covet
that territory and who desire to have full control over it for
the groups’ benefit (Knight
1982: 526)
It shows that in both ways, ultimately state has to face either
loss of its territorial
sovereignty or facing criticism regarding not respecting
self-determination right. As a
result, since the World War II, international community
(including UN and international
organization) defended the system based on the concept of
present nation-state. Article
2(4) of the UN Charter declares:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from
the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
As per the Helsinki Final Act (adopted on August 1, 1975) which
also supports the
territorial integrity of the states:
24
Particularly since the end of the World War I and especially
since World War II, the world has ordered
its affairs with an international system based on the concept of
states whose borders, no matter how they
were originally determined, are considered inviolable.
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36
The participating States will refrain in their mutual relations,
as well as in their
international relations in general, from the threat or use of
force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any State…
In a similar fashion, at the OSCE summit of 1999 in Istanbul, it
was decided that
international borders should not be changed by force – “either
by wars of aggression or by
wars of secession”. At the same time, governments have a
responsibility not just to defend
the territorial integrity of the state but to “establish and
preserve the civic integrity of the
population”.
In sum, one can say that there are both kinds of documentary
supports available in favour
of the principle of self-determination and the principle of
territorial integrity. But self-
determination has been used for all the people not for a nation.
As Chandhoke opined “in
effect, when the right to self-determination came to deciding
between the two units which
are supposed to possess the right to self-determination, either
(a) the entire people within
a territory, or (b) nations, the UN clearly decided in favour of
the former (Chandhoke
2008: 03). In other words, UN General Assembly has recognized
self-determination as a
universal right but it applies to those people who seek an end
to colonial domination
within their colonially derived bounded territories. It is not
intended for people who from
a minority within an existing state territory. In a way,
self-determination is all about
maintenance of the status quo, for keeping existing
international territories as they are,
and for denying the further application of self-determination
(Knight 1985).
After viewing both kinds of arguments, no clear cut norm or
definition has been
developed about the way secessionist movements are surfacing; it
forces a need to find a
way out of this contested terrain of self-determination vs.
territorial integrity. Ultimately,
the very purpose of the state is protect the life of the people,
but if state is not able to
protect the life of the people then why should people respect
the territorial integrity of the
states. At the same time, it is also needed to look that the
group which is demanding
secession in the name of self-determination has legitimate
grievances or not. The
complexities of the issue require normative framework to look in
to it.
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37
Normative Framework of Self-Determination
Appearance of secessionist movements around the world in 1990s
raised the eyebrows of
several philosophers regarding the legitimacy of these
movements. Allen Buchanan in his
book “Secessionism: The Morality of Divorce from East Sumter to
Lithuania and
Quebec” (1991) tries to view secessionism on ethical ground.
Several questions have
been raised like what are the moral bases of the right to
secession? On what moral ground
can a nation deny secession? And how should constitutions and
international law
accommodate these competing rights. At the same time, state
territorial integrity was also
questioned and so also the ethical foundation of claims to
national division or unity of the
country.
These are some of the questions which have generated the debate
in the post Cold War
era. The main thrust of this new conversation on secession has
been to detach the right to
secede from the passion of nationalism and force of armed might.
Basically the right to
self-determination cannot be invoked to undermine the
“territorial integrity or political
unity” of states “possessed of a government representing the
whole people belonging to
the territory without distinction as to race, creed, or colour”.
It only de-legitimises the
colonial rule, not beyond that, “its scope of application has
remained in question”
(Hoeing 2010:45) as mentioned earlier.
From the normative perspective, self-determination right will be
legitimate if there are
legitimate grievances of the people. Buchanan defends moral
framework for secessionism
because the “moral risks of waging a war against terrorism are
great in a world in which
there are many groups that have legitimate grievances against
their states, especially if we
lack a normative framework for evaluating and responding to
claims to self-
determination” (Buchanan 2004: 26). If the state is able to do
justice to its citizens then
only there is moral claim for territorial integrity, otherwise
the state cannot demand
allegiance from groups. In respect of post-9/11 scenario,
Buchanan argues “lacking such
a framework, the United States and its allies in the ‘war
against terrorism’ are likely to
fail to discriminate between insurgent groups that have
legitimate grievances and those
that do not” (Buchanan: 2004: 25).
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38
In today’s world order, ‘state-centric paradigm’, which
emphasizes the notion of state
territorial sovereignty, is the dominant paradigm. Territorial
sovereignty is considered as
pious and there is no scope for granting self-determination
rights. Those who are
supporting the territorial integrity of the present state are
criticizing all sorts of
secessionist movement on the ground that any demand for
secessionism will threaten the
survival of the existing state. On the other side, secessionists
are saying that their
aspirations will not be fulfilled unless and until their own
state will not come. Buchanan
argues that in both cases their imagination lies in the state
framework. Buchanan suggests
“we must choose between self-determination and order”. For that
Buchanan suggested,
‘intra-state autonomy regimes’ as ways of coping or avoiding
secessionism. According to
his view, such kind of arrangement “too represents a significant
curtailment of the
traditional power of sovereignty”. Such kind of ‘intra-state
autonomy regimes’ would be
just ‘short of full sovereignty’ (Buchanan: 2004: 24).
The above discussion suggests what should be the way out of this
dilemma of territorial
integrity and secessionism. Both have their own arguments to
justify their claim. State
sovereignty is justified on the ground of ‘order’ and the
secessionist movement is
justified in the name of the right to self-determination.
Broadly this discussion can be
summarized in major principles. First is ‘statist theory’ which
emphasizes on the
territorial integrity. Second, one tries to focus on ‘just cause
theory’. Apart from that
there are ‘choice theory’ and ‘collective right’ theories. In
response to the preceding
question, the ‘just cause theory’ argues that the nation-state
has obligation to protect basic
human right and that any group denied those rights has
justifiable rights to secede. This
theory is grounded in enlightenment ideas and natural rights
theories of social contract.
‘Just cause’ theory can be found in American declaration of
independence which is based
on the assumption that “grievances must be both numerous and
long endured in order to
legitimate a drastic measure like separatism. Independence is
remedy of last resort to
prolonged abuse of human rights. The best way for an ethnically
diverse, geographically
sprawling state to protect itself against separatism is to
protect the rights of minorities and
far-flung communities. Democracy is the political system most
explicitly designed to
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ensure self-determination. Democracy can be a vehicle for
peaceful secession, but it is
also the best antidote to secessionism and civil war, since, in
a truly democratic state,
citizens seeking to run their own lives have peaceful
alternatives to taking up arms
against their government.
Contextualizing Regional Identity and Separatism in the Context
of Chechnya and
Kashmir
The end of Cold War led to the emergence of a new kind of
conflict. Earlier it was
primarily inter-state in nature, but in post-Cold war era, it
became intra-state in nature.
Paradoxically, it neither has brought an ‘end of history’ as
Francis Fukuyama had
propagated nor opened an era of universal peace and democratic
capitalism. Instead, one
can see violent conflicts between weakened states and rebellious
ethno-national
communities (Riggs 1998). The rise of modernity25
in the West during the past few
centuries created forces and situations that have now reached a
boiling point and are
producing civil wars, genocide, refugees, and international
interventions on a global scale
(Smith 1996). At the same time, ethnic diversity and
cosmopolitanism flourish and
increasingly cross-cultural relationships are pervasively
harmonious. Ethnic identity has,
therefore, simultaneously become a cause for conflict and a
reason for celebration (Riggs
1998). Riggs argues that present ethnic conflicts are modern in
the sense that it is one of
the features of multi-ethnic modern state which is based on
‘ideology’ rather than their
national unity. To quote Riggs,
Modern states that are conspicuously multi- ethnic stress their
ideological goals rather than
national unity-the former Soviet Union and South Africa under
apartheid are good examples.
The goal of “Americanization” has been important in the United
States but obstacles to its
attainment have led increasingly to emphasis on such values as
“freedom,” “equality,” and
“justice” for all, regardless of ethnicity” (1998: 272).
In the context of secessionism, precisely, the ruling minorities
of the successor states of
industrial empires, the Third World countries have become the
targets of second-
generation self-determination movements, of revolts designed to
partition multi-national
25
Modernity combined three ingredients into a new synthesis.
Neither industrialism, nor nationalism, nor
democracy can be equated with modernity, but after they are
fused in a modern state we can identify them
as the necessary strands of a weave called “modern”.
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40
states and reunite divided nations, giving their citizens the
advantages they feel deprived
of in the states where they live. In fact, this mood has now
become global. Governments
in many First World states also are now increasingly are hard
pressed by movements
among members of indigenous or national minorities within their
own boundaries. The
distinctive feature of these movements is the negative attitude
of the supporters of
citizenship in the states where they live, and on the other hand
their desire to assert their
rights, as “nations,” to govern themselves. Their concrete goals
range from demands for
independence or the reunification of divided nations to the
acceptance of autonomy (a
nation within a nation) as an acceptable goal.
Many decolonizing states like India adopted federal structures
in an attempt to manage
their diverse populations or to maintain institutional
continuity with their colonial past.
But in case of Russian Federation the logic of disintegration
was very much prominent.
Though it seems different but in fact, there was challenge
before both the countries to
keep their territorial integrity intact. Being a multi-ethnic
country it becomes difficult for
both countries to accommodate theirs diversity or what Hardgrave
termed as ‘dilemmas
of diversity’ (Hardgrave 1993).
The main dilemma before the Russian political leaders after the
disintegration of Soviet
Union was to harmonize nation and state-building processes.
Actually, the specter of
regional separatism has haunted Russian politics since the
collapse of the Soviet Union
(Sakawa 2004). At the same time, the Russian federal system is
basically asymmetrical
and bureaucratic in nature, and it is based on a series of
treaties between the center and
constituent units (Lynn and Novice 1997) rather than on an
effective constitution