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©Ian Sommerville 2004 Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 10 Slide 1 Critical Systems Specification 3 Formal Specification
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©Ian Sommerville 2004Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 10 Slide 1 Critical Systems Specification 3 Formal Specification.

Dec 23, 2015

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Page 1: ©Ian Sommerville 2004Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 10 Slide 1 Critical Systems Specification 3 Formal Specification.

©Ian Sommerville 2004 Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 10 Slide 1

Critical Systems Specification 3Formal Specification

Page 2: ©Ian Sommerville 2004Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 10 Slide 1 Critical Systems Specification 3 Formal Specification.

©Ian Sommerville 2004 Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 10 Slide 2

Objectives

To explain why formal specification techniques help discover problems in system requirements

To illustrate model-based specification using a simple example

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©Ian Sommerville 2004 Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 10 Slide 3

Formal methods

Formal specification is part of a more general collection of techniques that are known as ‘formal methods’.

These are all based on mathematical representation and analysis of software.

Formal methods include• Formal specification;• Specification analysis and proof;• Transformational development;• Program verification.

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©Ian Sommerville 2004 Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 10 Slide 4

Acceptance of formal methods

Formal methods have not become mainstream software development techniques as was once predicted• Other software engineering techniques have been

successful at increasing system quality. Hence the need for formal methods has been reduced;

• Market changes have made time-to-market rather than software with a low error count the key factor. Formal methods do not reduce time to market;

• The scope of formal methods is limited. They are not well-suited to specifying and analysing user interfaces and user interaction;

• Formal methods are still hard to scale up to large systems.

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©Ian Sommerville 2004 Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 10 Slide 5

Use of formal methods

The principal benefits of formal methods are in reducing the number of faults in systems.

Consequently, their main area of applicability is in critical systems engineering. There have been several successful projects where formal methods have been used in this area.

In this area, the use of formal methods is most likely to be cost-effective because high system failure costs must be avoided.

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©Ian Sommerville 2004 Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 10 Slide 6

Specification in the software process

Specification and design are inextricably intermingled.

Architectural design is essential to structure a specification and the specification process.

Formal specifications are expressed in a mathematical notation with precisely defined vocabulary, syntax and semantics.

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©Ian Sommerville 2004 Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 10 Slide 7

Specification and design

Increasing contractor involvementDecreasing client involvementSpecificationDesign

UserrequirementsdefinitionSystemrequirementsspecificationArchitecturaldesignFormalspecificationHigh-leveldesign

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©Ian Sommerville 2004 Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 10 Slide 8

Specification in the software process

SystemrequirementsspecificationFormalspecificationHigh-leveldesignUserrequirementsdefinitionSystemmodellingArchitecturaldesign

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©Ian Sommerville 2004 Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 10 Slide 9

Use of formal specification

Formal specification involves investing more effort in the early phases of software development.

This reduces requirements errors as it forces a detailed analysis of the requirements.

Incompleteness and inconsistencies can be discovered and resolved.

Hence, savings as made as the amount of rework due to requirements problems is reduced.

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©Ian Sommerville 2004 Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 10 Slide 10

Cost profile

The use of formal specification means that the cost profile of a project changes• There are greater up front costs as more time

and effort are spent developing the specification;

• However, implementation and validation costs should be reduced as the specification process reduces errors and ambiguities in the requirements.

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©Ian Sommerville 2004 Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 10 Slide 11

Development costs with formal specification

SpecificationSpecificationDesign andimplementationDesign andimplementationValidationValidationCost

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©Ian Sommerville 2004 Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 10 Slide 12

Specification techniques

Algebraic specification• The system is specified in terms of its

operations and their relationships. Model-based specification

• The system is specified in terms of a state model that is constructed using mathematical constructs such as sets and sequences. Operations are defined by modifications to the system’s state.

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©Ian Sommerville 2004 Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 10 Slide 13

Behavioural specification

I focus on model-based specification here and illustrate it using an example. These slides illustrarte what a specification looks like - you do not need to understand it in detail.

Model-based specification exposes the system state and defines the operations in terms of changes to that state.

The Z notation is a mature technique for model-based specification. It combines formal and informal description and uses graphical highlighting when presenting specifications.

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©Ian Sommerville 2004 Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 10 Slide 14

The structure of a Z schema

contents ≤ capacityContainercontents: capacity: Schema nameSchema signatureSchema predicate

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©Ian Sommerville 2004 Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 10 Slide 15

Modelling the insulin pump

The Z schema for the insulin pump declares a number of state variables including:• Input variables such as switch? (the device

switch), InsulinReservoir? (the current quantity of insulin in the reservoir) and Reading? (the reading from the sensor);

• Output variables such as alarm! (a system alarm), display1!, display2! (the displays on the pump) and dose! (the dose of insulin to be delivered).

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©Ian Sommerville 2004 Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 10 Slide 16

Schema invariant

Each Z schema has an invariant part which defines conditions that are always true.

For the insulin pump schema it is always true that• The dose must be less than or equal to the capacity of

the insulin reservoir;• No single dose may be more than 4 units of insulin and

the total dose delivered in a time period must not exceed 25 units of insulin. This is a safety constraint;

• display2! shows the amount of insulin to be delivered.

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©Ian Sommerville 2004 Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 10 Slide 17

Insulin pump schema

INSULIN_PUMP_STATE

//Input device definition

switch?: (off, manual, auto)ManualDeliveryButton?: NReading?: NHardwareTest?: (OK, batterylow, pumpfail, sensorfail, deliveryfail)InsulinReservoir?: (present, notpresent)Needle?: (present, notpresent)clock?: TIME

//Output device definitionalarm! = (on, off)display1!, stringdisplay2!: stringclock!: TIMEdose!: N

// State variables used for dose computationstatus: (running, warning, error)r0, r1, r2: Ncapacity, insulin_available : Nmax_daily_dose, max_single_dose, minimum_dose: Nsafemin, safemax: NCompDose, cumulative_dose: N

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©Ian Sommerville 2004 Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 10 Slide 18

State invariants

r2 = Reading?

dose! ≤ insulin_av ailable

insulin_av ailable ≤ capacity

// The cum ulative d ose of insu lin de live red is s et to z ero o nce every 24 h ours

clock? = 000000 ⇒ cumulative_dos = e 0

// If th e cumulative dos e exceed s the limit the n operation is suspendedcumulative_dose ≥ max_daily_dose ∧ statu = s error ∧ display1! = “Daily dos e exceeded”

// Pump configuration parameterscapacity = 100 ∧ safemin = 6 ∧ safema x= 14max_daily_dose = 25 ∧ max_single_dose = 4 ∧ minimum_dos e= 1

display2! = nat_t _o strin g (dose!)clock! = clock?

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©Ian Sommerville 2004 Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 10 Slide 19

The dosage computation

The insulin pump computes the amount of insulin required by comparing the current reading with two previous readings.

If these suggest that blood glucose is rising then insulin is delivered.

Information about the total dose delivered is maintained to allow the safety check invariant to be applied.

Note that this invariant always applies - there is no need to repeat it in the dosage computation.

Page 20: ©Ian Sommerville 2004Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 10 Slide 1 Critical Systems Specification 3 Formal Specification.

©Ian Sommerville 2004 Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 10 Slide 20

RUN schema (1)

RUNΔINSULI _N PUMP_STATE

switch? = auto statu = s running ∨ s tatus = w arning

insulin_av ailable ≥ max_s ingle_dose

cumulative_do se < max_da ily_dose

// The dose of insulin is computed depending on the blood sugar level

(SUGAR_LOW ∨ SUGAR_OK ∨ SUGAR_HIGH)

// 1. If the compu ted insulin do se is ze ro, don’t delive r any ins ulin

Comp Dose = 0 ⇒ dose! = 0∨

// 2. The maximu m da ily dose would be excee ded if the comp uted dos e wa s de livered so the insulindose is se t to the diffe rence be twe en the max imum a llowed daily do se and the cum ula tive dosedelive red so fa r

Comp Dose + cumulative_do se > max_da ily_dose ⇒ a larm! = on ∧ s tatus ’ = warning ∧ dose! =max_da ily_dose – cumula tive_d ose∨

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©Ian Sommerville 2004 Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 10 Slide 21

RUN schema (2)

// 3. The normal situation. If maximum single dose is not exceeded then deliver the computed dose. Ifthe single dose computed is too high, restrict the dose delivered to the maximum single dose

CompDose + cumulative_dose < max_daily_dose ⇒ ( CompDos e ≤ max_single_dose ⇒ dose! = CompDose

∨CompDos > e max_single_dose ⇒ dose! = max_single_dos e )

insulin_available’ = insulin_available – dose!

cumulative_dose’ = cumulative_dos + e dose!

insulin_available ≤ max_single_dose * 4 ⇒ status’ = warning ∧ display1! = “Insul in low”

r1’ = r2r0’ = r1

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©Ian Sommerville 2004 Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 10 Slide 22

Sugar OK schema

SUGAR_OKr2 ≥ safemin ∧ r2 ≤ safemax

// sugar leve l stable o r falling

r2 ≤ r1 ⇒ CompDos = 0e

∨// sugar leve l increasin g but rate o f increas e falling

r2 > r1 ∧ (r2- 1r ) < (r1-r0) ⇒ CompDos = 0e

∨// sugar leve l increasin g an d rate o f increas e increasin g compute dose// aminim um dose mus t b e deliver ed if rounded to zero

r2 > r1 ∧ (r2- 1r ) ≥ (r1- 0r ) ∧ (roun (d (r2-r1)/4) = 0) ⇒CompDos = e minimu _m dose

∨r2 > r1 ∧ (r2-r1) ≥ (r1-r0) ∧ (round ((r2-r1)/4) > 0) ⇒

CompDos = e roun d ((r2-r1)/4)

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©Ian Sommerville 2004 Software Engineering, 7th edition. Chapter 10 Slide 23

Key points

Formal system specification complements informal specification techniques.

Formal specifications are precise and unambiguous. They remove areas of doubt in a specification.

Formal specification forces an analysis of the system requirements at an early stage. Correcting errors at this stage is cheaper than modifying a delivered system.

Formal specification techniques are most applicable in the development of critical systems and standards.