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Idealist ontology, philosophy of science, cognition, reality,
psychological Now, collective
conscious experience, egoless experience, philosophy of mind,
mind-brain relations, mind-
matter relations, collective consciousness, egolessness,
spirituality, shamanism, science and
religion, God.
Idealist Philosophy: hat is !eal "
#onscious $xperience %een as &asic to 'll (ntology. 'n
(verview
&y 'xel !andruparandrup)mobilixnet.d*
International #enter for Interdisciplinary Psychiatric !esearch,
#I!IP
ritten +-+. $lectronic publication only.
Content
'bstract
Introduction
#ontent and emporal $xtension of the Psychological Now
he (ntology of #onsciousness
he (ntology of Nature Including /ind - &rain !elations
Individual and #ollective #onscious $xperience. he (ntology of
Intersub0ectivity
#ollective #onscious $xperience 'cross ime. he (ntology of
1istory
$goless $xperience. he (ntology of orlds ithout an $go
he (ntology of orlds #omprising %piritual $xperiences
%hamanism
!eligion. God, !ationality, %pirituality
Note
!eferences
mailto:[email protected]://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1216/1/index.htmlhttp://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1216/1/index.htmlmailto:[email protected]
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Abstract
he idealist attitude followed in this paper is based on the
assumption that only conscious
experience in the Now is real. #onscious experience in the Now
is supposed to be *nown
directly or intuitively, it can not be explained. I thin* it
constitutes the basis of all ontology.
#onsciousness is conceived as the total of conscious experience
in the Now, the ontology ofconsciousness is thus derived directly
from the basis. he ontology of nature is derived
more indirectly from the basis. %cience is regarded as a catalog
of selected conscious
experiences 2observations3, ac*nowledged to be scientific and
structured by means of
concepts and theories 2also regarded as conscious experiences3.
/aterial ob0ects are
regarded as heuristic concepts constructed from the immediate
experiences in the Now and
useful for expressing observations within a certain domain with
some of their mutual
relations. 1istory is also regarded as a construct from
conscious experiences in the Now.
#oncepts of worlds without an ego are seen to be in harmony with
immediate egoless
experiences. orlds including spirituality are conceived as based
on immediate spiritual
experiences together with other immediate experiences. Idealist
or immaterial philosophies
have been critici4ed for implying solipsism or 5solipsism of the
present moment5. hiscriti6ue is countered by emphasi4ing the
importance of intersub0ectivity for science and by
introducing the more precise concepts of collective conscious
experience and collective
conscious experience across time. #omprehensive evidence
supporting the heuristic value
of these concepts is related.
I conclude that the idealist approach leads to a coherent
comprehension of natural science
including mind-brain relations, while the mainstream materialist
approach entails
contradictions and other problems for a coherent understanding.
he idealist approach
and the notion of collective conscious experience also
facilitates cross-cultural studies and
the understanding of intersub0ectivity.
Key-words : Idealist ontology7 philosophy of science7 cognition7
reality7psychological Now7 collective conscious experience7
collective consciousness7
egoless experience7 egolessness7 philosophy of mind7 mind-brain
relations7 mind-
matter relations7 spirituality7 shamanism7 science and religion7
God.
Introduction
In preceding papers the author has tried to expound an idealist
ontology stating that only
conscious experience in the Now is real. his challenges the
currently dominant materialist
ontology in the natural sciences, nevertheless it does maintain
the methodological
presupposition that all scientific research - materialist,
idealist, or dualist - rests on
empirical observations from which concepts and theories are
derived 2!andrup 899, 8999,
++3.
In this ontology, or philosophy the immediate conscious
experience in the psychological
Now is fundamental, and I shall therefore begin with this topic
and from that develop the
ontology of consciousness, nature, intersub0ectivity, history.
worlds without an ego, and
worlds comprising spiritual experiences.
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Content and Temporal Extension of the Psychological ow
' number of time studies and psychological experiments indicate
that the psychological
Now is experienced with a certain temporal extension and
therefore differs from the
physical moment or point of time, which is regarded as
infinitesimal with 4ero duration.
hus the psychologist !ubin 289;3 performed experiments with 5
two very short sound
stimuli in the outer physical world succeeding one another.5 hen
the interval between the
two sound stimuli was short, a fifth of a second 2in physical
time3, !ubin
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time of science and of daily life is an abstraction from these
immediate experiences. I find
that &ergson
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In the $nglish scientific and philosophic literature the term
5consciousness5 is used with
several very different meanings. 1ere are some examples showing
the span of the variation:
5#onsciousness is a neurological system li*e any other, with
functions such as the long-
term direction of behavior ... 5 2&ridgeman 89B3
5#onsciousness ... is best regarded as an aspect of the
system
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subse6uently develop is that of awareness per se, irrespective
of the ob0ects or contents of
awareness ... this fundamental sense is at bottom simple and
indefinable, and we are forced
to rely, in part, on each personrom Israel I have been
informed that it is difficult to give a good translation of the
$nglish word 5mind5 in
1ebrew, since there are ? - @ possible words, each of them with
a special shade 2/iriam
%chwar4 89B+, personal communication, 3.
It thus seems that it is not impossible to learn from other
cultures about concepts of
consciousnes and the ontology of consciousness, but great care
will be necessary, because of
the linguistic and general cultural differences. his applies to
what I write in the following
sections about #hinese, &uddhist, Capanese and other foreign
views. I rely on texts written
in $nglish or Aanish by authors with insight in the respective
cultures.
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The !ntology of ature Including $ind- %rain &elations
he dominant ontology of the estern scientific culture is
materialist realism which
assumes that what scientific theories describe is a material
world existing independent ofhuman consciousness and cognition. his
view has proved useful and productive within a
certain, large domain of the study of nature, but it has been
contested by many
philosophers 2night +87 !andrup 899, with references3, and a
number of scientific
findings made in the +th century have been difficult to
accomodate in this ontology. hus
cognitive
neuropsychology assumed from the beginning, li*e all biology,
the existence of an external
world independent of the human observer. he studies in this
discipline led, however, to
the conflicting result, that all our cognitions, including the
assumption of an external
world, must depend on the cognitive apparatus in our brain. he
same contradiction has
emerged in the discipline evolutionary epistemology 2the study
of cognition in the context of
biological evolution3 and has been discussed within this
discipline, during later years in the0ournal $volution and
#ognition. (ther examples of contradictions and problems
conse6uential to the assumption of a material world 5out there5
are found within the
disciplines second order cybernetics, statistics, and physics.
2!andrup 899 and submitted3.
Aoubts about the materialist ontology 2or realism3 have been
expressed by various
physicists. hus Jas4lo 2899@, p. +3 writes: 5's of today the
mainstream theorists of the
6uantum world have not succeeded in giving an unambigous answer
to the 6uestion,
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are thus regarded as heuristic concepts useful for expressing
observations within a certain
domain with some of their mutual relations. his reinterpretation
of materialist ob0ects
allows a direct understanding and use of traditional scientific
theories without accepting
their ontology 2/arshall +8, p. @, !andrup 899, section ;3. he
idealist ontology
emphasi4es the role of the evidence in science and is
particularly open to new theories and
to the application of more than one theory and set of concepts
to a domain of observations2Jindsay and /argenau 89;9, pp. 8-,
!andrup 899+, 899;, 899b, allace 899@, pp. +?-
+, 88-88;,8;B-8?, 893.
he idealist ontology of nature also readily accomodates the
intense nature experiences
*nown as nature spirituality 2!andrup 8993. hese intense, direct
nature-experiences are
felt by the experient to be essential and important, indicating
that they must be real and
that nature primarily is an experience. hese experiences are
thus felt to be in conflict with
the materialist view that nature exists separated from and
independent of the 5observer5.
'lso on more secular ground many people resist the alienation
from nature entailed by
strict materialist realism, and tend to retain naive 2or direct3
realism, where material
nature is believed to be as perceived.
he mind-body or mind-brain problem is now often called 5the hard
problem5, meaning
that it is hard to understand how a material brain can produce
consciousness. I believe that
the hardness of the problem is a direct implication of the
materialist ontology, and that
therefore the problem cannot be 5solved5 as long as this
ontology is applied. /aterialist
realism is the problem. 2Dery recently /arshall 2+8, p. @3 has
expressed similar views
on the hardness of the mind-brain problem3. ith the idealist
ontology the mind-brain
relations are relations between conscious experiences
2observations3 constituting the
material brain 2here seen as a heuristic concept3 and other
conscious experiences. It is
readily understood that such relations are possible, and they
can be studied in detail by
comparing the results from neurophysiology and from attention to
conscious experiences.
In a number of non-estern cultures and belief systems we
encounter conceptions of the
world and the human which are very different from the dominant
conceptions of
contemporary estern science. #learly those cultures have made
different extractions and
constructions from their immediate experiences in the
psychological Now.
riting on $ast 'sian thought u 289B3 gives a clear account of
such differences. 1e
states that according to $ast 'sian thought it is fallacious to
define human nature merely in
terms of biological, psychological or sociological structures
and functions because, viewed
holistically a more comprehensive grasp of its many-sidedness is
re6uired. he uni6ueness
of being human is an ethicoreligious 6uestion7 #h
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international diagnostic system in psychiatry, acceptable also
in the developing countries.
's one of the obstacles he mentioned conceptual bias, i.a. the
body-mind dichotomy.
%tanner 28983 gives an account of 'boriginal 'ustralian beliefs
and conceptions. 1e states
that our contrast of body versus spirit is not there and the
whole notion of the person is
enlarged. he 'ustralians 5enfold into some *ind of oneness the
notions of body, spirit,ghost, shadow, spirit-site, and totem5. he
'ustralians can also conceive that 5man, society
and nature and past, present, and future are at one5.
erblows*y 2898, p. 3 writes about Cewish thin*ing. Aistinction
between body and
soul2s3 occurs, but the essential feature of rabbinic
anthropology was not the opposition
body-soul, but the doctrine of the two inclinations, the good
yeser and the evil yeser. his
dichotomy is still fundamental in contemporary Cewish
thin*ing.
Purely idealist ontologies have been developed by schools within
&uddhism. hus ayman
2898, p. ;+@3 writes about 5the idealistic standpoint of the
Di0naptimatra school by which
there is no external ob0ect independent of consciousness5. 'nd
1su 28993 has written aboo* about the 5theory of Pure #onsciousness
considered one of the sub0ective and
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Indi'idual and Collecti'e Conscious Experience(
The !ntology of Intersub"ecti'ity
Immaterialist views such as the idealism proposed here,
phenomenalism, and radical
constructivism have been met with the ob0ection that they are
based entirely on private2individual3 experiences. hus 1irst 289?9,
pp.9;-9?3 states that material ob0ects are public,
while sense data are private to the percipient, and he as*s how
sets of statements about
these private sense data can give the meaning of a statement
about a public ob0ect..
Ji*ewise it has been critici4ed that the immaterialist views are
*inds of solipsism 2the idea
that the world has no existence outside the thin*eroerster 89B;,
pp. ?9-@, Don
Glasersfeld 89BB, p. B@, at4lawic* 89B;, p. 8?3. hitehead 289B,
p. 8?+3 states that if
experience be not based upon an ob0ective content, there can be
no escape from a solipsist
sub0ectivism, and he critici4es the philosophers 1ume and Joc*e
for failing to provide
experience with an ob0ective content. 1e also states that with
ant
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be possible to study relations between changes in two or more
brains associated with
collective experiences and with processes leading to collective
experiences.
%ome conscious experiences, such as intersub0ective scientific
observations and concepts,
are readily seen to be shared with a collective of persons,
while other experiences appear to
be more individual7 sometimes I feel that experiences I have are
not shared or only partlyshared by persons with whom I communicate.
his feeling may be reciprocal and even
shared, so it forms a *nown and directly experienced part of a
common collective
consciousness. his feeling may also give rise to a belief that
the other person has
individual experiences different from mine, and even give rise
to thoughts about the nature
of these experiences. %uch thoughts are, however, only
con0ectural, we cannot *now the
contents of other individual minds, but I thin* we *now and
experience directly the
collective experiences. his I regard as an answer to the much
discussed problem of 5other
minds5, thoughts about the complete content of another mind
remain con0ectural, but
what we share collectively we can and do *now by direct
experience. I also regard this view
as the beginning of an approach to another much discussed
problem, that of animal mind
2!andrup submitted a3.
he boundary between individual and collective consciousness is,
however, blurred. If we
tal* together about our experiences, the intersub0ective or
collective part will be expanded.
his aspect of intersub0ectivity has been studied thoroughly by
the phenomenological
school of psychology at #openhagen Fniversity 2!ubin, rane*0Mr
!asmussen, >rom3.
rane*0Mr !asmussen 289@B, chapter , with references3 writes that
through
communication it is possible to ma*e certain conscious
experiences 5intersub0ectively
transportable5 within a group of people. ' set of
intersub0ectively transportable
experiences he calls a recursive basis. %uch recursive bases are
established within scientific
disciplines 2technical languages3, but rane*0Mr !asmussen thin*s
that within the
disciplines little has been done to state the recursive bases
explicitly, and he thin*s that
wor*ing to accomplish this will be an important tas* for both
epistemology and
pedagogics. (btaining intersub0ectivity in psychologypsychiatry
aided by communication
between scientists has been described recently by /archais 2+,
pp. 8+;-8+?3 and by
/archais, Gri4e, and !andrup 2899?, p. 83. I thin* that
carefully established recursive
bases can be regarded as collective consciousness within a group
of persons. %ince recursive
bases in science can be 6uite comprehensive, we may envisage
that scientists, particularly
scientists within one discipline, have a significant part of
their consciousness in common, a
collective consciousness.
Indeed, *nowledge generally and many concepts such as 5eleven,5
5energy,5 and even
5solipsism5 cannot be individual at all, because from the
beginning they are shaped by
communication and education. his view is supported by several
reflections in the
literature. hus COrgensen 289@, p. 8@3 describes in detail how
two persons can arrive at
common names of certain phenomena such as 5head5, 5arm5, 5green5
etc. by ma*ing
observations together and communicate about the names. 1e
contends that originally we
have all learned the names of things and their properties in
this way7 in science further
education and communication has lead to the technical terms. In
a personal letter of /arch
+, 8999 Pierre /archais asserted that the number ? is an
educational, not a sub0ective
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phenomenon, an example of collective *nowledge. 1e told me that
the ? exists in me only
because I have been taught arithmetic. autischer 2899B, p. 8+3
maintains that in most
cultures *nowledge is seen as belonging to a group of people
rather than being the result of
individual effort. Ji*ewise Jut4 2899+, p. +3 regards
psychological and anthropological
thought systems as developing in a sociocultural context and as
constructed in interaction
with that context. %he also finds an essential similarity
between the cultural processeswhich structure academic psychology
and anthropology and those which structure other
forms of ethnopsychology and ethnoanthropology. hornton 2899@3
states that language is
an irreducibly public form of life which is encountered in
specifically social contexts, and
since a solipsist re6uires a language, hornton sees solipsism as
an inherently incoherent
theory. 'llwood 28993 writes in a similar vein7 he regards
dialogue as collective thin*ing
and contends that 5language is an instrument for 2collective3
activation of information 2or
thin*ing35. 'rtigiani 2899@3 proposes an hypothesis defining
mind as an emergent attribute
of complex social systems. 1e thin*s that mind becomes the
experience of brains in social
networ*ing 5computing5 environmental flows released by
cooperative actions.
Cung has written comprehensively about the collective
unconscious. his might be regardedas something different from
collective conscious experience, but the Cungian analyst
&ernstein writes 5....the collective unconscious which
clearly implies a collective conscious5
2&ernstein 899+, p. +?3. 'nd &ernstein 2+3 has reported
examples of directly felt
collective conscious experiences. Ji*ewiseKoung-$isendrath and
1ill 2899+3 thin* that
Cung
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he soul that empathetically identifies with both the pain and
the 0oy of others
begins to see that in the inner world we are not separated from
each other. Peace
and 0oy, no less than pain and sorrow, are shared, collective
experiences. 2p. ?3.
'nd in a recent special issue of the
0ournal&e)ision2!othberg and /asters, 899B3 several
authors have given examples of collective and egoless
consciousness in couples living andacting together in intimate
relationships. %ome excerpts from this special issue follow:
..... they felt they were ..... one soul residing in two bodies.
2p. B3.
'lso, a deep spiritual bond - which may be felt during the most
routine
activities and even far away - may develop. !obert &ly uses
the metaphor of
the 5third body5 as a way of describing the transpersonal
dimension that unites
a couple. It is the 5soul5 of the couple as one respondent
expressed it 2p. +3.
1olding to a sense of self and to the bond feels at times to be
overwhelming.
!epeated dancing bac* and forth - now self, now disappearing,
wave to particleand bac*..... separateness and union.....
2p.93.
hese examples show directly experienced, lived collective
consciousness7 it is also possible
to understand collective conscious experience conceptually as
described above in this
section. he last example given shows difficulties with
reconciling the individual and the
collective. Personally I have experienced such difficulties too,
a temporary fear of losing
myself. &ut these difficulties have not been serious for me,
after all the collective experience
is or becomes as familiar as the individual experience. hen an
experience moves from
individual to collective 2by communication for example3, my
immediate feeling is that the
sub0ect changes from I to e, while the rest of the experience
remains the same. In certain
cases the sub0ect 2I as well as e3 vanishes altogether as
described below in the section on
egoless experience. ' sudden change from experienced sub0ect to
no sub0ect is particularly
clearly described in the report by 'ustin 6uoted in that
section.
It seems probable that living and acting closely together in
smaller family and other groups
has contributed to the experience and concepts of collective
consciousness encountered in
various non-estern cultures. In these cultures collective and
relational features of
humans and their minds are emphasi4ed at least as much as
individual features. I thin*
this yields significant evidence supporting the heuristic value
of the concept of collective
consciousness for cross-cultural studies, and I shall relate
some examples of this evidence.
I have had some contact with*apanese psychiatry and shall 6uote
psychiatrist (*uyama,
who has practiced both in Capan and in the Fnited %tates. %he
writes about the three senses
of self among the Capanese: the collective, the social, and the
individual sense. (f these, the
collective sense is seen as the most important and fundamental
one. (*uyama states
explicitly:
Capanese people commonly thin* that the self exists only in
relationships with
others... our mind is thought to exist in a field of
relationships. he self
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cannot be considered separate from the relationship field nor
having as clear a
boundary, as estern people imagine.....one of the conditions to
be an adult
is the ability to feel somebody else
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followed by me 2see the section on consciousness above3.
%orenson 2899B3 has studied indigenous people living in isolated
enclaves around the world
more or less 5untouched5 by dominant, con6uering cultures. In
these people he found a
state of mind which he callsPrecon+uest Consciousness((ne of the
characteristics of this
consciousness is an empathetic, integrative, intuitive rapport
between individuals. %orensonfound their way of life to be
simultaneously individualistic and collective. each person
constantly enlivening the others by a ceaseless, spirited,
individualistic input into a unified
at-oneness. 1e felt strongly that this way of life was very
different from the ways of
estern cultures, he was used to, and even difficult to describe
in the $nglish language.
he difference was also clearly seen in some cases where a rapid
collapse of precon6uest
consciousness 2sometimes within one wee*3 occurred after contact
with dominant cultures.
hese non-estern views are difficult or rather impossible to
understand on the
bac*ground of a strictly individual concept of conscious
experience. If on the other hand
collective consciousness is conceived intellectually and
experienced directly on the basis of
scientific activity as described above, this will open
opportunities for understanding thenon-estern views and thus be
helpful in cross-cultural studies.
!osenstand
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very large in the communication between brains as well as in
communications within a
brain.
$xperiences with the Internet have given rise to new thoughts
about interaction and
collectivity. hus Gac*enbach, Guthrie and arpen 2899B3 find that
the most important
characteristic of the Internet is its emergent collective
properties, and de erc*hove 2899?3contends that the real nature of
the Internet is to act as a forum for collective memory and
imagination. 1e also thin*s that on-line communications have
created a new *ind of
permanence, a new stability of mind, a collective mind, in which
one plugs in or from which
one pulls out, but without affecting the integrity of the
structure other than by direct
contribution.
%urfing, e-mailing and chatting on the Internet have given rise
to new psychological
phenomena. Particularly %uler 289993 who created the word
5cyberpsychology5 has
published comprehensive studies of these phenomena. 'mong other
results he reports that
.....users often describe how their computer is an extension of
their mind andpersonality - a 5space5 that reflects their tastes,
attitudes, and interests. In
psychoanalytic terms, computers and cyberspace may become a type
of
5transitional space5 that is an extension of the individual
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Collecti'e Conscious Experience Across Time(
The !ntology of #istory
In estern cultures time is usually conceived as linear, the past
and the future separated
from the present. &ut the conception of time and the
attitude to the past and the future is
and was different in many other cultures, past and present. here
exists a comprehensiveliterature on this, for recent reviews
reference can be made to Gell 2899+3, /unn 2899+3,
Datsyayan 2899@3 and ithrow 289BB3. In the following some
specific examples of time
concepts will be given..
Na*amura 289983 emphasi4es that the Indian conception of time is
very different from that
in the est. ime is conceived staticallyrather than dynamically.
It is recogni4ed in India
that the things of this world are always movng and changing, but
the substance of things is
seen as basically unchanging, its underlying reality unaffected
by the ceaseless flux. he
Indian directs our attention not to the flow of water but to the
river itself, the unchanging
universal. Na*amura thin*s that the static conception of time
permeates Indian thought.
(ther authors use the wordtimelessnessinstead of 5static time5,
for example/ahadevan 2899+3 who writes that timeless &rahman is
the source of all orders of creation
and that time is the channel through which it is possible to
return to this source. hrough
meditation on time, one gets beyond time to the eternal 'bsolute
2p. ?;93. Gell 2899+, pp.
8-+3 6uoting Geert4 describe &alinese time as 5a motionless
present, a vectorless now5.
1e thin*s that this does not mean that the &alinese are
living in a different *ind of time
from ourselves, but that they refuse to regard as salient
certain aspects of temporal reality
which we regard as much more important, such as the cumulative
effects of historical time.
1all and 1all 28993 write about monochronic andpolychronictime.
/onochronic time
corresponds with paying attention to and doing only one thing at
a time, while polychronic
time corresponds with being involved in many things at once. he
cultures of the Fnited%tates, %wit4erland Germany, and %candinavia
adhere to monochronic time, while the
/editerranian peoples follow polychronic time. Ji*e oil and
water the two systems do not
mix, so for performing international business it is essential to
*now about the difference.
Cyclic concepts of time are found in various cultures, for
instance in the ancient Gree*
culture. !ser 2899B3 describes this view: 5's time proceeds
around the circle, one
encounters the past and repeats the transactions and events as
the present.5 !ser also
thin*s that this cyclical reality proved 6uite ade6uate for the
social, economical, and
political life in anti6uity around the /editerranean and
throughout 'frica. illiams 289B@,
p. 3 0udges that the Kolngu 2Northern erritory of 'ustralia3
perceive time as circular, so
that from any particular time, what is past may be future, and
what is future may be past.'nd she 6uotes a personal communication
by von %turmer: 5'borigines read life
bac*wards and forwards. e read it forward.5 %he also states that
for the Kolngu time is
in some contexts both cyclical and circular, though this does
not preclude a certain *ind of
lineal causality 2illiams 289B@,p. +B3.
In the Cewish way of thin*ing, as described by %teinsalt4 289B,
chapter ;3, time is seen li*e
a spiralor a helix rising up from creation. ime is seen as a
process, in which past, present,
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and future are bound to each other as a harmoni4ation of two
motions: progress forward
and a countermotion bac*ward, encircling and returning. here is
always a certain return
to the past, a constant reversion to basic patterns of the past,
although it is never possible to
have a precise counterpart of any moment of the time.
'lso in the &antu culture time is conceived li*e a spiral.
$ach season and each new
generation return on the same vertical of the spiral, but at a
higher level 2agame [email protected] /ayan concept of time is often
described as cyclical, but !ser 2899B3 finds it more
correct to shift the symbolism from a circle to a spiral.
&erndt 289;, p. B3 reports that with the 'boroginal
'ustralians mythological or sacred
time exists alongside secular timebut not identical with it. he
'borigines recogni4e both
*inds of time as e6ually real, as applying in different,
although overlapping, sociocultural
situations. &erndt and &erndt 289@;, pp. 8B-8BB3 write
that for the 'borigines the beings
said to have been present at the beginning of things still
continue to exist. In one sense the
past is still here, in the present, and is part of the future as
well. &ut the 'borigines also
recogni4e various time categories in connection with their
everyday activities: days and
nights, moons, the se6uence or cycle of seasons. /owal0arlai
2/owal0arlai and /alnic899, pp. @-@B3 explains that when you are in
an ancient state of mind, time stands still,
because your mind is in a state where time does not count.
'ncient time is no time.
/ore, comprehensive evidence for experience being regarded as
existing in both past and
present has emerged from several studies of the 'ustralian
'boriginal culture. hus $l*in
289@;, p. +83 states:
In those rituals we were 5in the Areaming5. e were not 0ust
commemorating or re-enacting the past. hatever happened in
the
mythic past was happening now, and there is no doubt that the
men
were 5carried away5 by the experience.
his statement by $l*in is particularly clear and explicit, but
it is substantiated by several
other reports about past events reoccurring in the present
during rituals and ceremonies in
the 'ustralian culture 2&erndt 89;, pp. +-+B, &erndt and
&erndt 89@;, pp. ++@-++,
1ume 8999, pp. 9 -8, Isaacs 899+, p. ;, %trehlow 89@B, pp. +9-
and 898, p. @883 .
'lso in other cultures than the 'ustralian ritual time may
differ from secular time. hus
%ilverman 28993 writes about the $astern Iatmul, New Guinea:
'lthough $astern Iatmul time can be incremental and linear, the
naming
system and totemic identifications seem to merge the present and
the past.
o some degree, so does the cyclical temporality of the *inship
system. his
form of time is also present in $astern Iatmul rituals such as
curing rites
which often enact primordial events as if they were occuring in
the present.
'nd Jancaster 2 899, p. +3 writes about the Cewish culture that
time for sacred history is
not the everyday passing time of literal history, but that
mysterious dimension of time
which is eternally present. 1e thin*s that while literal history
may satisfy the rational mind
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there are deeper dimensions to the psyche for which sacred
history can provide an e6ually
satisfying picture of the way things really are.
Ji*e some other people the 'ustralians believe in
reincarnation.. It is the soul or spirit
2which would include what is here called consciousness3 of the
deceased which is believed to
reappear in a person living in the present. his can of course be
seen as an example of thepast appearing in the present and as an
extreme example of consciousness shared across
time. 'ustralian conceptions of reincarnation are described by
several authors. %trehlow
2898, pp. @8?-@83 relates how an ancestral supernatural being
can become reincarnated
into the unborn child of a pregnant woman. his may happen while
she 2or, in some areas,
her husband3 is experiencing a dream-vision of the future child
brought on by the
supernatural being who is see*ing rebirth. %trehlow also reports
that in sacred ritual
totemic ancestors are represented by their human reincarnations
2898, pp. @88 and @89-
@+3. &erndt 289;, p. +B3 states that during the process of
initiation, a father could ta*e his
son away to a secret place and sing into him the spirit-double
of his own assistant totem. In
this way that totem spirit merges with the youth
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used in the past.
ith the idealist ontology the materialist entities and events in
history may be regarded as
heuristic concepts, 0ust li*e the material things in the
present. ime itself may also be
regarded as a heuristic concept useful for further ordering of
our conscious experiences in
the Now. I suppose that the different conceptions of time in
various cultures are and havebeen useful in this way. his goes for
the concepts of time in physics too7 thus in modern
physics the idea of static time is sometimes entertained and
regarded as useful, in
particular in association with relativity theory and cosmology 2
$instein and Infeld 89@,
chapter , section on space time continuum, 1aw*ing 89BB, chapter
B3. 1aw*ing describes
the theory of imaginary time, a spatial and therefore static
dimension, and states that li*e
other theories in physics, it is a mathematical model for
describing our observations. 1e
finds that it is meaningless to as* whether the usual or the
imaginary time is the correct or
real one, the 6uestion is, which description is the most useful
21aw*ing 89BB, chapter B3. It
may be added here that both of these concepts of time express
structures in the catalog of
scientific observations useful in different domains. e are aware
of this catalog in the Now,
in the focus and in the margin.
1aw*ing
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(n a biological and evolutionary bac*ground %heets-Cohnstone
2899, p.?+-@+3 also
considers re-enactment of past experience. %he uses a method
called hermeneutical
phenomenology and thin*s that by this means 5we might accede,
and in the closest possible
way, to the actual experiences of the ancestral hominids.5
&y writing about re-enactmentof past thought #ollingwood
2and %heets-Cohnstone3 seem to
regard the thoughts in history as fixed facts that existed in
the past. his is in agreement
with the usual estern linear conception of time. &ut it is
also possible to assume that the
historian gradually develops thoughts, about the emperor and the
edict mentioned above
for example, that fit the historical evidence 2here seen as
conscious experiences in the Now3
and therefore may be seen as shared with a historical person
such as the emperor 2here
seen as a construct based on historical evidence3. %uch sharing
would be parallel to the
development of collective consciousness with contemporaries by
communication as
described in the preceding section.
his interpretaton of #ollingwood
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of self that in normal life often intrudes in consciousness ...
In flow the self is fully
functioning, but not aware of itself doing it ... 5 2p. 3. 5'n
activity that fosters a merging
of action and awareness with a centering of attention on a
limited stimulus field will lead
inevitably to a loss of the ego construct, a loss of awareness
of the
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of 5cosmic consciousness5 2##3:
't this point I merged with the light and everything, including
myself,
became one unified whole. here was no separation between myself
and the
rest of the universe. In fact to say that there was a universe,
a self, or any
5thing5 would be misleading - it would be an e6ually correct
description tosay that there was 5nothing5 as to say that there was
5everything5. o say
that sub0ect merged with ob0ect might be almost ade6uate as a
description of
the entrance into ##, but during ## there was neither 5sub0ect5
nor
5ob0ect5...... 0ust a timeless unitary state of being 2%mith and
art 899B, p.
83.
hese are direct experiences of the environment or the universe
without the ego in the
usual central position. It is, however, also possible to thin.
of the world decentered from
the ego or even with another ego as the center. he change from
the Ptolemaic to the
#opernican view of the planetary system is an example of such
decentering. %ince then,
science has continued the decentering process and developed an
5ob0ective5 world view.
he decentered world of science is, however, as mentioned above,
most often considered as
a material world pro0ected 5out there5 and separate from the
human mind. his ma*es it
difficult to place consciousness in the scientific picture. In
contrast, an egoless experience of
the world 2perceived or conceived3 is still a conscious
experience and avoids the dichotomy
between the material and the mental. (n such a monistic
bac*ground, worldviews centered
on an ego, centered on a collective, or completely decentered
2egoless3 are not in conflict,
but can be seen as different structures in the same catalog of
conscious experiences. It is
*nown that there can be more than one structure in a system of
elements, for example, in
ambiguous figures. hese are perceived in two or more alternating
gestalts, only one at a
time, but in thought it can be conceived that the two or more
structures or gestalts exist
simultaneously in the figure 2&urling 89@;, Gregory 899B,
chapter 8, !andrup 899+3. his
point is also illustrated by the following anecdote 6uoted from
!andrup, /un*vad and >og
289B+3: ' visitor to >lorida wanted to mail a baby turtle to
his son at camp. he cler* in the
Post (ffice read the regulations aloud: 5ell5, he said 5Aogs is
dogs and cats is dogs,
s6uirrels in cages is birds - - and baby turtles is insects5
>or postal purposes this
alternative structure was preferred to the usual Jinnean
structure in 4oology.
In some cases egoless experiences are not only without ego but
also without other content
such as perceptions, thoughts etc. his is called pure
consciousness, contentless
consciousness, experience of nothingness, emptiness or void
etc.. here are many
descriptions of this type of experience in the literature from
Indian, Cewish and other
sources. he descriptions differ to some extent, the nothingness
seems to be more or less
complete, but surely these experiences lac* many details *nown
from ordinary, daily
experiences7 see further below.
Jancaster 2+, p. +3 6uoting %ullivan gives a clear example of a
contentless experience
which followed a road accident:
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here was something, and the something was not the nothing 2of
total
unconsciousness3. he nearest label for the something might
possibly be
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cosmic psyche is regarded as the source of all existence, the
ultimate reality. It is also seen
as the basis of the individual mind. 't the pinnacle of human
development, unity
consciousness, the individual is regarded as a fully integrated
expression of the cosmic
psyche. hus the world view and the direct experience is
harmoni4ed in Dedic psychology.
$golessness and nothingness are also important elements of
Cewish mysticism, both asdirect experience and in the conception of
the world.. here is a tradition of gradual
contemplative ascent to higher planes. 't a high plane the
mystic no longer differentiates
one thing from another. #onceptual thought, with all its
distinctions and connections,
dissolves7 awareness of the self disappears. >ortune 2899?,
p. 83 reports that at the one
occasion, when she touched the edge of the highest level, *eter,
of the tree of life, it
appeared as a glaring white light in which all thought vanished
completely. eter is also
seen as the totality of all existence. %ince God
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ocean - in no manner can the thrilling depth of these feelings
be written - with
these I prayed.... 2Cefferies 898, p. @3
he second description is from the partially autobiographic boo*
5here the %pirits !ide
the ind5 by >elicitas Goodman.
Dery soon I discovered all on my own what being an adult
apparently meant,
and confided it to my diary: 5he magic time is over5. >or all
of a sudden
and without the slightest warning, I reali4ed that I could no
longer
effortlessly call up what in my terms was magic: that change in
me that was
so deliciously exciting and as if I were opening a door,
imparting a special
hue to whatever I chose. I noticed the curious impediment first
with the
fresh, crunchy snow which fell right after my birthday. It was
nice, but I
could not ma*e it glow 2 Goodman 899, p. 3
Jater in life >elicitas Goodman regained her 5magic5, when
she studied shamanism both
by anthropological methods and by own experiences.
I regard these three experiences as examples of nature
spirituality, but Pierre /archais
2899, 8999, +, personal communications 899;-89993 while
recogni4ing the occurrence
of this *ind of experiences prefers to name them 5exceptional
intuitive experiences5. >or
/archais 5authentic spirituality5 is an act of faith, a part of
religion, particularly the
Cudeo-#hristian religions. 1e characteri4es the former type of
experiences, and also $ast
'sian mysticism and transcendence with the >rench word
5supranaturel5, while the
5authentic spirituality5 is characteri4ed by the word
5surnaturel5. his distinction
between supranaturel and surnaturel is fundamental in his
view.
$velyn Fnderhill 289??, p. 8983 distinguishes less sharply
between nature experiences and
religious faith:
%uch use of visible nature as the stuff of ontological
perceptions the medium whereby the
self reaches out to the 'bsolute, is not rare in the history
of
mysticism. he mysterious vitality of trees, the silent magic of
the forest,
the strange and steady cycle of its life, possess in a peculiar
degree this
power of unleashing the human soul ..... he flowery garment of
the world is for some
mystics a medium of ineffable perception, a source of
exalted
0oy, the veritable clothing of God.
his view is supported by 6uotations from several $uropean
mystics 2pp. 89-89@3.
>or Pierre /archais the meaning of the word 5spirituality5 is
therefore more restricted
than it is for me 2and for Fnderhill3. /archais and I have had
prolonged exchange on these
issues and have come to agree on much, also that even though the
terms may differ
25nature spirituality5 versus 5exceptional intuitive
experiences5 for instance3 it is possible
to agree on the phenomena.
&ut /archais and I still differ with respect to the
Perennial Philosophy. his philosophy is
based on a broad sense of the word spirituality comprising both
nature spirituality, $ast
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'sian mysticism, shamanistic transcendence, and experiences
embedded in Cudeo-
#hristian religions. It assumes that there is a similarity or
common core to all experiences
of spirituality 2understood in this broad sense3 across cultures
and across the ages. It does
not regard the distinction of /archais between the supranaturel
and the surnaturel as
important and is therefore not accepted by him. I, on the other
hand, tend to agree with the
perennialists, although I admit that since spiritual experiences
are often felt as ineffable,transverbal, it is difficult to discuss
the idea of the Perennial Philosophy in words. /y
positive attitude to this philosophy therefore rests on
intuition more than on reason
2!andrup 899B3.
In the special integration group %pirituality and %ystems within
the International %ociety
for the %ystems %ciences the Perennial Philosophy is widely
accepted, and on this basis it
seems possible that some intersub0ectivity might be obtained
through communication.
%ince 8998 such communication has been performed at annual
meetings in this group
2!andrup 899a3. he exchange has lead to better understanding of
both differences and
similarities between the participants, and the exchange is still
going on. >or me personally
the direct communication with colleagues from other cultures
2Capanese, Indian, 'mericanIndian, 'boriginal 'ustralian etc.3 has
been particularly illuminating. In the group we
have abstained from attempts to define spirituality, but rather
try to understand it by
means of the examples presented at our meetings.
&ased on all these experiences and exchanges I thin* thatthe
immediate spiritual experience
is the foundationof all spiritual beliefsandtheir ontology( his
applies to occidental and
oriental religions, 'boriginal 'ustralian belief systems,
shamanism etc.
/hamanism
%hamanism is described in various ways, but autischer 289B93
finds that shamanic
experiences are intersub0ectively accessible. hese experiences
often involve a certain state
of mind in which a 0ourney to another world or reality may be
experienced. 'nthropologist
/ichael 1arner, a pioneer of neo-shamanism has written about the
ontology of this other
world:
In shamanic experience, when one is in non-ordinary reality
things
will seem 6uite as material as they are here. (ne feels the
coldness or warmth of the air, the hardness or smoothness of
a
roc*7 one perceives colors, sounds, odors and so forth. 'll
thephenomena that characteri4e the so-called material world
will
appear 0ust as real and material there as they do here if it is
an
extremely clear shamanic 0ourney 21arner 89B, p. ;3.
1arner goes on stating that the shaman does not regard these
non-ordinary phenomena as
a pro0ection of his own mind, but rather as another reality
which exists independently of
that mind. 1arner
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expressed later in the same paper 2p. 8?3: 5's a person who has
followed the path of
shamanism for a long time, I aminclined to thin.that there is
more to the universe than the
human mind5. 2Italics by the present author3.
hese two views, the alternate world as an independent external
reality or as a mental
pro0ection are described and discussed in the literature by
several authors 2Peters 89B9, p.88B, Peters and Price-illiams 89B,
pp. ;?-;@, urner 899+, Daughan 899?, p. , alsh
89B9, pp. -8, autischer 89B9, iebe +3. his problem is completely
parallel to the
problem about the ontology of the material world in modern
science: does it exist
independentally 5out there5, or is it rather a mental pro0ection
or heuristic concept based
on regularities in the occurrence of the immediate experiences "
In science the view of an
external material reality has run into contradictions as
described above. 'n idealist
ontology based on conscious experiences seems to be a more
viable alternative, but this
does not mean that we can control the processes of sense
experiences at will 2&erger and
Juc*man 89@@, Introduction, p. 8, Aiettrich Q99?, pp. 9@, 8-8?,
!andrup submitted3 and
the same seems to be true for shamanic experiences. he shamanic
world view as well as
the scientific can be seen as mental constructs useful for
structuring the immediateexperiences in the Now.
&eligion( 0od, &ationality, /pirituality
urning to the religions more familiar in the est we may say,
rationally that God can be
seen as a something 2or a nothing3 which brings coherence to
both sensory and spiritual
experiences and to the felt urges to behave ethically. $ven fear
of God may be seen as fear
of performing something unethical which may harm family,
society, nature, and oneself.
'll this is a rational account, but religion is rather
experienced or *nown in an intuitive-spiritual mode. %piritual
experiences are usually regarded as mainly ineffable, beyond
words, but it may be said that spiritually God is imagined
either as li*e a person or in a
more abstract way. It seems to me that my rational account above
agrees with the abstract
spiritual imagination of God, as well as rationality can ever
agree with spirituality. his
suggests that there is a difference but no principal conflict
between science and religion.
hen these things dawned to me, it was felt as a great
relief.
ote
he content of this paper is influenced by prolonged exchange in
the %pirituality and%ystems group of the International %ociety for
the %ystems %ciences 2!andrup 899a3 and
in the #enter for Interdisciplinary !esearch, #I!IP 2/archais
and !andrup 899,
!andrup 899; a3, in particular with Pierre /archais, $laine
%mith, %Oren &rier, Grethe
%Orensen, and Jin addell.
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