ICCT Eijkman Preventative CT and Non Discrimination EU July 2011

8/11/2019 ICCT Eijkman Preventative CT and Non Discrimination EU July 2011

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Preventive Counter-Terrorism and Non-

Discrimination in the European Union:

A Call for Systematic Evaluation

Dr. Quirine Eijkman

Bart Schuurman

MA

June 2011

Abstract

As a result of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the bombings inMadrid and London, a prevention

focussed counterterrorism approach has developed across the European Union (EU). While the

majorityof these laws, regulations andpolicies recognise the importance of the ruleof law and

human rights, it remains relevant to examinewhether in theory and in practice certain security

measures that were implemented have had disproportionate effects on ethnic and religious

minoritiesandtherebyviolatenondiscriminationstandards.Thisstudybrieflydiscussestheconcept

ofpreventivecounterterrorism,afterwhichitwillgoontoconsidertheuseofpreventivecounter

terrorismmeasuresintheEUaswellastheirpotentialdiscriminatorysideeffects.Acasestudywill

bepresentedoftwoofthememberstates:theNetherlandsandtheUK.Intheconclusion,theneed

for systematic evaluation of the effect of preventive counterterrorism measures in relation to

compliancetonondiscriminationstandardsisdiscussed.


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About the Authors

Dr. Quirine A. M. Eijkman is a SeniorResearcher and Lecturer at the Centre for Terrorism and

CounterterrorismofLeidenUniversity.Additionally,sheisaconsultantforJusticeQ&A.Previouslyshe

worked for the Police andHuman Rights Programme ofAmnesty International, theHuman Rights

CommitteeoftheDutchAdvisoryCouncilonInternationalAffairs,theRooseveltAcademyofUtrecht

University,theNetherlandsInstituteofHumanRights(SIM)andattheInternationalHumanitarianLaw

DepartmentoftheNetherlandsRedCross.In2007,shedefendedherPhDthesisWeAreHeretoServe

You!: Public Security, Police Reform and Human Rights Implementation in Costa Rica at Utrecht

UniversityCurrently,she isaMemberoftheBoardofAdvisorsoftheDutchPlatformonCivilRights

andtheDutchSectionoftheInternationalCommissionofJurists(NJCM)ofwhichbetween2005and

2011 shewas the (vice)President. She has published on the sideeffects of securitymeasures for

humanrights,policereform,andhumanrightsmobilization.Herareasofinterestincludesecurityand

humanrights,counterterrorism,transitionaljusticeandthesociologyoflaw.

Bart

Schuurman,

MA

is

a

junior

researcher

at

the

Centre

for

Terrorism

and

Counterterrorism

of

LeidenUniversity.Additionally,he isworkingonhisPhD thesis.His research is focusedmainlyon

strategicnegotiationsbetweengovernmentalandnongovernmentalorganisations, the influenceof

public support on the outcome of terrorismrelated conflict situations, the theories of military

strategist Carl von Clausewitz, and the obstacles encountered by western actors in socalled

asymmetricconflicts.

About ICCT - The Hague

The International Centre for CounterTerrorism (ICCT) The Hague is an independentknowledge

centre that focuses on information creation, collation and dissemination pertaining to the

preventativeand

international

legal

aspects

of

counter

terrorism.

The

core

of

ICCTs

work

centres

on

such themes as de and counterradicalisation, human rights, impunity, the rule of law and

communication in relation to counterterrorism. Functioning as a nucleuswithin the international

counterterrorismnetwork, ICCTTheHagueendeavours to connectacademics,policymakersand

practitioners by providing a platform for productive collaboration, practical research, exchange of

expertiseandanalysisofrelevantscholarly findings.Byconnectingtheknowledgeofexpertstothe

issuesthatpolicymakersareconfrontedwith, ICCTTheHaguecontributestothestrengtheningof

both research and policy. Consequently, avenues to new and innovative solutions are identified,

whichwillreinforcebothhumanrightsandsecurity.

Contact

ICCTTheHague

KoninginJulianaplein10

P.O.Box13228

2501EE,TheHague

TheNetherlands

T+31(0)708009531

[email protected]

Allpapers

can

be

downloaded

free

of

charge

at

www.icct.nl

StayuptodatewithICCT,followusonlineonFacebook,TwitterandLinkedIn

ICCTTheHague2011
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1 ICCTTheHagueResearchPaper Dr.QuirineEijkman&BartSchuurman,MA

Introduction

Asaresultofthe9/11terroristattacksandthebombingsinMadridandLondon,apreventionfocussedcounter

terrorism approachhasdeveloped across theEuropeanUnion (EU). Preventive counterterrorism is appealing

because it implies interventionsthat removetheabilityor,betterstill, themotivationofpotential terroriststo

carryout

their

lethal

designs.

Member

states

such

as

the

United

Kingdom

(UK)

and

The

Netherlands

that

have

primarily experience with addressing home grown terrorism, have developed preventive counterterrorism

measuresinresponse.Themajorityoftheselaws,regulationsandpoliciesrecognisetheimportanceoftheruleof

lawandhumanrights.However,itremainsrelevanttoexaminewhetherintheoryandinpracticecertainsecurity

measures that were implemented have had disproportionate effects on ethnic and religious minorities and

thereby violate nondiscrimination standards. For instance, a 2008 survey conducted by the European

FundamentalRightsAgencyshowedthataconsiderablenumberofminoritiesintheEUfeelthattheyarebeing

stoppedbylawenforcementofficialsonthebasisoftheirethnicityorimmigrantstatus.1

When national intelligence and security services, law enforcement officials and other civil servants

implementandexecutecounterterrorismmeasuresinadiscriminatoryfashion,theyalienatethetargetedgroup

and thereby reduce opportunities for effective cooperation. This especially applies to preventive counter

terrorismmeasures includingcounter andderadicalisationpolicies,automaticbordercontrol,passengername

recordsdata,aliendeportationonthegroundsofnationalsecurityorpublicorder,surveillancecameras,stopand

search practices, and administrative measures including control orders. Strong claims are made by both

supporters and criticastersof certainmeasures,with little supportingevidence and inhighly chargedpolitical

climates.2Notwithstandingtheintensityofthisdebate,inmostcasestherehasbeenlittlesystematicevaluation

of the effect of these particular counterterrorismmeasures in terms of effectiveness in preventing terrorist

crimesand/orofadverseresultsforhumanrightssuchasperceivedorrealdiscriminatoryoutcomes.

Despite seriousmethodological and empirical challenges including limited access to confidential data,

mistrustand

limited

opportunities

for

the

informed

exchange

of

information,

there

is

increasing

research

and

advocacy from a human rights perspective on security and counterterrorism measures in relation to non

discriminationstandards.GiventheEUanditsmemberstatescommitmenttoaddressingterrorthreatswithfull

respectforthefundamentalrightsonwhichtheUnionisbased,andtheresearchevidenceindicatingthatpolicies

thatareexperienced and/orperceivedasunfairanddiscriminatoryare ineffectiveandpossiblyeven counter

productive,itisimportanttogivethesequestionsseriousconsideration.Theneedforgreaterscrutinyofcurrent

efforts to prevent terrorism increases as European authorities seek to support improved understanding and

exchangeofgoodpracticesinpreventingterrorismundertheStockholmProgramme.3

TheUnitedKingdom (UK) and theNetherlandshavebeen longstandingpioneers inefforts todevelop

early interventionsto identify individualswhomaybeonapathtoviolentradicalisation,andtousearangeof

police,judicial

and

administrative

measures

to

intercede

prior

to

an

actual

terrorist

attack

and,

at

times,

well

beforethereisanyevidenceofplanningormaterialsupportfortheexecutionofterroristacts.Whiletheneedto

preventactsofterrorismandextremistviolenceisclear,itisimportanttouseonlythoseapproachesthatcanbe

shown with a persuasive degree of assurance to be effective, and meet (inter)national nondiscrimination

standards.4

1EuropeanUnionAgencyforFundamentalRights,EuropeanUnionMinoritiesandDiscrimination Survey:DatainFocusReport4:PoliceStopsandMinorities

(Vienna:FRA,2010).

2EuropeanParliamentCommitteeonCivilLiberties,JusticeandHomeAffairsWorkingDocument1PE456.713v0100of19January2011ontheEUCounter

TerrorismPolicy:MainAchievementsandFutureChallenges,pp.23.

3TheStockholmProgrammedefinestheEUsframeworkforpolice,rescueservicesandcustomscooperation,criminalandcivillawcooperation,aswellas

asylum,migration

and

visa

policy

for

the

period

of

2010

2014.

For

more

information

on

the

Stockholm

Programme

see:

European

Council,

The

Stockholm

Programme:anOpenandSecureEuropeServingandProtectingCitizens,OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanUnion(4May2010).

4SeeamongothersPeterNeumann,PrisonsandTerrorism:RadicalisationandDeradicalisationin15Countries(TheInternationalCentrefortheStudyof

RadicalisationandPoliticalViolence(ICSR)/TheNationalConsortiumfortheStudyofTerrorismandResponsetoTerrorism(START),2010),pp.168;Bobde

Graaff,HoeBreed?:Contraterrorisme enRadicaliseringsbeleidOnderdeLoep[CounterterrorismandCounterRadicalisationPolicyReviewed], inJaapvan


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2 PreventiveCounterterrorismandNondiscrimination intheEuropeanUnion:Acallforsystematicevaluation

Thisstudybrieflydiscussestheconceptofpreventivecounterterrorism. Furthermoreitwillconsiderthe

useofpreventivecounterterrorismmeasuresintheEUaswellastheirpotentialdiscriminatorysideeffects.Two

member states, theNetherlandsand theUK, serveascase studies. In theconclusion, theneed for systematic

evaluationoftheeffectofpreventivecounterterrorismmeasuresinrelationtocompliancetonondiscrimination

standardsisdiscussed.

PreventiveCounterterrorismMeasures

Counterterrorism is a complex andmultifaceted subject that encompasses a host of different strategies for

dealingwithviolentextremism.Itscentralpurposecanbedescribedasdevisingmethodsandpoliciestocause

non state groups that employ [terrorism] to stop using violence to achieve their political objectives.5

ParaphrasingAlexSchmid,itispossibletodividethesemethodsandpoliciesintotwobroadcategories:namely,

those efforts that fight the manifestations of terrorism and those that attempt to address the conditions

conducive

to

the

spread

of

terrorism.

It

is

the

latter

category

of

preventive

counter

terrorism

measures

that

constitutesthefocusofthisreport.6

Whileapreventiveapproachtocounterterrorism istobe lauded for itsemphasisonavertingviolence

rather than responding to it, themanner inwhich such policies are currently being implemented by various

countries and international organisations raise significant questions related to the right to privacy, data

protection,thepresumptionofinnocenceaswellasthepositionofethnicandreligiousminorities.Forinstance,

what, ifany,arethediscriminatorysideeffectsofpreventivecounterterrorismmeasurestakenbytheEU,the

NetherlandsandtheUK,andhowdothese(unintended)consequencesaffectlegislationandpreventivepolicies?

Beforeaddressingthesequestions,thefollowingsectionwillbrieflyexploretheconceptofpreventivecounter

terrorismanditspotentialmerits.

Why(not)focusonprevention?

Themostobviousadvantageofacounterterrorismpolicy that focusesonprevention is itsability toavert the

deathsandinjuriesofinnocentcivilianswhomightotherwisehavefallenvictimtoaterroristattack.Moreover,by

forestallingthesocietalpolarisationandcallsforrevengethatfrequentlyfollowterroristactsandwhich inturn

mayleadtoaviciouscycleofretaliation,preventivestrategiescanalsohaveclearlongertermbenefits.7

However,policiesthatfocusonpreventingterrorismarenotnecessarilylimitedtoavertinganimminent

attack.Abroaderormore fundamental formofpreventive counterterrorismattempts to remove the factors

conducive to the spread of violent extremism. By engaging in dialogue with radicalising individuals or

organisationsandbyaddressingthegrievancesthatengenderanenvironmentinwhichviolentradicalisationmay

occur, governments can take steps towards the longterm resolutionof a conflict anddiminish the appeal to

resort to terrorism. Such a focus on conciliation andmediationwill certainlynot yield results overnight, and

politiciansadvocatingthisformofpreventionmustbepreparedtobeinitforthelonghaul.Thatsaid,removing

Donselaar,PeterRodrigues(eds.),MonitorRacisme&Extremisme:AchtsteRapportage(Leiden/Amsterdam:UniversityofLeiden/AnneFrankFoundation,

2008),pp.125140.

5RobertJ.ArtandLouiseRichardson,Introduction,inRobertJ.ArtandLouiseRichardson(eds.),DemocracyandCounterterrorism:LessonsfromthePast

(Washington:UnitedStatesInstituteofPeacePress,2007),p.1.

6Alex

P.

Schmid,

Prevention

of

Terrorism:

Towards

aMulti

Pronged

Approach,

in

Tore

Bjrgo

(ed.),

Root

Causes

of

Terrorism:

Myths,

Reality

and

Ways

Forward(London:Routledge,2005),p.223.

7Northern Irelands Troublesand Italysexperiencewithdomestic terrorismbothprovidemanyexamplesof thereciprocalnatureof terrorismrelated

violence.Forexample,see:SteveBruce,TheRedHand:ProtestantParamilitariesinNorthernIreland(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1992),pp.31,56,136

138;LeonardWeinberg,TheRedBrigadesin:ArtandRichardson(eds.)(seenote4above),pp.3031.


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beingespeciallyprone to radicalisation.14

Governmentscanalsodevelopa strategicnarrative todiminish the

appeal of the terroristsmessagewhilewinning support for its own, and timely and accurate intelligence is

anothercruciallyimportantaspectofdetectingandpreventingterroristplots.Finally,thereareahostofjudicial

measures thatpoliticianscanenact to increase thepowerof theexecutiveand thejudiciaryvisvis terrorist

organisations.15

PreventingTerrorismintheEuropeanUnion,theNetherlandsandtheUnitedKingdom

Statesabilitiestoimplementpreventivelawsandpolicies inthefieldsoutlinedabovearemosteffectivewithin

theirownnationalborders.Yetmanyoftodaysterroristthreatshaveaninternationalortransnationalcharacter;

operativesplanningattacksinWesterncountrieshavefrequentlyvisitedtrainingcampsinfailedorfailingstates,

mayreceiveplanningadviceandinstructionsfromhandlersinforeigncountriesoraresupportedlogisticallyand

financiallybyaninternationalnetwork.Howcaneffortstoaddressrootcausesbefruitfulinthiscontext?Asthis

sectionwill show,while statesareawareof theseconcernsandcommitted toaddressing themonpaper, the

difficultiesofactuallydoingsomayexplainwhy inpracticepreventivecounterterrorismhasastrongdomestic

focusaimedat identifyingandremovingradicalising individualsandgroupsbeforetheyhaveanopportunityto

strike.16

ApreventivefocussharedbytheEU,theNetherlandsandtheUKaimsathaltingthefinancingofterrorist

organisationsandindividuals.Afterthefatefulattacksof9/11,theUnitedNations(UN)SecurityCounciladopted

abindingresolutioncallingonitsmemberstofightterroristfinancingbyfreezingtheassetsoforganisationsand

individualswhohavecommitted,orare likely tocommit, terroristattacks.ThisUNSecurityCouncil resolution

1373hassinceformedanimportantbasisforcooperationoncounterterrorismamongEUmemberstates.17

TheEUscounterterrorismstrategyconsistsoffourstrands;prevent,protect,pursueandrespond.The

preventiveaspect

of

this

strategy

is

in

turn

divided

into

three

segments;

disrupting

radicalisation

and

terrorist

recruitment, ensuring mainstream opinion prevails over extremist views and promoting with a strong third

countrydimensionsecurity,justice,democracyandequalopportunity.18

Thislatteraspectwouldappeartobethe

mostsuitedtoaddressingtheconditionsconducivetothespreadofviolentradicalisationandterrorism,buton

howtoactuallyachievethisoutsideoftheEUsborders,theUnionissomewhatvague.OutsideEurope,wemust

promotegoodgovernance,humanrights,democracy,aswellaseducationandeconomicprosperity,throughour

politicaldialogue,assistance andresponsiblemediaprogrammes.Andwemustworktoresolveconflict.19

Due to the international character of contemporary terrorism, the Dutch government attaches

considerable significance to international cooperation as a means of preventing attacks. 20 This policy focus

corresponds with the preventive portion of the UNs global counterterrorism strategy, which emphasises

increasedcooperation

between

states

within

the

framework

of

existing

international

law

that

outlaw

terrorism

14Ibid.,pp.228229.

15Ibid.,pp.226234;LawrenceFreedman,TheTransformation ofStrategicAffairs.AdelphiPaper379(Abingdon:Routledge,2006).

16Schmid (seenote6above),p.227;Europol,TESAT2010:EUTerrorismSituationandTrendReport (TheHague:Europol,2010),pp.7,20,2226,98;

National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTb), Actueel Dreigingsniveau (NCTb, 2011).

http://www.nctb.nl/onderwerpen/Actueel_dreigingsniveau/index.aspx. Retrieved 27 January 2011;House of Commons, Prevent Strategy (London: The

StationaryOffice,2011).

17Committee on the Evaluation of Counterterrorism Policy (Suyver Committee) Report IBIS13171 of May 2009 on An Integrated Evaluation of

CounterterrorismPolicies[NaareenIntegraleEvaluatievanAntiterrorismeMaatregelen],pp.4142;CouncilofEuropeCommitteeofExpertsonTerrorism

ProfilesonCounterTerroristCapacityofApril2007ontheUnitedKingdom,p.3.

18CounciloftheEuropeanUnionNote15893/1/10of17January2011ontheEUActionPlanOnCombatingTerrorism;CounciloftheEuropeanUnionNote

15443/07of23November2007ontheEuropeanUnionStrategyforCombatingRadicalisationandRecruitmenttoTerrorism,p.3.

19Ibid.

2007,

p.

5;

Ibid.

2011,

pp.

67.

20 National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTb), Nationale Contraterrorismestrategie 20112015 (NCTb, 2011).

http://www.nctb.nl/Actueel/persberichten/2011/persbericht 110414.aspx. Retrieved 19 April 2011), pp.3031, 7678; House of Representatives of the

StatesGeneral,Terrorismebestrijding:BriefvandeMinistersvanJustitieenvanBinnenlandseZakenenKoninkrijksrelaties,[Counterterrorism:Letterfrom

theMinistersofJusticeandoftheInteriorandKingdromRelations]ParliamentaryPapers20032004,29745,no.1,10September2004,p.18.


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relatedviolence.Specificattention ispaid tosuch topicsas increasingcooperationunderexisting international

treaties,bringing terrorists tojustice, strengthening internationaljudicialcooperation,extraditionprogrammes

and the intensification of information sharing on terrorismrelated subjects between states.21

The Dutch

government recognises that failedand failingstatesareenablersof international terrorism,and thatcountries

withoutthecapacitytodetectterroristorganizationsoperatingwithintheirbordersarealsogroundsforconcern.

Whileit

acknowledges

that

the

effects

of

policies

geared

towards

preventing

or

containing

failed

states

will

only

become apparent in the longrun, the Dutch government believes that helping the latter category of states

improvetheircounterterrorismcapabilitiescanyieldshorttermbenefits.

TheUKscounterterrorismstrategy,Contest,alsoemphasisestheinternationalnatureofcontemporary

terrorismandcitestheimportanceofaddressingtherootcausesthatcanleadtoviolentextremism.22

Overseas

capacitybuilding,internationaloutreachtoMuslimcommunities,povertyalleviation,developmentaidandpeace

operations aredesignated as importantelementsof theUKs counterterrorism strategy,even if theyarenot

directlypartofContestbuttheworkof,forexample,theForeignandCommonwealthOffice.23

Althoughthereis

alackofevidenceforacausalrelationshipbetweenpovertyandterrorism,theBritishgovernmentistobelauded

foritsattentiontoterrorismsenablingfactors.24

Thesearelongtermgoalsandprogresstowardsthemishardto

measure.25Furthermore,

with

no

clear

end

in

sight

for

the

conflicts

in

Afghanistan,

Iraq

and

Israel

subjects

the

Britishrecogniseaskeygrievances fuellingterrorismtheseeffortstoreduceextremismandpoliticalviolence

abroadmaybeoflimitedutility.26

In amore general sense, addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism abroadwill

require at least somedegree of engagementwith organisationsmany voters and politicians considermorally

reprehensible.Theremustbesufficientwillingnesstotalktoterroristsamongpoliticiansandsufficientdomestic

supportforsuchcontroversialcoursesofaction.Withmanysuchorganisationsblacklistedeveniftheyrepresent

considerable constituencies (as isevident in the caseofHamas),andwith the struggleagainst terrorismuntil

recently considered a warby theworlds foremost power, it is hard to conceiveof a sizeable and effective

internationalstrategytopreventterrorismtakingshapeanytimesoon.27

Addressing the factorsconducive toacomplexphenomenonsuchas (international) terrorism isavery

difficultundertaking.Addtothisthestrongincentiveforgovernmentstobeseentodealwithterrorismandthe

moralandpoliticaldifficultiesofnegotiatingwith terroristsandapossibleexplanationarises for theemphasis

thattheEU,theNetherlandsandtheUKplaceonamorenarrowandimmediateinterpretationofprevention.28

Aninterpretationthatfocusesontheearlyidentificationofindividualswhomayberadicalisingandtheuseofa

rangeofpolicing,judicialandadministrative instrumentsto intercedeprior toaterrorattack,sometimeseven

beforethere isanyevidenceofplanningormaterialsupportforactsofterror.An interpretationofprevention,

finally,thatisprimarilyconcernedwiththreatsastheyoccurwithinacountrysborders.

Thereareofcoursealsoverygoodreasonsforfocusingonthedomesticterroristthreatthathavelittleto

dowith

public

pressure

and

limited

abilities

to

alter

the

internal

affairs

of

far

away

states.

As

the

2004

bombing

of

theMadridrailwaystationandthe2005attacksonLondonspublictransportmadeapparent,Europeanstates

may bemost immediately at risk from homegrown terrorism, rather than the international networks and

organisationsdirectlyassociatedwithalQaedaanditscohorts.Indeed,asCoolsaetargues,theseattacksfirmly

21UnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyResolutionA/RES/60/288of20September2006ontheUnitedNationsGlobalCounterterrorismStrategy,p.5.

22BritishGovernment(seenote16above),pp.46,50,54,56,80

23Ibid.,pp.68,85,92,9699.

24See,forexample:JamesA.Piazza,RootedinPoverty?:Terrorism,PoorEconomicDevelopment,andSocialCleavages,TerrorismandPoliticalViolence,

vol.18,no.1,2006,pp.159177;Schmid(seenote6above),p.227.

25BritishGovernment(seenote16above),pp.59,96,

26Ibid.,pp.4344.

27Isabelle

Duyvesteyn

and

Bart

Schuurman,

'Dialoog

en

Onderhandeling

met

Terroristische

Organisaties:

Voorbeelden

en

Lessen

uit

de

Westerse

en

Niet

WesterseWereld(19452009)'[DialogueandNegotiationwithTerroristOrganizations:ExamplesandLessonsfromtheWesternandNonWesternWorld],

(ResearchandDocumentationCentre(WODC),June2010)pp.1101.

28DuyvesteynandSchuurman(seenote27above),pp.2835;BeatricedeGraaf,WaarzijnwijBangvoor?VeiligheidsdenkenendeAngstvoordeAnder

[WhatareWeAfraidOf?SecurityandtheFearoftheOther](Rotterdam:Guys&Godoy,2011),pp.2025.


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anchored radicalisation, intertwinedwith the socalled homegrown dimension, at the heart of EU counter

terrorismendeavours.29

Theprecedinghastouchedupontheconceptofpreventivecounterterrorisminageneralsenseandhas

attemptedto indicatethat it isadifficultconceptforstatestoput intopracticebeyondtheirownborders.This

paper now turns to the way in which the EU, the Netherlands and the UK have attempted to implement

preventivepolicies

at

home.

PreventivecounterterrorismintheEuropeanUnion

The EUs response to terrorism has been partly eventdriven.30

Following the attacks of 9/11, international

terrorism immediatelybecameakeyconcern for theUnionand led to the formulationofa counterterrorism

actionplan.Thisplanhas sinceundergone severalmodificationsandcurrently listsdetailsofhow thevarious

strands (prevent, protect, pursue and respond) of the EUs Counterterrorism Strategy are to be put into

practice.31

Anotherkeymeasure thatwas taken following theSeptember11attackswas the2002Framework

decisiononcombatingterrorism,whichwillbeoutlinedinmoredetailbelow.32

TheMarch2004terroristattacksinMadridsimilarlyledtoaflurryofcounterterrorismmeasuresinthe

Union.The

EUs

counter

terrorism

action

plan

was

modified

to

incorporate

joint

investigation

teams

(JITs)

that

would enable member states to more effectively tackle this transnational phenomenon, to allow greater

cooperationandeffectiveness regarding theexchangeof terrorismrelated information, tocreateaspecialised

counterterrorism unit within Europol and to strengthen EUUS cooperation on counterterrorismrelated

matters.33

The 7/7/2005 terrorist attacks in London initiated anotherwave of counterterrorism legislation and

policies.TheMadridandLondonattackshadmadeitcleartopolicymakersthattheterroristthreathadtakenon

anewdimension;thatofhomegrownterroristgroupswithlittleornodirectlinkstoalQaedaand itsaffiliates.

Thisrealisationtriggeredan increased interest inthepathwaysthat ledtoradicalisation;whywouldEUcitizens

wish

to

take

up

arms

against

their

own

states

and

what

measures

could

be

taken

to

prevent

this

from

occurring

in

the future? Besides various counterterrorismmeasures aimed at restricting terrorists ability to operate, for

examplethroughtheimplementationofEuropeanArrestWarrants,the2005bombingsalsoledtotheadoption

oftheEUscurrentCounterterrorismStrategyanditsfourseparatestrands.34

AccordingtoCoolsaet,theEUsdomesticapproachtofightingterrorismhasalwaysfocusedondevising

measuresand institutionstocomplementmemberstatesowncounterterrorism initiativesandabilitieswitha

strongfocusoncriminalisingterrorism.35

Suchisindeedtheapproachtakenbythe2005strategy.Withregardto

thepreventstrand,thedocumentstatesthattheEUcanprovideanimportantframeworktohelpcoordinate

national policies, share information and determine good practice.36

Key elements of the prevent strand are

combating radicalisation and recruitment into terrorism, empowering mainstream opinion and promoting

security,justice

and

democracy.37

YetdespitethepreventstrandhavingbeenlabelledastheEUsforemostcounterterrorismpillar,many

ofthemostimportantcountermeasuresadoptedinthedecadesince9/11donotseemtofitthiscategory.38

At

least,not ifprevention isseenasaddressing the factorsconducive to thespreadof terrorism. Instead, theEU

29Coolsaet(seenote9above),p.869.

30EuropeanParliamentCommitteeonCivilLiberties,JusticeandHomeAffairs(seenote2above),p.3;Coolsaet(seenote9above),p.858.

31CounciloftheEuropeanUnion(seenote18above),pp.38.;CounciloftheEuropeanUnionNote5771/1/06of13February2006ontheEUActionPlan

onCombatingTerrorism.

32CounciloftheEuropeanUnionFrameworkDecision2002/475/JHAof13 June2002onCombatingTerrorism;DavidCasale, EU InstitutionalandLegal

CounterTerrorismFramework,DefenceAgainstTerrorismReview,vol.1,no.1,2008,p.52.

33Casale(seenote32above),p.52.

34Ibid.,

pp.

52

53;

Coolsaet

(see

note

9above),

pp.

867

869.

35Coolsaet(seenote9above),pp.871872.

36CounciloftheEuropeanUnionNote14469/4/05of30November2005ontheEuropeanUnionCounterterrorismStrategy,p.8.

37Ibid.,pp.79;CounciloftheEuropeanUnion(seenote18above),pp.38.

38Coolsaet(seenote9above),p.866.


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EuropeanCommissioncontinuestoproposethemajorityoflegislation,theEuropeanParliament,MemberStates

andotherbodiescannowinitiatelegislativeprocedurestoo.47

AlthoughnotyetcompletelypartoftheEUslegalframework,the2005PrmConventionhasalsoplayed

animportantroleinincreasingEUmemberstatescooperationwithregardtotransnationalcrime,terrorismand

illegal immigration.OriginallydrawnupandsignedbyBelgium,Germany,France,Luxemburg,TheNetherlands,

Austriaand

Spain,

this

conventions

success

has

attracted

the

attention

of

other

European

states

as

well

as

the

EU

itself,which in2007proposedtopartly incorporatethetreaty.Theconventioncalls forclosercooperationand

increased interoperability on such topics asDNA information and fingerprints, vehicle registration and police

work.48

ThereareaplethoraofEUinstitutionswhichconcernthemselvesinonewayoranotherwiththeUnions

internalandexternalsecurityandtherebyhavearoletoplayinimplementingitscounterterrorismstrategy.The

increasedauthorityandexpandedopportunitiesforcooperation thattheLisbontreatyoffersthese institutions

has inmany instances given an impetus toplans forbuilding, expanding,or increasing interagency access to

databases that containextensivebiographicalandbiometric informationonEU citizens and foreignnationals.

Databases that are used, inter alia, for security and immigration policy. Such databases are used to identify

individualswho

may

pose

asecurity

risk,

enabling

the

relevant

authorities

to

launch

an

investigation

to

assess

the

actual levelof risk. In theory,suchprofiling techniquesenableaproactiveandpreventive response toserious

crime and terrorism; removing likely offenders from the general public before they are able to carry out or

completetheircriminaldesigns.49

Europol is a prime example of such an institution, a core EU agency tasked with improving the

cooperationofandcoordinationbetweenmemberstateslawenforcementagenciesinordertomoreeffectively

tackle transnational crime and terrorism. The Europol Information System contains extensive personal

informationonindividualswhocouldhavetheintentiontocommitacriminaloffence.Suchabroadcriterionfor

inclusion in thisdatabasepotentiallyallows forbiographicandbiometric informationonvirtuallyanyone tobe

recorded, which raises a number of concerns related to the presumption of innocence, privacy and data

protection.Furthermore,Europolhastheambitionto integratethissystemwithsimilardatabasesoperatedby

otherEUinstitutionsandmemberstates,creatingavastpoolofinformationthatisaccessiblebyaveritablehost

ofinstitutions,countriesandagencies.Infact,Europolalsowishestomakepossiblethefreeexchangeofpersonal

dataandbiometricinformationwithpartneragenciesintheUnitedStatesofAmerica,makingdataonEUcitizens

accessibletransatlantically.50

Another EU agency that focuses on pooling large amounts of information on potentially unwanted

individuals is Frontex, the EUs External BorderAgency,which is taskedwith protecting theUnions borders,

primarily from illegal immigrants. It strives to establish an integrated border security system that utilises

biometricinformationaswellasdatagarneredfromsatellites,unmanneddroneaircraftandhightechdetection

andborder

surveillance

technology.

51

Neither

Frontex

nor

Europol

is

exclusively

tasked

with

counter

terrorism,

yetbothinstitutionshavearoletoplayinimplementingEUpolicyinthisareaandthedatathattheygathercan

bedirectlyusedforthepurposesofpreventingterrorismbyidentifyingpossibleperpetrators.52

Numerous largescaledatabasescontainingpersonaldataandbiometric informationonEUcitizensand

foreignnationalsalreadyexist,andarebeingdeveloped,withintheEU.AmongthemtheVisaInformationSystem

(VIS),whichwasexpanded to includebiometric information following the9/11attacksspecifically, thoughnot

exclusively,tocontributeto internalsecurityand fightingterrorism.53

TheSchengen InformationSystem (SIS I

47Articles76TreatyofLisbon;Peers(seenote45above),p.3.

48VerdragvanPrm[TreatyofPrm],Stb.2008,25,enteredintoforce17January2008.

49Jespers(seenote12above),pp.259275;OpenSocietyInstitute(seenote40above),p.68.

50Valentina

Pop,

MEPs

Decry

Breach

of

Trust

in

EU

US

Data

Deal,

EUObserver.com

(16

March

2011);

Franoise

Gehring,

Europol

Accord

Sparks

Data

ProtectionFears,Swissinfo(20September2004);Jespers(seenote12above),pp.261265.

51Jespers(seenote12above),pp.272273.

52Casale(seenote32above),pp.5354.

53Ibid.,p.66.


11/35


andSISII):averylargedatabasethatcontainsimmenselistsofwantedandunwantedpersonsandobjects54

and

information,whichisdistributedamongthememberstatesforbordersecurityandlawenforcementpurposes.55

Furthermore,theEuropeanCommissionput forwardanew legislativeproposaltousePassengerNameRecord

(PNR)datatoamongotherpreventterroristoffences.

In2007,theCounciloftheEUlaunchedaninitiativetocreatetheEuropeanCriminalRecordsInformation

System(ECRIS),

aproject

that,

when

completed,

will

ease

the

sharing

of

information

on

convicted

criminals

betweenmemberstates.56

ThereisalsoEurodac,afingerprintsystemcreatedtocoordinateasylumapplications

acrossEUmemberstates.57

Lastly,toconcludethis(notexhaustive)overview,itisworthwhiletopointoutthat

EUalsoallowsinformationonEuropeancitizenswhotraveltotheUStobetransferredtoAmericanauthoritiesas

partofthePassengerNameRecordDataTransferAgreementandtheElectronicSystemforTravelAuthorization

(ESTA).Currently,theEuropeanCommissionhasproposedanewdraftforEUPassengerNameRecordlegislation,

which intends to fight terrorismandseriouscrimebysharingpersonal fight informationcollectedairlineswith

othernations.58

Whatalloftheaforementionedinstitutions,databasesandagreementshaveincommonisthedesireto

collect,storeandshareincreasingamountsofpersonaldataandbiometricinformationonEUcitizensandforeign

visitors.One

of

the

main

goals

of

such

systems

and

institutions

is

to

increase

the

Unions

ability

to

fight

crime

and

terrorismand topreemptively investigateorarrest individualswhomightposea security threat.Even if it is

implicit,preventionisattheheartoftheseendeavours.Butwithfew,ifany,oversightmechanismsinplaceand

plentifulproblemswith dataprotection andprivacy issues, thesedatabases constitute a key concern for civil

liberties and human rights advocates and have even attracted the concern of the EUs own Agency for

FundamentalRights(FRA).59

TheFRAistaskedwithmonitoring,investigatingandreportingonthedevelopmentoffundamentalrights

intheEU.Itisoneoftheagenciesparticularlyconcernedwiththeuseofpersonaldataandbiometricdataforthe

largescaleprofilingofpotentialterroristsuspects,apracticewhichhasbecomeoneofthemainthrustsofpost

9/11terrorismpreventionbutonethathasaverypoortrackrecord,withfewrealthreatsbeingidentifiedand

manyinnocentciviliansbeingsubjectedtodiscriminationandstigmatisationonthebasisofsuchbroadindicators

asplaceofbirthandreligiousconvictions.60

Thedesire to streamlinemember statesandEUagenciesability toaccesseachothersdatabases, to

createnewdata storage facilities andprogrammes and to further the cooperation and coordinationbetween

memberstatesjudicialsystems,policeforcesandintelligenceagenciesisofcentralimportancetotheEUs2010

2014sStockholmProgramme.ThisfiveyearstrategicapproachwasapprovedbytheCouncilinDecember2009

andaimstodevelopwhattheEUcallsitsareaoffreedom,securityandjustice.61

TogetherwiththeEurope2020

Strategy,a tenyearplan forrevivingtheEuropeaneconomy, Stockholm isamajorelementof theEUs long

termplanning.62

Althoughit

claims

to

put

citizens

interests

first,

the

Stockholm

Programme

has

attracted

criticism,

among

others from the FRA andAmnesty International,on accountof itsweak stanceonnondiscrimination and its

54HouseofLordsEuropeanUnionCommitteeReport#92006/2007of2March2007ontheSchengenInformationSystemII(SISII),p.8.

55OpenSocietyInstitute(seenote39above),p.165.

56AssociationEuropennepourlaDfensedesDroitsdelHomme,TheEuropeanCriminalRecordsInformationSystem(ECRIS)CreatesNewRisksforthe

ProtectionofPersonaldata (Brussels:AEDH,October2008),pp.12;MarthaL.Arias, InternetLawTheEuropeanUnionWillHaveaCriminalRecord

InformationSystem(InternetBusinessLawServices,29March2010).

57OpenSocietyInstitute(seenote39above),p.166.

58ProposalforaDirectiveoftheEuropeanParliamentandtheCouncil2011/32(COM)of2February2011ontheuseofPassengerNameRecord(PNR)data

fortheprevention,detection,investigationandprosecutionofterroristoffencesandseriouscrime;TeriSchultz,ATransatlanticTourismTax?,GlobalPost

(27September2010).

59Ibid.; Open Society Institute (see note 39 above), pp. 5869; European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Towards More Effective Policing,

Understandingand

Preventing

Discriminatory

Ethnic

Profiling:

aGuide

(Luxembourg:

Publications

Office

of

the

European

Union,

2010),

pp.

910.

60Ibid.,EuropeanAgencyforFundamentalRights;OpenSocietyInstitute(seenote39above),pp.5871;PeterGill,SecurityIntelligenceandHumanRights:

IlluminatingtheHeartofDarkness?,IntelligenceandNationalSecurity,vol.24,no.1,2009,p.91.

61EuropeanCouncil,(seenote3above).

62EuropeanCommissionCommunicationCOM(2010)171of22April2010onDeliveringanAreaofFreedom,SecurityandJusticeforEuropesCitizens.


12/35


doubtfulprotectionof the rights toprivacy anddataprotection.63

Within the realmof counterterrorism, the

Programme has expanded the definition of terrorism to encompass radicalisation and extremism, thereby

significantlyenlargingthepoolofpotentialsuspectsandraisingthespectreofcitizenswhopracticetheirrightto

protestbecomingthevictimsofrestrictiveandrepressivecounterterrorismpolicies.64

Some, likeInvestigative

Journalist Tony Bunyan,warn that there is an emerging picture across the EU that demonstrations and the

democraticright

to

protest

are

among

the

next

to

be

targeted

to

enforce

internal

security.

65

Lastly,theEUhasintroducedanumberofadministrativeandorganisationalinitiatives.Perhapsthemost

notableofsuchundertakingshasbeen thecreationof theofficeofCounterterrorismCoordinator.Thisoffice,

whichhas received criticism forbeingapaper tiger, is responsible for improvingEU cooperationonCounter

terrorismandcoordinatingthevariousprogrammesandeffortsthatarealreadyinplace.66

Furthermore,efforts

arecurrentlyunderwaytosimplifythemanagementoftheEUsextensivedatabasesbyestablishinganAgencyfor

theoperationalmanagementof largescale ITsystemswithinthenextfewyears.Equallydeservingofattention

aretheplanstocreateaJointSituationCenter(SitCen),ineffectanefforttocoordinatememberstatesciviland

military intelligenceagencies.SitCenwould functionastheEUsown intelligenceagencyandcooperateclosely

withEuropolandEurojust.Aswithmanyof the institutionsand information systems thatconcern themselves

withthe

EUs

internal

and

external

security,

critics

worry

that

democratic

control

of

this

new

institution

is

lacking.67

Finally, the EU has also commissioned a considerable amount of research on fighting terrorism and

countering radicalisation and has convened expert meetings between academics and counterterrorism

practitioners todevelopbestpractices. In the2011EUActionPlanon countering terrorism, reference among

others ismade toMemberState cooperation in relation tomonitoringwebsites,communitypolicingprojects,

developing longtermdisengagement andderadicalisation tools targeted at youngsters and cooperationwith

thirdcountries.68

Preventive

counter

terrorism

in

the

Netherlands

Onanationallevel,theDutchgovernmentemployswhatitreferstoasabroadapproach,aimedataddressing

both the effects of terrorist violence and preventing such incidents fromoccurring by early intervention and

counteringviolentradicalisation.69

TheGeneralIntelligenceandSecurityService(AIVD)playsacentralroleinthe

preventive part of this counterterrorism strategy, using its considerable resources to map trends in

radicalisationandtopinpointindividualsandorganisationswhocouldposeathreattoDutchsociety.TheOffice

ofTheNetherlandsNationalCoordinator forCounterterrorism (NCTb) isprimarilyconcernedwithstreamlining

Dutchcounterterrorismpoliciesandefforts,butalsoconductsthreatlevelassessmentsofitsown.70

TheDutchgovernmentspreemptive approach to counterterrorismhasalso led to several important

legalandpolicyreforms.SomeofthesereformswereundertakeninordertoimplementEUFrameworkdecisions

whileothers

were

the

products

of

domestic

politics.

Such

legislation

has

consistently

viewed

terrorism

as

a

criminalact,consequentlystrengtheningtheabilityoflawenforcementandpublicprosecutorstodealwithit.Of

63European Agency for Fundamental Rights, The Stockholm Programme: a Chance to Put Fundamental Rights Protection Right in the Centre of the

EuropeanAgenda,(Vienna:EUAgencyforFundamentalRights,July2009)pp.114;Amnesty International,AmnestyInternationalBriefingontheFuture

StockholmProgramme,(Brussels:AmnestyInternationalEUOffice,July2009)pp.115.

64Jespers(seenote12above),pp.305326.

65TonyBunyan, Protests intheEU:Troublemakersandtravellingviolentoffenderstoberecordedondatabaseandtargeted,(Londen:Statewatch,

April2010),p.8.

66 Council of the European Union, EU Counterterrorism CoOrdinator (Council of the European Union).

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1344&lang=EN.Retrieved4March2011;OldrichBures,EUCounterTerrorismPolicy:Apaper tiger?,

(Prague:MetropolitanUniversity,2011)pp.137148/245251.

67Jespers(seenote12above),pp.275276;Casale(seenote32above),p.54.

68Coolsaet

(see

note

9above),

p.

870;

European

Commission

Communication

(see

note

44

above),

p.5;

Council

of

the

European

Union

(see

note

18

above),

pp.38.

69NationalCoordinatorforCounterterrorism(NCTb),Terrorisme(NCTb,2011).http://www.nctb.nl/

onderwerpen/wat_is_terrorisme/wat_is_terrorisme.aspx.Retrieved3March2011;NCTb(seenote20above),pp.6279.

70Ibid.


13/35


14/35


Furthermore, the draft Bill on Administrative Measures for National Security enabled a variety of

preventivesecuritymeasures in relation tonaturalpersons.83

Thiscould implya restrictionon the freedomof

movementorassociationandwouldcodifysocalleddisturbanceorinterferenceorders,whichwouldjustifylaw

enforcementofficials(atthebehestofthemayor)todisturbsuspectsonanalmostdailybasis.Eventhoughthe

BillwasrecentlywithdrawnwhilependingbeforetheSenate,84

itcodifiedpractisesthataretoacertainextent

werealready

in

use

and

have

to

some

extent

been

dealt

with

by

new

administrative

and

criminal

legislation.

85

Amongotherthesenewpreventivepowersenabletheauthoritiestotaketemporarymeasuresexclusionorders

(forbidding persons from entering a particular area), restraining orders (forbidding them from going near a

particularperson),arequirementtoreporttothepoliceatsettimes.Underthesenewprovisions,whenseveral

conditionsare fulfilled (necessityand apersonsbehaviour), individualsmaybe subjected to thesepreventive

measuresbyorderofthemayor,thepublicprosecutororajudgeforalimitedperiodoftime.86

According to theNationalCounterterrorismStrategy20112015,personaldisturbanceaswellasearly

intervention will continue to play a key role in future policies to prevent terrorism.87

Early intervention is

executed among others through initiatives designed to counter radicalisation. Using both hard and soft

measures, this broad approach aims to recognise such radicalisation processes at an early stage in their

developmentand

abort

them

using

specific

intervention

strategies.88

They

appear

to

include

administrative,

financial, communicative and immigrationlaw related measures.89

One of the most concrete counter

radicalisationmeasures is the personoriented intervention or disturbance,whereby individuals suspected of

radicalisation are among othermade to understand that law enforcement personnel is following their every

move.90

Takingabroader lookatthissubjectbrings intoviewawidervarietyofprogrammesthatappeartobe

predominantly concerned with improving the social integration of minorities. Examples include efforts to

counteractdiscriminationinthelabourmarket,increasingthechancesyoungpeoplehaveoffindingemployment

bywayofapprenticeshipprogrammesandimprovinginterculturalunderstanding,forexampleviasportsevents.

In addition, Dutch counterradicalisation initiatives focus on developing strong communities and improving

youngstersunderstandingof Islam.91

While thisstudy isnot theplace toprovidea fulloverview, itshouldbe

notedthatthereexistprogrammesaimedatderadicalisingrightwingextremistsaswellas (potential) Islamist

fanatics.92

Somewhatremarkable,however,a2009evaluationofDutchcounterterrorismmeasuresimpliesthat

numerousgovernmentofficialsfeelthatcounterradicalisationinstrumentsareunderutilised,withmostcounter

terrorismmeasuresfocusingonsituationsinwhichradicalisationhadalreadyoccurred.93

PreventivecounterterrorismintheUnitedKingdom

Inordertoprevent terrorismtheBritishgovernmenthas reliedontheextensionofpowersof intelligenceand

securityservicesaswellasspecificpolicies. Itscounterterrorismstrategy iscalledContestandconsistsof four

83Wetsvoorstel Bestuurlijke Maatregelen, Kamerstukken II 2005/06, 30566, nrs. 15, Kamerstukken II 2006/07, 30566, nrs. 613 and Kamerstukken I

2006/07,30566,nrs.AB(parliamentarydocuments),passedHouseofRepresentativesinMarch2007,withdrawninJune2011whilependingbeforeSenate.

84DutchGovernment(seenote79above),p.115.

85Forexamplearticles38v38ijCriminalCode;articles366a,509hhand558CriminalProceduralCode;Articles172a/bMunicipalAct

86Ibid.;TheActMeasurestoCombatFootballHooliganismandSeriousPublicNuisance(seeHouseofRepresentativesoftheStatesGeneral,Amendment

oftheMunicipalitiesAct,theCodeofCriminalProcedureandtheCriminalCoderegulatingthepowerofthemayorandthepowerofthepublicprosecutor

to takemeasures to combat footballhooliganism, severepublicnuisanceor seriousdamagingbehaviour in relation topersonsorgoods (measures to

combatfootballhooliganismandseriouspublicnuisance),ParliamentaryPapers2010,31467,no.20,31August2010.

87NCTb(seenote20above),pp.6276.

88SuyverCommittee(seenote17above),p.15;NCTb(seenote20above),pp.6974.

89NationalCoordinatorforCounterterrorism(NCTb),Radicalisering.http://www.nctb.nl/onderwerpen/

terrorismebestrijding/radicalisering.Retrieved17March2011.

90NCTb (seenote20above),pp.6276;NationalCoordinator forCounterterrorism (NCTb) letter to theHouseofRepresentativesof theStatesGeneral

5486478/07/NCTbof

22

August

2007

on

Person

Oriented

Intervention.

91CouncilofEuropeCommitteeofExpertsonTerrorismProfilesonCounterTerroristCapacityofNovember2008ontheNetherlands,p.3.

92FroukjeDemantetal.,TeruggangenUittreding:ProcessenvanDeradicaliseringOntleed[ProcessesofDeradicalisationDissected] (IMES2008),pp.160,

168169.

93SuyverCommittee(seenote17above),p.80.


15/35


strands;pursue,prevent,protectandprepare.Contestwas launched in2003andhasundergonea renewal in

2009.ResponsibilityforputtingthevariousprogrammesthatmakeupContestintopracticerestswiththeOffice

forSecurityandCounterterrorism (OSCT),whichwas founded in2007.94

According to theBritishgovernment

that refocused theprevent strategy in2011,efforts are intended to respond to the ideological challengesof

terrorism, identifyand supportvulnerable individualsandcooperatewith institutionsandorganisationswhere

thereare

risks

of

radicalisation.

95

In

the

independent

oversight

of

the

prevent

review

and

strategy,

it

is

stressed

that the policy should be free of discrimination and that support for extremism is often associated with a

perception of discrimination.96

In the equality impact assessment of the prevent strategy stakeholders

emphasized that theprevious strategy hadhad a disproportionate impact on belief, religion and race. There

mightbeaperceptionamongyoungmanthatthispracticecontinues.97

OverthecourseofthefollowingparagraphsanattemptwillbemadetoclarifyhowtheUKhastriedto

accomplishtheseaims.Toillustrate,accordingtotheWestMidlandsPolice,preventisakeyelementofContest

andone that focusesonbuilding relationshipswith localcommunitieswithaneye topreventing radicalisation

and addressing the conditions conducive to the spreadof terrorism.More specifically, thisentails challenging

violent or extremist rhetoric and supportingmainstream opinion, disrupting those who spreadmessages of

violence,supporting

individuals

vulnerable

to

terrorist

recruitment,

increasing

the

resilience

of

communities

to

extremistpropagandaandaddressingthegrievanceswhichmaymakeindividualsandcommunitiesvulnerableto

suchexploitation.98

Onpaperatleast,thefocusonaddressingtherootcausesofradicalisationandthedesireto

intervene before individuals turn from extremism to violence is very reminiscent of theDutch and European

counterterrorismprogrammes.

Prechargedetentionof terrorist suspects isone suchmeasure thathas extended thepowersof the

executivetothwartpotentialterroristplots.AsdeterminedbytheTerrorismAct2006suspectscouldbedetained

for up to 28days beforehaving tobe chargedwith aparticularoffence. In a January 2011 review ofBritish

counterterrorism policies, a reportwritten by Lord KenMacdonald, the ability to hold suspects for such an

extended period of time was criticised and a recommendationwas issued to reduce themaximum time of

detentionto14days.99

Asofthe25th

ofJanuary2011,prechargedetentionintheUKwasindeedreducedtoa

maximumof14dayswhentheorderwhichalloweda28daylimitwasnotrenewed.100

Otherpreventivecounterterrorismmeasuresthatfocusonremovingpossiblesuspects,andinthiscase

also suspicious objects, from public life are stop and searcheswithout reasonable suspicion and the use of

surveillance cameras.Stopandsearchesby lawenforcementofficialson the street,atairportsorportsallows

individualsand theirproperty, suchas cars, tobe subjected toa searchwithouta specific indication that the

individualinquestionhascommittedanoffence.TheMacdonaldReviewhassupportedthe2010EuropeanCourt

ofHumanRightsrulingthatthismeasureisunlawfulinitscurrentformandrecommendsthatlimitationsintime

andplacebeattachedtothepractice.101

Bothdetentionswithouttrialandstopandsearchpowersaregranted

bythe

Terrorism

Act

2000.

In

2010,

stop

and

search

powers

were

restricted:

except

for

airports

and

ports

British

lawenforcementofficialsarenowrequirereasonablesuspicionthatapersonisaterroristbeforebeingallowed

toexercise it.Asa2011 investigationhas indicatedthatpeoplefromethnicminoritiesarefarmore likelytobe

94HouseofCommons,ProjectCONTEST:theGovernmentsCounterterrorismStrategy,(BritishGovernment,2009).

95HouseofCommons,PreventStrategy,(London:BritishGovernment,2011).

96AlexCarlile,ReporttotheHomeSecretaryofIndependentOversightofPreventReviewandStrategy(London:BritishGovernment,2011),p.4.

97HouseofCommons,PreventStrategy:EqualityImpactAssessment(BritishGovernment,2011),pp.56.

98WestMidlandsPolice,WhatWeDo(WestMidlandsPolice,2011).http://www.westmidlands.police.uk/

crimereduction/tacklingterrorism/index.asp.Retrieved18March2011.

99Ken

Macdonald,

Review

of

Counterterrorism

and

Security

Powers

(London:

The

Stationary

Office,

2011),

p.

4.

100 Liberty, Extended PreCharge Detention (Liberty, 2011). http://www.libertyhumanrights.org.uk/humanrights/terrorism/extendedprecharge

detention/index.php.Retrieved14April2011.

101Macdonald(seenote99above),pp.45;EuropeanCourtofHumanRights,GillianandQuintonvtheUnitedKingdom,Applicationno4158/05,Judgment

of12January2010,sections57,63,8086;TerrorismAct2000,PartVandSchedule7;RulesonStopandSearchChanged,BBCNews(8July2010).


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targetedatairportsandports,therearestillsignificanthumanrightsconcerns.102

Surveillancecamerasareused

todealwithreducingcrime,antisocialbehaviourandcounteringterrorism.However,inadditiontoinvadingon

peoplesprivacysurveillancecamerasmayalsocontributetothestigmatisationofminoritiesandparticularareas.

Forinstance,impactresearchinBirminghamshowsthatsurveillancecameras,whichhadbeendeployedinareas

withsignificantMuslimspopulations,strainedtherelationsbetweenthepoliceandlocalcommunities.103

Afurther

powerful

piece

of

legislation

is

the

2000

Regulation

of

Investigatory

Powers

Act

(RIPA),

which

specifieswhenandhowlocalauthoritiesmayusecovertsurveillancetechniquessuchaswiretapping,informants

orundercoverofficers,andthemonitoringofdigitalcommunicationssuchasemail.104

Therehasbeena lotof

concern in theUK that localauthoritieshaveabused thesepowers to investigatecitizens forminor infractions

insteadofusingthemtofightandpreventseriouscrimeincludingterrorism,andthatuseoftheActhasnotbeen

subjectedtotheappropriatejudicialreview.105

UndertheTerrorismAct2000,theUKgovernmentcanalsoproscribeorganisationsthatopenlyespouse

racialor religioushatredor incite their followers toviolence, if theseorganisationscanbeascribeda terrorist

motive.TheMacdonaldReportarguesthatsuchapracticeisilliberalanddisproportionateandproposesamore

measured response that targets the specific individuals guilty of incitement rather than entire groups or

organisations.106The

Act

also

prohibits

the

gathering

of

information

(often

taken

to

mean

photographs)

which

couldbeusedforterrorismrelatedpurposes. Incombinationwiththestopandsearchpowers,thisprohibition

hasresultedintheuseofcounterterrorismlegislationagainstcitizenstakingharmlessphotographs.107

Anotherpreventivecounterterrorismmeasureemployedby theBritishhas focusedonpreventing the

financingofterrorism.UndertheTerrorismAct2000severaldistinctoffenceshavecomeintobeingthatprohibit

raising funds for terrorismrelated purposes, directly or indirectly using money or property for purposes of

terrorismaswellasanyactivitiesaimedatfacilitatingtheretentionorcontrolofterroristpropertyinanyway.108

InaccordancewithUNSecurityCouncilResolution1373of2001,theUKalsofreezestheassetsofindividualsand

organisationssuspectedofinvolvementin(international)terrorism.109

ThelistofpreventivecounterterrorismmeasuresinusebytheBritishgovernmentdoesnotstopthere.

However,similarto theDutch, theBritishhaveusedthedeportationof foreignnationalsandsocalledcontrol

orders for ostensibly preemptive purposes. The Macdonald Report makes clear that deportations are only

acceptablewhenthedeporteewillnotbesubjectedtotortureormistreatmentintheircountriesoforigin.110

The

abilitytousecontrolordersisgrantedbythe2005PreventionofTerrorismAct.111

ThismeasureallowstheBritish

government to place a variety of restraints upon individuals suspected of involvement in terrorismrelated

activitiesbutagainstwhomthereisinsufficientevidenceto initiatecriminalproceedings.112

Controlordershave

attracted considerable criticism on account of their alleged unlawfulness and because, by essentially placing

suspectsunderhousearrest,nofurtherevidencecanbegatheredtoconfirmordenytheirallegedinvolvementin

terrorism.113

Theintroduction

of

the

Terrorism

Act

2006,

which,

further

adds

as

an

offense

the

encouragement

of

terrorism,forexamplebyglorifyingeventssuchasthe9/11attacksorbydirectlyincitingotherstocarryoutacts

102AsianPeople42TimesMoreLikelytoBeHeldunderTerrorLaw,TheGuardian(23May2011).Formore informationseealsoTufyalChoudhuryand

HelenFenwick,The ImpactofCounterterrorismMeasuresonMuslimCommunities,EqualityandHumanRightsCommissionResearchReportSeriesnr.72

(Manchester:EqualityandHumanRightsCommission,2011),pp.1828.

103Ibid.2011,pp.3638.

104RegulationofInvestigatoryPowersAct2000,TheGuardian(19January2009).

105ExtentofCouncilSpyingRevealed,BBCNews(26March2009);Macdonald(seenote99above),pp.67;HiddenCamerasinPartsofBirminghamWill

BeRemoved,BBCNews(5July2010).

106Macdonald(seenote99above),pp.78.

107Ibid.,pp.56.

108CouncilofEuropeCommitteeofExpertsonTerrorismProfilesonCounterTerroristCapacityofApril2007ontheUnitedKingdom,p.2.

109Ibid.,p.3.

110Macdonald

(see

note

99

above),

pp.

8.

111CommitteeofExpertsonTerrorism(seenote108above),p.3.

112Liberty,ControlOrders(Liberty2011).http://www.libertyhumanrights.org.uk/humanrights/terrorism/controlorders/index.php.Retrieved24March

2011;DominicCasciani,Q&A:ControlOrders,BBCNews(3January2011).

113Macdonald(seenote99above),pp.915.


17/35


ofterrorism.The2006Actalsooutlawsthedistributionofterroristmaterialsuchaspamphlets,videosanddigital

material.Finally,itmakesitanoffensetotrainorotherwiseprepareforterrorismortoprovidesuchassistanceto

others.114

PreliminaryConclusion

Succinctlyput,

it

appears

that

the

desire

to

prevent

terrorism

and

serious

crime

is

leading

the

EU

and

states

such

as TheNetherlands and theUK to design and adopt counterterrorismmeasures,which affect human rights

compliance. For instance, the presumption of innocence is pressured by (preventive) stop and searches and

personaldisturbance and the rights toprivacy anddataprotection are infringedbymass covert surveillance.

Likewise,when authorities implement andexecutepreventive counterterrorismmeasures in adiscriminatory

fashion, theyalsoalienatethe targetedgroup,whichareoftenethnicorreligiousminorities,andtherebymay

reduceopportunities fordialogueandcooperation.Even thoughbothsupportersandhumanrightsadvocates

make strong claims, in most cases the effect of these particular counterterrorism measures in terms of

effectivenessinpreventingterroristcrimesand/orperceivedorrealdiscriminatoryoutcomesareundetermined.

Thereforethefollowingsectionofthisreportseekstocontributetoaclearerunderstandingoftheissuesatstake.

PreventiveCounterterrorismMeasuresandNondiscrimination

ManypoliticiansandcitizensintheEUfeelthatinexceptionalcircumstancescurtailingtherightsandlibertiesof

minoritiesassociatedwithterrorism isjustified.Mostpeople recognisethatabsolutehuman rightssuchasthe

right to life should be respected, but in order to fight terrorism adequately, particular rights including the

discriminationprohibitionaswellastherighttoequalitymayneedtobelimited.Forinstance,significanteffortis

beingput intofighting violent extremism inBritishMuslimcommunities,but less infarRightcommunities is

discriminatory.115This

point

of

view

has

been

described

as

the

balance

(and/or)

proportionality

response

thesis.116

Since 9/11, numerous governments as well as influential scholars such as Micheal Ignatieff have

supported it.117

Thebasicassumptionholds that inorder toprotect security,public interestmustbeweighed

against human rights. If this means that the rights and liberties of minorities are limited than this is an

unfortunate sideeffect of counterterrorismmeasures,which is tolerated by themajority population. Other

scholars,suchasforinstanceDanielMoeckli,arguethatthebalancingmetaphorismisleadingandthatforlegal,

practicalandpubliclegitimacyreasonstherighttonondiscriminationandequalityintheWaronTerrorshould

beupheld.118

Additionally,humanrightsadvocatessuchasTheEminentJuristsPanel,initsreportonTerrorism,

CounterterrorismandHumanRights,recommendthat (preventive)counterterrorismmeasuresshouldrespect

therightsofminoritycommunitiesandbefullynondiscriminatory.119

Increasingly,humanrightsandcivilrightsorganisationsandcommunitygroupswhostresstherelevance

ofassessingthediscriminatorysideeffectsofcounterterrorismeffortsarebeingheardby(inter)nationalbodies.

Forinstance,inhis2010EuropeanCounterterrorismStrategydiscussionpaper,theEuropeanCounterterrorism

Coordinator acknowledges the relevance of assessing the impact that counterterrorism measures have on

minoritygroups.120

Also,althoughthemajorityofofficialevaluationsonthe impactofcounterterrorismdonot

114CommitteeofExpertsonTerrorism(seenote108above),p.4.

115Arun,Kundani,Spooked:Hownot toprevent violentextremism (London: InstituteofRaceRelations2009),pp.2324.Even though thenewprevent

strategywasrecentlyrefocusedandrecognizedtheissue,itmayinpractiseremainproblematic(HouseofCommons(seenote95),pp.45/1317).

116AndrewAshworth, Security,Terrorismand theValueofHumanRights, inB.JGooldand L.Lazarus (eds).SecurityandHumanRights (Oxford:Hart

Publishing,2007),pp.207209,224.

117Michael

Ignatieff,

The

Lesser

Evil:

Political

Ethics

in

an

Age

of

Terror

(Princeton:

Princeton

University

Press,

2004),

p.46.

118DanielMoeckli,HumanRightsandNonDiscrimination intheWaronTerror,(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2007),pp.234237.

119InternationalCommissionofJurists,AssessingDamage,UrgingAction:ReportoftheEminentJuristsPanelonTerrorism,CounterterrorismandHuman

Rights(Geneva:InternationalCommissionofJurists,2009),pp.116,165.

120CounciloftheEuropeanUnionNote15894/1/10of29November2010onEUCounterTerrorismStrategyDiscussionPaper,pp.1011.


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explicitlydiscussthe(potential)discriminatoryeffect,afew,suchasthe2011BritishreviewonCounterterrorism

andSecurityPowers,addressit.121

Despitethesesignificantdevelopments,theeffectofmostcounterterrorism

effortson the rights and libertiesofminorities is uncertain. This can be primarily attributed to the fact that

discriminatorysideeffectsareusuallyrelatedtootherhumanrightsinfringement,includingfairtrial,therightto

privacy,dataprotectionandfreedomofmovementandexpression.Thereforeinthissectiontheexistingreviews

onpreventive

counter

terrorism

measures

are

considered.

This

discussion

is

preceded

by

an

introduction

of

the

(inter)nationalstandardsonequalityandthebanondiscrimination.

NondiscriminationStandardsintheEuropeanUnion

In the EU the right to equal treatment and the ban on discrimination are fundamental human rights.

Discriminationbetweenindividualsonthebasisofrace,ethnicorigin,religion,sex,sexualorientation,nationality,

languageetc.isprohibitedbyseveralinternationalconventionsthataredirectlyorindirectlyapplicable.122

These

include almost allUNhuman rights conventions123

and the Councilof Europes European Convention for the

ProtectionofHumanRightsandFundamentalFreedoms(ECHR)124,especiallyArticle14,andtheTwelfthProtocol

to the ECHR125. The EU legal framework that affects equal treatment and the prohibition of discrimination

includesthe

EU

Race

Directive,

Anti

discrimination

Directive,126

Privacy

Directives,127

Lisbon

Treaty,

and

Charter

ofFundamentalRights.128

TheEURaceDirective,whichseekstocurbdiscriminationonthebasisofraceorethnic

origin,deals solelywithequal treatment in the supplyofgoodsand servicesandnotwithnationalityand the

Lisbon Treaty, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of nationality, applies this prohibition only to EU

citizens.129

LikeotherEUMemberStates,TheNetherlandsandtheUKarepartytomostinternationalhumanrights

conventionsandsubjectedtotheEUslegalframework.Discriminationbetweenindividualsonthebasisofrace,

ethnicity, religion, sex, nationality, language etc. is prohibited by international conventions that are directly

applicableintheKingdomofTheNetherlands,aswellasbytheDutchConstitution,theEqualTreatmentAct,and

a

number

of

provisions

of

criminal

and

administrative

law.

130

Article

1

of

the

Dutch

Constitution,

for

instance

enshrinesbothaprincipleofuniversalequalityandabanondiscrimination.131

Someofthesestatutoryprovisions

relatetoinstitutionalpolicyandtheactionsofpolice,security,immigrationandcustomsofficials.TheDutchEqual

121HouseofCommons,ReviewofCounterTerrorismandSecurityPowers:EqualityImpactAssessment(London:BritishGovernment,2011).

122FormoreinformationseeEuropeanUnionAgencyforFundamentalRights,HandbookonEuropeanNondiscrimination Law(Vienna:FRA,2011).

123AmongotherstheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights(ICCPR),especiallyArticle26andtheUnitedNationsRaceConvention,

124Where theECHR isconcerned, itshouldbenoted thatArticle14providesprotection fromdiscriminationonly incombinationwithoneof theother

rights,suchastherighttolibertyandsecurityofperson.

125Article1,paragraph2oftheTwelfthProtocoltotheECHRprohibitsdiscriminationbyanypublicauthority.TheNetherlandsratifiedthisProtocolon1

April2005.

126European

Commission

Proposal

for

aCouncil

Directive

2008/0140

(CNS)

of

2July

2008

on

Implementing

the

Principle

of

Equal

Treatment

between

PersonsIrrespectiveofReligionorBelief,Disability,AgeorSexualorientation.Thisdirectivesupplementsearlierdirectives,includingEuropeanParliament

and the Council of the European Union Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 on Implementing the Principle of Equal Treatment between Persons

IrrespectiveofRacialorEthnicOrigin.Atthesametime,Article10oftheLisbonTreatystatesthatindefiningandimplementingitspoliciesandactivities,

theUnionshallaimtocombatdiscriminationbasedonsex,racialorethnicorigin,religionorbelief,disability,ageorsexualorientation.

127EuropeanParliamentandCouncilofEuropeDirective1995/46/ECof24October1995ontheProtectionofIndividualswithRegardtotheProcessingof

PersonalDataandontheFreeMovementofsuchData;EuropeanParliamentandtheCouncilofEuropeanUnionDirective2002/58/EUof12July2002on

PrivacyandElectronicCommunication.On28 January2010,EU JusticeCommissionerRedingannounced that shewouldbeproposing amendments to

modernisetheEUprivacyregulationsonthebasisoftheDataProtectionDirectiveandthespecificrulesapplicabletotelecommunicationandtheinternet

(ePrivacyrules).

128TheCharterofFundamentalRightsoftheEuropeanUnion(7December2000,amended12December2007Strasbourg)isnotpartoftheLisbonTreaty

(2007/C306/01),whichmodernisedandreformedtheTreatyonEuropeanUnionandtheTreatyestablishingtheEuropeanCommunity,butEUinstitutions

andnationalstatesthatimplementEUlegislationareobligedtoobservethesefundamentalrightsandtheprincipleofsubsidiarityappliestotheobligations

ofthememberstates.

129UnderthetermsofArticle3,paragraph2ofthisDirective,theprohibitiondoesnot includedifferenceoftreatmentbasedonnationality,andnonEU

residentscannot

derive

any

rights

from

it;

Article

18,

Lisbon

Treaty.

130TheNetherlandsadherestoamonisticsysteminwhichinternationalconventionsandthedecisionsoforganisationsestablishedunderinternationallaw

areselfexecutinganddonothavetobetransposed intonational legislation.Seearticles93and94,ConstitutionoftheKingdomoftheNetherlands,12

September1840(BulletinofActsandDecrees1840,54);

131Article1Grondwet,12September1840(BulletinofActsandDecrees1840,54).
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32002L0058:NL:HTMLhttp://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32002L0058:NL:HTMLhttp://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32002L0058:NL:HTMLhttp://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32002L0058:NL:HTMLhttp://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32002L0058:NL:HTMLhttp://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32002L0058:NL:HTML


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Treatment Commission, which is about to transform into the Netherlands Institute for Human Rights, is a

specialisedbodythatpromotesandmonitorscompliancewithequaltreatmentlaws.132

As theUK is thebirthplaceofCommonLaw,whichpredominantlydependsonjudicialprecedents, the

doctrine of stare decisis, there is nowritten law apart from some special acts, administrative guidelines and

practisedirections.Hence,thereisnoconstitution,andinternationallawonlybecomesdirectlyapplicabledueto

specialacts.

For

example,

the

ECHR

was

implemented

with

the

1998

Human

Rights

Act.

Similarly

EU

legislation

is

adopted and then transposed into national law.133

Discrimination between individuals on the basis of race,

religionandbelief,sex,sexualorientation,age,disability,genderreassignmentandpregnancyandmaternity is

prohibitedby theEqualityAct aswell as anumberof criminal (forexample theCrime andDisorderAct) and

administrativeacts.Furthermore,there isageneralequalityduty,whichfocusesontheeliminationofunlawful

discrimination, the integration of equality and good relations in the everyday business, especially of public

authorities, and the Equality andHuman Rights Commission is responsible for consultation and engagement,

monitoringanddatacollectionaswellasequalityimpactassessment.134

Despitethissignificant legalframeworkapplicantintheEU,theeffectofmostcounterterrorismefforts

onnondiscriminationstandardshasreceivedmodestattention.Amongotherexplanationsthiscanbeattributed

tothe

fact

that

even

though

according

to

international

law

non

discrimination

is

anon

derogable

right,

counter

terrorism reviews, following the EuropeanConventionofHumanRights regime,have tended to focuson the

infringements on the primary human right, for example the torture prohibition, fair trial or freedom of

movement, rather thannondiscriminationnormsassuch.135

Furthermore,even thoughexpertopiniondiffers

whenitcomestotheabsoluteprotectiontheprohibitionofdiscriminationandtheprincipleofequality,thereisa

consensusthatitislegitimatetodrawdistinctionsonthebasisofspecificscrutinytests,includingproportionality,

effectivenessandnecessity.136

This isclear from thecase lawof theEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsand the

DataProtectionConventionoftheCouncilofEurope.137

GoldschmidtandRodriques,forinstance,maintainthat

whenever there is a breach of human rights, law enforcement officials must ask themselves whether the

advantagesofprofilingoutweighthedisadvantages,andwhethertheobjectivecannotbeattained insome less

extremeway.138

Nondiscriminationreviews

Eventhoughindebatesaboutpreventivecounterterrorismmeasurestherighttoequalityandtheprohibitionof

discriminationarereceivingeverincreasingattention,theissueofnondiscriminationremainsambiguousdueto

legal, political and social factors. The UK governments counterterrorism strategy reflects this ambiguity as,

althoughthereisnoexplicitmentionofaspecificfocusontheMuslimcommunityatanationallevel,itisimplicit

inmanyoftheprogrammes.139

Combinedwiththefactthatthewebsiteofaspecificpoliceforcedoesmakesuch

afocusexplicit,thismightbeseenas indicativeofhowtheterroristthreat isperceivedbyelementsoftheUK

132Formore information seeDutchEqualTreatmentCommission, Homepage (CGB,2011).http://www.cgb.nl/english.Retrieved4March2011;Dutch

HumanRightsInstitute,Home(CGB,2011).http://www.naareenmensenrechteninstituut.nl/.Retrieved4March2011.

133NeilDavidson,DavidsonReview:Implementation ofEULegislation(London:TheStationaryOffice,2006),p.12.

134 Equality and Human Rights Commission, Public Sector Duty, http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/adviceandguidance/publicsectorequality

duty/introductiontotheequalityduty/.Retrieved7April2011;EqualityAct,2010,Section149.FormoreinformationseethewebsiteoftheEqualityand

HumanRightsCommission,Retrieved4April2011.

135AmongothersFRA(seenote122above).

136EuropeanNetworkAgainstRacism (ENAR), Factsheet40:EthnicProfiling, (ENAR, June2009),p5;CouncilofEuropeEuropeanCommissionAgainst

Racism and Intolerance (ECRI)General PolicyRecommendationNo11CRI(2007)39of 29 June2007on CombatingRacism andRacialDiscrimination in

Policing,p9.

137EuropeanCourtofHumanRights,TimishevvRussia,Applicationno.55762/00,55974/00,Judgmentof13December2005,sections5658;Councilof

EuropeConvention1981/108of28January1981ontheProtectionofIndividualswithregardtoAutomaticProcessingofPersonalData.

138JennyGoldschmidtandPeterRodriques,HetGebruikvanEtnischeenReligieuzeProfielenbijhetVoorkomenenOpsporenvanStrafbareFeitendieeen

BedreigingVormen

voor

de

Openbare

Orde

en

Veiligheid

[The

Use

of

Ethnic

and

Religious

Profiles

in

Preventing

and

Investigating

Criminal

Offences

that

poseaThreattoPublicOrderandSecurity],inJaapvanDonselaarandPeterRodrigues(eds.),MonitorRacisme&Extremisme:ZevendeRapportage(pp.40

60.InJvanDonselaarandPRRodrigues(2006)(eds),MonitorRacisme&Extremisme:Zevenderapportage(Amsterdam/Leiden:AnneFrankFoundation/

UniversityofLeiden),p.40.

139Kundani(seenote115above),pp.2324.


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government.140

TheEUalsoappears tomakeaneffort to stress that the threatcomesnotonly from Islamist

terrorism,butalsofromseparatistandanarchistterrorists.141

TheDutchgovernment,morespecificallytheNCTb

andAIVD,statesthatitdoesnotspecificallyfocusitsbroadapproachonacertaingrouporideology,butatthe

sametimedoesimplyquiteclearlythatinthe21stcenturytheterroristthreatderivesmostlyfromIslamistgroups

andindividuals.142

Somepreventive

counter

terrorism

measures

distinguish

by

their

very

nature.

For

instance,

restrictive

measuresonadmissionortravelbansintheEUarefocusedonpersonsandentitiesinvolvedinterroristacts.143

Theythereforedistinguishbetweenimmigrantswhoarebelievedtobeassociatedwithterrorismandthosethat

arenot. To a certain extent, thediscriminatory side effectsofpreventive securitymeasures are toleratedby

societyatlarge.ThemajoritypopulationinseveralEUmemberstatesmaynotbeawareoforconcernedwithfor

example the fact that theminoritieswho personally or as part of their household own a car have a higher

likelihoodtobestoppedbylawenforcementofficials.144

Additionally,manyEUcitizensdonotknowthatminority

groupsaregenerallylessawareofantidiscriminationlegislationcomparedthemajoritypopulationandtherefore

rarelyissuecomplaints.145

Furthermore,discriminationusuallyoccurs incombinationwithan infringementonotherrightssuchas

thefreedom

of

movement.

For

instance,

police

stops

in

theory

affect

the

entire

population,

but

in

practice

may

sometimesbe implementedselectivelyagainstoneethnicor religiousgroup (ethnicprofiling).146

Lastbutnot

least, notwithstanding a number of official evaluations, there are few empirical studies that independently

substantiatedifferenttreatmentintheEU,TheNetherlandsandtheUK.Inthesubsequentsection,anumberof

existentreviewsof(preventive)counterterrorismmeasuresandreferencestonondiscriminationareconsidered.

ReportsabouttheEuropeanUnion

International human rights committees and civil society organisations have stressed the risk of the negative

impactofEUcounterterrorismmeasuresonminoritiesand immigrants foranumberofyears.Common side

effects

concerns

relating

to

preventive

counter

terrorism

measures

include

the

violation

of

the

presumption

of

innocence,theprivacyofindividualsandpersonaldataprotection,aswellasthestigmatisationofentireorethnic

orreligiousgroupsandthepresumptionoftheexistenceofcollectivesinsby,forinstance,couplingterrorismto

Islaminanationscollectivememory.147

Securitymeasuressuchastheaforementionedpersonaldatabasesand

detection and identification technologies have a tendency to become permanent, thereby normalising the

exception.TheEuropeanDataProtectionSupervisorhasexpressedhisconcernabout the (mis)useofpersonal

data, which in combination with the broad powers of national authorities could lead to discrimination and

stigmatisation.148

Also,itisnotjustaquestionofwhetherornotpeoplewithaminorityandimmigrantstatusintheEUare

disproportionally affected by preventive counterterrorism measures, the very fact that they experience or

perceivebeing

treated

differently

creates

anxiety,

mistrust,

resentment

and

disengagement.149

For

example,

140WestMidlandsPolice(seenote98above).

141EuropeanCommission(seenote44above),p.2.

142NCTb(seenote20above);GeneralIntelligenceandSecurityService(AIVD),Jaarverslag2010[AnnualReport2009](AIVD,April2011),p.1.

143European External Action Service (EEAS), Sanctions or Restrictive Measures (EEAS, 2011). http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/index_en.htm.

Retrieved14April2011.

144EuropeanUnionAgencyforFundamentalRights(FRA)(seenote1,above),p.11

145EuropeanUnionAgencyforFundamentalRights(FRA),EuropeanUnionMinoritiesandDiscrimination Survey:DatainFocusReport3:RightsAwareness

(Vienna:FRA,2010),pp.810.

146OpenSocietyInstitute(seenote39above);EuropeanUnionAgencyforFundamentalRightsseenote58above);QuirineA.M.Eijkman.HastheGenie

Been Letoutof theBottle?:EthnicProfiling in theNetherlands,PublicSpace: theJournalof LawandSocialJustice,vol.5,no.2,2010,pp.121; Frank

Bovenkerk,WieisdeTerrorist:ZinenOnzinvanEthnicProfiling[WhoistheTerrorist?SenseandNonsenseofEthnicProfiling](Rotterdam:GerGuijs,2009).

147AgnesHankissCornerstonesoftheEUsCounterTerrorismStrategy(HungarianCivicUnionintheEuropeanParliament,July2010);ENAR(seenote136

above),pp.8

9;

Open

Society

Institute

(see

note

39

above);

Office

of

the

High

Commissioner

of

Human

Rights

(OHCHR),

Human

Rights,

Terrorism

and

CounterTerrorism:FactsheetNo.32(Geneva:OHCHR,2008),pp.3738.

148EuropeanEconomicandSocialCommittee,Soc/388CESE1570/2010of31March2011ontheEUCounterTerrorismPolicy,p.7.

149OpenSocietyInstitute(seenote39above),pp.8384,98.

149Ibid.,pp.98108.


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significantnumbersofEuropeanMuslimsfeelthatsince9/11theyareundersurveillanceandexperiencethisasa

form of stigmatisation. Therefore any potential benefits that this practice offers from a counterterrorism

perspective must be weighed against the increased alienation and stigmatisation that it engenders. As the

effectiveness of preventive counterterrorism measures is hard to judge, one wonders when their

implementation isjustified and when it can be counterproductive: could these measures mobilise the very

individualsand

groups

they

are

supposed

to

prevent

from

turning

to

political

violence?

150

Eventhoughduringthe lastdecadecivilsocietyhassometimeshaddifficulties inhaving itscasesheard

andsystematicevaluationsofcounterterrorismmeasures intermsofeffectivenessandtheir impactonhuman

rights have beenmodest, there are signs that EU politicians and policymakers are becomingmore receptive

towardsthe issueofnondiscriminationandequality.151

TheEUAgency forFundamentalRightshasconducted

several studies in relation to discrimination after 9/11 and has published reports on ethnic profiling.152

Furthermore,inhis2010EuropeanCounterterrorismstrategydiscussionpaper,theEuropeanCounterterrorism

Coordinator acknowledges the relevance of assessing the impact onminority groups, both in the context of

radicalisationaswellasrecruitment.153

Moreover,theEuropeanParliamenthasexpressedinterestinevaluating

thesideeffectsofpreventivecounterterrorismpolicies.154

ReportsaboutTheNetherlands

Inrelationto(preventive)counterterrorismmeasuresnondiscriminationconcernsarenotwidespreadinDutch

political and public discourse. A January 2011 government evaluation of Dutch counterterrorism measures

concludesthattherearenogroundstoassumetheyviolatebasichumanrightsstandardsassetbytheEuropean

ConventiononHumanRights.155

Inaddition tothe fact that thisconclusion isbasedon thegovernmentsown

evaluation andnot thatof the EuropeanCourtofHumanRights (ECHR), assessmentsby internationalhuman

rightscommitteespresentaslightlydifferentpointofview.A2009CouncilofEuropereportonTheNetherlands

expressed concernwith the legislative and administrative counterterrorismmeasures enacted by the Dutch

government.

For

example,

it

argued

that

terrorism

was

too

broadly

defined

in

Dutch

law,

thus

running

the

risk

thatfarreachinginvestigati

ICCT Eijkman Preventative CT and Non Discrimination EU July 2011

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