Ibikunle Adeakin, doctoral candidate, University of ...

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Beyond the Militarist State Concept: Understanding the Recent Security Challenges on

the Nigerian State

Ibikunle Adeakin, doctoral candidate, University of Waikato, Hamilton New Zealand.

E-mail: [email protected]

Introduction

On October 12, 2001 serious civil unrest broke out in the ancient Northern Nigerian city of

Kano. The protest which immediately occurred after the Friday jumma prayers in the city

was aimed at showing solidarity with the al-Qaeda leader, Osama bin Laden, and denouncing

the United States ‘war on terror’. The October 12 protesters were also against the US-led

military invasion of the Taliban regime of Afghanistan. In addition, these groups of protesters

were displeased with the pronouncements of President Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007)

stating that Nigeria supported the United States government actions, including its invasion of

Afghanistan. This pronouncement by Obasanjo angered some Islamic organizations in

Northern Nigeria, in particular those in the states of Zamfara, Kano and Kaduna. The

resultant two day carnage in the city of Kano included the burning of cars, Christian religious

buildings and a general attack upon non-indigenes (mostly Igbos) in the Sabon-Gari area of

Kano city. Conservative estimates, such as those of the Nigerian Red Cross of people killed

during the riot were as high as 100 although the Kano state chapter of the Christian

Association of Nigeria (CAN) recorded a significantly higher number of deaths (Minchakpu,

2001; VOA, 2001).

A number of Islamic based organizations with perceived external affiliation sprung up in

Nigeria after 2001, the most prominent of these being Boko Haram, whose literal translation

means ‘Western education is evil’, or ‘a sin’. The group seeks to overthrow the present

federal government of Nigeria and establish an Islamic state (Chothia, 2012). From 2003 to

date, Boko Haram has engaged in numerous armed campaigns against the security forces of

Nigeria in several states in the Northern part of the country. For example, between 26 and 30

July, 2009, hundreds of armed Boko Haram members fought against the military and police

in north-eastern part of Nigeria. Much of the heaviest fighting happened in the cities of

Maiduguri and Bauchi, and also in the towns of Potiskum and Wudil (Hill, 2012, p. 27). The

group also targeted prominent civilian politicians, high ranking retired military officers and

traditional/religious community leaders. In 2010, the group claimed responsibility for the

assassination of the All Nigeria Peoples Party’s (ANPP) candidate for governor in Borno

State, Alhaji Awana Ali Ngala (Hill, 2012, p. 28). In 2012 the group murdered a former

military administrator of the defunct North-Central state—Brigadier-General Mamman

Shuma (Retired) in his residence at Maiduguri, Borno State (Musa, 2012). The group also

assassinated a prominent Muslim cleric, Ibrahim Birkuti in Maiduguri in 2011 (BBC, 2011).

Similarly on January 19, 2013, the second most prominent traditional ruler in the North, the

Emir of Kano, Alhaji Ado Bayero, barely survived an assassination attempt when his car was

ambushed by Boko Haram (Ross, 2013). In August, 2011, the group claimed responsibility

for the bombing of the United Nations’ headquarters in Abuja, killing 18 people (CNN, 2011).

In addition to Boko Haram, several other ethno-religious crises have erupted in Nigeria since

1999. These crises have caused a significant level of insecurity in the country. They include:

1. The July, 1999, Oro cultist crisis in Sagamu, Ogun State. This incident occurred when

a Hausa woman was accused of violating the cultural custom of the Oro cult by going

out when women by tradition are not allowed because it contravenes the cultural

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festival of that time of the year (Oro festival) in the town of Sagamu in South West

Nigeria.

2. The introduction of the Islamic Legal Code (Sharia) by some governors in the

Northern states of Nigeria—with the first being Zamfara in 1999; this caused great

animosity between Muslims and Christians, especially those residing in Kaduna city.

3. The presidential electoral victory of Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian, in 2011 with 59%

of the vote; this re-ignited the North vs. South divide and triggered riots in

predominately Northern Muslim cities, fuelled by claims of vote-rigging.

4. In addition to ethnically/religiously motivated riots, insecurity in Nigeria has been

motivated by groups demanding a greater share of the natural resources produced in

and exported from their regions. The Niger-Delta area of Nigeria has consistently

being a hot spot for militant groups demanding greater proceeds from the oil revenues.

Militant groups often engage in illegal activities as a way of pressuring the federal

government to meet their demands. Such illegal activities include the kidnapping of

foreign oil workers, piracy and oil bunkering (Peel, 2010).

Since the last move to civilian rule in 1999, virtually all methods of inquiry into the state of

insecurity and the challenges of democratization in Nigeria have tended to analyse these

challenges using militarism as a concept. (See for example, (Fayemi, 2002, c.2012; Obi,

2007). The idea that the principal legacies of military rule include a culture of impunity, a

lack of public accountability from the ruling political class, and proscriptions against

collective bargaining and compromise however, is now out-of-date based on new and

emerging conditions:

1. The expanding role of the military in the polity, and especially with regard to internal

security duties and the implications that they may have on political elites’ approaches

to addressing these multi-faceted problems.

2. The 2011 presidential elections. They appear to have changed the interaction of

religion and politics in the country. For the first time in Nigerian political history, the

core Muslim states in the North voted for a presidential candidate (Mohammadu

Buhari) based on the candidate’s Muslim religious affiliation.

3. The recent religiously motivated security threat on the state. It does seem that Boko

Haram has changed its methods and strategy. This suggests that the security

challenges in Nigeria have moved from a previously internally-driven ethno-religious

conflict to one with an international dimension. There have been several reports that

link Boko Haram with other Islamist militant organizations in Africa, and probably

beyond (Chothia, 2012).

To explore this subject matter, Geoff Harris’ (2004) criteria of militarism in sub-Saharan

Africa are used to analyse the Nigerian state post-1999. These criteria are:

1. The military controls or strongly influences government policies and

actions.

2. There is a strong military ethos and military ideals are dominant.

3. Security is viewed as fundamentally a military matter and military

imperatives dominate the security agenda.

4. The use of force or the threat to use force is high on the list of possible

responses to any disputes which may arise (Harris, 2004, p. 1).

Harris (2004) went further to highlight several other cost alternatives to a militarised

approach to dealing with security challenges in sub-Saharan countries. He based his

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alternative measures on four variables that appear to be relevant to the sub-Saharan countries

context. These include the following:

1. The Nature of Warfare has Significantly Changed: Almost all armed conflicts

in sub-Saharan African countries usually occur within the boundaries of individual

countries rather than between them. Most of the time these are between groups

wishing to take over a government or secede from a territorial area.

2. The Meaning of Security has changed: This means that the traditional definition

of security which for most of the time deals with protection from an external

aggressor against the territorial integrity of a country, has moved to that of other

areas of security. These are increasingly becoming more relevant to countries as

they aspire to increase the overall standard of living in their societies. Such areas

include economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political

security.

3. Military Expenditure Retards Economic Growth and Development: Military

expenditure is known to hinder economic growth and development because capital

that should be invested in key areas of the economy such as those in education,

housing, and healthcare are used in procuring military hardware that appears not

be necessary.

4. The Military is Ineffective in Resolving Conflicts: This is based on the fact that

internal security duties for military officers usually involve allegation of human

rights abuses. In more recent times, military officers have been targets of

vengeance attacks from groups in societies that were victims of the military’s

internal security mission. Some of these groups justify their attacks on the military

because of the allegations of human rights abuses perpetuated by this institution.

Also, military engagements is known to restore law and order in the short term but

does very little to deal with the underlying reasons for the conflicts (Harris, 2004,

pp. 8-11).

Consequently, in order to justify my argument on Nigeria, it is important that the concept of

militarism as it relates to Nigeria is examined in detail.

Militarism in Nigeria

In general terms, a historical understanding of the concept of militarism traces its roots back

to the inter-war years, with the rise of totalitarian regimes such as those in Nazi Germany and

Fascist Italy. Harold Lasswell (1941) provides an earlier understanding of this concept as he

described the probability of a future ‘garrison state’ where modern soldiers would include

non-combat skills as a core requirement of their training. These are skills which traditionally

were accepted as part of modern management (Lasswell, 1941, p. 458). In Lasswell’s words,

the core characteristics of the future garrison state is “a world in which the specialists of

violence are the powerful group in society” (Lasswell, 1941, p. 455).

While Lasswell’s concept of militarism basically sought to address the threats of

ideologically driven totalitarian regimes in Europe at that time, likewise scholars of

militarism in contemporary Africa have sought to address the threats posed by the military

institution on the continent. In an African context, militarism is defined by Robin Luckham

(1998) as: “… The pervasiveness in society of symbols values and discourses validating

military power and preparation for war” (Luckham, 1998, p. 14).

He went further by defining militarisation as:

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… a multidimensional process through which a number of elements—such as military

coups and regimes, authoritarian government, the dominance of patriarchy, powerful

military and repressive state apparatuses, war and armed conflict, rising military

spending and arms imports, and external military intervention—become dynamically

linked, both to each other and more widely to capital accumulation and projects for

national and international hegemony…Yet these individual elements have not

invariably correlated, nor have they always been on the increase (Luckham, 1998, pp.

14-15)

Robin Luckham (1998) further suggested that after several decades of military interventions

and failed transitions to civil rule, the contemporary style of governance of the African state

has been militarized. As for Nigeria, militarized governance is characterised by a significant

increase in military expenditure, domination of the political system by the military—both

active service and, most importantly, high ranking retired military officers. This leads to the

glorification of military interests and values, and an increase in the reliance of the military in

domestic conflicts (Best, 1999, p. 28).

Similarly Cyril Obi (2007) defines militarism in a Nigerian context to mean “… not just

military rule, but its political legacy, a culture steeped in impunity, a deep loathing of

opposition or criticism and a reliance on force, rather than persuasion” (Obi, 2007, p. 379).

This political legacy in Nigeria also includes the involvement of retired high ranking military

officers who had held political positions under military rule and use this prior political

experience as an advantage to occupy selective positions post-military rule. Their politics and

actions have had far-reaching implications. This also has a direct influence on civilian

political elites, who build on this type of leadership style. In particular, this is thought to

foster a lack of accountability to the electorate (Fayemi, c.2012).

As stated earlier, militarism as an analytical tool of social methodology is not a new form of

analysis of the Nigerian state. It became the dominant method used by Nigerian political

scientists in the early 1990s to explain the multi-faceted challenges facing the Nigerian state.

The literature of militarism in Nigeria, especially as an analytical tool of social enquiry, can

be categorized into four phases. The first phase looks at the asymmetry/symmetrical

relationship between colonial rule and military rule. The second phase analyses the causes or

reasons why military intervention is prevalent in Nigeria and sub-Saharan Africa. The third

phase argues that the problems associated with democratic consolidation are due to years of

military dictatorship, and lastly, the four phases suggest that the growing problems of

insecurity in the polity can only be achieved through proper security sector reforms. In brief

each of these phases will be discussed.

Colonial Rule and Military Rule

Dipo Kolawole (2005) suggests that there is an asymmetric relationship between military

governance in sub-Saharan Africa and colonial rule. He identifies five parameters of

similarities between the two:

1. Both military and colonial rules were predicated on coercion, force and lack of

consent of the governed. As both British and military rule were a form of

imposition.

2. Both rules used constitutional reviews as instruments of regime continuation and

survival. Under colonial rule just like military rule there were series of

constitutional reviews and conferences.

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3. Governance under the two systems was for the sole purpose of the governors. The

colonial rulers administered Nigeria within the overall framework of promoting

and protecting British interest. On the other hand, their Nigerian successors

practised the doctrine of ruling for themselves and for the interest of a few strong

political and military elites.

4. The colonialist utilized indirect rule at the local level of administration and had

Lieutenant-Governors who were not Nigerians at the regional level. Their military

imitators likewise allowed indigenous government at the local administration level

but appointed military governors or administrators at the state level who usually

were non-indigenes of the state they govern.

5. When it became inevitable that independence would need to be granted to the

colonized territories, the colonialists embarked on gradual de-colonialisation

programmes. Similarly military regimes have democratization programmes

intended to give the impression of a determination to invariably return power to

the civilian politicians (Kolawole, 2005, p. 865).

Accordingly, even though the political institutions that were adopted post-independence in

Nigeria were identical to Western style democratic institutions, the leadership styles of the

first generation Nigerian political elite manifested several colonial governance styles. This

style of political leadership was later perfected by the military rulers that ruled the country

from 1966 and upwards.

Reasons for Military Intervention in Nigeria

There is an extensive literature as to why military intervention is so prevalent in sub-Saharan

Africa and Nigeria. In Nigeria, four main cases are crucial to understand why military

intervention is prevalent in the country. These are:

Political Development Theory: The basic assumption here is that military intervention

follows from weak institutions—political and social institutions that are weak are therefore

vulnerable, and create a high likelihood that the military will intervene in the polity. This was

demonstrated in the first military intervention of 1966. The coup was partially caused by

weak institutions which lacked the capability to handle the crises of the Western Region and

federal elections. Also, the political institution at that time lacked the capability of conducting

a credible population census, and was unable to address cases of political corruption.

Military Centrality: The main argument of military centrality theorists is that resourceful and

cohesive militaries are more likely to intervene in the polity (Janowitz, 1964). It is argued

that in developing nations such as Nigeria the military institution has been the only agent of

modernization and political development. Other political actors and institutions are

characterized by primordial loyalties. The military in developing nations such as Nigeria is

seen as an agent of modernization because of its international exposure through its

peacekeeping operations. Military training requirements include being exposed to the latest

military equipment and hardware, and promotions must be based on meritocracy. This creates

institutional discipline which is an essential tool to modernize an agrarian society with

multiple ethnic affiliations (Pye, 1962).

Ethnic Antagonisms: There are basically two approaches to dealing with ethnic antagonisms

on Nigeria. Ethno-politics in Deeply Divided Societies is one branch of the body of literature

that posits for developing nations the followings: the fewer the number of groups, and the

larger their overall size and cultural heterogeneity, the greater the likelihood of domestic

tensions within states, and consequently the less the ability to form political coalitions, one of

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the essential components of democracy (Rabuskha & Shepsle, 1972). Consequently, this

creates a tendency for military intervention. The argument is almost geometrical: when there

are only a few major ethnic groups that dominate a large system, there is greater vulnerability

to inter-ethnic competition, tension, and ultimately conflict.

Ethnic Competition: The central theoretical argument behind this aspect of ethno-political

theory is that state building and economic development simultaneously increase the

competition between groups and provide greater opportunities to compete for resources from

the state (Bates, 1983). With the end of colonialism, and the presence of diverse ethnic

groups that were geographically and traditionally isolated, some of them because of lack of

Western education and modern infrastructure, these groups suddenly become competitors for

jobs, housing, schools and social services. State-building thus created a centre-point for

political competition as well as an arena for ethnic mobilization. Rapid urbanization and

industrialization in post-colonial societies has tended to bring different groups into greater

competition, simultaneously creating more proximity and intra-ethnic political mobilization

(Kposowa & Jenkins, 1993). National-level competition in these societies has never been fair

or democratic, and thus, in many cases, political tensions have escalated to bloody conflicts

between the groups, as in the Biafran civil war of 1967-1970. Unresolved competition of this

kind has been used in many cases in Africa, and in Nigeria in particular, to justify military

intervention.

The Legacy of Military Rule

Since the end of military rule in 1999, the dominant academic discourse in the literature on

Nigeria has tended to focus on the long years of military authoritarian rule, and how this has

impacted upon democratic consolidation and the militarisation of the democratic processes

(Best, 1999; Obi, 2007; Olurode & Anifowose, 2004) It is argued that the repeated

programmes for transition to civilian rule instituted by the military, especially those of

Generals Ibrahim Babangida (1985-1993) and Sani Abacha (1993-1998), had a lasting impact

on the Nigerian state. These military ‘transitions’ were characterized by a focus upon military

interests rather than upon national interests. The military elites determined when there should

be a transition to civilian rule, the duration of the transition, the context or democratic

structure of the incoming civilian government, and who should be allowed to participate in

the process. In addition, the military had the power to determine whether or not an elected

president should be allowed the mandate to rule. Consequently, what should have been the

supreme will of the people in democratic content became a ‘privilege’ under military directed

transitions. As a result, the general requisites for democratic rule, the rule of law, public

debate, consensus-building, as well as an open and transparent system of governance, have

been significantly absent in the current Fourth Republic in Nigeria. The military legacy of

political impunity has had a significant impact as well on the Fourth Republic. Political elites

since 1999 seem to have mirrored the military tactics of consolidating political power for

themselves and a few privileged members of the political class.

Other scholars have also noted that the problems of militarization in Nigeria post-1999 have

significantly limited freedom of speech and expression of the various ethnic groups,

particularly those agitating for greater rights and equality (Fayemi, 2002, c.2012; Obi, 2007).

This has resulted post-1999 in an increase in the number and strength of ethnic and religious

militias seeking either greater allocation from natural resources that are extracted from a

region, or addressing the lop-sidedness in the federal structure that favours the federal

government in revenue allocation and constitutional responsibilities. Other causes of tension

include ethnic/regional marginalization, the desire for religious/cultural revival in some of the

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regions, and the actions of groups that favour the disintegration of the country. Current ethnic

militias include the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), the

Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), Boko Haram,

Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer

Force (NDPVF), O’odua People’s Congress (OPC), Arewa People’s Congress, among many

others.

Security Sector Reforms

Since the military handed over political power to the civilians in 1999, there have been

several efforts at security sector reform in Nigeria, especially directed at the military

institution (Abiodun, 2000; Fayemi, 2003; Smith, 2006). With the growing state of insecurity

that is presently caused by religious-based militias in the North and resource based militias in

the Niger-Delta area of the country, such reforms seem increasingly necessary for adequate

security and societal development. At the moment, most of these reforms seem to be more

pronounced in the military, where ‘military politicians’ were immediately forced to retire

from service in 1999 by the new civilian government of President Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-

2007). Other measures have included bilateral military training agreements with the military

establishments of other countries that have long years of military subordination to civilian

authorities. Also, the government has allocated a substantial amount of revenue to the

military institution and, to a lesser extent, the Nigerian Police.

Critics have however argued that the government has not done enough to promote these

reforms. For example, they cite the case of the military and the constitutional provisions

accorded to it in the 1999 Constitution. Section 315(5)c of the 1999 Constitution states that

the National Security Agencies Act (a body of principles, policies and procedures on the

operation of the security agencies) is the law, and can only be repealed by the support of two-

third of the legislature at both the state and federal level. Critics of this provision argue that

the Act came into being via military decree, that it has limited the legitimacy under civilian

rule post-1999, and that it calls into question the democratization process in Nigeria. It was

also said to expose Nigeria to the dictates of the security agencies, which continued to operate

without effective civilian scrutiny. Fayemi (2003, p. 70) posits that this provision contradicts

Section 1(2) of the 1999 Constitution. This states that:

The Federal Republic of Nigeria shall not be governed, nor shall any person or group

of persons take control of the Government of Nigeria or any part thereof, except in

accordance with the provisions of this constitution

Fayemi (2003) argues further that the National Security Agencies Act can override Section

1(2) and the constitution. An interpretation is thus possible that any person or group that

successfully removes a constitutional government in accordance with the provisions of the

National Security Agencies Act is acting in a constitutional, or at least a legal, manner

(Fayemi, 2003, p. 70). Other criticisms have also included the inability to downsize the

military from the current 100,000 service personnel to 70,000. There is no national defence

policy that can effectively serve as a guideline for Nigeria’s international interests, shortage

of personnel in the police force or the failure of the federal government to exercise total

control over the country’s sovereign territory. This deficiency has been partially blamed for

the relative lack of skilled officers and also inadequate equipment for policing and

enforcement (Hill, 2012; Omitoogun & Oduntan, 2006). Additional measures that would be

required by the military as part of effective security reform are:

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Resolution of the Challenges of Ethnicity in the Recruitment of Military Personnel: Although the constitution of Nigeria—Section 217 (3) explicitly states that “the composition

of the officer corps and other ranks of the armed forces of the federation shall reflect the

federal character of Nigeria”, successive civilian government since 1999 have not been able

to counter the ethnic favouritism that is still dominant in the Nigeria military (Fayemi, 2002).

Development of Civilian Government Expertise over Military Matters: Currently, the

level of civilian expertise in military matters can be categorized as having two vital

components legislative expertise and knowledgeable personnel in the Ministry of Defence

(MOD). Currently the Senate has committees for the Air Force, Defence and Army

(combined). Similarly, the House of Representative has committees for the Air Force,

Defence and Army (combined). The jurisdiction of these committees includes the following:

1. Payments, promotions, retirements and other benefits and privileges of members of

the army.

2. Size and composition of the army.

3. Defence headquarters.

4. Ammunition depots, forts, arsenal, reservation and establishment.

5. Scientific research and development in support of the army.

6. Barrack projects.

7. Military application for nuclear energy.

8. Disarmament.

9. Army cadets.

10. Resettlement scheme for serving officers of the army.

11. War graves, monuments and memorabilia.

12. Peacekeeping operations.

13. Consideration and appropriation of annual budget estimates for the army.

Source: www.nassing.org/nass/committees.php?id=60 (April 16, 2012)

Also, the federal National Assembly is empowered by the 1999 Constitution in its legal

jurisdiction over the following:

1. Budgetary control: allocations provided through the MOD.

2. Presidentially initiated use of the military: the president cannot unilaterally engage the

military in any internal or external duties without formal approval from the legislative

chamber.

3. Composition of the officer corps: the National Assembly ensures that the composition

of the officer’s corps of the military reflects the federal character principle of the

country.

4. Appointments, promotions and disciplinary control: the National Assembly has

powers to make laws as regards the appointment, promotion and disciplinary control

of the military (Section 217-218).

As for the budgetary allocation to the (MOD), the de jure process passes through four phases:

the formulation stage, approval stage, implementation stage and the auditing and reporting

process (Omitoogun & Oduntan, 2006, p. 158). It is expected that during these stages,

civilian experts within the MOD are significantly involved, and that the committees in charge

of defence within the National Assembly scrutinize defence expenditures when the budget is

submitted as a draft to the House. After that, the Minister of Defence is invited to a public

hearing of the committee to explain and clarify any issues regarding the anticipated funds that

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would be allocated. From there the committee in charge of defence evaluates the expenditures.

The budget is then debated in the House before it is approved.

Despite the appearance of being a rigorous process, the reality is that approval of defence

expenditures is largely a ‘rubber stamping’ of the draft submitted to the legislature with little

adjustment. This stems from a lack of understanding of what Nigeria’s defence priorities are,

as well as a lack of knowledge of the committee members in charge of defence in the House.

Another issue that hinders legislative oversight over the budgetary issues of the military is the

extra-budgetary spending and funds allocated to the military by the presidency. Under

military rule this method was effectively used to undermine the functions of the MOD. Also,

peacekeeping allocations under the military were never channelled through the MOD, and

were inadequately accounted for. An example of this was the estimated US$12 billion that

successive regimes spent through ECOMOG on attempting to end the civil wars in Liberia

and Sierra Leone. Under the present civilian rule, this method of allocation has not

significantly changed. Funds are allocated to the military under ‘security votes’ in the budget

and allocations for peacekeeping duties are still handled through funds other than those

allocated to the MOD (Omitoogun & Oduntan, 2006). Likewise within the MOD, it is also

expected that there should be civilian experts on key military matters. The reality, however, is

that personnel employed in the MOD lack the academic competence and skill to run the

MOD. This is why the de facto operation of the military is directed by high ranking military

officers.

Beyond Militarism: Understanding the Recent Security Challenges in Nigeria

The recent security challenges in Nigeria can be broadly divided into two categories: the first

are those that demand significant financial allocations based upon the natural resources

extracted from their regions. The second group appears to be religiously inspired, and

involves groups that seek to impose religious beliefs on the entire country. MEND and

NDPVF are examples of resource-based militia groups located in the swamps and creeks of

the Niger-Delta area of Nigeria. The primary reasons why these resource demanding militia

groups emerged in the Niger-Delta area are perceived regional economic and political

marginalisation, both historical and current, by the Nigerian federal government. Even though

the region contributes approximately 90% of Nigeria’s export earnings, it remains highly

impoverished.

The problems and politics of the Niger-Delta earnestly started in 1995 during the regime of

General Sani Abacha (1993-1998). The regime executed (by hanging) environmental and

human rights activists Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni leaders after brief trials in

which they were alleged by the military regime to have committed questionable offences.

Subsequent governments since the execution of Saro-Wiwa have tried to ameliorate the

problems that he had highlighted by providing some basic public amenities for the townships

and villages clustered across the region. These amenities, however, have done little to

minimise the agitation of people in the region, especially for justice for those executed in

1995. It is therefore important to note that the region’s grievances based on political and

economic marginalisation are not limited to the federal government alone. Groups in the

region have consistently accused the major oil companies (especially Shell) of contributing to

the past and present problems in the region. There is evidence that this is the case for example,

in 2009, Shell Corporation agreed to pay the sum of US$15.5million as compensation to the

families of the 1995 killings. This settlement was reached on the eve of a trial in a US federal

court in New York, and was one of the largest pay-outs ever agreed to by a multinational

corporation charged with human rights violations (Pilkington, 2009).

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MEND, NDPVF core activities are however opposite to those of Saro-Wiwa and the eight

other Ogoni leaders. Their activities have included attacking the country’s oil infrastructure

(pipelines, pumping stations, wells, platforms and vessels), as well as participating in oil

bunkering. The reasons why these groups attack oil and gas infrastructure in the Niger-Delta

area is to put pressure on the Nigerian federal government, as well as on Western Countries—

especially those that buy Nigeria’s crude oil and gas—and multinational oil corporations to

force them to listen to their demands. Their demands are often interwoven with political

issues that appear not to benefit the people of the region, however. For example, on 11

January 2006, MEND issued a demand that one of their leaders, Dokubo-Asari and former

Bayelsa state governor, Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, be released from prison. Usually however,

they demand that: a substantial percentage of the crude oil and gas revenue be returned to the

region’s residents (50%); there be an end to institutional corruption at the federal level; and

that oil companies pay significant compensation to local people for reparation of

environmental damage caused by the operations of these companies (Hill, 2012; Peel, 2010).

On the other hand, Boko Haram is an example of a religious-based militia group with a

national focus that threatens the existence of the Nigerian state in its current form (Chothia,

2012). In ideological terms, it can be argued that Boko Haram has undergone fundamentally

different phases of evolution, and that, although its roots are local, it represents a distinctly

new phenomenon in the context of Islamism and the presence of political Islam in Nigeria.

The first phase in the development of Boko Haram was the implementation of a‘Missionary-

Activist’ ideology, as Boko Haram first emerged in 2002. Its founder and original leader,

Mohammed Yusuf, had belonged to both Ibrahim Zakzaky’s Islamic Movement in Nigeria

(IMN) and Abubakar Mujahid’s Ahl al-Sunnah wal-Jama’ah, Ja’amutu Tajidmul Islami

(Movement for the Islamic Revival, MIR). Its main financial backer, Alhaji Buji Foi, had

close ties with Sheikh Abubakar Gummi’s and Dr. Ahmed Gummi’s Jama’atul Izalatul

Bid’ah Wa’ikhamatul Sunnah (Izala) (Hill, 2012, p. 26). Initially, its primary goal was

establishing an autonomous Islamist community ruled by a radical version of Sharia Law

(Islamic Law), something that Boko Haram sought to implement in the Northern state of

Yobe. After late 2003, Boko Haram evolved into a ‘National Jihadist’ Islamist organization

employing militant tactics and targeting politicians, members of the Nigerian police force,

and other security agencies. From this point on Boko Haram sought the institutionalisation of

Islamic Law throughout the twelve predominately Muslim states in the North, in a longer

term effort to turn Nigeria into an ‘Islamic state’. This period represents the second

ideological phase of Boko Haram. After 2009, following more than five years of clandestine

activities and the establishment of new leadership, the organization appears to have ‘re-

branded’ itself. Boko Haram had further evolved into a ‘militant terrorist’ organization and

had begun targeting both combatants and civilians. Within this context, it appears that Boko

Haram has begun to develop strategic ties with other Jihadist groups in Africa, especially al-

Qaeda, in the Islamic Maghreb/North Africa (AQIM), the Movement for Oneness and Jihad

in West Africa (MUJAO), Ansar Al-Dine (Defenders of the Religion) in northern Mali, as

well as with al-Shabab in Somalia—all of which are al-Qaeda affiliates (Ayoob, 2008;

Foxnews, 2012; Hashim, Patte, & Cohen, 2012`).

What is the government’s strategy for limiting these security challenges? All governments

since 1999 appear to maintain the original tactics for dealing with serious internal security

threats, the engagement of the military. This emphasis on military engagement first started

during the early years of the current Republic, six months after the military left political

power. In 1999, President Olusegun Obasanjo ordered the military into to the small town of

Odi in the Niger-Delta area of Nigeria in retaliation for the killing of twelve security

11

personnel that had been stationed in the town to guard against militant groups like MEND

and NDPVF. The federal government argued that the people of the town were responsible for

the killings of the security officers because they alleged provided shelter and security

information to the militant groups operating in the region. As a result, the military, ostensibly

under federal orders, proceeded to indiscriminately attack the entire civilian population of the

town. Commenting on what has been termed the Odi massacre, the Guardian Newspaper

editorial of December 13, 1999 stated that:

The government ordered the [military action] on November 20 following the

horrendous killing earlier in the month of about a dozen security personnel at Odi.

The act was barbaric and it was universally condemned. On November 10, President

Olusegun Obasanjo issued a 14 day ultimatum to the Bayelsa State government to

apprehend and prosecute the killers else a state of emergency would be imposed. But

a few days before the expiration date, the soldiers struck. The ruthless manner the

attack was executed points to a premeditated plan to rout the community. The soldiers

did not only deploy the most lethal of weapons, they sealed off the area and made

escape practically impossible, even for the children and the aged. Worse still, no

access was opened for observation nor was relief allowed to reach the injured and the

dying. The media was shut out. This is a violation of all conventions governing war. It

is inexcusable (GuardianEditorial, 1999).

Likewise, similar allegations of human rights abuses by the military have been made by both

the local and international media as regards to operations conducted against Boko Haram in

the North (AgencyReporter, 2012; Smith-Spark, 2012). In 2009 the government of President

Umaru Yar’Adua decided, after several years of alleged human rights abuses by the military

in the Niger-Delta, publicly acknowledged the great social injustices that had been committed,

and declared political amnesty to all the militant groups. The amnesty programme was

supposed to be accompanied by job training programmes, scholarships to eligible candidates

to study IT and applied sciences degrees overseas and other steps to reintegrate these fighters

back into society (Campbell, 2011, pp. 64-65). However, after the sudden death of Yar’Adua

in 2010, the amnesty programme—like many other government schemes—appears to have

lost momentum. Even though the current president, Goodluck Jonathan, has promised to

implement the amnesty programme, for now it sounds more like rhetoric.

How should the government respond? At the moment it has centred on creating new political

institutions and agencies to address these concerns. For example, in the Niger-Delta, the

NDDC (Niger-Delta Development Commission) was established in 2000 with the mission of

“facilitating the rapid, even and sustainable development of the Niger-Delta into a region that

is economically prosperous, socially stable, ecologically regenerative and political peaceful”

(NDDC, 2013). Similarly at the federal level, the Ministry of Niger-Delta Affairs was

established in 2008 by former President Yar’Adua with the mission of formulating and

executing plans and programmes that are essential to the development of that region.

There have been several other government and non-governmental recommendations for the

federal government, including issues ranging from tackling societal poverty in a country were

successive governments have been unable to tackle the alarming increase in the rate of people

dropping under the poverty line. According to the World Bank, Nigeria’s poverty level was

43% in 1985; by 2004 it has risen to 54.7% (WorldBank, 2013). Other areas of concern

include unemployment—especially youth unemployment, provision of qualitative and

efficient social amenities, and the tackling of uneven development between the Northern and

Southern part of the country. Recommendations on security have included the establishment

12

of a Ministry of Religious Affairs at the federal level as a means of managing Nigeria’s

ethno-religious diversities, the creation of state police units as in the First Republic

constitution (1960-1966), the establishment of a US style homeland security department for

intelligence gathering and surveillance, and the provision of more sophisticated equipment

for border security (ChannelsTelevision(Nigeria), 2012; Hill, 2012).

As laudable as these recommendations are the fundamental problems of establishing new

institutions appears unresolved. It appears that such new institutions never fulfil their

missions and mandates. My empirical analysis of the security situation in Nigeria suggests

that more emphasis should be placed on building existing institutions rather than creating

new institutions. It seems that the creation of newer institutions does not provide the

government with the ability to have a holistic approach in dealing with the current security

situation in the country.

Conclusion

This paper has sought to explain the current security challenges in Nigeria by arguing that

militarism, as a focus of analysis, or ‘approach’ to understanding the major problems of

Nigeria while prevalent in the literature, is not very helpful. A more promising avenue of

research is an institutional analysis because I suspect from my research, that institutions in

Nigeria (aside from the military to a certain degree) are critically weak. Also, years of

military dictatorship led to the systematic weakening of institutions. Joel Migdal (1988) states

that dictators tend to weaken institutions because they see them as potential or actual rivals.

Finally, a comprehensive analysis of the major institutions in Nigeria, focusing upon their

perennial weaknesses, is a far more promising route to understanding the Nigerian difficulties.

It is therefore crucial that more research should be undertaken on the suggested alternative

method of analysis to see if it increases our understanding of the current security challenges

in Nigeria. It would allow us to tell a more complete ‘story’ of why there is a significant

increase in the level of insecurity in Nigeria.

13

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